Enemy Life: Theorizing Exile Through Milton, Shelley and Byron

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ENEMY LIFE:
THEORIZING EXILE THROUGH MILTON, SHELLEY AND BYRON

BY

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DISSEPTION

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates the contemporary discourse and conceptions of exile as it is presented by Milton Shelley and Byron. Utilizing biopolitical theory as a lens, it posits that the Satanic iteration or narrative of exile embodies the reality of worldly exile. As such the dissertation explores the complex framing and subsequent deconstruction of Satanic and human subjectivities found in *Paradise Lost, Prometheus Unbound, Manfred* and *Don Juan*. The dissertation examines *Paradise Lost* for its competing narratives of exile, Adam and Satan, and explores notions of home, transgression, the purification rituals which are the origin of sovereign Power and the parody that Satan’s exilic body presents. The dissertation examines *Prometheus Unbound* against the grain of many traditional reading, focusing on the agonistic-audial subjectivity it produces for its exilic subject and its stance in rehabilitating the exile as an integral member of society for their very apartness. Finally, the dissertation examines *Manfred* and *Don Juan* for its Ironic, decentered representation of exile as a fundamentally human, transgressive condition.
Dedication

To Marina
Acknowledgements

This work could not have been completed without the support of my family: my soon-to-be wife, Marina Malli and my mom and dad Allison and Louis Berger. I would also like to thank Jean-Pierre Mileur for his guidance and support throughout the dissertation process as well as David Bartine and John Havard for their revisionary notes and editorial patience. A special thanks to Colleen Bailey, Donna Berg and Rosaria Mcnierzzy and the entire English department staff and faculty here at Binghamton for all their contributions to getting me here. Finally, thanks to all my fellow English grad students who have struggled beside me during this taxing process.
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Introduction

This work brings together a nexus of areas of academic interest: *Paradise Lost*, the Satanic School of British Romantic poetry, and contemporary theories of the exilic figure. I bring these areas into contact to address the discourse of the exile. This is a task that, in our divided and emotional political moment, has grown in urgency. We live in a time in which Power uses the rhetoric of “the Enemy”, promise walls, perform banishments, incite panic and dread all in the name of security.

At the same time, beings-in-exile continue to appear in every region of the world, in every aspect of our lives. We believe we see and know the forms and bodies of the “Mexican Immigrant” and the “Syrian Refugee” (to frame a few examples). We “see” them everywhere. Yet our thinking is caught by the necessity of finding a way to give greater recognition to these displaced persons. One could say the worldly exile is central in the gaze of Western thought, yet still remains unseen. It was in observing this ironic motion, this movement of the exile in both its literary and worldly form, from the unseen center to the unobserved periphery and back again that I began to think contemporary theories of exile and the Satanic School involved with each other.

In thinking this, my work represents a de-structuring of the ways the West regulates itself, its citizens and its exiles, not just by its form of thinking, but also by frame of its stories. This is my reading of *Paradise Lost*. After this first movement, my work pivots to address the exile in the works of the Satanic School. I posit Shelley and Byron are thinking the exile in ways which are contemporary to the work theorists like Judith Butler, Giorgio Agamben, and Jean-Luc Nancy are performing now. Thus, this work is designed to bridge the narrow spaces between biopolitical theory, *Paradise Lost* and the Satanic School of literature.
The impasse to this work is the narrative, the framework of the exile that exists in the West today. This rather static form is found in the stories of exile in the news and entertainment media and in public political discourse. They function as what Foucault calls a mechanism of control or the micro-physics of power. Everyday fictions and frames of power mediate our knowledge and understanding of ourselves and our world precisely because they occur with an unobserved daily regularity. Such mediation means that when the Western subject receives an image or story of the exile, understanding is and has always been conditioned into a specific form by a long-perfected discourse of Power. Discourse and its fictions determine what individuals see before they see it. It is pre-figurative form of control and one cannot underestimate the influence of this consistent, pervasive re-framing.

Examining the popular narratives of exile, the way in which Power show us the exile invokes the depiction of Satan, the adversary to God and Man in John Milton’s 17th Century epic poem *Paradise Lost*. The likeness is uncanny. Satanic imagery and descriptors cross the boundary of “the Enemy” into use for the bodies and beings of exiles. Framed for us in this way, these figures of exile become “Enemy Life” (a term which I will define later) in the most righteous, vehement, fundamental sense, rather than as human beings. This is the root structure of the discourse of exile in our time. This is the reason that the problem of the exile becomes so difficult to address. Almost every aspect of the exile is perceived to be an embodiment of the Enemy as formulated by a long standing narrative tradition in the West. And, as *Paradise Lost* demonstrates in detail, there are established punishments and corrections that *must* be brought to bear upon the Enemy.
Perceiving this distorted representation of exile, the de-structuring intellectual response and the necessary political disruption should naturally be akin to the poetic response of Percy Shelley and Lord George Byron. These radical figures, who were as much outside the tradition in their time as they embody the tradition in ours, composed their works in the early 19th Century, in the shadow of the French Revolution and perhaps the dawn of modern Empire. They were the principle members of what was called at the time the Satanic School of English Poetry. Both Shelley and Byron found Satan to be Milton’s most human character and the being most in need of compensatory justice. The Enemy presented the human to them and they represented it in their work. This is precisely the same effort that current theorists are putting forth in their own scholarly works when they move toward including the exile, such as Judith Butler in her works, *Frames of War* and *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly*. The two schools seem to be working the same goal, and thus one might able to think through the questions posed by theory through poetical means.

Literary and theoretical involvement is the method of this work in exploring exile. By siting the exilic being of Satan as a central motif in Western politics and utilizing the insightful re-framing tactics of the Satanic School, one can add to the theoretical conversation about how to foreground the exile to the Western tradition and the Western subject. In this way, *Paradise Lost* and the Satanic School of British Romanticism become a contemporary theory of exile.

**An Overview of the Work**

The work is carried out in an introduction, four major chapters and a conclusion. The introduction demonstrates the reality of the exile in the world and in the tradition of Western literature. The first two chapters consider the two exiles of *Paradise Lost* Milton places most emphasis on: Adam and Satan. The third chapter explores Percy Shelley’s Satanic, exile figure,
Prometheus, in *Prometheus Unbound*. The fourth chapter looks at Byron’s Satanic influenced *Manfred*, and also his revision of Satanic exile in *Don Juan*. The conclusion ties together the concepts and realities the chapters have produced and attempts to solidify what Enemy Life as a discourse of exile is.

