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Did Aristotle 'Develop'?
Reflections on Werner Jaeger's Thesis

Every policy for interpreting an Ancient philosophical text incorporates theoretical commitments, no matter how innocent or ingenuous its philological surface might appear. It seems to be frequently, if not inexorably, the fate of any such policy that the commitments on which it rests and, hence, the evidence or evidentiary claims by which it was originally animated, gradually become sedimented or impacted at the same as the policy itself is becoming institutionalized and routinized.

This has been the fate, I believe, of the interpretive strategy mobilized by Werner Jaeger in his account of the history of Aristotle's development, a strategy that came to dominate nearly all Aristotelian commentary soon after the publication of his major work in 1923. Its role has been much like that of what Michel Foucault calls the "discursive police", legitimating results that conform to its primary edicts, arresting hypotheses at odds with them. This is never more vividly in evidence than when other scholars challenge, often quite vehemently, the particular results of Jaeger's analysis, while remaining loyal to its fundamental spirit, namely, that the sequence of developmental stages is the key to understanding of Aristotle's texts. Developmental analyses as such, however widely they might diverge from Jaeger's own scheme, continue to hold out the same promises, that disparities and contradictions among Aristotle's doctrines can be mitigated or even eliminated by reference to the different periods in which they were articulated and that, more generally, Aristotle's substantive philosophical claims can best be understood (and assessed) when they have been linked to those periods. In short, those who dissent from, and criticize, Jaeger, play the game by his rules and those rules determine how one responds to the intimations and instagations of Aristotle's texts. So long, then, as the evidence on which Jaeger's interpretive policy rests remains sedimented and obscured, the status of the products it licenses is uncertain.

In the present paper I want to desediment the evidentiary claims inherent in Jaeger's own work, not for the sake of a narrow, ad hominem, critique of his theses in particular, but in order to bring to light the conventions invisibly at work in the general strategy of analysis practiced by his myriad progeny. If these conventions prove to lack solid foundations then the ground will have been cleared for new strategies. Three strata of 'evidence', and three interpretive obligations corresponding to them, are on display in Jaeger's work. There is, first, the internal evidence of the Aristotelian texts themselves and the need to arrange these and their parts into a chronologically coherent and philosophically plausible sequence. Second, there is the historical evidence of Aristotle's career and preoccupations, which has to be correlated with, and made to corroborate, the previously established sequence. Finally, there is the overarching evidence, or presupposition, of 'development' itself; its suitability to the works of Aristotle (and, more generally, to philosophers and their texts) must be convincingly shown.

We can fairly assume that these varieties of evidence are meant to be mutually reinforcing, so that faults and defects in their individual structure will collectively unsettle the whole. Similarly, failures to discharge the interpretive obligation associated with each kind of evidence will undermine confidence in the stability of the total edifice. I want to examine each stratum of evidence in turn, in the hope of exposing such faults and such failures.
1. Internal Evidence

Since Aristotle's texts do not date themselves by way either of sufficiently unambiguous internal allusions or univocal cross-references, since the ancient catalogues of his writings are classifications, not chronologies, and since the stylometric technique seems unavailing in regard to them, the primary datum for the developmental approach has to be the internal condition of the transmitted texts. Indeed, for Jaeger it was inattention to the "literary form" of Aristotle's writings that discredited the non-developmental, systematic approach of his predecessors (e.g., Zeller), where by "literary form" we should actually understand formlessness or deformity. It is not surprising that the Metaphysics was both the first object of Jaeger's scrutiny and the touchstone for his later, more ample, developmental picture, inasmuch as its apparent internal disarray, i.e., the repetitions (e.g., in Books A and M), the seemingly awkward placement of Books A, A, K, M-N, the lack of connective particles between almost all the books and the inconcinnities among themes and programs, can scarcely escape attention and must surely provoke doubt as to its compositional unity. These features of the text did not go unremarked prior to Jaeger. The ancient commentator Asclepius wrote that "the present treatise does not seem to have any sound arrangement or connectedness", a sentiment echoed much more violently by an anonymous 18th century scholar: the Metaphysics is a "monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen adeptum est". Hence, the initial textual phenomena (of the Metaphysics and, to lesser degree, of other treatises) are scarcely in doubt; but they do not, on the other hand, immediately dictate the lines of analysis most appropriate to them.

This can be brought out in various ways. Jaeger himself uses Aristotle's doctrinal adherence to, and dissension from, 'Platonism' as the benchmark by which to arrange the compositional layers of the Metaphysics, and of Aristotle's thinking in general, in a chronological (and philosophically meaningful) sequence. Responses to Jaeger's proposal exhibit a beguiling duality: either his basic scheme, viz. from enthusiastic commitment to Platonic metaphysical theology to dedication to empirical research, is retained, but the component elements in the sequence are re-arranged (e.g., von Arnim); or, the basic scheme is challenged, perhaps inverted, (e.g., from an initial critique of Platonism to its gradual reappropriation), so that the same components must now be arranged according to a new philosophical "reading" of his 'development'. A survey of post-Jaegerian scholarship on the Metaphysics, such as Berti and Joseph Owen provide, makes it plain how varied, not to say, kaleidoscopic, these combinatorial patterns have become. (Book Lambda, to take a key example, has been shifted all along the developmental spectrum.) These variations, each with its own relative plausibility, demonstrate the fragility and even arbitrariness of any one proposal, since each trades on a prior picture of philosophical 'development' and, indeed, of what should count as philosophical progress, into which the supposedly disparate parts of the text are then fitted. Thus, even if those parts can be reliably recognized as coming from different periods in Aristotle's life, there is nothing intrinsic to them that dictates or suggests a single chronological ordering; rather, an extrinsic or a priori philosophical judgment bears the burden of giving them both chronological and doctrinal significance.

