Hiccups and Other Interruptions in the Symposium

George Kimball Plochmann

Southern Illinois University

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp

Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation

https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/48

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Plato's Symposium has so much charm but contains so little open debate over concepts that were it to have been his only surviving work, literary critics would seldom have conceded that its author was a worker in the philosophical vineyard. Readers through the ages, unconditioned as they would have been to expect dialectic even in the strangest Platonic framework, would hardly have glanced inside the incisive characterization, the dazzling rhetoric, and the glowing mythology; and they would have accordingly missed an extraordinarily subtle philosophic structure, a stately dialectical sequence that when laid bare all but overwhelms us. There is a second tendency to misinterpret: with the rest of the dialogues at hand to offer help, many philosophical critics of the Symposium are hesitant to seek for "Platonic philosophy" in any but the actual spoken discourse of Socrates, and they continue to think of the half-dozen other speakers as mere attractive foils to the hard going of the theory of ideas and the ladder of aspiration or love. To put my own view bluntly, these critics, both literary and philosophical, are in their several ways wrong, and all the more inexcusably wrong because Plato himself has supplied literally dozens of clues to his intention that there is a doctrine, and also that the whole train of discourses, Phaedrus to Alcibiades, should be taken as integral to the very heart of this doctrine of love, virtue, and knowledge. To neglect these multiple clues, which are so trivial as the personal traits of Aristodemus, so outlandish as the hiccups of Aristophanes (surely more significant than any belch in Shakespeare!), or so hammered-in as the repeated references to wine, is to risk losing hold of the special unity of this dialogue. Very few of the studies made on the Symposium see it as all of a piece, and especially are the speeches of Aristophanes and Alcibiades treated as extraneous to the ladder of Eros and whatever else is taken as echt-Platonism. Hence I propose to re-examine some of the passages that have excited interest largely for their "drama," "satire," "poetic fantasy," and see if these, too, cannot be found to fit nicely into the total scheme. But there is one proviso: I do not wish them to bear more than their just weight, nor overload them so that they cease to be exciting, or funny, or imaginative, as the case may be. The hoped-for result of my study will be, perhaps, to discover that the genius of philosophy and that of literature do not change places, yet are somehow the same; and if this conclusion involves getting rid of certain textbook conceptions of either philosophy or literature, this too will be all to the good.

At the outset readers are confused about the philosophic purposes as soon as they see that rhetoric and poetic appear to dominate Agathon's party, and that even the plea for giving epideictic speeches on love has a most personal cause--hangovers. The reason offered for talking about Eros is rather incidental historical one - the poets have been remiss. Moreover, the chief feature of the dialectic in almost all the other dialogues lies in the control of meanings of words, and the consequent checking of definitions, by some one master - Socrates, Parmenides, the Athenian Stranger, and so forth. In the Symposium, on the other hand, there is little attempt
(except for a short colloquy between Socrates and Agathon) to alter directly the statements of previous speakers, or affect those whose turns are still to come. It must be, then, to other hints which we must listen if we wish to discover the precise meanings of the terms that Plato would have us carry away: we must partly gather the dialectic from the sequence of characters and incidents of the piece. A modern reader who failed to perceive the purposes of these for clarifying the connections of philosophy and literature and who came across Socrates for the first time here would think of him as an unaccountably tardy, informal guest with a hollow leg whose speech is elevated, paradoxical, difficult to follow, and who seems to be having a marked negative effect on a handful of the younger men as a result of having displayed a sneaky puritanism. Where, then, is the skill in debate, where is the intellectual stringency, where are the uncanny refutations about which we have all heard? In truth, their place is taken here not by other verbal devices, but by the pattern of applause and criticism, drinking, and erotic companionship; and, running throughout, there is the physical placing of the guests and their largely consequent order of speaking.

