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THE TWO STATES IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

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It is all too often taken for granted in recent discussions of Plato's Republic that Guardians and Philosophers are identical, and that the introduction of the Philosopher in Books V-VII is motivated by nothing but a desire to add further refinements to the character of the Guardian as described in Books II-IV. The purpose of this paper is to take issue with this position by arguing that Plato maintains a clear distinction between Guardians and Philosophers throughout the Republic and that his political doctrine in the Republic involves not one kind of state but two, of which the Guardians rule one and Philosophers the other. Further, I should like to examine the nature of these two states and their rulers and try to ascertain Plato's purpose in introducing each.

In a passage which has, as far as I know, not received the attention it deserves in recent discussions of the Republic, Plato is quite explicit about the fact that it is two states with which he is concerned. At the opening of Book VIII, Socrates wants to bring the discussion back to the point where the "three waves" had interrupted it. It will be remembered that, after the account of the state of the Guardians, when Socrates was just about to speak of the degenerate states here on earth in their relation to the state of the Guardians (V. 1749 ab), Polemarchus and Adeimantus made him digress to take up the problems of the equality of women, of the common possession of women and children, and of the Philosopher and his education. The end of Book VII brings with it the end of these "three waves", and the words with which the subject of the degeneration of states is resumed are the following. Socrates asks Glaucous at VIII. 543 c: ἀλλ' ἀγ', ἐπειδὴ τούτ', ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθώμεν ποτεν ἐχθρο ἐξετασμόμεθα, οὖν πᾶλιν τὴν σύνθεν ἰδον. -- ὥστε, ἐφεξήγησεν ἐνδεχόμενον, καθολικῶς, ὡς ἔστω, ἠπαθεῖαν ἐπὶ τῆς πάλαις τούτος λόγους ἐπίστευσε, λέγειν ὡς ἐξαίρετον ἀπὸ τῆς τοιούτου, οἷον τοῦτο διήθητος, ἀληθείας πᾶλιν, καὶ ἀνεδρέξον ἐκείνη ὅμοιον, καὶ τούτω, ὡς οἰκίας, κοιλίας ἐτί ἐχεῖν εἰπεῖν πᾶλιν τοῦτο καὶ ἀνεδρέξα. (1) Glaucous's reply indicates that Plato, at this point in the discussion, speaks of two states rather than one, and the reference back to V. 1749 a leaves no doubt about the nature of these two states: the first is that which had been discussed before V. 1749 a, i.e. the state of the Guardians, and the individual corresponding to it is the just man; while the second state and individual "still more beautiful" are those discussed in the digression, i.e. the Philosopher and his state of Books V-VII.

Although the differentiation between the two states and their respective rulers is here made most emphatic, there are a number of other passages in the Republic to corroborate it. For example, in constructing the state of the Guardians, Socrates had insisted on older men being the rulers and the younger the ruled (III. 412 c 2-4); but when speaking of the philosophic rulers at VII. 536 c-d, he says: τάδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλαοθεσκυ- μῃδε, οτι ἐν μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ προσβάσας ἐξελέγομεν, ἐν δὲ ταὐτῇ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσοι, since νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πάνοι. (2)
The distinction drawn between the "former selection" and the "present" one again points to a conscious difference between the two states and their rulers.

What, then, is the precise difference between the two? And what exactly is Plato's purpose in introducing each? Let us begin with the Guardians and their state. Even before the foundations for the state of the Guardians are laid, Plato clearly states its purpose: εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεωρομέναλογφ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τίτις ἐφοίμον ἐν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἄδικον. (3) If we get here the first suggestion that the account of the origin of the state, which Plato is about to give, is not meant to be historical, this impression is confirmed at once by the ἀναγκαιοτέρη πόλις which Socrates begins to construct. It consists of only four or five men, each a specialist craftsman; no mention at all is made of any women and children that are to inhabit it. It is hardly necessary to stress the point that Plato was quite aware that women, too, are needed for the establishment of an actual state, and we only have to point to the entirely different account in the Laws to show that he knew that division of labor did not stand at the beginning of the history of human society. Accordingly, Plato's purpose in constructing the state in which the Guardians are to be placed is not historical but ideological. (4) He constructs the state not for its own sake, but to discover the principles of justice and injustice in it: it is to exist λόγῳ and not ἐφαρμοσθεῖ (cf. V. 473 a 5-6); and by means of it Plato wants to show step by step what justice is, not how it can be attained. In short, the state of the Guardians is meant, initially at least, to be a model to demonstrate something other than a state.

