Some Observations Concerning Plato's Lysis

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Let us concede that the Lysis is not some alien intrusion into
the Platonic Corpus—so Ast and Socher claimed long ago—but
a genuine work of Plato. Even in the nineteenth century those
who thought this dialogue spurious were only an embattled few.

But, though the majority were agreed that Plato himself had
enned the Lysis, they could arrive at no consensus regarding
the date of composition. The rise of the science—or pseudo-
science—of "Sprachstatistik" did not eliminate controversy.
Recurrence or non-recurrence of τι μήν and πῶς δ' οὖ, apparently
meant one thing to one scholar, something else to another.
Soberer spirits tried to find some way of harmonizing their
stylometric researches with what could be deduced from analysis
of the content of the various dialogues. Did scholarly agree-
ment result? Hardly. The lateness of the Parmenides, Sophist,
 Politico, and Laws (which had hardly been open to doubt even

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1. F. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften (Leipzig 1816) 428-34;
J. Socher, Über Platon's Schriften (Munich 1820) 137-44.

2. S. Cholava's denial of Platonic authorship on the grounds of
inexact or erroneous dialectic, uncharacteristic modes of thought
and speech, unusual behavior of the interlocutors, and unsatisfac-
tory composition of the whole ("Über die Unechtheit des Dialogs
Lysis," Zög 9 (1858) 793-802 (Cholava I)) was promptly attacked by
J. Kvičala, "Über Platon's Lysis," ibid. 10 (1859) 275-84 (Kvičala I)
(H. Bonitz appended a sympathetic "Anmerkung zu dem vorstehenden Auf-
von I. Kvičala Über Platon's Lysis," ibid. 589-91 (Cholava II),
stimulated a "Gegenbemerkung" from Kvičala, pp. 591f (Kvičala II).

3. L. Campbell and W. Dittenberger are among the pioneers. See,
in particular, the former's editions of various Platonic dialogues
(published at Oxford from the 1860's onwards) and the latter's
"Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge,"
Hermes 16 (1881) 321-45.
in the pre-statistical era) continued to be acknowledged. Yet in the case of the Lysis there was such great divergency of opinion that Verdam, von Arnim, and Wilamowitz could call the dialogue respectively fourth, fifth, or sixth in order of composition (making it thereby more or less contemporaneous with its companions from Tetralogy V, the Charmides and Laches), whereas Ritter and Raeder placed it fourteenth or fifteenth, directly ahead of the Symposium, and Pohlenz went so far as to claim that its publication not only directly preceded that of the Symposium, but also postdated the appearance of the Phaedrus among Plato's works.


5. So far as I am aware, there has been very little inclination to vouch for the authenticity of the Theages, the "black sheep" of the tetralogy.

6. See the comparative table assembled by Ross (above, n. 4) Lutoslawski could bring himself neither to confirm nor to deny that the Lysis was Plato's own) as well as H.D. Verdam, "De ordine quo Platonis dialogi inter se succedant," Mnemosyne N.S. 44 (1916) 255-94 (which includes ad fin. a comparison of the schemes of Verdam, Ritter, and Raeder). Verdam dates the Lysis c. 397 B.C., but A. Sirth, AJF 16 (1895) 211-16, insists on 394 B.C. as terminus post quem.

7. M. Pohlenz, Aus Platons Werdezeit (Berlin 1913) (Pohlenz I) 367. This chronology, along with other of Pohlenz' proposals (see the discussion below and accompanying nn.), was vigorously assailed by H. von Arnim, Platos Jugenddialoge und die Entstehungszeit des Phaidros
Quot eruditi, tot ordines dialogorum. Rather than inflict yet another chronological scheme on the scholarly community, I shall take my cue from Monsieur Robin. Restricting his concern to those dialogues in which Plato's formulations regarding love and friendship are expounded, playing down stylometrics, moreover, in favor of other forms of comparison, he arrives at the following progression—one which ought to have been obvious generations before his time:

Lysis (early)
Symposium (middle)
Phaedrus (late)

So much for chronology. Having granted not only that the Lysis is genuine, but also that it antedates both the Phaedrus and the Symposium—whether it precedes or follows the Charmides, (Leipzig and Berlin 1914) (von Arnim III). Pohlenz defended himself first in a review of von Arnim's book, GGA 178 (1916)(5) 241-72 (Pohlenz II) (on the relationship of the Lysis to the Symposium and Phaedrus see pp. 251-60), again (von Arnim having attacked anew, "Platos Lysis," RhP N.F. 71 (1916) 364-87 (von Arnim IV), even as Pohlenz was warding off the initial onslaught) in an article wearily entitled "Nochmals Platos Lysis," NCG 1917 560-88 (Pohlenz III).

8. Without committing myself necessarily thereto, I should like to call attention to the arrangement set forth by G. Vlastos when I studied under him at Cornell University in the early 1950's:

Group I (Socrates utilizes ξέγγυς in his professedly agnostic rôle): Ion, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Maior

A group unto themselves: Apology, Crito

Group II (Theory of Ideas given mature expression):
Gorgias, Protagoras, Helen, Cratylus, Phaedo

Group III (after 388 B.C.): Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus

Group IV: Parmenides, Politicus, Theaetetus, Sophist

Group V: Timaeus, Philebus, Laws

9. L. Robin, La théorie platonicienne de l'amour (Paris 1903: new ed. 1933), Ch. 2 (pp. 53-120).
it's "twin brother," according to some, or the Protagoras, or any of the other allegedly early "aporetic" dialogues need not concern us—let us turn now to questions of more than ancillary interest.

Alas! Among those who move beyond such considerations in order to grapple with "what Plato said" (pace Paul Shorey) there is little agreement concerning the import of the Lysis. Pohlenz, for example, declares that the scope of this work, like that of the Phaedrus, is restricted to ξαίδικος ἤρως. Frankly I think that this statement does disservice to both dialogues. Von Arnim


11. That the Lysis could have been written during Socrates' lifetime is no longer seriously entertained, since hardly anyone allows much credence to the anecdote recorded by Diogenes Laertius (3.35):

 Possibly the final statement is true, however, not only of the Lysis, but of the Platonic dialogues in general. Cf. Pohlenz II (above, n. 7) 252. My own surmise is that the anecdote itself grew out of the preoccupation of the rhetorical schools with what this or that celebrity "might have said" on this or that occasion (i.e. "How would Socrates have reacted, had he been present at a recitation of one of Plato's works?"). Cf. Wilamowitz' suggested explanation of how an anti-Callimachean epigram (AP 11.275) came to be ascribed to Apollonius (Hellenistische Dichtung (Berlin 1924) II 97, cited with qualified approval in the course of my own discussion of the poem in question, TAPA 93 (1962) 162, n. 24).

12. Shorey's book of the same name (Chicago 1933)(Shorey III) is useful, so far as it goes. But to find out "What Shorey said" about Plato and Platonism one must repair also to other of his works, notably "The Unity of Plato's Thought," University of Chicago Decennial Publications 6 (1903) 129-214 (Shorey I), a most salutary piece of writing, in my estimation. Shorey II, for our purposes (much that is relevant to Plato intervenes), is "The Alleged Fallacy in Plato's Lysis 220E," CP 25 (1930) 380-83.