This is as it should be in any situation in which encomium rather than analysis or exposition is to be the aim of discourse. Thus the applause after Agathon's talk is universal and prolonged, showing that he fulfills the common ideal of what encomium should be, and that his fanciful ascriptions really gather up a number of earlier threads of discourse and tie these together. The applause for Socrates is fairly general, but the thin-skinned Aristophanes attempts a reply to Socrates' slight correction of love as a blind seeking of another part to reconstitute a whole, regardless of the goodness of this whole. Then Aristophanes and the applause are both halted by shouts, just as Socrates' defense of himself as philosopher is interrupted by shouts in the Apology. But the shouts here not those of a dicast but of a lover - Alcibiades, who later will praise Socrates, and whose irruption stops the applause as a way of hinting firstly that the applauders may have enjoyed the speech for the wrong reasons (let us say rhetorical rather than dialectical reasons), and secondly that what will ensue must be of quite a different sort, taking rise from lower, less taught and less teachable levels of man's nature, rather than the quite carefully instructed contrivances of the earlier speakers. (We remember that the teacher of Phaedrus was Hippias, or maybe Lysias, of Pausanias Prodicus, of Eryximachus a number of pre-Socratic thinkers and men of medicine, of Aristophanes the Muse, of Agathon Gorgias, and of Socrates Diotima. None of these men speak altogether in his own name, though Socrates is the only one wholly to disclaim originality, regardless of how much he professes to know about matters pertaining to Eros.) It is accordingly of high importance that Alcibiades be neither a man much instructed nor a man sober enough to exercise traditional restraints, but rather a man of miscellaneous experience who in his puzzled, groping way has divined a little of the real business of philosophy, which is to elevate man not only in words, as Agathon and Socrates had just elevated, but to give man the virtues in fact—in actions. The function of Alcibiades in the dialogue, in this connection, is not so much to praise Socrates to strangers as it is to differentiate him before friends from the sophistic temperament of Agathon, whose speech is quite like that of Socrates in its exaltation and poetic freedom, but unlike it in substance as a statement of what love really means for man.
Secondly, there is the wine, which has given pain to all the other guests (Socrates alone excepted) yet gives pleasure and freedom to Alcibiades, and although Agathon cannot pour wisdom into Socrates or anyone else as he can water,16 Alcibiades can communicate to others his partial insight into the nature of Socrates with the help of this wine. There are, withal, several relations that the participants in the Symposium bear to wine - indeed, almost all possible. Wine brings pain to most, regardless of how much pleasure it has brought before - it is a mixed pleasure, according to the Philebus.17 To Socrates it is neither a pleasure nor a pain, nor is it useful or detrimental to promoting his intellectual insights. To Alcibiades it is allowed to seem an unmixed good, because it permits his telling of the truth. The anonymous heedless ones who break in after Alcibiades, and who seem also to be drunk, put an end to all discourse.

Thirdly, the pattern of lovers and those loved cuts across that of drinkers. Thus Pausanias and Agathon form a pair within the group, Phaedrus is paired with someone not present, and Socrates, though neither lover nor beloved in the sense intended by the other speakers, has two quite opposite sorts of admirers, Alcibiades and Aristodemus.18 The former desires actively, while the latter is the typical passive well-wisher, content with a few crumbs of attention and with no hope or need of further satisfactions.19 (In a way, Aristodemus is as chaste as Socrates, but mere passive chastity is insufficient, in Plato's view, to constitute philosophic virtue. It is at the end of, not apart from, the climb up the great ladder that a man becomes a true lover.) Then there is the extraordinary bond between Socrates and his sublime prophetess: here it is impossible to decide in ordinary terms which is the lover and which the beloved; even in Socratic terms both seem to be ranged together as common lovers of a truth. Their differences arise from the unsureness of Socrates' step as he is about to enter into the greater mysteries of Eros.20

