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# Organic and Sustainable: The Emergence, Formalization and Performance of a September 11th Disaster Relief Organization

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Organic and Sustainable:

The Emergence, Formalization and Performance of a September 11<sup>th</sup> Disaster Relief  
Organization

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### **Abstract**

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 spawned 252 new nonprofit organizations. We know little about these organizations, including how they emerged, formalized, met constituents' expectations for immediate performance and ultimately survived. This paper explores these issues through a case study of one successful organization, the Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund. Using concepts from disaster, organizational ecology and entrepreneurship research, the analysis identifies six propositions that link these literatures, notably the role of resource acquisition in formalization and the role of legitimacy in both fund development and organizational endurance. The study contributes new knowledge about the role of collaboration in acquiring capacity to enhance responsiveness. The study's findings suggest potential parallels to the evolution of new nonprofit organizations in other contexts.

*Organic and Sustainable:*

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*Organization*

Emergent groups, particularly those that formalized and became nonprofit organizations, played a major role in the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One indicator of this phenomenon is the receipt of nonprofit tax exempt status, provided to disaster response organizations through the expedited review process of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Their records indicate that 252 such organizations received expedited exempt status and generated nearly \$700 million dollars in revenue between 2001 and 2002 (Campbell, 2009).

Researchers have written extensively about the emergence of organizational forms and populations and the developmental challenges new organizations face. Stinchcombe's (1965) theory that new organizations face obstacles to survival early in their existence, which he characterizes as a "liability of newness" has been a particular source of scholarly debate. The liability of newness is important for understanding group emergence in response to disaster because founders and the community members who benefit from emergent groups expect them to be immediately operational and responsive to needs generated by the disaster; otherwise they are not relevant actors in disaster response.

Previous research addresses how public and nonprofit organizations respond to disaster, but that work has provided only limited discussion of the emergence of new groups that evolve into formal nonprofit organizations, particularly those that emerge in response to acts of terrorism, such as the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks (Drabek & McEntire, 2002). Important questions remain about these groups, including how they emerge, when they formalize and what conditions

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facilitate success. Understanding what makes it possible for organizations to succeed following such events would be useful for the founders of nonprofit organizations established in other contexts, given the well-established challenges they face in less turbulent environments. This paper addresses these issues through an explanatory case study of an emergent group created following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, the Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund. The study considers four questions:

1. How did the Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund emerge following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks?
2. Why did Windows of Hope evolve from emergent group to formal organization?
3. How did Windows of Hope organize its work to respond quickly to its constituents?
4. How did Windows of Hope overcome the liability of newness?

### **Group Emergence Following Disaster and the Liability of Newness**

Group emergence following disaster is well chronicled (Drabek, 1986; Drabek & McEntire, 2002, 2003; Horton Smith, 1997; Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985; Voorhees, 2008); however researchers have provided limited analysis of it as a phenomenon. Stallings and Quarantelli's (1985) seminal article about emergent groups define them as sets of individuals who come together after a disaster to accomplish a new, collective goal. Group members may or may not have worked together previously; however, they come together because they have made sense of the disaster in a similar way and perceive similar remedial actions as necessary (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2006). The newness of both the relationships among group members and the tasks establishes the group's emergent nature. Emergent groups are often informal and last a short time. They may engage in a wide range of activities, such as search and rescue, providing

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food to emergency responders and interorganizational coordination (Drabek, 1986; Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985; Quarantelli, 1996; Voorhees, 2008). Disaster researchers note that the evolution of emergent groups into formal organizations follows a sequential pattern. Founders define the domain within which their work takes place, establish a division of labor, determine how to acquire resources and pursue agreement on the actions needed to carry out their goals (Kreps & Bosworth, 2006). Formalization of the emergent group occurs when “other organizations recognize their work, legitimate the group’s function” (Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985, p. 95), and when organizational structure and boundaries become clearly defined. The September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 disaster generated many emergent groups that evolved into formal organizations (Campbell, 2009).

Stinchcombe (1965, p. 148) famously identifies that “a higher proportion of new organizations fail than old,” a challenge he characterizes as the “liability of newness.” He identifies four primary reasons why young organizations struggle with survival. First, new organizations place people in new roles. The people carrying out these roles must learn job tasks on their own, relying on general knowledge, without the benefit of training from previous incumbents. Second, starting a successful new organization requires its members to create complex operational procedures, which have “high costs in time, worry, conflict and temporary inefficiency” (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 148). Resolving these operational challenges disadvantages new organizations over established ones. Third, new organizations involve relationships among people who have not worked together previously, which makes it more likely that workers in the new organization will not trust each other as much as workers in existing organizations. Finally, new organizations do not have “stable ties to those who use organizational services” (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 149). Without those ties, customers or those in

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need of the services the new organization is providing, have no clear incentive to use the new organization instead of an established one.