13. Pohlenz I (above, n. 7) 370. See also n. 36 below.
thought likewise, and was so forceful in denunciation\(^{14}\) as to cause Pohlenz to back away from his original position.\(^{15}\)

Radically different, but not much more satisfying, is the suggestion put forth by Grote a century ago. "To multiply defective explanations," he avers, "and to indicate why each is defective, is the whole business of the dialogue."\(^{16}\)

I shall not add any further examples—at least for the moment. Actually not a few explorers of the thought conveyed in the \textit{Lysis}, despairing, no doubt, of any satisfactory overall categorization, reduce their own contribution to running restatement of and commentary on the content of the several conversations which constitute the dialogue. This technique—if technique be the right name (and I do not mean to imply that scholars who attempt a summation invariably neglect to avail themselves of it)—has been iterated so often\(^{17}\) that my choosing to resurrect it now would hardly arouse much excitement, let alone interest, had I not chosen also to combine sparing use with an innovation or two. Instead of doggedly citing or paraphrasing every significant proposition or dialectical link from \textit{Lysis} 203\(^{a1}\) to 223\(^{b8}\) I shall start at the end of the dialogue before even considering the beginning. A pause for clarification or for mulling over some possible deeper significance will be inserted wherever necessary. By placing the last first and the

\(^{14}\) Von Arnim III (above, n. 7) 60.

\(^{15}\) See Pohlenz II (above, n. 7) 258 and n. 2, who meekly replies that he had meant only to attract notice to the extension of the concept of \(\varepsilon\rho\varphi\varsigma\) which may be observed in the \textit{Phaedrus} and \textit{Lysis}. I remain unconvinced.

\(^{16}\) G. Grote, \textit{Plato and Other Companions of Socrates} (London 1865 and several subsequent editions) I 516.

\(^{17}\) Tedium increases rapidly after the first few encounters. Robin's exposition, op. cit. (above, n. 9) 3-8, stands out, however, thanks to its wonderfully Gallic (hence possibly somewhat un-Platonic) lucidity.
first later and by ranging freely through the whole\textsuperscript{18} I hope not only to shed more light on the conduct of the argument in the \textit{Lysis}, but also to demonstrate that the structure is closely interwoven and that the cleavage alleged by some between a "protreptic" introduction (up through the first conversation between Socrates and \textit{Lysis})\textsuperscript{(203\textsuperscript{a}1-211\textsuperscript{a}3)} and a "philosophical" main body of the dialogue (211\textsuperscript{a}9ff)\textsuperscript{19} is much less pronounced than would appear at first glance.\textsuperscript{20}

Let us begin, then, with the aftermath to \textit{διαρρήα}. Socrates, always alive to the humor of a difficult situation, observes that he, old man that he is, and \textit{Lysis} and \textit{Menexenus} have all three made themselves ridiculous in their inability to complete a simple definition, when it is so manifest that their mutual relationship provides in itself an illustration of that which was to be defined (223\textsuperscript{b}3-8). After a whole series of complex discussions the speakers find themselves back whence they began: they point to isolated examples, but so far\textsuperscript{21} no general principle has been

18. To my knowledge, no previous scholar has proceeded in exactly this way. However, F. Horn, \textit{Platonstudien} (Vienna 1893), after having recapitulated the argumentation of the dialogue in detail (pp. 103-6) commences his several pages "Zur Erläuterung (109-19) with a reexamination of the last of the three large sections into which he thinks the \textit{Lysis} to be divided.

19. See, for example, von Arnim III (above, n. 7) 70.

20. Von Arnim took issue with those who assumed that the first part had been written for the sake of the second. I myself think that they are right. Still, there may be some merit in von Arnim's assertion that Plato has constructed the conversation with Hippothales and the initial interrogation of Lysis in such a way as to disprove the old slander that Socrates was guilty of corrupting the youth of Athens. Cf. Wilamowitz (above, n. 4) 141', who believes the rehabilitation of Socrates as educator to have been a common aim of the \textit{Lysis} and \textit{Charmides}. Although he claims to detect signs of friction between the author's philosophical and artistic aims, Wilamowitz urges that they not be studied in isolation from one another.

21. The fact that Socrates has prefixed \textit{οὐπω} rather than \textit{οὐ} to the clause which terminates in \textit{οὐδὲ ἔγενεμεθα} \textit{ἐξευρεῖν} (223\textsuperscript{b}7f) may indicate that he retains some glimmer of hope for an eventual solution.
enunciated to their satisfaction.

Just before this, as a pair of slaves was arriving to guide his teen-aged interlocutors home from the gymnasium, Socrates reconsidered all the blind alleys into which their joint endeavor had strayed (222e3ff). The term awaiting explication, he notes, can be identified neither with "the beloved" (οἱ φιλομενοί) nor with "the loving" (οἱ φιλοντες). Both equivalences were ruled out in the course of Socrates' first talk with Menexenus (211d6ff).

Nor can it be equated either with "likes" (οἱ οὐκοι) or with "unlikes" (οἱ αὐποι). The one possibility was disproved during the second conversation between Socrates and Lysis (213d6ff), the other in an ensuing discussion (215e3ff) into which Menexenus found himself drawn. Not even equation with "the good" (οἱ ἀγαθοί), which would have so gladdened the soul of Socrates, could it only have been upheld, turns out to be valid. Invalidity was an inevitable consequence of the previous determination that, contrary to the supposition of many, "like is no friend to like" (215a4ff).

This catalogue of failure reaches a sort of climax with Socrates' mention of "those akin by nature" (οἱ οἰκεῖοι), unhappily dismissed from consideration only a short time before (once again the incompatibility of similars turned out to be the stumbling block), despite what had seemed a promising start (221e3ff).

Lest he try everyone's patience by extending the list further, Socrates classifies other discarded possibilities as τὰ ἄλλα 𨭸α διεληλθαμεν: "all else that we have discussed" (222e5). Undoubtedly

22. This expression originally denoted members of the same household (οἶχος or οἰκία), and was applied both to family and to retainers. Cf. below, p.23. Extension beyond the confines of the household to include all who share some affinity is clearly indicated in the suggestion of Socrates that Lysis and Menexenus might be φύσει istringstream of one another.
he has in mind "the evil" (οἱ κακοὶ), no sooner mentioned than rejected out of hand (214b3-d7), as well as "the morally neutral," "those who are neither good nor evil" (οἱ μήτε ἀγαθοὶ μήτε κακοὶ), initially brought into the discussion during Socrates' second interview with Menexenus (216c1ff).

Up to now I have refrained from acknowledging just what it was that Socrates and his companions were so anxious to define. I have done so deliberately in the hope that a few misconceptions might be cleared up in the interim. The Lysis, like a number of apparently early dialogues, poses a crucial question which may be reduced to the formula "What is X?" "What is courage?" (ἀρετή) Socrates asks in the Laches. In the Charmides he raises a similar query regarding temperance (σωφροσύνη).

There exists, however, another type formulaically expressible as "Is X Y?" One rather noteworthy instance is shared between the Protagoras and the Meno:

άρα διδασκόν ἡ ἀρετή;

23. However, "evil" in another sense (τὸ κακὸν as a causative agent) figures very prominently in later discussion (217a3ff; see also below, pp. 24 and 28) before being eliminated altogether from consideration.

24. T. Becker, "Zur Erklärung von Piatos Lysis," Philologus 41 (1882) 284-308, who translates τὸ κακὸν, ἀγαθὸν κακὸν as "das Indifferente" (p. 299), expresses astonishment that A. Westermayer (I have not yet been able to lay hands on a copy of the latter's Der Lysis des Plato zur Einführung in das Verständnis der sokratischen Dialoge (Erlangen 1875))—apparently his favorite whipping-boy, as Pohlenz was von Arnim's (cf. above, n. 7 and pp. 4f with nn.)—would have the temerity to regard "das relativ Gute" as an accurate interpretation of the original.