My point is not, of course, that such philosophical judgments can or ought to be dispensed with. After all, even when the chronological relations among the texts of a modern philosophical author are beyond doubt, analyses of the factors behind that author's 'development', assessments of the 'progress' or 'retrogression', still must rest on philosophical insights and convictions, when, that is, they do not simply and uncritically reflect prevailing currents of opinion. My point
is rather that the indispensable philosophical judgments are independent of the fragmentation of a text into portions assumed to have been written at different times. The question would accordingly become whether the repertory of judgments and allied interpretive tactics brought to bear on Aristotle's works is sufficiently ample, or too narrow, to do justice to them. Without trying to answer that question in the least here, I do think it worthwhile to point briefly to two instances of pre-Jaegerian interpretation which should set the singular character of his portrait into relief.

Aristotle's deliberate obscurity (στάσεις) was a stock-motif in Neo-Platonic commentaries on his work; the sixth-century writer Elias, resuming a long tradition, discusses this issue at some length twice in his Proem to the Categories, once in his treatment of Aristotle's diction (ἐκ τοῦ εἶδος τῆς ἑξοδοῦ ἀποφάσεως) and then again in a section especially devoted to it (ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιστήμου ἐπιστήμονος καὶ ἀριστοτελῆς). He concludes that Aristotle had three motives for writing obscurely: κρύως, δοκιμασία, and μυστικό. This analysis indicates that for Elias and his predecessors Aristotle's 'professorial' writings were primarily instruments of teaching, by which his students were put to the test, not professions of theoretical doctrines and arguments made without attention to their capacities and receptiveness. A variant of this same motif comes out in Syrius' hypothesis concerning the obscurity of the Metaphysics: σιβάρι τῶν τολμήσεων προς τα θέλοντα φυσικάς αἰσθητικάς. 2

Here, too, sensitivity to the opinions of his actual and potential audiences is supposed to have had a hand in shaping Aristotle's discourse.

A second type of alternative to Jaeger's reading is presented by Karl Ludwig Michelet's Examen critique de l'ouvrage d'Aristote intitulé Métaphysique (1836), which was the co-winner of the prize-question set in 1835 by the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. As Victor Cousin, spokesman for the jury, reported, the prize-question was set at a time when the Metaphysics had long since been judged "unintelligible" and "empty". Michelet confronts unflinchingly the same evidence of internal disarray, repetition, and incongruity that will later figure in Jaeger's Studien of 1912 and concludes that "the different books of the Metaphysics are particular works which appeared separately under special titles". However, Michelet then turns, in section II of his book, to an "analysis of Aristotle's Metaphysics as an intrinsic proof of the unity of its plan and of the harmony reigning in it, "before concluding with hypotheses as to the stages in the composition and compilation of our present text. He claims to have "reconciled perfectly the daring (hazardous) hypothesis of the philologists ... with the intrinsic harmony which the philosopher ought to recognize in this work". In other words, having reduced the extant text into its disparate parts -- a reduction that produces, as he says, "despair" -- Michelet then reconstitutes a harmonious whole out of these parts, a whole absorbing and thus mitigating the discrepancies and tensions between Aristotle's inquiry into "fugitive and sensible substances" and his search for the one, absolute principle on which all beings depend.

Needless to say, Michelet is unabashedly Hegelian throughout his account. However, in light of Jaeger's later emphasis on the conflicts between Platonic speculative metaphysics and Aristotelian empiricism in Aristotle's development we might find it instructive to keep in mind Hegel's dictum in his lectures on Aristotle: "The Empirical, comprehended in its synthesis, is the speculative Concept". 2

Neither the Neo-Platonic nor the 19th century Hegelian reading has any prima facie authority over Jaeger's developmental approach; their existence and their internal consistency do serve to remind us of the contrasts between the theoretical convictions which supply the motive-power for divergent interpretive procedures.
Nonetheless, the partisans of the general tenor, not necessarily the details, of Jaeger's scheme might well want to reply at this point that he has the upper hand philologically over his ancestors insofar as he had access to the fragments of Aristotle's dialogues and could weave them into his account of Aristotle's 'development'. Indeed, Jaeger makes the interpretation of the dialogues and other 'extra-curricular' writings (esp. the Protrepticus) pivotal to his case for Aristotle's shift from an earlier, whole-hearted 'Platonism' to the later critique of the forms.

A host of questions have been raised as to the soundness of Jaeger's particular construals; in the present context what is most germane is his (and others') general failure to pay heed to the ways in which statements excerpted by later writers might have been embedded in a special discursive setting. Sometimes the residue of this setting is still apparent, as when, in the Eudemus, the reference of \( \nu \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \nu \) (fr. 5 Ross) is most naturally taken to be the traditional 'sights' in the underworld, not allegorized Platonic forms. More often, the original setting has become occluded. Consequently, what we are left to reckon with is the question of the literary format or intention of an Aristotelian dialogue. Somewhat surprisingly, Jaeger, although he devotes close attention to the format of the 'treatises', does not take up the same issues vis-à-vis the 'dialogues'. For instance, there is nothing in principle, or in the Ancient testimonia, to exclude the possibility that Aristotle wrote the attested dialogues on different occasions throughout his career, rather than at the outset only. While Cicero is most probably incorrect in identifying the dialogues with the ἐζωγερικοὺς λόγους mentioned from time to time by Aristotle himself, his characterization of the former as "populariter scriptum" may be quite apt. If it is apt, then we would have at least to envision the prospect that Aristotle wrote deliberately and perhaps persistently in two different genres; on this hypothesis the goals of works in the dialogic-genre would most likely be distinct from those of the ἐπιμαθεῖα or "school-logoi", as Jaeger called them. For example, the Protrepticus, which he took as a doctrinal statement in which unalloyed Platonism (e.g., the construal of ἀρχαί as metaphysical insight) was still being fervently endorsed, might have to be understood in a fundamentally different manner, namely, as an attempt to turn the non-philosopher to philosophy "in every possible way, without openly having to decide in advance in favor of a particular teaching," just as Iamblichus himself announces and as the generic title suggests.

At all events, the generic difference between the treatises and the dialogues, open-letters, etc. would bar us from making precipitate inferences concerning fixed doctrinal positions taken by Aristotle in his own name or in his own right in the latter. Sensitivity to the intended audience(s) and to the context in which they are being addressed is likely to have been as thorough in their case as in that of the treatises.