What I have been trying to establish by these three examples is this: that the Symposium is neither a statement of philosophy with a delightful background, a "drama" of ideas pure and simple, nor is it a drama of persons who happen to be talking theory,21 but rather it is a new form, which makes the two sorts of drama wholly integral one with another. Many scholars now agree that the highest kind of literature in Plato is philosophy; less often the critics insist that the supreme philosophy is literature. The objection that the Parmenides and Sophist are, after all, good philosophy and bad literature holds only if one looks to a more popular conception of what literature should be than Plato's. It seems to me that both of these statements are true as parts of a completer truth: that for Plato real philosophy, not the bogus kind that the sophists teach in public or that Dionysius II would like to write, and real poetry, not even that of Homer and his great themes of war and human society and the intercourse of men and of gods,22 but something truer, are precisely the same. I do not suppose this fusion could be completely written out, even by Plato. But for all his reservations regarding the written word, he endeavored mightily.23 In his dialogues the movement is from persons to ideas and back to persons; but equally it is from ideas and back to ideas. This, of course, is not all: which ideas (I mean here Platonic ideas) are presented in connection with which persons, and how they are substantiated or refuted, clarified or obscured, lies deep in the nature of Platonism, and manifests the rhetorico-dialectical genius of Plato in its uniqueness rather than in
its accidental similarities to other writers of dialogue. What this leads to is a reformulation of the connections between personality and that which is known. The person is most properly the way in which perfectly understood ideas are in fact viewed, by reason of the confusions wrought by the senses and the vagaries of popular education; and the ideas, in their turn, are indistinguishable from what the enhanced and instructed mind can apprehend by the dialectical reflection upon the widest possible variety of the objects of experience. This knowledge must be intimate with the experience. Thus Socrates talks with two poets about the fundamental unity of intellect behind both comedy and tragedy. Even when they are weary and drunk the assertion seems plausible to them as it would not to persons mis-schooled and lacking native talents. For their common outlook upon poiesis derives from their having natural gifts beyond the others - had not Agathon, for instance, in spite of his Gorgian conceits, won a prize which neither Phaedrus, nor Pausanias, nor the irretrievably stuffy Eryximachus could ever have taken? Would these three men have understood anything about the knowledge of comedy-writing and the identity with that of tragedy? Is there any idea of unity where persons cannot grasp that idea through proof or experience?

But the dialogue illustrates what I have said still more fully. There are no refutations in the Symposium, as we pointed out, except for the passage where Socrates forces upon Agathon an awareness of a possible mean between contrary opposites, politely pretending - or was he pretending? - that a similar distinction had been forced upon him by Diotima. At any rate, lacking any further recourse to refutation, the participants cannot launch interpretations of poetry either25 and hence no valuing or dis-valuing of poetic stories, except for the silence when there might have been applause. The only way to show where poetry resides is to show how it is incorporated into philosophy, and this is one function of the great speech of Socrates. Nearly everyone laughs after the tall tale of Aristophanes, but they all applaud after a tale almost as tall when it is told by Socrates. Even the general company can see that a story standing by itself is ludicrous when the dialectic it illustrates is shaky and indeed patently false, whereas a very similar story, exemplifying much more complex relations between parts and wholes of bodies and of souls and their progeny, strikes them as praiseworthy. This much of Socrates they do understand. The fact that the dialectic of Socrates is a complete statement of human aspiration is further driven home when, at the very end, he proves to the soporific poets that their knowledge is fundamentally the same. This does not mean that Aristophanes could assume Agathon's role as a limited poet - indeed in some ways he can more easily change places with Eryximachus, the Chief Medical Officer of the group - but it means rather that the real knowledge which is at the bottom of comedy and tragedy, and which has the characters of both, is the poetically enriched dialectic of the philosopher. This next-to-last line of the dialogue makes little sense if we forget that the speech of Socrates, with its being-becoming-non-being triad, is preceded by a passage-at-arms with Agathon, who has a simple diremption of fixed contraries, and is followed by an attempted interruption of Aristophanes, who in his speech had attempted to show compounds of contraries, in a crude version of the Eleatic Stranger's blending of classes in the Sophist.26 Moreover, the identification of the two kinds of poetry is clearer to anyone who can grasp the long speech of Socrates as a whole, that is, a fusion of the comic and the serious, or at any rate a mean between them. The two men, however, agree to this only half-heartedly. Their grasp is partial.
Let us go back to the famous hiccups. Either the critics have set these aside as a mere literary touch, or else they have pointed out that the purpose is to get Aristophanes' harangue postponed, so that it could be made to fit the dialectical order of the speeches. It would seem that the first view could now be dismissed as an improbability because so many other "touches" seem to point in philosophical directions, just as the sequences of hands in Leonardo's Last Supper indicate the relationships of the disciples. The second ignores the ineconomy of having two men trade their speaking-order, when they could have sat differently at the outset. I like to think that these hiccups are one of the surest indications in the Symposium that nothing is really casual and that if we follow them far enough they will give even more weight to the contention that Plato, in his dialectical poetry, is composing a work of incredible, if often unappreciated, tidiness. First of all, of course, the hiccups are a disharmony of the diaphragm, which in the Timaeus is listed as the point of separation between the respective seats of appetitive and the ambitious parts of the soul. It is the maladjustment of bodily love and ambition which for Aristophanes is the very point in question - Zeus splits four-legged men not because they are lovers but because they are overly ambitious, and he is jealous of his ramparts. This turns men back upon themselves, eliciting their most abject sexuality. Second, if this harmony goes awry, the cure is not so easy - three remedies must be applied. But more important still is the fact that when Aristophanes begs for a prescription or a substituting speech, Eryximachus gives him both. This can only mean that the two speeches, rather than the two men, are somehow transposed, in their subject matter and manner of treatment. Normally, Aristophanes would be expected to talk about love in a very general way, making it a universal and perhaps blind passion; and Eryximachus would then talk about the phylogenesis of love, its possible mutations.

