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SAGP SSIPS Abstracts 2013

Anthony Preus

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with

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and Science (SSIPS)**

Abstracts

Vishwa Adluri,

vadluri@hunter.cuny.edu

“Gita, Greek philosophy, and Arendt”

This paper examines the interface between Greek and Indian notions of action. My starting point however will be Arendt’s notion of thinking as the paradigmatic activity. Through showing how the life of thought is not opposed to the life of action in Arendt I will introduce an important nuance into the Bhagavadgītā’s notion of action (karma). As in Arendt, the Indian text makes a distinction between mere work or labor and action in the true sense. A recovery of this notion of action is essential not only for understanding the Bhagavadgītā, but also for addressing our contemporary political context. I will also discuss allied issues such as the distinction between private and public spheres and the concept of immortality versus eternity in both the Gītā and Arendt.

Han Thomas Adriaenssen, University of Groningen

h.t.adriaenssen@rug.nl

“Peter Olivi and Peter Aureol on Conceptual Thought False Friends?”

As human beings, we can cognitively engage both with particular objects such as John and with general concepts such as ‘man in general’. But crucial as this latter capacity may be, it is also highly elusive. For when I cognize John, it is clear what the object of my cognition is: John. But what is the object of my conceptual thought of man in general? One option that was often discussed by scholastic authors was that conceptual thoughts were directed at inner representational devices. This is what I call a ‘representationalist’ account of conceptual thought.

In this paper, I ask how the Franciscan thinkers Peter Olivi (1248-1289) and Peter Aureol (1280-1322) relate to such an account. Olivi and Aureol were among the most daring and original Franciscans of their times. Importantly, they are often mentioned in one breath as foes of representationalist accounts of cognition (for instance Prezioso 81-4; Kraml, 1548; Marenbon, 295). And indeed, both are highly critical of representationalist theories of perceptual cognition. In this paper, however, I argue that the two thinkers diverge when it comes to analysing conceptual thought. To this extent, then, they are false friends. While Aureol firmly sticks to his anti-representationalism, Olivi makes significant concessions to the representationalist by assigning a crucial role in his analysis of conceptual thought to image-like representations.

First, Olivi thinks that when my intellect conceives of man in general, my imagination must at the same time present an individual man to me. It does so by presenting me with a so-called ‘memory-species’. A memory-species for Olivi is an image-like representation that is the object of cognition when we remember or imagine something (Toivanen, 293-326). By assigning a crucial role to such species in conceptual thought, Olivi makes a concession to representationalism. This puts him at

odds with Aureol. While Aureol agrees that intellect and imagination must work together in conceptual thought, he resists representationalist accounts of the imagination: ‘the father who is imagined by me is the man himself in intentional being, not, indeed, a species’ (Aureol, 697-8). Imagining my father, my cognitive powers immediately reach out to the man himself, not to an inner representation.

Second, Olivi thinks that in mnemonic conceptual thought, our intellectual acts are primarily directed at memory-species. Commentators who propose anti-representationalist readings of Olivi on conceptual thought (Perler 138; Pasnau, 273) have underestimated the extent to which this is a concession to representationalism. Indeed, for Olivi to say that an intellectual act is primarily directed at a memory-species is to say that an intellectual act is primarily directed at some kind of inner image. This once more puts Olivi at odds with Aureol, who extensively argues that such an account interposes a veil between the human mind and external reality. To conclude, then, Olivi and Aureol are not simply the like-minded foes of representationalism they are sometimes made out to be. When it comes to their analyses of conceptual thought, they are false friends.

Aureol, *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum* (ed. Buytaert), Louvain, 1956

Kraml, ‘Why did Ockham reject Species?’ In Pacheco, *Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy*, Turnhout 2006

Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy*, London 2007

Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the later Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1997

Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, Frankfurt 2004

Prezioso, *La species medievale e i prodromi del fenomenismo moderno*, Milano 1963

Toivanen, *Perception and the Internal Senses*, Leiden 2013

Doug Al-Maini, St. Francis Xavier University

dalmaini@stfx.ca

“Two Types of Love in the *Phaedrus*”

Plato's *Phaedrus* presents a debate between a lover and a non-lover for the favours of a youth. However, the terms of that debate are left ambiguous by the participants: what 'love' actually consists in, what the youth receives in return for the granting of favours, and indeed whether anyone competing in this debate can be coherently described as a 'non-lover' are questions that receive different answers depending on who is speaking. All of this would seem to lead to a very confused youth who is expected ultimately to choose which speaker to embrace. Using the concepts of philos

and eros as they are outlined in the debate I shall try to disentangle the various positions taken regarding these questions and provide some assistance to the beloved in making his choice.

Audrey Anton, Western Kentucky University

audrey.anton@wku.edu

“Ignorance and Moral Vice According to Aristotle Or Why stupid jerks are the worst”

Having taught Aristotle’s four main human character types for several years now, I now anticipate that students will strongly object to Aristotle’s ranking of the worst types of character. According to Aristotle, it is worse to be vicious than it is to be incontinent, even though both character types are to be avoided. What’s more is that the vicious person, according to Aristotle, is ignorant of the good. These two facts generate the common objection that Aristotle must have been mistaken in this assessment, for we all know that it is worse to knowingly do wrong than to do wrong in ignorance.

In this paper, I aim to defend both Aristotle’s characterization of the incontinent and vicious persons as well as his ranking of these characters. In order to first motivate a reason for a defense, I must carefully construct a phenomenological account of what acting immorally seems like from the point of view of the vicious person. I do this with the help of Aristotle—arguing that the vicious person views bad ends as good ones, receives pleasures that are “alien” pleasures (achieved in ways that are not proper to such feelings), and does not recognize her behavior as morally wrong. Then, I shall provide an analysis of Aristotle’s criteria for voluntary behavior that is subject to praise or blame. This analysis will show how Aristotle held that there were at least two different ways a person could be ignorant, and only one way constitutes an excuse for bad behavior (EN III.2). The second type of ignorance is, in fact, the kind of ignorance attributed to the vicious person.

Still, like my students, I am skeptical that making such a distinction is sufficient for solving the problem. We must consider why such ignorance is inexcusable. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not provide a clear explanation beyond this distinction. Finally, I argue that such ignorance is inexcusable because, given what Aristotle seems to hold about communities and character acquisition, it is likely that such ignorance was willfully acquired. That is to say, while the vicious person may be mean and stupid without even knowing it, her ignorance is more a result of self-deception than simply being mistaken.

Carolina Araujo, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

correio.carolina.araujo@gmail.com

“Adeimantus' challenge”

A large amount of contemporary literature on Plato's *Republic* deals with Glaucon's speech as the major challenge Socrates is to face in his defense of justice, seeing in Adeimantus' speech nothing but a restating of the question. However, Plato is very clear in stating both that Glaucon's argument was not enough and that he did not make the most relevant point to the matter (362d3-5). The aim of this paper is to present Adeimantus' contribution to the problem in two general theses: first the objection to piety as a virtue, submitting it to justice; second the argument about the power of collective concealment as a device for breaking the cause/effect pattern that sustains the logic of retribution. The conclusion is that, while Glaucon presents an account that would grant justice to members of a community that obey its laws, Adeimantus considers this only an appearance of justice that would still produce collective unjust actions. By means of Glaucon's challenge, Socrates is expected to prove that justice has a power in the soul besides its communitarian function, but because of Adeimantus' challenge, he is to demonstrate that it has a power in the soul despite the injustice that constitutes a community.

Key-words: Plato, *Republic*, Adeimantus, justice

Kelly Arenson, Duquesne University

arenson.k@gmail.com

“Plato on Why Injustice Can't Kill You”

In Book X of the *Republic*, Plato presents an argument for the immortality of the soul that turns on the claim that each thing has a particular evil. Injustice, as the worst and/or only psychic evil, cannot destroy the soul; hence, the soul is immortal. Most scholars find this argument to be laughably illogical, but Eric Brown has convincingly shown that the argument makes sense if its steps are interpreted in certain ways and if it is considered in light of Plato's overall project in the *Republic* “to establish that internal, corrupting evils are far the most destructive dangers, so powerful that no amount of external rewards can make up for having an unjust soul.” (Eric Brown, “A Defense of Plato's Argument for the Immortality of the Soul at *Republic* X 608c-611a,” *Apeiron* 30 (1997): 220). Assuming Brown's interpretation of the particulars of the argument is correct, I consider the consequences of treating the Book X argument in light of the overall project of the *Republic* as Brown understands it. Although I agree with Brown that the argument for immortality is itself internally consistent, I contend that it is incongruous with the rest of the *Republic*. For starters, the Book X argument would seem to lessen the blow of the *Republic*'s message about the dangers of internal evils since the argument shows that internal evils are incapable of bringing about the soul's ultimate destruction. Indeed, the message of the Book X argument is that even the soul's particular evil, injustice, cannot kill the soul in any reasonable senses of ‘kill’ or ‘die’ (which might include dispersal, as discussed in the *Phaedo*; decomposition, as happens to the body; or some sort of

substantial change, such that the soul would become a different thing altogether). In addition, the fact that injustice, as the soul's main corruptor, cannot destroy the soul weakens the parallel between the city and the soul in the *Republic*. Cities, after all, can be obliterated by injustice: its parts can be dispersed and scattered as a result of internal corruption. The city, in other words, can become sicker and sicker until it dies; the soul, however, can only keep getting sicker, the reason for which, I argue, could be that immortality serves a didactic and often punitive purpose: psychic injustice can be punished in the afterlife only if there is no way the soul can die.

Anne Ashbaugh, Towson University

aashbaugh@towson.edu

“Impersonation: An Approach to the Performative Aspects of Plato's Philosophy”

Impersonation: An approach to the Performative Aspects of Plato's Philosophy

We find most famous among Platonic impersonations Socrates' enactment of how the Laws would address him were he to attempt an escape from prison (*Crito*, 49e-54d). Also noted are Socrates' impersonations of Protagoras and Heraclitus within the discussion of perception in *Theaetetus*, 151d-186e. What remains puzzling is why should impersonation in any way serve to advance the course of philosophy. The question, I believe, goes to the heart of Platonic philosophy because in an important sense, Platonic dialogues enact the practice of philosophy. In fact, if we accept the midwife analogy in *Theaetetus*, 149a-151d, every Socratic interaction is a doxastic delivery and every questioning a labor. This essay will address the puzzle of impersonation by first defining what impersonation entails and its performative powers, then, showing the importance of this rhetorical device for the practice of philosophy. Central to that task is the following question: Do the ornaments of rhetoric veil truth by concealing the weaknesses of arguments or do these ornaments facilitate inquiry?

Emily Austin, Wake Forest University

austinea@wfu.edu

“The Politics of Fearing Death in Plato's *Republic*”

This paper defends a new interpretation of Socrates' arguments for communalizing the family in Book V of the *Republic* (452c-465d). Scholars have addressed whether the proposal itself is an elaborate joke [Bloom (1968)], whether it counts as meaningfully feminist [Annas (1976), Okin (1977)] and whether it would be practicable [Ar. Pol. II 3-5]. I focus instead on the role the communal family plays in the regulation of the negative emotions (e.g., grief and fear) that arise

from natural human desires for procreation. Textual evidence external to the *Republic* suggests that Plato thinks we have a natural and divine desire to pursue immortality by creating children, art, and political organizations that are of necessity unstable and subject to fortune (Symp., 206cff; Lg 4: 721b-d). This instability gives rise to negative emotions that are painful and that serve as impediments to virtue: fear of death impedes courage, too much grief is intemperate, etc. For this reason, Socrates claims that the 'greatest good' for the city is when joy and grief are shared and dispersed (462a-e). For Socrates, collectivizing children stabilizes negative emotions by ensuring the general satisfaction of the desire for procreative 'immortality'. It ensures that individuals die without fear that they have failed to produce something that persists after they die. I argue that insofar as political structure plays an essential role in regulating anxiety arising from natural desires for procreation, commentators should be more cautious about treating the collective family as a joke or inessential to the larger ethical picture of the *Republic* [Annas 1999].

Andreas Avgousti, Columbia University/University of Pennsylvania
aa2773@columbia.edu

“Rehabilitating Philosophy’s Reputation: a Reading of Plato’s *Republic*”

This paper provides a framework for understanding the role of reputation (doxa) in Plato’s *Republic*. The dialogue is peppered with claims that most people believe that philosophy is at best useless and at worst dangerous. It follows that if the dialogue argues for philosophic rule, then rehabilitating philosophy’s reputation must be its aim. Plato’s Socrates targets the false beliefs most have about philosophy via three images. The Cave simile, the Ship analogy, and the personification of philosophy as a bride, collectively show that philosophy’s reputation is contingent to it. Given that the philosophers are just men, in order to fully rehabilitate philosophy’s reputation Socrates must successfully respond to Glaucon’s challenge in book II. Glaucon insists that the just man must have a reputation for injustice and reports that most people believe that a reputation for justice is desirable only for its benefits such as political office. Socrates’ answer is at once a solution to the problem of political deception: he who appears just is just, and if he is not, then the result will be the corrupt political constitutions illustrated in book VIII. Therefore, only the just philosopher can wield political power effectively. Rehabilitating philosophy’s reputation suggests an escape from a paradox that sits uncomfortably in the core of the dialogue, to wit, that those who are wise, just, and ought to rule, do not seek either a reputation for their traits, nor political office.

Allan Bäck, Kutztown University
back@kutztown.edu

“Avicenna on the Sea Battle”

In Al-'Ibārā (Aš-Šifā I.3), a “commentary” on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) discusses the problem of future contingents and the famous example of the sea battle. Here I present what he says. Avicenna insists upon there being logically contingent events. I end by showing how this view is consistent with his necessitarian metaphysics.

Jesse Bailey, Sacred Heart University

baileyj34@sacredheart.edu

“Mystery Cults and Pythagoreanism in the background of the *Phaedo*”

Religion in Greece undergoes radical transformations in the 6th and 5th centuries. The *Phaedo* can, in large part, be understood as a transformation or development of religious concepts; specifically, the dialogue develops the concept of the psyche, and of the afterlife that the psyche can expect, from out of the context of these religious traditions which were integral to the polis. Thus, it is clear, in line with Socrates’ conviction on the charge of impiety, that philosophy begins with a tense relationship to the polis, and to religion. This paper explores one dimension of this tense relationship as it figures in the historical context of the *Phaedo*.

In Plato’s time, Mystery cults gained prominence which, while staying within the broader outlines of the traditional accounts of the gods as presented in Homer and Hesiod, nevertheless begin to question the place of the individual both within the polis and within the kosmos. While many of these cults had been in existence for over a thousand years, these cults gained in size and import within Athens in the 6th century (particularly, the Eleusinian Mysteries under Peisistratus, who ruled Athens from 546 to 527). These movements are connected to a transformation of the understanding of the meaning and nature of the psyche. At this same time, agnosticism regarding the nature and even the existence of the gods begins to become fashionable with the sophists and educated people of Athens. A brief account of some of these changes will clarify what might be at stake in Plato’s discussion of the self in the *Phaedo*.

Nicholas Baima, Washington University in St. Louis

nichbaima@gmail.com

“False Words and True Souls in the *Republic*”

Plato's attitude towards truth and falsity in the *Republic* is puzzling. On one hand, it is obvious that truth is highly valued. On the other hand, practical considerations often override the value of truth. Perhaps this is most apparent in Book III where Socrates says that "being deceived about the truth

[is] a bad thing, while possessing the truth is good" (413a). Nevertheless, a few lines later Socrates founds the Kallipolis on a "noble falsehood" (414d-415c). What exactly is Plato's attitude toward truth and falsity in the *Republic*? Is falsehood tolerable in some instances and not in others? And if, so what are these instances?

I argue that the key to answering these questions lies in Socrates' enigmatic distinction between "true falsehoods" (*hos alethos pseudos*) and "mixed falsehoods" (*ou panu akration pseudos*) (382a-e). Socrates maintains that "true falsehoods" are located in the soul and concern the most important things, and thus are hated by gods and humans alike. However, "mixed falsehoods" are located in words and are sometimes useful to humans. I argue that the latter term corresponds to semantic truth, while the former refers to practical truth or well-being. I argue that Socrates is tolerant of semantic falsity because sometimes believing semantic falsehoods can lead to practical truth, which is the primary concern of human life. However, I will argue that this only partially solves Plato's paradoxical attitude towards truth. Part of the tension is irresolvable because Plato has two distinct concerns—truth and well-being—and these two goods cannot be completely unified in human life; only the gods can harmonize them. When they do conflict in the lives of humans, considerations of well-being have primacy over truth.

Erik Baldwin, University of Notre Dame

edbaldwi@nd.edu

“Dvaita-Vedanta and Plantingan Religious Epistemology”

Plantingan Religious Epistemology, i.e., Alvin Plantinga's proper function account of warrant and his models of warranted theistic and Christian belief, is compelling and plausible to many theists, Christian and non-Christian alike. But non-Christians who accept a Plantingan religious epistemology must make certain modifications to his models. In this paper I articulate a Dvaita-Vedanta extension of the Standard Aquinas/Calvin model that covers the core creedal beliefs of monotheistic Hinduism. (The main outlines of the model apply, perhaps only with some modifications, to Bhakti, Śaiva, Vaishnava and Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika belief as well.) I show that since monotheistic Hinduism is compatible with Reformed Epistemology, monotheistic Hindus, too, may claim that Hindu Belief is rational and, if true, (probably) warranted.

That there is a uniquely monotheistic Hindu extension of the Standard A/C model has benefits but also raises problems. The fact that monotheistic Hindus can adopt Plantinga's religious epistemology exacerbates the problem of religious diversity and threatens to provide any Plantingan with a rationality defeater for their 'extension specific' beliefs about God. How is a Plantingan to rationally determine which extension of the Standard A/C Model is reasonable to accept and why? Is reasonable disagreement between Plantingans about which extension of the Standard A/C model possible? Can one go about this in a properly basic way? I propose evaluate Plantingan answers to

these questions and offer my account of how disagreement about which extension of the Standard model is true can be reasonable.

Michael Baur, Fordham University

mbaur@fordham.edu

“The Metaphysical Grounds of Aristotle's Distinction between Distributive Justice and Corrective Justice”

Aristotle's distinction between "distributive justice" and "corrective justice" has been exceedingly influential in the history of philosophy; nevertheless, what Aristotle means by this distinction has been frequently debated and poorly understood. My primary aim in this paper is to illuminate the meaning and implications of Aristotle's distinction between "distributive justice" and "corrective justice." My secondary aim is to show how a proper grasp of Aristotle's distinction between "distributive justice" and "corrective justice" can help to correct some of the ways in which Aristotle's account of justice has been wrongly applied in contemporary political and legal theorizing.

In recent years, Ernest Weinrib and others have insightfully made use of Aristotle's thought in order to argue for what has been called the "bipolarity" or "correlativity" of corrective justice. According to Weinrib, "Corrective justice treats the defendant's unjust gain as correlative to the plaintiff's unjust loss.... The injustice that corrective justice corrects is essentially bipolar.... Just as when the equality of corrective justice is disturbed, one person's gain necessarily entails another's loss, so the doing of injury by one entails the suffering of injury by another. The correlativity of gain and loss supervenes on the correlativity of one person's doing and another's suffering harm...." (The Idea of Private Law, pp. 64-65).

Weinrib is right to insist on the necessary "bipolarity" or "correlativity" of corrective justice; but Weinrib goes on to misrepresent Aristotle's account when (following Hans Kelsen) he argues that Aristotle provides no hints about how distributive justice and corrective justice are related, and no hints about when or how one kind of justice is to be "preferred" to the other (*ibid.*, p. 67). Weinrib's concern about "preferring" one kind of justice to another, I argue, rests on a serious misunderstanding.

Aristotle's comparison of distributive justice to geometrical relations and of corrective justice to arithmetic relations is meant to show that distributive justice has to do with the relations between wholes and parts, while corrective justice has to do with the relations between parts and other parts. Contrary to what Weinrib suggests, there is no question about "preferring" one kind of justice to the other, since the two kinds of justice have to do with two different aspects of one and the same body politic. In other words, one must appreciate Aristotle's metaphysical mereology in order to appreciate his distinction between distributive justice and corrective justice. Further evidence for this key claim can be found in Aristotle's army analogy (*Metaphysics*, Lambda), in his arguments for

the priority of the whole to the parts, and in his arguments for the priority of final causality to the three other kinds of causality. The relevance of Aristotle's metaphysics to his account of justice can be further illustrated by reference to his argument against Plato's community of women (*Politics*, Book II) and his account of how the best flutes are to be distributed to the best flute-players (*Politics*, Book III).

Martha Beck, Lyon College

martha.beck@lyon.edu

“The Socratic Way of Life vis-a-vis the Theory of Forms”

In *Phaedo* 99b, Socrates explicitly describes his way of life as caused by his mind, “[In everything I do] I act with my mind” Plato’s dialogues give readers “an image in speech” of this kind of life. In *Apology*, Socrates defends his way of life as that of the best citizen in a democratic society. The *Phaedo* is Socrates’ second defense of his way of life, based on his view of the principles of reality as such. Socrates describes the view of reality he wished Anaxagoras had defended, “it is Mind (Nous) that directs and is the cause of everything” (97c). If human beings have the capacity to understand Divine Mind, then the life governed by mind is the most natural and best human life. In *Republic*, Socrates claims that human beings by nature possess the power of mind. The best system of education is dedicated to educating this power (518c). The philosophical life, then, is a microcosm within the macrocosm, an individual human life empowered by the same drive toward perfection and order as the ultimate power “guiding” the universe.

This paper argues that the nature and existence of “Forms” is a consequence of this view of reality. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates says that once he decided Divine Nous is the power underlying reality, he realized that he could not discover the real causes of physical phenomena by uses his senses. Rather, he would have to posit a theory, “taking as my hypothesis in each case the theory that seemed to me the most compelling, I would consider as true, about cause and everything else, whatever agreed with this and as untrue whatever did not so agree” (100a). Socrates eventually chooses the “theory of forms” as the best explanation for the nature of reality as such. Socrates then says here that he is always talking about the forms as the causes (aitia) underlying physical reality (100b).

At some place in Plato’s dialogues, each form is referred to as a power (dunamai), either a natural power or a power of the human soul that emerges from the soul’s evolution from and response to the universe. Socrates’ speech and actions, his way of life (ergon) are a literary image of the actual exercise (energeia) of this power. The philosophical life is empowered by mind, which, in turn, is connected to other secondary powers. The universe is empowered by Divine Mind which, in turn, leads to the emergence of an ordered universe whose secondary causes, or powers, are the individual “Forms.” The forms are not disembodied universals. They do not exist in a universe apart from the

one we live in. The name for a Form, “Beautiful itself,” “Good itself,” refers to existential powers, in the physical universe and the human soul.

Yann Benétreau-Dupin, University Western Ontario / Rotman Institute
ybenetre@uwo.ca
“Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox”

In order to assign a truth-value to such a sentence as “What I am saying is false,” Jean Buridan has offered a solution that rests on a conception of truth by supposition and on a requirement of contextual consistency, crucial for the assessment of self-referencing sentences. Recent works have brought new interest to Buridan's solution to the Liar Paradox (the eleventh sophism of chap. 8 of the *Sophismata*). While Stephen Read has argued that it was an ad hoc solution, others (especially G. Klima and C.D. Novaes) have suggested that, if not ad hoc, Buridan's solution weakens his theory of truth. I wish to contest Read's accusation of adhocery, and thereby clarify the scope and strength of Buridan's theory of truth.

It has been argued that Buridan's appeal to the principle of contextual consistency (or virtual implication) reveals the insufficiency of his theory of truth by supposition (because it needs an additional principle to deal with such insolubilia), and that it is ad hoc, applying only to self-referencing sentences.

The accusation of insufficiency makes of the requirement of contextual consistency a new principle, an addition to Buridan's theory of truth. However, since this requirement implies other principles (namely that of non-contradiction and that of bivalence), this accusation is defensible only if it is also directed toward these other principles.

Even if we accept the accusation of insufficiency, that of adhocery is more problematic. One could not make such an assertion without making Buridan oblivious to the very criticism he addresses to others (namely, regarding Ockham's ban on self-reference). Moreover, it would make him inconsistent, since he asserts only four sophisms earlier (the seventh) that the principle of virtual entailments applies to every proposition.

Furthermore, it is clear that the application of the principle of self-entailment is to be done in terms of supposition. Thus, it reaffirms the relevance of the criterion of co-supposition for carrying out inquiries about the truth and falsity of propositions.

Buridan's solution to the Liar Paradox then consists in asserting that the particular case of self-reference forces us to handle assessments of truth by means of supposition more carefully, and consider principles that can otherwise be overlooked. This is not the same as introducing ad hoc rules, particularly when these principles are consistent with the rest of his logic.

As has been shown by Novaes, this requirement, if universal, only allows one to identify false sentences. True sentences, however, can only be shown not to lead to contradictions if they are taken to be true. By refuting the accusation of adhocery, it is this very interpretation of Buridan's conception of truth that I make more plausible. To assert that it is a weakened conception of truth would be to forget that it is consistent with the tenth conclusion of chap. 2 of the *Sophismata*, which only gives necessary conditions for truth, but sufficient conditions for falsity.

Brad Berman, Portland State University

bberman@pdx.edu

“Aristotle on Like-Partedness”

Central to Aristotle's definition of an elemental body is a negative condition that precludes elements from being “divisible into bodies different in form” (DC III. 3, 302a18; cf. *Meta. Δ.* 3, 1014a26-34). The idea is that any part of a given elemental body, say elemental water, would, if separated out, also belong to the same natural kind as the whole—that it, too, would be elemental water. According to Aristotle, if the parts into which the water was divided differed in kind, then *ipso facto* it would not have been elemental water to begin with.

For Aristotle, elements are unique among bodies in meeting that negative condition. Yet, their uniqueness in this respect has been obscured. This is because, according to the received view in the secondary literature, Aristotle thinks that all homoeomerous bodies, not just the elements, are indivisible into bodies differing in form. I argue that the received view conflicts with Aristotle's treatments of both homoeomery as such and the various non-elemental homoeomers.

Scott Berman, Saint Louis University

bermansj@slu.edu

“Plato's Theory of Perceptibles”

It is commonplace, though not universal, to interpret Plato as holding that perceptibles are illusory things and that only the Forms are real things. I will add my voice to those who argue, to the contrary, that Plato does not think that perceptibles are not real things but only that perceptibles are not real objects of knowledge, as compared to the Forms, which are the real objects of knowledge. Nevertheless, a philosophically satisfying account of what perceptibles are, from a Platonic perspective, has yet to take hold in the literature. I aim to explain and defense Plato's theory concerning perceptibles which is both textually grounded and philosophically plausible.

Timothy Berryman, University of Oklahoma

timothy.berryman@gmail.com

“On Eudaimonia and the Arguments of Nichomachean Ethics I.2 and I.7”

The existence of a highest good, which Aristotle identifies with the activity of eudaimonia, is one of the central claims of his project in Nichomachean Ethics I. There are two key passages in which he suggests that there is a highest good, the first at EN I.2 1094a18-22 and the second at EN I.7 1097a15-1097b21. However, the exact relationship between these two passages is never clearly presented in the text. This has led interpreters to a variety of conclusions about their relationship; [a] some say they are the same argument, [b] others that they are two arguments for the same thing, and [c] others still that they are two arguments for different things. There is no consensus on this issue, which leaves it open as to what role these passages play in the greater context of the book. It is my belief that resolving this question, and thus clarifying the role of eudaimonia, is important for a complete, coherent reading of the Nichomachean Ethics. As such, the central question addressed in this paper is the following: What is the relationship between EN I.2 1094a18-22 and EN I.7 1097a15-1097b21?

In this paper, I will defend the claim that these passages present two different arguments for the same thing, i.e. the existence of a highest good. First, since what it is to be an Aristotelian telos plays a significant part in the passages under investigation, I must explain the teleological aspects of Aristotle’s theory. In this section, I will examine the notion of telos, as well as the ancillary concepts of teleion and autarkes, by looking at passages of *Physics* II and some commentary. Following this, it is necessary for me to show how both passages present arguments. Since it is more controversial whether EN I.2 1094a18-22 is an argument, I will consider it first. This will involve setting out the structure of the argument and addressing allegations of fallacy directed against it. Next, I will present a similar analysis of EN I.7 1097a15-1097b21. Specifically, I will show how this passage has two parts, one that gives the new argument for the highest good (EN I.7 1097a15-25), and one addressing Aristotle’s identification of eudaimonia with the highest good (EN I.7 1097a25-1097b21). Finally, I will briefly examine how the conclusions of our arguments enable clarification of the puzzle of the relationship between EN I and the remainder of the text.

John Bewaji, University of the West Indies

“Science, epistemology and the challenge of africana development”

There is a sense in which philosophy, and by extension epistemology, have fallen victim of "disciplinary decadence", as Gordon (2006) argued. This decadence has created a situation where

philosophy has become rather uninteresting as the intellectual discipline for driving the development and emancipation of swaths of underprivileged members of societies globally. To this end, philosophy has become a pariah discipline that is not much valued for its capacity to facilitate social and economic development. If this is the global situation, the peculiar circumstances of Africa and its Diaspora, with regard to the development of knowledge industries is worse. The factors of global recession and domestic institutional ineptitude of leadership have combined to make philosophy a luxury that is left for later. Even more so is the incapacity of institutions to engage epistemological dialogues which will serve as liberating beacons for the emplacement of scientific and technological ideologies for development. In this discussion, I explore the nexus between the global issues indicated above and the localized issues of absence of robust engagement of epistemological investigations, the ways in which the technological divide/gulf have shaped knowledge trade, and the consequent effects of these matters on the capacity of African societies to be owners of their on developmental destinies.

Metha Binita, Texas State University

bvm6@txstate.edu

“Self-knowledge and mystical cognition in Plotinus and Indian Advaita philosophy”

Plotinus and Indian Advaita philosophy present the view that complete self-knowledge is attained at the level that is devoid of duality. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is divided into subject-object relation such that one part contemplates another part of itself, one will know oneself as “contemplated but not as contemplating” (V.3.5.1-22) and no real self-knowledge obtains in this case. In a similar fashion, Śāṅkara, who in this paper will serve as one of the chief representatives of Indian Advaita thought, points out that the self cannot know itself as an object because what is called an object to be known becomes established when it is separated from the self, the subject (Upadeśa Sāhasrī II.99). According to Śāṅkara, the self can be known only through immediate “intuition” (anubhava) which transcends the subject-object duality. For Plotinus, the complete unification of the self – a necessary condition for self-knowledge – is achieved only at the level of the absolutely simple One. Śāṅkara locates the highest state of self-knowledge in the ātman consciousness, which transcends all duality and which lie beyond the mental apparatus as constituted by manas and buddhi. The first part of the paper will show that from the perspectives of Plotinus and Śāṅkara the full reality of one’s self is brought to oneself in a mystical cognition as constituted by the non-dual awareness. Now Plotinus speaks of the One as beyond thinking. But he also attributes “immediate self-consciousness” to the One (V.4.2.21-29), suggesting that the One is the state of non-dual consciousness without an object, rather than a state where consciousness is absent. For Plotinus, thinking is a movement towards an object, that is, it implies a subject-object structure, or the existence of otherness (V.3.10). Thus, there is thinking in the intellect, which is a complex whole or a one-many: the “Intellect needs to see itself...first because it is multiple, and then because

it belongs to another (the One)” (V.3.10.14-17). But the One has “nothing to which to direct its activity” (V.3.10.24-25); it is an “object of thought to the Intellect, but in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought” (V.6.2.15-17). In the second part of the paper, I will examine the epistemological significance of the role of non-dual mode of cognition in Plotinus and Advaita thought. Here I will analyze the notion of *pratibhā*, which constitutes an important element in the Śaiva Advaita school of Abhinavagupta. *Pratibhā* is the intuitive light of the *ātman* or the power of self-illumination and the very basis of the subject’s knowledge. I will juxtapose the doctrine of *pratibhā* with Plotinus’ view that thinking is a “movement towards the Good” (V.6.5.11) which can be interpreted to mean that non-dual level of consciousness is fundamental in all knowing.

Joshua Blander, The King's College

jblander@tkc.edu

“John Duns Scotus’s Formal Distinction, Persons and Natures, and the Question of Separability”

In this paper, I discuss John Duns Scotus’s use of the formal distinction in his account of the Incarnation, which sheds light on his distinction between natures and persons, and, as a result, his account of the Trinity. In his examination of the doctrine of the Incarnation, he makes use of this distinction when marking the contrast between a person and an individual human nature. In an individual human nature, we can distinguish formally between the human nature and the individuating feature that makes the nature an individual nature. Scotus specifies the conditions required for being a person negatively: a person is an individual human nature that neither is inclined to depend nor actually depends on another. Though such a nature is never inclined to depend, if the second person of the Trinity were to assume the individual human nature, the nature is subsequently actually dependent; therefore, it is no longer a person.

Scotus’s primary aim in this discussion is the avoidance of the suggestion that there are two persons co-present in the Incarnation, i.e., both the Second Person of the Trinity and an assumed human person. It also provides a helpful structural parallel to the doctrine of the Trinity. As a result of his discussion of the Incarnation, he suggests that there is a formal distinction between the (human) person and the (individual human) nature. Similarly, in each Trinitarian person, there is a distinction between the (divine) person and the (divine) nature. Given Scotus’s disposition toward univocity, and toward generally unifying metaphysical principles, this should not be a surprising result. Scotus’s work here is helpful for extending our understanding of the metaphysical structure present in the Trinity, and his general account of constitution.

However, Scotus’s claims here are complicated by his commitment to the presence of a formal distinction between the individual human nature and the person. As we saw above, the individual nature can exist when the person does not (although not vice versa); thus, there is one-way independence or separability between the nature and the person. However, all of Scotus’s

contemporary commentators claim that the formal distinction entails two-way inseparability; that is, if x and y are formally distinct, then each is inseparable from the other. Furthermore, they claim that a real distinction entails (at least one-way) separability.

If Scotus's commentators are right to think that the formal distinction entails two-way inseparability, the case of the Incarnation suggests a serious conflict for his view, as it implies the co-presence of separability and a formal distinction. I argue that the Incarnation case provides prima facie evidence that he was committed to allowing conceptual space for separability in the presence of a formal distinction, and that none of the reasons for thinking that Scotus is committed to two-way inseparability are sufficient to overcome this evidence.

Chiara Blengini, Università degli Studi di Pavia (University of Pavia - Italy)

chiarablengini@gmail.com

“*De Anima* and Aristotle's theory of definition”

Definition has long been a central topic in ancient Greek philosophy, since Socrates introduced it as the fundamental tool for philosophical investigation. Plato applied this innovation to his dialogues and Aristotle pursued these issues further, developing a technical account of definition in the *Topics*, *Analytics* and *Metaphysics*.

In particular, *Posterior Analytics* B.8-10 tightly links definition and explanation, based on the interconnection between causality and essence (Charles). The theory that thus emerges is comprehensive and coherent, although not free of difficulties. A major problem of Aristotelian scholarship is in fact whether this account can be seen at work in Aristotle's scientific practice, especially in the biological works.

This paper specifically addresses the issue with respect to the definition of the soul in *De Anima*.

I shall argue that, far from positing an obstacle to the validity of the *Analytics* account of definition, *De Anima* constitutes the natural development of a wider project aiming at applying such a model to substances as well. This ambitious program initiates in *Metaphysics* Z.17 through the question of primary substance and reaches a sort of provisional conclusion in H.6, focusing on the controversial theme of a thing's unity. *De Anima* is but the continuation of this line of thought, in that it takes over such progress and draws heavily on the same resources on which it rests, i.e. the theory of matter and form, as described in *Physics* I.7 and the *Metaphysics*, and that of actuality and potentiality, expressed in *Metaphysics* Θ.