The truth of this is borne out by the deliberate parallelism between the structure of the completed state and the structure of the soul of the individual, in order that the virtues as public qualities will be shown to be identical with the virtues as private and personal qualities. Moreover, Plato shows so little concern for the practical aspects of the Guardian state that some of the most serious administrative problems posed by it are not faced at all, and many of the proposals made are so difficult of realization as to be completely impracticable. To single out a few points only: though much is said in Book II about the education of the Guardians, we are not told who is to educate them; no attention is given to the problem of enforcing the marriage regulations; and, though the point is made that the state must not grow too large, only the birthrate of the Guardians -- the best element in the state -- is controlled, so that, as Cornford remarks, they will soon be so outnumbered by the producing class that they will not be permitted to procreate at all, if the total number of citizens is to remain constant. Many more examples could be adduced to demonstrate Plato's lack of concern with the practical side of the state of the Guardians, and it is surely not insignificant that the problems connected with marriage and procreation, which had been brushed aside by Socrates at IV. 423 e, are brought back into the discussion only on the insistence of Polemarchus and Adeimantus at V. 449 c. But even in dealing with the first two waves, the equality of women and the common possession of women and children, Socrates expresses grave doubts as to the feasibility of his proposals (V. 450 c, 456 b, 457 d), and finally requests his interlocutors merely to assume (θεῦτριφ) that the common possession of
women and children is possible. This is tantamount to saying that his interest lies more in the program as such than in advocating its adoption in actual practice.

This will suffice to show that the state of the Guardians is not intended as a blueprint of a state to be set up here on earth. It is intended to be the embodiment of justice, courage, self-control, and wisdom, and since these are Essential Forms, which for Plato constitute the only realities, only this is a state worthy of the name, while all other states c_i ô_píâllai ôll ôú póliç. (5)

The relation in which this ideological state stands to actual states here on earth and to what is desirable in them is brought out with the utmost clarity as Glaucos's insistent questioning about the practicability of the state of the Guardians brings the third wave of paradox down upon Socrates. Socrates' reply to Glaucos requires a detailed analysis. He begins by re-emphasizing (V. 472 b) that the state was constructed to show dínai osún oíóv èstí kai àdêiçn, (6) and then proceeds to introduce a distinction which will become fundamental for everything that is to follow (472 b 6 ff.): èph và éndra toû dímaion àxiôsmen mSpeakóv éuiôv avûsîs ékêînês diáferein, allâ pántakh próitou dîxîs oíôv dímaioûn èstîn; éî agapísoumen èav èstî égýntata auûsîs h kai plêîstra tôv allôw ékêînês mûtêxm. -- Oútwv, éphô' agapísoumen. (7) What we learn here is made still more explicit in the immediate sequel: Socrates differentiates between the énû pêlathos dûmaîos, the "perfectly just man", who had been defined earlier (IV. 473 c - 474 a), and the kind of just man we may encounter in our existence here on earth. Justice itself and the perfectly just man were sought only pàraðéîmata ênêka (8) and the actual existence of such a man is thrown in doubt by the addition of eî ãvôîto (9): justice and the just man as we meet them in the world around us may come close to, but they never completely attain, the perfection embodied in the model. The same applies to the state of the Guardians as a whole: pàraðéîmía ênêka - oumèn lóghû ãgâthês pêlathos (10) and here, too, Socrates warns Glaucos, we must not expect to be able to demonstrate that it is possible to govern a state in the way described. (11) Accordingly, it is wrong to expect ever to achieve an exact correspondence between the perfection of thought and the imperfection of action: the best that can be hoped for is an approximation of action to thought, and if that can be brought about the optimum state must be regarded as possible, but possible within the limitations of the actualities of this world. (12) For the actual states which we encounter in our lives are all badly governed, and what we must look for are one or perhaps two of the least changes by which an approximation to the state of the Guardians can be brought about. (13)