To draw this outline in more detail: the introduction is comprised of three parts. First, I introduce “problem” of the various forms of exile and the figures involved with his “Enemy” status: the authorities, and the “mere” observers of exilic apartness. Second, I review exilic literature and foundational theory concerning not only political exile but also existential exile. Finally, I will give an overview of my method in theorizing the exile through the Satanic School.

In Chapter One, I perform a reading of *Paradise Lost* that demonstrates its situation as one of the pre-figurative narrative of exile in Western politics. I introduce John Milton and his situation, review the critical material on *Paradise Lost* and then examine the exilic narrative frame for Adam and show the correspondence the world formed in *Paradise Lost* with the world we inhabit. This chapter therefore represents an analysis of the fictional form of exile that Power and the tradition of literature are intent on creating as an ideology for its citizens.

In Chapter Two, working to disrupt this accepted fiction of exile, I read for the nature of “Enemy” subjectivity and narrativity as Satan represents it. I explore the Satanic exile in its relationship with Power, focusing on the function of the ban, the ethos of God in during the banishment, and “treatment” of Satan as a madman, a criminal and even as blasphemous parody of Power. This chapter represents a critique of how exile is actually framed and corrected by Power and narrative, corresponding precisely to the treatment of real-world exiles in our time.
In Chapter Three, I provide a brief history of the Satanic School of British Romanticism and then transition into a reading of Percy Shelley’s *Prometheus Unbound* that demonstrates the lyrical drama as a theory of exile. Shelley’s work demonstrates a tension between the traditional visual phenomenology of the subject, and more elusive iteration of subjectivity that can best be described as agonistic, performative and sublime. This new representation of exile transpires through auditory exchanges between Prometheus, the exile and the peripheral figures of drama who witness his disintegration and in turn act on his behalf to affect his rehabilitation. Thus, this chapter serves to demonstrate how Shelley’s representation of the exile enables new stances of subjectivity, apart from Power’s purview, which have gone underexplored in the Western tradition, yet are currently being discussed by theorists such as Jean-Luc Nancy and Judith Butler.

In Chapter Four, I examine Lord Byron’s work on the exile in *Manfred* and *Don Juan*. I focus on the internalized awareness of exile in *Manfred* and demonstrate how Byron, preceding Foucault, thinks the exilic being as one which is principally defined by a “limit-attitude”. Because of this, *Manfred* represents the exile with a greater attention to the transgression and movement of a subject than previous works, while still considering his exile an integral part of the social order. This way of representing the exile is carried out even further in *Don Juan* wherein Byron appears to deploy a form of Irony which emphasizes an unpredictable orbital movement of being. This form of representing exile creates a kind of contemporary dissonance in a way that anticipates Said’s contrapuntal analysis. It is in this way that this chapter operates to theorizing Enemy exile both apart from the tradition of the human being, yet essential to rendering the full range of life.
The final section of this work provides a synthesis of the various elements I have examined and speculates how the exile one comes to know through the Satanic School may be used to re-frame the exiles one encounters in the world today.

Exiles

I use the term “exile” in this work rather loosely, to refer to those vulnerable lives experiencing de-situations of being, body and world. Exile is being without a place. It is a being without a home. One passes by such people every day. Every day, one hears and sees people placed in “our” country or displaced apart from “their” societies. At the moment, there is a mass exodus taking place in the Middle East. There are Mexican citizens de-situating themselves to cross into the United States. There are people of differing sexual orientations and genders fleeing from the repression of their supposed homes to find more tolerant communities. There is an ongoing struggle for Black Americans to live lives free from the violence of “their” police force within “their own” communities and in “ours”.

These are merely a few examples of exile. The more one investigates exile, the more one comes to see that exile can and is experienced by almost every human, if not in body then at least in being. One cannot dismiss the importance of being-exiled--exile, existentially. Tying being-apart to bodily displacement is an important task, but as the vulnerable exilic body is the most pressing form of exile, the most easily annihilated by force, or prefiguratively erased from view via discourse, it is this form that I address now.

Consider how Fox News depicts border-crossing. In an article, titled “Return of the Surge: Illegal immigrant minors, families flooding southern US border” published May 9th 2016, by William La Jeunesse, he describes an “invasion” of the United States:
Two years ago, the Obama administration referred to the surge of Central American children and families coming into the U.S. as a "humanitarian crisis." This year, it's worse – as Border Patrol agents apprehend even more Honduran, Guatemalan and Salvadoran immigrants claiming asylum. But due to a backlog in the courts, there is even less of a chance they’ll be deported.” (La Jeunesse)

Mr. La Jeunesse’s lack of compassion is alarming, and he continues framing his short article with an equally clinical outlook, providing bullet points as to the danger such illegal immigrations present, including such gems as:

Violence, poverty and lawlessness in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala is forcing families looking for a better life to leave. Gangs and drug cartels often target children, turning to the boys to traffic narcotics and the girls for prostitution.” (La Jeunesse)

One wonders what Mr. Jeunesse would do were he confronted by a such a daily life. Surely fleeing from gang violence and “looking for a better life” can hardly be thought a crime. Yet Mr. La Jeunesse and a large portion of the American population think it is, to the extent that they call a large number of fleeing desperate children a “surge” a word that recalls former President George W. Bush’s incursive military action in Iraq.

This article represents a mere taste of some of the rhetoric deployed by the power apparatus to frame the issue of Mexican immigration. According to the narrative, the immigrant becomes a villain, an enemy. Power appears as a warning voice, urging those pious individuals that listen that danger is coming. The viewer of this spectacle of discourse, left implicitly with a non-questioning question by power: Which side are you on? Are you a citizen? Will you defend the integrity of the border?
One might suppose that traditional “liberal” media coverage of these people presents a fuller depiction. To a certain extent, this is true. Consider how CNN depicts the refugee in a story titled: “‘We are dead souls in living bodies’: Australia accused of abusing refugees” by Ben Westcott and Judy Kwon. The story, published August 3rd 2016, details the manner in Australia seems to be deliberately attempting to dissuade refugees from coming to its shores by making the transitional experience in a refugee detention camp as hellish as possible. The refugee camp is a place where there are: “Daily violence, suicide attempts and children left without medical treatment”. A refugee says of the experience: "People here don't have a real life. We are just surviving. We are dead souls in living bodies[…]We are just husks. We don't have any hope or motivation.” The Australian director of Human Rights Watch, Elaine Pearson, describes the country's policy towards refugees as a "horrible human experiment…It seems to be a very deliberate policy to maintain a certain level of cruelty…” (Westcott and Kwon)

The narrative that emerges from this depiction is, of course, far different than the one presented to us via Fox News but we still have similar figures: the refugee, Power and the viewer. Here, the refugee is portrayed as the victim and Power’s voice appears as a more empathic witness to injustice. The viewer is left with a perhaps less rigid rubric to question within: “How is this possible?” “When will this senselessness stop?”. But one might suggest that rather than “when” being the primary question, embedded in such stories as this there is a lingering authoritarian drive: “Who will make this senselessness stop?”

