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Tim Hyde
SUNY Stony Brook

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Reasonably Free: The Question of Slavery in Plato’s Kallipolis Revisited

Tim Hyde, Stony Brook University

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Abstract

Plato’s critics observe that he tells us little about the sphere of the oikos in the Kallipolis. Even whether there would be slaves is contested. Vlastos suggests that they are a fourth class doing all the unseemly work behind the scenes. Yet, even though the text mentions slaves in passing, a fourth class doesn’t fit into the psychodynamic taxonomy of the Kallipolis, which has led to the suggestion that, to be consistent, Plato’s Kallipolis shouldn’t have slaves. Neither of these positions is satisfactory. Rather, the economic arrangement of the Kallipolis leaves no room for a distinction between trader-producers and their putative slaves. The household disappears both as a political and an independent economic unit, removing the conditions under which there could be intra-household literal slavery or inter-household metaphoric slavery, although Plato’s aristocratic economic dirigisme means that in no way should he be thought of as an abolitionist. Rather, Plato thinks of the worker class as either slaves or slavish, but objectively freed because they are ruled by reason.

Every man should hold the view regarding men in general, that the man who has not been a slave will never become a praiseworthy master, and that the right way to gain honor is by being a slave honorably rather than by ruling honorably—being a slave first to the laws, since this is slavery to the gods.

*Laws* VI: 762e

Introduction: The Four Mentions of Slavery

To paraphrase Vlastos, distinguishing between what an author said, what an author might have meant, and what would make an author consistent are the ABC’s of exegesis. The first order of the day is to get what the author actually said right. Even at this stage, however, real problems for exegesis occur when the answer to the question, “What did he say?” is “Oddly, not very much, and what was said seems on the face of it contradictory.” Such is the case with slavery in Plato’s *Republic*. That leaves the burden of philosophical archeology resting on B and C. Not surprisingly, the definitive answer to the emotive question of slavery in the Kallipolis has proved elusive, inconclusive, and opposing camps have formed.

One camp, the “yes, of course, there is slavery” camp, tends to be occupied by philologists and classicists. The other, the “on balance, no, there shouldn’t be slavery” camp, tends to be occupied by those who are willing to read between the lines, even at the risk of anachronism, for the sake of philosophical systematicity. As my tone suggests, the conservatives have the balance of textual evidence, but the battle is also one of philosophical temperament, which is not decided textually.

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1 Arguably, but only arguably, I have over-translated *douleuó* (and all its forms) in its literal meaning of to be a slave; be that as it may, “to be a slave” is its primary and literal meaning. Vlastos points out that the extreme metaphorical usage many scholars, including himself, impute to Plato is little evidenced elsewhere if at all, so maybe Plato is more literally minded than we think. Gregory Vlastos, “Slavery in Plato’s Thought,” *The Philosophical Review* 50, no. 3 (1941), p. 292. Reprinted in Gregory Vlastos, *Platonic Studies*, 2nd print, with corrections. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). Since the earlier paper’s page numbers are marked in the reprint, I retain only those. By and large I have followed Bury’s translation. Plato, *Laws*, trans. R. G. Bury, 2 vols., *The Loeb Classical Library* (London: William Heinemann, 1926).
2 E.g., Vlastos, Morrow, and anti-Plato critics like Popper, or hybrids such as Ste. Croix. Let me cite references when I come to discuss the authors individually.
3 E.g., Calvert and stalwart defenders of Plato, such as Levinson, Ritter, and Wild. Let me cite references as I discuss these authors individually. But to quote Alexander Fuks, “We are not playing the—rather futile—game of <<calling names>> … Nor do we play the game of <<defending Plato>> …. Trying to understand Plato’s views is a rather serious matter and diversions such as these do not help much,” Alexander Fuks, “Plato and the Social Question: The Problem of Poverty and Riches in *The Republic*,” *Ancient Society* 8 (1977): 49-83, here p.78. If a more complete list
Neither of these positions is satisfactory. I wish to argue that both positions are in one sense right and one sense wrong. I propose a radical solution that has the advantages of both camps, namely, the advantages of a close if staid reading of the text, as well as the advantages of a reading that makes the best systematic sense of Plato. Proleptically, let me just say that in *The Republic*, Plato is envisaging a new social relation based neither on familial ties, nor on household interests, nor on power, but on reason that objectively frees those who Plato thinks would otherwise be suited to be slaves, regardless of whether they would actually have been classed as such in other poleis. The *type* of social positions available is radically transformed in the Kallipolis. Regardless of whether the traders and producers live in houses, the household is neither the fundamental political unit, nor the fundamental economic unit, so there is no place for literal slaves within households and no place for metaphorical enslavement between households.6 Other poleis are based on a network of competing households; the Kallipolis, *in principle*, is a network of singled purpose agents whose interactions and function are organized by what reason dictates is the good of the whole.7 In effect, Plato organizes the Kallipolis as one might run the best of households, were it entirely self-sufficient.8 The auxiliaries are the command and control mechanism by which the reason of the philosophically minded rulers *in principle* permeates every social, political, and economic interaction. Plato has removed the conditions under which there could be exploitative economic slavery. Nevertheless, Plato is no abolitionist, in fact far from it, because he thinks that almost all people are fundamentally slaves and, in line with his aristocratic dirigisme, treats them as such. Perhaps one could say that almost everyone in the Kallipolis is a slave but there is no room for exploitation.9 In any case, there is not room for a forth distinct *class* behind the scenes doing the “unseemly work.”

