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### Xenophon's Teleology

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XENOPHON'S TELEOLOGY

Now that I've pretty well finished with this paper, I must confess to some regret for having planned it just as I did. I have two main points to offer. The first is a discussion of the contents of two chapters of the Memorabilia, 1.4 and 4.3. The second is an analysis of the order and arrangement of the four books of the same work. Put very briefly, my thesis is that these two chapters are expansions of a single idea; and that these expansions were made consciously in order to allow the placing of them where they are, at the beginning and end of the work. The work shows certain other signs of a developed ring-composition, but these two chapters do not have to be explained merely as elements of a formal habit of design: they also are the pillars of the refutation of one of the two principal charges against Socrates, that he did not recognize the gods of the city.

Because the paper was to be presented under philosophical auspices I decided to reduce to more or less precis-form my treatment of the order and arrangement of the subjects within the four books of the Memorabilia; my feeling was that this was primarily a philological matter, and that perhaps it would be more interesting for this audience to hear a discussion of the philosophical points at issue. But as it has turned out, these philosophical points are perfectly clear where we have them available; the problem is in many respects not a philosophical one at all, but concerns the judgment of evidence. I do of course discuss the details of the two chapters at some length within, but in case any of you should feel cheated, I hope to have on hand for distribution when I present myself to the society at Christmastime a fuller outline of the four books than that given within (sec. 2.a). The first part of this paper presents what one might call supporting arguments, with some account of the history of the problem. The latter part analyses the two chapters, convincingly enough, I hope, to make my point. Therefore if the membership prefer to debate the philosophic and biographical points set forward here they may do so --- or they may debate the matter of whether Xenophon's Memorabilia is or is not a higgledy-piggledy collection of random notes and casual observations.

1. This paper may be felt to be a roundabout and oblique attack on a much larger problem, for in one direction it amounts to a reopening of the old question of the relationship of Xenophon and Plato to our picture of Socrates. The restatement of this ancient question in Anton-Hermann Chroust's Socrates Man and Myth (London 1957) is helpful in giving us what is probably still the most widely recognized and most generally acceptable view (see esp. p. 6). In brief this says that Xenophon, using more or less half heard and half understood information about Socrates, gradually built up a picture of him so cribbed cabined and confined by his own intellectual frailties and moral prejudices that it does not represent the Master at all, but is as it were a pure invention. What we have in the Memorabilia is a little bit as though Mr. William Buckley should rewrite the Gospel according to St. Matthew from memory.

2. However sound may be this view of the relationship between Xenophon and Socrates, it nevertheless has done much harm to our approach to the Xenophontic document itself. Certainly for example this must be the principal reason why this work has found no serious commentator during the century and a half between the old Schneider-Bornemann edition (itself an updating of the late 18th century Gotha edition) and the work of Olof Gigon, who has finished as far as I know only his commentary on the first two books (in Schweizerische Beiträge 5 and 7, 1953 and 1956). Lesky, whose approach to this matter benefits from Gigon's work and from his own very good sense, is quite cautious and does not risk any doctrinaire comments on Xenophon's work-method, but (HGL, Engl. transl., 1966, p. 622) after remarking on the "motley variety" of these Socratic discourses, he says "Hardly anyone would claim that the combination of such heterogeneous elements has yielded a whole of convincing unity." This is not a sentence that one can really take exception to, and I shall not insist that the Memorabilia is high art in any Platonic sense.