So, the recovery and collection of the fragments do not straightaway give Jaeger a decisive advantage over rival interpretive traditions. Moreover, the philosophical constructions put on the fragments have proved as various as those offered for the main treatises. Thus, in the end, if the 'literary' condition of the main texts were the only kind of evidence on which developmental reconstructions could be based, the open-ended, combinatorial character of the latter would seem to frustrate any strong claims advanced in behalf of some one reconstruction and to render the project as such uncertain of fulfillment.
2. External Evidence

However, in Jaeger's execution of the developmental project another kind of evidence is, in fact, put into operation. This consists of the external 'facts' of Aristotle's life, his travels, sojourns, political activities, relations with other philosophers and with rulers, and so on. If these can be brought into an unambiguous correlation with the content or spirit of Aristotle's thinking and writing at various times, then a developmental picture is more solidly sustained than it would be on the basis of internal, textual evidence alone. The stringency of the required correlation must be emphasized: the outward events of Aristotle's career and his theoretical preoccupations and dispositions must not be just loosely linked, but, rather, so closely tied to one another that the evidence of the former will allow us to infer securely the nature of the latter. This means, in addition, that the documentation of those events must itself be immune to doubt; otherwise, they cannot be made to bear trustworthy witness to Aristotle's philosophical activities at different 'stages' in his career.

Jaeger's periodization of Aristotle's life - early residence in the Academy, departure from Athens close to the time of Plato's death, sojourns in Assos, Mytilene and Pella, return to Athens and establishment of the Lyceum, second departure from Athens to reside in Chalcis - has been, in the main, accepted and taken over into almost all standard presentations. The key period for Jaeger begins with Aristotle's decision to leave Athens and centers on his stay in Assos under the patronage of the tyrant Hermias. Two documents are especially germane to the assessment of what this period signified for Aristotle's 'development', the Didymus-papyrus (Pap. Berol. 9780) discovered by Diels-Schubart and the so-called "Hymn to Hermias" reliably ascribed to Aristotle himself. I have tried to show elsewhere in detail that neither document can bear the full interpretive weight Jaeger assigns to it; a brief review of my arguments will have to suffice.

Jaeger held the period embracing Aristotle's departure from Athens and subsequent residence in Assos to be historically and philosophically decisive, "the most productive epoch in Aristotle's life". Although he acknowledges that the precise motives for Aristotle's departure are not known, he is confident that this move represented an "inner crisis" in his life and sure that the fact that he had Xenocrates as his companion shows that they jointly seceded from the Academy once Speusippus had become scholarch. Furthermore, Jaeger is certain that Aristotle not only resumed public teaching in Assos, but that he and Xenocrates (together with other disciples of Plato) were engaged in founding a "colony of the Athenian Academy". Hence, this "most productive epoch" is marked by an ambivalent and complex attitude towards Plato and Platonism; this is most poignant in the hymn to Hermias, where Jaeger reads a split between "exact thinking and religious feeling", the latter a sentimental residue of Platonic metaphysics, left when Aristotle had finally set out on his own independent course.

How far are these conclusions sustained by the actual texts of Didymus and the Hymn? A glance at the photographic reproduction of the papyrus (or at the editio maior of 1904) will quickly furnish strong initial reasons for skepticism, since the section most pertinent to the Hermias-episode is both incomplete and shot through with lacunae. Two of these are especially conspicuous: at line 54, where another name is presumably linked with Aristotle's and at lines 56-57, where Hermias' motives in giving a gift to the resident philosophers was probably specified. In the first case Jaeger restores "διαπαρατήρησιν"; in the second, he completes the surviving letter ΗΚΟ', to get the reading ΗΚΟ'ον'ων ΑΠΘΕΥΝ. Both restorations are open to challenge on several grounds. Crönert, who reexamined the papyrus in 1907, thought he detected ΑΠΘΕΥΝ 'at the end of the space following Aristotle's name;" the
parallel treatment of the Hermias-episode in the earlier Index Herculaneensis mentions Aristotle among Hermias' guests, but says nothing of Xenocrates. The latter's name appears only in a much later passage in Strabo, a passage much criticized for its historical inaccuracies and confusions on several matters. Strabo is clearly drawing on unfriendly sources in which the association of Academic philosophers with the tyrant of Atarneus has become a standard reproach. Examination of the extant traditions concerning Xenocrates' political attitudes and activities makes it extremely difficult to resist the conclusion that he was consistently pro-Athenean and loyally democratic, in contrast to his egregiously pro-Macedonian contemporaries in the Academy (e.g., Speusippus and Aristotle). Accordingly, he, unlike Aristotle, would not have had any reason to seek political refuge outside of Athens at the time of the anti-Macedonian reaction triggered by the fall of Olynthus in 348. On the other hand, the hypothesis of a joint-succession from the Academy (and putative removal to Assos) on the ground that "Speusippus had inherited merely the office and not the spirit" of the school is in conflict with the well-attested friendship between Speusippus and Xenocrates, as well as with the latter's succession to the scholarchate upon the former's death.

The second restoration [ ἡ χεισεν τὰ υπό] is certainly possible, although it should be noted that Wormell's reading ἐπει ἦκον πρέσβειος Κελλυμένον does more justice both to the surviving traces and to the length of the gap. More dubious is the weight Jaeger, following Wilamowitz, puts on this passage as a whole, namely, that Hermias' gift to the philosophers was a plot of ground for a new school. The Didymus-fragment and its counterpart in the Index tell us only that the tyrant gave them Assos as a place of legal residence. He most probably did enter into discussion with his guests, as is suggested by his decision to modify his regime, but the sources tell us nothing of an organized school with lectures which he might have attended. Moreover, as Düring has pointed out, the expression " ἐκλογούμεν ή εἰμι ἑπερίτων θυγατέρες " in the Index should most likely be translated as "they came together for joint philosophical discussions," with no implication that an actual school-building existed in which these conversations took place.