Researchers have provided strong empirical support for the notion that new organizations are at significant risk for failure (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Hannan, 1998; Hannan & Freeman, 1989), particularly nonprofit organizations (Bielefeld, 1993; Chambré & Fatt, 2002; Hager, Galaskiewicz & Larson, 2004; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986). In recent years, researchers have focused on factors that exacerbate or mitigate the liability of newness. Several have found a “liability of scarcity,” arguing that organizational failure is negatively related to resource levels (Chambré & Fatt, 2002; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983; Hager, et al; 2004; Hannan, 1998); resources are particularly critical in the first year of operation (Hannan, 1998). Other researchers have paid considerable attention to the role legitimacy plays in organizational survival. Organizations succeed because other actors in the environment acknowledge them as legitimate. In particular, linkages to the broader environment, reflected by level of donated income and volunteer support, enhance survival chances (Hager, et al. 2004). External legitimacy plays a more important role in the initial success of organizations than aspects of an organization’s internal operations (Singh, et al., 1986).

Research on the liability of newness often involve analyses of organizations over a longer period of time than the one to two-year lifespan of many groups that emerge following a disaster (Campbell, 2009). Entrepreneurship research offers more applicable insights in its focus on nascent entrepreneurs and the early stages of new enterprises (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001; Reynolds & White, 1997; Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007). These researchers also emphasize legitimacy, particularly as a means by which new ventures acquire the resources to operate. The challenge facing nascent entrepreneurs is to convince others to engage in exchanges with their

enterprise. This challenge is similar to those facing new nonprofit organizations which seek philanthropic contributions as start-up capital. Researchers have identified characteristics of entrepreneurs that make nascent enterprises legitimate to investors, notably, that they are “trustworthy” and have “skills” (Low & Srivatsan, 1994); or that they are “competent, efficient, effective and worthy, appropriate and or needed” (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p. 416). Others argue that strategic legitimacy, active engagement in “convincing external audiences that the organization is operational” is critical to the success of new ventures (Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007, p. 312). Researchers appear to agree that establishing legitimacy is important; however they lack consensus regarding what constitutes legitimacy, as Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) assert “legitimacy ultimately exists in the eye of the beholder” (p. 416).

### **Research Methods**

This project follows the case study strategy outlined by Yin (2009). The study’s focus was the early life of the Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund. Its founders established the organization immediately following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, and it quickly evolved from an emergent group into a formal organization. Yin (2009, p. 47) notes that single-case studies are useful in representing “unique” phenomena, such as Windows of Hope’s unusual success as an emergent disaster response organization. In that way, an analysis of the organization can provide important insights into this study’s research questions.

Case study data came from two primary sources: interviews with the organization’s founders and review of archival material. Interviewees included the organization’s executive director, three trustees and two primary advisors. Materials reviewed included the organization’s first annual report, board meeting minutes, fund raising material,



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collaborative agreements and a five-year report prepared for donors and other interested parties. The author worked directly with the founders of the organization, as a senior staff member at the Community Service Society of New York (CSS) with which Windows of Hope closely collaborated. Documents from CSS defining its relationship with Windows of Hope, were also reviewed. Finally, the author participated in many discussions with Windows of Hope staff and trustees in the year following its creation. Notes collected as a participant observer were also used as data for the study.

### **Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund**

The Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund was founded by hospitality industry professionals to meet the needs of the 120 families of hospitality industry workers who died in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack on the World Trade Center. The group took its name from Windows on the World, the restaurant at the top of the World Trade Center. The restaurant was well-known and a popular attraction given its panoramic views of metropolitan New York. Since 2001, the organization has raised over \$22 million dollars. It has used its resources to provide financial assistance, health insurance and education support to its beneficiaries. The Fund expects to continue to provide education support until the youngest children of those who died complete college, in 2024. An executive director, three trustees, and several additional advisors have led the organization.