Because it is plainer, we may look at the discourse of Aristophanes first. His strange assortment of limbs and heads is more than likely a parody of the Empedoclean view (reported by Aetius) that the generations of animals and plants do not breed true, but are altered radically from parental to filial; and of the related Empedoclean assumption (reported by Aristotle) that faces without necks sprang up, arms without shoulders, and so on. I do not need to labor the fact that love and strife, which are not contraries anywhere else in the Symposium, are related and opposed by Aristophanes, though admittedly he scarcely applies them as Empedocles applies them. Moreover Aristophanes' three-fold combinations of like and unlike may stem directly from Empedocles; but that they stem from him alone would be dubious, inasmuch as the like-unlike principles could be had from Heraclitus and others. But certainly Empedocles was the chief influence upon medical thinkers of the period and his four-phase cosmology is indeed a vast expansion of simple chemical elements, changes, and their causes, a projection of them on a grand scale. Were a poet asked to speak imaginatively on Empedoclean biology and cosmology, taking a physician's place, no doubt this would be his subject matter.

Eryximachus, for his part, makes an equally radical shift away from the materials that a doctor would be expected to deal with. The talk is about physiology not at all, but rather about the arts - music, the mantic art, poetry. And Eryximachus dwells at length upon the extension of the same knowledge throughout earth and heaven, and this, it happens, is a point that the real Aristophanes had already made in The Clouds. The doctor turns the tables on Aristophanes by advocating the very type of
cosmic knowledge that the comic playwright had already disparaged in his play about Socrates; and as he does this he also sets up a vague hierarchy which makes his speech seem structurally the most akin to that of Socrates and the ladder of love. In sum, the speech of Eryximachus turns the Aristophanic attack on Socrates upside down; the speech of Aristophanes reduces the Empedoclean cosmology of Eryximachus to a relatively puny human scale and shows by implication (when contrasted with the addresses of Agathon and Socrates) that physiology is unable to account for the psychic aspects of Eros. If the Symposium is in part about the lover, Socrates, then between Aristophanes and Eryximachus each of the pair nullifies the implied attack of the other on Plato's heroic, daimonic philosopher. The two men, outwardly doctor and patient, deliver speeches that are also related by their diverse transformations of Empedoclean and other sources, and by their quite different direct bearings upon Socrates and his view of Eros. As with Phaedrus and Pausanias, one builds upon the other, but also each has a different relation to Socrates.