Consequently, the evidence of the Didymus-papyrus, over which Jaeger was so enthusiastic, is too weak to support the picture he drew of Aristotle's public activity during this period of 'Wanderjahre'. Similarly, the Hymn written to commemorate Hermias, for which Aristotle was much later charged with impiety, is, I think, over-interpreted by Jaeger. He takes the invocation of ἄρετα at the start of the epitaph as evidence of Aristotle's lingering emotional attachment to the transcendent Platonic forms, now transmogrified into poetic symbols. This interpretation gives the poem "unique value ... for our knowledge of Aristotle's development," since it attests to the clash in his soul between religious sentiment and the desire for scientific exactitude.

C.M. Bowra has already demonstrated the close affinity between the Hymn and the Pæan to Hygieia by Ariphon. We can add that apostrophes to ἄρετα are traditional, as are poetic references to other 'personified abstractions.' Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that Aristotle's use of μορφή (at lines 3 and 15) carries specific philosophical connotations; he is prepared to use even ἐπει in some contexts in the traditional sense of personal beauty. Finally, the Hymn's descriptions of personified ἄρετα (e.g., ἡ ἄρετα ἐν, line 3) go far beyond even the most extravagant Platonic renditions of the ἄρετα τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

These observations compel us to take the poem for what it is, namely, a pièce d'occasion, firmly embedded in poetic tradition and
meant to celebrate the personal virtues of Aristotle's violently and
treachery murdered patron. The Athenians who, for overtly political
motives, cited it against Aristotle were closer to the mark than Jaeger.

3. The details of Jaeger's account of the Hermias-episode have been
pressed so hard here since he himself regarded this period as crucial
to his general account of the rhythm of Aristotle's development; furthermore, it is only for this period that extensive external documentation
seemed to be at hand. If, as I hope to have shown, this cannot be made
to corroborate the claims rooted in internal features of the primary
texts, then the persuasiveness of that account and, therewith, the po-
tential success of the developmental enterprise are made more question-
able. What remains to bolster them is simply the notion of development
itself, that is, the a priori conviction that philosophers necessarily 'develop' and that, for this reason, a reconstruction of their develop-
ment is best and most naturally suited to discerning the meaning of
their achievements.

The whole notion of 'development' (and the interpretive strategy
it licenses or demands) has become so familiar a part of the present-
day intellectual attitude as to seem 'self-evident'. However, the notion
itself is pervaded by its own historicity and, thus, by theoretical
preconceptions of a distinctive sort. No doubt, the original metaphor of
'unfolding', 'Entwicklung', 'explicatio' has become petrified; its ori-
iginally bright colors, long since etiolated. Nonetheless, contemporary
users of the notion inherit the burden of its origins even when they
refrain from reflection on their legacy, that is, on its meanings and
its possible ambiguities. To bring these to light would therefore be
a contribution to methodological self-consciousness, independently of
positive or negative assessments of the appropriateness of the restored

Such a move towards self-reflection, and away from an unreflective
'taking for granted' of historically-shaped meanings, might begin
simply by taking once again into account the absence of 'development'
and, indeed, of 'history' as a leitmotiv in pre-19th century programs
for interpreting Aristotle. The canons and conventions for ordering
his texts in earlier ages were quite different from those of Jaeger
and his followers; formost in the Neo-Platonic tradition and in its
Arabic descendants was the intended or intrinsic pedagogical sequence
in which these texts were to be read, not the sequence in which they
were composed, al-Farabi, for example, on one occasion used the Platonic
allegory of the Cave as a device for arranging the Aristotelian treatises
along a line that begins amongst the shadows of the Rhetoric and ascends
to the sunlight of the Metaphysics. If this scheme seems artificial to
modern scholars, this is principally because the "historical sense", so
celebrated, not to say, invented, by 19th century authors, was embraced
by them as both natural and plenipotentiary.

At all events, Jaeger was prepared to submit countervailing evi-
dence to the effect that at least some of the Ancients, too, were in-
clined to analyze Aristotle's philosophy in developmental terms. If
this is the case, then the contemporary application of developmental
schemata cannot be accused of being completely alien to the self-
understanding of the author or the audience of the texts upon which
they are directed. Hence, it is to this 'evidence' that I must now turn.

As far as I have been able to discern, Jaeger calls upon three
ancient writers as witnesses to the fitness of a developmental inter-
pretation: Cephisodorus, the pupil of Isocrates and contemporary of
Aristotle, Plutarch and Aristotle himself. The first of these is taken
to have testified to Aristotle's early loyalty to orthodox Platonism;
the second, to his willingness to alter his views; the third, to the
general philosophical merits of a genetic or historical understanding
of philosophy.
The Neo-Platonic Numenius cites Cephasdorus as an example of a polemicist whose criticism missed its intended target: ἐπολεμήσας λέγεν. 26 ἀριστοτέλει, ἐβαλε ἰδίᾳ διάλεκτῳ καὶ κατηγορεῖ ἀριστειν αὐτῷ λέγειν. Jaeger and Bignone took this report to mean that Aristotle advocated the orthodox theory of forms in his early dialogues and that this was well-known to a contemporary such as Cephasdorus. Several comments are in order: first, the words καὶ κατηγορεῖ κρίσι. most naturally as their referent; they do not, then, tell us that Cephasdorus attacked an Aristotelian version of the theory of forms. 29 Secondly, Numenius has just accused Cephasdorus of being ignorant of Aristotle's thought and of wrongly thinking that he "philosophized in the manner of Plato". It has to be remembered that our fragment comes from a book devoted to showing "the differences between Plato and of his disciples down to the time of Antiochus". Numenius was consequently intent on keeping Platonic and Aristotelian teachings separate from one another and this surely colored his reaction to an apparent assimilation of the two. His book has to be viewed as a contribution to the on-going Ancient debate concerning the harmony or incompatibility of Plato and Aristotle, not as an exercise in detached scholarship. Cephasdorus, on his side, wrote in defense of Isocrates and his practice of ψίλοσοφία; the Academy could quite naturally be regarded as a single antagonist. It begs the question to assume that his anti-Aristotelian polemic was necessarily written early in his career and thus addressed only to Aristotle's own youthful dialogues and pièces d'occasion (e.g., the Gylllos). According to Athenaeus 30 Cephasdorus' work was in four books and thus a substantial production; furthermore, the rivalry between Isocrateans and Academicians persisted at least through the period of Speusippus' scholarchate. The opprobrium in which he indulged (e.g., Aristotle was a "voluptuary and a gourmand") is perhaps better suited to a period of exacerbated political tensions, when, for example, both schools were jockeying for influence at the court of Philip of Macedon. 32

Finally, the surviving testimonia concerning Cephasdorus' polemic say nothing about a shift of 'development' in Aristotle's teachings and thus cannot be summoned to support the methodological practice at issue here.