This is the context into which the paradox of the Philosopher Kings is introduced in words carefully chosen to emphasize the difference between their state and the state of the Guardians: 'Exan mú ... h oî fîlô-sofîos bûsîlêuôsin év tâis pôlêsiûn h oî bûsîlêîs te têv lêgômêgos kai ûn-vástai fîlôsofîôswsûs gânyôwos te kai dêvânêhs, kai têvûto eîs toûtou sîmêpêr, ûnûmâîs te polîtîkê kai fîlôsofîa, têv bêv pôrûmêgovn kûrîs ép' êkâ-terov aî pôllai wûsîtès êz' ânûghîs dîpôlêisêôswsûs, ouk èstî kaiûn pôlêwç, dî fîlê Glaûwâs, tâis pôlêsiûs, dêkâv è' ouûv têv ãnêrêswînûs gênesî, ouûv àúth
Unlike the state of the Guardians, the state to which Plato refers here is not to exist λόγῳ in the realm of thought, but it is a state which may be realized ἐργαζόμεν, a state which can grow εἰς τὸ δυνατόν. Plato does not speak of a Philosopher King arising in the πόλις in the singular, as he did in creating the state of the Guardians, but he speaks of αἱ πόλεις, the actual states here on earth which, as he had pointed out previously, are now all badly governed. It is in these corrupt states that the Philosopher Kings are to effect a change, by which these states are to be brought close to the state of the Guardians, though, as we have just learned, actual states can never be identical with the παράδειγμα ἀγαθῆς πόλεως.

This brings us to the question of the precise meaning to be attributed to the term "Philosopher Kings". Plato takes great pains from here on to the end of Book VII to describe the Philosophers as fully as possible. He is, however, not as explicit in explaining what he means by "Kings"; still, the passage we have just been discussing provides us with adequate clues: the Kings he means are those who are called kings and potentates by his contemporaries (οἱ νῦν λυγόμενοι). There is, accordingly, nothing philosophical or intellectual about the Kings. They are monarchical rulers in actual states, and perhaps not even monarchical rulers at that: the vagueness of the term δυνάστατα does not seem to preclude the possibility of some kind of oligarchical or aristocratic rule. Plato does not tell us how these kings and potentates are to attain power in the first place; but it is safe to assume that they attain it in the normal constitutional way in which a given state appoints its kings and potentates: in a hereditary monarchy, for example, a king will succeed to the throne by reason of his birth as the son of a royal father; in an elective monarchy he will be chosen by those who, in that state, have the right to vote from among those who are eligible for the office, and so forth. That this is what Plato had in mind is confirmed by the alternative he proposes: whether Philosophers become Kings, i.e., a Philosopher succeeds to the throne in the constitutionally accepted way, or those who have already become kings in the normal constitutional course of events turn to philosophy -- not in the sense that they dabble in it, but in that they thoroughly (γνησίως τὸ καὶ ικανώς) imbue themselves with it.

What Plato advocates is, therefore, not a revolution but a peaceful transition involving the least possible change from an actual state as it is to an actual state which comes as close as possible to the παράδειγμα ἀγαθῆς πόλεως. He is concerned with what is possible, δυνατόν: the Philosophers and Kings who are to rule actual states are not ἀνδρεῖς τελεσί δώσις, nor are they to be δημιουργοὶ ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως πάνω ἀκριβοτῶς (15), as he had described the Guardians at III. 395 c 1; they are to be the actual rulers of actual states. The reason why a monarchical or aristocratic-oligarchical form of an actual state is chosen for the Philosopher is not explicitly stated here. But there is no doubt that Plato regarded it as easier to effect a change through one man or a few than through many. We see him argue the same thing in Laws IV. 709 e ff., where he states that a change for the better in the existing order of things can be brought about most effectively by a young, intelligent, and virtuous tyrant.
Furthermore, unlike the Guardians and their state, which can attain the perfection of which thought is capable, there is in the passage we have been discussing every indication that no such perfection can be achieved by the Philosopher. Without the coalescence of political power and philosophy, Plato says in a phrase which is repeated almost verbatim at VI. 487 e and 501 e, "there is no respite from ills...for states and...not even for mankind." There is no assurance that the ills to which actual states are subject will ever cease. All we are promised is that a mitigation of these ills, if possible at all, can come only through the rule of the Philosopher. We are decidedly far from the state of the Guardians and in the world of change and decay in which we now live.