This hints at something not often remarked in the order of speeches; it is a twofold order. The speakers recline in a circle, so that their discourses must be arranged serially, and, if you like, cumulatively. This is indicated by the frequent backward references to the distinctions set forth earlier. But the effect of this arrangement taken by itself, would be either total dialectical indigestion or else total cancellation of the positive results of each speaker. (Remember, there is practically no refutation as there is in the Republic I to separate out what is worthwhile from what is trivial or false.) So there must also be a different order, which is indicated not by physical placement at all but rather by the dramatic prominence given to one central personage, Socrates. This is conferred upon him by Apollodorus' opening remarks, by the bath, the cryptic episode under the neighbor's porch, the banter with Agathon, the very length of Socrates' speech, not to mention the bivalent enthusiasm and jealousy of Alcibiades, and by the final departure and second bath at the end - all these establish the centrality of Socrates, his position at the hub of a dialectical wheel.

Let us look at the serial order first. The patterns of contrary pairs of terms selected by the seven speakers to explicate love are of some interest. Thus Phaedrus speaks of lover and non-lover, though the latter is a shadowy creature indeed, and the former is hard to make out; Pausanias, of the heavenly and popular, to his mind similarly related as are good and bad; Eryximachus divides love into the healthy and the sick, while Aristophanes takes love to be good if it be between like persons, bad if between unlike; for Agathon there is a contrast between the ugly and the beautiful, to be corrected only by Socrates' insistence that these contraries (along with certain others) have intermediates. The contraries in all these pairs are what might be called ideas or principles; the two chief opposites in Alcibiades' bibulous eulogy are things - himself and Socrates.

Running side by side with these is a very important discussion of the virtues, which are used throughout to interpret either what love does for man or what man should do for love. These virtues are the same four that occupy Socrates in the Apology, in the Republic, the Laches, and elsewhere. Thus Phaedrus refers only to courage (a bad mark against him, inasmuch as it appears to be the least rational of the virtues, and least implies the
the other three). For Pausanias, good love, heavenly love, is really the same as temperance, though what is temperate is fixed according to extrinsic standards of custom; where wisdom intrudes, it is only as an adventitious education of the beloved. Eryximachus, who quite naturally sees all things in terms of health (harmony) and disease, looks upon the former as a kind of temperance, or, if you like, justice; here wisdom enters in the guise of a rather superficial knowledge of the arts: - an "integrated course." Aristophanes, taking justice as the paramount virtue, treats it as a restraint, a holding-back of ambition to supersed the gods; courage now becomes subordinate, but exists as one of the kinds of love, that of man for man. Agathon, the rhapsodic Agathon, tries to say that love is all the virtues, or at any rate promotes them, but he fails to order them in the right way, because he leaves wisdom as nothing more than the poet's skill. This is soon corrected by Socrates, who points out (in the context of a long account of the virtues) the identity of love and wisdom, which is in turn the knowledge of the good and of beauty, and which implies the knowledge of what is everlasting.

Now comes Alcibiades. He is drunk, he has no tricked-out discourse, he will tell the truth. (The point of this is that when he praises Socrates the goodness of the master is to be estimated in terms of a universally felt standard, not one taught for special occasions.) It is remarkable now that he puts all four of the virtues in fairly good order: Socrates is said by him to be temperate, courageous, just (he takes no bribes), and finally he has wisdom, as manifested in his persuasive, indeed stunning use of words. But Alcibiades, while he gives a fair description of what it means to be temperate and brave (the two conspicuous virtues of a soldier), is woefully weak on the other two virtues. How, then, is his speech internally related to that of Socrates? The relations are indeed very many, and the closeness that Plato intends is hinted at by the inordinate amount of banter between the two men, by their continued sitting next each other, even though they change places; and of course by the contents of their respective discourses, the second of which draws a picture of the life of the true lover, in near-ignorance of the nature of true love. But these are only pointers.