25. R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic 2 (Oxford 1953) 49, would add the Euthyphro, where "the Holy" (τὸ ὅσιον) and the Hippias Maior, where "the Beautiful" (τὸ καλὸν) is to be defined. He disjoins, however, the Gorgias, Meno, and Republic I (he too, like so many previous scholars, prefers to classify the last as a separable "early dialogue") on the ground that all three "abandon the question 'What is X?' for the question 'Is X Y?'" (concerning which latter see below).
Is virtue \([X\text{-term}]\) teachable?

\([X\text{-term}; \text{not predicate adjective, really, but quasi-substantive:}\]

"a teachable thing"

In the latter dialogue, as a matter of fact, the formula undergoes several modifications at the outset. "Is virtue teachable?" Meno's initial question to Socrates, may be codified as "Is \(X Y_1\)?" Immediately \(Y_1\) gives way to \(Y_2\) as Meno asks, "Or is it not teachable, but to be acquired through practice?" (η οὐ διδάσκεταν, ἀλλ' ἀσκητήριον;). Still further questioning on Meno's part introduces the possibility that \(Y_1\) and \(Y_2\) must both be rejected in favor of \(Y_3\) or \(Y_4\). "Or is it neither to be acquired through practice nor to be learned?" (οὔτε ἀσκητήριον οὔτε μαθήτήριον;), Socrates' interlocutor would like to know, "Is it inborn instead or imparted to mankind in some other fashion?" (ἄλλα φύσει παραγιγνέται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἂλλω τινὶ τρόπῳ;).

Obviously the same sort of inquiry occurs in the \textit{Lysis}, with of \(φιλοσφερεῖν\) as \(Y_1\), of \(φιλοσφονεῖν\) as \(Y_2\)... We need not gone through the rest of the list. It is time now to consider the other term which remains constant. If we interpret the "What is \(X\)?" and "Is \(X Y\)?" of this dialogue simply as "What is friendship?" and "Is friendship such and such?" we shall be considerably in error. To put it succinctly, the \(X\) which awaits both some sort of definition and

26. Robinson recognizes the presence of the "Is \(X Y\)?" question in the \textit{Meno} (cf. n. 25 above), yet strangely groups the \textit{Protagoras} with \textit{Ion}, \textit{Hippias Minor}, \textit{Apology}, and \textit{Critias}, which dialogues, he avers, "never raise the question at all." Or have I misunderstood his not entirely clear language? Does he mean to say that some works of Plato start with "What is \(X\)?" then shift to "Is \(X Y\)?" while others either dispense with both or bring up the latter without considering the former?

27. Cf. Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, where the problem is acknowledged (καὶ ὁμοίως καὶ ἀπορεῖται ποτέρον ἐστὶ μαθήτης ἢ ἀσκητήριον ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πῶς ἀσκητήριον, ἢ κατὰ τὴν θεᾶν περὶ τινὰ μοίραν ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἡ παραγίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἀριστοτελεῖαν solution proposed.
identification with some \( Y \) is not "friendship" (\( \varphi \lambda \lambda \iota \lambda \alpha \)), but "friend" \( \varphi \lambda \lambda \iota \omega \). This is made clear throughout the discussion. Note Socrates' final words, which I now cite in full:

\[
\text{ἐροῦσι γὰρ οἴδε ἀπίόντες ὡς σώμεθα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλων φίλοι οἶοι—καὶ ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔν ὡμῖν τίθημι—οὕτω δὲ, ὃ τι ἐς τιν ὃ φίλος ὁ σι ὁ ὁ ὃ ὁ ὁ ὃ τε ἔγνοιμεθα ἐξευρεῖν.}
\]

They will say in taking their departure that we think ourselves to be friends to one another--indeed, I count myself in your number--but that we were incapable of ascertaining what a friend is. 28

Confession of inability to deal with this question of the type "What is \( X \)?" is, of course, preceded by the admission that, no matter which \( Y \) was brought under consideration in the series of "Is \( X \) \( Y \)?" questions which dominate the dialogue, a satisfactory equivalent for \( X \) could not be found. 'Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ δὲν τούτων φίλοι ὑμῖν ἔστιν,' resignedly comments Socrates, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκετί ἐχὼ τί λέγω: "But if none of these [i.e. the several \( Y \)'s] is friend, for my part I have nothing more to say." Socrates will speak again, to be sure—with possibly even a hint that all is not lost. 29 But as things stand

28. Cf. above, pp. 6f. "The explicit question of the Lysis," Robinson contends, loc. cit. (above, n. 25), giving precedence to the "Is \( X \) \( Y \)?" question, "is not what friendship is, but what its condition is." I should prefer that he had said "not what friendship is, but the conditions under which one becomes a friend." Just before the first interrogation of Menexenus (212a3ff) Socrates himself, having noted the astonishing ease and speed with which Lysis and Menexenus have taken to one another (211c8-212a4), admits that he is at a loss to explain this or anything of the sort (212a5f):

\[
φίλοι που ἐς ταῦτα ποτὲ ὑμῖν γιὰ τὰ θάνατα ἐτέρως ἔστιν οἴδα.
\]

29. See n. 21 above.
now, meaningful discourse has ceased.

Having attempted to translate Socrates' words, I am conscious of an ambiguity which ought not to be passed over without comment. In the protasis of the condition should I have taken τούτων not as partitive genitive with μηδέν, but as some other type of genitive (possessive, or possibly objective) with φίλος? If so, that latter adjective—or is it really a substantive?—would have to play a new rôle also. It is one thing to say "if none of these is friend," quite another to say either "if nothing is their friend" or "if nothing is friend to them."

This apparently minor grammatical difficulty is linked with much larger problems which beset the whole. Had Plato chosen to allow Socrates and his followers to essay a definition of φιλία rather than of φίλος, perhaps the discussion would have proceeded, if not without difficulty, then at least with somewhat less tendency for the dialectics of the inquiry to prove abortive. What is φιλία, really, but a relationship between φίλοι?

Of course Socrates himself, though he might have extracted from an interlocutor an admission of its correctness, would hardly be likely to take much satisfaction in so simple, not to say tautologous, an explanation as this. It has been alleged, for example, that φιλία lies at the very center of the political thinking expressed in the Platonic dialogues and epistles. Possibly too, had this been the

30. Cf, διότι in the "Is X Y?" question cited above, p. 8. Observe, however, that διότι in predicate position, is clearly a Y-term, whereas φίλος, though apparently in predicate position also, was always X, so far as the preceding discussion in the Lysis was concerned.

31. I count some seven occurrences of the former in the Lysis: 207c11; 214d7; 216b1; 219a4; 220b3; 221d3; 221c4. Though its appearance is never without significance (most of the passages in which the noun occurs will be discussed below), there can be no mistaking the fact that φιλία is not the term to be defined.

32. See W. Jaeger, Paideia (tr. G. Highet) II (Oxford 1943) 174f.
term to be defined in the Lysis, Socrates would have taken up the questions posed for him by latter-day expositors:

Is φιλία quite distinct from ἔρως?
Are they really one and the same?
Does the former subsume the latter?