If, then, the purpose of the Philosophers is to bring about that transformation in actual states which will bring them as close as possible to the state of the Guardians, our next question is how that approximation is to be effected. Before Plato tells us that, he prepares the way by making three rather subtle points. The first of these is that at VI. 484 b he describes the Philosophers as "guardians". But unlike the Guardians of the ideological polis, these Philosopher guardians are to govern the polis, the actual states here on earth: "...δύνασθαι...οικόν μοι...παλαιάτως...φυλέλαξαι νόμους...τούτους...καθιστάναι..."(16)The second point is introduced immediately after this: the Philosophers must have in their soul an ἐναργές πορεδείγμα, a "clear model", to which they look in order to enact τα ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καὶ δικαιώματα καὶ ἀγαθάν (17), and they are to do so ὡς οἷον τοὺς ἄνδρας βέστατον. That the model in their soul is the state of the Guardians, which embodies all the moral qualities, is shown by a later passage (IX. 591 e), when the model is referred to as the "constitution within" the Philosopher (ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτική). This means that the state of the Guardians is now internalized to be precisely what Socrates had earlier claimed it was: it is a πορεδείγμα which cannot be actualized with the same precision with which the Guardians were to fulfill their task at III. 395 c, but only "as precisely as possible." Finally, a point is made at 484 d, which is later elaborated at VII. 539 e ff.: in order to be guardians of actual states, the Philosophers must have experience (ἐμπειρία) as well as knowledge. This, too, marks them off from the Guardians: general experience in governing of the kind a king has played no part at all in the state of the Guardians; the only experience required there was in the Guardians' education for war.

With these qualities, the Philosopher can begin his work of transforming actual states. His first task is to make the state a tabula rasa (501 a ff.; cf. VII. 540 e ff.), and then re-create it in the light of his knowledge of "what is by nature just, self-controlled, and so forth," (18) and his creation will then be the ὑποκείμενα πολιτική. This "best constitution", as Socrates again takes care to point out, is very similar to, but not identical with, the state of the Guardians. It will be like the state of the Guardians in all points but one; for while it had been suggested at IV. 429 c that the Guardians are to accept unquestioningly what the lawgiver tells them, in the state of the Philosophers "there will always have to be...an element which adheres to the same constitutional princi-
ples as those which you, as the lawgiver, had when you enacted the laws."(19)
In other words, the Philosophers must perpetuate through education the
λόγος on which their constitution is based,(20) for the Guardians it
was sufficient to accept what the lawgivers told them.

We have in these statements the clue to answering the question
why Plato felt constrained to treat the subject of education twice in the
Republic. The discussion in Books II-III deals with the education of the
Guardians who, as the watch-dogs of the state, have to be trained physi-
cally and intellectually for the possession of the virtues: ...οὔδε μους:
κοι πρώτον ἐμμέθα, οὔτε αὐτοί οὔτε ὀυς φομν ἡμῖν παῖδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς
φύλακας, πρὸν ἐν τῇ σωφροσύνης εἰθη καὶ ἁνδρείας καὶ ἀλευθερίατος
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπίας καὶ ὑσα τούτων ἄκεκα καὶ τά τούτων αὐ ἑνεγκτα παντα-
χοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμα καὶ ἑγόντα ἐν ὅς ἑνεστὶν αἰθανωμερα καὶ
αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνια αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν συκροτὶς μήτε ἐν μεγαλοὶς ἀτμαμω-
μον.....(21). The discussion about the education of the Philosophers, on
the other hand, is less concerned with the possession of the virtues than
with the way by which they are to be acquired. The approach taken from
VII. 521 c - 535 a thus becomes primarily practical: we are given in con-
crete terms a program of education by which, Plato believes, the Philo-
sopher ruler can be created, provided that he has the right kind of dis-
position to start with.