The conservative and the liberal discourses are the two broad narratives that cover the exile’s being for popular consumption. From them, one can see the actors that make up the narrative and get a sense of the “usual” setting for such a story. However, the reality of exile is more complex and seems to be more fundamentally embedded. It is with some sense of irony
that, even in the refugee camp itself, there are still exiles from the community. Consider a recent story published on August 9th 2016 on Devex.com by Morgan Meaker, “How can humanitarian actors protect LGBT refugees?”. The article addresses a problem in refugee camps around the world: a current of hostility toward and routine violence against LGBTQI people. Javid Nabiyev, a gay refugee from Azerbaijan describes his flight from his home to avoid prison and social prosecution saying he would be “OK” once he came to Germany. The deplorable conditions of the entire camp have enabled especially harsh treatment of LGBTQI people, to the point where he has to take pains to act “straight” to avoid humiliation and violence. Even amongst other refugees, LGBTQI people are outcasts. The “solution” to this “problem” is a familiar one: to form a new camp within the camp strictly for them. But this hardly an ideal outcome. As Mr. Nabiyev puts it: “LGBT camps are important for urgent situations...But in a way, I am against them. Instead of telling other refugees you must respect LGBTI people, you take the LGBTI people away” (Meaker).

This is “problem” of exiles and their narrative. The reality of exile is not simply one of the binary villain/victim and the unattached viewer of the story, or the even the violence and repression itself. One must look to the cycle of the story. The once-victims here become villains, playing out the same violence that they experienced at “home”. Human subjectivity seems constituted in such a way that exiling is either inherent or learned. It seems grafted to our nature. Thus the act of exiling recurs time and time again in whatever society emerges. The problem of exile emerges from a fundamental part of the human being, something non-localized that society for all its Power cannot bring forth and address.

Yet there is at least an attempt at redress. Mr. Nabiyev has not taken his treatment as matter of course. He has formed a group, “the LGBTI rights organization Queer Refugees for
Pride ‘to show society the problems we have’” (Meaker). This act, though not fully rendered in the article, is one of resistance. Resistance, the deference, avoidance or undermining of power and control has been taking place in society since the historical record began. It is becoming an increasingly substantial part of the narrative of the exile. Such a public deconstruction against Power seems to one of the most necessary and existential acts of the exile. The reality is that being an exile pre-figures the person as resistant to power, but without the use of some tactic, technique, or voice, there is little hope that any resistance to discourse and power is possible.

This comingling of the exile and the resistant figure seems to lead back home and speaks to the black American citizen. The most recent iteration of police violence as of the time this was written occurred in Milwaukee, where a police officer shot and killed a young black man. This incident was followed by weeks of protests, riots and further conflict between police and citizens. Through CNN, in an August 19th 2016 article by Ray Sanchez, Ms. Goddess Brown, a member of the community and activist, says of the incident: "Yes, a black man did the shooting but he was wearing a blue uniform with a badge…He represented the mentality that people around here are less than human. We're enemies of the state" (Sanchez).

Cedric Jackson, a former police officer in the community, describes a dismal relationship between officers and citizens. "But Jackson said younger officers are taught to show people in the community "who's boss and keep them in fear of you."" There also are frequent attempts to humiliate people in impoverished sections of the city, Jackson said. "During questioning or stops, officers would often ask black men, 'Are you working?'" he recalled. "When they said, 'No,' the officer would say, 'What a shame. How can you consider yourself a man and not work? If I had children, I'd shovel s--- if I had to’” (Sanchez).
In an article linked to Mr. Sanchez’s, CNN delves into the problems in the Milwaukee community, which stem from issues with drugs, gangs, police violence, problems in the education system and a widespread current of fear and resentment in the community. But CNN in the same coverage speaks on the various forms of protest that have emerged in the wake of the incident. This proximity is a clue as to how public discourse conceives the Black citizen and the figure of resistance. For even in CNN’s coverage there seems to be a specter of violence attached to resistance, with images of burning gas stations splashed beneath the headlines of the stories. The reality of a group of protesters holding up signs for “free hugs” is buried a few pages down. Naturally, this depiction is only exaggerated in conservative news outlets with the term “riot” rather than “protest” and the emphasis being placed on the protestors’ violence rather than the initial injustice. Thus, a Fox News story covering the protests describes the scene:

Some two dozen officers in riot gear confronted about 150 people who blocked an intersection near the fatal shooting Saturday afternoon, and more arrived. Police moved in to try to disperse the crowd and warned of arrests after protestors threw bottles and rocks at police and shots were fired (Associated Press)

The conservative press presents a villain (and notably another villain without a face, a mob), a mere lightning rod for misplaced liberal rage, who should have “obeyed the law or the law officer.” The liberal press, perhaps more empathetically, presents a victim who has been abused by systemic problems, indifference and hostility. We must see the resemblance. Black people, in general and specifically as resistant figures, are being framed out of being human. They are prefigured as the enemy who dissolves the binary between villain and victim. They present a deep uncertainty, leading almost inevitably to oppressive violence.

The reality is far more difficult to present. Many, if not most or even all, Black citizens living in America do so in a form of unseen exile. And while familiar iterations of the refugee
camp are being shown to us across the Atlantic and the Pacific, the conditions in many communities here, at home are just as dire, violent and divided. It is this rather astounding circumstance that informs the rest of the work. The exile, quite often, is everywhere, sometimes directly in our field of vision, indeed the very being we are trying to focus on, and yet the exiles seem to elude our sight.

In this penultimate part of the section, I want to provide with some descriptions the mournful unifying thread of these stories: a savage yet indifferent violence directed at the exile.

In August 2015, there was an incident in Boston.

[Scott] Leader and his brother, Steve, were arrested and charged with multiple assault charges after police said they urinated on and then assaulted a 58-year-old homeless man they found sleeping outside a T-station as they walked home from a Red Sox game. They allegedly beat him with a metal pole, breaking his nose and causing other injuries. According to the *Globe*, Scott Leader told police it was OK to assault the man because he was Hispanic and homeless” (Berman).

In August 2016, the Guardian reported on an attack on a gay refugee living in Turkey.

Wisam Sankari, a hospital cleaner, [who] went missing on 25 July after going to meet another gay man in Istanbul. His body was found two days later in a nearby area of Istanbul, his head severed and his battered body only identifiable to his friends by his clothing (Kingsley).