Let me begin by enumerating the passages relevant to the question of slavery in the Kallipolis. I then lay down some stringent criteria for any successful interpretation of Plato’s position. My thesis is that Plato thinks of the working class—whether in other poleis technically citizens or slaves—as slavish and thinks that they would, in any other polis, be enslaved either metaphorically or literally. Only the Kallipolis can ‘free’ that class—and in the Kallipolis the workers form one class. The passages I produce are often dismissed. Vlastos says that they are not meant to be taken literally.

(i) I start by arguing that there is no room for a fourth type of soul, required by a separate class of slaves—an argument already rehearsed by others—so trader-producers and putative slaves have the same internal constitution, if you will.

(ii) Further, I also argue that due to the peculiar property structures of the Kallipolis, there is no room for a distinction between metaphoric and literal slavery within its institutions. In both cases, slavery would of combatants is desired, see Ronald Bartlett Levinson, *In Defense of Plato* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).


5 My solution also has the unanticipated benefit of addressing what has long been seen as a shortcoming of *The Republic*, a shortcoming universally and oft remarked upon, namely, that Plato tells us even less about the mundane lives of the traders and the producers than he does about slavery. In fact, his surprising silence on both the issues of slavery and the day-to-day existence of the traders and producers turns out to have a common ground. See n. 47.

6 Keeping Plato’s literal and metaphorical uses of “slavery” straight is, of course, essential to a coherent reading of *The Republic*. I see the economic sphere as approximately synonymous with the household sphere in the classical world as the etymology of “economics” suggests.

7 In effect the single agents would almost certainly be the man, the trader or producer of the household. I imagine that Plato’s “liberation” of female guardians extends to liberating women in the iron and bronze class. The text itself is famously unclear on the issue.

8 It is not that the traders and producers live communally, of course. They would live in houses and could even appear to have underlings. Nevertheless everyone would be acting *as if* each individual were a unit working and interacting *as if* coordinated with every other individual for the good of the whole.

9 As Plato says in my epigraph, even the philosophical minded ruler is in a sense a slave to reason.
amount to being subject to the will of another. Both trader-producers and putative slaves are equally
subject to someone else’s will and the same will—the will of the philosophically minded rulers.

(iii) I then show that the difference between trader-producers and slaves is not based on a set of tasks
essentially reserved for slaves. The genesis of the febrile city demonstrates that citizens can do every task.
(iv) Nor could the function of slaves be to free up leisure time for the traders and producers. Rather the
productivity of the working class in general allows the guardians to perform their function.
(v) Nor is it a question of who controls whom, the guardians being politically in charge of the traders and
producers, the slaves being confined to an economic sphere, controlled by the traders and producers,
sequestered away from the political, for the guardians in principle control the economic sphere for the
good of the whole.

Taken together, these considerations imply that Plato means what he says. In the Kallipolis, Plato
collapses any possible distinction between citizen workers and slaves, although hardly as an abolitionist.

In the course of his description of the Kallipolis, Plato mentions slaves, “douloi,” in a way
pertinent to the question of whether there are slaves in the Kallipolis four times.\(^\text{10}\)
(1) His first mention is in the context of the definition of justice, namely, that people should mind their
p’s and q’s and keep to their own business, such as “women, children, slaves, freemen, rulers and ruled”
[433d].

(2) In his second mention, Plato says that rulers in other cities call their citizen wage-givers and
supporters “slaves” [463b].

(3) His third mention in the context of the prohibition against taking Greeks as slaves in the spoils of war
[469b].

(4) Plato also talks of the traders and producers as if they were slaves [590c-d].\(^\text{11}\)

Let us take it that Plato’s prohibition of Greek enslavement is agnostic on the question of whether there
are barbarian slaves in the Kallipolis.\(^\text{12}\) The possibility of barbarian slaves in the Kallipolis is left open.\(^\text{13}\)

10 See the appendix below for a complete list of these citations and all others in which Plato mentions “slavery,”
“enslavement,” etc., in books II-VII.

11 While the discussion occurs in book IX, outside the bounds of the discussion of the Kallipolis proper, those so
enslaved are presumably the Kallipolis’ third class.

12 One might think that Plato’s clear injunction against the enslavement of other Greeks in defeat at least mitigates
the scope of slavery in the Kallipolis. Here, however, Popper apparently finds definitive evidence that the Kallipolis
not only allows for slavery, but is built upon it and encourages it. Popper says that Plato “goes on (in 471b-c) to
courage [the enslavement] of barbarians by Greeks, and especially by the citizens of his best city.” The Open
“How he [Popper] gets this out of 471BC—where enslavement is not mentioned—he does not explain,” Vlastos,
“Does Slavery Exist in The Republic?” p. 292. Vlastos, however, does find textual evidence in these passages for
slavery in the Kallipolis, although he admits correctly to its inconclusive nature. Vlastos points out that the fact that
Greeks can’t take other Greeks as slaves is, according to Plato, supposed to make them fight harder against
barbarians. Vlastos correctly infers that this is only a sequitur if taking slaves is a reason to fight and, if so, you must
have them. Vlastos with great care and honesty points out that it is not 100 percent clear that the “they,” who would
fight better against the barbarians, includes the Kallipolis or not, although he is correct when he says that it is
grammatically and contextually possible that the Kallipolis is included. That having been said, despite the fact that
Vlastos’ textual analysis is magnificent and balanced, he doesn’t take full account of the surrounding argument.
Plato has already told us that the Kallipolis gives away any spoils of war [422d]. It is conceivable in the context, I
suppose, that the victorious Kallipolis would be forbidden only from taking gold or silver away with them but could
load up with slaves. I find such a suggestion improbable, to say the least. But even if the Kallipolis does have slaves,
That leaves three mentions. At face value, the first mention (1), the mention of slaves in the context of the definition of justice [433d] seems to suggest that there are slaves in the Kallipolis, and I lay down the following firm criterion that any reading of The Republic on the question of slavery needs to take this comment at face value.\textsuperscript{14} The second (2), the mention that says the people corresponding to those called wage-givers in the Kallipolis are thought of as slaves by their rulers in other poleis [463b] might be taken to suggest that just about everyone is a slave outside of the Kallipolis,\textsuperscript{15} and the mention from book IX, the fourth mention (4), suggests that just about everyone in the Kallipolis is a slave [590c-d]. The correct interpretation of both of these last two claims hangs on what the possible differences are between metaphoric and literal slavery both in a Kallipolis and in other poleis.

