Epicurus, Sententia Vaticana XXIII

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NOTE TO THE READER. Due to a miscommunication, I received only about a week's notice of the deadline for this draft. Hence, it is rougher than I would like, with the arguments underdeveloped and the research incomplete. I perceive four gaps in particular. (1) I have not completed my search for and reading of recent treatments of this topic: among other things, the articles by Brescia and Gemelli are unseen by me. (2) I have not yet searched to my satisfaction for uses of δι' ἑαυτὴν (and the like) with substantives. (3) At a couple of key points in sections two and three, I have indicated rather than made the argument I plan to make. (4) I have not yet given the second alternative the sort of defense it deserves. I apologize for these shortcomings and plan to remedy the situation with an improved version in December.

1. The Orthodox Reading

The singular manuscript of Epicurus' *Sententiae Vaticaneae* (SV), codex Vaticanus Graecus 1950, includes the following curious claim as number twenty-three (SV 23):

πάσα φιλία δι’ ἑαυτὴν ἀρετή, ἀρχήν δέ εἶληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑφελείας.

The initial clause has long seemed especially harsh and puzzling. Is this a good Greek way of saying that "every friendship is by itself a virtue"? And what would Epicurus mean by calling friendship a virtue? The overwhelming majority of editors and commentators have found the manuscript sufficiently problematic to adopt Usener's emendation of αἱρετή for αρετή. This

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1 The emendation appears in the first publication of the *Sententiae Vaticaneae* (also called the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*), in C. Wotke and H. Usener, "Epikurische Spruchsammlung." The roster of those who adopt Usener's emendation is imposing, including leading editions (Arrighetti, Bailey, Bignone, Geer, Inwood and Gerson, and von der Mühll), specific examinations of Epicurean friendship (Festugière, MacFarlane, Mitsis, Müller, O'Connor, Preuss), and important broader discussions (Anna, Long's *Hellenistic Philosophy*, Sharples). It is worth noting, too, that several of these (although by no means all; see esp. MacFarlane and Sharples) express strong confidence in the emendation, including Bailey (p. 379), who takes it to be "a necessary correction," and Inwood and Gerson (p. 37n22), who "regard the emendation as virtually certain."

I have found only three adherents to the manuscript, none of whom makes the defense that I think is by now required. (1) A.A. Long's adherence manifests itself in Long and Sedley (text 22F1) and in "Pleasure and Social Utility—The Virtues of being Epicurean." Long interprets Epicurus to be saying that friendship is "an inherently pleasurable state of mind, and not just a means to that end" (Long and Sedley 1:138, cf. article, p. 305). But even if it were acceptable to think of friendship as both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable—I shall argue.
move has several points going for it: other manuscripts show confusion over this paleographically similar pair (at, e.g., Epicurus, *Ep.Men.* 129), δι’ έαυτήν fits better with αιρετή than with ἀρετή, and the emended clause gives Epicurus the perfectly intelligible claim that "every friendship is choiceworthy in itself."

I maintain, however, that this claim should not be attributed to Epicurus because it amounts to a singular contradiction of our other evidence concerning his view of friendship. After arguing against the orthodox reading, I offer two alternative approaches to *SV* 23. First, I give an interpretation of the manuscript reading which agrees happily with what we know of Epicurus' view of friendship, and then I speculate on the possibility that we should emend *SV* 23 but attribute it to some later Epicurean. Both of these alternatives have advantages and disadvantages, and while I favor the first, I am not firmly decided between them. I am, however, firmly convinced that both are superior to the orthodox view that attributes the emended text to Epicurus, and my primary aim here is to argue for this conviction.