a. I do not propose to weary you with the tedious and depressing narrative of the many and fruitless theories offered over the past century to explain why Xenophon's Memorabilia should have been something other than what it is. The criticism of the past twenty years has done much in all fields to make the scholar recognize the weakness and corruption of his own nature, and to cause him to approach with greater compassion the infirmities of ancient texts. In the present instance a humble approach to facts as they are will show that what we have here is to a considerable degree an example of ring-composition. The opening two chapters (19 Teubner pages) are a second Xenophontic Apology, while the concluding four chapters (20 pages) constitute a summary of the whole work and a repetition of the defense. Chapters 1.3-5 (10 pages) are on the primary virtues, and include a teleologic proof of the gods' interest both in us and in our virtues, while the single chapter 4.3 (4 pages) is a discussion of teleology as a proof of pronoia and as a support to sophrosyne; the first of these teleological chapters (1.4) centers on the structure of man for its evidence, while the last (4.3) centers on the structure of the outer universe. The remaining twenty-eight chapters (92 pages) contain a series of conversations or short dialogues on the virtues, on friendship, and on the implementation of the good and useful life. These are all more or less worked out in such a way as to illustrate the wrongheadedness of the charge that Socrates tended to corrupt the young. The position of honor given to the two teleology chapters of course attacks the other horn of the famous accusation.

3. The present research began many years ago in an attempt to clarify to myself and to my students the situation of Xenophon Mem. 1.4. This chapter falls into two almost equal parts, one a defense of the existence of deity, the other a demonstration that the same deity consciously watches over our best interests. The first part begins with the argument from

design, in this case the design of the human body. From this we slip with very little warning into a proof by analogy: as man's body is made up of the universal elements, so his soul must be a small piece of the world-soul. The section concludes with another analogy: as the governing soul is unseen, so may the gods be assumed to exist from the order of the universal matter. These three arguments may be referred to briefly as the arguments 'from design,' 'from the macrocosm,' and 'from the evidence of things unseen.' The recklessness with which we shift from one kind of proof to another would seem to be typical of Xenophon and of his method throughout the Memorabilia, but it is not as artless as it looks. Part two of the chapter begins again with the 'argument from design,' and repeats much of the material in the first part, but from a more strongly hedonistic slant. This is followed by the proof 'from consensus' (divination and civic law), and in the final section we revert to the 'macrocosm argument.' The chapter concludes with an appeal (I suppose he is falling back on the 'evidence from things unseen' argument) to give the divine a try by doing them honor; then, says Xenophon - Socrates, we shall soon see that it is capable of seeing and hearing all things, of being everywhere present, and of caring for all. This brief analysis here presented should make it clear that Xenophon is not reckless in his change of subject, though he often does not warn us what he is doing. He has three themes, each repeated twice: a-b-c; a-c-b; but the two c-themes are not quite the same, though the 'evidence of things unseen' does associate itself with the evidence from 'consensus' as well as with the 'macrocosm' argument. Most striking is the tripartite concluding adjuration, which (though loosely) reflects these same three themes. God's seeing and hearing recall the terms in which the 'argument from design' is set, and they also recall the 'evidence of things unseen.' His presence everywhere fits with the 'macrocosm argument,' and of course his epimeleia is again a reference to the proof of pronoia as a whole.

4. Several 19th century editors had bracketted this first passage as spurious. Their principal reason was the 'historical' one, namely that the 'argument from design' was primarily, at least in this full-dress form, a Stoic argument (seen best in Cicero De Natura Deorum 2); and that therefore the passage must have been inserted into the text of the Memorabilia at a later date, possibly in the third century, by some misguided Stoic scholiast who hoped to win thereby further support for his sect from the greatest wiseman of them all.

5. A secondary argument, and one naturally linked to the above, was the 'structural' one, that this chapter doesn't fit here, and that the Memorabilia itself is an incoherent collection of notes. As any one can see, these two approaches contradict each other; if Xenophon's real work is a higgledy-piggledy collection of disparate parts, a section to be rejected must be shown to fit in very rationally, while if it does not fit, we should be

expected to show that the work is in other respects very well ordered. Oddly enough, some quite respectable people use both approaches. For example, the old standard Christ literary history --- 3rd edn, 1898 --- though it accepts much of the Memorabilia as genuine and as presenting a true historical picture of Socrates, says that these two chapters seem to be historically out of line with the rest of the work, while it explains the lockeren, planlosen Aneinanderreihung of the several logoi as due to the author's lack of logical training.