Now let us consider what Plato says about slavery in the context of the degenerate poleis. The fact that degenerate poleis have slaves does not by itself demonstrate that there is slavery in the Kallipolis. Equally, the introduction of slavery and enslavement at this point in the text does not immediately exclude there being slaves in the Kallipolis.\textsuperscript{16} That having been said, something peculiar is certainly

\textsuperscript{14} One must admit, considerable, not to say disingenuous ingenuity is used to get round this minor inconvenient fact if one is in the “no” camp. Only Calvert, to my knowledge, wisely admits the full extent of the “damage” that this line does to the anti-slavery camp’s case. Brian Calvert, “Slavery in The Republic,” Classical Quarterly 37, no. (ii) (1987), p. 367 credits Levinson, In Defense of Plato, p. 171, with such an admission, but I find no evidence of it, save that he addresses the sentence. Calvert opts for merely keeping alive the idea that slavery is, nevertheless, inconsistent with the logic of the soul espoused by Plato in The Republic. Most of Plato’s other defenders argue that this list is either a completely parenthetical remark or Plato wasn’t thinking about the Kallipolis or had somehow forgotten he was speaking about the Kallipolis. E.g.; ibid, p. 293, given (i) Plato’s acquiescence to barbarian enslavement by, at the very least, other Greek poleis, given (ii) his enshrinement of their status in his Laws IX, and given (iii) Plato takes it as a fact that there are such types of individuals as would make slaves [e.g., Republic 395e, Laws IV, 720c], one is left in little doubt that Plato does not find the institution of slavery morally repugnant, despite how painful this is for contemporary ears to hear. Any interpretation of Plato’s position on slavery in The Republic must not overstate Plato’s opposition, if any, to slavery. It must also be noted, however, that the actual implications of The Laws for Plato’s views on slavery are as hotly contested as those of The Republic. The two camps fight over how willingly Plato acquiesces to the institutions of his day. Ritter argues that Plato does so unwillingly and wants to mitigate the excesses of the institution, Constantin Ritter, Platon: Sein Leben, Seine Schriften, Seine Lehre, 2 vols., History of Ideas in Ancient Greece (New York: Arno Press, 1976). Morrow argues the opposite, Glenn R. Morrow, “Plato and Greek Slavery,” Mind 48, no. 190 (1939): 186-201.

\textsuperscript{15} As Vlastos astutely remarks, ibid., p. 293, given (i) Plato’s acquiescence to barbarian enslavement by, at the very least, other Greek poleis, given (ii) his enshrinement of their status in his Laws IX, and given (iii) Plato takes it as a fact that there are such types of individuals as would make slaves [e.g., Republic 395e, Laws IV, 720c], one is left in little doubt that Plato does not find the institution of slavery morally repugnant, despite how painful this is for contemporary ears to hear. Any interpretation of Plato’s position on slavery in The Republic must not overstate Plato’s opposition, if any, to slavery. It must also be noted, however, that the actual implications of The Laws for Plato’s views on slavery are as hotly contested as those of The Republic. The two camps fight over how willingly Plato acquiesces to the institutions of his day. Ritter argues that Plato does so unwillingly and wants to mitigate the excesses of the institution, Constantin Ritter, Platon: Sein Leben, Seine Schriften, Seine Lehre, 2 vols., History of Ideas in Ancient Greece (New York: Arno Press, 1976). Morrow argues the opposite, Glenn R. Morrow, “Plato and Greek Slavery,” Mind 48, no. 190 (1939): 186-201.

\textsuperscript{16} Again, the camps are divided about which way the evidence points. Popper is off the mark when he argues that the fact that the timorous man is rough to slaves, whereas someone better educated only despises them, means that there
afoot. Any interpretation of Plato’s position on slavery in *The Republic* as a whole that is worth its salt needs to:

(i) address the difference between what slavery could mean in or out of the Kallipolis,
(ii) sort out the differences between literal and metaphoric uses of the word, as well as
(iii) explain the sudden profusion of the term in Plato’s discussion of the degenerate poleis.

These three considerations, along with the stipulation that the occurrence of “slave” in the definition of justice must be taken at face value, form the criteria for evaluating the success of any reading of Plato on the issue of slavery in the Kallipolis.

**Slavery, Literal and Metaphoric**

Since my argument is that in the Kallipolis Plato collapses the difference between slaves and trader-producers, let me first consider if there can be a psychological difference between the trader-producers and slaves. Plato seems to straightforwardly say not.

And why do you suppose mechanical and manual art bring reproach? Or shall we say that this is because of anything else than when the form of the best is by nature so weak in a man that he isn’t capable of ruling the beasts in himself, but only of serving them, and is capable of learning only the things that flatter them? … In order that such a man [the mechanical and manual artist] is also ruled by something similar to what rules the best man, don’t we say that he must be the slave of that best man who has the divine rule in himself? [590c].