The expositor's own response may depend upon which dialogue he has been lately reading—or even upon which part of a given dialogue. Casting a glance at Phaedrus 255e1f (καλεῖ δὲ ἀφτὸν καὶ οἴσται ὁ ἐρωτά ἐρωτά δὲ λλὰ φιλὶ λ ᾠ ν εἴναι), but leaving Laws 837a-b 33 conveniently out of account, Wilamowitz finds Plato to share in what he takes to have been a more or less universal opinion in antiquity: friendship and love are two basically different relationships ("zwei grundverschiedene Verhältnisse"). 34 For this reason too he argues—wrongly, I think—that the Lysis is much less closely connected with the Symposium than most Platonic scholars are willing to admit. 35

Grube, however, not only reaffirms the kinship of the Symposium and the Lysis, despite what Wilamowitz has said, but justifies his reaffirmation with a claim that in both works ἔρως, the species, is subsumed under the genus φιλία. 36 In his eagerness to demonstrate that the generic term must include the "passionate love" of the

33. Concerning this passage see n. 36 below.

34. Op. cit. (above, n. 4) I 143. Cf. II 68, where Wilamowitz again cites a belief in basic difference, but ascribes it to "griechisches Empfinden" rather than to the ancients in general.

35. He prefers to see a tight bond between the Lysis and the Charmides. Cf. above, n. 20.

older Hippothales for Lysis as well as Lysis' more normal friendship with his contemporary Menexenus—"or else," he warns, "the whole introduction is singularly irrelevant"—Grube defines the special term much too narrowly. In view of the behavior of Hippothales, the would-be pederast or excellence, "sexual desire" might be an adequate translation for ἔρως in the Lysis—at least at the outset. But in a later passage equivalence with φιλία seems almost to be assumed.37

Nevertheless Grube himself, if I am not being overcharitable, apparently realizes that ἔρως so conceived does not suit the Ἐσύποσιον, except (here I am carrying charity even further, since he says nothing of the sort) as a preliminary error to be corrected through the remarks of the several speakers.38 "We are therefore justified"—if I may quote Grube directly—"in tracing the development [emphasis mine]

boundary between the two concepts. Without claiming, as did Pohlenz before he had been rebuked by von Arnim (above, p. 2 and nn. 15-15), that in the Lysis it serves as sole subject, F. Friedländer, Plato III (Bern in 1957), 94, nevertheless claims that an atmosphere of Attic ἔρως can be sensed from the beginning of the dialogue to the end. Behind the φίλια overtly presented he finds ἔρως to be constantly lurking. Cf. Laws 637E f., which Friedländer translates as "Wenn Freund- schaft heftig wird, so nennen wir sie Liebe." But is not Plato simply talking of genus and species, as Grube suggested (though he did not cite this passage)?

37. I.e. at 22195-5 (cited in part by Friedländer, loc. cit. (above n. 36), p. 95, along with Socrates' statement at 21192f: ὅπος δὲ τὴν τῶν φ [λῶν κτησιν ἐκ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν [καὶ ὑμῖν ἐρωτικὸν (σκ. ἔρως) to show the close connection between the two concepts throughout the dialogue)

τοῦ ὀίκελος, δ ἐκόμεν, ὦ τε ἔρως καὶ ἡ φίλια καὶ ἡ ἐρωτικὴ τυχάνει σῶσα, ὡς φανέρα, ὡς δὲ γεγένετο τα ἑαυτῷ.

K. Glaser, "Gang und Ergebnis des platonischen Lysis," JHS 53 (1933) 47-67, thinks φίλια to be subsumed under ἔρως (p. 56). Cf. the suggestion of von Arnim III (above, n. 7) 40 that ἔρως in the broadest sense = ἔρως without reference to pederasty. If Glaser is right (ἐρωτικόν, at any rate, is shown in the dialogue to function as a sort of efficient cause; cf. below, pp. 24 and 28), perhaps we should interpret this passage as an indication not of interchangeability of the three terms, but of progression from the less to the more inclusive.

38. Note particularly Pausanias' distinction between a vulgar (ἀκιδοχῶς) and a heavenly ἐρωτικὸν Aprodesite and concomitantly between a vulgar and a heavenly ἔρως (180a5ff). The Lysis and the Erosius diverge also in another not unimportant respect. In the Tesserolογον ἔρως is endowed with a personality from the outset; such is not the case ever for either ἔρως or φίλια in the Lysis.
of Eros through the *Lysis* to the *Symposium*, as is usually done...  

Levi is one of those who follow this "usual" procedure. His assertion that the theory of ἐρως set forth in the *Symposium* resolves many of the difficulties left unresolved in the *Lysis* with respect to φιλία could hardly be labeled revolutionary. Yet note his willingness to consider ἐρως identifiable with φιλία—provided that it signify a love which is pure and not an egotistical and sensual passion.  

However, what Levi has just rejected describes exactly the emotion experienced by Hippothales. And in the *Lysis* it is called not φιλία, but ἐρως. The former term does not even enter the picture until the conversation with Hippothales has been terminated and Socrates turns his attention to the two comrades—φιλων γάρ ἐστον, he says to them (207c8)—*Lysis* and Menexenus. Addressing them, not Hippothales, he cites the old proverb to the effect that community of property is the rule among friends (κοινὸς τὰ γε φιλῶν λέγεται), and deduces therefrom that Menexenus and Lysis will differ little from one another, "if the two of you," he remarks, "are telling the truth about friendship" (εἴκερ ἀληθῆ περὶ τὸν φιλον λέγεται)(207c10f). Even in replying to Socrates' good natured banter the two boys react in unison. I cite three successive responses:

Wherefore the two of them laughed.  

(ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἀμφω)(207c6)

39. Loc. cit. (above, n. 36). I have broken off at the point where Grube takes issue with Milamowitz' denial of close kinship between the two dialogues.


41. Levi II (above, n. 40) 293.

42. See especially 204b7f:

...οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐρως ἐρ ρ ὃ ἐνοφω, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόρρω ἡ ἡ εἰ πορευόμενος τῷ ἐρ ρ ὃ το το ε.
"Quite so!" the pair responded.
(πάντως ἐν, ἐφάτην)(207°9)

The two assented.
(τοῦν ἐφάτην)(207°12)43

The contrasting manner of the two interviews, that with Hippothales enamored of Lysis, yet unable to establish a relationship, and that with Lysis and Menexenus, bound so closely to each other that they speak as one, not only serves to indicate that ἐρως is not identical with φιλία—that the latter is the genus, the former the species would not be ruled out44—but also paves the way dramatically for the ensuing discussion of whether "opposites attract" or "like cleaves to like" as well as for the puzzlement over the necessity or non-necessity of reciprocation.45

It ought to be clear by now that ἐρως is something more than "passionate love." In the Symposium and Phaedrus its scope will be be increased to the point where ἐρως will take over most or all of the rôle assigned to φιλία in the Lysis, as well as new functions not mentioned or perhaps only hinted before. But in the Lysis already φιλία too seems to be considerably more inclusive than "friendship" as we con-

43. Though it may have been already obsolescent in his lifetime, Plato rarely neglects an opportunity to employ the dual. Its use with reference to Lysis and Menexenus is both deliberate and appropriate.

44. Hence I discern no real disharmony between Laws 837a8f and Lysis 221b3-5 (see above, nn. 36f), if the latter be interpreted as I suggested at the end of n. 37 above.