### **Case Description**

#### **Founder Motivations and Group Emergence**

The founders of Windows of Hope described several related concerns that motivated them to pursue collective action in response to the World Trade Center attack. They all knew

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people at Windows on the World who died in the attack; all of those relationships were based in experiences within the hospitality industry, as colleagues or employers. The founders expressed concern about particular challenges the victims' families would face. They knew that many of the survivors were immigrants, including a significant number of children. They worried that immigrant families lacked local social networks to deal with the stresses created by the loss of a wage-earning family member. In addition, founders feared that the families of low-skilled workers, immigrants in particular, would not be adept at navigating the assistance systems created to meet victim needs. Similarly, the founders were concerned that those systems would neglect hospitality industry workers at the expense of other, higher profile victim groups. This last concern reflects the founders' identity as hospitality industry professionals. Founders consistently described their motivation for action in familial terms. One characterized his involvement as an indication of "a proprietary feeling" in the hospitality industry, describing his effort as "an extension of the restaurant industry family" in which "we take care of our people by our rules." Another framed his interest similarly, as "an opportunity for us to give back to our family. It's the spirit of hospitality."

Three distinct experiences brought the founders together and led to the group's emergence. The first draws upon the experiences of those founders who were most closely connected to Windows on the World. The restaurant's owners co-owned a second restaurant, in midtown Manhattan. In the days immediately following the attack, family members of the 79 people who died at Windows on the World converged on the second restaurant, in search of final paychecks and any assistance the staff there could provide. Its co-owner—one of the founders of Windows of Hope—commented "we could see that cooks and waiters' families had come here looking for paychecks; they were living paycheck to paycheck. Most people needed cash; [they

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were] immigrants with kids and no English.” This experience re-enforced that group’s understanding of the challenges facing the families of those who had died and led them to consider ways of assisting them.

A different experience drew in another founder. She was a public-relations professional in the hospitality industry who had plans to coordinate an event at Windows on the World on the afternoon of the World Trade Center attack. In the days immediately following the disaster, she focused on volunteer activities defined by her experience in the hospitality industry. She cooked with other professionals to provide food to rescue workers and volunteers, and came together with other hospitality industry professionals who worked in her office. They shared ongoing concerns about the families of the hospitality industry workers who had died and sought to take action in response.

Another Windows of Hope founder experienced similar motivations but became involved in a different way. He recalled feeling an immediate concern for the workers at Windows on the World on September 11<sup>th</sup>. He worried about a friend who worked there and about “all the busboys and cooks [he] had referred there over time.” He also worried about the kinds of struggles their families would face, and their limited financial resources. His initial response was to commit to doing something with other hospitality industry professionals. He noted “I thought of a fund raiser; that’s what chefs do,” and he described calling colleagues with such urgency that his “ears were raw.” His initial vision was that “the industry” would “work to support” the families of those who had died. To carry out this vision, he planned a meeting at his restaurant on September 14<sup>th</sup>. The founders described this meeting as a call to bring together everyone in the hospitality industry who wanted to help families from their industry affected by the attack.

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The founders agreed that the September 14<sup>th</sup> meeting was a defining moment in the group's emergence. The founder who called the meeting used his network of industry professionals to bring together all those interested in taking action. The meeting included a wide variety of hospitality industry leaders, such as restaurant owners, chefs and food and beverage distributors. Those in attendance agreed to form a group, defined as hospitality industry professionals, to assist the families of those from their industry who were killed in the attack. The group further defined its effort in industry terms by using the hospitality industry as its primary mechanism for fund raising. The founders agreed to sponsor a fund raising event they named "Dine Out," that invited restaurant owners around the world to donate ten percent of the income they received on October 11, 2001, the one month anniversary of the attack. This strategy re-enforced the group's focus on hospitality industry victims and the obligation of workers in that industry to each other.

The founders indicated that the well developed network of industry professionals committed to this project made it possible for the fund raising event to succeed. Members of the group used their networks to encourage restaurant participation locally, nationally and internationally. This effort was seen as the payoff for years of industry networking. The founders and others involved in the group enlisted a wide range of colleagues. One founder described it as "kind of like an inside job. It's an old boys' network; I knew I could count on others. I had done years of traveling food shows." The October 11<sup>th</sup> fund raiser generated much more revenue than the founders expected. Within three weeks, the group had received more than six million dollars, and by March 31, 2002, the organization had received over seventeen million dollars, despite not having conducted any additional fund raising events.

## **From Emergent Group to Formal Organization**

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When the founders established themselves as a group, following the September 14<sup>th</sup> meeting, they viewed their effort as informal, a way to respond quickly to provide emergency assistance to the families of hospitality industry workers. One founder described the initial approach as “just a one-off donation,” that the founders would receive donations, distribute them and the effort would be complete. The group took advantage of the Internal Revenue Service’s rules expediting reviews of applications for tax exempt status for groups formed in response to the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack. They pursued this course of action not as an effort to formalize, but as a means to encourage donations. The group’s founders indicated “we didn’t intend to create an organization,” but they pursued the federal tax exemption because “we needed the capacity to receive donations.”