That the educational program of Book VII is meant for the Philo-
sophers and not for the Guardians is clear beyond reasonable doubt. As
if to emphasize the point, it is here (535 a and 536 c) that Plato speaks
of the selection of Guardians at III. 412 bc, in which older men were to
be chosen as Guardians, as the πρώτα ἐκλογη, which will not do in the
case of the Philosophers: here it is the younger men who must be selected.
Before the education of the Philosopher is treated in detail, Plato states
the goal of that education in a way which shows the relation he wanted
to establish between Philosopher and Guardian.

For the discussion of the Essential Form of the Good through the
analogy of the sun and the eye, he takes the Guardians as his point of
departure. He begins by enumerating again all those qualities which had
been mentioned at III. 412 c ff. as prerequisites of the Guardians, but
soon introduces an important modification. Though he had required, at
II. 375 e and 376 bc, that some kind of vague philosophical element be
present in the Guardians, he had also stated at III. 412 e and 413 c that
they must be constant in their belief (φύλακες τοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἄδικατος).
But now we are told, on the basis of insights gained through the discus-
sion of the Philosopher, that as Guardians in the fullest sense philoso-
phers must be appointed. (22) The difference between this statement
and the demand that Philosophers be made Kings or Kings Philosophers is
rather remarkable. While in the discussion of existing states Kings and
Philosophers are treated equally as rulers, here in the realm of thought
the Guardians are not interchangeable with Philosophers. What we find is
simply that a further requirement has been added: it is now considered
no longer sufficient for the Guardians to have constancy of belief, but
the best of them must also be philosophers in the sense that they must
themselves gain the knowledge of the moral entities, which forms the basis
of their rule. This is not a shift in Plato's position: Guardians and Philosophers are not now suddenly identified with one another, but we merely get the assertion, elaborating in the case of the Guardians the earlier requirement that they know the Forms of the virtues (III 402 b ff.), that knowledge of the Good is as necessary for the rulers of the ideological state as it is for those of the actual one. (23)

The Allegory of the Cave shows that this is what Plato has in mind. The Guardians are here no longer mentioned, but only the Philosopher. For it is from the Cave, i.e. from our actual world, that the Philosopher proceeds on the upward path toward the world of the Essential Forms, and once he has seen them in all their purity, he must be compelled to return to the Cave to be its guardian: Ἐκέχω τοῖς εἴσοντας, εἰπὼν, Ἀ Πλαῦκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδικίαςοιμίν τοῖς παρέν πολέν ψευδάρανθρον γινόμενοι, ὅλη δυσμᾶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐρώμεν, προσαναγείκοντες τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ταύτα καὶ φυλάσσειν. (24)