2. Against the Orthodox Reading

On its face, the emended version of *SV* 23 says that every friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy. The problem is that according to other evidence, Epicurus implicitly denies this claim in favor of the view that every friendship is choiceworthy only for the sake of pleasure.² Indeed Epicurus must think that every friendship is choiceworthy only for the sake of pleasure, for he holds that every choice should be referred to pleasure, i.e., to the absence of mental disturbance (*ataraxia*) and of physical pain (*aponia*) (*EpMen* 128-129, *KD* 25). There are several ways of against this view—Epicurus would not make this point by calling friendship a virtue. To Epicurus, virtue is merely instrumentally valuable: see Epicurus, *Peri Telous* ap. Athenaeus xii 596f (U 70); DL X 138; *De Finibus* II 48, 69; Usener frs. 504-505, 509-515. Hence, Long is wrong to suggest that whether *arete* or *hairete* is read, "the problem of assigning a *per se* value to something other than pleasure is unaffected" (Long and Sedley 2:132, cf. article, p. 305): *arete* does not carry any *per se* value. (2) David Konstan also accepts the manuscript reading, but because he does so in the midst of briskly covering an enormous amount of ground on ancient views of friendship, he does not mount a full defense. And while I find some things to like in his brief remarks on Epicurus distinguishing between *philia* in the broad sense and *philia* in the narrow sense, I cannot accept his claim that Epicurean *philia* (in any sense) "comes to be valued for its own sake" (p. 110). (3) The best defense of the manuscript is presented by Jean Bollack. He (p. 451) notes that the philological evidence underdetermines the matter, and he perceives that anyone who emends "se trouve devant la double difficulté d'avoir à opposer l'affirmation du caractère désintéressé de l'amitié à la doctrine utilitariste, et à expliquer, dans le cas particulier, pourquoi le caractère utilitaire demeure limité à l'origine." But as he explains the contrast, it is not between interestedness and disinterestedness, but between the pursuit of friendship for some external benefit and the practice of friendship which itself is the benefit ("L'intérêt s'y satisfait pleinement, dans la seule pratique de l'amitié... aussitôt qu'elle (viz., l'amitié) existe, le bienfait est dans l'amitié, en dehors des bienfaits qui la motivaient"). This, too, extends Epicurus' account of virtue too far.

² See, e.g., DL X 120b; *De Finibus* II 78, 84 (utilitatis causa amicitia est quae sita); Plutarch *Adv Col* 1111b.
trying to coming to grips with this problem posed by the emended SV 23, some of which accept the *prima facie* reading and argue that we must nevertheless attribute the claim to Epicurus and others of which deny the *prima facie* reading. I argue that none of the reactions is satisfactory.

First, one might insist that there is other evidence in addition to the emended SV 23 that leaves us with no choice but to attribute to Epicurus a contradictory account of friendship. Phillip Mitsis, for example, has argued that the first Epicurean account of friendship that Torquatus discusses in *De Finibus* I attributes to Epicurus the view that friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy. This first account includes three crucial claims:

(A) "Some... deny that those pleasures which pertain to our friends should be sought *(expetendas) per se* as much as we seek our own." (*De Finibus* I 66)
(B) "For we enjoy the joy *(laetitia)* of our friends just as much *(aeque)* as our own and we suffer equally their sorrows *(pariter dolemus angoribus).*" (1 67)
(C) "Thus *(quocirca)*, the sage will be moved with respect to his friend just as he will in his own case *(eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum quo in se ipsum)* and whatever work he would take on for his own pleasure, he will take on for his friend's pleasure." (I 68)

I do not wish to quarrel with Mitsis' conclusion (pp. 102, 112n26) that all three of these claims accurately represent the views of Epicurus himself, but I reject his suggestion (pp.100-101, 102) that claim (C) supports the attribution of the emended SV 23 to Epicurus. On my view, claim (C) does not even entail that the sage will value his friend for herself (i.e., independent of his own pleasure), let alone that he will value friendship for itself. The second gap between claim (C) and the emended SV 23 marks the obvious difference between friends and friendships, but the first one is more complicated. Let us notice that if claim (A) and claim (C) are consistent, then there must be significant stress on *per se* in claim (A), and the *eodem modo* in claim (C) cannot be taken to cover being moved *per se*. On this understanding, claim (A) holds that there is difference in the finality

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3 When originally citing SV 23 (p. 100n6), Mitsis also cites *KD* 27, *De Finibus* I 65, and *De Finibus* II 83, but he rightly does not insist that these passages support the claim that friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy. Bailey (p. 379) is not so cautious and misleadingly suggests that SV 23 simply agrees with DL X 120 and *KD* 27.