45. The thesis that careful characterization of the several speakers is not mere "dramatische Einkleidung" (I forget whether it is von Arnim who introduces this expression; yet the viewpoint that the Lysis does not hang together is certainly his: see above, p. 6 and nn. 19f); but an essential feature closely linked with the philosophical tenets set forth in the dialogue receives vigorous affirmation from R.G. Hoerber. See his "Character Portrayal in Plato's Lysis," CJ 41 (1945-46), 271-73 (Hoerber I), and (with most of the same material incorporated, pp. 24f) the subsequent "Plato's Lysis," Phronesis 4 (1959). 15-28 (Hoerber II).
ceive it. "The Greek word is ambiguous," Shorey remarks, "being used also for what we should speak of as love." [emphasis mine].

Earlier I begged the question by defining φιλία tentatively as a relationship between φίλοι. Now I propose to beg the question further by classifying as φίλοι those whose conduct can be described via the verb φιλεῖν. But if the noun φιλία is ambiguous, meaning normally "friendship," though in extenso "love" of every sort, the verb φιλεῖν is ambiguous in just the opposite way. Normally it means "to love," but "be a friend to," the equivalent of φίλος εἶναι, an expression employed regularly in the argumentation of the Lysis, is another possibility.

Unfortunately φίλος εἶναι proves no less fraught with ambiguity than were φιλία and φιλεῖν. First of all, φίλος could be a noun.

46. Shorey III (above, n. 12) 115. I have deliberately suppressed the remainder of the sentence:

though passionate love is usually eros

inasmuch as our previous discussion ought to have clear that Plato, at least, goes well beyond the usual.

47. A.E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work (New York n.d.) 65, n. 2, while admitting the multiplicity of possible meanings for φιλία (see also below, p. 20 and n. 61), insists that φιλεῖν "can only be rendered 'to love.'" In certain contexts, however (outside the Lysis, as it happens), the verb can carry a specialized meaning akin to that of the Latin osculare. Similarly the noun φιλότης, though etymologically related to φιλία, may convey connotations of passion. See, for example, Maimonides L.1.3ff:

κρυπταθήν γράφεται λόγος τῆς ζαλίμας δόμα καὶ εἰνήν
ολίπος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γαρ λέμει "ἀρέσκεται ἀρπαλέα"
ανδράσιν ἵππος γονατίζεται...

However, φιλότης has quite a different significance (= ἰσότης, especially where good men are concerned) for Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Θ5.1157β36ff. Also, of course, φιλότης is the preferred term in Empedocles Περὶ φύσεως, appearing regularly as the counterforce to νέικος, whereas φιλία recurs there only rarely.

48. On the prevalence of "Vieldeutigkeit" throughout the Lysis (practically every important term turns out to be ambiguous, as will be shown in the discussion below), see S. Ranulf, Der eleatische Satz vom Widerspruch (Diss., Copenhagen 1924) 26-40. A catalogue of ambiguous expressions to be found in the various dialogues is inserted at pp. 184 ff (for the Lysis see p. 185).
"Friend" is the most obvious translation. One is hardly likely to render the Greek word as "lover": that is the meaning attached rather to the noun ἐραστής, the very term which Plato employs in the *Lysis* to denote persons such as Hippothales, just as he indicates their accustomed behavior through the use of the verb ἐρᾶν. This verb, like φιλεῖν, can mean "to love." But it often has connotations quite distinct from those with which φιλεῖν is regularly associated.

Plato, however, is no respecter of vulgar norms. Just as the ὑπερως of the *Symposium* comes more and more, in the course of the several speeches, to resemble what is called φίλα in the *Lysis*, so the ἐραστής of the larger dialogue (actually the personified ὑπερως himself, as Socrates demonstrates when it is his turn to speak) (199c3ff), shows progressively less resemblance to Hippothales, *Lysis* aspirant lover, while taking on lineaments already familiar from the discussion of the rôle of the φίλος undertaken by Socrates, *Lysis*, and Menexenus. Similarly in the *Phaedrus* there is a movement toward a truer conception of the lover's rôle, once the false eroticism of the speech ascribed to the orator Lysias (230d6-234c) has been effectively dispelled.49

But an ἐραστής be he sensualist or sage, must direct his emotions toward some object. The beloved of a pederast like Hippothales may be called ὅ παις—literally "boy," but here no doubt "darling" or "favorite":50 a meaning shared not only with the relatively unambigu-

49. Even apart, however, from preoccupation with rhetoric and style, the *Phaedrus* ventures into new territory not really explored in the other two dialogues: e.g. μανία. The notion that love was a sort of madness already seems to have become a cliché. Consider the ribbing to which Hippothales is subjected (*Lysis* 205a7f: οὖν ὑγιαίνει, ἐφ' ὁ κτησίμπος, ἀλλὰ ἄρετέ ναι με ἤγετα). Nevertheless, there is no effort here to evolve a theory of μανία as concomitant of love on a more exalted plane.

50. Were it not for the article (N.B. ὅ παις = "girl"), not even the sex of the beloved would be clear. But even with the article restored παις remains an ambiguous term, since in some contexts it can
ous τὰ παῖδικα\(^{51}\) (comparable, it would seem, to Latin deliciae),\(^{52}\) but also, apparently, with ὁ καλὸς. In fact it is the question ὥς ὁ καλὸς; (204\(^{b}\)1f) which inaugurates Socrates' probe into the love-life of Hippothales.

Now it happens that καλὸς (translated most frequently as "beautiful," but also as "handsome," "noble," "brave," "fine," "good," "excellent," and much more)\(^{53}\) is one of the widest ranging terms in the Greek vocabulary. But out of this seeming chaos is evolved the philosophical hierarchy central to Plato's Symposium (210\(^{a}\)4-211\(^{d}\)) from beautiful bodies (τὰ καλὰ σῶματα) through a series of ever more exalted impersonal and intangible καλὰ stepwise all the way to the Idea of the Beautiful (αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν).

In the Lysis, however, where a comparable progress to the Good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν—which, if conceived already as the Idea of the Good,\(^{54}\) would mean "servant" or "slave," whether or not the individual in question is still an adolescent. Consider too the fact that pederasty smacks often of exploitation. But these ambiguities apparently are not important enough to merit attention in Ranulf's catalogue (see above, n. 48).

51. This latter is really a technical term. Accordingly it occurs far more often in the interview with Hippothales and Ctesiphon (204\(^{d}\)6; 205\(^{a}\)2; 3; 63; 6; 3; 4; 5, 206\(^{d}\)) than does ὁ καλὸς (204\(^{b}\)8; 205\(^{b}\)).

52. Pueri delicati (note the etymological connection) constitute almost a professional class of male courtesans. But pederasty was never so much in vogue among the Romans (who deemed it an alien vice) as among the Greeks. Hence the term deliciae is applied more often to "females, as are expressions such as mea ulta and mea lux (literally "my life" and "my light"), utilized so frequently by Catullus and his fellow poets. Concerning the not inconsiderable erotic vocabulary which developed at Rome see especially R. Pichon, De sermone amatorio apud Latinos elegiarum scriptores (Diss., Paris 1902).