If traders and producers are slavish, perhaps literal slaves don’t really have comparable souls to citizens at all. What we can, I think, infer from the *Meno* here is that Plato does not think that the psyche of a literal slave is radically different from the psyche of any other human. It seems unlikely that Plato could hold two such radically different doctrines in two dialogues of more or less the same period.

must be slaves in the Kallipolis, only there they will be “properly despised,” rather than roughly treated, ibid., p. 47. The homebody philosophical father figure in the timocracy is, of course, the one referred to, who only “despises slaves.” On the other hand, it cannot immediately be inferred, as John Wild does, that just because Plato suddenly starts talking about slavery, and more importantly enslavement, when he comes to consider the degenerate poleis, that there is no slavery in the Kallipolis, John Daniel Wild, *Plato’s Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 50. Wild does, however, accurately point out that much of the answer to the question of slavery in *The Republic* depends on what you mean by “slavery.”

17 In the first seven books of *The Republic*, “doulos” or a related word occurs fourteen times, “diakonos” [servant] four, “andrapodon” (or its verbal form) [often a war captive] thrice, and “oiketês” [domestic] twice. (I will discuss the differences between when Plato uses these terms below, see n. 48.) There are more than forty mentions of these in the next two books, with an astounding twenty of those between 575b and 579a. At the very least, one can’t say that Plato didn’t have slavery and even more enslavement in mind when he was writing *The Republic*. He is almost obsessed with slavery and enslavement, with his description of the worst possible state imaginable, namely tyranny, as being literally “the bitterest enslavement to slaves” [569c]. See the appendix for a complete list of relevant passage in Books II-VII.


19 No discussion of Plato’s views on the institution of slavery would be complete without a mention of the *Meno*. Here it is Vlastos who shows bias. Vlastos claims that “Socrates makes each successive point so plain that only a half-wit could miss it. Plato never suggested that slaves are stupid. … He [the slave-boy] knows the true solution, but not why it is true. Nevertheless I should not conclude that Plato thinks that the slave-boy could not discover the forms. This point is left undetermined,” ibid. n. 9, p. 290. It is hard to imagine such a close reading of the text that misses so wide the mark. Socrates is arguing that in order to know something about anything at all we have know its “ti esti,” which turns out to be difficult, of course. This line of reasoning suggests to the “good looking” [80c], well-born, and rich Meno that we can’t know anything. Socrates, horrified by the suggestion that we should give up trying to search for knowledge, shows that even a slave-boy can come close to the very forefront of Greek mathematical knowledge, namely, the incommensurability of surds. It is hard to see how that wouldn’t have smarted someone like Meno, and unimaginable that Plato didn’t want his readers to get that point. As for whether the slave-boy could have true knowledge, Plato is unequivocal. “But if the same questions are put to him on many occasions
Furthermore, slaves do have their place in the Kallipolis, whatever that might be. Our first mention (1) of slavery [433d] tell us it is only by them knowing and staying in their place that there is justice. Therefore, slaves need to be fitted into the psychodynamic taxonomy of the Kallipolis, and if per hypothese, they have a psyche different from the traders and producers, it would mean that there would need to be a fourth part of the soul that predominates in slaves, but not in traders and producers, but there isn’t a forth part. Alternatively, it can’t be that slaves are a forth class in the Kallipolis when there are only three types of soul. As Calvert points out, Plato [435b ff. especially 441c] gives the overwhelming impression that the tripartite analysis is complete.20 Calvert pointedly concludes that, faced with a choice of either saying that the soul-city analogy breaks down or saying that slaves don’t have a fourth type of psyche, the choice is fairly clear.21

Even if it seems that putative slaves and the trader-producers have the same type of soul, one might think that the difference is that traders and producers are not treated as slaves. But Plato has just said quite the reverse. “Don’t we say that he must be the slave of that best man who has the divine rule in himself?” Vlastos writes off Plato’s plain statement with the claim that

He [Plato] certainly does not mean to be taken literally. He neither means to degrade all artisans to the level of bondmen, nor to raise the social status of the slave to that of a free laborer. There is not the slightest indication, either in The Republic or anywhere else, that Plato means to obliterate or relax in anyway that distinction.22

There is the very passage in question (!) of course, but let us suppose for the nonce that Vlastos is right that here; Plato is referring to traders and producers only metaphorically as slaves. According to Vlastos there are, additionally, literal slaves. So what is the difference in this scenario between a literal and a metaphoric slave?23 Morrow enumerates what he takes literal slavery to be, and I’ll follow him for the sake of argument.24

and in different ways, you can see that in the end he will have a knowledge on the subject as accurate as anybody’s” [85c-d, following Guthrie’s translation, Plato, Meno, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971)]. And lastly, surely the doctrine of amnesia entails that all souls have the truth of reality waiting to be unforgotten, and that includes slaves’. How this cannot be seen as undercutting the institution of natural slavery, I do not know. Thus the least one can say is that there is a tension between what Plato implies in Meno and the constitution he lays out in The Laws. However, Plato wouldn’t be the first person to have been of more than one mind on slavery. To make Plato completely consistent over all his texts, as Vlastos appears to be trying to do, is both misguided and futile. That having been said, the implications of the Meno don’t settle the question for the Kallipolis. It does, however, strongly suggest that Plato does not think of slaves as subhuman or with deficient souls. It would be unusual if he did anyway because, as Morrow points out on various grounds in his analysis of Greek slavery, slaves were understood to be subjects and have something like personality. Morrow, “Plato and Greek Slavery,” p. 189.