a. Numerous other arguments have been introduced both in the 19th century and since. Perhaps the weakest is this, that since Plato clearly invented the concept of the demiurge (in a Hegelian sense, that is, not the word, but the fulfilment of the concept), and that this word occurs in the Memorabilia in this passage, the entire work must be later than the Timaeus. This old idea is most recently developed by C.J. Classen, "The Creator in Greek Thought from Homer to Plato," Class. et. Mediev. 23 (1962), 1-22. He does not claim that the Memorabilia is necessarily a late forgery, but simply accepts (pp. 21-22) the demonstrandum: in any Plato-Xenophon parallel Xenophon is the imitator. Another view is Chroust's (Socrates, Man and Myth, p. 5), which also goes far back in the tradition (see Gilbert's ed. mai., praef. crit. p. LXI), that Xenophon forgetfully treated the same subject again in Book Four (Mem. 4.3). This argument is of course a subhead of the 'structural' argument mentioned above.

6. It took no more than a few moments of reflection to recall that several points of this proof of the existence of divinity bore some relation to Anaxagoras's thought. Further reflection and indices soon supplied as well the famous passage from the Phaedo where Socrates not only says that in his youth he was fascinated by the Pre-Socratic philosophers' theories of matter and the universe, and that he thought he had at last found the solution to their various anomalies in Anaxagoras's nous. He says at this point in the Phaedo (95e-99d), you will recall, that he had been disappointed to find that Anaxagoras's motive force was not really an immanent dynamic power but a mere mechanistical 'theity' working through first causes.

7. For me as I first read this problem (and so for a number of years I taught it to students) it seemed that this was the intelligent answer. Socrates, as Plato's work and Xenophon's both show, was well acquainted with the materialist philosophers' doctrines of 'evolution' if we may call it that, and with their theories about the formation of the world. He saw that their tentatively teleological explanations of structural development in man and in universe as well had obvious implications in what we call a 'theological' sense, and he no doubt saw how hard the two positions, materialist evolution and anthropomorphic theology, are to reconcile. Xenophon sees him as using the materialist's evidence and theories to support a pious argument,

while Plato sees him as rejecting the whole Anaxagorean scheme (and in fact all natural-philosophical speculation) precisely because it will not provide him with the meaningful world he wants to believe in.

a. Each of these presentations of Socrates' views may be regarded as unscientific or even cynical. Each looks like an attempt to distort the evidence; one gives you a pious Philistine, the other shows you an irresponsible intellectual. I myself see no particularly good reason why Socrates might not have held for a time, in sequence, both views; in fact from what I know of human beings I should say it was most likely. Some people regard the Xenophon version as an example of that writer's small-mindedness intruding its Gestalt onto the Socratic hyle, while they look on Plato's as a brilliant insight by an Idealist into the weaknesses of materialist thought. Many scholars currently hold that this 'life-experience' (the pathe) recounted by Socrates in Phaedo 95-98 is not Socrates's at all: it is a kind of geschichtsphilosophische Konstruktion (both Archer-Hind and Hackforth seem to adhere to this party; see for example the former's note on ta ema pathe in his edition, p. 125, and Hackforth, p. 128). I cannot see much difference between a Xenophon-lie and a Plato-lie. The weight of tradition (including many statements in Xenophon himself: see the arguments on technical scientific study in Mem. 4.7) suggests that Socrates did finally drop his interest in matters scientific.

b. Oddly enough people constantly misread the Phaedo passage itself. Archer-Hind, in the note referred to above says specifically, "Such inquiries must have been always alien to the strongly practical genius of Sokrates." Hackforth, (Phaedo, p. 125, fn. 1) says that Plato has interpreted Anaxagoras as a teleologist manqué, but he misses the more obvious fact that Socrates is the person pointed at. See especially 97e (my paraphrase): "It seemed to me that somehow it was right that he should say that nous was the cause of all, and I thought if this is so, then this ordering nous would order all things and dispose each several thing in precisely the way it would best be disposed in..." This last is clearly Socrates' own extension of the Anaxagorean premiss. And note that Hermann's deletion of the word kosmein is surely a source of some modern error.