Keeping the theory of definition in the background will help us realize the importance of the initial chapters of *De Anima* B – the proper key to understanding Aristotle's conception of psyché. Both

what precedes and what follows should be read in the light of the various formulations of the definition of soul which we find here.

The first book of the treatise is best seen as preparatory work for reaching a scientific definition of the object of enquiry. It is, in fact, a survey of the views elaborated by preceding Greek thinkers about the nature of the soul. Aristotle ascribed to such abundant material examined an overall tendency to describe the soul as the source of movement, sensation, and knowledge.

In accordance with the heuristic function of endoxa in dialectics and in analogy with the role of linguistic definition (Modrak), such elements constitute the starting-points of the following Aristotelian analysis. This allows, incidentally, a re-evaluation of the long-neglected dossography of *De Anima* A.

Aristotle's positive contribution to the enquiry starts indeed with the search for a scientific definition which opens *De Anima* B. The difficulty in its corresponding to the paradigm case of definition in the Analytics is due to the fact that the item to define is sui generis, as the one typified by the snub as opposed to the merely concave. For this category of items, reference to matter must be included in all effects in the essence, while the general version of the theory does not allow it for standard cases.

Once the reason of the aporia is individuated, the rest of the treatise could be seen as a further development and expansion of the definition reached by *De Anima* B.3.

In conclusion, when reading *De Anima*, being cognizant of the Aristotelian theory of definition, far from leading to puzzles, will grant a better understanding of the structure of the whole treatise and its overall strategy.

Luigi Bradizza, Salve Regina University

luigi.bradizza@salve.edu

"The Place of Philosophy in Xenophon's "Cyropaedia""

In his "Cyropaedia," Xenophon presents Cyrus as an enemy of philosophy. At the same time, he presents Cyrus as a great, heroic figure who reorders the politics of his region to the benefit of great numbers of people. This raises the question of Xenophon's attitude towards philosophy. It is my argument that Xenophon presents Cyrus as praiseworthy for his political prowess, but defective for his lack of philosophic curiosity. Xenophon thus offers a subtle corrective to political action: It must in some important sense be ordered by the philosopher.

Jay Bregman, University of Maine

Bregman@maine.edu

“Thomas Taylor on Julian, Sallust and Synesius”

Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) thought Julian was a good Neoplatonist though not of the caliber of Proclus. A Philosophical ruler of a Platonic *Republic* could be a perfect philosopher, but Julian had as much philosophical genius as possible for a Roman emperor; better than all before and after him.

Taylor's exegesis of Julian follows Proclus' Platonic Theology. He is in sympathy with the emperor's mission: "to restore a religion which is coeval with the universe". In order to explicate Julian's description of the efficacy of the image of Cybele, upon her arrival in Rome, Taylor noted Julian's friend Sallust's theory of statues designed according to divine imitation and similitude; in sharp contrast to the false theory of images of Saints; the former "beautifully pious" the latter "...impious...full of delusion.

Taylor admired Synesius the Hellene, but never quite forgave him for his conversion to Christianity; though he refused to translate his Christianizing Hymns, Taylor's Hymn to Jupiter is admittedly and demonstrably inspired by Synesius' metaphysical poetics.

Taylor's N. American disciples were not rote followers. They acknowledged Christianity as part of a syncretistic synthesis, esoterically in agreement with Platonism. I will discuss Taylor's ideas and comment on some of his American enthusiasts. Including Emerson, who quipped about a revival in the Churches brought on by reading Taylor translations of "pagan" counter-Christian texts; Alcott and the later Neoplatonic American Transcendentalists.

Sara Brill, Fairfield University

sbrill@fairfield.edu

“Deformations of Logos in Aristotle's Ethics”

This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of Aristotle's explorations of *zōē* by examining the relationship between two dimensions of human life, the analysis of which is necessary for the fullest possible account of animate beings: a) human life admits a plurality of kinds based upon distinct forms of character and defining passions (e.g. the pleasure-loving life, the honor-loving life and the contemplative life) and b) the possession of logos dictates that the flourishing of human life requires that it be shared and creates a variety of better and worse possibilities for this 'sharing.' In mapping the landscape of *pathē* and events with which one must contend in a manner that could be praised or blamed, Aristotle charts these possibilities and, I argue, attributes to them the means by which human life attains sufficient coherence and definition as to permit it to be described by kinds. He also offers an account of the deformations of logos that threaten the stability of the city and the intelligibility of human life. These are particularly evident in his analyses of the limits of polite

conversation (the virtues pertaining to ‘shared words and deeds’ 1126b8), the excellence which applies to shared goods and what is one’s own (justice), and the life that is forged in friendship.

Michael Butler, University of Memphis

mgbutler@memphis.edu

“Why Socrates is not a Philosopher: One Necessary Condition for the Practice of Philosophy in Plato’s *Sophist* and *Statesman*”

This paper examines Plato’s *Sophist* and *Statesman* in an attempt to outline one necessary condition for the practice of philosophy put forward therein by the Eleatic Stranger. At the opening of *Sophist*, Socrates asks the Eleatic Stranger if he can explain the difference between a philosopher, a statesman and a sophist, and whether the Stranger believes these to be the same sort of person or three distinct kinds. The Stranger says that they are indeed three distinct kinds and proceeds to attempt to define each of them. While we get an account of the sophist and statesman in the two dialogues that bear these names, there is no dialogue dedicated to the philosopher. Although providing a full account of the possible contents of this third dialogue would be an enormous undertaking, my paper will draw upon *Theaetetus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman* in order to sketch out only one necessary condition for being a philosopher put forward by the Stranger. I will argue that, according to the Stranger, the philosopher practices a productive art and that he must be the primary cause of the thing his art produces – namely, an account of what is. An interesting implication of this is that, given what Socrates says about his own art in *Theaetetus*, he is not a philosopher according to the Stranger. Barren of ideas but an expert in helping others give birth to ideas of their own, Socrates can only be a contributory cause in the production of accounts of what is. Thus, Socrates fails to satisfy the Stranger’s necessary condition.

My paper will have three sections. First I will argue that, according to the Stranger’s account in *Sophist*, philosophy must be a productive *techné* that produces a true account of what is. Next, I will examine passages in *Statesman* where the Stranger suggests that the only person who can claim to practice a productive craft (like philosophy) is the person who is the primary cause of its product. Finally, I will examine Socrates’ own self description in *Theaetetus* and argue that, although he is very close to the practice of philosophy, Socrates does not satisfy the necessary condition for being a philosopher put forward by the Stranger.

Miriam Byrd, University of Texas, Arlington

mbyrd@uta.edu

“Dianoetic Investigation in the *Republic*: Socrates’ Prelude to Dialectic”

In *Republic* 7, Socrates explains that education is not a matter of putting knowledge into someone's soul, but consists of turning the eye of the soul from the sensible realm of becoming to the realm of being. He credits the dianoetic sciences, specifically mathematics, with this pedagogical task. I posit that Socrates' actions in the *Republic* provide an important supplement to his discussion of dianoetic education. Though Socrates' description of the beneficial influence of dianoetic education is limited to the context of mathematical instruction of future rulers of the Kallipolis, his answer to Glaucon's challenge in *Republic* 2-4 exemplifies how dianoetic education may be used in the context of philosophical discussion. I support this thesis by 1) describing dianoetic reasoning and explaining its correct and incorrect use, 2) drawing parallels between correct use of dianoetic reasoning and Socrates' investigation into the value of living a just life, and 3) showing how the investigation may serve as a prelude to dialectic for the reader.

Eva Cadavid, Centre College

eva.cadavid@centre.edu

“The importance of intellectual virtues to moral virtues in Plato and Aristotle”

The importance of knowledge to moral virtue is at the core of Platonic ethics. Although the *Republic* leaves open the possibility of being virtuous by doing right action even if not knowing why it is the right action, the emphasis in Plato's work is full knowledge of the causes or 'aitia' of virtuous action. This explains his concern with mathematics (episteme) and its importance in the education process of a philosopher. Mathematics teaches us abstract thinking, looking beyond the world of sense perception, and gives us training in the evaluation and measuring needed for applications of moral virtues. It has the additional advantage of teaching us about evaluating evidence, reasoning, and offering justification for our beliefs. The influence of Plato on Aristotle is strong and the *Nicomachean Ethics* is no exception. In the ethics, there is a very strong connection between intellectual and moral virtues. The connection between practical wisdom (phronesis) and moral virtues seems clear. However, in this essay, I will explore the connection between episteme and phronesis. Although not explicitly considered by Aristotle, I wish to explore whether mathematics and the theoretical sciences are also useful in the development of phronesis because of the training and epistemic practices it entails.

Elena Cagnoli Fieccconi, University of Oxford

elena.cagnoliefieccconi@ccc.ox.ac.uk

“Aristotle on the Content of Perception”

In *De Anima*, Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for not having properly distinguished between perception (aisthesis) and thought (noesis/phronesis). For this reason, we would expect him to draw a sharp distinction between perceiving and thinking. The expectation is met, and in *De Anima* we find a number of arguments in support of this distinction:

The Argument from Animal Perception: perception is different from thought because, as opposed to thought, it is available to both humans and animals.

The Argument from Truth: perception is always true, while thought can be false

The Argument from Thinkables and Perceptibles: perception and thought are different because perception is of external objects and of particulars, whilst thought is of universals which are "in the soul".

The Argument from Bodily Organs: while perception requires a bodily organ, thought doesn't.

In this paper, I first examine these arguments and suggest that Aristotle's demarcation between perception and thought is less clear than it may seem. I then argue that the only consistent argument Aristotle proposes in order to draw this difference is the Argument from Animal Perception. In the second section, I defend this thesis by referring to Aristotle's account of perceptual illusions. I suggest that both Aristotle's account of perceptual illusions and his Argument from Animal Perception rely on the idea that the content of perception is different from the content of thought. In the third section, I try to clarify the distinction between the content of thought and the content of perception by considering Aristotle's account of recollection and his account of persuasion. I argue that the content of thought has a complex syntactic and conceptual structure, while the content of perception doesn't. In conclusion, I note that the thesis that perceptual content is unstructured can help us clarify the epistemological link according to which, in Aristotle's view, we can derive knowledge from perception.

Esra Cagri Mutlu, Van Yuzuncuyl Universitesi

esracagr@yahoo.com

"Translating Muthos into Logos in Platonic Literature"

Why does Plato need muthos? He is accepted as the philosopher who makes the intellectual revolution. Nevertheless Atlantis, Er and Socrates-Diatoma speech suggests that muthos is included in Platonic literature. First of all, muthos is accepted as a type of discourse by Plato. It is also a support for rational argument. For myths may have rational arguments but not like logos has. So the line between muthos and logos is hard to draw. As a type of discourse, muthos is accepted as an unfalsifiable one while logos is the falsifiable one. Muthos and logos work together for a new way of understanding, myths have the information about the distant past which neither can be falsified nor

has an argumentative structure, it has a certain usefulness though. In the second book of *Republic*, Socrates suggests that an education must use both *muthos* and *logos* but first of the false, that is, *muthos* (376e6-377a8). In the *Sophist*, myth is accepted as a discourse which gives information about facts or events in the past (262c9-d7), it is an interweaving of verbs and nouns (261e-262d). *Muthos* belongs to the sensible world and has a value insofar as it participates in the world of intelligible forms. Consequently, in this paper I will try to figure out the importance of *muthos* for Plato. What are their proper functions, what value of truth can be assigned to them? Are *muthos* accepted as poetic or philosophical discourses?

Paul Carelli, University of North Florida

paul.carelli@unf.edu

“Psychic Representation in Plato’s *Phaedrus*”

Abstract: Psychic Representation in Plato’s *Phaedrus*

The three parts of the soul in the Myth of the Charioteer are most often understood to correspond to the three parts of the soul in the *Republic*, with the charioteer representing the rational part of the soul, the good horse the spirited part and the bad horse the appetites. Such an interpretation, however, is at odds both with the suggestion at the end of the *Republic* that the soul is a unity when it is free of the body and with the creation of the human soul in the *Timaeus*, where the soul receives its spirited and appetitive parts only after embodiment. Further, this interpretation causes problems with the elements of the Myth of the Charioteer itself. In this paper I argue that it is better to understand the elements in the *Phaedrus* myth as representing divisions within rational soul.

Keywords: Plato, *Phaedrus*, soul

Troy Catterson, Salve Regina University

tcatterson@gmail.com

“Rehabilitating Aquinas’ psychological model of the Trinity”

In his *Summa Contra Gentiles* (Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* (4.26.6; 4.11.13; 4.19.7–12.)), Aquinas presents a development of Augustine’s psychological model of the Trinity, whereby the Father is to the Son and the Holy Spirit as a perfect knower is to his self-knowledge through his act of knowing. William Lane Craig (2009) critiques this model as not implying the subsistence of multiple persons in the Godhead. I attempt to rehabilitate the analogy in the light of recent developments in analytic epistemology and phenomenology. More specifically, I argue that there is a

type of non-conceptual or experiential knowledge of oneself that can only be had from a second person perspective. Thus if God has perfect self-knowledge then he must experience himself as both an 'I' and a 'You,' which implies that there must be multiple subjects of experience within the Godhead. Any omniscient being must exist in an I-Thou relationship with his/herself.

Aiste Celkyte, University of St Andrews

ac967@st-andrews.ac.uk

“The Stoic Argument “That Only The Beautiful is The Good””

The Stoic Argument “That Only The Beautiful is The Good”

In this paper, I reconstruct and analyse an often-overlooked Stoic syllogism designed to prove that only the beautiful (to kalon) is the good. Although Cato in Cicero’s *On Ends* describes this argument as only an auxiliary proof to the standard Stoic thesis that the only good is virtue and the original form of this argument is not at all clear, these difficulties ought not to prevent us from studying this piece of material further. This material, on the contrary, is very promising evidence for Stoic ideas of beauty and ethics, because it not only contains an argument about a relationship between the good and the beautiful, but also shows how ideas of beauty were embedded in Stoic philosophy.

There are two main obstacles to analysing this argument. The first is that there is conflicting evidence about the form of the original syllogism. The body of the argument typically consists of a varying number of propositions connected by the similarity of terms used (ex., what is good is praiseworthy, what is praiseworthy is beautiful; therefore, good is beautiful), but the sources that record the argument do not specify how the propositions of this syllogism are linked or what the precise significance of the conclusion is.

There are two different interpretations of the implications of this argument in ancient sources, which constitutes the second problem I address in this paper. Diogenes Laertius and Seneca offer different interpretations of this argument. Diogenes claims that this argument is a statement of equivalence of the good and the beautiful. Seneca, meanwhile, claims that there is a distinction between the good and the beautiful.

I suggest that these two problems are related and that by determining what the original form of the argument might have been, it is possible to determine whether Diogenes or Seneca interprets the implications of the argument more accurately. In order to do this, I compare all the surviving versions of the argument and determine its logical form. I propose that originally the argument most likely had a modus ponens form. From this, I argue that the form of this argument shows that it cannot be an equivalence statement, as Diogenes interprets it. Instead, Seneca’s reading, which suggests that the argument is an attributive statement, picks out the original intentions of the

argument much more clearly. Then I suggest that such an interpretation of the argument is also in sync with other common Stoic beliefs.

Finally, I argue that the important implication of the way in which this argument conceptualises beauty is the distinction of beauty as the actual good from only seeming goods. The reconstruction of the obscure argument provides much information about one of the ways in which the Stoics conceptualised beauty and relationship between the beautiful and the good. This syllogism reveals that Stoic ideas about beauty were sophisticated, complex and deserving much more scholarly attention than they have received so far.

Rose Cherubin, George Mason University

rcherubi@gmu.edu

“The Eleatics and Aristotle's Sciences”

Aristotle's account of sciences (*epistēmai*) in general, and his investigations into physical sciences in particular, reflect attention to Eleatic concerns in several ways.

On the one hand, in *Physics* I.2-3 he portrays Parmenides and Melissus as working outside the scope of *phusikē*, and arguably outside the scope of *epistēmē* as Aristotle understands it (he charges that the premises he associates with them prevent one from learning what what-is is, 187a5ff.). In *Physics* VI and VIII, he strives to produce an account of motion that does not fall to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. In general, Aristotle accepts neither the ontological claims nor the arguments that he attributes to the Eleatics.

On the other hand, Aristotle adopts and develops several key epistemological points that can be found in the Eleatics, especially Parmenides. Some of these he explicitly associates with Parmenides or Melissus (as e.g. at *De caelo* 298b). Others appear without reference to predecessors. Examples include the reasoning behind the multiplicity of approaches to the question of whether what is can come to be or perish (*De caelo* and *De generatione et corruptione*); and the accounts of the distinctions among sciences and between “special sciences” and the “science of being qua being” (*Metaphysics* IV and *Posterior Analytics* I).

I will examine these passages in light of Parmenides' goddess's account of the requisites of inquiry and (time permitting) Zeno's and Melissus' argument-forms. While Aristotle's account of *epistēmē* shares much with Parmenides' account of inquiry, questions arise as to whether the assumptions that enable “special sciences” in general, and *epistēmai* concerning things that appear to move in particular, also compromise inference.

Suk Choi, Towson University

suchoi@towson.edu

“Neo-Confucian Discussion on Dao (道) and Aesthetic Value”

The aim of this paper is to compare Neo-Confucian perspective on aesthetic values with moralism in contemporary aesthetics, focusing on Zhu Xi's view of the relation between Dao (道) and wen (文 literature). For this aim, I will note two points: 1) a tension between autonomism (the moral qualities and defects of artworks are never aesthetically relevant.) and moralism (the intrinsic moral flaws of an artwork can be evaluated as aesthetic flaws) in recent debates on aesthetic and ethical values. 2) Zhu Xi's position as an exemplar of Neo-Confucian ethical criticism of art and a possible role of his aesthetic view in recent debates. Some contemporary leading aestheticians, who recognize that ethically concerned criticism of art has been neglected in contemporary aesthetic discourses, have been developing their arguments on the relationship between ethical and aesthetic values. I note two assumptions of their arguments; 1) They support aesthetic cognitivism (a crucial aesthetic value of some artworks lies in what they can teach us); 2) They focus mainly on the relationship between artwork and its appreciators. In the Sung period when different intellectual traditions such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, were lively inter-exchanged, Neo-Confucian scholars learned and experienced a broad range of diverse perspectives on Dao, human beings, mind, emotion, and the universe. They developed their contemplations of those issues and applied them to their reading and writing of literary works. Through an examination of Zhu Xi's view as an exemplar of Neo-Confucian aesthetic theory and practice, I will argue that; 1) He would agree with recent ethical criticism and aesthetic cognitivism, asserting that the relationship between Dao and literary works should be the most central question in understanding literature; 2) For this reason, he is concerned with the method of research, self-cultivation, and writing from the standpoints of both writer and reader.

Seth Christensen, Duquesne University

christensens@duq.edu

“Is Place a Partial Formal Cause?”

At 208b9-12 and at 20-23 in Chapter 1 of Book IV of the *Physics*, Aristotle says that place has a certain potency (τινὰ δύναμιν/τῆ δυνάμει). Many interpreters have attempted to understand what Aristotle means when he says that place has a certain potency or influence. For example, W. D. Ross claims that, “The proper place of a body, according to Aristotle, has an actual influence on it; an attractive influence which draws the body to it” (Aristotle: *Physics* 563). More recently, in his book *On Location: Aristotle's Concept of Place*, Benjamin Morrison has rejected the thought that place has an attractive influence on bodies. Instead, Morrison claims that the potency of place can be found in the fact that places are "partial formal causes" insofar as places appear, in part, in the

definition of the simple bodies (On Location 51). However, attributing places with the status of partial formal causes seems to contradict Aristotle's assertion that places are none of the four causes (*Physics* 209a18-22). This paper investigates the potency of places and shows that, against Morrison, places should not be understood as partial (or full) formal causes.

Graziana Ciola, Scuola Normale Superiore

“Modalities, Consequentiae, and Scientific Knowledge: Logical and Natural Necessity in John Buridan”

Modern discussions of medieval modalities tend to separate into two paths: the one, ontological/metaphysical; the other, technically logical. The connection between these two paths is deep, appears to be fundamental, and to run both ways: it might be deceptive or plainly wrong to try to deal with one without any consideration of the other.

On the one hand, every logical analysis or employment of modalities presupposes an interpretation of modal concepts i.e. a conception of modalities, a modal paradigm (statistical, diachronic, synchronic...) that rightfully belongs to the first path. Furthermore, the distinction, the analyses, and the discussions of a logical notion of necessity/possibility vs. a natural one have rightfully a foot on both paths. Broadly, the way we think about modalities conditions what we do in modal logic and its technical developments.

On the other hand, the ontological/metaphysical path is in turn affected by the logical one in various ways and at a multiplicity of levels. In general, logical techniques are largely used as a tool in the analyses of ontological, theological, philosophical questions. Such instruments are not neutral with respect to the analysis itself: they give a direction to the philosophical enquiring and they have in turn to be calibrated on it i.e. what we try to do with them affects the way we conceive them.

With this kind of framework in the background, I will take John Buridan as a case study. Taking modal paradigms as a guiding thread, I shall examine the interaction between the two paths we have delineated by focusing on the role played by modal notions in Buridan's theory of consequentiae and in his natural philosophy.

If we ask ourselves “What is Buridan's take on modal paradigms?”, we find a twofold answer.

On the one hand, modal notions are an essential component in the medieval development of consequentiae under two aspects at least: the quite traditional notion of *necessitas ex hypothesis* and the recurring modal element in the widespread Chrysippean and Abelardian definitions of conditional. Buridan deals with such matters in his analyses of consequentiae, giving also a systematization of the modal inferences and of modal syllogistic. In this kind of properly logical context, he embraces a synchronic modal paradigm.

On the other hand, the modal paradigm he embraces in natural philosophy is the more traditional statistical model. This appears to be a justified and unproblematic choice to treat natural necessity as it came to be defined since the late XII century.

Yet, Buridan employs a great deal of logical tools and logically interesting concepts (consequentiae, suppositio naturalis, an analysis of Universal affirmative propositiones as conditionals) while working on natural philosophy; and his stand on natural necessity results not so straightforward: in some cases, some natural principles can be formulated as conceptual necessities simpliciter. Therefore, a closer analysis of modal notions and logical tools in Buridan's natural philosophy and a comparison with his positions in logic might be a good starting point to examine the dialectic between the two paths delineated in dealing with such questions as: how do the logical instruments condition the matters they are applied to analyse? And, vice versa, how does the application affect the conceptual definition of the formal tool? What is the relationship among ontological presuppositions, logical theories, and logical applications?

Alison Coombs, Binghamton University

acoombs1@binghamton.edu

“Moral cultivation and the self in Aristotelian and Early Buddhist Thought”

Aristotle's account of persons starts from a fairly general point of being hylomorphic body-soul compounds, which we share with all living things. As he enumerates the different functions of the soul, we get a pretty clear picture of human beings in general as unique with respect to many intellectual and social capacities. In particular, it seems that human capacities are largely directed and promoting individual flourishing. In this sense, the any account of persons as selves seems to be in this moral context, and not in any other sense. However, if we look at Aristotle's account in light of Buddhist metaphysics of substances and selves, we can see how the various functions of the soul might be said to contribute to an account of selves that is compatible with the Buddhist account.

Early Buddhists give an account of the self that corresponds, more or less directly, to the causal account they give of substances more generally. This gives rise to a connection between their understanding of the role of the self and the role of substance in moral cultivation and perfection. Namely, their account involves dissolving the sense of both self and substance (and, not surprisingly, the self as substance) as ultimately real. They contrast this with a sense of the self and substances as conventionally real, which their account of these things lends itself to quite readily. Interestingly, the parts of living things, especially persons, in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *De Anima* correspond relatively closely to the five components or skandhas that, according to early Buddhist metaphysical accounts, make up the self. However, looking at the Aristotelian person in light of the Buddhist metaphysics of self allows us to see the self in Aristotle as more well-developed. Looking at selves in this way also

allows us to see some compatibilities and tensions between Buddhist and Aristotelian accounts of morality and self-cultivation.

Nathan Cornwell, Franciscan University of Steubenville
NCornwell001@student.franciscan.edu
“Action Theory in the Nicomachean Ethics”

The still-young discipline of action theory or philosophy of action owes, to a proportionally greater extent than possibly any other field in contemporary philosophy—history of philosophy of course excepted—very much to direct reading of Aristotle. By way of example, we have the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, who made explicit and lengthy references to Aristotle in her paper “Modern Moral Philosophy” and even more so in her book *Intention*, both founding texts for the philosophy of action, and that of Donald Davidson, who claimed Aristotle’s support in his paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” which is another founding text for the discipline. This attention and the attention paid to Aristotle by later generations of action theorists are neither undeserved nor unfruitful. On the contrary, it has been a vital force in the development of the discipline, both in the sense of irreplaceability and vivification. It is, however, still vulnerable to the caution offered by David Wiggins in his paper “Deliberation and Practical Reason:” there remains “the difficulty of finding a perspective or vantage point, over a philosophical terrain still badly understood, from which to view Aristotle’s theory.”

I wish in this paper to offer a preliminary outline of such a vantage point for the Nicomachean Ethics, which is the subject of the majority of contemporary commentary in the philosophy of action. I take as my point of departure the certainly not unprecedented observation that Aristotle nowhere gives a systematic treatment of action. There are passages which treat kinds of action, or action considered under a certain aspect, but never simply action. One upshot of this, which is again not unnoticed by contemporary thinkers, is that the exegete interested in learning from Aristotle on the subject of action must be prepared to undertake a lengthy and careful exegesis, one which takes him far beyond the confines of Aristotle’s ethical works. I submit, however, that there is another conclusion which may be drawn and subsequently utilized as an interpretive principle: It need not, and should not, be assumed that Aristotle gives the same sense to what is translated “action” (usually *praxis*) in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as contemporary action theorists; instead, his intended sense, along with its degree of consonance with the contemporary, must first be determined before attempting to apply his findings today.

I shall first undertake to show that it is likely that Aristotle gives “action” a different sense than the contemporary by means of some remarks on Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics. Next, I shall undertake to show that it is impossible that the senses should be identical by means of a close examination of a few passages. Finally, I shall show the fruitfulness of the above principle by

applying it to passages which some contemporary exegetes find problematic and showing that the problem disappears with its application.

Carlos Cortissoz, SUNY Binghamton

ccortis1@binghamton.edu

“Plato on Contemplation as Internal Action”

Based on a non-merely analogical interpretation of the city-soul analogy, I will articulate a sense in which, for Plato, the contemplative life is at the same time the most practical. Contemplation is the activity by means of which both cities and souls rearrange the political relations among their internal parts. Just as cities become internally harmonious through the activity of philosopher-kings, souls become internally harmonious through the activity of contemplation. In so far as contemplation is the principle of the soul's internal harmony and, hence, of the virtues, it is not only a theoretical activity but a practical one; it is, indeed, the most practical one. The city provides us with a model writ-large of the process by which this is possible. Contemplation, I will conclude, is an internal action of the soul, an action whose nature is political but its object is not external but internal. Aristotle confirms it in *Pol.* VII, 3, where he affirms that the happiness of the state consists in the activity that is more complete, self-sufficient and for its own sake, i.e. contemplation.

Antonis Coumoundouros, Adrian College

acoumoundouros@adrian.edu

“Plato on Laughter and Humor”

Plato on Laughter and Humor.

Contemporary theorists of humor argue that Plato was the most influential critic of humor and laughter in the western philosophical tradition. Following him, the tradition has mostly negative things to say about laughter and humor. These theorists place Plato's view on laughter and humor under superiority theory: laughter and humor are expressions of feelings of superiority over others. Plato seems to have two main objections to laughter and humor. In the *Republic*, Socrates wants to prevent poetry from causing the guardians to laugh violently since violent laughter deprives one of his capacity to reason well (388e). In the *Philebus*, Socrates claims that laughter is malicious (48-50). When we laugh we do so at another person's self-ignorance which is a vice and thus we delight immorally in another person's vice. In this paper, I argue that such an interpretation of Plato's view of laughter and humor is mistaken since it fails to account for the fact that Plato uses various forms of humor in the dialogues with the purpose of causing laughter or amusement in the reader. After I

examine the several passages in which Plato discusses laughter and humor (in *Republic*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*) and some of the main usages of humor used in the dialogues, such as Socratic irony, I argue that Plato thought there is much in laughter and humor that is morally acceptable and philosophically useful.

Anna Cremaldi, Appalachian State University

cremaldiam@appstate.edu

“The Errors of the Virtuous”

“The Errors of the Virtuous”

Anna Cremaldi, Appalachian State University

Surprisingly, Aristotle’s virtuous person makes mistakes. In the discussion of liberality, for example, Aristotle attributes to the liberal person a tendency towards giving so excessively that “he leaves too little for himself” (1120b4-6). Similarly, in his discussion of good temper, Aristotle remarks that the good-tempered man too readily forgives the people who have offended him (1125b35-1126a3). The claim that the virtuous person tends to err is problematic, first of all, because it conflicts with Aristotle’s view that the virtuous person cannot willingly perform a non-virtuous action. Second, the claim also conflicts with the very notion of Aristotelian virtue, since the virtuous person does not, insofar as she is virtuous, have tendencies towards excess or deficiency. Commentators have solved the problem of the error-prone virtuous person in two ways. According to the first view, defended by Howard Curzer, virtue is a disposition to hit the mean for the most part. According to a second view, defended by Shane Drefcinski, virtue is a disposition to hit the mean in the ideal case, so that Aristotle’s definition of virtue in NE II.6 describes a moral ideal, rather than an actual virtuous person. But these solutions assume that these errors are expressions of imperfection in the state of virtue. Rather, I claim, the errors of the virtuous person are expressions of virtue. To defend this interpretation, I argue that Aristotle’s virtuous person commits errors in cases involving what Aristotle calls the ‘natural goods’ (*ta phusei agatha*). I draw on Aristotle’s discussion of natural goods in NE IX.9 and EE 8.3 to show that the virtuous person will set aside her claim on natural goods when giving up those natural goods gives her the greater share of the *kalon*. Thus, while the virtuous person appears to be making errors of negligence regarding the natural goods, she is, in fact, exercising her virtue fully by pursuing what is most consistent with the *kalon*. My reading not only resolves an interpretive controversy, it also sheds light on the important and neglected topic of natural goods in Aristotle’s ethical theory.

Milo Crimi, University of California, Los Angeles
mcrimi@humnet.ucla.edu
“Significative Supposition and Ockham's Rule”

Paul Spade argues that there is a tension between Ockham's descriptions of the various types of supposition at *Summa Logicae* (SL) I.64 and a rule he provides at SL I.65. According to Ockham's Rule, a term can have material or simple supposition in a proposition if the other extreme is a term of second imposition or intention respectively. But if a term supposits significantly (i.e. personally) just in case it supposits for something it signifies, and material and simple supposition are non-significative, then 'noun' cannot supposit materially in 'Noun is a written word', despite the fact that 'written word' is a term of second imposition. A similar problem arises, with respect to simple supposition, when we consider the supposition of 'concept' in 'Concept is a species'. In later papers, Spade proposes a solution: a term supposits significantly just in case it supposits for everything it signifies. I evaluate Spade's proposal and explore some of its implications. I show that it successfully resolves the tension and that it suggests a way to more precisely describe material and simple supposition. Material supposition occurs when a conventional term supposits for itself only, and simple supposition occurs when a conventional term supposits for its superordinate natural term only. Besides the fact that the proposal resolves the tension, Spade does not provide any evidence to suggest that Ockham maintains it. I argue that Ockham maintains the proposal (perhaps implicitly) by showing that his theory implies it. In doing so, I raise and refute two potential objections. According to the first, the proposal implies that syncategorematic and empty categorematic terms always supposit personally. According to the second, exceptive propositions provide counterexamples to the proposal. Finally, I highlight and discuss a controversial result: self-signifying conventional terms can supposit materially. I argue that this result makes for a more satisfying theory.

Tim Crowley, UCD
tim.crowley@ucd.ie
“The Matter of the Elements”

At *De Gen. et Cor.* II.1 Aristotle says that there is some matter of the perceptible bodies, and that it is from this that the so-called elements come to be (329a24-6). What this seems to suggest is that the elements fire, air, water, and earth are not the most fundamental kinds of matter that Aristotle recognises, for there is a 'matter of the elements', in the sense of a matter that composes the elements. In this paper I want to argue that that is not the case. I shall argue that there is scope in Aristotle's texts for an interpretation that accommodates both the claim that the four so-called elements are the most fundamental kinds of matter, and the claim that there is some matter from which the elements come to be, which is other than, but common to, the elements. In other words, I

do not believe that the acceptance of the latter claim threatens the elementary status of the so-called elements fire, air, water, and earth.

A key distinction to which I shall appeal in this paper is that between the ways in which one thing may be said to be 'from' (ek) another. If we say, for instance, that 'A is from B', then we might intend that A is from B in the sense that B is that out of which A is made, or composed; alternatively, we might intend that B is the source or origin or principle of, or the starting point in the change that leads to, A. The distinction is important because, whereas with the former use of 'from', B is a constituent of A, with the latter, B need not be, and generally is not, a constituent of A (Metaph. XIV.5, 1092a29-30). Let's call this a distinction between 'constitutive' and 'non-constitutive', or 'originative', uses of 'from'. In this paper I intend to argue that the elements come to be from the matter of the perceptible bodies according to the second use of 'from'. In other words, the elements come to be from (ek) some matter, in the sense that they emerge from this matter, or are generated from it; the matter is, as it were, the origin of the elements, but it does not persist as material constituent of the elements. It is not, then, the matter 'of' the elements in the constitutive sense of 'that of which each of the elements is composed', or 'made of'. But what is this matter? It is precisely what Aristotle says it is, i.e., the matter of the perceptible bodies, understood as the matter of familiar composite substances; in other words, it is itself something that comes to be from the elements (that is, in the constitutive use of 'from').

I believe that the rather novel interpretation I propose is supported by the textual evidence; it is consistent with key principles of Aristotle's system; and, moreover, it defuses a number of problems in Aristotle's *De Gen. et Cor.*

Howard J. Curzer,

howard.curzer@ttu.edu

"Plato's Rejection of the Instrumental Account of Friendship in the *Lysis*"

In the *Lysis*, Socrates argues that friendship is always motivated by a desire to use others for one's own gain (210b-d), and some commentators take Socrates to be speaking for Plato on this point. By contrast, I shall argue that the *Lysis* is a *reductio ad absurdum* of this instrumental account of friendship. First, Socrates reaches the counterintuitive conclusion that good people cannot befriend each other (214b-215c). The natural way to avoid this conclusion is to abandon the premise that friendship is instrumental. Second, Socrates shows that unlike love, friendship must be mutual (212b-d). Socrates later argues that neither-good-nor-bad people and good people can befriend each other (216c-217a). But neither-good-nor-bad people are not useful to good people. Again the instrumental account of friendship should be abandoned. Third, Socrates distinguishes between people who are desirable because they are useful, and "true friends" who are desirable for their own sake (219c-220b). This is an explicit rejection of the instrumental account of friendship. Finally,

Socrates shows that equating “desire for someone” with “wanting to use that person to improve oneself” leads to the absurd implication that someone who is truly loved must reciprocate. This is yet another reason to reject the instrumental account of friendship.