53. Consider too the combination καλὸς κάγαθος, which supposedly characterizes the true gentleman. There may be a play on this signifi-

54. A.C. Pacheco, Plato's Conception of Love (Diss., Notre Dame 1942) 7, is not alone in detecting "germs of the Theory of Ideas" already in the Lysis. Concerning the significance in the dialogue also of παρουσία and of the πρῶτον φίλον see below.
subsume even τὸ καλόν— is not sketched out until long after the termination of Socrates' talk with Hippothales, whatever ambiguity of language lurked in that interview could have been minimized still further, had Socrates been content to prune his vocabulary of expressions like ὁ καλός and refer to the beloved, the passive partner in the relationship, always as ὁ ἐρωμένος, the lover, the active partner, always as ὁ ἐρωτόν. Early in the conversation (in fact, immediately after having proclaimed his awareness that Hippothales is in love) Socrates employs this very terminology to indicate his own divinely bestowed power quickly to recognize one who loves and one who is loved (γνώναι ἐ ρ ὡ ν τ ὁ τ ἔ και ἐ ρ ὡ μ ε ν ο ν)(204c2).

Analogous distinctions are imported into Socrates' first conversation with Menexenus. But, whereas it was quite clear earlier that ὁ ἐραστής, "the lover," was identical with ὁ ἐρωτόν, "one who loves," it is not at all clear that ὁ φίλος must be the same as ὁ φιλῶν, the active partner in a friendship. We noted earlier that φίλος could be a noun and that "friend" was how it ought to be translated usually. However, φίλος can also be an adjective exhibiting the same amphibious nature as the Latin word amicus. The same distinctions occur in both tongues; the noun is construed with the genitive case, the adjective with the dative. But amicus, whether it means "friend of" or "friendly to," seems to be active always, comparable to amans, "one who loves,"

55. This is made clear, at any rate, in the Republic. See also the discussion of "Le Beau" and of "L'idée du Bien" contributed by Robin (above, n. 9) 226f.

56. Actually ἐραστής, invariably active in meaning, is just about synonymous with the latter.

57. Cited above, n. 42.

58. Cf. n. 56 above.

59. See above, pp. 16f.
never--so far as I can discern--to amans and amatus respectively as "he who acts the part of a friend" and "he who is befriended"; but normally amare, like φιλεῖν, is rendered "to love," whereas amicus, like φίλος (let us restrict our attention to the nominal use for the moment) is usually "friend." Cf. above, p. 16 and n. 47.

60. Perhaps it is possible to translate amans and amatus respectively as "he who acts the part of a friend" and "he who is befriended," but normally amare, like φιλεῖν, is rendered "to love," whereas amicus, like φίλος (let us restrict our attention to the nominal use for the moment) is usually "friend." Cf. above, p. 16 and n. 47.

61. "Friendly," explains Taylor, loc. cit. (above, n. 47), "means definitely 'a person feeling affection' and 'dear' a 'person toward whom affection is felt,'" N. Eckert, Dialektiker Scherz in den früheren Gesprächen Platon's (Progr., Schwabach 1906--7), in the course of his discussion of the Lysis (pp. 85--98), neatly distinguishes between φίλος with genitive (nominal and active) and φίλος with dative (adjectival and passive). He cites this as a difficulty. The real difficulty, however, so far as Plato conceives it, is not that φίλος can be either noun or adjective, but that both the adjective and the noun seem susceptible to either active or passive interpretation.

62. In the interest of idiomatic expression I have translated the combination έν τοῦτοις, έν οἷς as if it were really καθ' οἷς (which appears, as a matter of fact, directly afterwards at 210c8 (cited below).
If, indeed, the notion put forth here and constantly reiterated throughout the dialogue, namely that friendship must be based on utility, is one of the rocks on which the whole discussion founders— for it is on this account that Socrates disallows the pairing of like with like, despite evidence to the contrary from life itself, and denies that the good man (δ ἄγαθος), self-sufficient as he is, can be anyone's friend—ambiguous terminology constitutes not another rock merely, but a congeries of vicious shoals.

True, there are occasions where Socrates is allowed to engage in clever word-play without damaging the main line of the argument. In the course of the exchange with Lysis to which we have been giving

63. L. Stefanini in his chapter on the Lysis (Platone2 (Padua 1949); I 180-86), has effectively put his finger on the problem. But there are other problems too in the Lysis. Hence I cannot accept fully the conclusion which Stefanini draws at p. 185:

Svariano di motivo il Liske illustra l'unico argomento: in una concezione utilitaristica della vita morale non esistono ragioni dell'amicizia.

This doctrine is finally rejected by the Stoics. See Diogenes Laertius 7.124 (cited by C. Huit, Séances et Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques N.S. 41 (1894) 636, n. 2, who notes, on the other hand, that Socrates is credited with such views not only in the Lysis, but also in Xenophon's Memorabilia).

64. Not only the poets (with only slight modification Homer, Odyssey β 218, ὃς ἄει τὸν ἐμοῦν ἄει ὡς ἄει τὸν ἐμοῦν, is cited at 214α6), but also the natural philosophers, notably Empedocles and Democritus (for a listing of relevant fragments see Diels' Index (VS9 III 309f) s.v. ἐμοῦν Substantiv), stress the mutual attraction of similars. Those who assert that like is hostile to like (see Hesiod, Works and Days 25f, somewhat garbled in quotation at Lysis 215φ-31), and that attraction occurs rather between opposites (which notion is overthrown in turn by Socrates and his interlocutors), appear to have been in the minority, though the eminent Heraclitus is included among them. However, I sense a paradox in Empedocles' formulations: what brings "likes" together (air with air, fire with fire, etc.) is the ascendancy of Strife; whereas the ascendancy of Love causes a redistribution of such a sort that dissimilar entities are brought into juxtaposition.

65. Aristotle, be it noted, makes room in his Nicomachean Ethics both for friendships geared to convenience or mutual advantage, though he finds them impermanent and not very exalted, and for φίλος τῶν ἄγαθῶν, something quite distinct to which he accords high honor. That Plato does not conceive of utility in the common fashion is quite credibly argued by Horn (above, n. 18), 111.
attention he deftly brings together a series of etymologically related expressions (φονεύω, μέγα φονεύω, μεγαλόφρων εἶναι, ἀφφων εἶναι) whose ambiguity, already noticeable when they were isolated from one another, is enhanced by their interrelationship in the present context.66

But the ambiguity of φίλος is a much more serious matter. Perhaps it is only after the rest of the dialogue has become familiar to us that we recognize a foreshadowing of trouble already in the supposedly simple and non-technical first interrogation of Lysis by Socrates. "If, accordingly, you become wise, my boy," Socrates avers, "all will be friendly to you" [φίλς with dative, take note: the adjective, but in an active sense]67 "and to you," he continues, "all will be οίκειοι --for you will be useful [χρήσιμος] and good" [γαθός] (210d1-3):

Once again utility seems to be the sine qua non of friendship.68 Not until later will Lysis' or anyone else's being good as well as useful turn into a stumbling block on the paradoxical ground that no other person can be of any use to the good man.69 For the moment, at least, it is asserted that, should Lysis fail to become wise and useful

66. Ranulf (above, n. 48) takes note of this combination in his catalogue, p. 185. He translates μέγα φονεύω (with which μεγαλόφρων εἶναι may be equated) both as "grosse Einsicht besitzen" and as "edelmütig und hochsinnig sein." One would have supposed that the objective of this byplay was to show that pride in oneself must be conjoined with knowledge and understanding. However, in his more detailed discussion of the passage (p. 29) Ranulf indicates some dissatisfaction with Socrates' procedure. Leaving Ranulf's objections aside, I think the interplay between the two meanings of μέγα φονεύω to be most a proos in view of the earlier conversation in which Socrates advised Hippothales against continuing to sing Lysis' praises, lest he render the boy insufferably proud. The present interview with Lysis came about, after all, in order that Socrates might demonstrate to Hippothales the proper way for an ἔρωτις to address an ἐρώμενος (i.e. with gentle reproof rather than with conceit-inspiring laudation).