The case of Plutarch is much more complicated philologically and cannot be given its full due here. Jaeger himself welcomed Plutarch as a predecessor in developmental interpretation on the basis of a passage in de Virtute Morali (447F-448A). Düring and Verbeke later brought forward a second passage from the same text (442B-C) to complete this dossier.

In the first of these two passages Plutarch is arguing, against the Stoics, that reason is essentially distinct from the passions and that the struggle between them is not the same in kind as an internal division within the reasoning or deliberative faculty. He cites Aristotle, Democritus and Chrysippus as instances of a willingness painlessly, even pleasurably, to alter one's philosophical speculations under the influence of others (το μετέχειν μετὰ τῶν ἐπέφευγεν ἱστοι καὶ μετάργησαν ἐν δύο πολλάκις). This context of argument is quite wide and general; Plutarch does not go on to give any particular cases of such alterations in one's theoretical views. Jaeger, however, asserts that Plutarch's verb μεταργήσας is a "terminus technicus" in Hellenistic philosophy for the passage from one school to another. He does not bring forward any evidence for this strong claim; in fact, this verb is used by Diogenes Laertius, Athenaeus and others with the connotation of "shiftiness", of frequent turns from one opinion or sect to another. Dionysius of Heraclea, an erstwhile disciple of the Stoa, is given the sobriquet "ὁ μεταφεύγων", which Diogenes Laertius traces to his fickle or erratic manner of life. Earlier
usage seems to convey much the same semantic force; Plato has Socrates advise Thrasymachus "ἡ ἐκατοτόκος, γιαγείρως μηχανοῦς καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπατή", where the verb seems clearly to refer to shifts of position within the stretch of a single discussion, not over a lengthy period of 'development'.

Two further details of this initial Plutarchean passage lend support to this construal, as against Jaeger's. First, the adverb "πολλὰς" indicates that what Plutarch had in mind were frequent transitions from one speculative stand to another; second, the phrase "ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγερθῶν" suggests that these transitions should be seen as occurring under the impetus of interlocutors in a conversation or debate, not as a consequence of a pattern of 'development' to which a philosopher is somehow predisposed. It has to be recalled that Plutarch's point, in this passage, is a quite general one, even a commonplace: Discussions or arguments of a philosophical sort take place dispassionately; the conflict among equally probable conclusions puts one in the painless state of ἀποφάσις, in which the reason appears as one in spite of its inner 'Entzweigung'. Hence, this riposte against the Stoics can invoke philosophers of disparate persuasions, just as Plutarch is prepared to do elsewhere in illustration of a general point. Nothing, then, in this passage commits Plutarch to a specifically 'developmental' point of view vis-à-vis Aristotle, or, for that matter, the other two thinkers named.

The second passage (441E-442C), however, has been taken as strong evidence of just such a commitment on his part as far as Aristotle in particular is concerned. Once again Plutarch is enlisting support for his anti-Stoic view that reason and passion are genuinely distinct, not merely two faces of a single coin. Plato, with his picture of the tripartite soul, is an obvious ally. Can the same be said of Aristotle? The crucial passage reads as follows: ταύτας ἐξανείρισε τις ἂν δι' ἐπεὶ πλέον ἡ ἀρχή ἐπεὶ πλέον [καὶ ἐπεὶ πλέον] ἀριστοτέλης ... ὅτε δὲ τοῦ μὲν οἰκεῖος τῶν ἐπιστημονικῶν προσελέβης τοῦ μὲν δὲ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἀλογον μεξαρτών τὰ ἐν περιβολῇ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρύμενος
detélesen...

I have underscored the phrases on which the interpretation of the passage turns. Once ἐπεὶ πλέον has been taken in a temporal sense, "during a long time" (Verbeken), one is apparently constrained to read both ὅτε ἐπεὶ πλέον and μεξαρτών as likewise having temporal force ("later", "to the end"). With these readings Plutarch certainly does seem to the recording a shift in Aristotle's position from 'orthodox' tripartition to the bipartition argued in, e.g., EN I, 13.

But, does ἐπεὶ πλέον clearly have temporal reference? Plutarch's use of the expression elsewhere makes this doubtful - e.g., Mor. 34 B: τῆν ἐπεὶ πλέον τῶν ἐποικείων χρῆσιν ("the wider application of the poet's statements") or, in the superlative, Mor. 235 A: ἐπεὶ πλέον φέρειν τὰ παρίστατον παρέχουσιν ὑπὸ ("when a bath-attendant was providing an extreme amount of water for Alcibiades").

And this doubt is strengthened by the sense it frequently has in Polybius: 18.4.3, ἡμίχρήμενος τις ὁμοθέν ἐπεὶ πλέον ("his sight was injured to a great degree"); 29.23.4, τὴν ἐπεὶ πλέον διάφοραν ἔχειν ("to have a specially close relation"). Since Plutarch is eager to show the essential agreement between Plato and Aristotle, in opposition to the Stoa, ἐπεὶ πλέον in the meaning "to a very great extent", "largement" (Babut) would be very much in place here.