Michael Da Silva, Currently Rutgers, but Toronto starting in Fall 2013

Michael.e.dasilva@gmail.com

“Aristotle’s Empirical Foundationalism in the Posterior Analytics”

There are two dominant approaches to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics [PA]. The latter admits of competing interpretations. The main split is between those who believe it is a predominantly non-epistemological project concerned with something other than knowledge and those who believe it is an epistemological project concerned with ‘scientific’ or ‘intellectual’ knowledge. Those who assume that there is an epistemological project in the PA debate whether it is empiricist or rationalist in nature. Even approaches that combine empiricism and rationalism raise questions of primacy. This work supports the empiricist reading. It argues that, at minimum, Aristotle has an empirical foundationalist epistemology in the PA. Aristotle’s epistemological project begins with an empirical knowledge base on which all further knowledge depends: perceptual data. His epistemological project is accordingly fundamentally empirical at its outset, even if acquisition of some types of further knowledge depends on rational processes. Once this position is clear, the piece goes on to suggest that this picture is not as implausible as it may seem at the outset as it has some broad consistency with modern epistemological viewpoints. The strong principle of charity often applied to Aristotle can be applied to the empirical foundationalist reading.

Carlo DaVia, Fordham University

davia@fordham.edu

“Starting Points of Inquiry in the Nicomachean Ethics”

Many scholars have regarded the methodological passage (1145b1-7) prefacing Aristotle's discussion of akrasia as articulating the “diaporetic” method by which the entire *Nicomachean Ethics* proceeds. It is often supposed that the method proposed in this passage involves two central claims: (1) the goal of ethical inquiry is reach true beliefs about happiness, virtue, friendship, pleasure, and other matters relevant to the good life; and (2) this goal is always achieved by first identifying the relevant ethical phenomena, then raising difficulties concerning those phenomena, and then resolving dialectically those difficulties in a way that preserves as many of the reputable beliefs about the phenomena (endoxa) as possible.

A recently growing minority of scholars have rightly argued that the “political science” (epistēmē politikē, 1094b11) presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not, in fact, follow the diaporetic method, but rather conforms to the structure of demonstrable scientific inquiry discussed in the *Posterior Analytics*. As with any epistēmē, the *Nicomachean Ethics* begins by showing the existence of its subject matter – in this case the human good, or happiness. Having identified its subject matter, the text then proceeds to gain an understanding of it. This understanding is acquired through definition. First a nominal definition is given (to eu prattein: A.4, 1095a19-20), and then an essential definition (cf. *An. Post.* B.8, 93b29-32) is reached through the “function argument” (A.6, 1097b22ff). The remainder of the *Nicomachean Ethics* then seeks to articulate this conception of the good human life by defining each of the moral and intellectual virtues, as well as ancillary ethical concepts like friendship and pleasure.

This reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics* has led a number of scholars to hold the claim that that the starting points for political science are, as in all sciences, “the facts” (ta hoti; cf. *Post. An.* B.1, 89b25-31; *NE* A.4, 1095b3-7). This, however, is a misunderstanding. Although the *Nicomachean Ethics* indeed presents a political science, the starting points of inquiry are not scientific facts, but rather dialectical premises, as defined in the *Topics*. The text is intended to guide listeners from premises they would accept to conclusive definitions of ethical concepts like happiness, virtue, and so forth. In order to serve this didactic purpose, Aristotle must present his ethical definitions in a way that begins from dialectical premises that are more familiar (gnōrimōteron) to his audience (*NE* A.4, 1095b3-4; cf. *An. Post.* A.2, 71b20-72a6; *Met.* Z.4, 1029b3-12).

In order to help correct this misunderstanding, this paper will offer a close reading of the four passages most often adduced as examples of where Aristotle either (a) makes a methodological remark about employing facts as starting points, or (b) appeals to “facts” rather than endoxa in order to reach or confirm definitions of ethical concepts: A.7, 1098a33-b8; A.8, 1098b9-11; I.12, 1172b4-7; and K.8, 1179a16-19. It will be argued that when these passages are understood in their contexts, none of them do, in fact, refute the claim that the starting points for inquiry in the *Nicomachean Ethics* are dialectical premises.

Paul DiRado, University of Kentucky

paul.dirado@uky.edu

“The Normative Structures of Judgment in Plato's *Theaetetus*”

In the *Theaetetus*, Plato critiques what would now be described as a representationalist account of knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that Plato's critique reveals that judgment has an implicit normative structure. These norms are the standards that the soul uses to reach concrete determinations concerning the concepts it considers in judgment, but they are not themselves concepts or representations. Thus, on Plato's account, representationalism overlooks the very non-

representational normative structures that allow judgment to operate in the way that representationalist accounts presuppose.

Plato arrives at this conclusion as a result of investigating whether Theaetetus' second definition of knowledge is capable of accounting for the possibility of falsehood. Theaetetus claims that knowledge is true judgment (*doxa*), where judgments are formed when the soul calculates the non-perceptual features of its various perceptual experiences. Theaetetus understands this calculation as a kind of comparison—experience leaves behind certain markers or concepts in the soul that represent past experience, and the soul forms judgments by matching these concepts with other concepts and present experiences. However, for this account of judgment to succeed, it must be the case that the soul knows these concepts, as the soul cannot make determinations about something it doesn't know. This account seems to make falsehood impossible, however, because it is unclear how the soul could ever make incorrect determinations about something it knows.

Socrates attempts to explicate how such falsehood is possible by presenting the representationalist images of the waxen blocks and the aviary. These images, the aviary in particular, demonstrate the existence of an intermediate stage between knowing and not knowing a concept. The soul can possess some concept without actively applying that concept in a given situation. Though this solution resolves one version of the problem of falsehood, both images make it clear that the concepts formed from experience are in principle separable from the experience that those concepts are intended to represent. The waxen block image shows that nothing necessitates that the Theaetetus waxen block be matched up with the present perception of Theaetetus, since it could just as readily get applied to the perception of Theodorus. Similarly, in the aviary the soul does not have to choose the representative concept of "12" when attempting to add $5+7$, as the 11 "bird" can just as readily be selected as the 12 "bird." The correctness of a given match between representative concept and phenomenon thus requires that the soul grasp some normative standard in addition to the representational concept. This normative standard would govern the application of the concept to the thing. However, if this norm is itself one of the representations present in the soul, an infinite regress emerges—the application of that representation would require some further governing norm. Thus, the norms governing judgment cannot themselves be representations and must be explanatorily prior to the acquisition of knowledge via experience.

Brian Donohue, SUNY Buffalo

bdonohue29@gmail.com

"Thomas Aquinas on Persons"

Nowadays the concept of person is widely supposed to be of central importance to both metaphysics and ethics—metaphysics insofar as 'person' is thought to indicate a peculiar class of beings with certain properties, and ethics insofar as being a person is thought to grant special moral

status or consideration. But the history of this concept is obscure, both in its definition and in its implications. One important figure that can throw light on both facets is Thomas Aquinas, who (like his contemporaries) discusses the meaning of *persona* largely in connection to Trinitarian doctrine, but also (unlike his contemporaries) suggests linking the word to societal status, jurisprudence, and dignity vis-à-vis the rest of nature.

The paper will proceed in three stages. The first is to dispel certain mischaracterizations of Thomas's concept: 'person' does not pick out the soul-body (or so-called 'hylomorphic') unity; 'person' as such is not specially related to morality; Thomas's association of 'person' with dignity is unlike the contemporary expression, "the dignity of the person." The second is an argument that the concept in Thomas does not indicate a metaphysical class, 'persons,' of which (say) human beings, angels, and God are all members. This is due to the priority of nature over person in Thomas's Boethian formula, and the determination of the latter by the former. The third is an exposition of a few neglected texts in Thomas that link 'person' with the use of *persona* in the medieval jurists, and the implications of these texts for our understanding of 'person' in historical perspective.

Ryan Drake, Fairfield University

rdrake@fairfield.edu

"Mimetic Sympathy in Aristotle's Poetics"

While Aristotle makes clear in the *Poetics* that a blending of pity and fear with pleasure is central to tragedy's proper effect – and indeed, much of the text is devoted to the proper composition of dramatic structure to this end – it is decidedly less clear how this overall effect is brought about in terms of the psychology of the spectators. For such blending implies a psychological contradiction: in Woodruff's words, "The poet must make us respond to events represented on stage as if they are actually happening, so as to evoke fear and pity, and as if they are not, so as to cause pleasure rather than pain." This complex state, wherein we are seduced into feeling with and for fictional personages as if they were real, and which Skulsky refers to as the work's "almost hypnotic domination of consciousness" on the part of the audience, is only mentioned in passing in *Poetics* 6, under the somewhat mystical term 'psychagōgia'. Yet even more vexing for the modern reader, who would be inclined to explain such experience with reference to the imagination, is the fact that Aristotle nowhere invokes *phantasia* in his extensive treatment of poetic mimesis. This paper undertakes the speculative project of tracing out an implicit connection between *phantasia* (as discussed in *De Anima* 3 and the *Rhetoric*) and *psychagōgia* in relation to mimetic representations in order to account for just what it is, beyond the necessary rational comprehension, that the audience contributes to a tragic performance such that the latter can do its proper work.

Maureen Eckert, UMASS Dartmouth

meckert@umassd.edu

“Assessing the Origin Myth of Western Philosophy”

Is (Western) philosophy inherently agonistic? Are intellectual contest and conflict the means to achieve philosophical truths? And, further, are these aspects of philosophical practice exclusionary? Renewed debate regarding contemporary academic philosophy and exclusions found with respect to gender, race and class frequently refer to an Origin Myth located in ancient Greek philosophy. Plato's depiction of Socratic dialogue, specifically the elenchus, is central in the origin myth establishing Western Philosophical discourse. The vast diversity of Pre-Socratic writing forms muddies this supposed paradigm-setting moment for what counts as philosophical discourse. However, further complexities arise, as Plato's works are, themselves, literary illusions of this paradigm setting moment. Plato engages in a form of historical fiction in dialogue, landing him squarely within the diversity of the "Pre-Socratic" writers (despite the fact that he wrote after Socrates). The labeling of “Pre” and “Post” Socratic philosophy fails to do justice to the historical context and diversity of options available for philosophical expression. The entrenched Origin Myth of Western Philosophy conceals its origins. To some extent, the agonistic model of philosophical practice, itself entrenched, generates this very occlusion as it relies on a selective interpretive method with respect to the source materials central to the Origin Myth. Debates about present philosophical practices could be improved by either reflective, historically grounded assessment of our myths or even abandoning mythic justifications entirely.

Ariane Economos, Marymount University

arianeeconomos@gmail.com

“An Aristotelian Approach to the Ethical Treatment of Animals”

An Aristotelian Approach to the Ethical Treatment of Animals

In this paper I argue that contemporary debates concerning the ethical treatment of animals would be greatly enriched if we were to utilize two elements of Aristotle's philosophy, namely, (1) a teleological explanation of animals' natural operations, and (2) an emphasis on the role of practical reason in ethical decision-making. By combining these elements with a loose form of natural law, a new and fruitful starting-point emerges for addressing ethical concerns regarding the treatment of animals.

The paper will begin by outlining some current ethical approaches concerning the treatment of animals (in particular, contractualist and utilitarian approaches), and I will argue that these approaches rely on unjustified assumptions about the mental states of animals. I will then argue for my own view, namely, that we need not make any assumptions whatsoever about animals' mental

states in order to come up with a robust ethical position which can address how we ought and ought not to treat them. Instead, we can develop such an ethical position solely by relying on the observation of: (1) the typical behavior of a species, (2) the typical behavior of an individual, or (3) both, depending on the ethical issue under consideration. That is, we should observe how animals do tend to behave, and then treat them in such a manner that they are able to continue behaving in such a manner. It is in this part of the paper that I will discuss how the roots of my view may be found in Aristotle's discussion of teleology and Aquinas's discussion of natural law.

I will provide a few examples of the application of my view to particular cases, highlighting how it can make a similar case for the consideration of animals' interests as do rights-based and utility-based approaches, while avoiding some of these views' pitfalls. The benefits of adopting my approach will be shown in three ways: first, that it is in accord with some of our common intuitions about how we ought to treat animals; second, that it encourages us to make similar changes to the way we currently treat animals as do other ethical approaches, but without the baggage of assumptions about animals' minds; and third, that it provides a response to one of the most common reasons people give for failing to act in an ethical manner toward animals, namely, that we "can't really know" if they are suffering. Finally, the paper will address some objections to my view.

Jay Elliott, Bard College
jelliott@bard.edu
"Virtue Embodied and Embedded"

A central debate in ancient moral philosophy concerned the "sufficiency thesis", according to which a life of virtuous activity is sufficient for happiness. In the ancient debate, the Stoics defended the thesis, while Aristotle and his followers rejected it, on the grounds that happiness requires certain bodily and external goods in addition, such as health, wealth, and friends. Despite the recent revival of interest in ancient virtue ethics, contemporary philosophers have not usually regarded the sufficiency thesis as open to serious discussion: they have tended to dismiss it as obviously implausible, and to assume that the ancient debate was effectively settled by Aristotle. In "Virtue Embodied and Embedded", I argue that we should regard the ancient debate as far from settled, and that we should place the sufficiency thesis back on the agenda for contemporary virtue theory. In particular, I aim to provide a novel defense of the sufficiency thesis that allows us to combine the essential insights of the Stoic and Aristotelian positions while avoiding their respective limitations.

My argument begins by identifying the profound but usually neglected insight behind the sufficiency thesis. This insight is that as human beings, we are essentially agents of a certain sort, and therefore our happiness lies in what we make of our lives, rather than in anything that merely happens to us. The traditional problem for the sufficiency thesis, as Aristotle rightly pointed out, is that it seems to ignore the dependence of human happiness on the body and the world, and thus to

deny our vulnerability to factors outside of our control. This problem has seemed to doom the sufficiency thesis, I argue, only because we tend to assume a particular conception of human agency, which I call “internalism about agency”. According to internalism, virtuous activity primarily consists in certain “inner” states, such as choosing or intending, and is essentially independent of anything bodily or worldly. In opposition to this internalist conception, I develop an alternative, externalist conception, according to which virtuous activity should be thought of as the successful performance of certain bodily and worldly actions. This externalist conception allows us to affirm the sufficiency thesis, while also acknowledging our vulnerability, since from an externalist perspective, our capacity to perform virtuous actions is itself subject to factors beyond our control.

I conclude by contrasting my argument with Daniel Russell’s recent attempt to revisit the ancient sufficiency debate. Russell and I agree that neither the Stoic nor the Aristotelian position is fully acceptable, and that a third alternative is needed. But we differ fundamentally over the shape of that alternative. Russell has proposed that the key to overcoming the ancient debate is to acknowledge that virtuous activity can be indexed to particular persons and relationships. By contrast, I argue that the fundamental assumption driving the ancient debate is internalism about agency, and that a successful alternative needs to begin from the thought that virtuous activity is not simply a matter of what we choose or intend, but of what we do.

Charlene Elsby, McMaster University

celsby@gmail.com

“Truth and Temporality in Aristotle”

Here I examine what Aristotle’s tensed notion of truth in conjunction with his metaphysics of time, in order to determine what can be truly (or falsely) said about things that existed in the past as well as things that don’t exist yet. Things that no longer exist, or that do not exist yet, are of different kinds, according to Aristotle: things that no longer exist (but once did) are definite, and we can represent them linguistically with statements that either correspond or don’t correspond to how they existed; things that do not yet exist, on the other hand, are a more difficult problem for logicians and philosophers of language, for what we can say of them depends on how we imagine a metaphysics of time. The problem of future contingents in *De Interpretatione* 9 tells us Aristotle’s views on what is possible for us to truly say about the future, limited by the contingency introduced by events that occur as a result of deliberation. What is true of the future is also clearly dependent on the concept of time Aristotle is working with, and how temporality is present in assertions (as a possibly truth-functional element). I will begin by describing the problem of Aristotle’s future sea battle and how it has been traditionally interpreted, with more and less success, as describing Aristotle’s views on a possible exception to the Law of Excluded Middle, and as an attempt to define “contingency”. While much of the literature has been critical of Aristotle, I will defend his view and demonstrate its consistency with his ideas on time we find in the *Physics*. One problem with traditional

interpretations is where we should locate temporality within an assertion. That is, where something does not exist yet, what is true to say of it or, more importantly, when is it true to say such things—at the moment of utterance, or when the time to which we refer becomes the present time. In a third section, I will point out the relevant sections of Aristotle's *De Anima* which indicate that temporality is not only evident in the copula or verb of an assertion but also in the complex affections of the soul to which we refer when we assert something of something. Where something no longer exists, it is possible to match up the times included in the subject and predicate if I were to say, for instance, "Socrates was a monster,"; for, if the temporal aspect of the thought I have of Socrates is that he existed in the past, the verb agrees in tense with the time included in my thought. If, however, I attempt to make a similar match up of a future subject with a future tense, there is nothing yet to which the subject term of my assertion refers—that is, I can have no accurate thought of Future Socrates or what he will be like, for the mere fact that I do not yet know him.

Mark Erste, Jr., Franciscan University of Steubenville

eagle.erste@gmail.com

"Plotinus' Metaphysical Foundation of Eternity in Intellect's Completeness, Unity, And Immutability"

Although there has been worthy discussion of Plotinus' Ennead III.7 "Eternity and Time," our understanding of his concept of eternity remains hazy. Scholars have not formulated a clear, unequivocal definition of what precisely he means by eternity. When the metaphysical underpinnings of eternity and Intellect's intensity of being are taken into account, however, a much clearer definition can be formulated. These allow eternity to be seen as a byproduct of Intellect's changeless and complete way of existing rather than as a separate entity or independent reality. Incidentally, such an account has major impacts for Plotinus's theory of time, but this latter theory has been better discussed and its proximity to our experience makes a clear definition less necessary for our understanding of his meaning. Clarifying Plotinus' theory of eternity will enrich our understanding of his theory of eternity, time and his broader metaphysical doctrines. Additionally, it may help advance the contemporary debate on the nature of time by suggesting for debate a metaphysical underpinning for time. This paper attempts to clarify what Plotinus means by eternity in an attempt to reach a well-defined statement of his notion. I will conduct this analysis as follows. I examine III.7 to lay out a preliminary understanding of what Plotinus means by eternity. This examination will include a brief discussion of time as a counterpoint to help understand eternity. It will also show that temporality and eternity are each the consequence of being in a specific way. A discussion of Intellect follows to show how Plotinus theory of the intellectual world strengthens, clarifies, and entails this or a similar concept of eternity. Lastly, I examine contemporary discussions of his theory to show how the exposition of the first two analyses solves some major ambiguities. I conclude that Plotinus sees eternity as the "temporal" analysis of Intellect's way of being, of

possessing its being all at once instead of spread out past, present, and future in a line, as it were, over the temporal dimension.

Christos Evangeliou, Towson University

“Aristotle vs. Guthrie: The question of Philosophy's birth in relation to Africa”

Did philosophy began in the 6th BC in Asia Minor, as the Western historiographers contend? We will consider this question from two contrasting perspectives, Aristotle's and that of Guthrie, as typical representatives of the Ancient Hellenic and Modern European approach, respectively. By analyzing their respective arguments critically, we will expose their respect of truth and bias.

Christos Evangeliou, Towson University

cevaneliou@towson.edu

“Pletho's Response to Aristotle's Critique of Platonic Ontology”

Pletho’s Response to Aristotle’s Critique

Of Platonic Ontology

By

Dr. Christos Evangeliou

Professor of Philosophy

Towson University, USA

Abstract

It is my purpose in this study to identify and discuss the major points on which Aristotle differs from Plato ontologically, in Pletho’s judgment, by critically presenting the main arguments of his sustained critique. It will be shown that these arguments are invariably favorable to Plato, because of the perceived imbalance in favor of Aristotle, at least in Western Europe and in the Scholastic era.

In spite of his Platonic bias, it will become clear that, by pointing out fundamental differences between Plato and Aristotle, in their respective theories of being, as well as in other areas, Pletho’s critique accomplished its specific goal of reviving even briefly the Platonic philosophy in the Italian Renaissance.

Our discussion will also make clear Pletho's method of approach and the main target of his critique, which was Aristotle's novel conception of being as a "πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον." In this sense, Pletho's critique of Aristotle can be seen as a continuation of Plotinus' critique of the Aristotelian ontological novelties, in defense of the divine Plato.

William Evans, Saint Peters University

wevans@saintpeters.edu

"On Teaching Plato's *Republic* as a Dialogue on the Education of the Soul"

On Teaching Plato's *Republic* as a Dialogue on the Education of the Soul

When I teach philosophy, I don't tell students much in advance what they will find in the readings; instead I aim to help them to see the philosophers' ideas revealed as we read the books together. But Plato's *Republic* presents special problems in setting out on this road: it is so rich in ideas as to seem labyrinthine, and students need some guiding thread to find their way through it; the *Republic* is a dialogue, not an essay or treatise, so that not only what is said, but who says it, to whom and at what time, are not dispensable and only add to the dialogue's complexity; and Plato himself never speaks in his own voice, making attributions of theories or ideas to Plato risky. Unless one has the time to study the entirety of the *Republic*, so that the dialogue in all its richness might be gradually revealed, one faces the problem of what parts of the dialogue to use. This choice should be guided by some conception of what the *Republic* is about, but therein lies another problem: is it, as commonly believed and as the title suggests, a work primarily of political philosophy? Is Plato presenting a sketch of a utopian state and a critique of lesser states? Or is Plato a metaphysician presenting his theory of forms? I suggest that we teach the dialogue differently, that its subject matter is the nature of the soul and what improves it. This is clearly implied by the city-soul analogy and by Socrates' remarks at the end of Book IX. In order to support this reading I will focus on the character of Socrates, especially on his frequent expressions of doubt and his hesitancy about what he proposes. As a philosopher who in his own terms is in doubt and still seeking the truth, we can better understand his frequent use of images, especially of the Good. The *Republic*, then, is essentially open and undogmatic: it is an image of the soul of the Socratic philosopher, ever seeking but not possessing wisdom, in dialogue with others about the very nature of the soul and what improves it, which allows us to ask whether Socratic dialogue really is an activity that improves the soul.

Gene Fendt, Univ of Nebraska, Kearney

fendtg@unk.edu

"The least serious music, and some others"

In Laws 2, the Stranger says "whenever someone says that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall necessarily reject his statement, seeking such music as the least serious--if indeed such music can come to be, rather seeking that which carries along likeness (homiotita) to mimesis of the beautiful." This paper will try to answer two questions: Why does the Athenian Stranger consider it doubtful that a music that is "a harmless pleasure only" can even exist? What does he mean in seeking art which "carries along likeness to mimesis of the beautiful"?

Our first question seems perfectly reasonable given the context of the remark we are questioning. Just before it, the stranger said, "in all things which are accompanied by some charm (charis) [isn't] the most important or serious feature either this charm itself, alone, or a certain correctness, or third, the benefit?"

The second seems excessively verbose; the Stranger could more briefly consider what "carries along likeness to the beautiful (or good)" or "is a mimesis of the beautiful (or good)"? to state what is usually considered the Platonist point more precisely.

A careful reading of the scene will argue that the Stranger seems to want us to make a distinction between what he calls the eikastic and the mimetic aspects of a work of art. Such a distinction allows us to answer these questions in a way which reveals that a judgment of the beautiful does not depend upon a pleasure engendered by the work having a correct relation to a thing, but rather a beneficial relation to the subject, the audience. The judgment that a thing (or rather experience of it) is beautiful will include pleasure, but must also be distinct from the pleasant, for we will have seen how pleasure haunts every sort of soul—mad, prudent, well-trained, ill-raised as well as the arational child. This, in turn, allows us to see that there can be (against Kleinias) an incorrect but beneficial music--comedy. The Stranger, then, is not himself concluding that "the poets are so inferior, as poets, to the Muses themselves. The latter would never make a mistake like setting a man's words to a woman's color and tune, or like harmonizing the tune and postures of free men with the rhythms of slaves" (669c). Rather this is what Kleinias must say given his incapacity to make the distinction the Stranger suggests. The Stranger himself may praise a comedy that is full of such things, as Dionysus, in *Frogs*, exemplifies.

Alessandra Fussi, Department of Philosophy University of Pisa
fussi@fls.unipi.it

"Aristotle's discussion of shame in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the *Rhetoric*"

A preliminary question we have to ask with respect to Aristotle's discussion of *aischyne* in the *Rhetoric* is whether this concept only partially overlaps with that particular segment of the emotional continuum that we would nowadays call shame. One related problem is that in Greek culture we cannot find a word corresponding to guilt. Scholars who characterize Greek culture as a culture of

shame point out that, while for us guilt and shame are two interrelated concepts, the absence of the concept of guilt in classical philosophy and literature has significant moral relevance, and ought to play a role in our attempt to understand *aidos*/*aischyne*. A person feels guilt, the argument goes, with respect to her actions when she feels she may have wronged others. Guilt is an emotional response to moral responsibility. Shame, on the other hand, is not primarily related to an authentic concern for others; rather, it is a self-related emotion. We feel shame at our bad actions because they may endanger our good reputation. Others play a role only insofar as we care for their opinions.

With respect to Aristotle's conception of shame, the question is then if a concern for reputation may entail a concern for moral action and to what extent shame plays a role in the virtuous life. However, Aristotle speaks of shame not only in the *Rhetoric* (when he addresses the emotions), but also in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (where his focus is on virtue and vice), and he employs two different terms with slightly different meanings: in the *Rhetoric* he speaks of *aischyne*, while in the *Nicomachean Ethics* his focus is on *aidos*. *Aidos* and *aischyne* do not seem to refer to the same emotion. While *aidos* roughly corresponds to a prospective and inhibitory sense of shame for future actions, *aischyne* corresponds to the shame one feels for past actions.

In this paper I am going to address both the possible distinction between *aidos* and *aischyne* in Aristotle's work and the moral relevance of shame in Aristotle's overall conception. With respect to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, I will concentrate on the reasons why Aristotle maintains that *aidos* can be helpful in the education to virtue but cannot itself be considered a virtue. With respect to the discussion of *aischyne* in the *Rhetoric* I will first address the relevance of temporality, and then focus on the role that witnesses are supposed to play with respect to shame. In the last part of the paper I will attempt to draw some conclusions with respect to guilt and shame. My claim is that on the one hand Aristotle attributes to shame certain functions that we would commonly attribute to guilt; on the other hand, however, I will also claim that shame for Aristotle covers a wider range of phenomena than we might be inclined to expect (not just actions for which an agent can be responsible, but also situations in which the agent plays no active role, or even events in which the subject suffers passively evil done by others), and that it would be wrong to interpret shame only in moral terms. The concept of shame that emerges from the reading of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is related to guilt but wider and more complex than guilt.

Myrna Gabbe, University of Dayton

mgabbe1@udayton.edu

"Lessons From *De Anima* I: The Argument from the Emotions"

LESSONS FROM *DE ANIMA* I:

The Argument from the Emotions

Aristotle's conception of the soul was radical in his day. His hylomorphic soul departed from the theories of his predecessors in terms of its purview, capacity to move, and inseparability from the body. Aristotle's predecessors took movement and discrimination to be the chief characteristics of the soul, belonging to it in virtue of its nature. And as an operationally independent entity, the soul was ascribed a constitution distinct from the body. Aristotle widens the purview of the soul by making it responsible for all natural activities of a living being. The result is that nutrition, growth, and reproduction come under the scope of the soul's responsibilities, allowing him to group plants among the entities with souls on the condition that he can show it unmoved by its nature.

Aristotle's positive treatment of the soul appears in Book II and III of the *De Anima*. Book I prepares the reader for the innovations detailed in the later books by mining the views of his predecessors for valuable insights and engaging their positions to bring to light problems that must be avoided. The *De Anima* thus employs the dialectical method to arrive at and justify psychic truths.

None of this should be new knowledge to anyone familiar with Aristotle's psychology. Yet the dialectical nature of the *De Anima* is often treated as marginal or irrelevant for understanding Aristotle's positive assertions in Book II and beyond. It is typical, for instance, to find the arguments in Book I analyzed without any reference to Aristotle's opponents, and at least three translations, or publications, of the *De Anima* encourage this treatment of the text by providing only portions of Book I.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a contextually sensitive analysis of the argument in Book I that uses fear and anger as examples to show that the affections of the soul belong properly to the complex of body and soul. This is an important argument not in the least because it serves as a central piece of evidence in support of a functionalist interpretation. In this paper I shall argue that a contextually sensitive analysis of Aristotle's argument prohibits such a reading. The functionalist interpretation takes the argument out of its historical context by directing the argument towards opponents that Aristotle did not have. I shall then provide an interpretation of the argument that provides insight into why Aristotle was driven to unify the body and soul with his hylomorphic treatment. The argument from the emotions, I contend, reveals that Aristotle conceived the body and soul as providing two aspects of a single affection: the body provides the felt sensations, the soul the articulable discriminations. The body is a necessary component of any thought or desire in that it expresses their content and explains the manner (not the reason) by which we act. Only a body that is made one with the soul, as Aristotle's novel treatment does, can account for the unity of an individual's experience.

Erikk Geannikis, The Catholic University of America

36geannikis@cardinalmail.cua.edu

"Aristotle and Plato on Derivative Naming: Paronymy and Onomatopoeia in the Categories and the Cratylus"

The *Categories* of Aristotle and the *Cratylus* of Plato are both fairly enigmatic works, yet each provides a fairly unique opportunity for insight into how each author understood the relationship between words and things. In this paper I discuss how this broad question of how words are related to things can be investigated in both texts through an analysis of derivative naming—the process whereby some name is either originally contrived or applied to a thing only insofar as it is derived from some other name. In the first and primary part of the paper, this analysis is a discussion of Aristotle’s relationship of paronymy, a concept which is introduced in ch. 1 of the *Categories*, but receives crucial further development in the context of qualities (ch. 8) and relations (ch. 7). I analyze the grammatical, predicational, and ontological circumstances of Aristotle’s examples of paronymy in each of these contexts, showing how, in Aristotle’s theory of relations, paronymy can necessitate onomatopoeia—name-creation. I also briefly outline a connection between paronymy and the controversial situation of so-called “non-substantial individuals” in ch. 2. I argue that an analysis of the logistics of paronymy relations sheds light on the *Categories* as a work of “proto-metaphysics,” a kind of phenomenology of how words are used in describing being. In the second part of the paper, I compare these conclusions to the situation in Plato’s *Cratylus*, where Socrates introduces the onomatourgos—the hypothetical demigod of ideal name-creation. First I recapitulate key points in the dialogue’s conflict between Hermogenes and Cratylus regarding the source of correctness in names, and I discuss Socrates’s responses to each character’s position. I aim to show that Socrates’s remarks—even the notoriously idiosyncratic “etymologies”—can, like Aristotle’s claims in the *Categories*, also be interpreted as a “proto-metaphysics,” with some crucial differences and distinctions (along the lines of perennial divergences of Aristotelian philosophy from Plato). Socrates’s emphasis on the act of name-bestowing, and on a kind derivative naming in particular, allows us to carve out a *via media* in the theory of names somewhere between the conventionalism of Hermogenes and the naturalism of Cratylus, one which shares some important features with the *Categories* account. In both works, all claims to metaphysics, “proto-metaphysics,” or the theory of language are governed by a positive commitment to a primary ontological association between words in their use and the true nature of things.

Twyla Gibson, University of Missouri

gibsontg@missouri.edu

“The Vicious Circle: The True Definition of Knowledge in Plato’s *Theaetetus*”

Plato’s *Theaetetus* appears to end without arriving at a true and accurate definition of knowledge. A number of responses to this puzzling inconclusiveness have been offered in the history of interpretation. This paper presents a new proposal. I argue that Socrates provides the accurate definition at the beginning of the dialogue, shows that three alternative views cannot be correct, and then calls for a return to the place that served as the starting point. The approach relies on recent

research concerning parallelism and ring composition in Plato (and the Greek tradition more generally). In parallelism, the overall plot of a work is organized by topic into a series that is then repeated in exactly the same order: A-B-C-D-A-B-C-D. In ring composition, the order of the topics in an initial series is reiterated in reverse to return to complete the circle: A-B-C-D-C-B-A. Socrates in the *Theaetetus* divides knowledge into four distinct parts by way of four views of “what knowledge really is”: (1) the position that “knowledge and wisdom are the same thing” (Tht. 145e); (2) the view that “knowledge is nothing else than perception” (Tht. 151e); (3) the saying that “knowledge is the true opinion” (Tht. 187b); and (4) the notion that “knowledge is true opinion accompanied by reason” (Tht. 201d). After asserting that knowledge is “neither perception, nor true belief, nor the addition of an ‘account’ to true belief” (Tht. 210b), he warns that we have been moving in “the most vicious of circles,” and tells Theaetetus to go back to the beginning. I propose that the plot pattern of the dialogue follows the sequence, D-A-B-C. The discussion begins from the final place in the sequence: D, moves to the A position in the series, and then in turn through B and C, whereupon there is a return to the starting point, i.e., D-A-B-C. Thus, the correct definition, that “knowledge and wisdom are the same” is found at the beginning and not at the end of the dialogue.

Owen Goldin, Marquette University

Owen.Goldin@marquette.edu

“Principles and Metaprinciples in Philolaus and the Earlier Pythagoreans”

Within *Meta. A 5* Aristotle distinguishes between two Pythagorean accounts of the principle of things, that which arrays the principles of all things in two opposed columns, and that which takes numbers to be the principles of all things. Aristotle takes these accounts to arise from different sets of Pythagoreans, and scholars today agree. The first account is an attempt to schematize the sort of associations among contraries that anthropologists recognizes as implicit in the conceptual frameworks of many pretechnological cultures. The second is that of Philolaus (as Aristotle reads him). Although Aristotle does not attempt to integrate the two accounts, the genuine fragments of Philolaus show that the second has much to do with the first. Philolaus’ core distinction between those principles that are limiters and those that are unlimited is related to the distinction between limit and unlimited, as presented in the table of opposites. Odd and even, which are among the opposites given in the table, are principles of number. Although this is somewhat speculative, it is reasonable to understand Philolaus’ account of principles as a response to and development of the account of principles that underlies the table of opposites. Although the particular principles posited by Philolaus are instances of what is limiting or unlimited, the limit and the unlimited are implicit as more fundamental principles, by which the particular principles are to be understood. Philolaus thus shows how one pair of principles in the table of opposites is thus logically and conceptually prior than the others, as it is that pair that explains why the other pairs have the role that they have. Philolaus has thus moved beyond the identification of causes and principles; he has

determined what it is about a cause or principle that makes it a cause or a principle. This marks a major advance in the development of ancient Greek theories of explanation and causation. The reification of these meta-principles, however, awaits Plato's *Philebus*.

Francisco Gonzalez, University of Ottawa

fgonzal2@uottawa.ca

“Heidegger's (Re)Turn to Aristotle: the Seminars of 1944 and 1950-52”

Much has been written about Heidegger's intensive engagement with Aristotle during the 1920's and the heavy debt to this engagement of the major work that would close the decade: *Being and Time*. Much less attention has been given to the importance of Aristotle for Heidegger's later thought (after the so-called *Kehre*) for the simple reason that this later study seemed limited to the essay on the essence and concept of *physis* in *Physics* II from 1939. Now the recent publication of volume 83 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, *Seminare: Platon – Aristoteles - Augustinus* shows us that Heidegger's later study of Aristotle went far beyond the second book of the *Physics* and was pursued much later than 1939. At the very end of the war (April 20 to July 28, 1944) Heidegger led a seminar on *Metaphysics* Gamma and Zeta. Here Heidegger finds in the first sentence of Book Gamma the problem of the ontological difference between being and beings, since the phrase “being insofar as being” is explained by the ambiguity of the Greek word for being (*on*) between its nominal (beings) and verbal (to be) senses. After the war, when the ban that prevents him from teaching is lifted, Heidegger immediately devotes three seminars to Aristotle. The first dates from the winter semester of 1951-52 and focuses on the notion of causality: a notion that in its importance for Western metaphysics Heidegger sees as arising from the forgetting of the distinction between being and beings. The second dates from the summer semester of 1951 and focuses on the notion of causality again and the phenomenon of motion in Books 2 and 3 of Aristotle's *Physics*. The third dates from the winter semester of 1951-52 and, continuing the reading of the account of motion in Book 3 of the *Physics*, also turns to the account of being as truth in *Metaphysics* Theta 10. In these last two seminars Heidegger is significantly returning to two issues that were central to his reading of Aristotle during the 1920's: being as motion and being as unconcealed. The aim of the present paper is to determine why Heidegger returns to Aristotle with this intensity in the 1940s and 1950s, how this later reading both continues and departs from the early reading, and what the later engagement tells us about a contemporary appropriation of Aristotle the story of which still remains to be fully told.