Horrifically, to “human beings” there seems to be something embedded in the nature of the exile as a form of life that provokes these kind of responses. This incredible, inhuman violence has a rhetorical counter point, found lamentably in the speeches of the now President of the United States, Donald Trump:

Trump: When do we beat Mexico at the border? They’re laughing at us, at our stupidity. And now they are beating us economically. They are not our friend, believe me. But they’re killing us economically. The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else’s problems. (APPLAUSE)
Trump: Thank you. It’s true, and these are the best and the finest. When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. But I speak to border guards and they tell us what we’re getting. And it only makes common sense. It only makes common sense. They’re sending us not the right people. It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably — probably — from the Middle East. But we don’t know. Because we have no protection and we have no competence, we don’t know what’s happening. And it’s got to stop and it’s got to stop fast.
(APPLAUSE)
(Trump Transcript)

This story of immigrants, refugees and exiles coming to America, is not coming from a marginalized voice or a small portion of the population. Mr. Trump is the President of the United States, nominated by one of the two major parties and supported in a general election by slightly less than half the voting population of the country. The story he is telling is that foreigners are the enemy, that they need to be kept out and guarded against or else they will hurt us, weaken us, change our nature if they live amongst us.

The story is, as Trump’s campaign slogan states: “Make America Great Again!” The emphasis in this statement must be seen to be placed on the word “again” as if some vital essence of what America was, has been lost or abandoned as it has become more pluralistic. It is this essential narrative element that finds resonance with Paradise Lost. What Mr. Trump’s discourse (alongside an entire array of similar but less overt depictions, representations and stories) is pre-figuring for the American public is a very specific setting for the narrative of the exile in the West. Trump is invoking the long standing trope of the Western Eden, which has run through literature and art for centuries, but now seems to have matured to its natural endpoint. He is positing that just as the narrative of Adam and Eve suggests that any visitor is an Enemy with the
disguised intention of despoiling our sanctum, our paradise and our certain situation at God’s side. When such an Eden was lost and when it existed is unclear but it is this rallying cry that spurred my thinking on how the West truly represents the exile to itself and this form of discourse I will destruct as the work continues.

**The Exile in Theory**

There are many theorists working on problems of exilic life in being and body, but my work principally derives from Giorgio Agamben, Hannah Arendt, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger. These philosophical figures are theoretical points of references throughout my work and I wish to introduce them here and indicate how one may later problematize their thinking.

Martin Heidegger, in his masterpiece *Being and Time* thinks exile in the existential sense. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger considers the be-ing of being, the process of being. From him, Western philosophy gains a significant amount of ontological terminology. At the heart of Heidegger’s argument is the subject’s complex perception of, and interaction with time, which he argues determines human being. Unique to human consciousness, is the awareness of time’s passage. At the same time, there is, in consciousness, the ability to be untimely or out of time. This predicament represents the essential paradox of human being. Just as much we struggle for a worldly home in terms of space, we are aware that in terms of time we are uprooted and yet are still unable to move according to our will. Heidegger posits it is because of this uncertainty of being’s time that Dasein, (being-there or openness to being) tries to orient itself in a world that it feels thrown into. Heidegger also claims that human thought and/ or technology is designed to alleviate the dread of the nothingness of being which is always and immediately alongside Dasein. The result is *ge-stell* or enframing: the structuring or ordering of the world according to
a pre-rendered image and position. This enframing closes off the possibilities of being-in-the-world which Dasein presents. Heidegger writes about this image as a “world-picture” saying:

Because this position (of the world picture) secures, organizes and articulates itself as a world view, the modern relationship to that which is, is one that becomes, in its decisive unfolding a confrontation of world views that have already taken up the fundamental position of man that is most extreme, and have done so with the utmost resoluteness (Age of the World Picture 134-135).

If Heidegger’s conception of subjectivity holds true, it directly relates to our explorations of worldly exiles. The human being’s experience of time is vital because it adds a dimension to the possible human situations in the world. Conjoining being and time, Heidegger shows that existentially, the human being is an exile. At the same time, the exile wishes to distance him or herself from that fact, dreading the nothing which is coexistent with being and going so far as to pre-render a frame that precludes exile from his or her position. The later theorists of exile have an acute awareness of this reality Heidegger has elicited. Thus, one can claim that although his efforts to address the worldly exile are absent, his concepts are essential to figuring forth the body of the exile today.

Michel Foucault represents an eruptive way of thinking of the subject. He follows Nietzsche in style and purpose, but arrives at a subjectivity that is a mirror image of the German’s unrestrained superman, the carceral figure. Foucault explores the ways in which Power coerces subjectivity to appear, how it structures its mechanisms of control and eventually, how one may escape the limits of being as it has been constituted. Foucault provides his insight into how Power punishes those it deems unacceptable to be citizens, vividly rendering this reality in Discipline and Punish. Foucault also proves instrumental in understanding how Power thinks resistance and makes it appear to the citizen in History of Madness. History of Madness has perhaps become even more important than Discipline and Punish as the 21st century stumbles
into irrationality and increasingly divided political geography. What Power apprehends of the
exile, is not so much a rational criminal human being, but a figure who seems to roam between
beings and embodies madness, anathema and blasphemy to its doctrine. Foucault points to how
such resistant madness haunts Power and from this we can begin to speculate how Power will
react to displaced people. Foucault’s flamboyant narrative style also proves illuminating in and
of itself. It belies an atemporal way of arriving at and presenting the “truth” of being. Often in
representing the exile the (narrative) structure that will deny this movement is a linear, temporal
one. This is part of the critique this work attempts: how atemporal narrative structure and style,
one can offer better resistance and perhaps even undermine the Panopticon.

Judith Butler’s *Frames of War* is frequently cited in recent works concerning how power
“frames” its violence for public consumption. Her use of the word “frame” is an excellent
concept, both fictive and philosophical, denoting the possibility of seeing within and knowing
the limits of what is seen.

As we know, "to be framed" is a complex phrase in English: a picture is framed, but so too is a criminal (by the police), or an innocent person (by someone nefarious, often the police), so that to be framed is to be set up, or to have evidence planted against one that ultimately "proves" one's guilt. When a picture is framed, any number of ways of commenting on or extending the picture may be at stake. But the frame tends to function, even in a minimalist form, as an editorial embellishment of the image, if not a self-commentary on the history of the frame itself (*Frames of War* 8).