4 Cicero gives us ample reason to attribute all three claims to Epicurus by presenting them as part of one position, by saying (II 82) that only this position contains words of Epicurus himself, and by kicking off (I 65) and wrapping up (I 68) this view with citations of Epicurus' actual words. To reach the same point via a different path: if the other two positions are not attributable to Epicurus, as Cicero suggests (II 82), and if it would be odd to think that no Epicureans in Cicero's time were defending Epicurus' own view, then it should be odd to think that this first account were not Epicurus' own. O'Connor does think that (B) and (C) should not be attributed to Epicurus (p. 184), but he is motivated in part by his conviction that the needed distinction by which to reconcile (A) and (C) is "left utterly obscure."

5 Mitsis skates over both gaps when he explains that "by showing disinterested concern for friends, one treats friendship as a noninstrumental end" (p. 102).
between the value of one's own pleasure and the value of one's friend's pleasure, while claim (C) maintains that there is no difference in intensity or "action-guidingness" of the value of one's own pleasure and the value of one's friend's pleasure.\(^6\) In support of this interpretation, it should be noticed that claim (C) is an inference (quocirca) from claim (B), which is solely about equal intensity of feeling. Hence, the natural reading is that claim (C) infers from equal (aeque) intensity of feeling equal "action-guidingness," and there is no need to read eodem modo so expansively as to contradict claim (A). So claim (C) says only that the sage is as disposed to act on behalf of his friend's pleasure as on behalf of his own. This does not entail that the sage seeks his friend's pleasure \textit{per se} as he does his own, let alone that the sage seeks friendship \textit{per se}. The emended version of \textit{SV} 23 stands alone in attributing to Epicurus this problematic claim.\(^7\)

For a second approach to emended \textit{SV} 23, one might insist that it reflects not a problematic contradiction, but a virtuous tension. Perhaps Epicurus has actually come around to the best possible view of friendship, for there just are bound to be conflicts between the intrinsic value of friendships and other important goals and projects. I myself am sympathetic to this view of friendship, but there are excellent reasons not to attribute it to Epicurus. First, there is no evidence that Epicurus admits of a tension in his account of friendship. Rather, there is copious evidence that he valued friendship for the sake of pleasure and just one emended sentence suggesting that he valued friendship for its own sake. Furthermore, Epicurus has good reason to avoid tension in his account of friendship, since the human good on Epicurus' view is the removal of disturbance (ataraxia) and tensions between friendship intrinsically valued and one's pleasure are bound to be disturbing.

A close cousin of this second approach can be had by admitting that the tension is problematic for Epicurus' theory but insisting that his view of friendship without such a tension is even worse. In this case, our sympathy for the view that friendship has intrinsic value and introduces tensions into our lives is so strong that we would rather attribute this view (with the emended \textit{SV} 23) to Epicurus than find him with a consistent but less plausible account of friendship. To this I insist that consistency is the first (though not only) virtue of the philosopher, but I also think it important to argue that a consistent Epicurean view of friendship is not nearly as implausible as it is often made out to be. First, much of the alleged implausibility melts away if we

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\(^6\) I owe the central distinction between intensity and finality of fellow-feeling to MacFarlane, but he should not be held responsible for the points about \textit{eodem modo} and "action-guidingness."

\(^7\) It is interesting, then, to note that Mitsis refers to the emended \textit{SV} 23 (by number or by the central phrase \textit{di' heauten hairete}) nine times in the first half of his investigation (pp. 98-114). Mitsis also has an interesting account of how and why Epicurus might have come to this contradiction in his account of friendship. This account, of course, is no reason in the absence of positive evidence to attribute the contradiction to Epicurus, but it does raise interesting questions for thinking about hedonic approaches to ethics.
allow that Epicurus may not be talking about our kind of personal, passionate friendship when he is discussing *philia*. *Philia* is invoked very broadly in antiquity, and we ought at least to allow Epicurus the room to be advocating some friendship other than the one we are most familiar with (before we ask whether the good life requires just Epicurean friendship or personal, passionate friendship). 8 Second, if Epicurus limits *philia* to sages—as I shall argue below—then the Epicurean friend is unconcerned about death and is especially able to call to mind the pleasures of a friendship in order to overcome any pains that it will bring. Such a limitation, then, will dull the edge of many objections to the Epicurean account.