James Greenaway, St. Mary's University

jgreenaway@stmarytx.edu

“Eriugena and the Intimacy of Being”

In his *Periphyseon*, Duns Scotus Eriugena explores the meaning and direction of existence within the comprehensive and comprehending totality that he calls Nature. One way to look at his work is to consider it as a consideration of what it means to belong within and beyond Being. This paper seeks to show what Eriugena’s mystical thought tells us about the problem of belonging and why this is an enduring problem. After briefly suggesting a hermeneutic of belonging, this paper discusses Eriugena’s Neoplatonist theme of the Infinite from which all things begin and to which all things return. The metaphysical consubstantiality of all things points toward a primordial belonging that already structures the intellect, reason, and sensibility of each individual.

Michael Griffin, University of British Columbia

mjgriffin@gmail.com

“Shall we not show that none of them missed the truth?” Simplicius of Cilicia on the value of philosophical commentary, and his possible sources”

In this paper, I would like to explore an interface between philosophical education and inquiry in later ancient Greek philosophy, focusing on the work of the commentator Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 490–c. 560 CE). Simplicius is well known as an interpreter (*exēgētēs*) of the formative texts of Hellenic philosophy (a function whose qualifications he outlines at in *Cat.* 7,23-29; cf. Baltussen 2008), and he regards the commentary as an important vehicle for what we might call 'research' or inquiry into an array of subjects: a philosopher can progressively uncover the truth about a subject by interpreting a canonical text on that subject with care, or perhaps by synthesizing a detailed doxography of differing but reputable views (cf. in *Phys.* 640,12-18). Simplicius also treats commentary as a useful tool for pedagogy. A student who reads a book like Epictetus' *Handbook* with Simplicius' commentary may advance in virtue (in *Ench.* pr.87-90, with discussion by Hadot 1996, Hoffmann 2008).

In the first half of the paper (1), focusing on Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, I will suggest that a common psychological or pedagogical theory underlies the function attributed to the commentator by Simplicius in both inquiry and education: a pupil who engages in dialectic with a teacher, or with the 'greats' of the past, may recover the natural, undistorted concepts (*ennoiai*) that were her birthright, before they were distorted by the fall of the soul and the rattle and hum of our quotidian experience (illustrated by Simplicius in an evocative passage at in *Cat.* 12,10-13,4). This analysis has a sound justification in Neoplatonist psychology (see Hoffmann 1987), which I hope to draw out here.

In the second half of the paper (2), I will explore possible earlier sources of this psychological position, exploring two possible lines of approach, drawing alternately from Aristotle's approach to

historiography of philosophy or alleged "endoxic method" (challenged by Frede 2012, but perhaps, I suggest, more viably attributable to the commentators), coupled with the Stoic tradition of allegorical exegesis of ancient or 'primitive' thought to recover the human *ennoiai* (Boys-Stones 2001). In closing, I will try to draw some conclusions of general interest about the self-perception of commentators like Simplicius in ancient philosophical traditions.

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Nabeel Hamid, University of Pennsylvania

nabeelh@sas.upenn.edu

“Reasonable impressions and reasonable assent in Stoicism”

This paper develops an account of the concept of the reasonable (*eulogon*) in Stoic philosophy in light of its relevance for understanding a number of issues in the Stoic theory of action. An appropriate action (*kathekon*), for instance, is described as one for which a reasonable defense can be adduced. The term *eulogon* also modifies the *eupatheiai*, or the “good” affective states experienced by the sage. Finally, a proper understanding of *eulogon* is necessary to evaluate the Academic proposal on behalf of the reasonable as an alternate “practical criterion” to the Stoic insistence on the *cataleptic*.

Commentators have typically interpreted the reasonable as connoting an ordinary and unsophisticated standard of reason that most people use in everyday life, and have accordingly

glossed eulogon in terms of probability and fallibility. Tad Brennan (1996) criticizes this “lax interpretation” in favor of a stricter one according to which the Stoic sage can sometimes have cataleptic impressions of reasonable propositions. That is, even in situations where clear and distinct perceptual content is unavailable, the sage could grasp, and give assent to, “it is reasonable that p”, rather than just “p”. Brennan’s interpretation, however, by extending katalepsis to merely formal features of impressions, threatens to rob the cataleptic impression of the essential transparency with which it mediates knowledge of the object. It is that directness of contact with the world that gets undermined on the proposal that katalepsis can be of an impression of p being reasonable, rather than of it actually being the case that p.

By contrast, I develop and defend an interpretation of the reasonable impression as being characterized first, by a certain mode of representing a proposition; and second, by a type of assent that is distinct from the type of assent given to cataleptic impressions. I argue that the reasonable impression should be understood as a hypothetical or suppositional mode of thought that bears on the evidential value of the object represented, and to which evaluative assent is given. Unlike in situations where perceptual content is directly available, reasonable impressions paradigmatically involve propositions where that is not the case, such as those about the past or future. In such situations, the sage represents a proposition as being reasonable under some set of suppositions, and this requires her to give a different kind of assent. The kinds of assent that are given to cataleptic and reasonable impressions, I suggest, can be understood as running parallel to the Stoic distinction between assenting to a self-evident proposition, i.e., one that reveals its object just by itself, as opposed to assenting to a non-evident proposition, one that requires argument. The standards of reasonability that determine assent of the latter sort, ultimately, are those of the Stoic sage who is guided by her state of virtue and her knowledge of the proper ends of life. The notion of the reasonable, thus, far from being a mere concession or stopgap, provides the sage with a robust criterion for action in situations where katalepsis is not possible.

R. Kathleen Harbin, University of Richmond
kharbin@sas.upenn.edu
“Universals and Particulars in Aristotle's Ethics”

Aristotle makes repeated reference to universals and particulars in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and while he does not offer a clear account of what they are, it is clear that he views them as important to ethical activity and to practical reason. The predominant approach to interpreting these references holds that Aristotle has in mind what is called the practical syllogism, an argument with a major premise that identifies some goal to be achieved (the universal premise), and a minor premise that identifies a means to realize that goal within the immediate circumstances (the particular premise). I hold, however, that commentators’ misplaced emphasis on the practical syllogism can make Aristotle’s account of practical reason look far less plausible than it is. I argue that a different sort of

account of ethical universals and particulars is at work in the EN. This account articulates a distinction between two deeply important aspects of practical thinking.

First, I show that Aristotle's talk of universals and particulars in the EN should not lead us to believe that there are formal syllogisms in ethics or that practical syllogisms are required for action. I thus reject two dominant interpretive approaches to the practical syllogism. I first argue against the view, held by Natali, Gottlieb, and Nussbaum, that the practical syllogism is a formal syllogism in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises; I then argue against the view, advocated not only by the aforementioned commentators but also by Charles and Santas, that the practical syllogism is a model for practical reasoning or a necessary part of practical reasoning.

Having rejected these positions, I contend that Aristotle instead holds that performing the right sort of action for the right reasons requires an understanding, at the universal level, of what kinds of actions are worthy of pursuit as well as a capacity for recognizing, at the particular level, specific situations which call for those kinds of actions. I hold, then, that the practical syllogism is neither deliberation itself nor a necessary link between deliberation and action. In fact, Aristotle's syllogistic examples and his talk of universals and particulars more generally in practical contexts are not evidence that the practical syllogism is central to practical reasoning, or that locating the right formal reconstruction of it will show us how practical intuition and reasoning work on his account. Rather, Aristotle makes use of the structure of the syllogism to emphasize that performing the right sort of action for the right reasons requires both the understanding of what kinds of aims are worthy of pursuit (the universal), and the capacity for recognizing situations which call for actions that further such aims (the particular). Aristotle has a nuanced account of how we assess situations in ways that connect the concrete particular circumstances in which we act to the underlying values we hold.

Chelsea Harry, Southern CT State University

harryc1@southernct.edu

“Time as Interval in Aristotle's Treatise on Time”

In this paper, I offer a reading of Aristotle's *Physics* iv 10-11, a portion of his “Treatise on Time,” with the aim of showing that *chronos* here means time as an attribute of motion, as an interval, i.e. the type of time that, as Aristotle describes at 218a1, “is taken” (*lambanoumenos chronos*). In support of this thesis, I argue that (1) *Physics* iv 10 is analogous in purpose to the initial chapters of each foregoing treatise in the *Physics*, e.g. on the *archai* of nature, *kinêsis*, the infinite, place, and void—namely, it serves to discuss the *endoxa* as preparatory to Aristotle's actual analytic—and, that (2) the alternative type of time, which Aristotle also discusses at 218a1, “infinite time” (*apeiros chronos*) is outside the scope of Aristotle's project here in the *Physics*. Finally, I propose that Aristotle's analytic of time actually begins in *Physics* iv 11 at 219a1-3. I work to this conclusion by way of a proposal that the “now,” which Aristotle discusses in *Physics* iv 10, is not only (1) non-

temporal, as Ursula Coope has suggested, but also (2) a name for existing self-subsistent natural beings undergoing kinêsis.

George Harvey, Indiana University Southeast

whgeorge@ius.edu

“Religion in Plato’s Laws: The Gods and What the Citizens Believe About Them”

In book three of Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger describes the origins of constitutions by first describing human existence in an age prior to the development of the art of politics (676a-681d). He praises the characters of individuals living in that age, and cites a simple-minded outlook toward the gods as one of the major factors that contribute to their good ethical condition (679c). This simplistic outlook consists in the acceptance of what is learned about the gods and goodness as the literal truth. The Athenian’s account suggests that such an outlook ensures that individuals will not alter their views about the gods and will reliably act in accordance with them. If such an uncritical view has a positive effect on the ethical characters of individuals living in the pre-political age, it is reasonable to ask whether, and to what degree, such a view might also contribute to the virtue to be attained the Cretan colony. The purpose of this paper is to examine the Athenian’s remarks about religion in the Cretan colony and highlight the role that unquestioned belief in the gods plays in cultivating virtue in its citizens. Since the colony exists in the age of politics, its aim (i.e., complete virtue) will encompass the development of the rational capacities of its citizens. This is in clear contrast the pre-political age, where the very simple-mindedness that is responsible for the unquestioned belief in the gods compensates for the lack of any rational development in the individuals living in that age. In this regard, a comparative assessment of the religious views of the Cretan colonists will highlight the difficult balance the Athenian is trying to maintain in achieving the secure beliefs that approximate what is found in pre-political life in citizens whose rational capacities are to be cultivated to the extent necessary for complete virtue. By examining the case of religious belief in these contrasting ages, we gain a deeper appreciation of the broader theme found in the Laws, namely, that the enterprise of politics can be understood as an attempt by human beings to rely on their own rational capacities to approximate the kind of happiness that in another age is the result of divine reason.

Etienne Helmer, University of Puerto Rico

etiennehelmer@hotmail.fr

“Plato’s and Aristotle’s Approaches to Economic Anthropology”

As Leo Strauss's most famous book - *The City and Man* - indicates, Plato and Aristotle consider that the understanding of the nature of the polis and politics goes hand in hand with the understanding of the human nature. More precisely, these ancient philosophers' ideas about the perfect state and its corrupted forms are based on an anthropology that close consideration reveals is economic in nature. According to them, it is mainly through economic practices and institutions that human nature has an effect on the organization of the polis. But as far as I know, while their ideas on economy have been studied, very little has been said about the anthropology that informs their respective works. My aim is to show that Plato's and Aristotle's distinct anthropologies determine their political and economic ideas, in particular their opposite thoughts on private property and wealth.

Both Plato and Aristotle consider it man's nature to be desirous of owning and appropriating something, but they do not give the same value to this desire, and the practical conclusions they draw from it are very different too. Plato sees private possession as the root of political evil, for it gives rise not only to war but civil war. The same holds true for wealth. Plato shows himself stricter than his disciple, not because he thinks wealth is bad in itself, but because it can "tyrannize a soul made wild with desires" (*Laws IX*, 870a1). On the contrary, Aristotle sees private possession as legitimate, and considers wealth as the raw material for generosity and magnificence, which are obviously helpful to the city.

Plato's and Aristotle's economic anthropologies each give way to two different economies and cities. In both cases, the common and the private spheres are woven into two distinct webs for the sake of one same ideal, which is called justice. The nature of justice is slightly distinct according to each of these two philosophers. Nevertheless, Plato and Aristotle share the idea that a city is not a mere economic association, nor politics a mere regulation of the economic sphere. For both of them, the true political art consists in giving the city its unity through common values, to which the material aspect of the city must be subordinated. In both cases, the regulation of economics and economy by ethics and politics is then a condition of the just city.

Hyun Höchsmann, East China Normal University

hhochsmann@gmail.com

"The Yijing as a text of Cosmic Principles and Divination"

The Yijing as a text of Cosmic Principles and Divination

I would give fifty years to the study of the Yi, then I might come to be without great faults
(Confucius, *Analects*, 2.7).

The topics pertaining to the Yijing explored in this paper are: the principles of harmony and change, the metaphysical and ethical implications and the parallels between the Pre-socratic philosophy and the Yijing.

The Yijing transcends the division between mysticism and rationalism. There has been a dichotomy regarding the Yijing either as a text of cosmic principles which belongs to wisdom literature or as a text of divination. The present study seeks to reconcile the two approaches. The important connection between knowledge of nature and the right course of action has been emphasised in the philosophical tradition of China from Confucianism and Daoism to Neo-Confucianism and also in Western philosophy from the Pre-socratic thought to the conception of natural law.

The underlying assumption of the Yijing is that the universe and man's actions are governed by moral purposiveness. The basic outlook of the Yijing, that only the accurate understanding of the physical world can lead to right actions in the human realm, is far from superstition. The belief on which the Yijing is based is that there are general patterns and principles of physical and human reality which can be comprehended.

Hyun Höchsmann, East China Normal University
hhochsmann@gmail.com
“Freedom, Happiness and Justice in the Gorgias”

Freedom, Happiness and Justice in the Gorgias

In the Gorgias, Plato explores the topics of foremost importance in ethics, values and society: freedom, happiness and justice. Socrates encounters escalating ferocity of the three sophists, Gorgias, Polus and Callicles who put forward forceful arguments that the tyrant is the happiest man as he has the complete freedom to act as he pleases without being constrained by justice.

Gorgias confidently declares that he knows how to teach all who seek “freedom in their own persons” and to attain the greatest good sought after by men: power. Polus' view of happiness is frankly hedonistic: “to be at liberty to do and to follow my own pleasure in every act.” Callicles argues for the position of egoism. The happy man is he who has the power to satisfy his passions and desires to the full and obtain wealth and honour. This is acting in accordance with nature. Self-control is praised only out of weakness when men lack the power to take what they want.

In his refutation of the three sophists Socrates demonstrates that far from being happy, the tyrant is more miserable than those he injures: to do wrong is the worst that can befall a man. Socrates is convinced that only those who are just and good are free and happy.

The central philosophical questions raised by Socrates in the *Gorgias* are: What kind of life should we live? What is the difference between knowledge and belief? How do we distinguish the pleasant from the good?

Sarah Hogarth Rossiter, The University of Western Ontario

shogart@uwo.ca

“Modality and Thomas Bradwardine's account of future contingents”

Modality and Thomas Bradwardine's Account of Future Contingents

In his treatise *De futuris contingentibus* (On future contingents), Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) presents an interestingly original account of future contingents in opposition to that of William Ockham. The problem for both thinkers, of course, is how to go about reconciling God's foreknowledge with the real contingency of future events. According to Ockham's highly influential account, this is possible because although God has knowledge in the present of future contingent events, the fact that the subject matter of that knowledge is future and contingent makes the knowledge itself future and contingent in some special sense; thus, Ockham denies that the sort of inferences we may make about the necessity inhering in present events can in any way apply to God's present knowledge of things future, or in turn to the objects of that knowledge.

Bradwardine is not satisfied with this solution, which he considers to be incompatible with divine immutability, and instead proposes a solution resting on the distinction between absolute and ordered (or ordained – *ordinata*) power. Bradwardine applies this distinction (which is not itself novel to him) in a highly original way to argue that God's knowledge of future events is enacted by his ordered power, and that relative to this power, the events of his knowledge are indeed necessary. However, this relative necessity says nothing of the events' absolute necessity – and hence the contingency of the event, at least in absolute terms, may be preserved. As should be clear from this outline of his argument, tricky manoeuvring in modal logic plays a key role in Bradwardine's solution. In this and other places, Bradwardine employs fine distinctions of modal logic, often making surprising claims that defy conventional assumptions about modality.

In this paper, I examine some of these interesting features of Bradwardine's modal logic, demonstrating the ways in which they are applied in his solution to the problem of future contingents. Though *De futuris contingentibus* is not the only work of Bradwardine's that may be relevant to this discussion, my own treatment focuses on this treatise because of the little attention it has been paid up to this point. It becomes clear through this examination that Bradwardine's innovations in modal logic play a pivotal role in his development of a new and compelling solution to this problem. This demonstrates one way in which developments in modal logic, far from being an idle theoretical past-time of no practical import, have been central to the creation of new and exciting theories and explanations in relation to age-old metaphysical problems.

Travis Holloway, SUNY-Stony Brook/NYU

traviswholloway@yahoo.com

“Revolutionary Athenian Poetry and its Implications for Plato’s *Republic*”

This paper examines late 6th and early 5th Century Greek poetry as a way of inquiring into how politics for the Greeks was not merely an idea, a principle, or an understanding, but also a kind of performance, an action, and a craft. More specifically, I examine the political and historical role of poetry and the Greek chorus in the Athenian theater leading up to and immediately following Athens’ democratic revolution in 508 BCE. I argue through texts and vase paintings that a revolution in poetic practice preceded and influenced the actual democratic revolution in Athens. I show that accounts of Athenian poetry before the revolution bear striking similarities to descriptions of the revolution itself and to later, democratic reforms that established free and equal speech in the Assembly. I consider the implications of this research alongside Books II and III of Plato’s *Republic* concerning poetry, as well as passages in Book VIII concerning democracy and anarchy. What I hope to show is that unlike much of contemporary democratic theory’s focus on norms and principles, the poetry of ancient Athens can show us not only what democracy is, but how people participated in a democracy that needed to be performed.

Kyle Hubbard, Saint Anselm College

khubbard@anselm.edu

““Use-love and Enjoyment in Augustine’s Confessions””

Kyle Hubbard

Saint Anselm College

SAGP Proposal 2013

Title: “Use-love and Enjoyment in Augustine’s Confessions”

In *De Doctrina Christiana*, Augustine of Hippo (in)famously distinguishes between ‘use-love’ (*uti*) and ‘love of enjoyment’ (*frui*). He claims that only God should be enjoyed because God is the supreme good whereas we should love other things with ‘use-love,’ basically as a means to enjoying God. While there have been many attempts to explain the *uti/frui* distinction in *De Doctrina Christiana* as well as many defenses and critiques of Augustine’s distinction, there have been relatively few attempts to see the distinction in Augustine’s *Confessiones*. While Augustine does not specifically use the terms ‘use-love’ and ‘enjoyment’ in *Confessiones*, the lack of

scholarship on the *uti/frui* distinction in *Confessiones* is curious because they are roughly contemporaneous texts; *De Doctrina Christiana* was written in 397 while *Confessiones* dates from 397-400. However, I believe *Confessiones* offers a helpful way to understand the distinction between ‘use-love’ and ‘love of enjoyment’ because Augustine offers a vivid example of the problems that arise when he tries to enjoy another person in a way that should only be reserved for God.

In Book Four of *Confessiones*, Augustine relates the story of the death of his closest friend. Augustine spends much of the book discussing all the problems with this friendship, but they essentially boil down to one: Augustine’s belief that he loved his friend in the place of God. To use the language from *De Doctrina Christiana*, he enjoyed his friend instead of loving him with ‘use-love.’ I will argue that this story from *Confessiones* helpfully explains the *uti/frui* distinction from *De Doctrina Christiana*, even though Augustine does not actually use those terms. Augustine shows the damage done to himself, but, maybe more importantly, he reveals the damage done to his friend. While I will not attempt a thorough defense of Augustine’s claim that we should love our friends with ‘use-love,’ I will suggest that Augustine is right to recognize deep problems with attempting to find one’s ultimate happiness in another person.

James Hubler, Lebanon Valley College

hubler@lvc.edu

“Aristotle's Fundamental Opposition to Plato's Epistemology”

Although Aristotle and commentators focus on arguments against the theory of Forms, Aristotle’s has a more fundamental, logical disagreement with Plato’s theory of cognition. Whereas Plato understands cognition primarily as *alio*-relative, Aristotle maintains that truth is an identity and hence not *alio*-relative. Although Aristotle rejects the theory of Forms, he would also reject any other *alio*-relative theory of cognition, given his own identity theory of truth.

Plato’s theory of Forms is an expression of his basic intuition that cognition is *alio*-relative and defined in relation to its object. Knowledge can only be certain if its objects are unchangeable and eternal. By contrast sense-perception cannot attain truth since its objects are inherently unstable and prone to slip away, undermining any claims to truth. However, Plato’s view of cognition as *alio*-relativity leaves him to puzzle over the self-reflexivity of knowledge (*Charmides* 167–9).

In the Late dialogues, Plato develops an analysis of cognition as psychic motion that helps resolve the puzzle, because circular motion can be both *alio*-relative and self-reflexive. It is self-reflexive because in circular-motion, the immaterial mover never changes its course, but always circles back upon itself. However, since its eternal course conforms to the Forms, it is *alio*-relative (*Timaeus* 37 A–C). Likewise, Plato understands sense-perception as a shared motion between body and soul (*Philebus* 34 A). Sense-perception is then both *alio*-relative and self-reflexive because it is the soul’s

own motion, originating from the soul as a self-mover, but it is also alio-relative because it is shared with another—the body.

Aristotle, however, rejects motion as an adequate analysis of cognition along with the theory of the Forms, but his dispute with Plato runs deeper than any specific arguments against either. On a more basic, logical level Aristotle takes truth to be an identity and hence not alio-relative. For Aristotle, truth is a *pros hen* analogous notion with the identity between the Unmoved mover and its noetic object at its core. Aristotle also finds identities at other levels of cognition, although he posits different types of identities at lower levels of truth. At the level of the human intellect, there is an identity between the human intellect and its objects, but it is not as strong an identity as the Unmoved mover because of the potency of the human intellect. At the levels of understanding and sense-perception, he asserts a formal identity with each of their objects.

Aristotle even analyzes true linguistic predication as a type of identity, asserting that an affirmative proposition is true just in case the terms composed in thought are also composed in reality (*Metaphysics* 9.10, 1051 b 1–5). Analogously, negative propositions are true if their terms are not joined in reality. The species/genus predication, “Humans are animals” is true because every instance of a human is also an animal (PA 91b5–7), so he finds an identity in the underlying subject of predication.

John Humphrey, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University
jhumphr@ncat.edu

“Two Paradigms in Plato’s *Theaetetus*”

2013 SAGP Conference Paper Abstract

Two Paradigms in Plato’s *Theaetetus*

J. F. Humphrey

In three previous papers, “Socrates’ Interpretation of His Own Wisdom,” “Socrates and Achilles: A Shift in Paradigms,” and “Plato’s Paradigm in the *Apology* of Socrates” I have been concerned with Plato’s paradigm of the philosopher as represented in the character of Socrates. In particular, I have examined what Socrates means when claims that the god used his name in order to make him a pattern [paradeigma], “as if he would say, ‘That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom’” (Ap. 23a-b). Considering Socrates as the paradigm of the philosopher, led to an investigation of Socrates’ allusion to Achilleus, the paradigmatic warrior in the *Apology* (Ap. 28b-29a), where Socrates implies that the philosopher, the paradigmatic rational individual, should replace the warrior, the paradigmatic individual governed by thymos. But just what sort of paradigm is Socrates? Juxtaposing

Socrates to Achilles, on the one hand, and to Oedipus, who for Sophocles is the unenviable paradigm of human beings because he is mortal and enjoys only fleeting happiness, on the other, I argued that instead of suffering his fate, Socrates embraces it and thus becomes enviable because, in the face of the limits of human finitude, he is a paradigm of a life guided by and subject to reason – a noble human life that, by embracing the human condition, transcends it. Consideration of Plato’s paradigm of Socrates the philosopher led me to ask what precisely does Plato mean by “paradigm”? Hence, in a fourth paper, “Plato’s *Republic*: The Polis as a Paradigm,” I examined Plato’s use of the word “paradigm” in the *Republic* V where Socrates asks, “Weren’t we ... also making a paradeigma in speech of a good city?” (472d-e). There I argued that the city in speech is a paradigm that, according to Socrates, is absent in the life of evil individuals, but is one on which good individuals may model their lives.

In this paper, I shall return to Plato’s conception of a “paradigm,” not as it appears in the *Apology*, nor the *Republic*. Instead, I will consider the two paradigms that Socrates identifies in the *Theaetetus* in the context of “a digression” (177b-c): “the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched” (176e). While Socrates does not develop these two paradigms in the dialogue, we can understand them in light of his conversation with Glaucon in *Republic* III where he distinguishes the individual who has “a good soul” from the one who is “clever and suspicious” and has “done many unjust things” (409c-d). Focusing on these two paradigms, we will see that the first paradigm, the divine, is the life of the philosopher and the second, the life of the evil individual who has only a confused paradigm within his or her soul. Moreover, each individual must “pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and ... unless they depart from their ‘cleverness,’ the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves – evil men associating with evil ...” (*Theaetetus*, 177a). Thus, I will argue that the use of “paradigm” in the *Theaetetus* is consistent with Plato’s use of the term in the *Republic*; indeed, understanding the two paradigms in the former work amplifies our understanding and appreciation of the importance of paradigms in the *Republic* and the *Apology*.

Jennifer Ingle,

jingle@clemson.edu

“The Beginning of Knowledge: The Prologue of Plato’s *Theaetetus*”

The *Theaetetus* can be a vexing dialogue for scholars intent upon interpreting Plato’s dialogues as presenting a systematic philosophy. After all, the dialogue does not mention the doctrines of *anamnesis* or the Forms when, clearly, for those who advocate a systematic view of Plato’s philosophy, either doctrine would yield a positive conclusion to the dialogue’s guiding question. Paul Stern has suggested a compelling reason why Socrates does not present the doctrine of *anamnesis* or the Theory of Forms: to do so would constitute a framework for answering the question ‘what is knowledge’. Such a framework would obviate the need for a fifth century

interlocutor in the dialogue, or a member of the fourth century audience of the dialogue to formulate that framework for themselves. Moreover, if armed with this framework, the internal and external audiences of the dialogue may be inclined to presume that they possess knowledge, when in actuality what they would possess is endoxa (received opinion). As I hope to show through an examination of the Prologue, for Athens the importance of knowledge to the political life lies in endoxa. Socrates contests the role of endoxa with his particular practice of paideia, a practice that gives Socratic ignorance as the grounds for knowledge, knowing that you know not.

Cristina Ionescu, The Catholic University of America

ionescu@cua.edu

“The Dialogue Between Pleasure and Knowledge throughout Plato's Philebus”

When discussing the Philebus, scholars have typically chosen to explore either the account of pleasure or that of knowledge, while the connection and interrelation between these two throughout the dialogue has remained rather underexplored. The present paper attempts to address this lacuna. I hope to show that as we go through the text, following every major instance in which pleasure is spoken of in relation to knowledge, we notice a gradual progression from the initial absolute unbridgeable distance between pleasure and knowledge towards a more and more intimate collaboration between the two that culminates in the personified dialogue between them, whereby species of pleasure welcome the relevant types of knowledge and knowledge in turn invites pleasure in the good human life. I thus hope to show that after the opening remarks set pleasure and knowledge as diametrically opposed poles of human experience, we move towards passages that first set them side by side, and then, gradually, towards arguments that indicate an intimate relation, whereby pleasure is causally dependent on and structured by knowledge. I argue that we owe this shift to the transition from the Phileban conception of pleasure as thoughtless thrill or sensation to the Platonic understanding of pleasure as intentionally and cognitively structured experience that depend on our beliefs not only about factual situations but also about the meaning and value of such situations and of life generally. The passages that I will be analyzing and discussing in this sequence are: 11b-13c, 15e, 21c-d, 33c-35d, 36d-39d, 39d-44d, 51a-53b, 63b-64a.

Jolanta Jaskolowska, Westwood College, Chicago IL

jolaj@att.net

“How Reasonable is the Practical Syllogism?”

In the *De Anima*, *De Motu Animalium* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle describes the process of practical reasoning using the same vocabulary of universal major premise, particular middle term and

particular conclusion that he uses elsewhere regarding logical reasoning. In what sense though is the reasoning of the practical syllogism like that of logical inference? Nicomachean Ethics VI .2 (1139a21ff.) suggests that the relation between logical and practical reasoning is merely analogical: pursuit and avoidance in desire correspond in some unspecified manner to affirmation and denial in thought (*dianoia*). However, *De Anima* III.3 (431b10ff.) states that distinctions between what is true or false and good and bad are in the same genus, differing only in that the former are distinguished unqualifiedly, while the latter are distinguished in relation to someone. This passage strongly suggests that the processes of theoretical and practical reasoning are generically the same, even if the specific content is different in category in some way. I argue that Aristotle understands both practical and theoretical reasoning to be syllogistic because the part/whole relations he distinguishes in terms of affirmation and negation in the square of opposition in *De Interpretatione* are generically the same as those made regarding desirability/undesirability in practical reasoning. As the passage from *De Anima* III suggests, statements that function semantically simply as references to things and their attributes with respect to logic can also function semantically to refer simultaneously to dispositional relations. For example, to state, "Grizzly bears are dangerous to human beings," is a universal statement which, when combined with a particular, "That is a grizzly bear," induces a desire to flee. The conclusion in this case is not a statement of fact but a change in disposition towards a particular based on syllogistic or logical relations that induce an action. I find support for my understanding of Aristotle in his accounts of language and emotion in the *Poetics* and in the *Rhetoric*, and in the late antique commentator Ammonius' summary of *De Interpretatione* and his citation of a fragment from Theophrastus. Finally, I argue that Aristotle's understanding of practical reasoning in terms of a cognition or judgment producing emotional states ties Aristotle more closely than is usually taken to be the case to the Hellenistic focus on the causal association of proper argument with the emotions and ethics.

David Jennings, University of Antwerp

davidleejennings@gmail.com

"Friendship and Intellectual Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics"

For Aristotle, friendship and moral virtue are codependent: each needs the other for its highest manifestation: the morally good person needs friends, and friendship exists only between such persons. But can the same be said about the relation between friendship and intellectual virtue? I argue that it can. First, I consider some reasons to think that friendship and intellectual virtue are independent: the contemplative life has the least need of external goods, such as friends, and friendship depends on the dispositions of its members, which sit outside the scope of the intellectual virtues. After responding to these worries, I then argue that friendship and intellectual virtue also depend on one another for their highest manifestation: friendship involves loving another for who

one really is and the contemplative part of us is, above all, who we really are, and intellectual virtue needs friendship for increasing its activity and pleasure.

Erik Jensen, Michigan State University

jensen82@msu.edu

“Moving Beyond Opinion: Barnes, Burnyeat, and the Jury Passage in *Theaetetus*”

Myles Burnyeat (1980) and Jonathan Barnes (1980) disagree as to whether the epistemological commitments espoused in *Meno* and *Theaetetus* license or prohibit the transmission of different forms of knowledge. Burnyeat holds that the jury could not come to an understanding of the events of the case, even when considering an experientially-laden version of 'understanding' he claims is latent in Plato's treatment of knowledge (episteme) in the *Theaetetus* (179, 185). Barnes claims that propositional capture of the experiential component of understanding is possible, and so, in principle, the jury could come to have understanding of the testifier's perceptual experiences without any of them sharing those experiences. I show that the approach Burnyeat uses to resolve an alleged paradox in the *Theaetetus* by reference to the epistemology in the *Meno* can likewise be used to motivate Barnes' claim that understanding could be transmitted to the jury.

Erick Jimenez, University of Navarra

erickraphael@gmail.com

““Deliberation and Authority in Aristotle's *Politics*””

Deliberation is an idea key to Aristotle's political theory: Having the power to deliberate is a qualification of citizenship (*Pol.* III.1); the several distributions of that power are creative of the several forms of government (*Pol.* IV.14); and in general for Aristotle the deliberative element in political life is authoritative or sovereign (*kurios*) (*ibid.*). Given the centrality of deliberation to contemporary theories of government scholars have naturally looked to Aristotle's prioritization of deliberative practice in political life as a precursor to and model of ideas relating, above all, to deliberative democracy. Whether by emphasizing its combativeness (Tercheck and Moore), its lack of appeal to external moral criteria (Yack), its role in the shaping of character (Nieuwenberg, Smith), or its liberal or democratic tendencies (Taylor), scholars have therefore praised various aspects of the Aristotelian theory. However, as I argue in this presentation, such comparisons are limited in one fundamental respect, namely that for Aristotle political authority consists in the power to deliberate and not in any purported legitimacy achieved through deliberation; for Aristotle political authority is pre-deliberative. In developing this thesis, I begin by sketching certain Aristotelian limitations: Only certain things admit of being deliberated about (*NE* III.3); deliberation is required because legality

cannot be determined at certain levels of specificity or detail (Pol. III.16); and finally not all human beings are capable in fact of deliberating—natural slaves cannot, children cannot, and, though they can, for women the deliberative power is not “authoritative” (Pol. I.13). I then argue that in Aristotle’s political theory these ontological dimensions are intended to serve as a basis for the political dimensions. Thus the ends of deliberation must be given beforehand (for deliberation can only be about means); and moreover, as a specification of this idea, political deliberative practices, because practices of a state, are oriented by state interest—questions predominantly, as I interpret the matter, of order (taxis). I then show that Aristotle’s conception of political deliberation has nothing immediately to do with attaining consensus, which is central to deliberative-democratic ideas, but rather fundamentally with the inadequacy of law for governing. Deliberation thus has to do with consensus only to the extent that consensus is a matter of establishing order, and avoiding sedition, and order a matter of state interest. But this relation is not an essential one for Aristotle. Thus, for example, he seems to endorse the view that those who live near borders should not be allowed to deliberate in border wars (Pol. VII.10). Aristotle’s theory of deliberation may therefore have much to recommend it, first of all, as a description of political authority, and perhaps, secondly, as a prescription for its distribution, but in the second respect it is closer to classical republican ideas than to democratic ones.

Brian Johnson, Fordham University
brjohnson@fordham.edu
“Rescuing Aristotle’s Art of Living”

From the Hellenistic era forward, philosophy has often been characterized as the art of living. And yet, despite the poetical power of that image, Aristotle would have rejected it. Although he draws a number of important parallels between art and virtue, he surprisingly concludes that moral reasoning cannot be a craft. As a way of analyzing Aristotle’s striking claim, I will argue against him and show that he, in fact, provides good grounds for concluding that practical wisdom is a kind of craft-knowledge. Aristotle should have accepted the claim that practical wisdom is the master craft.