What, then, about ὅτε ἐπεὶ πλέον? This certainly does mean "later in time" quite often in Plutarch (e.g. Mor. 229 B: χρῶς ὅτε ἐπεὶ πλέον); but must it mean that here? Once we have seen that ἐπεὶ πλέον most likely has an emphatic, not a temporal, sense, we are free to explore
possibility that οὐστέρον introduces a different sort of contrast from what has usually been assumed, one, namely, between what is primary or fundamental and what is secondary or subordinate in importance. This suggestion would also allow us to grasp the intention steering the final grammatical sequence μὲν ... μὲνοι ... μὲρε παντός .

Plutarch does, on occasion, use οὐστέρον in a non-temporal sense, to designate what is posterior or inferior in status or importance. For example, Mor. 225E: οίκος οὐστέρος τοῖς ρήμασι τὰ μαθηματικά, said by a young Spartan soldier. Similarly, in Vitae 845E: Πρίζελι τῆς Κόλων οὐκ ἔδιδεν Κλεομένιος οὐστέρον γεγονέναι .

While the clearly temporal sense is more frequent in Plutarch by far, this alternative usage gives us a natural construal of the passage at issue: "Aristotle used these principles to a great extent, as is evident from his writings; it is of secondary importance that, on the one hand (μὲν), he assigned the spirited function to the active part ... , since, one should also note (μὲνοι), he continued throughout (μὲρε παντός) to treat the passionate and irrational part as differing from the rational ...." On this reading Plutarch is true to his principal aim, namely, to show the agreement between Plato and Aristotle as regards the distinctness of the rational and irrational 'parts' of the soul. Shifts or modifications in the latter's statements should be made subordinate to this more fundamental agreement.

Accordingly, even if a temporal nuance is assigned to οὐστέρον , the context will not allow us to credit Plutarch with anticipating the view that Aristotle 'developed' from Platonism to his own position. We can reliably conclude at most that Plutarch (or his sources) detected differences in expression and argumentative emphasis within one and the same general position.

Jaeger had still a third putative ally in his developmental campaign, Aristotle himself. It would take me far beyond the bounds of this presentation were I to try to enter into this topic in requisite detail. It must suffice for me to draw attention to two of its aspects.

Although Jaeger begins his book by claiming Aristotle as the "inventor of the notion of intellectual development in time," his statements later in the text tend to diminish the intended force of this claim. For example, Jaeger notes that Aristotle's sketch of the "development from Thales to Plato" in Book A of the Metaphysics is not really "historical" at all, but "systematic". More crucially still, he challenges the conviction that Aristotle's "real achievement" was the "conception of biological development" as "a thoroughly vicious modernization", despite the fact that the conception of historical development, as Jaeger uses it, is the metaphorical transposition of its biological ancestor (cf. infra). As he concludes, what interests Aristotle "is the fact, not that something is coming to be, but that something is coming to be". 33

These latter emphases cohere more persuasively with the posture towards ἑστία. Aristotle himself adopts in, for example, chapter 9 of the Poetics; it is consistent with this relegation of historical accounts to a less philosophical and less serious status that his own presentation of his predecessors is rhetorical in its dictum and dramatically in its structure. It might also be added that Aristotle's belief in the eternal recurrence of similar opinions within each of the periods of civilization separated by catastrophes implies that philosophy, in its dialectical orientation to the ἑστία, the reputable opinions of men, (Top. A. 10 ) can never be 'historical' in its procedures, at least not in the sense of having to reckon with radical novelty, uniqueness or linear progress. 34

It should not really come as a surprise that the Ancient evidence for the notion of development, whether applied to philosophical thinking or taken more widely, is thin at best. Heinrich Dörrie, for instance,
in his article "Entwicklung" in the Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum, comes time and again to the result that "the concept of development remained alien to Ancient thinking".39

This is not a matter of superficial differences in lexicon; what is involved is rather a topological transformation of Ancient into Modern 'conceptual space', whereby essences are displaced in favor of histories, *genesis* is substituted for invariant nature. The interpretive plausibility of 'Entwicklung' ultimately stands or falls with the epistemic credentials of these substitutions. This ultimate question can be made more accessible if we narrow our focus to its immediately salient implications for Jaeger's own presentation of Aristotle.

Jaeger inherited the leitmotiv of 'development' from 19th century Romanticism and Historicism, in which an originally biological metaphor, i.e., the 'growth and maturation of a plant or animal through a sequence of stages following upon one another according to an invariant rule, was transposed and transformed into a general pattern or even law for cultural activity and for individual personality alike. This metaphor, with the constellation of meanings it initiated and organized, was itself shaped in confrontation with the rival metaphor of 'mechanism'"."Its cardinal promise, when put into the service of historical analysis, was that a set of temporally distinct periods of achievement and activity can be rendered intelligible as a series of internally related and intrinsically conditioned phases within a whole that embraces them; the explanatory relevance of external causalities is thus largely nullified. Furthermore, that whole, far from being simply the aggregate of those phases, is present "in germ" from the start and is progressively exfoliated; accordingly, the significance of any one phase is a function of its relation to this pre-figured and self-unfolding whole. It is a special additional feature of the Romantic versions of this view, at least in quasi-Hegelian inflections, that completed developments, looked at in retrospect, appear to have been inevitable; development, in other words, is also a kind of destiny, whether cultural or personal.