21 Ibid., pp. 371-2. Of course, because he still thinks a slave would be different from a trader and producer in the Kallipolis, he has no way of explaining Plato’s reference to them.
22 Vlastos, “Slavery in Plato’s Thought,” pp. 292-3. As evidence, Vlastos cites Morrow’s text on the Laws, which only shows that Plato doesn’t have universal sympathy for the predicament of slaves. If Plato is indeed collapsing the difference between the lowest citizens and slaves, it is not to liberate the slaves, but because he doesn’t think much of the hoi polloi. Telling us that Plato doesn’t think very highly of slaves either, hardly argues against such an “emancipation.” In his piece as a whole, Vlastos makes the radical but convincing argument that not only are political relationships thought of in terms of a master-slave relationship, but Plato’s ontological, psychological, and cosmological relationships are analogous to the master-slave relationship as well, but he thinks that such talk is merely metaphorical even in the political case of the Kallipolis. Levinson also mentions this passage in passing, and he too dismisses it as metaphorical, Levinson, In Defense of Plato, p. 174.
23 Morrow, who influenced Vlastos’ interpretation of Plato on slavery, similarly tries to drive a wedge between Plato’s unique and highly metaphorical use and literal uses of “doulos.” He blithely says that such uses have “confused commentators.” Morrow, “Plato and Greek Slavery,” p. 187.
24 Ste. Croix gives a definition of slavery more appropriate in ancient contexts, see n. 31 below, where I also discuss the nearest thing we have to a Platonic definition of slavery. I use Morrow’s definition because it is the one least amenable to my argument.
(i) a slave is a possession,
(ii) subject to the will of another,
(iii) who possesses no rights of action,
(iv) nor political rights,
(v) including, presumably, property rights.\(^{25}\)

The trouble with the first two of these characteristics of being a slave is that they are mutually incompatible in the Kallipolis. Simply put, as all in the “no” camp have pointed out, the guardians famously have no property, so they can’t be the ones who own slaves. Nor, on Vlastos’ account, would slaves be needed by the guardians. On Vlastos’ account, they would be needed by the traders and producers. But as Calvert points out and even Vlastos admits the point plainly obvious from Plato, namely, to use Vlastos’ own words, “[T]he title to absolute authority over persons is conferred by philosophic wisdom.”\(^{26}\) Surely, this rules out anyone but the philosophically minded having legitimate authority over slaves.\(^{27}\) It seems the only people who could own slaves shouldn’t, and the ones that have the right to can’t.\(^{28}\)

If one drops being owned as part of the definition of slavery, then it seems, as Heitland remarks, the auxiliaries are the only literal slaves in the Kallipolis, since they both own nothing and are subject to the will of another.\(^{29}\) Nor is the difference between literal and metaphorical slavery a question of who has property rights. Although the traders and producers can use property, they do not have property rights. The guardians strictly regulate all economic activity including the concentration and distribution of property.\(^{30}\) If one removes both being owned and not having property rights from the definition of slavery then there is no difference between literal and metaphorical slavery, and it does indeed again look as if Plato has collapsed the difference between citizen trader-producer and slave in the Kallipolis. Both amount to being subject to the will of another.\(^{31}\)

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\(^{25}\) Morrow, “Plato and Greek Slavery,” p. 188. I have made the absence of property rights explicit, which is not listed by Morrow but is presumably included under rights of action. I have excluded moral and religious injunctions protecting slaves because it seems fair to presume that if there are slaves in the Kallipolis they aren’t abused.


\(^{27}\) Vlastos does not say how Plato could consistently hold that the bronze class could hold slaves, leaving his account incomplete if not completely inconsistent. The “no” camp is on much stronger ground here when they try to consider systematically how slavery might work in The Republic.

\(^{28}\) It has been suggested by a helpful and thorough anonymous reviewer that it might be argued that all the producers and traders need to rule slaves is merely some kind of practical expertise. In other words, putative slaves are relegated to a tool in the economic sphere. What the trader-producers do with their time, their money, and their tools is regulated by the guardians for the good of the whole. But that good must also be their good. To suggest that Plato thinks that putative slaves are just to be used and used up, to suggest that Plato thinks that putative slaves would accrue none of the benefits of living in a well run Kallipolis is to suggest that he thinks of them as subhuman, as no different from a plough or an ox. As I have argued, such a doctrine is neither Platonic nor Greek. See n. 19.


\(^{30}\) This is not an uncontentious claim, both in a longer version and in a conference paper, “Plato’s Aristocratic Dirigisme,” in *International Conference on Ancient and Medieval Philsophy* (Fordham Universtity: 2008), I go into more detail to demonstrate this it. The only other person I know to have considered the issue is in basic agreement with me. See Fuks, “Plato and the Social Question: The Problem of Poverty and Riches in The Republic.”

\(^{31}\) In line with the fact that ancient intellectuals didn’t think that the protection of private property was the primary function of states, slaves, according to Ste. Croix, were not defined in the ancient world in terms of being unable to own nor of being owned. Rather, what made a slave a slave is that a slave is ordered about, not to put too fine a point on it, (Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, p. 135). In this regard, the putative literal and figurative slaves are identical. Plato doesn’t discuss slavery anywhere in his corpus in detail. The nearest he comes to doing so is in *The Laws* at IV: 720, where slaves are differentiated from freemen by their inability to reason fully, at least in a medical context. Clearly, in this regard, the figurative and literal slaves of the Kallipolis are identical too.
Perhaps then the difference between slaves and trader-producers is in some task set aside for slaves. To see if such a set of tasks exist we need to turn to the genesis of the febrile city from the city of sows. Plato starts off with four or five men. This merry little band of men are professionals at what they specialize in doing. The implication seems to be that there aren’t to be slave masters organizing all the basic functions. Rather, the original inhabitants of the city of sows are to get their own hands dirty. So too the craftsmen, the herdsmen, the merchants, the seamen, the tradesmen, and finally the day-laborers, who all belong to the same class. To claim that there needs to be a whole class of slaves to accomplish something not accomplished by this motley crew is not ruled out, but it is hardly suggested. Presumably, the febrile city, close as it is to Socrates’ and Plato’s historical reality would or could have slaves, but it is not due to the addition of specific roles. The luxurious city needs more servants (diakonoi) to perform increasingly diverse tasks, but as the servants mentioned before are emphatically not a separate class, then neither can more of them form a distinct class. Thus there is no textual evidence that either basic or more specialized tasks are essentially reserved for slaves. Slaves are not essentially distinguished from