67. Cf. above, p. 20 and n. 61.

68. Cf. above, p. 21 and n. 63. But see also n. 65.

69. Cf. p. 21 above.
and good, no other person will be friendly to him (φίλος again, and once again active), neither parents nor οἰκεῖοι (210\textsuperscript{b}3f).

Twice over I have deliberately left this last term untranslated. Already in these first two appearances what will later mean "akin by nature"\textsuperscript{70} is included in the same context with φίλος in the active sense. Clearly οὐτε ὁ πατήρ...οὐτε ἡ μήτηρ οὐτε οἱ οἰκεῖοι signifies "not father nor mother nor members of the household,"\textsuperscript{71} whereas "and all will be on familiar terms with you" seems to be the meaning of καὶ πάντες σοι οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται.

Thus in this initial encounter of Socrates and Lysis the way has been prepared for concentrated inquiry, beginning with the question of whether φίλος actually designates the active or the passive party to the relationship (212\textsuperscript{c}8ff), and terminating with the attempt to demonstrate that the basis of friendly relations is τὸ οἰκεῖον, the fact of a "natural affinity" (221\textsuperscript{c}3ff).\textsuperscript{72}

I promised earlier to avoid a dogged itinerary through the dialogue from 203\textsuperscript{c}1 to the end. Nor shall I attempt anything of the sort for any of the individual conversations. Instead I should like to consider what of value remains after the shipwreck of every effort to explain who is friend to whom and why.

En route it might be worthwhile to scrutinize yet another rock or set of shoals. The argument, or rather, the several arguments in the Lysis foundered not only on ambiguities of language and on the insistence that a friend be useful, but also on Plato's refusal to acknowledge

\textsuperscript{70} Cf. above, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. above, n. 22.

\textsuperscript{72} Lysis 221\textsuperscript{e}3-5 is cited above, n. 37. The opposition between οἰκεῖον and ἀλλότριον is noted several times over in the dialogues: e.g. Charmides 163\textsuperscript{b}4-6. At Lysis 222\textsuperscript{c}3ff and Symposium 205\textsuperscript{e}6f the former term is paired with τὸ ἀγαπᾶν, the latter with τὸ κακόν. See Glaser (above, n. 37) 60; von Arnim III (above, n. 7) 59; A. Guzzo, GEOF 9 (1928) 391.
gradations. This problem is closely related to the other two, of
course. "Monados means "similar," yet need not imply total equality;
 Monados means "dissimilar," yet need not be synonymous with ἐναντίος.
Hence it would be possible for two individuals to resemble one another
(to be ἐμοιοι, that is) and yet differ enough (that is, be Monados) to
allow each to complement the other's deficiencies. Such being the
case, it would be possible to justify both seemingly contradictory
propositions: "like goes with like" and "opposites attract."

Furthermore, by avoiding mutual exclusiveness Plato could have ef-
rected a successful rapprochement with his conception of τὸ οἰκεῖον.
Affinity does not preclude mutual need. In fact, it was in explanation
of how ἐπιθυμία oό ἰν ἐνδεές Ἧη("desire for what is lacking"), operates
as a cause of friendship (replacing the previously discredited supposi-
tion that the presence of evil, κακοὶ παρουσα was responsible), that τὸ οἰκεῖον was brought into the discussion. For τὸ οἰκεῖον here
means not only "that which is akin by nature," but also, if the im-
lications of possible synonymity with τὸ ἐνδεές may be included,
"that which is one's own but of which one has been up to now bereft." The analogy with the formulations assigned to Aristophanes in Plato's

73. Here is the language, at least, of the Theory of Ideas. Cf.
J. Moreau, La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien (Paris 1939).
153ff. But two oddities ought to be noted. In view of its negative
nature, the status of τὸ κακόν as a "form" is somewhat questionable.
Moreover, a distinction is drawn (217c3ff.), between a "presence" whose
influence is permanent and that which produces only a temporary or
apparent change.

74. Much unnecessary controversy has arisen over the interpreta-
tion of 221e2f:

ἐνδεές δὲ γίνεται ὡς καὶ τι ἀφαίρεται

The text too is disputed. Codd. give τις, Stephanus, with whom Burnet
seems to be in agreement, prefers τι. Heindorf would change ἐνδεές to
ἐνδεές; Eckert (above, n. 61) 95, n. 110, approves. No one, so far as
I know, has proposed to replace ἐνδεές with something else. But
some are annoyed at the suggestion that τὸ οἰκεῖον, which will be men-
tioned before the end of 221e3, could be equated with that which has
been snatched away. The best course, I think, is to take the verb
not too literally; "what is lacking" can then be understood as "that
which is at least potentially one's own."
Symposium (189–2–193d5), should be quite obvious to everyone. It is indeed fortunate that later dialogues have salvaged conceptions such as this out of the shambles occasioned in part by too rigid insistence that τὸ οἶκεῖον is simply τὸ ἔξοιλον (already jettisoned, thanks to a refusal to recognize distinctions and gradations) under another name. The Symposium is, of course, the chief beneficiary of this salvage operation. Not the speech of Aristophanes alone, but other speeches as well owe something to the Lysis.

Nowhere is this indebtedness more manifest than in Socrates' confutation of Agathon (199c3–201c9); and subsequent report (201d1–212c3) of an alleged conversation with Diotima. That ἐρως which is personified and portrayed by Socrates, in contrast to what Agathon had asserted, as bereft of τὸ καλόν and of the several ἔρεται, yet eager to possess them all, as being in a state midway (μεταξὺ) between wisdom and ignorance, yet desirous of attaining the former—which, of course, means that he is φιλόσοφος in the truest sense—corresponds very closely to the active "friend" depicted in the latter part of the Lysis. He too happens to be not σοφός, but φιλόσοφος. He can be 75. Considerable insight into the significance of this speech (which he deems a "capolavoro") is shown by Levi I (above, n. 40) 294–97. Also worthy of notice is Levi's sympathetic evaluation (pp. 292f) of the doctrines set forth in the speech of the physician Eryximachus (Symposium 185e6–186a4).

76. It is left for posterity, e.g. Glaser (above, n. 37), 64, to observe that "ähnlich" and "verwandt" are not identical.