c. One fairly important piece of evidence I have so far omitted, the Clouds of Aristophanes. The long prevailing rata sententia about the portrait of Socrates there given is that it is really, or is in large degree, a portrait of Diogenes of Apollonia 'photomontaged' on top of that of Socrates. This view goes back at least as far as the work of Hermann Diels in the 1880's (Verhandlungen der Philologenversammlung, Stettin, 1880). It has much likelihood: particularly the association of thought with air (most of the points are presented by Theiler (see sec. 8 below), pp. 8-10, and the principal passages of similarity between the ideas of Socrates and those of Diogenes are listed

at the end of Diogenes' fragments in Diels (under section C, Imitations). And of course if we contend merely that in presenting Socrates on the comic stage Aristophanes drew him in larger lines eclectically as the ultimate egghead, we shall not be far wrong (so most recently K.J. Dover, Clouds, introd. xxxii-lvii). But in recent years a good deal has been done to show that Aristophanes' portrait is substantially correct --- it must have been so, we will see, if we think for only a moment of the nature of the Athenian theater audience --- and it is interesting to note that Lesky (HGL 495) not only accepts the Clouds portrait as genuine but omits any mention of the Diogenes of Apollonia identification (and the same silence is kept elsewhere in his account of Diogenes).

One interesting feature of this identification is that it makes absolutely no difference to our problem one way or another. For Xenophon's Socrates is not very similar to the one in Aristophanes. Now if Aristophanes is really giving us a picture of Diogenes, that only serves to make the difference between the two portraits the more reasonable, and does not make Xenophon's Socrates a bit less credible. If on the other hand both authors are describing Socrates, clearly one is satire (and of a younger man), while the other is encomium (and of a maturer person).

I am not sure that this old identification has not clouded our views somewhat. I think there are several quite good anti-philosophical jokes in the Clouds whose significance is still unmined. Note for example Clouds 368, compare Strepsiades' view with Socrates' explanation and with Aristotle Phys. 2.8. Or consider the anti-idea joke of the earth-grubbers whose ἄνωκτοι αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτὸν are looking at the sky and engaging in astronomical observations.

8. It was only some years later that I first came across Willy Theiler's early work (Zurich 1925, now reprinted Berlin 1965), Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtungen bis auf Aristoteles. This brilliant but often deceptive presentation (in the strictest old Germanic Quellenforschung tradition) argues that the teleological development was added to prosocratic (and primarily to Anaxagorean) thought by the minor eclectic 5th-century thinker Diogenes of Apollonia (fl. ca. 440-420). For a long time I felt that this was a most important work which would ultimately help me to understand what Xenophon was doing; then a more careful examination of many of its arguments convinced me that the thesis really doesn't hold water (Zeus still rains through his seive), while at the same time I began to see, what should certainly have been clear from the beginning, that the net result of his work is to separate both Socrates and Xenophon from the tradition. To me it had seemed possible to accept Xenophon's attribution to Socrates of this peculiar set of proofs of the existence of god and providence. Such a belief was surely supported by the fact that these ideas are more or

less present in ovo in Anaxagoras, and because Plato says that Socrates read Anaxagoras. But now Theiler says that Xenophon had little if any direct knowledge of Socrates, while these teleological conceptions are more certainly those of Diogenes, a follower in part of Anaxagoras. Therefore a) Xenophon is a weak evidence for either Socrates or Diogenes, and b) Socrates need not be thought to have held any such ideas at all. In fact what Theiler is up to is the old Quellenforschung trick of establishing a capacious primary source into which to drop all our known and unknown quantities (this is known as 'putting all your x's into one basket'), and thereby bypassing all the actual historical evidence we have in favor of whatever conclusion we prefer to lead to.