With this word as a hinge in her work, Butler considers recent American foreign and
domestic policy and investigates the question of when and how life, human life becomes
“grieveable” and questions how the fictive, philosophical frames of power are used as tools to
formulate the subject.
Butler is incisive in her explorations of the everyday mechanisms of power, namely the narratives and images presented to us in the media. In understanding how in the circulation of alternative frames of reality one can begin to understand who is living recognizable life and who has been exiled to the peripheral, the ungrievable. The language Butler uses to convey this idea seems to be particularly resonant with the literary lens of Paradise Lost’s Satan:

“What is this specter that gnaws at the norms of recognition, an intensified figure vacillating as its inside and its outside? As inside, it must be expelled to purify the norm; as outside, it threatens to undo the boundaries that limit the self. In either case, it figures the collapsibility of the norm; in other words, it is a sign that the norm functions precisely by way of managing the prospect of its undoing, an undoing that inheres in its doings” (Frames of War 12)

I develop from this thinking a self-dissolving frame for the exile, a way of showing the exile’s story that does not ossify his or her being into simply an exile, or life that is not grievable.

In Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer, The State of Exception, The Use of Bodies and his collected essays one finds many useful concepts concerning exile. Homo Sacer is especially useful as it explores the nature of the relationship between the nomos and the banned being, the sacred man, whose banishment is co-extensive with the creation of sovereign power. As Agamben puts it:

“The originary relation of law to life is not application but Abandonment. The matchless potentiality of the nomos, its originary ‘force of law’, is that it holds life in its ban by abandoning it.” (Homo Sacer 23)

Agamben explores in detail how the power to ban a person is the fundamental site of sovereignty and how the sacred man is enmeshed in a zone of indistinction that is defined by having no status under the law and yet being externally bound by it.

Agamben is also useful is his thinking on time, both in contemplating the original moment of power’s inception and his formulation of the “contemporary”:

The contemporary is not only the one who, perceiving the darkness of the present, grasps a light that can never reach its destiny; he is also the one who, dividing and
interpolating time, is capable of transforming it and putting it in relation with other times (What is an Apparatus 53)

The moment of original sovereignty will prove important in Paradise Lost, which begins with Satan’s banishment. In addition, the concept of the contemporary will provide a nexus for Shelley to interact as theorist with our modern thinkers and plays a role in Byron’s Ironic form of time in Don Juan.

The Western Tradition of Literature and Exile

Clearly, the themes of truth, power, the exile, the refugee, and the rightless being are of great interest to modern theorists. This interest has produced a great deal of work on the subjectivity of exile. But one should hardly forget that these themes are not issues of a single time but stretch back throughout human history and literature. These efforts include a considerable percentage of what are considered canonical works and taken together seem to form the foundations of what one might call the narrativity of exile.

If one finds difficulty in bridging a supposed gap between modern theory of exile’s subjectivity and the narrative forms of history and literature, a theoretical framework one might build from would be that of Hayden White. His work including Metahistory and Tropics of Discourse offers insight into the poetical content and creative process of historiography. White examines critical figures in the writing of History from Hegel to Foucault and providing a way to understand them via formalist terminology derived from Northrop Frye. White provides an excellent nexus for theory and form to interact with one another and he assists us in thinking the often difficult philosophical works and narratives as documents prefigured by their creators’ artistry. White also proves useful when trying to negotiate theoretical conceptions of time and poetic representations of time, by thinking historiography in terms of the emplotment or
arrangement of events. It is in part from White’s nexus of art, form and theory that I will formulate a concept of exile originating from the Satanic School of Romanticism, reading especially Shelley but also Byron as if they were proposing ways of life rather than “simply” crafting poetry.

If then, one accepts the premise of a narrativity of exile that is developing alongside a philosophical subjectivity in the West, then the question becomes what are the aspects of this narrative and how has it changed over time and influenced exile’s depiction. Although the focus of this work is two specific moments in English Literature, one finds the story of exile as early as the *Book of Genesis* and throughout modernity and post-modernity in works like *The Stranger* and the popular television series *Breaking Bad*. These stories are far from being mere footnotes, since the story of the exile plays a central role in the Western Cannon, from the Odyssey to Shakespeare’s great tragedies, (*Othello, Hamlet, King Lear*). Again and again one sees that the exilic figure is central to the story of human being in literature. That being said, it is equally apparent, in both the literary canon and the fiction it is comprised, that the exile is being moved aside, overlooked or placed in the periphery. It would be impossible to trace the entirety of the exile’s literary evolution, but I want to note some significant works that came before *Paradise Lost* and after *Don Juan* to better situate the poetry of Milton, Shelley and Byron, alongside their most major influences and imitators in the center of our gaze. In this way, one can better understand their contributions and understand why I believe reading the Satanic School as a theory of exile is critical to presenting the worldly exile today.

If one were forced to trace the literary depiction of exile in a few pages, one would have to begin with the *Book of Genesis*. Genesis contains the stories of Adam and Eve and that of their sons Cain and Abel. Both stories are stories of exile and even beyond that, the exile of those
already exiled. First, our metaphorical parents ate from the Tree of Knowledge via a serpent’s temptation, despite the warning of God and were for their original sin banished from Eden:

Therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden Cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life (Genesis 3:23-24).

After this, their son Cain, slays his brother Abel and is further banished, and begets the entirety of the human race:

“Behold, thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the earth; and from thy face shall I be hid; and I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond in the earth; and it shall come to pass, that every one that findeth me shall slay me. And the LORD said unto him, Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold. And the LORD set a mark upon Cain, lest any finding him should kill him. And Cain went out from the presence of the LORD, and dwelt in the land of Nod, on the east of Eden” (Genesis 4: 4-16)

This is the beginning of humanity, depicted in one of our oldest stories, and it begins with a story of exile. One can see how this narrativity coincides with Agamben’s formulation of social subjectivity as principally derived from the banned being, and yet how it also differs in literary qualities: metaphor, allegory, imagery-- all attributes of poetry which one does not usually ascribe to theoretical works. But this narrative and its conception of exile can hardly be underestimated in Western Civilization, for its fiction has seen countless repetitions and reinforcements throughout the recorded millennia.

One will see Genesis’ influence in countless other works, perhaps next and most notably in the lengthier Book of Exodus wherein Moses, Pharaoh and God become the central actors in a far more worldly depiction of exile, replete with language depicting the suffering of those restrained by Power:

And the Egyptians made the children of Israel to serve with rigour. And they made their lives bitter with hard bondage, in mortar, and in brick, and in all
manner of service in the field: all their service, wherein they made them serve, was with rigour (Exodus 1:13-14)

Exodus also clearly would seem to formulate a highly influential frame for the refugee:

The Lord says: “I have surely seen the affliction of my people which are in Egypt, and have heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters; for I know their sorrows; And I am come down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them up out of that land unto a good land and a large, unto a land flowing with milk and honey…” (Exodus 3:7-8)

In this early moment, it would appear the exodus of the Israelites is justified by the command of God. Reflecting on this early, apparently inherent human right, one must question how and why exiles became framed into the kind of Enemies that they appear as now.