The referential scope of this conception of development was quite variable during the 19th century. Sometimes it was meant to comprise the entire history of humanity or of human culture, as in Herder's portrait of the emergence and subsequent course of the human race as both the continuation and culmination of the creation of material nature (e.g., man is "die Blüthe der Erden-Schöpfung") or in the representation of history by Thorbecke, a student of Schelling, as "essentially an organism, a being which fashions its entire life organically in time, as though it were another Nature". Sometimes, its scope was restricted to the whole history of philosophical thinking, as in this rendition of Hegel's approach: "a grand, cohesive development is present in the history of philosophy, one which corresponds to the movement of the notion itself and within which every system fits as a necessary moment". Finally, 'development' was applied to the intellectual and spiritual career either of a generation or of an individual, as in Dilthey's decision that in the span of a human life "we are given the natural unit for an intuitive measure of the history of intellectual-spiritual (geistiger) movements". It scarcely needs remarking that these different references quite frequently interpenetrate; the history of philosophy, for Hegel, both imitates and expresses the wider 'history' of the movement of Absolute Spirit towards the realization of self-conscious freedom; Dilthey, on the other hand, sought to discover the "causal nexus in which philosophical Systems" - whose development is otherwise explained from "alterations in the whole of a [single] man's being, in his full vitality and effectiveness" - "arose from the whole of culture and have acted in turn upon that whole". Indeed, this interpenetration of denotations often makes it, in principle, difficult to determine which domain, at which
level of generality, is meant to carry primary explanatory weight. This multivalence of explanatory relevance eventually becomes apparent in Jaeger's own reconstruction of Aristotle's 'development', especially in his climactic chapter "Aristotle's Place in History". Thus, Aristotle's movement from canonical Platonism to his mature position — variously described as empiricism, the "suppression of speculation in favour of factual research", and, in the case of the final recension of the Metaphysics, a sort of ontological phenomenology — is credited, at various places, to Greek culture as a whole, e.g., the "essential nature of the Greek spirit" or "inevitable historical development" to the evolution, of Greek philosophy and, finally, to what is "new and problematic in his philosophical personality".

This variety of descriptions leaves us uncertain to what substratum or bearer of the developmental process the changes in Aristotle's thinking are to be ascribed. We might be tempted, in the end, to say of Jaeger's reconstruction what he says of Aristotle, namely, "(0)utlines of a systematic arrangement, .... are carried only half through or remain unfulfilled".

Be that as it may, the architectonic of Jaeger's presentation does give central place to Aristotle's 'personality', to the inner crises and tensions in his psychological make-up and history to his emotional allegiance to Plato, etc., even though other factors, such as the 'Greek spirit', are causally implicated as well. The preponderant role assigned to personality brings numerous, interconnected problems in its train, only a few of which can be briefly canvassed here.

a. Jaeger's picture of Aristotle's 'personality' is painted in the colors of Goethe's Wilhelm Meister: "Lehrjahre", "Wanderjahre", "Meisterzeit", a three-part schema already utilized by Hermann in 1839 in connection with Plato and by Wilamowitz in his study of Aristotle. In Goethe's Bildungsroman the idiosyncratic and circumstantial are progressively brought under the yoke of authoritative self-command; personal distinctiveness and lived-integrity are the twin virtues to which the stylized personality of Wilhelm rightly aspires. Correspondingly, in the biographical treatment of Aristotle, his theoretical work becomes an occasion for personal growth, not its superordinate goal or fulfillment. However, not only is the 'objective' evidence for his inner life scanty, not only must it be reconstituted from an analysis of his philosophical works, but, more importantly, the very notion of personality invoked here is at odds with the concentration on the trans-personal nearly everywhere in evidence in Aristotle's work. In Metaphysics Gamma, for example, he contrasts philosophers and sophists by the deliberate choice of the lives that they lead, that is, a life in pursuit of impersonal wisdom or, on the contrary, of its semblances. If there are matters genuinely at issue in philosophically thinking and if these matters resist reduction either to the peculiarities of the individual thinker (cp. Nietzsche's dictum, "... every great philosophy hitherto has been the self-confession of its author and a kind of unwilled and unnoticed mémoire..."), or to the needs and tendencies of his 'culture', then it might make better sense to count the circumstances of a thinker's life as opportunities for his engagement with those matters, rather than vice versa. Hegel, notable for elevating the history of philosophy from doxography to speculation, also affirmed that "with regard to the essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors".

b. These reflections lead to the second class of problems attendant on Jaeger's biographical approach. He has frequently been praised, or accused, for having a generally Hegelian conception of "development"; one scholar spoke of his Aristoteles as "an ex voto placed before the shrine of Hegel". It is important, then, to see where their chief difference lies as far as interpretive strategy is concerned. For Hegel, and, indeed, for most of the 19th century adherents of the organic
version of "Entwicklungs geschichte", development without fulfillment, without an \( \varepsilon \eta \gamma \rho \tau \varsigma \), is blind and vacant. In other words, the process of the self-explication of some whole which is implicit from the start counts as a "development" only if that whole sooner or later comes fully into sight, whether this is held to occur in many separate instances (as in Herder and Goethe) or only in some ultimate stage (as in Hegel).

For Jaeger, in contrast, Aristotle's history never achieves a clearly articulated or clearly realized \( \varepsilon \eta \gamma \rho \tau \varsigma \), either in itself or in regard to its posterity. According to him, Aristotle's effort to weave together his Platonistic conception of metaphysics as theology with his "morphological and phenomenological study" of sensible entities, that is, his attempt to reconcile the religious with the scientific impulse in his own soul, never achieved success, either in his own case, e.g., in his alleged final recension of the text of the *Metaphysics* or in the historical aftermath of his work. Thus, Jaeger writes that "his 'system' remains provisional and open in every direction" and that "[o]nly in isolated passages do we suddenly become aware, almost with astonishment, of the living presence of a felt [sc. not discursively articulated] whole behind the subtle network of concepts". Similarly, Aristotle's "critical" project of giving scientifically precise and empirically well-founded pressure to the Platonic religious world-view, like Kant's, "have ... had no posterity". Neither the positivistically-oriented research of Hellenistic times, nor the inwardly-directed faith of early medieval Christianity (e.g., Augustine) succeeded in welding together the divergent, discordant elements (i.e., science and metaphysics); that Aristotle himself merely "restored(d)... to unstable equilibrium". These conclusions or concessions force us to wonder what explicatory valve this notion of 'development' *manque* retains, especially since, for Jaeger, nothing in modern philosophy is at hand to repair the defects of Aristotle's ineluctably flawed synthesis. Perhaps the only answer he was prepared to endorse is that "Aristotle is classical in spite of his lateness", where "classical", in a most curious way, denotes a set of trans-historical or at least sempiternal values, "geistige Gegebenheiten (\( \nu \sigma \delta \varsigma \))", that need to be reappropriated by modern, post-classical, man.\(^3\)