a. One point that gradually extrudes itself from Theiler's dense and often tendentious arguments, though he does not seem to see it, is that Xenophon is clearly making use of contemporary and wide-spread late 5th century thought about nature. This is certainly so, and I should like to suggest that Plato is parallel evidence that Socrates shared and used all these views. And as far as concerns to eikos, I cannot imagine so seminal a figure in the world's thought to have been so virginal, not to say barren and out of touch with everyday ideas as our philosopher-historians like to make him. But I am not writing about Socrates so much as about Xenophon.

b. One more point Theiler makes at the end of his section on Diogenes. This is that the special direction of all this teleologic natural philosophy towards a proof of the existence of deity was due to Xenophon ("...erst Xenophon der Akzent auf die Schöpfung gelegt hat." p. 52). I wish Theiler's proof of this were more convincing. It seems to run like this: a) it couldn't be Anaxagoras or Diogenes, for they were serious natural philosophers; b) Xenophon got nothing from Socrates, whom he did not know; c) Xenophon is a patsy, a blitomammas; d) ergo Xenophon thought up this foolish idea.

9. We have now reached the point at which it should seem reasonable to look more carefully at the two texts of Xenophon we are supposed to be discussing; one more item of question must be considered. This is the fact that there seem to be two teleological theories, one of which we can classify as 'good-think' and the other as 'bad-think.' Obviously Xenophon's personliche Schöpfergott (Theiler p. 52) is a product of a vulgar and unambitious mind; this is 'bad-think.' The demiourgos of the Timaeus is something else again, and the presence of this 'good-think' word in Xenophon (Mem. 1.4.7) has led scholars as far apart as 1906 (Lenke, see Theiler, p. 52) and 1962 (Classen, see above, sec. 5), to insist that the Memorabilia was written after the Timaeus. To say nothing of the fact that Xenophon would probably not have been able to survive reading it, such a contention is patently silly, for the word itself must surely go back to Socrates. It is just his kind of



linguistically loaded comic term. Demiourgos means a petty craftsman, and to call the creating deity in all his fundamental majesty a tinker is precisely the sort of charming and kindly but slightly satirical meiosis we expect from Socrates. It goes along with all those shoemakers and smiths and shepherds and cowherds who so embarrassed Critias and Charicles (Mem. 1.2.7).

But the real puzzle is that the same attitude seems to have existed in antiquity. Or why else should everyone except Xenophon's Socrates so carefully avoid the use of the argument from design to prove the existence of the god? I have been unable to find a direct confutation of Xenophon's position, but I suspect it had been put forward before and was being avoided. I can think of no other good reason for the incredibly complicated and unindpendant position into which Plato throws his own Demiurge. Aristotle too. Note the fascinating gap between his fully teleological explanation of natural growth and his complete omission of any such ideas in his notoriously arid conception of the deity in Metaphysics 11. The Stoics, too, whom one would expect to welcome so facile a demonstration of the existence of deity, make every effort to avoid this trap. In Cicero's De Natura Deorum 2, which I think goes back in its larger outlines (via later Stoic commentaries) to Xenophon, the existence of the deity is proved with four points: (DND 2.3) consensus of men, evidence of the heavens, recorded epiphanies, divination. Useful adaptation is reserved to the proof of a benevolent providence.

One reason is obvious enough, and it is reflected in the complexities of the Timaeus. The ancients had lots of gods, and to suppose a single creator-god was to burden themselves with a divided conception of deity. But I think I have found one small piece of evidence for a formal argument which made it clear that useful function does not prove conscious design by a creator. In the course of one of several anti-teleological excursuses in the De Rerum Natura (4.823-827) Lucretius lists some examples which parallel in part Aristotle Physics 2.8. Aristotle here refers specifically to Empedocles, and gives the example of the well-known bougene androprora, which seems to have been part of Empedocles' theory of 'survival of the fittest.' This theory is alluded to also in DRN 5.855-877, a section which also shows parallels to the same passage in Aristotle. As a result of these parallels Robin (Comm. to Lucr. ad 4.833) attributes the whole line of reasoning to Empedocles. Such a discussion is relatively unthinkable without its opposite, that is, a theory that functional adaptation is a sign of purposive creation, though we have no real evidence of this. I suspect, however, that frg. B57, which states that at one time 'eyes went wandering around deprived of eyebrows' suggests very strongly that this was a conscious attack on the well-known explanation of eyebrows as a geison or cornice added to keep the sweat out (see Mem. 1.4.5).