If Exodus explores more fully the political, exterior dimensions of exile, a later book, the Book of Job explores the internal reality of exile. The Book of Job concerns the expelling of a good man, Job, from the favor of God via the prodding of Satan. In a series of catastrophes, Job becomes an outcast, and for the fear of his supposed offense against God is shunned by his fellow country. The Book of Job accesses the distress of being an outcast, an exile from God/society. After his fall from God’s graces’ Job laments his condition:

Why is light given to a man whose way is hid, and whom God hath hedged in? For my sighing cometh before I eat, and my roarings are poured out like the waters. For the thing which I greatly feared is come upon me, and that which I was afraid of is come unto me. I was not in safety, neither had I rest, neither was I quiet; yet trouble came (Job 3:23-26).

Job’s experience touches the notes of exile, the sense of loss, the notion of searching and displacement all seem to be in concert with what has been previous figured in Genesis and Exodus. The difference and the development of Job in exilic literature is the greater exploration of Job’s interior suffering life. Neither Adam nor Cain have much time devoted to their inner
being in the Old Testament and Moses is consumed with affecting his political reality, but for most of *Job* we have his lamentations and these form for us his being in exile.

The effect of Job’s lamentations is well-calculated. It is designed to elicit our sympathy for Job’s plight in our identification of his metaphoric sorrows with our own actual ones. The *Book of Job* operates as a bridge or nexus wherein the everyday suffering and the extraordinary suffering of the exile can meet and converse so that the common man can better understand the outcast. It acts as a momentary frame which allows the periphery to present itself before the center. This is an important development in exilic literature, perhaps all the more so given the context in which Job become an exile an outcast. Job is called a pious upright man and his previous life was rich with family and situation. It is only after calamity that Job is left destitute and wandering. More so than the previous biblical exiles, who were the father of mankind and God’s chosen prophet, Job appears to his fellow human beings as one of them. Job’s common humanity and his former common situation, is essential to recall and implement when attempting to formulate a narrative of the exile in our time and though it does see recurrence in exilic literature, it is less ably implemented when representing actual refugees and exiles.

If such exilic literature were confined to merely the *Old Testament*, one might be tempted to relegate the exile to a specific culture at a trying time. However, what one sees is that the figure of the exile continually recurs in Western literature. Had one space, one would explore the wanderings of Odysseus and show exile as a mechanism of endless (self) invention. One might look to *Oedipus Rex* and *Oedipus at Colonus* to see how exile informs how we consider human knowledge and behavior. One could struggle with Dante in his *Inferno* as he makes his pilgrim’s way to Paradise. But beyond the Old Testament, the *Odyssey* and *the Inferno*, one can point to a great deal of Shakespeare’s plays, (*Henry IV, Richard III, Twelfth Night, Othello, The Tempest,*
etc) which deal explicitly with exile and exodus. That we do not think of these major works as exilic literature is testament to how diligently humanity tries to place exile in its periphery. But Shakespeare, as perhaps the influence on Western literature in the last 400 years, (and an especially powerful influence on Milton, Byron and Shelley) knew (as the writers of the Old Testament knew) that exile was at the center of our existence. And so at the center of his cannon are Hamlet and King Lear.

There is much that one could say of Hamlet with regard to exile and exilic literature, but perhaps the reason why Hamlet must be considered here is its further development of Job’s internalized exilic existence. Hamlet manifestly concerns the revenging of a murdered king and father by his son, but the exterior action of the play is hardly point of interest in the play. Hamlet is read because it seems to replicate consciousness interacting with itself. In the process of this action one observes the departure of Hamlet from the exterior world and a wandering within himself. Thus the famous line: “I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king of infinite space.” The effect of this wandering is near absolute solipsism, and for a time, this stark isolation this exile of the self within the self appears those around the Danish prince as a kind of madness. But if it is madness, it is a madness we should know because it allows us insight into what exile is, existentially. When being is forced to leave it seems to open up space within itself. This we have already see metaphorically in the Books of Genesis and Exodus, which lead their characters out toward the new possibilities of life, that were yet unknown. What Hamlet in his self-imposed exile explores is the infinite variety of beings there are within Being.

This mode of being “leaving into being” Hamlet seems to so completely represent is essential to the development of the Western subject as he or she is constituted today. The famous soliloquys of Hamlet, “To or not to be”, “Oh that this too, too solid flesh” and “What a rogue and
peasant slave am I” are excellent and specific contemplations of what Hamlet must do, should be and can do, as he is. But more important to our purpose in discovering the place of exile in Western narrativity is the fact they demonstrate that exile is the theoretical position from which modern man contemplates himself. One speaks of this stance as “thinking abstractly”. But it takes only a slight shift to see this thinking, as thinking from exile. This furthers the concept of exile, because it involves the central function of consciousness. The consciousness is the symbol so often identified as that which makes the human, and Hamlet presents it as way of thinking only possible in the leaving, the distancing of the self from the self. Shakespeare performs this exilic movement countless times in the course of Hamlet’s speeches. As Hegel puts it (I paraphrase) he allows the character to change themselves by overhearing themselves. In so doing the reader of Hamlet comes to identify this interior exilic condition as the essentially human one.

One can immediately see a dialogue Shakespeare’s work has with Heidegger’s. Both are situating an existential exile as fundamental to human being. What one gains in the Shakespearean language is a better sense of the struggle of consciousness to arrive at truth and the consistent questioning of being that Heidegger in his later works will attempt to provoke in his readers. Shakespeare’s exilic being is undeniably a human being. It is clear, however, despite the alternative formulations, that both Shakespeare and Heidegger, both poet and theorist, are thinking along similar lines when depicting exile.