Briefly, his function is not unlike that of the chilling description of the degradation of states in Books VIII and IX of the Republic. There is a kind of external ambiguity in the culminating account of the best state - it looks as though many states having a temperate populace and a well-trained soldiery would fit the account, and certainly the curriculum, in Book VII, for the philosopher-king is politically a trivial thing unless we are talking abstractly, about an ideal, never-never city. But what Books VIII and IX do is to show that no existing state can be made to fit that the description of the best one, that as the discrepancies between them and this best one become ever greater they in fact are worse and worse. There is a similar external ambiguity and abstractness about the speech of Socrates in the Symposium; but dialectic as a matter of fact always requires supplements of various kinds to show that it can fit real-life situations or that ordinary life really differs significantly from the description he gives. Socrates has a little of the weakness of Agathon - his talk makes one think of an emotionally charged situation in which we simply keep our eyes glued to something unshakeably wonderful - but not very important in our lives. Alcibiades, at the price of describing successive degradations of himself, shows that the difference between what Socrates is really
talking about and what might be taken as satisfying that account in the lives of men is of vast import: Socrates cannot live up to Diotima's discipline of love simply by being a Feinschmecker, fixing his gaze upon eternal beauty as Max Beerbohm's Oscar Wilde fixes his gaze upon a delicate flower - and committing the indiscretions which Athens would have cheerfully tolerated but which in London were enough to land a man in jail. It is noteworthy to this end that Alcibiades, though a frequent hearer of Socrates, is not really a pupil of his, as Theaetetus would have been; and he picks up the plainer features of Socrates' talk, without paying close attention to the rest. Thus he says that Socrates speaks only of packasses and cobblers, which is interesting in view of this, that in the speech just finished there was scarcely any reference whatever to anything so homely; the artisans and horses are back in Book I of the Republic, where they are used to illustrate the deficiencies of a conception of justice as an art of money-dealing.

I suppose that one ought to say something of Alcibiades' political position, the fact that he was a great tactician on the eve of his first triumph and disgrace, the fact that he came to a bad end; perhaps Plato would have had us see his weaknesses implicit in his speech of the evening, and how they led to his undoing. But it is really just an accident that Thucydides and Plutarch (among others) have supplied us with details of his life over and above what we learn in the Symposium, and that there is scarcely any clear testimony regarding the other participants, even Socrates, beyond what Plato chooses to let us know. According to Plutarch, Alcibiades met his death under a hail of arrows and javelins, but what we know of him at Agathon's party from Plato's portrait is that he was, as they say, stoned. Not only is he drunk, but even sober he is made by Plato to be the almost totally unphilosophical man. He is not a real philistine, for he admires Socrates, has some eye for statuary, and quotes Aristophanes, all very aptly; but for all that the man is wholly immersed in particulars. It is to the point to say here that Dionysius II, in the Seventh Letter, is another kind of unphilosophical man, and that the two differ in Plato's mind as the dilettante differs from the soldier, as the man who wants to copy doctrines differs from the man who wants to copy deeds, though both waver so that as often as they advance toward philosophic insights they fall away from them too. But both men have a dialectical service to perform, of clarification of what philosophy is not, and this they do in their several ways. Alcibiades has Thomas Gradgrind's respect for fact, sir, nothing but fact; yet the facts are remarkable, not trivial, and the attitude of Alcibiades, which may be summed up in the phrase "It beats me!" is an indispensable part of the milieu in which a philosopher, the real, Socratic kind, the sort that Nietzsche himself speaks of as the Superman, must live and have an impact upon his multifarious companions.

We have already said that Socrates is at the hub of a wheel of discourse and of discourses. Each speaker at the perimeter is related to him in a way differing uniquely from the way in which every other one is related. To explore these ways in detail would take a long time. Distinctions both horizontal (the opposites having the same value) and vertical (the opposites having unequal value), hierarchies, myths - all these dialectical devices are present in the first five speeches, and Socrates takes over from each of them in a fashion in which they cannot borrow from and improve upon each other. As well as sharing their cumulative, serial relation to them, Socrates is directly inclusive and sublative of each of the others.
We can read the description of the ladder of Eros in such a way that its relationships to the other speakers become very clear. The early speakers, for example, furnish pairs of stages which show up on non-adjacent rungs, and Socrates borrows from the two poets in a slightly different way. Alcibiades then reads off certain steps of the ladder of love, but this time in a reverse direction, so that, starting from the secret incorruptible beauty found in the figurine, he ends with the love of one person. I maintain, however, that this reversal is precisely what Plato would like to include as explanatory of the full meaning of love; we affirm the ladder and then turn it upside down to show its direct application to the human condition, much as old father Parmenides thought it necessary to deny whatever is said about the one and the others, as well as affirm. I think too that not only do these speakers expound and advocate certain rungs of the ladder, but also they represent them. Thus Alcibiades, with his lack of general knowledge and his jealousies over particular persons, stands lower than the others, and his character sets a limit to his dialectic. Aristophanes, too, is jealous, though it is over his ideas and the way they are viewed by others. Socrates can live upon all the rungs with ease—but it requires the speech of Alcibiades to show this to the other guests, and to the readers of Plato’s dialogue.