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32 Both the “no” and the “yes” camps agree that nowhere in The Republic does Plato talk about a class of slaves, neither in the febrile city nor any other. Even here, however, the conclusion to be drawn from this for each of the camps is the exact opposite. This is where the difference of temperaments between the two camps is clearest. Vlastos gives us what is accurately called by Calvert the presumptive argument, Vlastos, “Does Slavery Exist in The Republic?” pp. 291-2, Calvert, “Slavery in The Republic,” p. 367. Namely, that if Plato were going to radically alter this universal economic, social, and political structure, he surely would have mentioned it, nay argued for it. The “no” camp claims that such an absence—if, presumably, one reads between the lines—argues for the absence of slavery in the Kallipolis, e.g., Wild, Plato’s Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, p. 50. I think, to be fair, the absence of the mention of the abolition of slavery by Plato tells against the “abolitionist” camp, but the “yes” camp draws the false conclusion from the presumptive argument, namely, that everything must be just like it was in Athens or at least ancient Greece, unless Plato says otherwise. Plato constructs the Kallipolis, and lays down very clear lines for how many parts are to be included, and what each part should and should not be doing. It is to a systematic analysis of Plato’s reasoning that we should go to try to understand to what extent there is a need or place for slaves in the Kallipolis, rather than to the history books. Here, as whenever the logic of Plato’s argument is considered, the “no” camp has the advantage.

33 Interestingly, Benardete suggests that the fifth is the soldier. I don’t see why this should have to be so, however, Seth Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 54.

34 More importantly, many of these tasks were carried out by slaves in Athens. Plato includes as wage-earning laborers “other servants (diakonoi) who, in terms of their minds, wouldn’t be quite up to the level of partnership (axiokoinônetoi), but whose bodies are strong enough for labor.” Plato has wage-earners be only slaves or foreigners in The Laws [V: 742a]. Aristotle classifies people who are fit only for manual labor as slaves by nature (1254b20ff. and chapter 5, book 1 of his Politics generally). It seems that one of the roles for slaves in ancient Greece is performed in the city of sows and presumably in the Kallipolis by citizens.

35 For a discussion of the different terms Plato uses to refer to workers, see my n. 48, below.

36 Who, however, is the “we” at 373c who needs more servants? The “we” could be the impersonal “one” of the city builder, but in context, it could just as well be Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus in particular or guardians in general, who of course need to be liberated from work to practice only warfare and ruling, and who, although they start out as merely another profession, do form another class. In the run up to the introduction of the guardians, talk of the “we” becomes more pronounced. Similarly, the fact that the guardians get more “leisure time” [347e] indicates that they are the class who would have slaves, since having leisure and owning slaves, historically, went hand in hand, as Plato’s contemporary readers would well have known. Thus, if anything, the historical conditions of antiquity, when read into a systematic reading of the generation of the city of sows and then the febrile city, argues for the traders and producers being the nearest thing the Kallipolis has to slaves.

37 While some jobs, such as working in the silver mines were reserved for slaves and convicts, and some positions such as owning land denied even metics, slaves held a myriad of positions including such ones as banking, and some citizens were what Plato calls wage-earners. As a matter of fact, at least in Athens, slaves weren’t distinguished merely on the basis of what they did.
traders-producers on the basis of what they do. Nor, it should be added, given what Plato says about the evils of leisure [421d], are slaves supposed to free up traders and producers from work.

The psyche of slaves and trader-producers are the same. They are both equally slaves to the extent that subject to the will of another. They can’t be essentially distinguished by what they do. They don’t provide for the leisure time of the traders and producers, nor for the guardians any more than they do with the traders and producers as a whole. The only difference left is simply who controls whom. Do the guardians via the auxiliaries control the producers and traders and the producers and traders control their slaves? This requires that there is an unregulated economic sphere separate from the political. I argue that there is not. What the trader-producers do with their time and tools is organized for the good of the whole. That whole would include putative slaves and its good would also be theirs. The guardians must, at least in principle, micromanage the economic sphere. Any suggestion that putative slaves would in effect be equivalent to tools just to be used and who would not receive any of the benefits of being in a well-run Kallipolis amount to treating them as subhuman. As I have already argued such a doctrine is neither Platonic nor Greek.

**Conclusion: Reasonably Free**

Now that we have cleared up the question of whether there is a hidden slave class in the Kallipolis, in order to fulfill the aforementioned criterion of a successful reading of *The Republic* on the question of slavery, we need to:

(i) Answer the presumptive argument, namely, that if Plato were going to abolish slavery, he would have mentioned it.

(ii) Explain the three outstanding times that slavery is mentioned in the context of the Kallipolis:

   (1) First, when slaves are given as an example of who should stay in their place if the Kallipolis is to be just.
   (2) Second, when traders and producers are expressly said to be called slaves by their rulers under other regimes [463b],
   (3) and forth, then said to be slaves [590c-d].

(iii) Explain why Plato suddenly starts talking about slavery, almost obsessively, as soon as he starts discussing the degenerate poleis but not before.

   (i) The presumptive argument is easily put to rest. The reason Plato doesn’t tell us that slavery is abolished in the Kallipolis is because he isn’t an abolitionist—far from it. To put it bluntly, in a sense, he has turned just about everybody into a slave.