The nearest touchstone for King Lear is Job. Lear nears the tone Job’s pathos, while outpacing it in abyssal grandeur. The play concerns the fall of the aged king from his certain situation as ruler of Britain and his coming into consciousness of what it is to be human upon a storm stricken heath. Thus, Lear frames exile in terms of the subject losing himself and being forced from his home as if we were, each in our own subjectivity, sovereigns. There is much to
be made of Lear’s expulsion from (self)sovereignty, and his descent into madness but what I might draw attention to is the overwhelming experience of exhaustion that his journey imparts to its audience. Lear’s exhaustion and death provide the basis for much of the post-modern conception and framing of exilic, human life, just as Hamlet’s ironic consciousness served to frame the modern conception of it. Even more so that Job, who was stripped of his situated life relatively quickly by God at the onset, Lear’s slow loss of himself seems to evoke a pathos which has always been in exilic life, but to this point in exilic literature remained somewhat in the periphery. In Lear, Shakespeare successfully presents this pathos of exile. The journey that Lear is forced upon, the journey toward the heath, brings into being his soul and extracts from him the essence of his life. Thus Lear upon the heath brings himself most into human life straining against his accursed position:

Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! rage! blow!
You cataracts and hurricanoes, spout
Till you have drench’d our steeples, drown’d the cocks!
You sulphurous and thought-executing fires,
Vaunt-couriers to oak-cleaving thunderbolts,
Singe my white head! And thou, all-shaking thunder,
Smite flat the thick rotundity o’ the world!
Crack nature’s moulds, an germens spill at once,
That make ingrateful man! (King Lear, III.ii 1-9)

After this moment, Lear begins to live, and show his love to those that deserve his affection. But it would appear that the moment when the King has made himself most vulnerable ushers in his doom, (as in Genesis). To live as human being, exposed and exiled, is to always be, in a prelude to death. Thus a short time later, Lear dies, with Cordelia in his arms, exhausted, having travelled immeasurably since the beginning of the play. We, in witnessing the arduousness of his journey into human being can only feel relief in his dying. There are few more powerful, human and sublime moments in all of Western Literature. It is a distant, cosmic
vision of the self in exile, at the extreme limit of being, and at the same time at recognition that human existence at its deepest level occurs. It is a revealing of a truth of the human being: there is a fundamental exhaustion that builds throughout our lives while and because we are leaving “home”, or being forced to leave, seeking, oftentimes seeking ourselves, in exile. This is the illuminative power and truth of a narrative of exile. In its truth one sees flashes of recent theory, Butler’s “grievable life”, Foucault’s haunting of reason by unreason, the list goes on, and I would argue that the immediacy of Lear allows its readers to more effectively experience and know the human being in exile.

The framing of the human being in exile that occurs in *Hamlet* and *Lear* has had immeasurable effect on the way subsequent literature has thought what exile and exodus are. But if there is a flaw in their representation of exile it is a flaw in their form, the Tragedy, that creates it. *King Lear* comes closer to erasing this particular smudge, being much closer to pathos than true tragedy, But both do not quite fit as forms with which to present the exile as he or she is: continuing on in exile. They have satisfactory endings without further openings. (This is a major point we shall address throughout this work but especially in the first chapter, where we consider the Tragedy of Adam as the Power approved narrative form of exile.)

The fact that we can understand that the Tragic form might be a flaw comes to us in the development of exilic literature that follows Shakespeare. The evolution toward more complicated (if less perfect forms) of representation is most pronounced in the modern and post-modern periods of Western Literature. These are the forms that I will examine. To be clear, I am siting the cause of this evolution in the work of Shelley and Byron as they reacted to Milton. In coming chapters, I will develop how this change in form occurred and why it represents so critical and necessary a revision and one that needs be formulated into a modern theory, but for
now, I will merely demonstrate the nature of the change in the works that followed to provide the context for Milton, Shelley and Byron’s place in the exilic canon.

It is especially Byron’s insight, invention and especially his complex, humane irony in Don Juan that writers during the Modern period so closely identified with and began to elaborate on in their own explorations of exilic, human life. There is no better example of the exile in Modernity than in James Joyce’s Ulysses, which explores the being of exile through its two principle characters, Stephen Daedalus and Leopold Bloom. There are many facets to Joyce’s depiction of exile, but what I am most interested in is the use of irony and the abandonment of the Tragic form, indeed even the sense of tragedy concerning exile. If Byron in Don Juan begins to show exilic humanity with greater complexity and complications that many of the previous writers in the Western Tradition, then Joyce may have near perfected this technique in Ulysses. The narrative technique depicts an immense variety of moods, actions, reflections and desires and changes equally in tone, height and diction. This is apparent from the first introduction to Leopold Bloom, who upon his morning excursion follows a girl down the street for some time:

Mr. Bloom pointed quickly. To catch up and walk behind her if she went slowly, behind her moving hams. Pleasant to see first thing in the morning. Hurry up, damn it. Make hay while the sun shines. She stood outside the shop in sunlight and sauntered lazily to the right. He sighed down his nose: they never understand. Sodachapped hands. Crusted toenails too. Brown scapulars in tatters, defending her both ways. The sting of disregard glowed to weak pleasure within his breast. For another: a constable off duty cuddling her in Eccles lane. They like them sizeable. Prime sausage. O please, Mr. Policeman, I’m lost in the wood (Joyce 59).

The density and variety of this experience is astounding and yet such an experience is exceedingly familiar and human. Bloom, the wandering Ulysses, is an everyman and thus Joyce through an extraordinarily rich rendering presents the exile. Although Ulysses is so often spoke of for its stream-of-consciousness technique, there is perhaps just as much merit in Joyce’s
presencing of the sense of constant otherness that Bloom (and by extension the human being) endures in Dublin which often surfaces in Joyce’s depiction of anti-Semitism. This kind of prejudice Dublin at the time was of an extreme variety, for example consider Garrett Deasly, the schoolmaster who employs Stephen Daedelus. He jokes with Stephen:

   Mr. Deasy halted, breathing hard and swallowing his breath. "I just wanted to say," he said. "Ireland, they say, has the honour of being the only country which never persecuted the jews. Do you know that? No. And do you know why?"
   He frowned sternly on the bright air. "Why sir?" Stephen asked, beginning to smile. "Because she never let them in," Mr. Deasy said solemnly (Joyce 36).

   Clearly, Ireland “let them in”, but never entirely welcomed these refugees and exiles. The persecution is a subtler one than the Pharaoh’s, but it is a persecution rather like the kind America and a great deal of the West seems to have rhetorically rekindled in the early 21st Century. This kind of background racism exists throughout *Ulysses*, and because of it, Bloom often attempts to compensate for his very fact of being, his Jewishness, his otherness, his unspoken exile. This is how a Modernist, depicts exile even within the bounds of one’s home country and city. Home is not home when one is considered by one’s fellows as a kind of Enemy. The very experience one’s own body is affected. In *Ulysses*, one observes the exilic consciousness reflect in connected disconnectedness upon issues of race, gender and sexuality and the body itself. In this, the novel is proleptic of the mid-twentieth century theorizations of such “others”.

   This otherness, which so often results in an ironic or critical distance from the world is one of the primary ways the Modernist writers depicted exile. Joyce’s ethos is to fill up our sense of the other with everything we know as human and present the peripheral and essentially human before humanity. This makes *Ulysses* far less formal than the previous iterations of exile in the
Western Cannon and less tragic but if we are trying to think exile as the essentially human, then its style and narrative frame do appear to be the more authentic method of depiction.