Oh yes. We were talking earlier about hiccups. Why did Aristophanes have them when he had had not a drop to drink that night, and why was Alcibiades free of them, though he was far gone in his cups? This would be a question for Socrates to answer, not Eryximachus. Aristophanes was hiccuping from a surfeit of speeches from which Alcibiades had fortuitously stayed away. Would the latter have been able to make head or tail out of the second-hand vapidities of Phaedrus, the confused travel-diary of Pausanias, or the professional sententiousness of Eryximachus? Would any plain man, unless he had a Socrates to set him right, and put him back on the plain path of mules and pack-asses and reason and inwardly-lived divine poetic philosophy?
FOOTNOTES

1. This paper forms part of the program of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, meeting in December, 1962, in New York City.

2. I use this word here and there, following Professor J. M. E. Moravcsik, whose acute paper on the ladder of love was presented at the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in 1961. It was intended by him as a workable translation of Eros, and will be used on occasion here. Cf. Francis M. Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium," in The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1950), p. 72: "Just as the word 'making' (poiesis) really means creation of any kind, ... so the name of Eros ... really means 'any and every desire for good things and for happiness.'"

3. A fine exception to this is Meyer W. Isenberg, who in his The Order of the Discourses in Plato's Symposium (Privately Printed, Chicago, 1940) attempted to find the real dialectic of the speeches. This is a doctoral dissertation, buried so deep that I have found it referred to in very few places, even other dissertations. I differ from Isenberg in many questions of detail, and I miss in his dialectical zeal a sustained interest in the literary side of the work; but on the whole his point of view seems to me inescapably right.

4. See, for example, G. C. Field, Plato and his Contemporaries (London: Methuen and Company, 1930), p. 154: "There is one other dialogue of importance in which other interests seem to occupy a place at least as important as that occupied by the philosophical interest. And that is the Symposium. This also, though to a lesser degree, differs in form from the other dialogues. The serious argument occupies a relatively small place, there is a much greater amount of narrative, and in particular there is the intervention of Alcibiades."


6. Warner Fite, The Platonic Legend (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), strings together adjectives and allegations even more damning than these.

7. At this point it should be clear that I do not think of the dialogue as reporting an actual occasion. If there was such a party, it probably occurred in 416 B.C., but as I hope to show later, it is unnecessary for our understanding of the function of Alcibiades in the Symposium to know that he was just a year away from his expedition to Sicily, or indeed that he ever went to Sicily at all. It would have required but a stroke of Plato's pen to have hinted at this major event in the life of Alcibiades and his mother city. Thus the riskiness of W. Hamilton's conjecture "that one object of the Symposium in general and of Alcibiades' speech in particular is to make plain that Socrates was in no
way responsible for Alcibiades' betrayal of his country in the Pelo-
ponnesian War two years after the dramatic date of the dialogue"--

8. E.g. Apology 30B.

9. It is always dangerous to import statements of other dialogues while
interpreting some one work, as this must be done with insight equal to
what is necessary when keeping to one. But I think it fair to borrow
the conclusion of the Phaedrus, anyway (270E), that dialectic is like
rhetoric, but higher.

10. Protagoras 315C; Phaedrus 228A.

11. Protagoras 315D.

12. Symposium 189B.

13. Ibid., 198C.

14. Ibid., 201D; 212B.

15. Ibid., 177E.

16. Ibid., 175D-E.

17. 31B. The limit that the drinkers set upon their portion of wine was
dictated by the body primarily, not the mind.