The founders’ identified three ways in which their perspective changed after the unexpected success of the Dine Out event , each of which reflected a reconsideration of the assumptions of informality that had guided the group to that point. First, the founders felt more accountable. They recognized that having raised considerable resources, they would receive greater scrutiny from donors, the public and the families who were the intended beneficiaries. Founders noted they “needed to become incredibly responsible” and “more custodial, that we would be under more scrutiny.” Second, they re-evaluated what was possible and adjusted their strategy based on their increased capacity to address family needs. One commented that the founders learned that families had “more issues than emergency dollars” and the group was now able to do more to address them. Finally, the founders acknowledged that while they had the network and skills to raise funds, they lacked the expertise to utilize those funds effectively. They worried that they lacked the knowledge to provide proper assistance to families, as one commented, “we didn’t know how to do it, we’re cooks.”

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The founders pursued collaboration with two established institutions as its primary approach to addressing these concerns. This strategy enabled the founders to create immediate capacity and to be responsive to the purposes for which they formed. To manage the large volume of donations they received, they collaborated with a local accounting firm, known to the founders because it had provided accounting services for one of the founder's businesses. The accounting firm was able to process donations quickly and provide financial reports to the founders.

To develop and implement a plan for assisting families, the founders sought counsel from the leader of a well known New York City philanthropy. That person suggested that the founders collaborate with an established nonprofit social service organization to compensate for their lack of experience. They were ambivalent about this course of action at first; they felt protective of their resources and worried that they would not find an organizational partner that shared their passion for their mission. Ultimately, however, they were convinced that their lack of expertise in social services necessitated collaboration. The founders also wanted to create an intermediary between themselves and individuals requesting assistance—some of whom they knew personally. They wanted a professional social service organization to assess requests for assistance and make recommendations to the Windows of Hope leadership, to reduce potential conflicts of interest.

The partner organization, the Community Service Society, provided Windows of Hope with access to infrastructure and expertise. CSS had case management staff available to meet with victims' family members and implement the founders' decisions to distribute emergency assistance. In addition, because CSS had provided financial assistance to needy families for many years, its case managers were able to adapt policies and procedures to ensure fund

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distributions were consistent with the purpose of Windows of Hope and the intent of donors, thereby strengthening accountability.

Finally, the acquisition of resources also led the founders of Windows of Hope to reconsider their overall strategy. Their original plan was to raise money and immediately distribute it to victims' families; however, the founders revised that plan after their resource situation changed. The founders reassessed family circumstances and determined that families had long-term needs. As a result, they decided not to distribute all the resources they had generated immediately. Instead, they chose a short-term course of action, while they developed long-term plans. The short-term course of action involved the provision of emergency financial assistance, with an emphasis on education and health care. To develop a long-term plan, the founders used the professional expertise of staff at the Community Service Society to assess family needs and make recommendations for action. Ultimately, the founders committed to pay victims' families health insurance for five years and education expenses for all victims' families until the youngest children of those who died completed their undergraduate education. They made this choice because other relief organizations did not guarantee education or health insurance (at least initially), and because they believed that education was the most effective way to respond to the challenges created by the death of a parent or spouse in the attack. The founders also believed that this approach honored the wishes many of the workers who died had for their families, particularly those who were immigrants to the United States. The founders communicated this plan to their donors who were generally supportive. The development of this approach to assistance indicates that instead of the emergence of an ephemeral group, distributing a modest amount of financial assistance, the acquisition of resources led the founders

to formalize and develop a longer-term vision for the new entity as an organization. Table one provides a timeline of key events in the emergence of Windows of Hope.

<Table 1 About Here>

### **Discussion**

This case allows us to synthesize concepts from disaster research and organizational ecology to deepen our understanding of organizations that emerge in response to disaster. The Windows of Hope story illustrates the process of group emergence and formalization, consistent with Stallings & Quarantelli's (1985) description of such processes. The case indicates that perceived legitimacy, defined in institutional theory and used in organizational ecology and entrepreneurship research, was a critical element in the success of Windows of Hope, enabling its leaders to acquire resources and accomplish key goals. Most important, the case indicates how the founders of Windows of Hope overcame liability of newness challenges to respond quickly to the needs of their constituents. The experience of the founders of the organization helps us to understand their success and identify lessons for those who establish such organizations in the future.