Anton Kabeshkin, Johns Hopkins University
akabeshkin@gmail.com
“Philosophical Activity and Unreflective Life in Pyrrhonian Skepticism”

In this paper I will consider tensions between the defining characteristic of a Pyrrhonian skeptic, namely, her ability to create oppositions of appearances and arguments, and the skeptic’s own criterion of action. In the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* Sextus defines skepticism as “an ability to set out

oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgment and afterwards to tranquility” (PH I.8). A skeptic is, primarily, someone who is skillful at setting up oppositions of perceptions and arguments and achieving equipollence between them. On the other hand, as a response to the apraxia objection Sextus offers the fourfold criterion of action for the skeptics. On his account skeptics “live in accordance with everyday observances” (PH 1.23). Sextus then elaborates on the nature of these everyday observances. I will argue, first, that the proper way to interpret this skeptical criterion of action is that the skeptic, insofar as she is a skeptic, lives her life passively, unreflectively and without being governed by understanding explanatory relations between phenomena. I will further argue that such a life is not compatible with acquisition and even moderately efficient exercise of the skeptic’s ability to oppose perceptions and arguments to each other. In effect, this second argument constitutes a version of the apraxia objection which, to my knowledge, was not considered either by ancient rivals of skeptics or by contemporary scholars.

Kevin Kambo, The Catholic University of America

kkambo3@gmail.com

“Socrates in the City”

An enduring focus of debate in Plato’s *Phaedrus* concerns its theme. Different interpreters have identified various themes for the dialogue such as love, rhetoric, madness and persuasion. Others altogether deny that there is such a comprehensive theme, a distinction that may be a defect in the work or an aspect of a more elaborate Platonic ploy.

The lack of consensus about the theme stems from the structure of the *Phaedrus* which falls into two distinct parts difficult to join with a unifying thread. The first ‘half’ consists of three speeches given on the nature of love and its role in human life. The second is a discussion about rhetoric. The seemingly irreconcilable differences separating these sections is especially curious because Socrates explains that an essential characteristic of artful composition is that parts fit the whole and are in harmony with each other (264c). The unity and integrity of the whole explains the role of the parts and their relation to each other. Taking either love, the topic of the opening speeches, or rhetoric, the theme of the closing discourse, as the consistently dominant theme distorts the reading of the other part. What is needed is a theme that respects each part’s contribution. If the parts are to be properly understood, then it is important to have a view of the whole. I argue for taking conversation as the unifying theme of the *Phaedrus*.

There are two kinds of reasons on which I rely. The first, and less important, are situational, viz. taking the setting or backdrop as a clue or indication of Plato’s intent. I argue that the interaction of the characters is choreographed in a manner that stresses the informal conversation of the

interlocutors; that the ‘speeches’ of the first part are actually excerpts from conversations; and that it is significant that both interlocutors are identified as lovers of logoi (228b).

The second, more important class of reasons concern Plato’s philosophical aims: the theme of conversation explains the development of the technique of collection and division, which appears for the first time in the Platonic corpus in the *Phaedrus*. The dialogue is an extended reflection on the nature of conversation, a transcendent activity which unites souls in common action. It is through conversation that human minds are able to meet, by the communication of intentions. Socrates thus does not leave city because it is the locus for interacting with other minds (230d). In this light the Socratic turn can then be seen as a movement from impersonal speculation to personal conversation. Through the interrogation of other people’s articulations, viz. collections and divisions, of their beliefs and perceptions, the question of truth can be raised. The philosophical mind is aware that reality is what measures our beliefs and perceptions, and therefore seeks to collect and divide according to how things are, viz. according to natural kinds. Through the theme of conversation, I argue, we can see the method of collection and division as the fruit of the Socratic elenchus.

David Kaufman, Transylvania University
dhkaufma@princeton.edu

“Galen on the Therapy of Distress and the Limits of Emotional Therapy”

In my talk, I will discuss the contribution of Galen’s recently discovered consolation letter, *On the Freedom from Distress*, to both ancient consolation literature and the ancient philosophy of the emotions. In this work, Galen appeals to three prominent and, in their original contexts, opposing methods of consolation. Nevertheless, despite its apparent eclecticism, I will argue that Galen adapts these distinct and incongruous methods of therapy into a cogent and innovative, multi-tiered method of consoling distress.

Galen’s therapy of distress is based on his distinction between appropriate and inappropriate instances of the emotion. According to him, someone may be inappropriately distressed on account either of being distressed over the wrong sorts of objects – for example, at being deprived of her surplus wealth – or on account of being moved excessively by the right objects – for instance, by physical pain and hardship or mental incapacitation. Galen recommends two distinct sorts of therapy corresponding to these two kinds of inappropriate distress: first, he argues that the only method of consoling people experiencing distress over the wrong objects is to persuade them that the merely apparent bads over which they are distressed are, in fact, not bad; second, he argues that people who have more or less the right conception of what things really are good and bad, but are prone to be affected excessively by them should habituate themselves to misfortunes, by vividly imagining such things happening to them. As I will show, Galen adopts these two lines of therapy

from two opposing kinds of Stoic emotional therapy: the belief-based method proposed by the classical Stoics and the revisionary method proposed by the 2nd/1st Century BC Stoic, Posidonius.

In addition to these Stoic methods of emotional therapy, Galen also recommends the Epicurean therapy of distress, which consoles people experiencing distress by redirecting their attention from the source of their distress, say, their impending exile, to other more pleasant subjects. Although Galen rejects the Epicurean view that this method of consolation is capable of treating any instance of distress at all, however violent, I think that it plays an important role in his own therapy of distress. For of the methods of emotional therapy he discusses only the Epicurean method is useful for consoling people in the grip of occurrent distress over an appropriate object, such as extreme poverty or extreme physical pain.

Galen's own therapy of distress thus combines three distinct and, in their original contexts, competing methods of emotional therapy. Nevertheless, I hope to show that far from simply stitching together distinct and incongruous methods of therapy, he adapts each of these methods so as to develop a sophisticated and cogent theory of his own.

Anna Lannstrom, Stonehill College

alannstrom@stonehill.edu

“On behalf of Euthyphro: A less rationalistic understanding of piety”

Like other early dialogues, the Euthyphro ends in aporia. Many scholars believe that the aporia is only apparent and that the dialogue contains clues about what piety is. In particular, they say, it makes clear that we cannot understand piety as pleasing the gods by sacrifices or by other means. This paper questions this claim. I first examine 14d-e where Euthyphro proposes understanding piety as performing sacrifices. Socrates dismisses this idea by reducing sacrifice to trading skills and by pointing out that this definition is just another way of saying that piety is what pleases the gods. I argue that sacrifice plays a more respectable role in Greek piety than what Socrates suggests, that Socrates knew that this was so, and that there are some reasons to believe that Socrates even agreed with that view. Then, I argue that scholars dismiss Euthyphro's definition of piety as doing what pleases the gods much too quickly because (1) a definition which does not reference pleasing the gods departs too sharply from common usage; (2) Socrates' criticism of the pleasing the gods definition (e.g., the Euthyphro dilemma) is inadequate; and I argue that Euthyphro was on the right track in defining piety in this way.

Joseph Lemelin, The New School for Social Research

lemej459@newschool.edu

“Epistēmē as hexis apodeiktikē”

In book six of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defines epistēmē (knowledge) as a hexis apodeiktikē (an active capacity having to do with demonstration). In this essay, I aim to explicate the role of hexis in Aristotle’s formulation of epistēmē by bringing the *Nicomachean Ethics* account of epistēmē as an intellectual virtue into dialogue with the discussion of first principles (archai) in the opening and closing chapters of the *Posterior Analytics*. My claim is that in taking into account the role of hexis in epistēmē, as the way toward understanding the underlying causes of things, the conception of knowledge that arises must be approached as an active condition of the soul: what is known shows itself as inseparable from the manner in which that knowledge is achieved.

Glenn Lesses, College of Charleston

lessesg@cofc.edu

“Socrates the Stoic: Moral Psychology in Plato's *Symposium*”

The Stoics regard themselves as Socrates’ intellectual successors. Zeno, for instance, is reported to have wondered where someone like Socrates is to be found (D.L. 7. 2). Epictetus (*Discourses* 4.5.1-2) maintains that the life of Socrates should be adopted as an exemplar. Commentators often refer to Plato’s early dialogues, e.g., the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias*, to explain the appeal of Socratic philosophy for the Stoics. No doubt that such positions as the sufficiency of virtue for eudaimonia, the identification of virtue with knowledge, and the denial of akrasia influenced Stoicism.

The *Symposium* receives little notice as a resource for the Stoic version of Socratic doctrine. Yet, as Vlastos reminds us, Alcibiades’ speech in the *Symposium* highlights the strangeness of Socrates: “Such is his strangeness (atopia) that you will search and search among those living now and among men of the past, and never come close to what he is himself and to the things he says (221d).” Socrates’ strangeness is reflected both in the presentation of his character and in his philosophical doctrine. Fundamental aspects of the moral psychology ascribed to Socrates in the *Symposium* depart from other middle period dialogues such as the *Republic*. Irwin, Rowe, and other critics have recognized that the psychological theory of the *Symposium* is close to the position of Plato’s early dialogues and, arguably, philosophically Socratic. In this essay, I propose a Stoic reading of some central features of Socratic moral psychology in the *Symposium*. If the Stoics are as familiar with the *Symposium* as they are with other works of Plato, they can embrace the strangeness of Socrates for their own ethical and psychological theorizing.

I first look very briefly at aspects of the *Symposium*’s eudaimonism as well as its failure to mention the divided-soul-doctrine of other middle dialogues. Although somewhat imprecise about both issues, the *Symposium* is consistent with the Stoics’ stringent eudaimonism and their

psychological monism. Next, I develop several features of the Socratic analysis of emotion found in the dialogue. Socrates maintains that beliefs about value are directly related to emotional responses. Formulating truthful beliefs lead to the authentic emotion of love, a kind of rational affect. The Stoics agree that mistaken beliefs are, in part, the cause of irrational, emotional impulses that ought to be eliminated. They also attribute a kind of rational affect (i.e., *eupatheiai*) to ideal agents. Alcibiades explains Socrates' strangeness partly in terms of his rational, affective impulses. Finally, in her portrayal of love, Diotima describes a process in which an agent's becoming more rational modifies the objects of his desire as well as his corresponding motivations. This ascent anticipates in some ways the Stoic theory of moral development and rational agency (e.g., Cicero *Fin.* 3.20-23).

This reading of the *Symposium* is a preliminary attempt to show its attractions for the Stoics. Even though the dialogue is not an early work of Plato's, the *Symposium's* moral psychology can serve the Stoics well as they extend and put their own gloss on Socratic doctrine.

Donald Lindenmuth, The Pennsylvania State University

DCL1@psu.edu

“Plato's *Lysis*: The Beginning of Socratic Philosophizing”

Plato's *Lysis* presents the beginning of Socratic philosophizing. The pre-Socratic inquiry into nature is replaced by a new kind of wisdom requiring the existence of human friendship. But friendship rests on the need for goodness and the presence of human goodness in the friends. *Eros*, which is a force of nature, provides a principle of attraction within nature but Socrates turns to friendship, the source of human community, which attempts to address our needs, desires and wants for a life that is truly good.

The *Lysis* is the fullest explanation in Plato's dialogues because it both criticizes the definitions of *eros* given in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* and also shows how a more complete understanding of *eros* and *philia* by means of their similarity and their difference. The transformation of *eros* into *philia*, which is referred to in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, is presented in the *Lysis* both dramatically and argumentatively.

The difference between the two earlier dialogues and the later *Lysis* lies in the emphasis being placed in the *Lysis* on how humans befriend one another rather than the ascent to either the beautiful itself or the hyperouranian realm of the beings. The *Lysis*, unlike the other two dialogues is devoid of myth. it focuses on the necessary conditions for a community of friends to arise and that includes the presence of philosophy in word and deed.

The failure of his interlocutors to be persuaded of Socrates' final conclusion that they had yet to reach a conclusion which would be final is rooted in the limits of the kind of friendship present in *Lysis* and *Menexenus* and the failure of Hippothales to comprehend the movement of the soul from

eros to philia. That comprehension is prefigured in the motion from the discussion of eros outside the palaestra to the inner exhibition of Socrates' seeking for friend which takes place inside the palaestra.

Can Loewe, KU Leuven

CanLaurens.Loewe@hiw.kuleuven.be

“Aquinas on free judgment as self-motion”

Crucial to Aquinas's action theory is his claim that human beings possess the power of “free decision” (*liberum arbitrium*). In some of his writings he explains that our ability to freely decide is our ability to “freely judge” (*liberum iudicium*) (DV, q.24, a.2, c./ SCG II, c.48, n.3). Aquinas's account of free judgment is fairly brief. However, three things are clear. First, the ability to freely judge consists in the ability to reflect (*reflectere*) about one's practical judgments. That is to say, free judgment consists in the ability to form what Scott MacDonald calls practical “second order judgments” about one's practical first order judgments, which latter are about what one wants to do. Second, agents form practical second order judgments in light of their conception of the good (*ratio boni*). Third, by forming these second order judgments, agents are “causes of their judging” (*causa sui ipsius in iudicando*).

In recent decades, many scholars debated about how to adequately classify Aquinas's account of freedom (whether it is e.g. libertarian or compatibilist, intellectualist or voluntarist). But only few suggestions have been made as to how to understand the structure of free judgment. Since free judgment is essential to Aquinas's account of human freedom as such, I shall endeavour to expand upon these already existing suggestions.

First, I shall explore how the higher order status of practical second order judgments ought to be understood. Since Aquinas has little to say about this, I shall look at what Aquinas has to say about another class of reflective judgments, viz., introspective judgments, so as to gain some insight on the higher order status of practical second order judgments.

The second issue that I shall deal with is how to understand Aquinas's claim that free judgment is ‘free’. My contention is that the key to understanding the freedom of free judgment is Aquinas's claim that free judgment is a kind of “self-motion” (*in iudicando seipsa movent*) (SCG II, c.48, n.3). For, as Aquinas frequently says, a ‘free agent’ is a “cause of her own motion” (*causa sui motus*) (DV, q.24, a.1, c.). ‘Self-motion’, understood in the strict sense, only applies to self-imparted locomotion, and in fact requires that what is moved is a body (In Phys. l.12, n.1074). Since on Aquinas's view, intellectual processes such as judging are immaterial he must, therefore, use the term ‘self-motion’ as applied to practical reflection in a metaphorical sense. This metaphor, however, is quite revealing. For, with it, Aquinas suggests that free judgment is structurally similar to self-imparted locomotion. And so we may conclude, I shall suggest, that just as an animal is the efficient cause of its bodily

motion by virtue of its soul, so we are the efficient causes of our lower order judgments by virtue of our higher order judgments. And it is the fact that a judgment is efficiently caused by us, I shall argue, that makes it free.

Rachel Lott, Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto

r.bauder@mail.utoronto.ca

““Very Useful and Realist”: Pseudo-Campsall's Response to Ockham's *Summa Logicae*”

During the 1320's and 30's, Ockham's *Summa logicae* became sufficiently well known to provoke a series of responses from Thomist and Scotist realists. The main point of contention was SL 14-16, which Ockham devoted to the problem of universals and in which he deployed several arguments against common natures and Scotus's formal distinction. One of the Scotist responses, credited to Pseudo-Campsall and dubbed *valde utilis et realis contra Ockham* (“very useful and realist against Ockham”), engages in a chapter-by-chapter rebuttal of the *Summa logicae*, with Pseudo-Campsall answering some thirty paragraphs' worth of arguments and constructing his own defense of the formal distinction's logical coherence.

An examination of Pseudo-Campsall's interpretation of and response to Ockham's arguments reveals several implicit assumptions that underlie both scholars' treatments of common natures. While the surface disagreement is over universals, Pseudo-Campsall's answers to Ockham arise from more fundamental incompatibilities in the two scholars' metaphysics and logic. For example, Ockham and Pseudo-Campsall implicitly invoke different definitions of substance, which in turn lead them to hold contradictory views on what sorts of things can be substances, whether substances must be numerically singular, and whether a less-than-numerical-unity can be a substance. Ockham and Pseudo-Campsall also parse the relationship between actuality and “completeness” in the intellect in different manners, resulting in divergent positions on whether something can exist “actually” in many things even if it is made “complete” only in the mind. They go head-to-head in a lengthy section over questions of logical form and valid inference patterns for syllogisms involving formal distinctions. Finally, the two scholars have contradictory intuitions about the relationship between logic and Trinitarian theology. Pseudo-Campsall affirms the universal validity of logic, asserting that a valid syllogism which yields formal distinctions when applied to the Trinity must yield formal distinctions when applied to creatures. But Ockham implicitly restricts Trinitarian logic to the Trinity itself, quietly insisting that the problem of universals be discussed *in creaturis*—where, he argues, formal distinctions are illogical and nothing can really be common to more than one thing.

In this paper, I uncover the logical and metaphysical assumptions that inform Pseudo-Campsall's response to Ockham. I discuss points where Scotus's, Ockham's, and Pseudo-Campsall's arguments seem to miss one another, as well as points where they meet obliquely and address unspoken

assumptions. I conclude with a brief evaluation of how "utilis et realis" Pseudo-Campsall's response really was to the critique of universals in Ockham's Summa logicae.

Minnema Lourens,

l.minnema@vu.nl

“the bhagavadgita as a (frontis) piece of tragedy”

In this paper, several theoretical approaches, definitions and insights concerning Greek and Shakespearean notions of ‘tragedy’, ‘the tragic’ and ‘the tragic genre’ will be applied to the Bhagavadgita as an integral part of the Mahabharata epic in order to determine the nature of the similarities and differences between this classical Indian text and classical Western tragedies. A number of aspects of tragedy will be discussed by briefly referring to the scholars who have raised these issues as typical of or prominent in tragedy, and by then explaining in some detail how these aspects or issues are dealt with in the Bhagavadgita: tragic subjects, plot patterns (incl. reversal and ending), conflicts, mood, world view, irony, audience expectations, dialogues, dealing with values, moral grounds and the linking of human actions to human intentions, tensions between human freedom and cosmic necessity or divine fate, and functions of tragedy.

Roopen Majithia, Mount Allison University

rmajithia@Mta.ca

“Law and Morality in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Bhagavad Gītā”

This effort concerns the relationship of the law to morality in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Bhagavad Gītā. In relation to the Ethics, it will take the form of showing how Aristotle's conception of virtue is intimately connected to the law of the state, both in terms of conceiving the law and conforming to it (which has interesting implications for those who think his virtue theory is based only on character). In relation to the Gītā, it will attempt to work out how the content of morality (which is to be undertaken with detachment) is related to dharmic law, and what one is to do when one's dharmic obligations are not obvious (conceived in terms of the principle of world welfare). I will then reflect on the implications of both these attempts to walk a fine line between over and under defining moral action.

Deepa Majumdar, Purdue University North Central

dmajumda@pnc.edu

“Plotinus’ Doctrine of Reincarnation – Distributive Justice and Mystical Ascent”

One of Plotinus’ most urgent exhortations to the particular soul is for it to ascend out of the incarnate state and return to the One. Plotinus’ doctrine of reincarnation is of significance to this urging. The hypostasis soul – a real being which remains in the noetic realm and is not the soul of any particular thing – moves in a moving circle of aspiration around the Good. It therefore transcends altogether the transmigratory cycle. But the incarnate particular soul, which Plotinus tells us is liable to be forgetful of its transcendental origin, is subject to the rounds of reincarnation. Plotinus often exhorts this individual soul to return to its divine origin – an ascent, which can be understood only within the context of Plotinus’ doctrine of reincarnation. The incarnate soul, must ascend out of this state altogether, if it is to ascend beyond embodiment, time, and becoming, and gain the self concentration it needs to complete its ascent to the Good. The purpose of reincarnation in Plotinus’ Enneads therefore cannot lie only in the dispensation of distributive justice. Rather, it must be tied as well to this highest exhortation from Plotinus – to “‘escape’ to the upper world ... rise to the intelligible and intellect and God” (III.4(15).2).

Although, Plotinus’ doctrine of reincarnation has been explored by many scholars (Inge, Pistorius, Gerson, Rich), it has not been studied in the light of the mystical ascent of the particular soul. Nor have the respites (temporal and eternal) from reincarnation suggested by Plotinus – through death and mysticism – been explored in the light of the moral prerequisites for the ascent of the particular soul. In this paper I hope to make a modest attempt at understanding Plotinus’ doctrine of reincarnation, its moral purpose (distributive justice and mystical ascent), and the respites from rebirth.

Joel Mann, St. Norbert College

joel.mann@snc.edu

“A slave to the truth: Antiphon’s first tetralogy and the value(s) of testimony.”

This paper attempts to construct an interpretation of Antiphon’s first tetralogy as a carefully crafted and substantial contribution to certain issues in the philosophy of law and philosophical epistemology more generally, particularly to the epistemic value of testimony. The tetralogy centers around a fictional case of assault and murder. Its basic elements are assumed by both prosecution and defense: the victim was attacked and killed while walking through the city at night. There were no witnesses to the murder save the victim’s slave, who also died from wounds sustained in the attack, but not before identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. Thus, there is little in the way of evidence, and the credibility of the available testimony is called into question by Greek legal conventions, which generally regard slave testimony as unreliable unless given under torture.

The first tetralogy is usually treated as an exercise in argumentation based on probability (*eikos*), as contrasted with more secure forms of argumentation (e.g., arguments that proceed deductively from established fact). The received view of the first tetralogy understands it as a meditation on the ultimate unreliability of *eikos* argumentation, to which facts are epistemically, and so legally, superior. However, this assumes, first, that such facts exist and, second, that they can be accessed by the members of a jury. Both prosecution and defense appear to accept that facts can be accessed via eyewitness testimony, and further that such testimony supplies the jury with an account of what “really” happened. Thus, eyewitness testimony is deemed superior to mere *eikos* argumentation about the relative probability that the accusation is accurate.

The underlying puzzle of the first tetralogy, I will argue, depends on the realization that, while direct perceptual acquaintance may be a reliable way to attain knowledge of facts (putting the “eye” in “eyewitness testimony,” as it were), the jury members themselves have no such acquaintance with the facts in dispute. All “facts” are transmitted to the jury via testimony. But the responsible evaluation of testimony requires judgments to be made about whether, e.g., a witness is trustworthy, i.e., is the kind of person whose testimony can be trusted. And indeed, such concerns force one to advert to *eikos* argumentation. The result, I will argue, is that Antiphon has generated in an ancient legal context a problem central to contemporary discussions of testimony. Either testimony stands on its own authority (the so-called “non-reductionist” view), or it must depend on other modes of knowledge-acquisition (e.g., sense-perception) for its authority (the so-called “reductionist” view). If the former, then it would seem as though knowledge claims are extremely vulnerable to skepticism (especially in legal contexts, where the truthfulness of witnesses cannot be assumed). If the latter, then it seems as though most of the beliefs in which we are most confident will fall short of knowledge, mired in probability and “muddled” by questions of value.

Brian Marrin, Emerson College

bmarrin@bu.edu

“Anomalous Order: The Dynamic Function of Law in Plato's "Laws"”

While Plato's *Statesman* presents a critique of the rule of law as unable to cope with the diversity of political circumstance, the *Laws*, though recognizing the force of this critique, nevertheless defends the rule of law in the strongest terms. I argue that the *Laws* can do this because it develops an account of law (*nomos*) as not merely a static rule but as itself a force that shapes and partially orders the diverse field of political experience. Law as rule or measure attempts to overcome the unevenness (*anōmalotes*) of things or to reduce to a minimum the exceptions to its own rule. A variety of specific laws proposed in the dialogue can be understood as aiming at this end, from those regulating commerce the accumulation of wealth, which aim at an “even distribution of property (*homalotēta tais ousiais*, 918c3) to practice of choral dance, which unites the different members of the community in harmonious motion. Most importantly, law attempts to reconcile the various

forces within the city, and within the human soul, that pull individual and community toward disorder and license. The famous preludes to the laws are meant to complement the pure command of law with rational persuasion. This activity of law fulfills the task of the third kind of legislator, who reconciles the better and worse parts of a city without eliminating either of them (627c-628a). By proposing such a reconciliation the one of law with the many of political reality, the Laws can be seen as attempting to solve what could be called the political manifestation of the chōrismos problem.

Ian McCready-Flora, Columbia University

ian.flora@gmail.com

“Aristotle Domesticates Protagoras: Charity and Dialectic”

This paper examines Aristotle’s engagement with the measure doctrine of Protagoras, with a focus on one striking episode thereof and its implications for Aristotle’s view of truth, meaning and human reason.

While discussing “measure” in book 10 of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle takes Protagoras’ measure doctrine to mean something different from the standard subjective relativism. Knowledge and perception are measures, he says, because they are means by which we come to recognize things. Therefore, when Protagoras asserts that a person is the measure of all things, what he really means is that the person who knows or perceives is the measure, because knowledge and perception are measures.

The result is a “relativism” Aristotle can accept, as when he argues in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that people with practical wisdom are measures of the good. He even says in *Metaphysics* 10 that, while Protagoreans might seem to offer an astonishing view, in fact they are “saying nothing surprising.” Aristotle does interpret other philosophers in his own terms. This situation is unique, however, because he juxtaposes his own reading of the doctrine with the apparent intended meaning and then insists on his own. Moreover, Aristotle is well aware in other contexts that the “doctrine of Protagoras” is some form of global subjective relativism. So what is going on?

Aristotle employs what we would call a principle of charity. He takes words and assigns meaning to preserve truth: *anthropos*, for instance, actually refers to a person who knows or perceives. Interpretive charity is a going philosophical concern, and most agree that apparent intended meaning should constrain interpretation. Not Aristotle, though.

Compare how Plato reconstructs Protagoras’ view in the *Theaetetus*, on which Aristotle bases much of his own treatment. One must, says Socrates, reply as Protagoras himself would, preserving intended meaning in the course of rational reconstruction. This hews to a contemporary notion of interpretive charity. Plato uses such a method again in the *Protagoras* when discussing

Simonides' poem. Socrates makes fine distinctions in the meanings of key terms to save the poem from apparent contradiction. The constraint is therefore well-established, but Aristotle still ignores it.

He does so, I argue, because the measure doctrine is a special case with foundational implications. Aristotle claims in *Metaphysics* 4 that intersubjective significance is necessary for meaning. Interpretation is impossible if no interpretation could assign the proper meaning to the statement. If a view entails that mutual signification is impossible, it is therefore necessarily false. Dialectic sets the limits of thought.

Subjective relativism, however, has this consequence, because it entails a denial of the principle of non-contradiction, which itself entails, according to Aristotle, that words cannot have intersubjective significance. Aristotle therefore deploys charity that privileges truth over apparent intended meaning; Protagoras need not mean what he thought he meant. As interpreted by Aristotle, Protagoras speaks the truth, but this has its cost, as it means he can no longer tell us anything we did not already know.

Chrissy Meijns, University College London

c.meijns.09@ucl.ac.uk

“The unity of inner sense powers: Avicenna and Suárez”

What is the distinction between touching a knife, imagining it, and reckoning it to be painful? An underlying concern in the part On the soul of Avicenna's *The healing* (al-shifa: fi l-nafs) is to systematize which forms of post-sensory cognitive capacities there are, and to state on what basis they are distinct from one another. Avicenna answers that, as a counterpart to the five external sense modalities, there are five internal senses—that is: common sense, imagination, estimation, imaginative or cogitative power, and memory—and the criterion of their distinction is an object-function based on: to each there is a specific combination of an object it is of, and a cognitive role it performs with that object. While for authors in the Latin West Avicenna's answer has been influential, it has also attracted criticism. This paper focuses on the correction to the individuation of the inner sense powers proposed by Francisco Suárez in his *De Anima* VIII. Although Suárez agrees in principle with Avicenna that sense powers must be individuation on the basis of a unique object-function pair, he comes to a radically different conclusion. Instead of identifying five inner senses, Suárez contends that there is in effect only one inner sense; otherwise put, there is no real distinction between inner sense powers. What is going on here? I argue that, while both Avicenna and Suárez take the object-function based criterion of individuation seriously, their concerns are different. The core focus for Avicenna is to capture the specific contributions that distinct powers make to overall cognition, together with an awareness that a single power cannot be assigned conflicting characteristics. For example, if a power, in order to be able to receive sensible forms, must have a humid disposition in its part of the brain, it cannot at the same time have the dryness

that a retentive power requires. For Suárez, on the other hand, the central concern lies with accounting for the dependency and interaction between (or within) one or more capacities. Suárez emphasizes that in order for, say, what is at one point sensorily apprehended actually to be retained in cognition, the differentiation in object and function cannot be of such kind so as to merit a real distinction between powers. Hence, all inner sense powers are really just one. I bring out how the origin of this divergence between Avicenna and Suárez lies in a tension between acknowledging the unity and simplicity of the soul on the one hand, and a genuine diversity in acts and object of cognition on the other. I demonstrate how, in endorsing their respective options for the individuation of the inner sense powers, both authors seize on two different extremes already contained in this tension.

Christopher Merwin, New School for Social Research

merwc322@newschool.edu

“Reexamining Augustine on Time: Psychology, Realism, and Antirealism in Confessions X and XI”

Reexamining Augustine on Time:

Psychology, Realism, and Antirealism in Confessions X and XI

AUGUSTINE’S THEORY OF TIME, most explicitly given with the context of Book XI of his Confessions, is widely regarded as a subjective, or psychological, view of time. The relative position of time’s discussion in the text is significant when compared to the previous ten books that offer an autobiographical account of Augustine’s conversion to Christianity. As such, Augustine’s formulation of time within the opening chapter of the second half of the Confessions can be read as a significant theological starting point linking the previous ten chapters. Augustine’s account of time, however, is not without some significant difficulties. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the notion of time that Augustine presents within the context of Book XI of his Confessions and contrast it to the overall project of the Confessions and to understand the various problems that are implicit in Augustine’s discussion of Time. Primarily of interest will be the question of man’s association to eternity, held by Augustine as being the province of God alone, the status of time’s reality within his subjective psychological account, its relation to realism and antirealism, and the problem of change and movement. Implicit in my examination is an engagement with Sorabji’s reading of Augustine’s on time and asking the question that if we remove a conception of God from Augustine’s general outline of an experience of time, and thus not connected to eternity, we are presented with a series of three different and potentially overlapping problems (following Sorabji) and that time for Augustine may be one or more of the following, (1) a successively static series of tenseless ordered events, (2) unreal or nonexistent, or (3) merely a mental phenomenon which must be somehow overcome. For various reasons Augustine will reject at least (1) and (2) and the question remains, as to whether Augustine’s conception will force us to accept the third option. I depart from Sorabji’s interpretation that the mental model of time may be overcome and argue that

we must account (as Augustine suggests) for the epistemological argument from Augustine's concept of memory and the ontological status of time must both be addressed in a connected way.

Clyde Lee Miller, Stony Brook University

clyde.miller@stonybrook.edu

“Conjectural Knowledge and Metaphor: Implications of Nicholas of Cusa's *De coniecturis*”

In this paper I explain that for Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) almost all human knowing amounts to conjectural knowledge. I begin by examining what Nicholas means by “conjecture,” then discuss its presuppositions and implications for our knowing. His definition of *coniectura* as “a positive assertion that participates in truth as it is, but in otherness” makes it clear that Cusanus never doubts that our thought attains some measure of truth, particularly in our ordinary perceptual judgments that recognize and identify what is perceived. Nicholas does not hesitate to invoke both original and traditional proposals that he sees as conjectural when he turns to more philosophical conceptions about the natures of perceptible things and what transcends them, as well as about the nature of human knowledge. In the last part of the paper, I argue that such theoretical conjectures are typically metaphorical no less than the notion of conjecture itself. This implies that all our conjectural knowing and speaking about what we know may well be metaphorical.

Mark Moes, Grand Valley State University

moesm@gvsu.edu

“Comparing Socrates' Digressions in the *Theaetetus* and in *Republic* 5-7”

This paper attempts to call in question certain aspects of Sandra Peterson's readings of the digressions of the *Theaetetus* and *Republic* in her 2011 book *SOCRATES AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO*, by providing sketches of alternative readings that better explain some important connections between the two digressions not explained by her readings. Peterson's view of the *Theaetetus* digression is that Socrates there articulates views that belong to Theodorus, that no part of the digression is endorsed by Socrates or Plato, and that, when we realize this, we can dissolve the discrepancies between Socrates' characterizations of the philosophic life in the digression and his characterizations of the philosophic life in the *Apology*. Socrates' sequence of apparent pronouncements about philosophy and becoming like to God, according to her, is “Socrates' invitation to the young *Theaetetus*, and Plato's invitation to the reader, to examine those pronouncements,” and nothing more (86). But in response to Peterson's view, the paper recalls that Plato depicts Socrates in the *Phaedrus* as embodying and expressing a dialectical method of searching for the truth, a method that Socrates also to some extent explicitly articulates in his “collection and

division” of the term ‘rhetoric’. It argues that the second part of the Theaetetus digression invites examination of the pronouncements about philosophy and likeness to God in such a way as to contain hints and suggestions toward a monotheistic reinterpretation of the notion of likeness to God. On such a reinterpretation Socrates (and Plato) would be recommending a view of the philosophic life as a Basileike techne, in which living in likeness to God is living as a selfless and generous craftsman of goodness, imitating the “maker and father” God of the Timaeus rather than the Olympian gods as portrayed in the theogonies. Finally, the paper discusses how the monotheism of the Theaetetus digression echoes monotheistic suggestions to be found in Socrates comments during the *Republic* digression from 471c until the end of Book 7, taking issue with some of Peterson’s remarks about the middle sections of the *Republic*.

Christopher Moore, Penn State University

crm21@psu.edu

“Herodorus on Heracles the Philosopher”

Among the ten earliest records uses of the word “philosophize” is the mythographer Herodorus’ stunning claim about the hero Heracles, that he “philosophized until death” (φιλοσοφῆσας μέχρι θανάτου fr. 14 Jacoby, ca. 400 BC). This use—practically ignored by historians of philosophy—helps establish the original meaning of the term, a meaning soon lost behind the playful etymologizing in Plato’s dialogues, stories about Pythagoras’ self-appellation by Heraclides and his contemporaries, and Aristotle’s technical definitions. The association of a mythical champion and philosophizing unsettles received views that “philosophizing” in the fifth century meant either “intellectual cultivation” (e.g., Nightingale, Cooper) or “loving or seeking after wisdom” (e.g., Guthrie, Barnes, Hadot). In other words, the compound term’s meaning neither comes transparently from a supposedly stable pair of meanings (of phil- and soph-), nor follows a simple history of specialization, from a general term meaning “curious” or “thoughtful” to the narrowly demarcated name of a discipline. It has instead a complex evolution, initially identifying people who appeared to aspire to the elite social class of sophoi, the panhellenically-notorious sages; later self-applied by various circles historically and figuratively linked to Pythagoras’ lineage; and still later becoming generically related to certain self-consciously developed intellectual and ethical-maturation practices.

At some point in his at-least-17-book study of Heracles, Herodorus says that Heracles’ philosophy “conquered the much-variegated reasoning of poignant emotion” and won him “the three virtues: non-anger, non-avarice, and non-hedonism” (τὸ μὴ ὀργιζέσθαι, τὸ μὴ φιλαργυρεῖν, τὸ μὴ φιληδονεῖν). Thus “philosophizing” may mean, in this period near the end of Socrates’ life, the exercise of self-control. Whether this exercise involves rational argument, we cannot easily tell; the fragment uses only the metaphorical verb ἐνίκησε/νικήσαντα. Herodorus may mean that Heracles literally argued against the “reasoning” his emotion put forward; but he might instead mean that whatever equanimity philosophy amounts to silences the clever rationalization passion encourages. There is no

assertion here, at any rate, that Heracles exercised dialectical skill. Philosophy also preempts common vices. This suggests that philosophizing means successfully acknowledging the really valuable things in life; these exclude getting angry, lusting after money, and seeking inordinate pleasures. That Herodorus says, perhaps famously, that Heracles philosophized “until death” suggests that the process of focusing on the right values takes great constancy and does not depend on any particular discovery or ability. Elsewhere in his book, Herodorus said that Herakles became a phusikos (an inquirer into phusis) having “learned by having passed on to him the knowledge of the heavenly bodies” (fr. 13), but we have no evidence about the way this knowledge relates to Heracles’ philosophizing (although Servius wrote that this knowledge helped him complete his labors, ad Aeneidem 1.741). All the same, it is notable that Herodorus draws no direct connection between “philosophizing,” on the one hand, and “wisdom,” “love,” “curiosity,” or “seeking the truth,” on the other. This is contrary to what the traditional accounts would predict, and consistent with the trend of usage mentioned above.