10. Now let us look with a little more care at the two passages in Xenophon.

Mem. 1.4.

1-2  
8 1/2%  
Some say Socrates' protreptic was good, but did not carry through. They should consider his positive as well as his negative arguments. In this respect here is an item I heard myself He was talking with Aristodemus the small, who would not sacrifice nor consult mantike: Instead he mocked.

Introduction of whole topic

2-4  
7%  
Who are outstanding for sophia?  
--- Creative poets, sculptors, artists.  
Who are more outstanding, those who create dead and mindless or those who create moving and mindful images?  
--- Those who create the latter, except if this happens by tyche and is not a product of gnome.

Introduction of argument

But things that are functional are ipso facto products of gnome.

4-7  
23%  
a. Men were created with sense-organs intended to perceive the perceivable, as:  
eyes to see with  
ears to hear with  
noses to smell with  
tongues to taste with  
b. Other human structures function to assist these ends:  
lids, lashes, brows protect sight  
ears are never filled (funnel)  
front and back teeth (chopping and milling)  
mouth next to eyes and nose  
anus at extreme opposite (to avoid smell)

Part I

A.  
(soma)

--- Looks like the technemata of a wise life-loving demiourgos.

c. Innate drives function to keep life going: (emphytai)  
love of procreation  
love of nourishment  
longing for living  
fear of death

(psyche)

--- Looks like the mechanemata of one who wanted living creatures.

Mem. 1.4.

Do you confess to an innate phronimon?

--- Joking answer (probably means  
'how communicate without it?')

8 Is there then no phronimon elsewhere? B.

6 1/2% But your body is made up of the  
elsewhere existing elements;  
do you suppose you picked up  
your soul by some good chance? eutychōs

And was all this limitless matter  
so well-ordered through mindlessness?

---But I don't see the masters (kyrious)

9 While in the case of things here

3 1/2% below I do see the demiourgous. C.

And you don't see your soul either,  
so by the same tokens you must confess  
to acting not according to gnome  
but to tyche.

---But the divine is too great to want service.  
The greater the power, the more honor it deserves.

---But I doubt the gods care for humans.

But their arrangement show they do:

a. upright stature

Part II

(from which superior vision, comfort)  
sight, hearing, mouth  
hands, as well as feet

A.

(source of peculiar advantages which  
make us happier than other creatures)  
tongue

(soma)

10-14

(only ours produces speech)  
sex in other creatures periodic  
in ours perpetual (hedone)

25 1/2%

b. also man's psyche is best  
knows gods

(who order ta kallista and megista)  
worships gods

better than other psychai at warding off  
famine, thirst, cold, heat

at warding off disease

at exercising strength

at working out learning

(psyche)

at remembering what one has heard,  
seen, or learnt.

c. In sum, men live like gods by com-  
parison with other animals;

they are superior goth in soma and psyche.

So how can you fail to think that the

gods care for you when you have chanced on (tetychekōs)  
both these superior items?

What must they do to make you believe?  
--- Send advice, as they do to you (you say).

15-16  
10%

- a. But don't you include yourself in the lists of men? And surely they send advice to Greeks and to all men by mantike and terata C.
- b. And do you think they would (emphysai) implant in men the common belief in divinity just to fool them? Or that men would be fooled?

Evidence of wisest and longest-lived human institutions, nations and cities.