With the program of education, Plato's treatment of the Philosopher as ruler reaches its end, marked as such formally by the return, at the opening of Book VIII, to the discussion which had been interrupted at 412 a ff. by the "three waves" and which we cited earlier in this paper. Socrates now proceeds to measure existing constitutions and the individuals dominating each against the ideological construct of the state of the Guardians. While this part of the Republic is relevant for our purposes only in that it indicates that Plato is here, as he was in the ἐναγκαστή πόλις, not concerned with describing a historical development, but with measuring existing actual constitutions against his ideological construct, there is in the sequel a passage which throws an important light on the problem of the degree of practicability which Plato himself attributed to his proposals in the Republic. As a final answer to Thrasymachus' contention that justice is not profitable, Socrates, in proving the opposite, reaffirms the paradigmatic nature of the state of the Guardians. The just man neglects the honors and distinctions of this world and instead "looks at the constitution within him, being on his guard not to upset anything there either by the abundance or the lack of his possessions." (25) That this "constitution within him" is the ideological state of the Guardians becomes clear in the subsequent interchange between Socrates and Glaucon. Οὐκ ὅρα, ὡς, τὰ τε πολιτικὰ ἐθέλησε πράξειν, ἔστω ὑπό τούτου μηδέναι, ἀλλ' ἂν ἐγὼ, ἐν ὑπὸ ἐστιν πόλις καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ὑώς ἐν γς τῇ πατρίδι, ἐν μὴ θεία τετει συμβη σώς. ἀλλ' ἂν τὸ σύντομον ὁμοίως εὶς τὰ καλά ἐκάλλομεν ἀκιάδοντες πόλει λέγεισι, ἂν ἐν λόγοις κείμενη, ἐπεὶ θεία γς υἱός του ὅσιοι σύμεσα αὐτὴν εἴσατε, ἄλλ' ἂν ἐγὼ, ἐν ὑπὸ διαφέρων πάροικον ὁμοίως ἐγών καὶ ὁμοίως ὁμοίως, διὰ μετέχει δὲ ὑώς καὶ εἴτε ποτέ εἰς ταύτα καὶ εἴς ταύτα, τὰ γὰρ ταύτας μόνης ἐν πράξεις, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑώσις. (26) The distinction between the just man's "own state" and his "country"; the fact that the state under discussion exists only "in the realm of discourse"; and that it is called a "model" all point to the conclusion that the state of the Guardians is meant here, that its actual existence and non-existence in our world is irrelevant, and that Plato nowhere meant to suggest the possibility of its actual existence.
But is that also true of the state of the Philosopher, which, if any state can, will come close to it? In the passage just quoted Socrates reveals a glimmer of hope that "some divine chance" may make the just man engage in the political life of his country. That this glimmer presents for Plato a genuine hope is shown by his formulation earlier in the work as to how the ἀριστή πολιτεία of the Philosopher may be realized: "If men endowed with the highest gifts for philosophy are ever constrained to take care of a state, if they ever have been so constrained in the infinity of time past, or are so constrained at the present in some foreign place, far beyond our sight, or if they will ever be so constrained; then we are ready to argue that the constitution we have described has come into being, exists, and will exist, when this Muse (sc. philosophy) will hold power over the state. It is neither impossible, nor is what we are saying impossible. That it is difficult we agree." (27) Unlike the state of the Guardians which remains "set up as a model in heaven," there is, in Plato's view in the Republic, the faint hope that the state of the Philosopher may be possible.

NOTES

1. "Come now, since we have completed this account (sc. of the Philosopher), let us remember at what point we digressed, so that we can go back to it." "That is not hard," he replied. "You were talking, just as you are now, as if you had completed your account of the state, and you were saying that you would regard the state which you had been discussing and the man corresponding to it as good. But for all that it seems that you had a state and an individual still more beautiful to talk of...."

2. "But don't let us forget that while in our former selection we chose old men, that will not be possible in the present selection.... All great and recurring hardships are the job of young men."

3. II. 369 a 5: "If we study in our discussion the developing state, we should also see justice and injustice develop in it."

4. The state of the Guardians is usually referred to as Plato's "ideal" state. Since in modern usage "ideal" is the opposite of "real", I think this term should be avoided in discussions of Plato, for whom "realities" lie only in the realm of thought. Moreover, if we equate "ideal" with "thought of as perfect or as a perfect model" (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1959 ed.), the term would not be applicable to the state of the Guardians, because at VIII. 543 d - 544 a 1 the state of the Philosophers is described as ἀλλὰ ἐπιτιθέντος καλής.

5. IV. 422 e: "are very many states, but not a state."

6. "...what kind of thing justice and injustice are."
7. "Shall we demand that the just man, too, must in no way differ from justice itself, and that he must in every respect have the same qualities as justice? Or shall we be satisfied if he comes as close as possible to justice and has a larger part in it than anyone else?" "Yes," he said. We shall be satisfied."

8. V. 472 c 4-5: "as a model."

9. "... if he were to come into being."

10. V. 472 de: "we created in our discussion a model of a good state."

11. V. 472 e: ... ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν ἀποδείξεις ὡς δυνατὸν οὕτω πολὺν οἰκήσαι ὡς ἔλεγεν.