A portion of this paper addresses the authenticity of fr. 14; Detienne and others have wondered whether all but the end is a late paraphrase, given its strongly Stoic imagery. How much can be dated to the fifth century determines how much can provide evidence for pre-Platonic picture of philosophy. I argue that even a cautious appraisal preserves the findings above.

Gil Morejon, DePaul University

gdmorejon@gmail.com

“Zhuangzi's Trees: Insubordinate Joy and Heavenly Becoming”

In this paper, I locate the points of contact in the Zhuangzi that deal with the interrelated problematics of perspectivalism, teleological subordination, and givenness, by threading together the stories within it that involve the image of the tree. I show that the tree figures as something which eludes being subordinated to ends, giving the lie to the supposed metaphysical authority of teleology, by becoming useless; this evasion constitutes a kind of paradox, the usefulness of the useless, the importance of which Zhuangzi argues for throughout the text. The paper is a reflection on this paradox and the ethical ramifications implied by the radically immanent metaphysics that Zhuangzi espouses, an ethics summed up by the enigmatic phrase ‘becoming attuned to the heavenly’. I argue that this is a principled approach to producing harmonious interaction which, grounded in an epistemological finitude and a recognition of the univocal status of real difference, produces a space in which flourishing becomes possible for social beings. I contend that this model for becoming, ecstatically revolutionary and singular in its time, can only be exemplary in our own, marked as it is by increasingly violent subordination and tracing a dangerous trajectory toward the impossibility of human coexistence with nature.

J.J. Mulhern, University of Pennsylvania

johnjm11@verizon.net

“Politeia in Aristotle, Pol. VI: An annotated Catalogue”

Aristotle’s *Politics* contains 522 occurrences of the expression *politeia*, and Book VI contains 36 of them. Modern English-language translators have rendered by ‘constitution’ in almost every case; but few have made clear which sense or senses of ‘constitution’ they have intended their translations to mean. And in English, as the OED shows, ‘constitution’ is an expression with a variety of senses, some of which may not match up exactly with the senses of *politeia* in Aristotle or in other Greek authors.

Following indications in Bonitz, Newman, Rhodes, Bordes, and others, I have undertaken an annotated catalogue of all the occurrences of this expression in the *Politics* one book at a time, having already completed a trial run with the *Politeia* of the Athenians, which contains 62 occurrences and which was one of the preliminary studies on which the *Politics* was based.* The *Politeia* of the Athenians recognizes several senses of *politeia*, and I propose here to show how the different senses are distributed in Book VI of the *Politics*.

Where the sense of *politeia* can be divined from the immediate context in this book, the sense often is regime and occasionally polity. This distribution is consistent with the book’s being devoted largely to how the oligarchy and democracy might be saved, where these are construed most often as regimes. That they are construed as regimes rather than as arrangements of offices (constitutions) is clear where Aristotle speaks of saving the oligarchy (1321a1-2) and of changing the arrangement of offices to approximate the mixture known as the so-called polity (1320b22). The arrangements of offices (constitutions) themselves are not being saved. They, in fact, are being changed rather than saved. Aristotle devotes considerable attention to listing offices in VI.8, even though he has done so elsewhere earlier. In this book the contrast of the oligarchy and the democracy with the polity recalls the *Laws*, and the oligarchy and the democracy are treated as exclusive regimes—those that pursue their own interests as they see them, mainly or wholly.

*This trial-run material was presented in two conference papers: “*Politeia* in the Aristotelian *Politeia* of the Athenians: A Catalogue of Uses,” Annual Meeting, Northeastern Political Science Association, Philadelphia, November 18, 2011; and “*Politeia* as Citizenship in Aristotle,” Annual Meeting, American Philological Association, Philadelphia, Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Panel, January 7, 2012.

Joyce Mullan, Stevens Institute of Technology

jmullan@stevens.edu

“Changing ideals of *Arête* in portrayals of Odysseus during the Peloponnesian War”

In this paper, I would like to analyze the way Odysseus was portrayed in plays written principally by Sophocles and Euripides during the Peloponnesian War. I believe that Athenians, or at least some Athenian playwrights began to rethink popular ideals of manly virtue or *Arête* while prosecuting the war. I will begin analyzing traditional heroic ideals embodied in Achilles and Ajax, and then consider how and why the wily cunning Odysseus formed a new ideal. Athenians were very proud of their ability to outwit forces that were physically larger than them beginning with the Greeks in the Trojan War and Athenians in the Persian Wars. While they were fighting and defending themselves, and then while losing the war, in revising the character of Odysseus, they seemed to begin to re-evaluate the values they had lived by.

Dana Munteanu, Ohio State University

munteanu.3@osu.edu

“Arts, Characters, and Morals in Aristotle”

Although Aristotle’s division between the noble (*spoudaioi*) characters of tragedy and the vulgar (*phauloi*) characters of comedy in the *Poetics* is both well-known and memorable, his account of character-types, their morality, as well as ability to transmit morals, appears to be much more complex at closer examination. In this paper, I explore Aristotle’s classification of characters, in accordance to genre, within the same genre, and in relationship to other forms of art (especially painting and music). The examples from the *Poetics* will be put in a broader perspective by looking at the *Politics* and *On the Poets*.

Artistic imitation of people in action regards various types of characters in the *Poetics* (1448a1-8): these can appear better, worse, or such as we are, just as painters represent them (Polygnotus superior people, Pauson inferior, and Dionysius like us). Poets too imitate in a similar way (Homer better, Cleophon like us, Hegemon of Thasos and Nicocharēs worse, 1448a9-15; for a comparison between painting and poetry, see Zanker 2000). After an account of how arts, particularly music, represent character and emotions in the *Politics* (1340a), Aristotle notes that, though visual arts do not represent character directly but only give indications (*semeia*) of character through colors and forms (while melodies contain in themselves such representations), the young should not look at the works of Pauson but at the works of Polygnotus. I am interested in exploring several matters here. (1) How exactly do arts represent character and emotions? In the *Poetics* drama and painting were linked as very similar, but they seem to have different imitative abilities in the *Politics*. Where does music stand as an art, and more broadly in relation to tragedy? (2) While Aristotle abstains from any moral judgment in how types of poetry and their characters may influence the young in the passage

from the Poetics, this is not the case in the Politics. Then, perhaps, ethical value can be ascribed to epic and tragedy, based on the type of representation alone.

Finally (3) if generally Aristotle attaches epithets to characters in accordance to types of actions and to genre (epic and tragedy—better than us; parody—worse than us, etc), sometimes he seems to acknowledge differences within the same genre (e.g. tragedy). For example, wondering whether poets should be criticized when they represent things that are not true, Aristotle suggests that perhaps they ought not be criticized for representing matters as they should be (rather than as they are). He adds that Sophocles said that he himself represented people as they should be whereas Euripides portrayed them as they were (Poet. 1460b33-5; perhaps something of the sort is implied in On the Poets 3.7).

David Murphy, Nightingale-Bamford

david.murphy20@verizon.net

“By the Goose, By the Rooster.” Socrates' Other Unusual Oaths”

“By the goose, By the Rooster.” Socrates’ Other Unusual Oaths

David J. Murphy

Beginning in the Roman imperial period, we find reports that Socrates swore, not only “by the dog,” as Plato has him do, but by seven other natural entities: goose, plane tree, rooster, ram, goat, oak, and even “by any random stone” (Augustine, *De vera religione* 2). Antiquity credited the hero-king Rhadamanthys with the invention of such conversational oaths, as a device to reserve oaths by gods’ names for formal use. Many later reports also present Socrates’ unusual oaths as a ground of his indictment for impiety. Reports that Socrates swore “by the plane tree” may be careless inferences from the *Phaedrus*, but it seems a stretch to derive “by the rooster” from Socrates’ last words in the *Phaedo*, and no Platonic passages support reports of Socratic oaths by other natural entities. Xenophon’s Socrates swears only by Olympian gods. Reports of Socrates’ “Rhadamanthine” oaths, then, pose several problems. What was their genesis? By what route did they reach Roman and Byzantine writers? Why are Socrates’ purported oath-witnesses attested in such varying proportions (e.g. goose in 21 sources, rooster in three)?

Socrates’ oaths have been the subject of three recent studies, of which the most useful for us is by Andreas Patzer (“Beim Hunde! Sokrates und der Eid des Rhadamanthys,” in *Festschrift Werner Suerbaum* [Stuttgart 2003] 93-107). Patzer argues that it was in Polycrates’ display piece, the Accusation of Socrates, that all Socrates’ “Rhadamanthine” oaths known to us were collected and presented as evidence of impiety. Patzer postulates further that Polycrates had no other source than Socratic dialogues. Patzer’s thesis deserves scrutiny, not least because the attempt to uncover traces of lost Socratic literature is attracting renewed scholarly interest.

In the present paper I undertake, first, to refine Patzer's conclusions by assessing his assumptions critically and subjecting the ancient reports to analysis by individual oath formula. I argue that besides dog, only goose and rooster present strong claims to have stood in Polycrates; goat, oak and stone almost certainly appeared neither there nor in Socratic dialogues. Second, diachronic analysis of reports of Socrates' oaths has much to teach about scholarly methods from Hellenistic times to the Renaissance. I shall hypothesize that: 1. "the oath of Rhadamanthys" is an invention of Cratinus; 2. at least one lost Socratic dialogue a.) portrayed Socrates as promoting deisidaimonia, lit. "fear of the divine," through such oaths, and b). linked him to oaths by goose and, probably, rooster; 3. Didymus Chalcenterus in two works on comedy, and perhaps also in his collection of proverbs, compiled information about Socrates' and Rhadamanthys' oaths; 4. an ancient scholar compiling material about Socrates' trial wrongly located Polycrates' invective against Socrates' oaths in a speech given at the trial. Later tradition draws on these compilations.

John Murungi, Towson University

jmurungi@towson.edu

"Cultivation of African-asian philosophical relationship"

So far, in Africa today, what passes as professional academic philosophy is largely a product of Western teaching. African academic philosophers are primarily nourished by philosophy texts written by Western philosophers or by their teaching. It is also the case that African professors of philosophy have been taught by the Western professors of philosophy or by African professors of philosophy who have been taught by them. Even the history of philosophy they teach is largely a product of Western historians of philosophy and is primarily the history of Western philosophy. This trend in philosophy is increasingly being challenged by some philosophers who seek to diversify orientation in philosophy. I make a contribution to this end by cultivating an African-Asian philosophical relationship. In part, the contribution also seeks to loosen the dependence of African philosophers on Western philosophical tradition and on Western professors of philosophy. The dependence has inhibited a dialogue between African philosophers and their Asian counterparts. The paper prepares the ground for such a dialogue and highlights some of the obstacles that need to be overcome. And because the relationship is intended to be philosophical, the dialogue invites participation not only from Africans and Asians but from all philosophers

Edith Nally, University of Virginia

egn9b@virginia.edu

"How Socrates Misleads *Phaedrus*: Falsehood and Fallacy in the Palinode"

Socrates' palinode reads like a condensation of those doctrines most characteristic of middle Plato. The theory of the forms, recollection, and the tripartite soul play an integral role in Socrates' account of philosophic love. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the palinode has long been considered the "centerpiece" of the *Phaedrus*.

Nevertheless, a number of scholars have noticed that the palinode presents somewhat distorted versions of these characteristic views. In particular, commentators have pointed to a passage early on in the speech, where Socrates claims that philosophical love is a form of mania akin to prophecy, religious possession, and poetry (249c4-250b1). Often known as "the paradox of philosophic madness", many have wondered why Plato, the "ultra-rationalist", should come so suddenly and unexpectedly to describe philosophy as a kind of divine madness.

Others have noticed that the palinode contains a strange account of the immortal soul. It is generally agreed that, at this point in the dialogues, the mortal soul (the soul in its living, embodied form) is a composite entity, comprised of the intellect, the emotions, and the appetites (Rep. 439). By contrast, the immortal soul (that part of us which lives on even after the death of the body) is taken to be a non-composite entity, consisting in reason (nous) alone (Phd. 80d; Rep. 611a-b). But the soul of the *Phaedrus* is different in this respect: Socrates adopts the chariot metaphor—a composite image—in a tale describing the immortal soul. This is the first time in all the dialogues that the immortal soul appears as a composite entity.

Whereas many have taken these puzzles as straightforward philosophical developments, this paper presents an alternative account. I argue that Plato has not so much changed his mind, as he has put a number of insincere claims in the mouth of Socrates. My argument rests largely on the often-overlooked discussion of rhetoric from the second half of the dialogue. Here, I argue, Socrates doubts the sincerity of his earlier speeches. He claims that his speeches demonstrate the art of misleading (262d) and that the palinode was delivered partially "in jest" (265e). It very likely, I argue, that Socrates doubts the palinode in these later passages because he recognizes that he has misrepresented both the nature of philosophy and the nature of the immortal soul.

On my view, the purpose of the palinode is to disabuse Phaedrus of a potentially harmful belief. Recognizing at the outset of the dialogue that Phaedrus thinks that it is always better to favor the non-lover, and that this will drive him into the arms of men like Lysias, Socrates aims to persuade Phaedrus to favor to the lover—especially if he be a lover of wisdom. I conclude that the palinode misleads in a way that has often been overlooked in the dialogues; Socrates defends a number of false claims in the service of convincing his interlocutor of something that he will do well to believe.

“The Neopythagorean Backdrop to the fall (σφάλμα/νεῦσις) of the Soul in the Gnosis and its Echo in the Plotinian Treatises 33 and 34”

When speaking of the fall or decline of the Soul (Sophia) within the context of the Gnostic cosmogonic narratives, Plotinus, in addition to the term νεῦσις, resorts to the substantive σφάλμα (or the corresponding verb σφάλλασθαι), as if it were a synonym of νεῦσις. The following investigation demonstrates the validity of this usage, as the term σφάλμα is, in fact, used by the heresiologists to describe, in a language inherited from Neopythagoreanism, and therefore structured by number, the fall of Sophia, which embodies both the twelfth aeon of the Dodecade as well as the thirtieth and final aeon of the entire Pleroma. Related back to the Pythagorean metaphysics whence it stems, the Gnostic narrative loses any appearance of arbitrariness and finally reveals its true structure, ordered from start to finish by number. It is reasonable to think that the rival arithmology of Plotinus' Treatise 34 was created in order to undermine this very narrative.

Jonathan Nelson, Saint Louis University

nelsonjh@slu.edu

“Wisdom, Goodness, and Rulership: Soul's Divinity in Plato”

In the *Phaedo's* Affinity Argument for soul's immortality, Plato gives three reasons to think that unlike the body, soul is not the kind of thing that can scatter and cease to exist. First, like Forms but unlike bodies, soul is invisible to the human eye. Second, unlike bodies soul can cease changing at least while it contemplates the unchanging Forms. Finally, soul is like the gods and unlike bodies insofar as it is a natural ruler. Some readers find the last reason—if not the others—mysterious, unmotivated and even ad hoc. How is soul supposed to be a natural ruler and how does that make it like gods? In this paper I argue that Plato's reasoning in the Affinity Argument is not exceptional but that, in fact, Plato consistently defines divinity in terms of rulership throughout the dialogues and he consistently defines rulership in terms of wisdom, goodness, and a genuine concern for the well-being of the ruled. Moreover, Plato consistently maintains that soul is divine, akin to the divine, or resembles the divine insofar as it features understanding, goodness, and authority to rule. Although there are more passages I could discuss in a longer paper, I will confine myself to discussing *Phaedo* 61c-64a; *Alcibiades I* 133b-135b; *Gorgias* 507e-508a; *Republic* 341c-343a, 589b-591d, 611e-612a, and 379b-383c; *Phaedrus* 245d-247d; and various passages in *Timaeus*. I will argue that in these passages—especially when interpreted together thematically—present an overall understanding of the divine such that gods are, by definition, good and wise rulers who care about the good of their subjects. Gods are truly rulers in the precise sense. But insofar as souls, and human souls in particular, can themselves become good and wise and can rule over subjects simply for the good of those subjects, human souls are themselves divine. Such is not merely a possibility, however, but what we should all strive for. Becoming like god is becoming a ruler in the precise sense. But being a

ruler in the precise sense is impossible for Becomers, so soul must not be a Becomer and so must not scatter and cease to exist when it separates from the body at death.

Catherine Nolan, SUNY Buffalo

cnolan2@buffalo.edu

“Suárez on the Evil of Death”

In Disputation XI of Suárez' *Disputationes metaphysicae*, Suárez makes the controversial claim that death is not, strictly speaking, evil for the one who dies. He points out that while dying (the gradual corruption of a living being) is indeed evil for the individual, death causes an individual to cease to exist and therefore cannot be considered an evil for the non-existent individual. In this paper, I show both how Suárez's claim is rooted in his metaphysical system and how his claim is not necessarily entailed by his metaphysics. I conclude that Suárez could consistently have held that death is evil in several ways.

The first part of this paper summarizes Suárez's definition and classifications of evil. The second explains his claim that death is not evil; and the third elaborates upon three ways in which Suárez could have classified death as an evil. While Suárez claims that death is not “properly and strictly” evil for the one destroyed by it, and evil “broadly speaking” only since it destroys something good, I explore three more approaches to death allowed by Suárez's philosophical framework. First of all, we can examine death as it is evil for others: the death of his parents is an evil for the orphaned child. In a related way, we can suffer even from the deaths of those that do not deprive us of a relation that ought to exist: for instance, we can suffer from the death of a friend, or any living being which was important to us in some way. Here, the privation is not of a proper relation, but of agreeability to us. A second way in which death can be considered an evil—and in this case, an evil for the one who will undergo it—is to understand that in the Christian tradition, death is a penalty for sin. Penalty, for Suárez, is the form of evil distinguished theologically from fault; if death is indeed a penalty, it must be considered an evil, at least in a theological sense. Finally, death can be considered evil for the immortal soul of the human person who dies, since death reduces the soul to the state of an incomplete substance. Here, death is the privation of the proper union of soul and body. Suárez could therefore have claimed that death is an evil either for the person undergoing it or for others. By recognizing that Suárez' premises do not rule out claim that death is evil, we may be better suited to reconcile Suárez' philosophy with that of other medievals and the tradition of Christian philosophy as a whole.

Th Olszewsky, New College of Florida

tolshefsky@ncf.edu

“The Dynamics of Dynamis”

Abstract: The Dynamics of Dynamis

Witt, Beere, Ide and others have each recently called attention to the metaphysical importance of the dual concept of dynamis in Aristotle’s account of being in *Metaphysics* Θ, and to its conceptual independence from the two preceding books. None take note (as Rosamond Sprague aptly complained in her review of Witt’s book) of the conceptual developments in Aristotle’s other works. An account of those developments will make clear how they made this treatment in Θ possible. The story begins in Plato’s *Sophist* with the Eleatic Stranger wrenching from the giants the concession that it is “a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but dynamis.” (247e) Aristotle implicitly gave answer to this challenge already in the *Protrepticus* with his introduction of *energeia* as the correlate reality to dynamis, and he laid down his own challenges in *Metaphysics* A that it is necessary to give an adequate account of individuals and of motion for us to understand being. He gave his account of motion in terms of dynamis in *Physics* III, but it was not until he developed his two-tiered accounts of potentiality in *Physics* VIII and *On the Soul* II that he was able in turn to give an adequate account of the *ousia* of dynamis. This is paired with a dual account of actuality in Θ-7, which establishes the discrimination of constitution and activity as two senses of actuality. These developments may not only lead us to reevaluate the standard grouping of ZHΘ in the *Metaphysics*, but also give some insight into how these conceptual developments were necessary antecedents for arriving at the concept of the unmoved mover in Λ.

Darcy Otto,

darcy.otto@questu.ca

“Dialectical truth and the one”

Christina Papachristou, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, GREECE

plotinos@edlit.auth.gr

“Aristotle on Sleep (ὕπνος), Phantasmata (φαντάσματα) and Dreams (ἐνύπνια)”

"Aristotle on Sleep (ὕπνος), Phantasmata (φαντάσματα) and Dreams (ἐνύπνια)"

What is sleep? Why do we sleep? Why do we dream? Who we are when we are asleep? What is the relation between sleep and dreams? Are dreams meaningful? From antiquity until today, humans wanted to know what is going on during the process of sleep. They wanted to understand and

explain the reason why we spend one-third of our lives in this periodic state of rest or seemingly inactivity.

Ancient Greeks compared to other ancient populations dealt systematically with sleep and dream function. They believed that dreams were: (a) divinely inspired, (b) messages sent by the deity, (c) predictions for the future, (d) means of communication between the living and the dead to convey messages. (e) In addition, dreams had therapeutic powers. But besides all these, they attempted to approach and interpret sleep and dreams in a rational way.

In this paper I will attempt to show that Aristotle's rational interpretation on the nature and function of sleep/hypnos (ὕπνος) and dreams/enupnia (ἐνύπνια) is intriguing and important.

Aristotle examines the function of sleep and dreams in relation to the biological and psychological phenomena. He asserts that sleep «is a sort of privation of waking» («φαίνεται στέρησις τις ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ἐγρηγόρευσεως» (De Somno, I, 453 b 25-26). It is an affection (πάθος) of the sensitive part (αἰσθητικὸν μέρος) of the soul, while dream/enupnion is a kind of phantasma, namely a representation or image («τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα ἐνύπνιον λέγομεν, εἴθ' ἀπλῶς εἶτε τρόπον τινα γινόμενον» op.cit., I, 459 a 19-20).

The present paper has two aims. The first and foremost aim is to explore the Stageirite's views on dreaming, since these views, as I shall try to present and analyze, are developed out of his concepts of sensation (αἴσθησις), imagination/phantasia (φαντασία), memory (μνήμη) and mind or intellect (νοῦς).

The second aim is to show that today's speculations about the nature of dreams are not much different from the ones of the Stageirite philosopher. I shall argue that his philosophical and psychophysical interpretations concerning these issues have influenced in some respect the Freudian, the Post-Freudian and the Contemporary theories of dream analysis and dream imagery.

Anthony Pasqualoni, University of Edinburgh

pasqualoni@gmail.com

“The Method of Collection and Division as a Predecessor of Aristotle's Formal Logic”

The method of division is a mode of inference that plays an important role in Plato's later dialogues. However, in Prior Analytics 1.31, Aristotle argues that Platonic division is a “weak syllogism” because it assumes what should be proven (46a32-3). Unlike division, a valid syllogism establishes the correct relations of its terms and thereby provides a proof. However, modern historians of logic such as Anton Dumitriu argue the reverse: the method of division precedes and forms the basis of a syllogism. I will present a similar argument: division is part of a larger method, closely associated with Plato's dialectic, which subsumes the syllogistic.

According to Plato, collection and division together form a unified method that comprises two operations. In collection, seemingly disparate elements that share a common characteristic are collected together into a unified *eidos* ('class' or 'kind'; also referred to as 'genos'). Division, on the other hand, operates by separating an *eidos* into sub-classes. Thus, to collect is to unify into one class, to divide is to separate into multiple sub-classes. To use an Aristotelian example, plant life that shares a common characteristic can be collected into the *eidos* 'tree,' and this *eidos* can be divided into the sub-classes 'deciduous' and 'non-deciduous.' To use a Platonic example, the natural numbers can be collected into the *eidos* 'number,' which can be divided into 'odd' and 'even.'

A key concept of Aristotle's syllogistic is the universal ('*katholou*'; also referred to as 'genos' or 'eidos'). Arguably, the relation between a universal and the subject of which it is predicated is analogous to a Platonic *eidos* and its sub-classes. According to *Prior Analytics* 1.1.24b28, a term contains another just as a universal is predicated of a subject. Containment and predication in the *Analytics* are basic relations that are established by the method of division. To use a well-known Platonic illustration, that a 'sophist' is a 'hunter' is analogous to the claims that (1) 'hunting' "contains" 'sophistry'; (2) 'hunting' can be predicated of 'sophistry'; and (3) part of 'hunting' is 'sophistry.' These relations are defined through division, and they form the basis of a set of premises in a syllogism. In short, the individual terms of a syllogism are defined through collection, while the interrelations of these terms are determined through division. In this sense, collection and division precede and delineate the elements of a syllogism.

That collection and division form the basis of the syllogism shows that Aristotle's system of deduction rests on a conceptual foundation that precedes the *Organon*. Furthermore, Plato admits in several passages that the method of collection and division is a legacy that was practiced before the Greeks. In this sense, the foundations of the syllogism were articulated long before Aristotle. Studying the method of collection and division is useful for showing the roots of Aristotle's system of deduction and the syllogistic's relations with earlier forms of reasoning.

Carissa Phillips-Garrett, Rice University

cp17@rice.edu

"Reconciling Theoretical Virtue as the Final Good in the *Nicomachean Ethics*"

There has long been debate over whether Aristotle's conclusion in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that theoretical contemplation is the best and most complete good is inconsistent with the importance he places in the rest of the text on the other goods in life, and more specifically, with the role that moral virtue is given in the *Ethics*. I argue here that contemplation being the final good does not entail the maximization of theoretical contemplation at the expense of other goods, and thus the prominence of theoretical contemplation in Book X is not inconsistent with Aristotle's general ethical account.

The importance of the moral virtues in Aristotle's text suggests that maximization of contemplation at the expense of moral virtue is not what is intended. Although contemplation is divine, we are human, with composite natures, not divine. Since we have needs the gods do not, moral excellence is important for us in addition to contemplation. Excellent moral acts are indispensable for the excellent human life, even though they fail to be as self-sufficient as contemplation, and thus Aristotle rejects a life devoted entirely to contemplation. As the texts explicitly acknowledge that more than one complete good may exist, this is not surprising. Aristotle does not claim that contemplation is the only complete good, only that it is the best and most complete good, and thus the difference between contemplation and the moral virtues is in degree, not in kind.

Furthermore, friendship is quite important for Aristotle's conception of the good life, and a life devoted to maximizing contemplation is incompatible with maintaining the sorts of friendships that Aristotle lauds. Aristotle's character friendships involve ongoing and significant commitments, since the friends live their lives together and help one another practice virtuous activity. It may be thought that since contemplation is said to be even better when in the company of other people, Aristotle can acknowledge the good of friendship while still maintaining that contemplation ought to be maximized. This thesis would imply that friendship, along with all other goods, is desired instrumentally, for the sake of contemplation.

This response, however, misses how fundamental friendship is to Aristotle's conception of living well. While contemplation is better with friends, it is not the primary goal of friendship on Aristotle's account. Aristotle argues that no one would live without friends, even if he possessed all of the other goods, rejecting the notion that the blessed, self-sufficient person has no need of friends. Were Aristotle's goal to maximize contemplation, friendship should not play the role that it does in his ethics, since friendship requires too much time and effort to be taken away from contemplation. If contemplation were important enough to minimize other activities, it would be more effective to spend less time with friends. Since friendship is clearly quite important to Aristotle and any interpretation of the role of *theoria* must take those prior commitments of Aristotle's into account, this offers a strong reason to think that contemplation need not be maximized for Aristotle.

Natalia Pietrulewicz, University of Warsaw
natalia.pietrulewicz@gmail.com

“The problem of donkey sentences – why medieval resolution is the right one?”

When in 1934 Walter Burley was unconsciously introducing the problem which we now call ‘donkey sentences problem’, he aimed to make his contribution to supposition theory, presenting the following sentence:

(1) Omnis homo habens asinum videt illum. (Every man that owns a donkey sees it.)

Burley has never suspected that in XXth century thanks to Geach, who has a little strangely translated the original medieval piece as:

(2) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.

donkey sentences will attract the pertaining interest of philosophers and linguists. Contemporarily, the main problem of the sentences shifted to the problem of first order predicate logic translation of the sentences - that is which one from two readings to choose:

(3) general reading, when all farmers beat all donkeys they own.

(4) existential reading, when every farmer beats at least one of his donkeys.

Of course, when Burley were formulating the sentence, first order logic predicate calculus had not existed yet, but philosophers have no doubt that interpretation which Burley proposed for sentences is consistent with existential reading. Contrarily, the only reading Geach proposed for sentences was general reading. Since Geach lot of research on donkey sentences has been done, it seems that the majority of academics forgot about the Burleys resolution and are taking the ambiguous view – they simply state that reading depends on various factors like ie. the lexical properties of words like static, episodic etc. The aim of my talk is to present the conceptual and experimental work of Geurts (which is groundbreaking and inspired us) and of mine and Mieszko Talasiewicz which rehabilitates original medieval resolution, dismissing the problem of ambiguity.

Marcin Podbielski, Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie

marcin.podbielski@ignatianum.edu.pl

“Anastasius Sinaita on individual, substance and nature”

The proposed paper presents preliminary results of the collaborative project “Re-introducing the Early Byzantine Metaphysics,” which concentrates on the process of transformation of key metaphysical notions that took place in the works of Byzantine theologians of post-Chalcedonian period.

Anastasius Sinaita followed in his writings the path marked by his predecessor, Leontius Byzantinus. Namely, he took over the terminology of Leontius, which was formulated on the basis of Ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophical notions. Anastasius sought to underpin orthodox dogmatics with philosophical methodology, thus using philosophy to the advantage of theology and as a weapon in his polemics against adversaries of orthodoxy. Still, he did not merely use the already existent terminology and notions. He continued to transform the Greek metaphysical notions into conceptions not only conform with Christian theology, but also allowing further development of the conception of individual being as such.

Similarly to Leontius, Anastasius made an extensive use of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions. But in contrast to his predecessor, who concentrated on understanding the essence of universal realities, such as substance or nature, Anastasius started to pay more attention to the notion of individual, undervalued in Greek philosophical tradition, and engaged in discussions of essence and existence of individuals. In the paper, I shall present Anastasius' reading of the notion of individual in its relation to the notions of substance and nature. Special attention will be paid to the Neoplatonic roots of Anastasius interpretation of those notions.

Tiberiu Popa, Butler University

tpopa@butler.edu

“Early Theories on the Emergence of Powers”

Theories about the nature of material and mental dispositions (elasticity, toxicity, beliefs, sense of humor etc.) and about the emergence of powers or dispositions lie at the heart of current debates in philosophy of science, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Some of their underlying questions (albeit largely motivated by a different set of concerns) can be traced back to some of the philosophically minded Hippocratics.

We can find quite a few passages and even entire treatises (such as Regimen II) that deal with the nature of powers: the powers of foods, drinks, drugs, exercises, therapeutic techniques, cold weather, damp winds etc. to produce some effect or other in the human body. Indeed most Hippocratic works which are more or less concerned with *dunameis* inquire into the nature and manifestation of powers or dispositions, but do not explicitly investigate how dispositions arise in the first place. This is precisely why I find e.g. the first book of Regimen or *De victu* so intriguing. It pointedly explores the very process through which capacities of the soul and of the body come about. While basic material *dunameis* cannot tell the whole story about why someone is prone to, say, fall ill in spring or why someone is modest or intelligent, those material *dunameis* can still supposedly tell us a great deal. How, then, can one appeal effectively to elementary powers (i.e. the powers of irreducibly simple stuffs constituting the human body) – and cognate notions – when trying to explain the emergence of capacities and propensities such as courage, resistance to disease or being prone to sickness under certain conditions? This topic is usually approached obliquely by scholars and is examined mostly in so far as it is intertwined with other topics. Here I would like to mount a frontal attack on it, chiefly within the confines of Regimen I and of *Airs, Waters, Places*. Most of my talk is meant to elucidate the causal explanations for the emergence of complex mental and temperamental dispositions in these texts. I will make a few clarifications with respect to the orders of *dunameis* discussed there and will go over several key passages. In the concluding section of my paper I will evaluate what I take to be some of the more significant theoretical consequences of the story about the emergence of dispositions in Regimen I and in *Airs, Waters, Places*.

Tony Preus, Binghamton University
apreus@binghamton.edu
“Aristotle and Theophrastus on Food”

Aristotle was a foundational philosopher of biology who wrote extensively on the natural history of animals, and seems pretty clearly to have been an omnivore, not resistant to eating meat. At any rate he says in *Politics* I.8 that plants exist to provide food for animals and that animals exist for the sake of human beings, “the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for provision of clothing and various instruments.” (1256b15) Theophrastus was Aristotle’s student and associate, writing extensively on the natural history of plants, and was famously vegetarian, as reported to us in Porphyry’s “On Abstinence from Killing Animals.” How do these differences between the two Peripatetic philosophers influence their ethical, political, and social philosophy? What are the implications of the differences between omnivorous and vegetarian for the remainder of a philosopher’s views?

Marta Przyszychowska, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
przymarta@gmail.com
“Human Nature as an Indivisible Monad According to Gregory of Nyssa”

Gregory of Nyssa is undoubtedly not the first Father of the Church who considered humanity as unity. Already in the first serious Christian faith treatise, i.e. *Adversus haereses* of Irenaeus, we do find the belief in the unity of all human beings. But it was Gregory of Nyssa who created the first theory of human nature considered as an indivisible unit/monad. We find his very precise definition in his small work *To Ablabius*: “Nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it.”

In my paper, I will show how Gregory of Nyssa’s view of human nature permeates his entire work and informs his discussions of other subjects. Alongside, I will retrace various philosophical influences, sometimes non obvious, which may be discerned in his approach to human nature.

Jean-Philippe Ranger, St. Thomas University

jpranger@stu.ca

“Epicurean Epistemology and lessons from Plato's Theaetetus”

One of the fundamental and famous theses of Epicurean epistemology is that sense perception is the first step to scientific knowledge (episteme). To be more precise, sense perception is the foundation and first principle of scientific knowledge. Epicurus goes so far as to claim that if sense perception is unreliable, scientific knowledge is impossible (RS XXIV).

While it would be useful to understand how Epicurus justifies this first principle of knowledge, we only possess a few fragments from his Canon and these fragments are in the form of assertions rather than in the form of arguments. To reconstruct an Epicurean argument that justifies his theory of scientific knowledge, I propose the following starting point: Epicurus constructs his theory of scientific knowledge as a reply to a series of objections that suggest on the one hand that knowledge from sense perception leads to relativism, and on the other hand that sense perception cannot be a foundation to knowledge. Yet the most detailed treatments of such arguments are developed in Plato's Theaetetus. My thesis is not necessarily that Epicurus had an intimate knowledge of this text, but more fundamentally, that Epicurus must develop his epistemology by taking the objections of the Theaetetus into account. A confrontation of these two authors will allow me to find a justification of Epicurean first principles of knowledge. In a certain sense, I will be asking Epicurus the very question that Socrates asks Theaetetus: what is scientific knowledge (145e)?

I develop my argument in two steps. First I examine Epicurean epistemology in light of the theory of koina of the Theaetetus (184d-187a). Such an analysis will show that for Epicurus, scientific knowledge is discursive. Second, I analyze the foundation of Epicurean scientific knowledge in light of the aporia Socrates develops in response to his dream theory that we find in the third part of the Theaetetus (201d-206c). In this second section of my paper, I will show that Epicurus responds to this aporia by appealing to the notion of evidence (enargeia).