After considering three attempts to accept the tension that the emended SV 23 provides for Epicurus' account, we can consider two ways of denying that the emended SV 23 provides any tension whatsoever. In this vein, some argue that *di' heauten hairete* does not imply that friendship is choiceworthy apart from pleasure. 9 Rather, it implies only an attachment to friendship for its intrinsically pleasurable qualities (as opposed to an attachment to friendship for its extrinsically pleasurable qualities). On this view friendship produces pleasure "directly and without intermediaries" (Rist, *Epicurus*, p. 132); it "brings pleasure in itself" (Sharpies, p. 119). 10 Another approach has been suggested by David O'Connor (pp. 185-186). According to this suggestion, the second clause of the emended SV does not contrast with the first but simply explains the origins of friendship's being *hairete*, and the *di' heauten* just emphasizes that friendship is choiceworthy so far as it is concerned, considered apart from circumstances that may render it un-choiceworthy. 11

These two readings share two difficulties. First, they do not offer a natural construal of what is a perfectly natural sentence. The emended SV 23 naturally presents a contrast (de) between friendship *di' heauten hairete* and the origins of friendship chosen *apo tes opheleias*, and this contrast naturally suggests that friendship *di' heauten hairete* is chosen regardless of the *opheleia* it brings. My emphasis on the natural reading has some support elsewhere. First, there is some reason to think that Epicurus would restrict his use of *di' heauten hairete* to pleasure chosen non-instrumentally, since his only extant use of *hairete* shows this restriction (*EpMen* 129: *ou pasa [hedone] hairete*) and Torquatus says that Epicureans characterize pleasure as what is itself and per

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8 O'Connor develops this point very well.

9 I have found this view most clearly expressed in Rist (*Epicurus*), MacFarlane, and Sharples.

10 Ironically, Long advances this interpretation of friendship's value as a defense of the manuscript (see note 1). Long, Sharples (p. 144n5), and Dihle (in the discussion of Long's "Virtues of Being Epicurean," p. 317) agree that there is no substantive difference between the manuscript reading and the emended version. Disagreeing, I insist that calling *philia arete* means that it is not chosen *di' heauten* (see DL X 138), contrary to the emended version.

11 O'Connor directs our attention to the claim that not every pleasure is *hairete* (*EpMen* 129), since some pleasures lead to a greater amount of pain (*KD* 8).
se to be sought (I 31: *voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam*).\(^{12}\) And all by itself, *di' heauten* in emended SV 23 suggests that one need not look outside of friendship at all for its choiceworthiness. Friendship must itself possess what makes it choiceworthy; what advantage friendship brings is beside the point. If friendship is merely pleasurable and not a pleasure—and friendship cannot be a pleasure on Epicurus' view of pleasure—then friendship cannot be *di' heauten hairete*.

Further insistence on escaping this conclusion by an unnatural reading meets with a second, more important objection. If friendship contains in itself what directly produces pleasure, then it will be just like virtue on Epicurus' account. This would be sensible insofar as Epicureans are quick to give the same account for the value of virtue and for that of pleasure (*De Finibus* I 66, 68). But the doxographers also attribute to Epicurus the explicit denial that virtues are *hairesthai di' hautas*.\(^{13}\) The conjunction of these two commitments contradicts the emended SV 23.

In a quite general way this contradiction brings us back around to the initial tension that the emended SV 23 presents. For the emended version of SV 23 drives a wedge between the account of virtue and friendship because friendship is said to be *di' heauten hairete* while virtues are always more remotely productive of pleasure, not *hairesthai di' hautas*. This is just an instance of the general problem. There is copious evidence for Epicurean ethics that even the most supremely valuable things other than pleasure are valuable only at a distance in their service of pleasure, and that evidence stands against the suggestion of the emended version of SV 23 on any reading.

Charity demands that we look for alternative construals of SV 23.

### 3. First Alternative

First, there is a natural way of unproblematically interpreting Epicurus' claim that every friendship is by itself a virtue: Epicurus is saying that friendship is an inherently virtuous state of soul.\(^{14}\) Since virtues are valuable only instrumentally, Epicurus is not saying that friendship is

\(^{12}\) It is hard to trust the vocabulary of the doxographers for words like *hairete* too much, but they, too, tend to support the restriction of *hairete* to pleasure. See, e.g., Sextus *PH* III 194 or *MX* I 94. And lest it be thought *a priori* implausible that Epicurus would have restricted this term in this way, consider the way Diogenes Laertius' account of the Cyrenaics overwhelmingly associates *hairete* with *hedone* (II 88-92).