At first, Windows of Hope looks like many other groups that emerge following disasters: a group of individuals come together in new relationships to respond to the consequences of a disaster. What distinguishes the founders of Windows of Hope, however, is that while the post-disaster relationships in which they engaged were new, all those associated with it defined themselves as hospitality industry workers concerned for other hospitality industry workers. In fact, the founders of the organization were familiar with each other, at least by reputation, prior to the group's emergence. This characteristic was critical to the group's success.



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In addition, the organization's founders had well-established networks in the hospitality industry. The September 14<sup>th</sup> meeting which established the group's mission and strategy included approximately fifty industry leaders, extending the founders' network further. The group's focus on the families of hospitality workers killed at the World Trade Center and their definition of their work as an industry response created an immediate constituency for the group among hospitality industry workers internationally. In fact, the high profile of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack allowed the founders to leverage their networks to generate support for the group's efforts. The effective use of these networks reflects the importance of weak ties, a concept used in network theory to explain how individuals and groups acquire capital (Granovetter, 1983). The loose connections among group members made it possible for them to involve an unusually wide network of individuals in their effort. These circumstances are consistent with the legitimization activities Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) associate with the evolution of emergent groups into formal organizations.

Because Windows of Hope's leaders defined their primary goal as financial assistance to victim's families, the group pursued acquisition of financial resources. The group's fund raising success is consistent both with institutional theory and research on nascent entrepreneurs that funders will support individuals they perceive as legitimate. The founders' successful navigation of the Internal Revenue Service's expedited tax exemption review process and the speed with which they incorporated legitimated them further. The seventeen million dollars the founders raised in their first nine months is evidence that industry professionals perceived the founders as legitimate. Internal Revenue Service data indicate that only four organizations created in response to the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack generated more resources in that time. These

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findings suggest that institutional theory's claims about the conditions necessary for organizations to acquire resources apply in this case.

The relationship the case establishes between resource acquisition and the evolution from emergent group to formal organization is also significant. The founders of Windows of Hope expected to establish an informal group that provided immediate assistance to a discrete set of individuals in the aftermath of the attack. The acquisition of resources changed their perspective and led to the decision to formalize. The perceived legitimacy of the founders was a necessary condition for acquiring resources; however, it was the consequences of resource acquisition that led the group to move beyond the informal ideas that characterized its emergence. This emphasis on the role of resource acquisition adds to Stallings & Quarantelli's (1985) discussion of the importance legitimacy plays in the formalization process.

Securing resources eliminated that issue as a threat to the organization's immediate survival (the "liability of scarcity"). As such, the case is consistent with previous research about the importance of resources in general (Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan, 1998), donated resources in particular (Hager, et al 2004) and external legitimacy (Singh et al., 1986) in addressing the liability of newness. Windows of Hope emerged with little expectation of long-life; however, the founders' decision to formalize and its endurance are attributable to these factors. These findings matter because they indicate that disaster response organizations, regardless of the context within which they emerge, must meet the same conditions as other new organizations if they are to survive.

It is as important, however, to note what Windows of Hope's leaders did to become responsive quickly, after they acquired operating resources. The demand for immediate

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responsiveness distinguishes groups that emerge following disasters from groups that emerge at other times. One way to analyze what the founders of Windows of Hope did is to reconsider their actions in terms of the four liabilities that Stinchcombe (1965) argues affects the performance of new organizations. To be responsive following a disaster requires new organizations to overcome those liabilities quickly. Two of the liabilities were mitigated by conditions that existed at the creation of Windows of Hope. First, the founders' relative familiarity with each other minimized the challenge posed by having to work with relative strangers; in this case, the parties began with some trust and shared history. Second, Stinchcombe notes that founders lack ties to the users of the products or services the organization creates; however, the Windows of Hope founders had professional relationships with many of the families of hospitality industry workers who died on as a result of the September 11<sup>th</sup> disaster. Further, none of the families of those affected by the disaster had previous ties to existing relief organizations.

Environmental conditions did not mitigate the two other liabilities Windows of Hope faced. The first relates to the establishment of new roles needed to carry out the work of the organization; the second involves their implementation. To address these liabilities, the founders took direction action. The founders' strategy to acquire capacity through collaboration with established partners was critical to their success. Leveraging the infrastructure of existing organizations—and acquiring their knowledge and skills—lessened the burden of developing and implementing new roles and structures. The founders acknowledged gaps in their expertise and took steps to address them. Giving up control was difficult, but it enabled the organization to respond quickly. This finding suggests that collaboration or related strategies to acquire capacities can mitigate the liability of newness and contribute to the success of new

organizations. This notion appears particularly appropriate for organizations created in response to disaster for which immediate responsiveness is a condition of success.