18. I do not count Apollodorus, as he was not present at Agathon's party.

19. The question whether these two men were really like this, historically
speaking, might be of interest, but it is certainly not the primary one
in a philosophico-literary analysis. I do not wish to disintegrate
Plato's writings as testimony to leading figures of Athens and other
cities; but it appears reasonable to insist that we reserve judgment
upon Plato's "accuracy" until we have exhausted the possible literary
and dialectical purposes why these personages should be depicted as
they are. My own guess, though, is that Plato had such a rich experi-
ence of men in public and private life to call upon as he wrote, that
there was little trouble in finding characters to fit his dialectical
schemata and at the same time to fit many, though probably not all,
the facts.

20. Symposium, 210A.

21. F.J.E. Woodbridge, The Son of Apollo; Themes of Plato (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1929), passim.

22. Ion, 531C.

23. This, by the way, is true in every one of the dialogues, even the
driest and seemingly most impersonal of the "late" ones. For the
relations between persons and dialectics in the Parmenides, see

24. *Timaeus*, 43B-44D.

25. Poetry is carefully interpreted, for example in the *Protagoras*, *Republic*, and *Ion*.


27. So A. E. Taylor says in *Plato, The Man and His Work* (New York: The Dial Press, 1936), p. 216: "Aristophanes, one of the sturdy topers of the party (176B), is held up, when his turn to speak comes, by an accident which is a small joke in itself; the medical man of the group, who also happens to be a sober soul (176C) not able to carry much liquor, gives him professional aid and fills up what would otherwise be a gap in the evening's programme. There is nothing here which calls for a 'serious' explanation."

28. 70A.


31. Incidentally, Zeus and Apollo, who as gods represent the powers of reason, severally disjoin and rejoin the whole man and his parts. This is exactly similar to the "god" of *Phaedrus* 266B, whose dialectical method consists of separating and recombining. --The use of reason, Aristophanes seems to be saying, at first splits the ambitious sensualist and then reconstitutes him, although he is no longer able fully to gratify either his passions or his ambitions. He is both greater and less than he was before. Note how closely this approximates the unconscious self-portrait of Alcibiades later in the *Symposium*.

32. The parode of this play is really an account of knowledge as it ranges through the cosmos and over things terrestrial. I do not insist that Eryximachus' list of arts, however, is taken from *The Clouds*.

33. Eryximachus is complimented by Socrates at 193E for his speech in general.

34. Pausanias refers to *Phaedrus*, Eryximachus to Pausanias, Aristophanes to all earlier ones, Agathon to all, Socrates generally to all and specifically to Agathon. Alcibiades refers not to what Socrates has said but to what he is.

35. This is not an unusual sort of dialectical situation in *Plato*, where Athens and Atlantis, or Zeus and Apollo, are made contraries, though these appear in myths, not in patently historical sketch.

36. Socrates is shown in a good light in military and private life. In the *Theaetetus*, using similar extrinsic criteria, Socrates sketches the philosopher in ordinary society and public life, as something of a fool (173B ff.)
37. His notion of wisdom derives purely from an emotional response to a great teacher; he knows little about justice - and here I am willing to concede that Plato may have been thinking of the future shortcomings of the real Alcibiades.

38. At least these pointers help to show that Paul Shorey is wrong when he calls the entrance of Alcibiades an "afterpiece." --What Plato Said (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 196.

39. There is another correspondence, between the speech of Alcibiades and the closing pages of the Laws: There (968A ff.) the Athenian and his two comrades, having agreed that their account of legal theory is virtually complete, further agree that it is absolutely necessary that their next move should be the practical one of setting up the actual state they envisage and participating in the councils.

40. 221E.

41. A point commented upon too infrequently is that Diotima, when she was instructing the younger but not youthful Socrates, entertained strong doubts about his being able to enter into "the greater mysteries." Let us take this seriously. The speech of Alcibiades gives a close account of what changes have been wrought in a man who actually is able to enter the discipline of Eros-philosophy. But of course his teacher would have entertained doubts regarding the ultimate success of her instruction.

42. Parmenides, 135E-136A.