Is contemporary virtue epistemology in fact a revival of Aristotle’s theory of intellectual virtues and an appeal to Aristotelian epistemology? In this paper I will examine Linda Zagzebski's theory of virtue epistemology, the most explicitly Aristotelian version of the agent-based epistemologies. The objective of this analysis is threefold: (1) To examine to what extent Zagzebski's virtue epistemology is genuinely Aristotelian, particularly in the use of moral and epistemic exemplars. (2) To draw attention to some significant concerns regarding the use of exemplars, such as the famous phronimos, in both moral and epistemic evaluation. And finally, (3) to offer a critique of Zagzebski's virtue epistemology, in which I conclude that the.most serious problem with contemporary virtue epistemology philosophically is that it is not Aristotelian enough.
Rubarth, Scott, "Aristotle, Epistemic Exemplars, and Virtue Epistemology" (2005). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 352.