17  
6 1/2%

Recognize that as your mind within (nous) governs your body so the mind of all governs the all (phronesis) B.  
And disposes the all as it pleases  
τίθεσθαι ὅπως αὐτῇ ἡοὺ ἦ  
Your eye is to the eye of god  
as your mind to the mind of god

18  
6%

Give god a trial test  
as in the cases of human service,  
favor, advice.  
You'll find god πάντα ὄραν, ἀκούειν  
πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι  
πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι

19  
3 1/2%

This advice tended to influence his followers to eschew the unholy, the unjust, and the shameful both in public and unobserved.

The theodicy of the fourth book is less artificially balanced an affair than that in the first, and though I shall not present all the arguments for it, I think it likely that this account is far more archaic in origin. It much resembles in form the creation-lists of early oral literature; the second part shows clear similarities to the lists in Sophocles' Antigone (second chorus, 332-374) and in the Prometheus Bound (441-506). It was of course only fitting that this ancient mantic archetype should show up again in a predominantly sceptic philosophical tradition; one may suggest that the real reason for its use lay not so much in Xenophon's simple-mindedness as in the requirements of the defense, which had to make use of the proof from mantike. Mrs. Chadwick, in her brilliant Poetry and Prophecy (Cambridge 1942), uses Hesiod only as an example of the tradition in this type of literature of the appeal to divine inspiration. Many of her examples, however, in the fourth chapter (pp. 74 ff.) especially, connect this list of the wonders of the universe and the powers of man with the mantic tradition.

Mem. 4.3

1-2 He tried to have his associates  
61/2% learn sophrosyne before studying Introduction  
technic skills of lexis and praxis of the whole  
Because skill without virtue is vicious topic  
The first stage of sophrosyne was peri theous.

Others tell similar stories;  
this one I heard myself.  
A conversation with Euthydemus.

Have you noticed how gods care (epimelōs) --- No.  
They provide light to see by,  
--- Otherwise our eyes would be useless.  
and night for rest; the sun by day,  
stars and moon by night.

3-9 These also regulate our time.  
They give food to live on (from the earth)  
and seasons proper to its growth.  
In sum they provide for our needs and pleasures.

37% --- Quite philanthropic. A.1.  
They give water for growing plants The first  
and for ourselves and for cooking cosmic list:  
(which makes things both more edible and use and  
more tasty) pleasure  
and that in inexhaustible supply-

--- Forethought too in this.  
They give fire, an ally against cold and dark,  
and a fellow-worker for every craft.  
In sum, nothing do men devise without the aid of fire.  
--- An excess of philanthropy.

[Air limitlessly provided to support us and to help us cross the sea after goods of all sorts from foreign lands.]

The sun and the path of the ecliptic, its effect on the seasons and shift of temperature

--- This seems to be for man's sake.

The kindly gradualness of the change.

--- The gods must be busy all the time; but surely these things are equally helpful to the other animals.

a. But animals plainly born for man: we get more apolausis from sheep, goats, etc. than other animals do (and we get more from animals than plants, some tribes being purely pastoral).

10-12  
24%

--- Agreed: even the stronger animals are man-dominated.

A. 2.  
Second human culture-list: mainly apolaustic

b. All the beautiful and pleasurable things in the world, and perceptors to enjoy each with (apolauein).

c. And reasoning implanted, source of reflection, understanding, to enjoy goods and eschew ills.

d. And speech, to teach and share all goods; source of social order, laws, cities.

--- Gods seem to spend much care on man (epimeleia).

e. And what about knowledge of the future, which comes to us through mantike?

--- They seem to be more friendly to you than to the rest of men, if (as you say) they tell you in advance what to do and what not.

You will recognize the truth if you don't wait to see their shapes, but are content to revere their works.

The minor gods unseen give us particular gifts;

The major ordering god is also unseen.

For example, the sun cannot be looked on directly without loss of sight, and other agents, thunderbolt and wind are also unseen.

13-14  
18 1/2%

C.  
Evidence of things unseen

Likewise man's psyche is unseen, and it, if any part of man, shares in the divine, for Psyche basileuei (in our little kingdom).