\(^{13}\) This phrase is used at DL X 138, but the attribution is supported by the way the evidence for the merely instrumental value of virtue stresses a distance between virtue and pleasure (despite the fact that Epicurus believes that virtue necessarily leads to pleasure: *EpMen* 132, *KD* 5, DL X 138, *Fin* 1.57, *etc.*). See Epicurus, *Peri Telous* ap. Athenaeus xii 596f (U 70); DL X 138; *De Finibus* II 48, 69; Usener frs. 504-505, 509-515. Note that this objection to the emended SV 23 holds for any interpretation: it must drive a problematic wedge between the accounts of friendship and virtue.

\(^{14}\) Note that we do not have to interpret the manuscript in such a way that every friendship is an "intrinsic virtue," *pace* Mitsis (p. 101n6) and Preuss (p. 207n32).
valuable per se. Rather, he is making two points: friendship is really about one's own soul and friendship is possible only for the virtuous.

The second of these points is easy enough to attribute to Epicurus. Aristotle and the Stoics limited genuine friendship to the virtuous,\(^\text{15}\) and there is independent evidence that Epicurus did the same. It is wisdom (sophia, sapientia) which devises friendships (KD 27=Fin I 65) and the noble person (gennaios) who is concerned with wisdom and friendship (SV 78). Further, friendship is said to be "sustained by a commonality among those who are filled up with pleasures" (DL X 120b), and Epicurean references to friends frequently identify them as sages.\(^\text{16}\)

But can we attribute the claim that friendship is about one's own soul and not just about a relationship to another to Epicurus? There is no reason not to. After all, character states and virtues require all sorts of things, and some of them, like justice, even require certain attitudes and behavior in relation to others. So why should friendship not be a disposition of the soul toward certain beliefs and actions in relation to certain others? Here it is worth noting that the Stoics were at least tempted to say that two sages are friends (though not totally (pantos) friends) even if they have never met and that Aristotle comfortably classes philia as a kind of virtue (tis arete) or something "with virtue" (met' aretes) (EN VIII.1 1155a3).\(^\text{17}\) As the Stoics and Aristotle suggest, it would be implausible to suggest that friendship is merely a state of soul, but the manuscript for SV 23 does not suggest that. It suggests only that friendship is a virtuous state of soul.

Not only is it possible for Epicurus to say this; he has good reason to do so. One difficulty his account of friendship faces is posed by the vulnerability attachment to friends causes. But if friendship is largely about one's state of soul and if friendship requires wisdom, then the vulnerability imposed by attachment to friends will be much less threatening. That is why Epicurus would have good reason to say that friendship is a virtue. The statement is a bit obscure, but Epicurus avows that obscurity will not stop him from speaking the beneficial truth (SV 29): "I would rather use frankness (parrhesia) in my study of nature and proclaim things that are

\(^{15}\) For Aristotle, see, e.g., EN 1156b7-8 on "perfect (teleia) friendship," and for the Stoics, see, e.g., DL VII 124.

\(^{16}\) DL X 118, 121b; De Finibus I 68, 70. Also, Cicero's retort to the Epicureans that "there is enough protection in ordinary friendships (mediocribus amicitia)" (II 84) makes sense only if they were interested in extraordinary friendship. It might be objected that a restriction of friendship to sages will make unintelligible the reports that Epicurus had huge numbers of friends (DL X 9, De Finibus I 65), but it is entirely possible that these reports are trading on a different sense of "friends" as adherents to Epicurus' school.

\(^{17}\) For the Stoic position, see Arios Didymus ap. Stobaeus II 101, 21 Wachsmuth: "All the excellent benefit each other—even when they are not totally (pantos) friends with each other... on account either of being unknown or of not living in the same place—they are still disposed toward each other in a kindly, friendly (philikos), approving, and receptive fashion." Consider also Seneca, EpMor ix 8, in the context of comparing Stoic and Epicurean friendship: "The sage, even though he is content, nevertheless wishes to have a friend, if for no other reason than in order to exercise friendship, lest such (a?) great virtue go to waste (ne tam magna virtus iaceat)."
advantageous for all people—even if no one would understand—than assent to opinions and reap the heavy praise that falls from the many."