77. Some scholars argue that the lady from Mantinia serves as a convenient mouthpiece for the expression of Platonic doctrines alien to the thinking of the historical Socrates:

78. The same distinction between "wise" and "loving wisdom" (note the use of the neuter τὸ σοφὸν and τὸ φιλόσοφον) will be found at Phaedrus 278d3–6. Whether or not this belongs among the "purely verbal quibbles" to which Shorey I (above, n. 12) 141, n. 77, makes passing reference, there can be no doubt that the theory of reciprocity between friends (either of whom could then be φίλος both actively and passively, i.e. at once φιλῶν and φιλούμενος) not only seems to be contradicted by those numerous instances in which affection is answered by hostility, but is also dealt a body blow by Socrates' insistence that con-
classified neither as evil nor as good: he is "morally neutral" (οὔτε ἀγαθὸς οὔτε κακὸς). 79

The object of his affections, on the other hand, is not morally neutral, and certainly not evil, but desirable (φίλος in a passive sense), and good (ἀγαθὸς). No, that is not quite right. We must take cognizance of a most significant shift in gender. When one person cares for another, the real love-object, according to Socrates' formulations, is not the latter individual, but that for the sake of which (οὗ ἔνεξα) he is loved. Hence there exists the hierarchy tersely put into words by Glaser:

Primär ist das φίλον, sekundär der φίλος. 80

Glaser is right too in stating that this order of precedence does not contradict the stepwise progress which Diotima purportedly set forth for Socrates' benefit. 81 I should have preferred a more positive declaration, however. The movement from lesser to more lofty καλός, and finally to αὐτῶ τὸ καλὸν— I have already noted it in passing 82—clearly is derived from the Λύσις and should be seen as a development

sideration be given to a series of compounds (φίλατμον, φιλόσοφον, φιλόκουνες, φιλόποιοι, φιλογνώμοναι, even φιλόσοφοι) (21δ21) applicable only to the active partner in an obviously one-sided relationship. Plato has been accused, moreover, of misconstruing the Solonian couplet (= fr. 13 Diehl) cited at 21δ21:

"Οξύλοις ὑπαίθριοι τε, φίλε, ξυνίας ἑνώσει καὶ μῦνες ἀγρευταί καὶ ξένος ἀλλοδαποῖς.

Actually the status of the crucial adjective is ambiguous. φίλος could be predicate adjective in agreement with several subjects (as Plato seems to have interpreted) or simply an attributive modifying καλέσθαι (as Plato's critics think Solon meant to indicate), in which latter case the quotation would not really be relevant to the problem with which Socrates and Menexenus are grappling.

79. See also above, p. 8 and n. 24.

80. Loc. cit. (above, n. 37) 63. "Primär ist das Eidos," Glaser adds (p. 65), explaining himself more fully (be it noted that Plato does not yet use the term ἔνεξα itself in this sense; see below, p. 27). "und die Verwandtschaft mit ihm, sekundär die Freundschaft mit Menschen, die es gemeinsam haben." 81. Ibid., n. 20. With regard to the relationship between "soul" and "thing" Glaser recommends consultation of the Phaedrus.

82. See p. 18.
of the theory therein expounded to combat an infinite regress. If the passive φίλος is "dear" to the active (and, conversely, if the active is "friendly" to the passive) for the sake of something else which is deemed "desirable" (φίλον τυ.), and that latter in turn has been sought for the sake of yet another φίλον τυ, the seemingly endless chain of subordinate and superior φίλα will terminate in a πρῶτον φίλον ("prime love-object" or "prime desirable") whose close correspondence with αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν of the Symposium is undeniable, just as it is undeniable that both may be equated with the Good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν),83 the ultimate goal of all endeavors.84

That in the Lysis, as in the Symposium, Plato has already conjured up the world of "eternal, immutable forms"85 can there, then, be any doubt? Granted, the terms εἶδος and ἴδεα have not yet joined the technical vocabulary of Platonism. It would be a mistake, surely, to draw any inferences regarding the Theory of Ideas from Lysis 204a5f (πολλοῦ δὲ ἴδις τὸ ἐ ἴ ὁ κ ἄγνοειν τοῦ παῖδος) or from the sequence κατὰ τὴν ψυχῆς ἰδίος ἐ τρόπους ἐ ἐ ἴ ὁ κ ἄτ 222a3, where the last word seems to be merely a reinforcement of the two nouns preceding. On the other hand, the noun παρουσία and the verb παρεῖναι, whether it be "whiteness" or "evil" which makes its "presence" felt,86

83. Cf. above, pp. 18f and n. 55. On the introduction of a transdeni al sumnum bonum "long before Republic VI" see H. Gauss, Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos III ii (Bern 1954) 108.

84. Cf. Aristotle’s reference at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics to σαλαθόν, οὐ πάντι ἐφίτεια.

85. See above, n. 54. Frankly I am surprised at the dearth of interest in the Lysis manifested by most authors of books or monographs on "Platonische Ideenlehre" (P. Natorp not excepted). Some mention the Lysis not at all, others (to one or two of whom I have made or shall make reference in these notes) allow only a passing nod.

86. Cf. Charmides 160b5 (ἐννοίοντας ὑπολογίζει τιγά ἐ σε σε, ποιεῖ ἐ σωφροσύνη π. τ. ὁς εἶσ κ. δ. и and ἰδιαθή (σωφροσύνη δὲ γε ἄγαθον, εἶπερ ἄγαθος ποιεῖ σεις ἂν π. τ. ἐ ρ. ἄ μ., κακοίς δὲ μη). 217. Is one of the passages in the Lysis (the other is 213b-5, where the distinction between σοφος and φίλος φίλος (cf. above, p. 25 and n. 79) is demonstrated) to catch the attention of P. Brommer, Etos et Idee (Diss., Utrecht 1940). 27.
indubitably foreshadow not only the language, but also the substance of the mature "Ideenlehre" to be found in the middle dialogues.87

A hint of what is to come may be discerned also in the designation of the "prime desirable" as φίλον...τῷ ἐντὶ (220b1f; b4) and ὡς ἀληθῶς...φίλον (219d4f), whereas the great mass of φίλα, which turn out to be "desirable" only for its sake, turn out also to pose a danger of deceiving us (219d2f), inasmuch as they are little better than "images" (εἰδωλα) of that which is truly to be sought.88

Lest we be deceived, nevertheless, though from a different quarter, let us not take our leave of the Lysis without dispelling the impression that the argument yields up only negative results. The theory of reciprocity is abandoned, to be sure, as is the widely held view that similarity or the not quite so widely held view that dissimilarity forms the basis of friendly relations, not to mention the apparently original doctrine of το οἰκεῖον. Of course, it is hardly surprising that evil should be eliminated not only as a final, but even as an efficient cause—if terminology usurped from Aristotle may be allowed this once—and that its place should be taken by a more acceptable and morally untainted ἐπιθυμία ὃ ἄν ἐνδείκτη.89

And what is it that is lacking and is thus become the prime object of desire (πρῶτον φίλον)? It is the Good (τὸ ἀγαθῶν), the ultimate

87. I should agree with those whose chronology of the Platonic Corpus places the Phaedo in close proximity to both the Symposium (which it probably follows) and the Republic (which it probably proceeds).

88. Cf. F. Susemihl, Die genetische Entwicklung der platonischen Philosophie I (Leipzig 1855) 20. Yet a note of caution (excessive caution, in my opinion) is sounded in the very next paragraph:

Das höchste Gut ist keineswegs der Begriff des Guten.

Had he been discussing Aristotle rather than Plato, Susemihl's comment might have been more to the point.

goal which remains always in view to Plato and Platonists, no matter how much else must be abandoned as dialectically unacceptable.90

90. "Das wichtigste Ergebnis des Lysis," observes Horn (above, n. 18) 118, "ist mithin die Feststellung des absoluten Werthes des Guten..." He adds, and I should agree, that the Lysis does not deserve the subordinate rôle usually assigned it. In view of the status of the Good as the cornerstone of Plato's ethics and in view of the frequency with which this dialogue is echoed in later Platonic works, there may be considerable justification for Horn's claim that the Lysis lays the groundwork for the whole Platonic Corpus. Huit (above, n. 63) 641, however, scales down the positive content of the dialogue to a view of friendship as "la tendance commune de deux âmes semblables et différents vers le bien souverain."