Christopher Raymond, Vassar College

christopherc.raymond@gmail.com

“Shame and Virtue in Aristotle”

Few concepts can claim a greater importance to ancient Greek morality than aidôs—“a sense of shame”, “a sense of respect”, or simply “shame”. In Hesiod's myth of the races, the collapse of human society is marked by the flight of the goddesses Aidôs and Nemesis (“Moral Indignation”) from the earth to Olympus. At the end of the Iliad, Achilles regains his humanity when he is moved by pity for Priam and aidôs before the gods to release Hector's body. Though by the fourth century BCE the status of aidôs had diminished, Aristotle still saw fit to include it in his systematic account of the virtues. But in his main discussion of aidôs, which concludes Book 4 of the Nicomachean

Ethics, he argues that it is not a genuine virtue. The two arguments of NE 4.9 have puzzled commentators: both passages seem to conflict with things Aristotle says elsewhere in the treatise, and neither is fully persuasive in its own right. The primary aim of this paper is to reconstruct Aristotle's view of *aidôs* and argue that he does have good grounds for excluding it from his list of virtues.

I begin by analyzing the opening argument of NE 4.9, in which Aristotle suggests that *aidôs* is not a virtue because it is the wrong sort of "condition of the soul". The standard objection is that he fails to distinguish between occurrent and dispositional senses of the emotion term. I show that in spite of this weakness the argument points to a more persuasive line of thought, which can be pieced together from other passages in his ethical works. After offering some ideas for what such a restoration might look like, I turn to the second, more substantive, argument of NE 4.9, and consider an objection that has its roots in antiquity. Here the central complaint is that Aristotle fails to distinguish between the prospective, or inhibitory, and backward-looking varieties of shame. This has led commentators to claim that the prospective kind of *aidôs* does play a central role in the virtuous person's motivations. In the final part of the paper, I draw on other aspects of Aristotle's ethical theory to demonstrate that, in his view, shame has no significant role to play in the psychology of virtue. The key text for my purposes is his discussion of "civic" courage in NE 3.8, which I analyze in the light of two passages from the *Iliad* (both cited by Aristotle), that represent heroes acting from *aidôs* without true virtue. I conclude by contrasting Aristotle's account of shame with the more positive view advanced by Bernard Williams in *Shame and Necessity*.

Brian Reese, University of Oxford
brian.reese@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
"False Statement in the Sophist: A New Proposal"

In this paper, I examine Plato's treatment of false statement in the 'Sophist' and develop a new reading against the three most widely supported interpretations. Each of the three main interpretations understands the referent of the false statement "Theaetetus flies" as a sensible particular; 'Theaetetus' is thus understood as undertaking various actions in time. I argue that the referent should instead be taken formally, and so atemporally—as 'Theaetetus qua man.' This reading not only respects the final aporia of the 'Theaetetus,' but is also more philosophically faithful in context.

Heather Reid, Morningside College
reid@morningside.edu

“Aristotle on Fairness”

Fairness is an important ethical concept, especially in sport where the concept of “fair play” seems to function as the universal arbiter of what is right and wrong. Some philosophers have argued that fairness as an ethical concept actually derives from sport. I believe that it comes from the criterion of *to kalon* (beauty) found in ancient Greek Philosophy. In this paper I argue, based on Aristotle’s use of *to kalon* in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, that fairness is the ethical-aesthetic sense that motivates the activity of the *kaloskagathos* (good and beautiful person). Fair actions on Aristotle’s account are (a) virtuous (b) autotelic (c) civically-minded, and (d) pleasant. This account may seem to be at odds with the more rule-based understanding of fairness current in ethics and philosophy of sport, but it by incorporating an aesthetic dimension it better reflects the ideal and practice of fairness by athletes, officials, and even institutions.

Daniel Restrepo, New School for Social Research

restrepo.dan@gmail.com

“Different Causal Frameworks for Plato and Aristotle”

In Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, he explores how earlier philosophers utilized causes (*aitia*) and what causes they had discovered. This is a heuristic method to see if there are any more than his well-known four causes. What he found was that no philosopher had discovered all four causes, not even Plato. Despite Aristotle’s claims, many scholars nevertheless impose his causal framework onto Plato’s so-called natural philosophy. While Aristotle is often unfair to his predecessors, he is right that Plato simply does not have the same conception of causes as he does. Building on the work of Carlo Natali, I want to argue that while Aristotle sees the causes as principles or constitutive of things, Plato, especially in the *Timaeus-Critias*, sees the causes as generative. This is because the two do not share the same natural project. For Plato, the project of *Timaeus*’ cosmology is not a natural science as such but in many ways a theodicy. He begins with the assumption of divine architect and works from there to explain in what ways the cosmos is ordered towards the good. In this respect, it is a response to Socrates’ concern in the *Phaedo* when he reads *Anaxagoras*—why is it best that the world is ordered as such. Aristotle’s own project is less concerned with justifying goodness in the world and more focused with explaining the world as it is. To be sure, there are still moments of normativity in his physical inquiry (the assumption that the world is in principle intelligible), his project is mostly scientific at its basis. Thus, though both philosophers utilize cause as explanatory, what each is trying to explain and how they explain it is radically different.

Benjamin Rider, University of Central Arkansas

brider@uca.edu

“Living in Agreement: Stoicism and Daoism on the Sage”

Although arising in very different historical and cultural contexts, Stoicism and the Daoism of the Daodejing characterize the life of their wise man, or Sage, in surprisingly similar ways. For both traditions, the Sage—who represents the highest form of human life and activity—seeks to live, in some sense, in accordance or harmony with the world (Diogenes Laertius [DL] 7.87; Daodejing 3, 5, 25). Both see persons as integral parts of the world, who realize themselves as individuals by harmonizing their experiences, thoughts, and actions with the natural or cosmic context in which they are embedded (DL 7.87-8; Daodejing 16, 64). Another striking feature the philosophies share is their warnings against human attempts to control the events and circumstances of life (Epictetus, *Enchiridion* 1; Daodejing 29, 57). For both, the Sage succeeds because of a carefully cultivated quality of the self, or virtue—*aretê* in Greek, *de* in Chinese—that enables him to respond appropriately and fruitfully to circumstances, working to promote positive outcomes while accepting what he cannot control.

My essay compares how these two philosophical traditions understand the Sage and his actions and explores the implications of the differences for the central questions of ancient ethics. On the one hand, the Stoics pursued to its logical extreme the Greek ideal of rationality, imagining the Sage as a perfected rational actor who makes maximally wise decisions from a firm and infallible virtue. This ideal, however, creates puzzles about the possibility of human virtue—is it possible for a human to realize their ideal? The problem arises because of three claims about the Sage’s wisdom and action to which Stoics are committed: First, that wisdom consists in a systematic understanding of the fundamental truths of the cosmos (about god, Fate, value, etc.), an understanding which enables a Sage to choose actions which are befitting in terms of the larger cosmic order. Second, Stoics hold that a Sage’s judgments and choices are infallible. The Sage assents to an impression only if he recognizes it to be adequate or *kataleptic*, such that it carries its own guarantee of truth—he holds no mere opinions. And third, the Stoics embrace particularism about ethical judgments. The Stoics insist that there are no exceptionless general principles, but that befitting actions must be determined situationally and holistically. But is it possible to gain an infallible and systematic understanding of the cosmos? And even if it were possible, would such an understanding enable one to engage with the concrete particularity of real life decision making?

Laozi’s Daoism, by contrast, begins by acknowledging limits to human knowledge and positing the rational unintelligibility of the concrete (Daodejing 1, 2). For Laozi, any concrete experience is of complex particulars embedded in unique and changing webs of interrelationships. Such complexity defies rational analysis. Therefore, having cultivated openness to concrete experience and unmediated feeling (*wuzhi*) of the unique things and events in the world, the Daoist Sage acts non-coercively (*wuwei*), collaborating with the world in the co-creation of reality.

Nicholas Riegel, University of Brasilia
nicholas.riegel@utoronto.ca

“Beauty and Mathematics in Aristotle: *Metaphysics* M 1078a31-b6”

One of the most important passages in Aristotle’s works for understanding what he thinks about beauty, to kalon, is in *Metaphysics* M, where he makes a connection between goodness, beauty, and mathematics. At 1078a31 he states,

Now since the good and beautiful are different (for the former is always in action, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a very great deal about them; for it is not the case that if they do not name them but prove their results and accounts, that they do not speak about them. The chief forms of beauty are order, proportion, and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate most of all. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are causes of many things, evidently they mean that such a cause as the beautiful is a cause in a way. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.

The promise in the last line is not fulfilled in any of Aristotle’s remaining works. But this passage is exceedingly difficult to understand for many reasons. First, there are what might be called the “external” questions, questions having to do with the relation of the passage to its context. *Metaphysics* M seemed to be about the ontological status of numbers and geometrical objects. But then why does Aristotle go into the question of the relation of beauty and goodness to mathematics at this point? Additionally, who are these individuals who claim the mathematical sciences say nothing about goodness or beauty? Commentators point to the first aporia in *Metaphysics* B, where Aristippus is mentioned as one of the sophists who ridiculed mathematics because it makes no use of the good. But what was Aristippus’ argument, and why should Aristotle have taken it seriously? And how is this passage any answer to these critics? For Aristotle does not say that goodness is in mathematics, only that beauty can be found in it.

Then there are internal questions, having to do with the meaning of the passage itself. For instance, what is meant by the claim that the mathematical sciences “prove their results (*erga*) and accounts (*logoi*)?” And in what sense are order, proportion, and definiteness the “causes” of many things, and how does this make beauty a cause in a way? In what sense can beauty be thought of as a cause?

In this paper I would like to address all these questions with a hope of finding out more about how Aristotle thinks of beauty. And I would like to connect what he says here in the *Metaphysics* with the famous claims in his ethical works that moral virtue should be performed for the sake of beauty, to kalon. It is my belief and will be my thesis that Aristotle differed from Plato on the question of the relation of beauty and goodness, and that this shows that while their understanding of beauty was fundamentally the same, they had different notions of what goodness is.

Jan Maximilian Robitzsch, University of Pennsylvania

janro@sas.upenn.edu

“Political Order in Heraclitus”

In a 1994 paper, Jean Frère notes that “up to now, the question of Heraclitus’ political ideas has been neglected” (231; my translation). Almost twenty years later, not much has changed: while Heraclitus’ metaphysics and epistemology have been much discussed, Heraclitus’ political and ethical thought has received considerably less attention. Paradigmatic for this neglect is the – otherwise excellent – study by G.S. Kirk on Heraclitus’ cosmic fragments, which completely leaves aside Heraclitus’ ideas on politics. This is despite some direct evidence that Heraclitus attributed a high value to his political thinking. According to Diogenes Laertius (Lives IX.5-6), for instance, Heraclitus’ treatise *On Nature* was divided into three parts, one of which was politics. And according to Diodotus, a 1st century B.C. Stoic, *On Nature* was really about government and the section on nature was just added as a means of illustration (ibid., IX.15).

In this paper, I want to take these ancient clues seriously and will examine Heraclitus’ political thought. In doing so, I will be mainly concerned with the question what type of political order Heraclitus supported. This question is somewhat anachronistic as political vocabulary is just evolving at the time that Heraclitus is writing: a shift from nomistic vocabulary that stresses good or bad order (as in Solon’s *eunomiê* and *dusnomiê*) to kratistic vocabulary that stresses which group is in power (*demo-kratia*, *aristo-kratia*, etc.) falls into Heraclitus’ lifetime. Nevertheless, during the Ionian Revolt and its aftermath, Heraclitus, himself an aristocrat by birth, was certainly also confronted with different ideas of political organization. Was Heraclitus consequently a politically conservative supporter of aristocratic ideas or a proponent of newer, democratic ones?

In “Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies”, Gregory Vlastos’ argues for the latter view and this has been more recently supported in Boudouris. However, I think that such a reading of Heraclitus is mistaken. After an examination of the case that Vlastos and Boudouris make in favor of a ‘democratic reading’ of Heraclitus, I argue that Heraclitus cannot have been a proponent of democracy by stepwise refuting their arguments. Given (1) Heraclitus’ rejection of all egalitarian ideas in the political sphere, (2) his attitude towards the many, and (3) what we know about him from Diogenes Laertius. Instead, the more likely reading of the political fragments, I argue, identifies Heraclitus as a conservative and a supporter of an aristocratic political order.

David Roochnik, Boston University

roochnik@bu.edu

“Teleology as Death Wish: A Nietzschean Critique of Aristotle”

Teleology as Death Wish: A Nietzschean Critique of Aristotle

In Book I.10 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle grapples with a saying attributed to Solon: “deem no human being happy while he is still alive.” A careful reading of this chapter will disclose why the Philosopher thinks this perplexing and perhaps even morbid statement is worth serious consideration, and his complex and at times even ambiguous response to it. Doing so will not only shed light on central elements of his teleological ethics, but will also open the door to a line of fundamental critique, one which, as will be argued in the closing section, Aristotle can withstand.

Part One will offer a translation of NE I.10 and a brief commentary. Aristotle’s Greek is terse and sometimes elliptical. As a result, translators are often tempted to assist the reader by adding material (usually but not always putting it in brackets) in order to clarify the meaning of the text. Of course, doing so risks imposing the translator’s interpretation of the meaning of the text upon the reader. For this reason I will by and large resist this temptation.

Because NE I.10 presupposes material from earlier in the text—most notably, the definition of happiness developed at different stages of NE I.1-7—Part Two will digress in order to supply the background necessary for the discussion to proceed.

Part Three will resume and complete the translation-commentary.

Part Four, which is inspired by Nietzsche, will formulate a severe criticism of the Aristotelian position that emerges in NE I.10. Part Five will argue that, despite its seriousness, Aristotle can defend himself against the Nietzschean assault.

ALIREZA SAATI, NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

saati.philosophy@gmail.com

“The Concept of Being, Where there is no pertinence between Avicenna and Aristotle’s “live dog better than dead king””

Vindicating such an intriguing title asks quite enough tact audacity, of knowing how far we may go without going too far. In his ground – breaking masterpiece “المشرق يدين المنطق” , Avicenna points out to Farabi’s essay “اغراض في ما يدالط به” by the reading of which an end was put in his deep - rooted struggle with Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Until now, this adventure has always been interpreted in a way which somehow carries Aristotle’s favor against Avicenna. In this paper, in contrast I wish to argue that Avicenna’s different frame of reference does not allow us having such conclusion.

The central concept of metaphysics, namely the concept of being is the first glancing reference by which Avicenna separates from Aristotle, and in continues the Iranian Muslim world stands versus the Greek world. The main sources with which I am going through in this paper are

Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, books VII and XII (Z and Λ), in addition to the 4th chapter of Avicenna's *شفا* of *الهيات*, titled: on Being and its causes and the *الهيات* and *الاشارات*.

The provocative point is laid down in Avicenna's expansion of Farabi's distinction between essence and existence and the lack of this innovation in Greek philosophy. The milestone of this point could be surveyed exactly around the meanings of substance in Greek and Islamic philosophy.

Aristotle's notion of substance known as *οὐσία* is crucial to his metaphysics; though due to using the term in different interrelated ways it is absolutely complicated insofar as unmasking the term in Aristotelian philosophy has always been the subject of interests and disputes in order to understand on what this notion indicates!

The main drawback might be considered concern this is the different accounts of substance all through the Aristotelian Corpus which has always puzzled the scholars. In short, Aristotle's own words are not clear enough. The curtail account of substance proposed at the beginning of *Metaphysics Z* introduces the substance as "that which 'is' in the primary sense". As we see, Aristotle quite unequivocally, declares that the question of 'what substance is?' is rendered to the 'question of 'what being is?'. For Aristotle what actually exists is the world of substance, because to be is to be existent. It deserves already to see if any of either ontological or epistemological bounds support this idea? As a remark, at the outset, I would like to say that the answer is abruptly negative. Let examine why Aristotle's account of substance leads us towards such an upshot.

The referenced block – quoted passage of *Metaphysics* is involved in different circumstances each of which advocates Aristotle's not discerning of substance different from essence and existent. This idea is bound by a key passage of *Metaphysics Γ* in which Aristotle expressly asserts that "one man and a man is the same thing and an existent man and a man are the same thing". What Aristotle means by this is that "the duplication in the statement 'he is a man and an existed man' gives no fresh meaning". Aristotle not only does not reject being, but also he ignores it in getting joined with essence.

Though never Aristotle marks off any difference between essence and existence, most of the commentators and scholars have always tried to justify Aristotle by giving manifold senses to substance. But the evasive *aporia* concern defining substance as what exists still insists. No narrow squeak, however, is provided because defining substance as that which 'is' is explicitly begging the question, a kind of fallacy which was discovered by Farabi and had been opened by Avicenna. What I want to do here is to be more involved in doing a slightly different angle, on the subject.

Aristotle's account of substance was found by Avicenna as an unsustainable trajectory. In the *شفا* of *الهيات* at the end of the third article – chapter two he states that "One is entirely equal to being, in the sense of being predicated of any of the categories, as [when] they are predicated of being, but their notions as you knew are different from each other, [though] both concepts are united and concurred in the direction of having no indication on the essence and substance of any of the categories". This emphasize can be seen all throughout Avicenna's philosophy. From his

standpoint it is stipulated that two concepts of the One and Being are not any of ten categories, thus they are neither accident nor essence and even nor substance. In this extent, the concept of being stands in contrast to essence because essence including substance and accidents is the divisional point of ten categories.

In sum, this elegant point shows why Avicenna was not able to understand Aristotle's *Metaphysics* even after 40 times reading the book completely. The discussion of substance is a disturbed and disheveled controversy in Aristotle. Though Aristotle himself believes that "live dog is better than a dead king".

Gregory Sadler, Marist College

gbisadler@gmail.com

"Anger, Justice, and Injustice in Aristotle"

My paper reconstructs an Aristotelian treatment of anger as a psychological, moral, and political phenomenon, drawing primarily on *The Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, *the Politics*, and *the Rhetoric*. For Aristotle, anger is an emotional response uniquely situated in moral life.

It has to do in particular with (right or wrong) perceptions about justice and injustice, and it orients responses, not only of emotion but also of action, to (rightly or wrongly) perceived injustices. Anger does by its nature involve seeking retribution, and Aristotle thinks that in many cases, rightly oriented and limited anger will be a necessary component in the workings of justice. So, in simple terms, anger, both in terms of emotional response and in terms of characteristic action and motives, can often be a good, even necessary response, an insight not recognized by many modern theories or perspectives on violence and justice.

At the same time, Aristotle is very wary of human tendencies to go wrong with respect to anger, and for potentials of badly oriented anger to lead to violence that contravenes justice, to subvert the workings of justice, to generate further anger as a response, and to stand in the way of forgiveness when it ought to occur. He also provides us resources, however, for developing better understanding and capacity for judgment about the workings of anger and its interplay with justice.

Thanassis Samaras, University of Georgia

samarast@uga.edu

"Anaximander's Cosmic Justice and the Apeiron"

Thanassis Samaras

Anaximander's Cosmic Justice and the Apeiron

Anaximander puts forward a clear concept of cosmic justice, based on a process of reciprocity that leads to the perfect balance of the “so-called elements” over time. This process appears to be self-sustaining: Anaximander suggests that the universe is this way without explaining why it is so. On the basis of the existing fragments we can say that apeiron, being primarily conceived as material and impersonal, does not fit the role of a principle that guarantees the cosmic order. On the other hand, it is indisputable that the order that Anaximander describes could not possibly be sustained without apeiron. Is an interpretation of Anaximander possible that makes apeiron a first archē not only in the sense of a spatial and/or temporal beginning, but also in the sense of an Aristotelian “first principle?”

The other issue addressed here is to what extent Anaximander's cosmological postulations shed light on his political beliefs. The correlation between the two has long been noticed by commentators such as Vlastos, Vernant, Lloyd, Naddaf and Sassi. The language of the famous fragment preserved by Simplicius (DK12A9) leaves no doubt that Anaximander thinks of the distribution of cosmic justice as a normative process analogous to the dispensation of justice in human communities, and thus argues for a social and political order that will be corresponding to or reflecting the cosmic one. But the insufficiency of our information about Miletian politics in the mid-sixth century BC, the most likely time of the composition of Anaximander's book from which at least part of the fragment comes, makes it difficult to say more about his political views. It seems certain that they can be understood only in the context of a new set of ideas connected with the emergence of the classical polis. It is plausible, even if impossible to prove on the basis of the extant evidence, that Anaximander expresses, in some form, the political ideas of the people in the middle, the mesoi. But one should be cautious about thinking of Anaximander as a proponent of isonomia and the equality of all citizens, as Vernant does. Simplicius' fragment, though not necessarily incompatible with this interpretation, demonstrates a concern not with citizen equality but with power and its sharing between two social groups. Identifying these groups, the one which attempts to unjustly monopolize power and the one who is asking for a share in it is the key to interpreting the political Anaximander and a tentative identification will be attempted in this paper.

Gina Santiago, Binghamton University

gsantia2@binghamton.edu

“The Communicability of Knowledge in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*”

Aristotle is optimistic about the ability of human beings to attain knowledge about the mind-independent world and attests to his own optimism by remarking that “it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize”[982b13-14]. But what criteria does Aristotle set up for epistemic certainty? I believe Aristotle's reliance on human language as an

instrument of knowledge, together with the intellectual capacities from which the capacity for language stems (in Aristotle's model), allows us to formulate at least one criterion. I here argue that this criterion for epistemic certainty, the communicability-criterion, can be gleaned from Aristotle's exposition of the starting-point and objective, foundational principles of the "First Philosophy" and the science of Being in *Metaphysics Alpha* and *Gamma*.

My concept of the communicability-criterion is partly derived from Modrak's 2000 discussion: she states "the ability to communicate understanding is central to Aristotle's conception of knowledge," and, additionally, the "transmission of information from teacher to student depends upon the existence of a vocabulary containing terms, the reference of which...is accessible to both student and teacher." I am partly concerned with the transmissibility of knowledge in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. But the primary interest is specifically how, for Aristotle, communicability contributes to epistemic certainty and the process of knowledge acquisition in his ontological inquiry, rather than the outcome of these processes.

First, I define the communicability criterion as 1) cogency and intelligibility to oneself and 2) cogency and intelligibility to others. Then I briefly examine a passage from Chapter 1 of *De Interpretatione*, which illustrates a structural correspondence between natural language and reality. I then attempt to show that this correspondence underpins his program in the *Metaphysics*, specifically articulated in select, passages of *Alpha* and *Gamma*.

In *Alpha*, Aristotle seems to suggest that a greater degree of epistemic certainty is attained once we understand the causes and principles of mind-independent objects and states of affairs. The communicability-criterion, I believe, is implicit in his brief, comparative discussion of art and experience. The artist more reliably imparts knowledge because he or she deals with universals. In turn, we attain epistemic certainty because art is more teachable than experience. Universals are more teachable than particulars. Causes, principles, and the knowledge acquired by the artist, as a whole, are more communicable in ways that experiences are not. In reaching the "highest degree" of universal knowledge, human beings attain greater epistemic certainty because the objects of this universal science are communicable.

Finally, I attempt to show that Aristotle's exposition of the Principle of Non-Contradiction not only provides us with a logical and ontological starting-point, but that it most clearly delivers the communicability-criterion. More specifically, PNC gives us the following: 1) that there are extra-linguistic, extra-mental objects in the world (ontological-realist criterion) 2) our apprehension of these objects are communicable to others (communicability criterion) such that 3) some things can be articulated of these extra-linguistic and extra-mental objects that are definitive of them (e.g. that X is either y or \neg y).

dschaeff@holycross.edu

“Politike, Self-Sufficiency and Freedom in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics”

We are moved to seek a more precise understanding of what, exactly, Aristotle means by *politike*, if only because “a wide range of social theorists...claim to have found in Aristotle’s discourse of *politike* the correct foundation, or at least proper point of departure, for a new and more satisfying kind of ethical and political thought.” (Wallach 1992, 613) When we turn to the Nicomachean Ethics, however, we notice ambiguities in the presentation of *politike* that make it hard to pin down (or even to translate!). Most importantly, it seems to undergo a shift in meaning between the first and second times Aristotle discusses it. When *politike* is first introduced in Book I, Aristotle uses the term to refer to his own activity, the pursuit of knowledge of the highest good for human beings (1094b10-11). While this activity is referred to as architectonic, the utility of such knowledge remains ambiguous. After Book I, *politike* is not mentioned again until Book VI, where Pericles rather than Aristotle--the statesman rather than the political philosopher--is presented as the model of *politike*. Here, the practical side rather than the theoretical side of *politike* is emphasized, which is striking in light of the fact that this occurs in the context of a discussion of intellectual virtue. This raises questions about Aristotle’s view of the relationship between practical statesmanship and political science. In this paper, I will explore the ambiguities, and connect my discussion of *politike* to Aristotle’s exploration of the possibility of self-sufficiency (on both the level of the individual and the community or polis). Specifically, I will consider the implications for Aristotle’s understanding of what it means for human beings to initiate something new, and hence for his understanding of human freedom.

Gregory Scott, NYU

gs30@nyu.edu

“Harmonia Kai Rhuthmos' as Music and Dance in Plato and Aristotle, and the Ramifications for the Poetics”

The phrase *harmonia kai rhuthmos* is almost always transliterated as “harmony and rhythm,” as mere musical terms, in various works by Plato and Aristotle, especially the *Republic* and *Laws* for Plato and the *Poetics* and *Politics* for his student. However, I argue, the phrase should typically be translated as “music (or song) and dance,” not only because there was no such thing as musical harmony in our sense of the word, at least for these two Greeks, but because of how Plato explicitly defines the terms in an apparently little-read part of the *Laws* II, at 665a.

The correct translation has, perhaps surprisingly, significant ramifications for the *Poetics*, helping show that its scope is not poetry in our sense of the word (and that its purpose is not any systematic classification of literary forms) but instead only dramatic musical theater, primarily tragedy and

comedy (the third and final form, epic, is derivative or secondary but is said in Ch 23 in its quasi-definition to have plots that should be dramatic).

I demonstrate all of this by analyzing Ch 1 afresh: Traditionally, translators with very rare exception have been not sure how to treat *harmonia* and *rhuthmos*, too often thinking that *rhuthmos* only means “rhythm” in our musical or abstract sense, when it should be clear that Aristotle is using it to denote “ordered body movement” (or dance for short) at 1447a26-28. (By “dance” here, I mean dance in a broad sense, that is, any designed movement that involves purposefully ordered movement, not a narrow sense of highly stylized vocabulary such as classical ballet or tango.) Those translators also always, or almost always, merely transliterate *harmonia*.

The primary reason that perhaps the translators have been puzzled stems from the sentence “For music and *rhuthmos* alone are employed in oboe-playing and kithara-playing and in any other arts which have a similar function, as, for example, pipe-playing.” Translators have seemingly taken a modern view about the playing of instruments and have not fully realized that the Greek musicians were more like rock-and-roll guitarists, “strutting their stuff” while playing and singing, than they were like symphonic musicians glued to a chair (with possible apologies to the Greeks for such a comparison!). The instruments that Aristotle picks to make his point about *harmonia* and *rhuthmos* are, out of dozens of Greek musical instruments, the ones used by performers in the theater as they were “dancing”. Once we see this, *rhuthmos* becomes consistent and the rest of the chapter, and indeed of the treatise, as I shall show, becomes clearer.

Mark Sentesy, Boston College

sentesy@bc.edu

“Philosophy and the Struggle Between Poetry and Expertise”

In the *Ion* Socrates argues that unlike doctors and generals who have knowledge (*epistemē*), there is no domain of which poets are the master, and therefore they speak of things of which they do not have real knowledge. They are instead inspired by the god and draw others toward them magnetically.

Socrates assertion of this new technical paradigm and criterion for knowledge is perhaps the most trenchant criticism of poetry emerging from the dialogues, and Socrates uses it often. I draw the question of this paper from the *Ion*: there we do not see Socrates assert unequivocally the inferiority of poetry. Instead the dialogue leaves us to face a dilemma about which is superior, the masterful knowledge that characterizes expertise (*technē*), which we can choose seek and to exercise, or the inspiration that characterizes poetry, which is not entirely under our control, but is given by the gods.

By drawing on the *Ion*, *Phaedrus*, and *Republic*, I show that each has a claim to determining what has authority over human affairs. The aim of this paper is to clarify and heighten the difficulty of this dilemma, and what is at stake in how it is cast and decided.

Socrates seems to propose that the edifice of culture and human action move its foundation from poetry to knowledge modeled on expertise. In the *Republic*, for example, he seems to propose that knowledge like this is necessary to create a just city, that this latter kind of knowledge take over the domain of ethics that formerly belonged to poetry.

And yet though they certainly criticize it, Plato and Socrates do not abandon the use of poetry at all, neither in the allegories of the *Republic* nor in the speeches in praise of divine madness in the *Phaedrus*, nor in praise of Eros in the *Symposium*. There, and in the *Sophist*, the idea that human technical mastery is complete, sufficient and primary in the pursuit of truth is dismantled.

I argue that the introduction of *technē* as a model for knowledge is strategic: it mounts a powerful and intuitive criticism of poetry to which poetry cannot respond, at least not on its own terms. But neither poetry nor expertise can on its own decide which is superior: it appears that only philosophical discourse can do this.

Having argued for the superiority of technical expertise and criticized poetry on behalf of philosophy, it turns out that Socratic philosophy is not a form of expertise. Technical expertise often appears in the dialogues as something already completed and perfect: the general, doctor or philosopher king knows for certain what the truth is and what it is best to do. Yet the philosopher does not match this description: he lacks precisely the knowledge he seeks. Not having this knowledge, he cannot know that having it would be superior to inspiration.

On the other hand, what would persuade someone to take up philosophy? It seems as though the goal of philosophical activity must be presented poetically, as something enchanting or inspiring. Poetry—problematically—orients, motivates, and shapes philosophical activity, even as philosophy pursues an ideal of expertise.

Boanrae Seok, Alvernia University

Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu

“Moral Psychology of Negative Virtue”

Moral dispositions such as humility, poverty, and shame are rarely discussed in Greco-Roman schools of virtue ethics (i.e., Stoic and Aristotelian schools of virtue ethics). Unlike typical Greco-Roman virtues such as courage and wisdom, these moral dispositions are typically characterized as negative and deprived states of the mind: they are passive, accidental, and reactive states that do not reflect positive inner excellence and flourishing life of a moral agent. Despite the impoverished

characterization, these negative dispositions play very important roles in many non-Western philosophical and religious traditions. Poverty, humility, and shame are not just ordinary dispositions but major virtues of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. In this paper, instead of describing negative virtues as failure of inner excellence or re-interpreting them as virtues with hidden positive characteristics, I will embrace their negativity and analyze them as a special form of excellence. Specifically, I will analyze shame as a genuine moral disposition, i.e., a Confucian virtue. In contrast to Greco-Roman virtues that are characterized as positive power (virtus) and inner excellence (arête), Confucian virtues are understood as balanced, interactive, and spontaneous dispositions of a moral agent. I will analyze shame as an example of this interactive excellence to explain the moral psychological integrity and philosophical significance of negative virtues.

Michael Shaw,

Michael.Shaw@uvu.edu

“Unmoved Movers in Aristotle’s Sub-Lunar World”

That Aristotle’s God first causes natural motion in the universe as an unmoved mover is well known. However, most scholars limit the significance of such an unmoved and unmoving cause of motion to the heavens, not finding much relevance of this motive force to sub-lunary motion. Movement of Animals develops the joint in animal limbs as a relatively unmoved source of motion, but one which itself is clearly always in motion from different perspectives. This project examines two other Aristotelian texts that contain discussions of an unmoved source of motion: On Generation and Corruption I.6-10 and *De Anima* I.3-5. The account of a grieving person from GC I.6 will be compared to the inquiry regarding the unmoved character of the soul in DA I. The investigation seeks a coherent account of an unmoved source of natural motion that, while operating in a manner similar to the prime mover, inhabits the sub-lunar, rather than heavenly, realm

Ryan Shea, The Catholic University of America

ryanronaldshea@gmail.com

“Choosing Between the Political Way-of-Life and the Philosophical Way-of-Life: The Interplay of Theoria and Praxis in Aristotle”

Pierre Hadot and others have reinvigorated the ancient conception of philosophy as a way-of-life, or a bios. Yet, this reactivated conception poses the problem of having to choose which way-of-life is the best; the hedonistic, the political, the philosophical, etc. Interpretations of Aristotle’s treatment of this issue in the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are often off the mark due to a casual, and overly hasty, conflation of the political way-of-life with praxis and the philosophical way-of-life with

theoria. This paper focuses on disentangling the dynamic and complicated interplay between theoria and praxis as activities, which is contradistinguished from the political and philosophical as ways-of-life. By this analysis, I conclude that theoria and praxis are both mutually dominant and inextricably linked. For this reason, the philosophical way-of-life is not merely theory and, therefore, the argument for the superiority of theoria over praxis does not translate into an argument for the superiority of the philosophical way-of-life over the political. I conclude that the staunch either/or choice between philosophy and politics as ways-of-life is a false dichotomy. This conclusion reopens the larger question of what, exactly, is the relationship between philosophy and a way-of-life. In other words, if philosophy and politics are not mutually opposed, then what is the distinction between a philosophical and a non-philosophical way-of-life? . I give a sketch of an answer to this which relates to Aristotle's treatment of friendship as the essential synthesis of the philosophical and the political.

Dan Sheffler, University of Kentucky
dansheffler@uky.edu
"The Sun and the Good"

What place does the Good occupy in Plato's ontology? A careful reading of the Platonic corpus may suggest that that the Good is a Form just like any of the other Forms and that Plato's metaphysical account of it does not vary dramatically from the account he gives of Form in general. Many fine scholars interpret Plato in this deflationary way, but the Platonists of late antiquity come to quite another conclusion. The traditional Neoplatonist interpretation is that the Good stands in relation to the other Forms as their ground and source. As that which gives rise to the sphere of the Forms, the Good cannot itself belong to that sphere. The metaphor of the sun in *Republic* VI plays a crucial role in adjudicating this dispute. Many Neoplatonists cite the famous phrase at 509b that the Good is "beyond Being" as though it straightforwardly supports the traditional reading. Upon reading the entire sentence, however, we find the important qualifier that the Good is beyond Being "in dignity and power." In order to understand the precise force of this passage and therefore to understand a most important clue to Plato's middle metaphysics it is necessary to examine closely the details of the sun metaphor. This essay attempts to determine what support both the deflationary and the traditional readings can gain from this passage. I begin by giving a brief exposition of the role the Good plays in Neoplatonism so that we may become clear on what it would take for the sun metaphor to support that reading. I expend the bulk of the essay in a careful exposition of the passage, and I conclude with a brief analysis of the data. Ultimately, I find that the passage does support the traditional understanding of the Good as metaphysically beyond Being, but not as unambiguously as it may at first appear.

Mark Shiffman, Villanova University

mark.shiffman@villanova.edu

“How the Prior by Nature Comes to Light in Categories 12”

What looks like a compositional oddity in Categories Chapter 12 – that Aristotle promises four senses of “proteron”, but then adds as a seeming afterthought a fifth sense, which is none other than “the prior by nature” – is better understood as a phenomenological sign of a *dianoia*: the beginning of the quest for what is first in itself. As such, the Categories contains within itself the beginning of its own overcoming: the conversion from a merely logical and nominalistic understanding of *ousia* to a dialectical and metaphysical inquiry into the question of being.

Heidegger’s discussion of the distinction between the first for us and the first by nature helps us see the outlines of this conversion, but does not bring to light its fundamental feature: an education of desire premised on an orientation toward the good.

Rachel Singpurwalla, University of Maryland, College Park

rgks@umd.edu

“Friendship and Justice in Plato's *Republic*”

In *Republic* IX, Socrates claims that the citizens of his ideal city are friends (590d). Indeed, as I shall argue in this paper, three of Socrates’ most striking political proposals aim at inculcating friendship between the citizens: the early education, the noble lie, and the communal family. But this raises a host of important and under-explored questions. What, according to Socrates, is friendship? And why is it such a great good? In this paper, I argue that the citizens are friends because they recognize one another as akin, and so have a non-instrumental concern for one another. I argue that Socrates is at pains to inculcate this attitude because it is required for the citizens’ virtue; accordingly, it motivates the citizens to do the work of the city for which they are best suited. Thus, inculcating the attitudes involved in friendship is both good for the citizens who have these attitudes, and good for the community as a whole.