Yin (2009, p. 15) notes, case studies are “generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes.” Table 2 summarizes propositions derived from the case and identifies their implications and connection to existing theory. These propositions provide a foundation for future research about the development of emergent groups established in response to disaster, and its findings may be studied across populations of emergent disaster response groups. For example, we would benefit from greater knowledge about whether resource acquisition consistently leads to formalization or longevity. We do not know whether other factors, such as a group’s purpose, affect its development, regardless of resources. Further, catastrophic disasters, such as the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack, generate significant philanthropic responses. It would be useful to learn more about donors’ decisions to contribute to emergent groups, to determine whether legitimacy is the determining factor in donation decisions. Finally, there may be value in research comparing organizations that emerge in response to disaster with nonprofit organizations established in other contexts, to learn whether there are meaningful differences in their development and whether the accelerated expectations for the former hold lessons for the latter.

<Table 2 About Here>

### **Conclusion**

This study deepens our understanding of the emergence, formalization and performance of new groups created following disaster. The Windows of Hope case synthesizes concepts taken from disaster, organizational ecology and entrepreneurship research and adds to our

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knowledge in its identification of the important role collaboration plays in acquiring capacity quickly. Windows of Hope emerged as other groups in response to disaster, engaging people in new relationships and tasks. The group sought resources and acquired them due to its perceived legitimacy. Resource acquisition encouraged formalization and contributed to the organization's endurance. The organization responded in a timely way to its constituents needs because its leaders pursued collaboration with existing organizations to acquire capacity. While emergent groups founded in response to disaster are the focus of this research, it may be useful to study whether there are parallels between the evolution of these groups and nonprofit organizations established in other contexts.

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Table 1: Key Events in the Emergence and Formalization of Windows of Hope

<b>Date</b>	<b>Activity</b>
9/11/01-9/13/01	Founders engage in volunteer and initial organizing activity  Family members of Windows on the World killed in the attack seek assistance at owners' second restaurant.
9/14/01	New group emerges at fund raising meeting.
10/11/01	"Dine Out" fund raising event generates over \$6 million dollars.
10/01-11/01	Collaboration with CSS and accounting firm initiated. Windows of Hope provides emergency assistance to victims' families.
10/01-3/02	Windows of Hope generates an additional \$11 million dollars.
1/02-4/02	XYZ organization assesses family needs and recommends action to founders.
4/02	Founders dedicate resources to long-term education and health insurance needs of victims' families.

Table 2: Summary of Case Study Findings and Implications for Theory

<b>Finding</b>	<b>Implications</b>	<b>Propositions</b>
Hospitality industry professionals came together in response to the September 11 <sup>th</sup> terrorist attack to form a new group in a new relationship with each other to accomplish new collective goals.	Consistent with literature on group emergence in response to disaster (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2006; Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985).  Industry affiliation provided basis for success.	Unrelated individuals come together in response to disaster to form new groups and carry out new tasks to accomplish new collective goals.
The new group pursued resources to accomplish its goals.	Consistent with literature on the formalization of emergent groups created in response to disaster (Kreps & Bosworth, 2006).	Emergent groups pursue resources to accomplish goals.
The perceived legitimacy of the leaders of Windows of Hope made it possible for the group to generate resources.	Consistent with institutional theory and research on nascent entrepreneurs generally.	Resource acquisition depends on the perceived legitimacy of the leaders of emergent groups.
The acquisition of significant resources encouraged the leaders of Windows of Hope to create a formal organization.	Elaborates Stallings & Quarantelli's (1985) discussion of the role resources play in formalization.	Resource acquisition encourages formalization.
The acquisition of resources made it possible for Windows of Hope to endure.	Consistent with empirical research on the liabilities of newness and scarcity.	Resource acquisition is positively related to organizational endurance.
The perceived legitimacy of Windows of Hope made it possible for the organization to endure.	Consistent with empirical research on legitimacy and the liability of newness, notably Singh, et al. (1985).	Legitimacy is positively related to organizational endurance.
Collaboration with established organizations enabled Windows of Hope to overcome impediments to effective performance.	Builds on liability of newness research, particularly as it applies to organizations created in response to disaster.	Collaboration with established organizations enables emergent organizations to overcome impediments to effective performance.