B.  
macrocoşm

So one should not despise the unseen, but honor it for its power.



over us that it shares in the divine. The difficulty one has in following this argument lies in part in a kind of joke he is making about the visible evidence, and the invisible god ὄραται (ὄρατος... φανερόν, ὄραται οὐδ' αὐτή), but even more in the fact that there is nothing here in the first part to prepare us for the idea of the human soul which shares in the divine one. Again as in Mem. 1.4 the run of thought would be unclear to anyone who did not know the argument in the first place.

d. In part of the account in 4.3 we have, as I have already pointed out, an expansion of an archaic creation-list; it is very fitting then that it should conclude with a paraphrase of Hesiod's pious line, καθ' ὅσον αὐτὸν ἐρᾷεν ἕρπετα. (the fact that this is an abbreviation of the thoughts of Mem. 1.3.1-3 caused Dindorf to bracket the passage, which would leave the chapter without any sensible conclusion). A further sign of archaic character is its less intricate organization, and its strong apolaustic tendency (cp. the frequent use of this word in the speeches in Thucydides Books 1 and 2, and in the doctrine set forth in the Pseudo-Xenophon Constitution of Athens).

e. The argument in the first chapter is more sophisticated and more balanced, and plays constantly with the antithesis of tyche --- gnome and psyche --- soma, and the idea of the kalon (which is very important in 4.3) comes in here at the end as an afterthought.

f. The examples of design in 1.4 are largely human; in 4.3 they are largely cosmic.

g. The picture of the Demiurge and his relation to the world he makes in Plato's Timaeus, if I may compare great things with little, is far more like the one which Xenophon gives in the fourth book than that in the first. Knowing Plato's liking for archaic mythical schemes, his philosophical and ethical conservatism (at least in form), one is ready to believe that he went back to old priestly poetry for the setting of his great new myth of creation. In fact he says so himself at 40e-41a. I see nothing unreasonable in suggesting that Xenophon (or possibly even Socrates) used similar material for his own proof of the existence of the gods and of their kindly care for man.

12. This about concludes my presentation of the evidence, and I hope my view of the matter is clear. I think that Xenophon, using Socratic and other wide-spread fifth century ideas about the nature of the world, constructed out of an old creation-myth a proof, heavily laden with hedonistic and utilitarian arguments, of the existence of divine pronoia. This he placed at the conclusion of his memoir of Socrates as a final attack against the charge of atheism. In concluding the whole work he saw that it would make a nice balance to say somewhat the same



thing at the beginning, so he used the same material rearranged in the way I have shown, and stressing the human and the functional rather than the pleasurable and the universal (It has long been noticed that 1.4 does not fit in so well with its context as does 4.3). This cannot of course be conclusively proven, but I hope I have made it seem more likely than the supposition that he stole it all from the Timaeus (along with the fascinating two levels of godhead, which I have not had time to discuss).

13. I had hoped to have opportunity for one more kind of proof, the argument from tradition, for this is what explains my rather presumptuous title, but I can only give it in outline, for it requires an examination of a good deal of later Stoic and Greco-Roman material. Briefly, there is considerable evidence that the later Greeks and even more the Romans bypassed Aristotle and Plato in this as in other fields and went back to simpler and more immediately satisfying writers. Theirs was to be the age of immanent deity, of epiphany, of astrology, of credo quia absurdum.

The Stoic Pronoia idea, which we have in fullest form in Cicero's De natura deorum 2, closely reflects the version we have in Xenophon, even transferring elements from his proof of the existence of deity to the proof of pronoia. The connection is not immediate, as there are many other items added, and there is nothing to hinder us thinking of scholarly compilations and handbooks. But the one man we find most regularly cited is Xenophon, and I take this as evidence that they went back to him as to a locus classicus (They were not disturbed by a Sokratesproblem).

Finally, Xenophon's double treatment of his theme, stressing the cosmic in one chapter and the human in the other, initiated the tendency which later became even more widespread, of separating the evidences of design into two packages, one of human form, the other of ta meteora. It was from this chance development that arose the two great gnostic symbols, the microcosm and the macrocosm.

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