John Sisko, The College of New Jersey

sisko@tcnj.edu

“Four Routes Toward Understanding Parmenides”

In this paper, we assess four interpretations of the Way of Truth and its relation to the Way of Opinion. We show that there are significant difficulties associated with three better-known interpretations: first, if we take Parmenides to be a numerical monist (positing a monism of things), the cosmology of the Way of Opinion becomes untenable and we are left without an adequate account of Parmenides' manifest commitment to *Physics* and astronomy: second, if we take Parmenides to be a predicational monist (positing that any fundamental material token - however many tokens might exist and however many types might obtain - must be deathless, pure, and unchanging), we are left with both a problem of external negation and the difficulty that light and night – the fundamental material types within Parmenides' *Physics* – are not predicational monads; and third, if we take Parmenides to be a generous monist (positing the existence of a uniform, necessary, and unchanging being that coexists with non-substantial and mutable items), we are confronted with an insurmountable problem of co-presence (a problem of two things existing in the same place at the same time). The better-known interpretations are highly problematic, but a promising lesser-known approach comes to us from Parmenides' immediate successors in natural science. We show that both Anaxagoras and Empedocles understand Parmenides under the rubric of a fourth interpretation: they consider him to be a liberal monist (positing, in the Way of Truth, a pre-comic arche from which, or out of which, the dynamic world of the Way of Opinion comes to be formed). We go on to examine key passages in Parmenides' poem with an eye toward assessing the tenability of Anaxagoras' and Empedocles' interpretation. Contrary to initial expectations, we conclude that Parmenides may well be a liberal monist. At the very least, we show the fourth route toward understanding Parmenides merits further study.

Pavle Stojanovic, Johns Hopkins University

pavle@jhu.edu

“Carneades' Pithanon and Sextus' Isostheneia: Is There Really a Conflict?”

In PH 1.226–31, Sextus explains the crucial differences between Pyrrhonian skepticism and the skepticism of, as he calls it, the New Academy of Carneades and Clitomachus. According to Sextus, the chief distinction lays in the fact that “we say that, as far as the argument goes, appearances are equal in respect to persuasiveness or unpersuasiveness, while they say that some are persuasive [pithanas] and others unpersuasive”. Sextus' statement obviously refers to Carneades' proposal that one who suspends judgment about the truth of one's appearances could still use those that are persuasive as a practical criterion of action (SE M 7.166–89; cf. Cic. Acad. 2.99–101). Apparently, Sextus dissents from Carneades by rejecting the idea that appearances differ in respect to persuasiveness, so much so that he promotes an opposing principle, equipollence (isostheneia) of conflicting appearances, as one of the crucial elements of the Pyrrhonist's skeptical method (PH 1.8–10). In this essay, I will argue that Sextus' rejection of pithanon in favor of isostheneia is either intellectually dishonest, or based on a major misinterpretation of Carneades' philosophical method.

As many scholars have argued recently, it seems that Carneades' idea that there are appearances that are more persuasive than others has been used by some of his followers to imply that persuasive appearances are, at least in most cases, indeed true, i.e. correspond to reality. Given that Sextus' Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on how things really are, it is not surprising that he would reject any such alleged link between persuasiveness of an appearance and its truth (cf. DL 9.94). What is baffling, however, is that with his principle of *isostheneia* Sextus seems to reject not only the alleged link between persuasiveness and truth, but also the very fact that some appearances seem more persuasive than others. There are at least two reasons why this is extremely problematic. First, the concept of persuasive appearance, as something Carneades clearly took over from the Stoics (SE M 7.242–3; DL 7.75), should be understood as referring to an appearance that, in virtue of certain phenomenal properties it possesses, causes the subject to accept it, whether in the form of “assenting” (*sunkatatithesthai*) for the Stoics or “approving” (*adprobari*) for Carneades. In other words, persuasive appearance is whatever appearance—as a matter of psychological fact—causes the subject to accept it. But, it seems that Sextus grants that the Pyrrhonist too entertains appearances that cause his acceptance (in a form of non-dogmatic assent). In PH 1.13, Sextus says that Pyrrhonists “assent to *pathē* forced upon them by appearances—for example, they would not say, when cold or warm, ‘I think that I am not cold (or warm)’.” Therefore, in so far as some appearances cause the Pyrrhonist to accept them, there is no reason to assume that they do not seem persuasive to him in the original Stoic/Carneadean sense, and indeed, more persuasive than certain other appearances.

Second, contrary to Sextus' suggestion in PH 1.229–30, it does not follow that the fact that some appearances seem to the subject more persuasive than others would jeopardize the Pyrrhonist's proclaimed aim of achieving freedom from disturbance (*ataraxia*) in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling (*metriopatheia*) in matters forced upon him. As Sextus explains in PH 1.30 and M 11.141–61, unnecessary disturbance (*tarachē*) comes from accepting certain things as being truly or “by nature” good or bad. But, if Carneades did not assume that there is a link between the persuasiveness of an appearance and its truth, then accepting persuasive impressions does not lead to unnecessary disturbance. In fact, it seems that all practically relevant persuasive appearances fall into the category of Sextus' necessary *pathē*. Therefore, when he rejected it in favor of *isostheneia*, Sextus was either dishonest towards or ignorant about Carneades' conception of the *pithanon*.

Julie Swanstrom, Purdue University/Armstrong Atlantic State University
julieswanstrom@gmail.com
“Creation as Emanation in Aquinas”

In light of Aquinas' discussion of God's creative act in terms of efficient causation in the *Summa Theologiae*, it is somewhat surprising to discover that Aquinas also speaks of God's creative act in terms of emanation. Within this paper, I will explore the passages in which Aquinas speaks of God's

creative act as an emanation. When describing creating as emanating, Aquinas uses some but not all of the features of Neoplatonic emanation. So, the next task I undertake is to show what Aquinas means by emanating in the context of his discussion of creating. Aquinas does not adopt wholesale the Neoplatonic conception of emanation. Aquinas presenting creation as emanation (but not of a strictly Neoplatonic sort) is likely related to a distinction he wished to draw between God's generative acts of creating the world and of the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the members of the Trinitarian God in addition to God the Father. Finally, I argue that Aquinas thinks of emanation as producing an effect via efficient causation without a patient, and that the emanator acts voluntarily (rather than acting by its nature) when performing this act.

It is my contention that Aquinas does not subscribe to the Neoplatonic model of emanation when he describes creating as emanating. Aquinas's account of God's emanation does not align with the central aspects of Neoplatonic emanation. He rejects the principle that from one simple being, only one simple being can be produced, even within the context of the necessary emanations within the Godhead. He rejects the notion that God can only create a multiplicity of diverse things through mediation; in fact, he rejects the notion that created beings have the capability to produce something from nothing. He rejects the notion that God creates necessarily. Though the emanations within the Godhead are necessary, creation, which is the emanation outside of the Godhead, is voluntary. The one similarity between Aquinas's account of creation by emanation and the Neoplatonic account of emanation is that God produces being.

Mary Elizabeth Tetzlaff, The Catholic University of America

mtetzla@gmail.com

“Self-Knowledge and False Pleasure in Plato's Philebus”

This paper studies the question of what makes false pleasure false according to Plato's account of pleasure in Philebus 36c-50e. After considering a general account of pleasure, it examines carefully the specific account of false pleasure and proposes that false pleasures are false because they are imitations of true pleasures. The ability or inability to discern between true pleasures and imitations of true pleasures is then shown to rely on self-knowledge. Finally, two implications of this position are briefly considered. The first concerns the possibility of a holistic reading of Plato's Philebus guided by an aporetic hermeneutic; the second, the possibility of a cogent response to the so-called akrasia problem.

Allison Thornton, Baylor University

allison_thornton1@baylor.edu

“The Socratic Solution to the Meno Problem”

In the Meno, Socrates raises an interesting problem, now known as the Meno Problem. It centers around the question: is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Socrates says that it is, and he tells the story of the statues of Daedalus to illustrate his answer. Some contemporary epistemologists have thought that this story shows that the relevant difference between true belief and knowledge is justification. Alternatively, in the Theaetetus, Socrates argues that knowledge is not true belief plus justification (logos). In this paper, I will argue with Theaetetus' Socrates that justification does not make the difference between true belief and knowledge. I'll do so by arguing that the Daedalus story does not in fact support the thesis that justification is the difference-maker. I'll then argue for what I think the Daedalus story does illustrate, which is different from what many contemporary epistemologists take it to show.

Zita Toth, Fordham University

ztoth@fordham.edu

“Scotus on Modality and the Argument for God's Existence”

Duns Scotus's concept of modality has been, for the last few decades, a quite much debated issue, yet without any apparent consensus. Briefly put, the question is this: does Scotus regard possibility as ultimately dependent on God (either on divine power or on the divine intellect), or does he regard it as logically prior to, or independent of God? Moreover, if the latter, does this mean that Scotus's notion is the modern, “minimalist” notion of logical possibility (expressible in terms of non-contradiction alone)?

Regarding the first question, on the one hand, Calvin Normore has argued that for Scotus there is no possibility without the divine intellect; even if Scotus sometimes describes the broadest kind of possibility as the non-repugnance of terms, these terms (or notae) must be formulated in the divine mind, and so we cannot speak about possibility as entirely independent of actually existing things. On the other hand, however, Simo Knuuttila has made some effort to show that we should regard the concept of the possible as prior to any actual existence (including the divine intellect), and that Scotus's concept, after all, is basically equivalent to our modern concept of logical possibility.

Unfortunately, the majority of places where Scotus explicitly addresses the question, most notably in his Metaphysics commentary, can be interpreted in support of either of these positions. Therefore, in this paper, instead of engaging in the interesting but seemingly non-decisive philological debates about these passages, I examine the issue in a different context: in the context of Scotus's modal argument for God's existence in the treatise De Primo Principio. The De Primo Principio offers five arguments for the existence of a first cause. The fifth, which is the most interesting one from the

present point of view, aims to give a proof by proving first the possibility, then the actuality, and only finally the necessity of a first agent. Although in this text Scotus does not explicitly deal with the meaning of modal terms, the question immediately arises whether there is a sense of possibility in which his argument in the DPP is not obviously fallacious, and which does not contradict what he says about possibility elsewhere. I argue that the answer to this question is affirmative, and the concept that emerges here can help us to evaluate the debate about Scotus's concept of logical possibility in general.

Details aside, according to this interpretation, logical possibility neither depends on some actually existing power, nor is it reducible to mere non-contradiction: something is possible, in this sense, iff it does not involve a contradiction, and the power that can bring it about, although need not exist, does not involve a contradiction either. Interpreted this way, Scotus's account -- if his DPP is consistent with his other writings -- neither claims that possibility is determined by the divine power (as Normore would put it), nor is it the same as our modern concept of possibility (in Knuuttila's sense).

Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, Antioch College

lewscassity@hotmail.com

“Sumplokē as a stylistic and structural element of Plato's Laws”

Sumplokē as a stylistic and structural element of Plato's Laws

In *Greek Prose Style* (1952), J. D. Denniston notes the focused attention that Plato pays to word order, especially in his later works like the *Laws*. One device that Plato uses is hyperbaton, defined by Smyth as “the separation of words naturally belonging together” (*Greek Grammar*, 1920). Denniston describes the stylistic effect of “interlacing” as occurring when “one hyperbaton gives rise to another: two logically connected but spatially separated words in turn divide the word or expression, which divides them, from its natural fellows.” Describing interlacing, Denniston writes, “Often, however, and particularly in the *Laws*, the effect of interlacing is strongly marked, and it is difficult to resist the impression that the formation of word-arabesques had a certain fascination for Plato at the close of his life” (Compare also Holger Thesleff's *Studies in the Styles of Plato*, 1967).

In this paper, I will first review a few instances of sumplokē (Smyth's term for a device akin to Denniston's interlacing) at the level of the sentence structure of the Greek text of the *Laws*. Next, I will examine whether or not the stylistic principle of sumplokē occurs in larger sections of *Laws* at a thematic-structural level. As Voegelin has suggested, it may be that accusations claiming that the *Laws* is “garrulous and rambling” and that “it is poorly organized” stem from a misunderstanding of the *Laws*' “external” and “internal” organization (*Order and History*, Vol. 3, 1957). Taking Book 1 of the *Laws* as a test case, I will argue that Plato's argument in the *Laws* has an interlacing

structure that parallels Plato's stylistically efforts at the sentence level. The appropriate acknowledgement of this argumentative and structural interlacing provides a clearer appreciation of the artistry of the Laws as well as a more nuanced understanding of philosophical content of the Laws.

Dana Trusso, Duquesne

dana.trusso@gmail.com

"Plotinus' Intellectual Unconscious and Philosophical Erōs"

Psychic health is related to the soul's ascent insofar as it desires the good. Psychic illness is the descent of the human soul away from human good. The question thus arises, what is the human good? What is the human function? Seeking the answer to these questions is in itself an activity that leads to the best possible human life, but what fuels this striving? I claim that Plotinus' intellectual unconscious is the hinge between Plato's account of ascent towards Beauty Itself and philosophical erōs as the vehicle culminating in human flourishing.

For Plotinus, yearning to return to the Source, the rational human soul, also known as the intellectual unconscious, works to shuffle off the material world by a turn inward closer to unity with the One. Love makes possible both emanation and return, descent and ascent. Starting from mere matter, emanations desire to return to their source, and do so by contemplation. Just as in Plato's *Phaedrus*, the wings of the soul are nourished through participation in the Forms, so all emanations are nourished by contemplating the One. Perfection is found through contemplation, which is also the productive function. One reason why emanation overflows into lower forms of reality, starting with the three hypostases, is that perfection implies production. The One contemplates itself, overflowing into Intellect, which contemplates the forms and itself, overflowing into the third hypostasis Soul.

In the section on Plato I will highlight the tripartite structure as explained in the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Phaedo*. The *Republic* explains how the best soul is ruled by reason, where spirit functions as reason's auxiliary in order to control the appetites. The *Phaedrus* provides an intricate mythology that relates the nature of the soul to the Forms and an explanation of how visible beauty sparks recollection of Beauty Itself. The *Symposium*'s "ladder of love" is a correct guide for the education of the beloved's soul. Socrates uses this allegory to describe how the soul ascends via dialectic within the nurturing relationship of a moral education. Ascent ensures eudaimonia, that is, the flourishing, rational, and productive life.

In the section on Plotinus I will examine Ennead IV.8 "The Soul's Descent into the Body," V.1 "On the Three Hypostases," and V.3 "The Knowing Hypostasis and the Transcendent." I will explain the idea of the intellectual unconscious in the text and how it diverges from Plato's theory of the soul. I will use the contemporary scholarship of such thinkers as John Rist and Lloyd P. Gerson to clarify

Plotinus' philosophical theory, while also pointing to problems in the scholarship that will arise later when examining how the nature of the soul corresponds to the role of love.

Andrea Tschemplik, American University

atschem@american.edu

“Painting the *Republic*”

Much has been written about Socrates' critique of poetry; but fewer works analyze the role of painting in Plato's philosophy. I will examine what philosophical work is accomplished by Plato's discussions of painting. My paper will focus on the discussion of painting in the *Republic* and investigate the ways in which painting is the model for “mindful imitation.” I will pick up on and develop R.G. Collingwood's suggestion that the images created by a painter cannot be considered mere copies, but are rather windows into a new metaphysical space.

Katherine Tullmann, City University of New York Graduate Center

katherine.tullmann@gmail.com

“Art & the Inner Light: Augustine on Artistic Creativity and Aesthetic Experience”

This paper attempts to situate Augustine's views on aesthetics within the historical traditions of this field. One suitable way to accomplish this is by discussing the rationality of both artistic creation and an audience's aesthetic experience, a topic that has gained much attention in recent aesthetic debates. For example, Berys Gaut (2012) asks whether artistic creativity is essentially rational (pertaining to reasons) or irrational (based on feelings and impulses). In this paper, I will interpret Augustine's aesthetic theory in light of the rational creativity debate. Throughout the paper I will also consider various challenges to Augustine's aesthetic work, including the possibility of a secular understanding of his aesthetic theory.

I begin by contrasting Augustine's views with those of two predominant historical figures in aesthetics: Plato and Kant. Plato appears to have held a view that both artistic creativity and the audience members' engagement with artworks are fundamentally irrational. Kant's view is more complicated; the audiences' engagement with beautiful things, including artworks, is both a rational and irrational process. However, artistic creativity (the artistic genius) is irrational in Gaut's sense. I do not argue that there is a direct causal connection in ideas between Plato, Augustine, and Kant. However, certain important ideas pertaining to artistic rationality can be found in all three, particularly in the works of Plato and Augustine.

The second half of my paper delves into three themes of Augustine's aesthetic theory: the world as created according to number and wisdom, the world as a symbol of the divine, and aesthetic experience as a means of delight and joy. The first two themes suggest a primarily rational stance in the creativity debate, but the third promotes an irrational stance. Thus, I argue that Augustine's position is best understood as necessarily comprised of both rational and irrational components. I end this section with a brief discussion of the relevance of Augustine's thoughts in the contemporary debates on artistic intention and aesthetic appreciation.

My goal in this paper is not to defend Augustine's views, but rather to place them in context with other historical figures in the philosophy of art. Nor is this essay intended as a complete exegesis of Augustine's aesthetic theory. Rather, I wish to examine one particular area of Augustine's thought—his stance on the rationality/irrationality debate. Ultimately, I argue that an Augustinian position in this debate occupies a complex middle ground that is more plausible than either a Kantian or Platonic position. I conclude the paper with a brief overview and discussion of the relevance of Augustine's thought to contemporary debates.

Chris Tweedt, Baylor University

christtweedt@gmail.com

“A New Interpretation of Plato's *Republic*”

At the beginning of book 2, Socrates agrees with Glaucon to answer two questions: 1) What is justice? and 2) Is justice the best kind of good—that is, is justice both good for its own sake and for the sake of other things? By the end of book 4, supposedly Socrates has answered both the first question and the first part of the second, viz. that it is good for its own sake for each part of the soul to do its proper work. You would expect Socrates to start answering the second part of the second question at the beginning of book 5, but he doesn't do that until the beginning of book 8. Before answering the second part of the second question, Socrates proceeds to answer Adeimantus' question about the communal ownership of wives from the end of book 4 until the end of book 7. Given only what precedes book 5, Adeimantus' question seems irrelevant and dismissible by Socrates. To the contrary, I'll argue for an interpretation of the *Republic* according to which Socrates' answer to Adeimantus' question is central not only to what Socrates thinks about justice but also to the overall structure of the *Republic*.

Sara L. Uckelman, Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg

sara.uckelman@asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de

“The Relationship Between Epistemic Logic and Epistemology in Paul of Venice”

In recent decades, epistemic logic, in both its static and dynamic guises, has become an important field in contemporary mathematical logic, with many advances occurring each year. But one thing that has been lost in all the technical developments is a clear connection with epistemology and philosophical theories of knowledge; for example, in the idealized setting of multi-agent epistemic logic where all agents are logically omniscient and have perfect recall, there is no room for the concept of justification, or even of proof. As a result, contemporary epistemic logic is unfortunately of limited use for discussion epistemological problems.

In the Middle Ages, the connection between epistemology and epistemic reasoning is much closer. Treatises "De scire et dubitare" ("On Knowing and Being Uncertain"), philosophers and logicians investigate epistemological problems in tandem with logical rules governing inferences using epistemic modalities (know, believe, doubt, understand, cognize, etc.). However, these rules are often implicit, and must be reconstructed from the examples in which they are applied. In this paper, we investigate rules for reasoning about epistemic concepts in Paul of Venice's "De scire et dubitare", paying particular attention to the examples that he gives using the language of obligations. It is in these dynamic contexts that the roles of proof and justification play the most significant roles, as the introduction of new proofs and justifications into the disputation causes the Respondent's knowledge to change. This change of knowledge requires sophisticated logical machinery, which we can make explicit and precise using the tools and techniques developed in contemporary research on mathematical epistemic logic, marrying yet again the epistemic and the epistemological.

Monica Vilhauer, Roanoke College

mvilhauer@mac.com

“Sickness and Rehabilitation in Plato’s *Timaeus*: Retrieving the Value of the Body and Pursuing the Holistic Good Life”

In Plato’s *Phaedo*, we hear a story about the good life that has influenced, in the most pervasive ways, our Western understanding of human life, the peculiar kinds of sickness from which human beings suffer, and the strategies we should use to regain health and achieve happiness. The broad strokes of the story put forth by Socrates in the *Phaedo* suggest that the body – as the seat of sensation and all the affections -- is the source of human ills. The philosopher must treat the sickness of the body by “purifying himself,” or by despising and disassociating from the body as much as possible. Only then can he pursue truth unhindered and achieve psychic health. The “good life” in the *Phaedo* is conceived as the one that is, as much as possible, disembodied and closest to death. These broad strokes, passed down as Plato’s highest wisdom about the good life, are at the root of a philosophical tradition which conceives of the human being as soul or mind, as distinct from body, which separates the “rational” human from supposedly unintelligent nature, and which envisions the

philosophical life as a pursuit of pure reason and a denial of the body. As a result, aspects of life that are intimately intertwined (soul-body, intellect-sensation, human-nature) have been severed, leaving the modern world suffering from several forms of deep alienation.

In this paper, I want to call into question the notion that Plato offers such a univocal, crudely dualistic story about human life, and such a simplistic account of human sickness and the way to regain health. To do this I will turn in this paper to Plato's *Timaeus*, which offers a picture of human life as a psychosomatic whole, in which intelligence and sensation are intertwined, and a picture of human life that is intimately linked with the rest of nature. The *Timaeus* offers a story of the value of sensation, which it depicts as the root of our philosophizing, our self-ordering, and our ability to maintain health. It provides an account of human sicknesses that occur, not because of the existence of our bodies, but because of a disharmony between body and soul. And, finally, it offers strategies for healing these sicknesses that do not prescribe disassociating from the body, but attending to the needs of both soul and body and cultivating balance between them. The *Timaeus*, thus, provides us with a picture of the good life that is achieved by emphasizing, rather than severing, the deep connections between soul, body, and world, and offers a prescription for living as a harmonious whole.

Suresh Vythylingam, Tarrant County College, South Campus
forgivenandjustified@yahoo.com
"Philosophy of the Ancient Church"

This paper will review the philosophy of the early Church in terms of how it developed doctrine, applied the teachings of Jesus Christ, survived persecution etc.

Mélanie Walton, Belmont University
melanie.walton@belmont.edu
"Self Knowledge for Divine Knowledge in al-Ghazzali and Attar"

Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali's *Alchemy of Happiness* and Farid ud-Din Attar's *The Conference of the Birds* cast faith as the quest to divine knowledge and both command it to begin with and be enacted through a coming to know the self. After commanding that "you must seek out the truth about yourself," for "the key to the knowledge of God ... is knowledge about one's own self," al-Ghazzali denominates the human attributes as composed of those of the beasts of burden, predatory animals, demons, and angels, describing them rigorously so that their recognition can lead to their control, rendering the self as well-ordered and a source of divine knowledge (al-Ghazzali, *Kimiya-yi Sa'adat*).

Al-Ghazzali's text is rich with imagery (often hearkening Platonist themes), but still a treatise whose spiritual exercise is prompted by philosophical exegesis. Attar's *Conference of the Birds*, on the other hand, works through the poetic to command self-knowledge and culminates (nearly 4,500 lines in) in the philosophic revelation that the divine, the Simorgh, is one's self: "(Who sees the Lord? It is himself each sees) ..." (Attar, *Mantiq al-tair*). Distinctly blending the literary and philosophic and similarly merging Neoplatonism with Islam, both texts emphasize the power of the heart and warn of faith's trials, both instrumentalize self-knowledge as self-purification, and both guide us to the ecstatic realization of divinity.

While al-Ghazzali's *Alchemy of Happiness* is infrequently read philosophically with Attar's *Conference of the Birds*, they are uniquely compatible texts. Both were eleventh to twelfth century Sufi mystics who lived about 95 miles apart in what is today Iran, with Attar's birth only one to five decades after al-Ghazzali's death. Al-Ghazzali's poetic philosophy and Attar's philosophic poetry, as emblemized in these two texts, bear further notable similarities: both are demonstrably preeminent introductions to Sufism, both engage Aristotelian philosophy read heavily Neoplatonically, both use lush imagery (most notably the personification of animals), and both entwine love and suffering, ecstasy and asceticism. Read together, they reveal the depth of the Greek inheritance in medieval Sufism and demonstrate a fascinating interpretation of faith.

The focus of this paper is how both reveal the epistemic quest for divine knowledge as an ethical and religious command to self-knowledge and thereby transform faith into a journey and passage into self-reflection wherein what is reflected is the divine in each of us who undertake the journey. I will argue how the Neoplatonic theory of emanation aids our understanding of divine knowledge's prerequisite of self-knowledge, where we can see this theory illustrated in each text, and how the theory can help us to better understand their frequent, intricate mergers of the contradictions of love and sorrow, ecstasy and tranquility.

Kelsey Ward, Duquesne University

wardk1@duq.edu

"Hylomorphism in the *De Anima* and its Sources"

Matter and form are united as one thing in the *De Anima* where Aristotle writes, "there is no need...to inquire whether soul and body are one, any more than whether the wax and its stamp are one, or more generally the material of each thing and that of which it is the material" (DA 412b7). He seems to employ a hylomorphism that Sean Kelsey (2010) argues for in the context of the *Physics*. On this view, form and matter are together as one type of thing rather than standing as two types of entities in one divisible thing. And yet at DA 429a10 Aristotle turns our attention toward intellect. Though the intellectual function is the characteristic activity of human beings, intellect must be unmixed with body (429a24). This apparent conflict exemplifies the tension between Kelsey's view

of hylomorphism and the dualistic view explicated in Bernard Williams (2007). Thinking is clearly distinctive from other functions of soul for Aristotle. Does the status of the intellectual part of the soul threaten the hylomorphism that Kelsey proposes for the *Physics* in favor of a dualistic hylomorphism? To address this question, my paper examines the content of the *De Anima* through the lens of Aristotle's treatment of substantial being and parts of form in *Metaphysics* Z10-11.

Damon Watson, Marquette University

damon.watson@marquette.edu

“The Role of Teleology in Aristotle's Account of the Unity of Definition”

There would appear to be an inconsistency between Aristotle's account of the unity of definition from *Metaphysics* Z.12 and his understanding of definition as we find it in *Parts of Animals* 1.2. In *Metaphysics* Z.12 it seems that Aristotle's account of the definition's unity will work only for definitions possessing a single specific difference. However, in *Parts of Animals* 1.2 Aristotle explicitly criticizes and rejects an account of definition in which definitions are to possess only a single specific difference. In contrast to this notion of definition involving a single specific difference, biological definitions would seem to be derived from the several specifications of the various heterogenous organs out of which an animal is composed. In this paper I attempt to show that the account of the definition's unity from *Metaphysics* Z.12, despite appearances, is consistent with Aristotle's understanding of biological definitions in *Parts of Animals*. To show this I first look at the context in which the account of the unity of definition in *Metaphysics* Z.12 is introduced. There we see that Aristotle is well aware that the essential parts of an animal must be included in the definition of that animal. I read *Metaphysics* Z.12 as working with an unrealistically simple type of definition (definitions having only a single specific difference) so as to make Aristotle's account of the unity of definition more easily transparent. Therefore it is still an open question as to how we are to make the core account of the definition's unity from Z.12 work with the definitions that would be used by Aristotle as a biologist. To answer this open question I use an interpretation of the organic mereology out of *Metaphysics* Z.17 in tandem with Aristotelian teleology. Even though a definition of an animal will include several heterogeneous parts and so several specifications of these parts, nonetheless, by Aristotle's organic mereology, this total set of specifications of each organ must itself constitute a unity, for the ontological correlate to this total set of specifications is just the form of the animal under consideration. The specifications of the heterogenous organs will be imitative of the functional unity of the form insofar as each specification will be an account of the way the organ it names contributes to the entire functioning of the whole animal; this functioning of the animal is just the internal telos of the animal. In this way we can still hold that there is a single specific difference insofar as the total set of specific differences must constitute a unity as it reflects the telos of the animal, but also maintain that there are several specific differences insofar as the total set of specific difference has more than one element. Thus, with qualifications, we have an account of

definition for animals for which the Z.12 account of a definition's unity will be applicable, and also an account of definition that will work with Parts of Animals' rejection of a single specific difference.

Michael Wiitala, University of Kentucky
mwiitala@gmail.com
“Normativity and Being in Sophist 255e3-256d10”

In the *Republic*, Plato has Socrates claim that the things known “owe their being and essence (to einai te kai tēn ousian)” to the good (509b7-8). This paper examines the way in which Plato further develops the relationship between being and the normativity of the good through the Eleatic Stranger’s discussion of the five greatest kinds in the Sophist. I argue that the Stranger’s account of the communion of kinds in Sophist 255e3-256d10 shows that something’s being a discrete, countable, individual presupposes a higher order, and therefore uncountable, normative principle.

Lesley Brown calls the Stranger’s arguments in 255e3-256d10 “Plato’s ‘four quartets’” due to how systematically and similarly Plato structures the four four-line arguments which the Stranger presents in that section. The four arguments presuppose the Stranger’s claim at 255e3-6 that all things “participate (metechein) in the form of difference.” The four arguments can be formulated as follows:

- I. (1) Motion is different from rest (255e10).
- (2) So motion is not rest (255e14).
- (3) But motion is (256a1).
- (4) Because motion participates in being (256a1).
- II. (1) Motion is different from the same (256a3).
- (2) So motion is not the same (256a5).
- (3) But motion is the same (256a7).
- (4) Because motion participates in the same (256a7, b1).
- III. (1) Motion is different from different (256c5).
- (2) So motion is not different (256c8).
- (3) But motion is different (256c8).

(4) Because motion participates in different (255e3-6).

IV. (1) Motion is different from being (256d5).

(2) So motion is not being (256d8).

(3) But motion is being (256d8-9).

(4) Because motion participates in being (256d9).

The general structure of each argument can, thus, be formulated as follows:

(1) K is different from E (on the basis of participation in different, 255e3-6).

(2) So K is not E (on the basis of (1)).

(3) But K is E (on the basis of (4)).

(4) Because K participates in E.

A striking feature of these arguments is that the specific nature of motion is irrelevant. Motion could be replaced by any form other than one of the other five kinds and the each of the arguments would function in the same way. For example, replace “motion” with “greatness” in the arguments and the results do not change. I submit that this is because Plato has constructed these four arguments in order to define and reveal the preconditions for not only motion, but for the being of any countable something, any individual thing. The arguments claim that any countable individual is a being, is the same as itself, and is different from others because it participates in the nature (phusis, 255e5, 256e1, 257a9) of being, same, and different. Hence the nature of being, same, and different in which all things participate is prior in explanation to any being’s countability and individuality, and thus is itself uncountable and not “a being.” “Being,” “same,” and “different” in line (4) of the arguments name the normative principle which explains why countable individuals are countable individuals

John Wolfe, University of South Florida

jrwolfe@gmail.com

“Beginning at the Beginning: The Introduction to Plato's *Timaeus*”

This paper explores the ways in which the introductory scenes to Plato's *Timaeus* provide a guide to the interpretation of the works as a whole.

First I show how the opening scenes with Socrates, Critias, Hermocrates and Timaeus serve to demononstrate the sort of person who can properly perform the work of the phusikos. The clues

given in 'Timaeus' characterization are developed into an account of the kind of wisdom that must be possessed by the phusikos. Key in this reading an account of the relationship between character virtue and knowledge, the former serving as a necessary condition of the latter. Timaeus, the character, is

who he is because no one else could give this account of the cosmos. Finally, these conclusions are generalized to paint a portrait of the Platonic phusikos.

Second I address the puzzling inclusion of the Atlantis narrative. Whereas the dramatic introduction serves to show what sort of person is capable of physical inquiry, the Atlantis story serves to indicate method. The Atlantis story demonstrates the limits of mythopoeic explanation while at the same time showing the necessity of narrative in historical inquiry.

David Zettel, Cornell

dwz8@cornell.edu

“Action and Evaluation in Albert the Great”

I intend to examine two different ways of evaluating actions. In the late 12th and early 13th centuries, it became common to divide a large class of action types into two groups: generically bad acts, and generically good acts. Generically bad acts can be done well, and generically good acts can be done badly; but we have a reason to value generically good acts, and a reason to disvalue generically bad ones. This reason is only *pro tanto*, however; an overall reason to value an action attaches only to these action types considered along with their moral circumstances.

However, this way of evaluating actions changes in the mid-to-late 13th century. Aquinas transforms it to suit his purposes, while Godfrey of Fontaines omits it altogether. Albert the Great is a transitional figure here. In his early works, generic goodness is an important part of his moral theory. In his two early moral treatises, both of which focus on the cardinal virtues, he prefaces his discussion of the virtues with an account of the generic features of actions. Further, he treats the topic of generic goodness in his first commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (the standard textbook of theology at the time). By the time he writes his second commentary on the *Sentences* (the *Summa theologiae*) much later in his life, however, he seems to have lost all interest in the concept, and makes no mention of generic goodness.

I argue that Albert abandons his preferred method of evaluating actions in terms of their generic goodness or badness, along with their moral circumstances, for two reasons: first, because he has trouble formulating the principle in such a way that it will do real work and his theory; and second, because it is in tension with a second way of evaluating actions, which he also employs: what I will call the Dionysian principle. According to the Dionysian principle, an action is good overall

only if it is good in each of a number of different morally relevant ways of being good, whereas it is bad overall if it is bad in any one of those ways. This doctrine fits uncomfortably with the doctrine of generic goodness, and also seems to be free of the problems that beset Albert's early theory of generic goodness. It seems that Albert eventually abandons his early attempts to make them fit together, rejecting the one in accepting the other. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, manages to keep the Dionysian principle only by radically altering the doctrine of generic goodness.

Anna Zhyrkova, Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie

anna.zhyrkova@ignatianum.edu.pl

“Leontius of Byzantium’s Philosophy — a quest for individual”

The proposed paper presents the preliminary results of the project “Re-introducing the Early Byzantine *Metaphysics*,” which concentrates on the process of transformation of metaphysical key notions that took place in the works of Byzantine theologians of post-chalcedonian period. This conceptual process is of special interest as a possible origin for theory of individual and individuation that was formulated at the late Patristic period and developed in the Middle Ages philosophy.

In the paper I shall retrace and elucidate the broad lines of the process in which, in Leontius Bizantinus’ writings, the ancient metaphysical ideas were redefined and transformed. Leontius seems to play a key, even though much overlooked, role in the transformation of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian conceptions into ones suitable for the Christian doctrine. His works display the influence of such Greek Fathers as Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria, as well as of non-patristic philosophical sources. Leontius’ writings show deep interest in logic, which was inspired by Porphyry’s Introduction and the summary of Aristotle’s Categories by Porphyry or his pupils, and which cut [zanurzone] deep into Leontius’ theology, especially his Christological and Trinitarian doctrines. Leontius’ knowledge of Stoic doctrines could also be drawn from the works of Neoplatonic commentators.

The paper focuses on the conceptual core of Leontius work, analyzing and elucidating the usage and philosophical importance of terms like being, substance, nature, hypostasis, individual, particular, universal and person. In this first approach of mine to the subject I shall concentrate on the Neoplatonic element in Leontius’ conceptual world as well on the differences between Leontius usage of philosophical vocabulary and the usage introduced by Chalcedon teaching.