Finally, there is some independent evidence that Epicurus identified *philia* as an *arete*. So far I have mentioned that Epicureans were quick to analyze the value of friendship and virtue in the same way. But the evidence says more than this. According to Diogenes Laertius, "Epicurus says that virtue alone (*ten areten monen*) is inseparable from pleasure" (X 138), and Cicero records the attributes to Epicurus the view that friendship cannot be separated from pleasure (*Fin I 66*). From the conjunction of these two claims, it follows that friendship is (at least a part of) virtue.18

I have been arguing that it makes good philosophical sense to attribute to Epicurus the view that *philia* is an *arete*, but the manuscript reading of *SV* 23 actually attributes to Epicurus the claim that *philia* is *di* heauten *arete*. To this there can be philological objections.19 With the substantive *arete* and no verb, *kath' heauten*, it must be admitted, would have been much more natural.20 We are left weighing philological disadvantages and philosophical advantages. At this point, it is difficult to advance arguments, for the reader’s temperament is centrally at issue. To this reader, Epicurus’ Greek frequently seems a bit unnatural, and so emending on purely stylistic grounds seems imprudent. And even were that not the case, so long as I am faced with a choice between an unnaturally constructed sentence that makes a good philosophical point and an emended, natural sentence that creates a deep and problematic philosophical inconsistency, I will prefer to believe that Epicurus wrote the former.

4. Second Alternative

But what if Epicurus did not write *SV* 23 at all? A second alternative to the orthodox interpretation is to accept the emendation by the force of the philological objections but to insist that

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18 It is of course possible that Diogenes Laertius has gotten carried away with his addition of ‘alone’ (*monen*): other accounts of the inseparability of virtue from pleasure do not insist that it alone is inseparable (*EpMen* 132, *KD* 5, *Fin I 57*). But even if we choose to read *monen* away, we ought to recognize that Epicurus has good reasons not only to treat virtue and friendship in very similar ways but also to say that friendship is a virtue.

19 But note that an interpretation favoring an unnatural Greek sentence is very different from an interpretation which offers an unnatural reading of a perfectly natural Greek sentence, like the ones discussed for the emended *SV* 23.

20 Dihle’s response to Long’s "Virtues of Being Epicurean" (p. 317) puts the philological objection well: "Aber δι’ ἔστην ist ein Ausdruck mit finaler Bedeutung, den man ungern einfach mit einem Substantiv verbindet. Ἐστην läge näher." This leads Long to suggest (p. 319) that perhaps we should suppose "the loss of a word such as νενομίσθαι," a suggestion that is surely more editorially intrusive than the paleographically plausible emendation.
Epicurus is not the author. While this view of our sentence smells faintly of desperation, we should remind ourselves of how real this possibility is.

First, several of the sentences in the Vatican collection are elsewhere attributed to some author other than Epicurus. While the writings of Epicurus and Metrodorus likely did share some sentences, we still are given cause to wonder about the compilation of this text.

Second, we know that certain Epicureans other than Epicurus (see Fin II 82) came to hold the view that "friends love their friends for their own sakes" (amici propter se ipsos amentur, Fin I 69). Assuming that propter se ipsos amentur cannot be deflated just as di' heauten hairete cannot be deflated, these Epicureans will be seen as innovators who are admitting sources of value independent of constant reference to one's own pleasure. In this case, it is not difficult to imagine that these Epicureans also hold that friendship is di' heauten hairete.

And so if we are convinced that the manuscript of SV 23 is unacceptable Greek and that the emended version is unacceptably at odds with Epicurus' other commitments, we might be forgiven in speculating that some other Epicureans believed that friendship is intrinsically choiceworthy and had that belief memorialized in a manuscript now in the Vatican collection.

Sources Cited

A. Editions


21 Of course, it is also possible to employ both alternatives simultaneously, i.e., to reject the emendation and to insist that someone other than Epicurus wrote the sentence. But the strongest reason to take one of these alternatives—to save Epicurus from a problematic contradiction—does not provide warrant for both simultaneously.

22 SV 10, 30, 31, 47, and 51 are identical to fragments of Metrodorus in Koerte's collection. Other Sententiae Vaticanae of possibly uncertain authorship include 36.

23 Sharples endorses the deflation of Fin I 69 as well as the deflation of the emended SV 23 (p. 119).


B. Secondary