c. At all events, Jaeger's 'personalization' of the developmental leitmotiv faces still another sort of difficulty. The organic metaphor was fashioned, as I have already said, in opposition to the prevailing mechanistic images of modern physical science; it was supposed to give the distinctly human realm of culture and intellect an autonomy in the face of "Naturwissenschaft". However, in Jaeger's adaptation of this metaphor to the case of a single thinker we can witness the reinstatement of a causal model of explanation; in other words, Aristotle, by virtue of being made understandable historically, that is, in Kant's sense, understandable "better than he understood himself", is seen as thinking and arguing in the different ways in which he did under the pressure of factors neither intellectually transparent to him nor under his philosophic command. Thus, the thematic unity of Aristotle's understanding of \( \varepsilon \eta \gamma \rho \tau \varsigma \) and \( \nu \sigma \delta \varsigma \) throughout his treatises "does not arise ... from any intentional assimilation of the parts to each other; it is the original kernel out of which the multiplicity has grown".\(^5\) It is as though the same inevitable and, one would presume, unintentional character of cellular fission in the blastosphere marked the enterprise of philosophizing as well. Causes, in short, are made to replace reasons, much as though the 'mechanistic' account of Socrates' imprisonment told the whole story.

The questions raised by these three problematic aspects of Jaeger's adoption of the developmental metaphor are interlinked in obvious as well as in subtle ways. For instance, the constriction of "development" to an individual thinker makes the issue of whether his thinking, understood as largely the consequence of personal circumstance and disposition, has or lacks an \( \varepsilon \eta \gamma \rho \tau \varsigma \) especially pressing; similarly, the latter
question raises in its turn the highly-sensitive issue of the propriety of casual or non-intentional explanations of the arguments and undertakings of a thinker. Answers to these and related questions which are required by the metaphor depend on it alone for their justification.

Let me conclude by emphasizing what I have tried to suggest in this paper and where these suggestions, if sound, might point. I have concentrated, both narrowly and deliberately, on details of Jaeger's account even though few of his legatees have capitalized on the whole of that patrimony. Nonetheless, his commitments and the historical matrix from which they arose continue to lead a subterranean or subliminal life in even the most casual imitations of his style of analysis, thanks to which theoretical incongruities are supposedly dissolved into chronological distinctions (just as in the prevalent technique for understanding Plato's dialogues). None of the objections or critical questions I have posed to this manner of eliminative explication was meant to imply that Aristotle did not change his mind, respond to the exigencies of debate and refashion his arguments and programs in an 'open-minded' way, congruent with his own thesis that what is knowable is the non-relative measure of our acts of knowing. I have tried simply to call into question the status of the developmental-schema, however modified, as a talisman or, better, a fetish. The organicist metaphor underlying it is quite possibly no more eliminable than any other governing metaphor or image in philosophy; one should at least be aware of the theoretical presuppositions concerning history and the history of thinking that this particular metaphor imposes. To the extent that these, once made transparent, seem questionable, new (or, possibly, revived) exegetical models might suggest themselves. For instance, we might want to explore the notion that Aristotle thought and taught in concert with 'die Sachen selbst' and that their plurality, ambiguity and 'stratifications' gave life and determinate literary form to his writings. It might then appear that what Aristotle says about the meanings of κοινόν it fits his texts as well, viz. "that in which in no part naturally belonging to it is missing or that which contains its components in such a way that each of them is a one". In any case, this exploration of an alternative to the Jaegerian scheme is likely to lead us away from the early-modern picture of a monolithic system (Jaeger's own polemical target) and back to the deep truth disclosed in Kant's adage: "Die Philosophie des Aristoteles ist... Arbeit".

FOOTNOTES

(Because of constraints of space, I have limited my notes almost entirely to direct textual references. A fuller set of notes, including bibliographical and substantive elaborations of points argued in the main text, are available upon request.)

1 Asclepius, In Metaph. 4, 4-6 (Hayduck), CAG VI.2

2 Cited by Peter Petersen, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig, 1921), p.298, from Gottlieb Stolle, Einleitung zur Historie der Gelahrheit, 1736, p.488.


4 Elias, In Cat. Prooemium 123.12 - 127.2 (Busse), CAG XVIII.1.

5 Syrianus, In Metaph. 42.12 - 14 (Kroll), CAG VI.1.

6 The three sections of Michelet's work occupy pp.5-114; pp.115-198; pp.199-241, respectively. The reconciliation between philologists and philosophers is asserted on p.239; "substances sensibles et passagers" occurs on p.115.
7 Hegel, Sämtliche Werke (ed. Glockner), XIV, p.282
8 Cicero, Ep. ad Atticum 4.16.2; De Fin. 5.5.12.
12 Ibid., p.118
13 Lichtdrucke des Didymospapyros. Vier Tafeln (Berlin, 1904), Table 1, coll.1-5; Didymos, Kommentar zu Demosthenes (Papyrus 2780), ed. H. Diels & W. Schubart (Berlin, 1904) coll. 5,53-63. The editio minor was published in a Teubner edition in the same year (Volumina Aegyptiaca. Ordinis IV, Grammaticorum Pars 1).
16 Strabo, Geographia, XIII, 1, 57 (610).
17 Jaeger, op. cit., p.111.
19 Düring, op. cit., p.276.
21 Jaeger, op. cit., p.118.
23 See, e.g., Bacchylides 13,176 (Snell); Anon., Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (Nauck), p.910, # 374. For further 'personified abstractions', see G. Fatouros, Index verborum zur frühgriechischen Lyrik (Heidelberg, 1966), s.mn.
24 Rhet. II 2, 1379 a 35.
Athenaeus, II 60 d-e; III, 122b.


36 Plutarch, *De tranq. an.*, 472d (Empedocles, Plato and Democritus).


52 Jaeger, op. cit., p. 374; p. 379; p. 404.


54 Jaeger, lib. cit., p. 375.
