The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

4-1994

Abstract

In this paper I investigate one central source of Aristotle's dissatisfaction with a comprehensive analogy between aisthêsis and noêsis. I will argue that his conception of nous as organless is neither empirically motivated nor obviously misguided. On the contrary, Aristotle's insistence that nous is separate and unmixed with the body is grounded in an approach to intentionality nascent in his treatment of noêsis. This approach to intentionality helps motivate the special status he awards nous.

Notes

Christopher Shields presented “Intentionality and Isomorphism in Aristotle” to the Society at its meeting with the Pacific Division in 1994. A revised version was published in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 11 (1995) 307-30.

For information about the author see:

https://philosophy.nd.edu/people/faculty/christopher-shields/