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38 Levinson goes so far as to remark that slaves “would come dangerously near to being a leisure class,” In Defense of Plato, p. 171. Calvert, who also cites Levinson, stresses that the absence of a class of work for a class of slaves undercuts the need for slaves in the Kallipolis, but again leaves it possible that Plato envisaged there being slaves in the Kallipolis anyway, “Slavery in *The Republic*,” p. 369.

39 I cannot see how this wouldn’t violate the one person one job rule. Both from the description of the members of the city of sows, that is a healthy city, in which everyone does his appointed task getting his hands dirty, and which, in this regard, the Kallipolis surely emulates [369aff], and from the one man one task rule [e.g., 370b], one gets the distinct impression that traders and producers are supposed to do work themselves rather than order their slaves to do it for them. Plato seems to allow for traders and producers to swap jobs, but what he doesn’t want them ever to do is “advise” [bouleutikos] others [434a-c]. De jure, commanding others so that each part works for the benefit of the whole is the job of the guardians. Furthermore, it is quite clear that Plato doesn’t like the idea of anyone being freed up from work [421d], except in the case of the guardians, who have their own appointed work in the larger sense [374e]. Levinson claims that idleness was one of the many evils Plato found in Athens, In Defense of Plato, p. 171.

40 This is a contentious claim. I have argued for it a greater length in “Plato’s Aristocratic Dirigisme,” in *International Conference on Ancient and Medieval Philsophy* (Fordham University: 2008). See also n. 28.

41 See n. 19.

42 The third mention (3), concerning the enslavement of Greeks by Greeks, has been ruled out as irrelevant to our present concern. See n. 12, above.
(ii) The first (1) mention of slavery in the context of justice [433d] is similarly easily accounted for. If people—such as slaves, women and children who should be ruled, as well as those who should rule—know their place and stay in their place, justice will reign in the polis, and the workings of the Kallipolis will set all free, at least objectively, if not subjectively. 44 To describe what justice does, Plato needs names for people before and people after the institution of justice. Before we have people like slaves, women, and children, and justice subsequently organizes them so we get a Kallipolis with its three classes.

That Plato thinks of the traders and producers as slavish should come as no surprise and that explains the fourth mention (4) of slavery [590c-d].

That leaves the second (2) mention of slavery in the Kallipolis when Plato says that traders and producers are called slaves by their rulers in other poleis [463b]. This looks forward to the degenerate cities, and serves to underline that this kind of metaphorical slavery, along with the literal kind, is the inevitable result of all other political arrangements, whose politics are similarly infected by household competition and the untrammeled desire for wealth.

(iii) The reason Plato begins explicitly talking about slavery, both literal and metaphoric, as the Kallipolis degenerates is that for the first time there is room for the distinction between them and thus room for either literal or metaphoric slavery, properly speaking. The individual participants in the Kallipolis have retreated behind the walls of the household, politically and economically speaking. The position of the producers and traders has been exchanged for the position of slaves, the position of the guardians has become the position of the patriarchs. 45 Without a way for participants to have a political relationship, only a relationship based on economics is possible, and that means brute power is all that counts. Within the household, the lack of a polis-wide way to distribute chores and goods creates household slaves. 46 Between households, the lack of a polis-wide way to distribute chores and goods initially creates psychic conflict in the timocrat, but soon creates figurative enslavement in the case of the oligarchy, democracy, and finally enslavement to slaves in the case of tyranny. In the absence of the philosophic disinterested dispute arbitration, each household competes in the polis to subjugate others to its will and advantage, tries to enslave the other household metaphorically. In the Kallipolis, there is neither figurative nor literal slavery, except to reason, if you like, and outside there is both. 47

43 Of course, Plato doesn’t go out of his way to point out that he thinks of many who would have otherwise been citizens as equivalent to slaves, so a different form of the presumptive argument might apply here too, namely, that if Plato wanted to collapse the difference between slaves and citizens, why didn’t he say so? To this new form of the presumptive argument, I have three things to say: a) Plato does say as much when Plato is discussing moderation. “And further one would find many diverse desires, pleasures, and pains, especially in children, women, domestics (oikêtês), and in those who are called free (eleutherôn legomenôn) among the common many (phaulos)” [431b-c]. Clearly, being called free doesn’t suffice to make you different from the ones not so designated. b) Since he is trying to sell the idea of the Kallipolis, overtly insulting many of the then citizens of Athens wouldn’t be in his interests. And c) the Kallipolis is, according to Plato, the only place where such individuals are truly free, and that surely is the point.


45 More contentiously, I wonder whether we could say that the position of the auxiliaries, who are the feet on the ground controlling the traders and producers according to the will of the philosophically minded rulers is exchanged for the position of the wife organizing her household according to the wishes of its patriarch.

46 Household slavery is almost certainly not bad, for Plato, in and of itself. The good father of the timocratic regime [549c] could certainly try to run his household as if it were a self-sufficient Kallipolis for the benefit of it as a whole. The only Platonic worry would be if it allows a patriarch to be lazy. Plato is no abolitionist.