12. V. 473 ab: Τούτο μὲν ἡ μὴ ἀνάγκη μὲν, οἶν τῷ λόγῳ διήλθομεν, τοιαύτα παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἐργῷ δὲιν γιγαντεύοντα <ἄν> ἀποφαινεῖται ἄλλο, ἐὰν οἷοί τε γενόμεθα τυρεῖν ὡς ἄν ἔγεισητα τῶν εἰρημένων πολίς οἰκήσειν, φάναι ἡμᾶς δεξιορρθῆσαι ὡς δυνατὰ ταύτα γίγανθηναι ὥσπερ ἐπιτάττεις.

13. V. 473 b: τίνος ὁμικροτέτατος μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι εἰς τούτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλεως.

14. V. 473 e-c: "Unless either philosophers are kings in their states, or those who are now called kings and potentates engage genuinely and adequately in philosophy; and unless political power and philosophy coalesce in that the many natures of those who now travel their paths separately in the one direction or in the other are forcibly precluded from doing so; there is no respite from ills, my dear Glaucon, for states and, I think, not even for mankind; nor will this constitution, which we have gone through in our discussion, ever until such a time grow into the realm of the possible and see the light of the sun."

15. "... very precise fashioners of the freedom of the state."

16. "... if they appear capable of guarding the laws and pursuits of states, we must make them guardians."

17. "... measures here on earth as regards things beautiful, just, and good."

18. VI. 501 b 2: πρὸς τὸ τῷ φύσει δύνατον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σάφρων καὶ πάντα τα τοιαύτα.

19. VI. 497 cd: ... δείχοι τι ἐν ἐνενή αἰ ἐν τῇ πόλει λόγον ἐχον τῆς πολιτείας τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπερ καὶ οὐ δ νομοθέτης ἐχων τοῦς νόμους ἐπίθεσις.

20. VI. 497 d 8: Ἄνα τρόπον μεταχειρίζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφικήν οὐ διοικεῖται.

21. III. 402 bc: "... neither we nor the Guardians whom, we say, we have to educate will be cultivated until we gain knowledge of the Forms of self-control, courage, generosity, magnificence, everything related to
them, and their opposites, wherever they occur, and until we perceive them and their images as being present in the things in which they reside, and do not slight them in small matters or in great...."

22. VI. 503 b: τοὺς ἀκριβῶτάτες ως φιλακας φιλοσόφους οὖν καθιστάναι.

23. Cf. also VII. 543 a on the rulers of a good state, i.e., Guardian state as well as Philosopher state: βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τοῖς καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γεγονότας άφιστους.

24. VII. 520 a: "Observe, then, Glaucon," I said, "that we shall do no wrong to the philosophers among us, but what we shall tell them is just when we compel them to care for the others and be their guardians."

25. IX. 591 e: ὀποθέτων γε...πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν καὶ φιλάττων μή τι παρακινή αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεί διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι’ ὀλιγότητα.

26. IX. 592 ab: "Surely," he said, "if a man cares for such things, he will not be willing to engage in politics." "By the dea," I replied, "in his own state he will, though perhaps not in his country, barring some divine chance." "I understand," he retorted. "You mean the state we have now been founding, the state which is established in the realm of discourse, since I believe that it exists nowhere on earth." "No," I said, "but perhaps it is set up as a model in heaven, which anyone who wants to may see, and seeing it found one in himself. Whether it exists anywhere or will exist makes no difference. For he can engage in the politics of this state, but of none other."

27. VII. 499 od: Εἰ τείνων ὀκροίς εἰς φιλοσοφῶν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμελήθησι δὴ γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ ἁπείρῳ τῷ πορευθείσῳ χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς βαρβαρικοῖς τόποις πάρρω ποιτὶ ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίας ἐπάθειας, ἢ καὶ ἕπειτα γενήσεται, πρὶ τουτοῦ ἐστίν τῷ λόγῳ διαμισθείς, ως γε- γονὼς εἰς ἐρμημέρι πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὐτῇ ἡ μόνη πόλεως ἐγκρατής γένηται. οὐ γὰρ ἀδιόντος γενέσθαι, οὐδ’ ἤμετας ἀδιόνατα λέγομεν ἀλλ’ ἐπις καὶ παρ’ ἤμει ὀμολογεῖται.