47 I am sure that the textually and historically conservative philologists in the “no” camp will point out that most tradesmen and producers were citizens or at least metics in Athens, not slaves, so that a transformation of traders and producers in the Kallipolis into slaves in the timocracy, as I have it, cannot be right. And of course the historians are
I think it is untenable that there is a fourth class, a slave class, in the Kallipolis, but I think that in no way could Plato be called an abolitionist. My reading makes the best logical sense of Plato, both in terms of the psychodynamics of the Kallipolis and in terms of the progressive enslavement in the degenerate poleis. My reading is the only one to be able to read all four occurrences of “doulos” in the context of the Kallipolis in a straight-forward way. My reading captures the authoritarian nature of Plato’s thinking that Popper has right, on the one hand, while capturing, with Levinson and Wild, how this is supposed to be objectively liberating. My reading sees no need to resort to the dubious practice of postulating an extra-textual systematically problematic fourth class, as Vlastos wants to, but neither do I whitewash Plato into an abolitionist as Levinson does, nor suggest that he shouldn’t have had slavery in the Kallipolis, as Calvert does. Rather, Plato removes the conditions under which there can be literal or metaphorical enslavement in and to the economic sphere. Last, but not least, Aristotle agrees with me. While discussing The Republic, he twice refers to the third class of the Kallipolis in toto as slaves [douloi].

48 Once at Politics 1264a20 and once at 1264a35. It should be noted in passing that Plato does, in my opinion, mention those who would normally be slaves while discussing the Kallipolis. The reason that everyone has missed them is that he uses “oiketês” or “domestic” when he wishes to refer to them—and in the above quote at the cusp of the transition between the Kallipolis and the timocracy, it is the term that is carried over [547c]. “Doulos” is reserved almost exclusively for when the metaphoric or logical sense of slavery is required. So when the relationship of justice is under discussion, Plato talks about “slaves” [463b]. When he wants to pick out people who would not be good at controlling their desires, he uses “domestic” [431c]. So the vast majority of times in the context of the degenerate poleis, Plato uses “doulos,” except at 547c, 549e, and 578d-e, when he clearly means literal slaves, and again, calls them domestics. “Oiketês” is one of the alternate but standard words for a slave, a house-slave, to be precise. Interestingly, Plato prefers “diakonos” i.e., “servant” or “minister,” when he is setting up the city of sows and the luxurious city [see 369c, 371a, 371e, 373c]. The term clearly refers to the whole working class, but again, when he chooses to use the word, he immediately refers to the roles that would not have been performed by citizens, either because they were often performed by metics, in the case of importers, or performed by slaves in the case of the tasks left for wage labor and as well as many of the additional jobs in the luxurious city.
Appendix: Mentions of “Slavery,” “Enslavement,” etc., Books II-VII

So, then, when one man takes on another for one need and another for another need, and, since many things are needed, many men gather in one settlement as partners [koinônos] and helpers [boêtheia] to this common settlement we give the name city [369c].

And similarly, surely, other agents [diakonos] as well who will import and export the various products [371a].

There are, I suppose, still some other servants [diakonos] who, in terms of their minds wouldn’t be quite up to the level of partnership [axiokoinônos], but whose bodies are strong enough for labor. They sell the use of their strength and, because they call their price a wage, they are, I suppose, called wage earners [371e].

And so we’ll need more servants [diakonos] too. Or doesn’t it seem that there will be a need for teachers, wet nurses, governesses, beauticians, barbers, and, further, relish-makers, and cooks? [373c]

Do you suppose anyone who believes Hades’ domain exists and is full of terror will be fearless in the face of death and choose death above defeat and slavery? [386b]

… the less should they be heard by boys and men who must be free and accustomed to fearing slavery more than death [387b].

Not must they in any event imitate slaves, women or men, who are doing slavish things [395e].

These same things—that come to be without education—that found in beasts and slaves [andrapodon]—as not at all lawful and call it something other than courage [430b].

(1) Or is the city done the most good by the fact that—in the case of child, woman, slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler, and ruled—each one minded his own business and wasn’t a busybody [433d].

… and then not minding its own business, but attempting to enslave and rule what it not appropriately ruled by its class and subverting everyone’s entire life [442a-b].

(2) And what do they call the people? Wage-givers and supporters. And what do the rulers in the other cities call the people? Slaves [463b].

I hesitate to mention the pettiest of the evils of which they would be rid … doing all sorts of things to provide for the allowances that they turn over to the women and the domestics [oikêtês] to manage [465c].

(3) First, as to enslavement [andrapodizo], which seems just that Greek cities enslave [andrapodizo] Greeks; or that they insofar as possible, not even allow another city to do it but make a habit to spare the Greek stock, well aware of the danger of enslavement at the hands of the barbarians? Sparing them is wholly superior. And, therefore, that they not themselves possess a Greek as a slave, and give the same advice to the other Greeks? Most certainly. At any rate in that way they would be more inclined to turn to the barbarians and keep off one another [469b-c].

Then they’ll correct their opponents in a kindly way, not punishing them with a view to slavery or destruction, acting as correctors, not enemies [471a].

The free man ought not to learn any study slavishly [536d].

49 Unless otherwise specified, “slavery” and similar forms translates some form of “doulos.” The quotations in bold are the four sentences I examine in detail. Translations from Plato, The Republic of Plato.
Two Other Relevant Passages from Books VIII & XI

They distributed land and houses to be held privately, while those who previously were guarded as free friends and supporters they then enslaved and held as serfs \textit{perioikoi} and domestics \textit{oiketēs} [547c].

(4) And why do you suppose mechanical and manual art bring reproach? Or shall we say that this is because of anything else than when the form of the best is by nature so weak in a man that he isn't capable of ruling the beasts in himself, but only of serving them, and is capable of learning only the things that flatter them? … In order that such a man is also ruled by something similar to what rules the best man, don’t we say that he must be the slave of that best man who has the divine rule in himself? It’s not that we suppose the slave must be ruled to his own detriment, as Thrasymachus supposed about the ruled; but that it’s better for all to be ruled by what is divine and prudent, especially when he has it as his own within himself; but, if not, set over one from outside, so that insofar as possible all will be alike and friends, piloted by the same thing [590c-d].

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