This abandonment of the Tragic form and depiction is precisely the issue I wish to problematize in the recent theoretical treatments of exile, for Butler, Agamben, and even Foucault’s conception of human subjectivity as it exists in relationship with Power relies far too much on a moralistic world view. If the Modernists saw anything accurately it was that justice is a frame, that nothing can be done to correct or justify the humane experience of exile. They considered it the better course to detail the reality of Power and human beings as the fictions that pre-figure our experience of them.

This approach is a difficult form of fiction but it is precisely the fiction that is arriving in our own Post-Modern moment. After Joyce’s near complete catalog of all human experience in a day, what one perceives as a trend in the exilic tradition is an emptying out, a shedding of the inessential elements of being that Joyce seemed to so easily carry with him. Post-Modernity, if it has any form as a fiction represents literature coming to terms with the fact that irony and its critical distance is a poor palliative and turning to a rendering of the absurd to demonstrate the unresolvable paradoxes that the human being is forced to negotiate while being.

This sense of being in exile, emptied out to absurdity, can be found in Albert Camus’ short novel *The Stranger*. The novel concerns a young Frenchman, Meursault who finds himself guilty of murdering a man whom he hardly knows. In *The Stranger*, Camus pushes against the limits of being in the world, showing the reader a being who he is so distant, so exiled from himself and the world, that who is really is completely obscured and irretrievable. Camus crafts his story in such a way that what at first appears an emotional numbness in the aftermath of a mother’s death becomes questioned as madness by the authorities. Eventually the reader is left
entirely uncertain of where Meursault belongs because it is impossible to determine if he is mad, rational, or simply entirely and strangely emotional detached. One perceives the interpretative dilemma, one witnesses Meursault’s conversation with his defense attorney, who questions him about his mother’s death:

He went on to ask if I had felt grief on that “sad occasion.” The question struck me as an odd one; I’d have been much embarrassed if I’d had to ask anyone a thing like that. I answered that, of recent years, I’d rather lost the habit of noting my feelings, and hardly knew what to answer. I could truthfully say I’d been quite fond of Mother—but really that didn’t mean much. All normal people, I added as an afterthought, had more or less desired the death of those they loved, at some time or another. (Camus 40)

But what to make of this narration and conversation is difficult, given the multiple possible meanings: the rational, the detached, and perhaps the psychopathic. It is absurdity that one cannot resolve the human being. There is a denial of truth which seems to exile both the character and the reader from meaning. This leaves the reader in the mode of questioning, searching looking for the truth and in existential danger of not finding it. Camus’ technique leaves the reader adrift and perhaps immersed in the sensation of exilic life. The problem is that Meursault’s condition may be too unbearable to perpetually identify with: in the extreme distance of his condition, there is no distance at all, but total detachment. The periphery becomes central almost without any form of mediation. The result of the absurdity may be a panic Meursault seems immune to: where is the way out?

This absurd depiction of human exile seems to continue on as Post-Modernism develops, as one can observe Beckett’s existential play Endgame. Endgame depicts the struggle and relationship of Clov with Hamm, the struggle to leave the vaudeville existence a very empty humanity seems inhabit:

Hamm: Get me ready.
(Clov does not move.)
Go and get the sheet.
(Clov does not move.)
Clov!
CLOV: Yes.
HAMM: I'll give you nothing more to eat.
CLOV: Then we'll die.
HAMM: I'll give you just enough to keep you from dying.
You'll be hungry all the time.
CLOV: Then we won't die.
(Pause.)
I'll go and get the sheet.
(He goes towards the door.)
HAMM: No!
(Clov halts.)
I'll give you one biscuit per day.
(Pause.)
One and a half.
(Pause.)
Why do you stay with me?
CLOV: Why do you keep me?
HAMM: There's no one else.
CLOV: There's nowhere else. (Pause.)
HAMM: You're leaving me all the same.
CLOV: I'm trying.
HAMM: You don't love me.
CLOV: No.
HAMM: You loved me once.
CLOV: Once!
HAMM: I've made you suffer too much. (Pause.) Haven't I?
CLOV: It's not that.
HAMM: I haven't made you suffer too much?
CLOV: Yes!
HAMM (relieved): Ah, you gave me a fright! (Beckett)

Here Beckett, in a way that is quite similar to Camus, frames a fiction that is equally absurd and empty. But the difference between these two late writers of the absurd (and this will be critical to the work here) is that Beckett in Endgame attempts to open up the absurdity of exilic, to find a way out. As Clov puts it at the end of the play: “This is what we call making an exit.”
It is this stance, given our awareness of the long tradition of leaving leading up to it, that must surely signal to exilic humanity yet another shift in our depiction of our fundamental exilic condition. What that “way out is” has yet to appear, and given the length of the literary tradition’s attempt to find it, the way out may never be found since it appears to be part of the essentially human being. But hopefully what this overview of the exilic cannon has demonstrated is that the literature of the West has always been concerned with presencing the exile and has developed its own techniques and tactics for making the exile appear. One can note the several coincidences between the literature and the theories being put forth today and in the overlap come to understand that the literature and the theory share the same goals. The first step to explore this possibility I would argue is the same step that Shelley, and Byron undertook two centuries ago, the identification of the Enemy life that was embedded in *Paradise Lost* as the essentially complicated and eventually paradoxical human being, de-structuring the ideal, Tragic form of exile and allowing it to be something new.

**Exodus**

Given my sketches of the problem of the exile and the theoretical and literary solutions, one might be able to speculate on the way I am approaching exile in this work. But to make it explicit: I am attempting to address the exilic being via readings of *Paradise Lost* and the major works of the Satanic School of British Romanticism. My intent is to push the Satanic reading of *Paradise Lost* as far as possible, into an extensive rubric or way of looking at the world. The merit of this attempt will depend on proving adequately that the world of *Paradise Lost* and its Satanic Subject, so strongly resembles (and may in fact be incorporated into) the fictional pre-figuration of our real world that the observations one makes about *Paradise Lost* apply equally to its poetry and our collected worldly fictions. Doubtless, this may seem, at times, a spurious
junction, treating fiction as if it were flesh, but I believe one gains enough in the interchange that some obvious seams in the dialogue can be forgiven.

**Chapter 1 Adam and Home in *Paradise Lost***

This chapter examines Adam’s narrative of exile and the subjectivity it produces. This account will proceed through a close literary reading of characters, events and actions and a theoretical reading of the space Milton depicts in his epic. In his narrative, Adam is banished because of the disruption of Eden caused by an infiltrator, yet is forgiven by God and given a chance at redemption. Unlike Satan, (whose exilic subjectivity I address in the next chapter) Adam makes a new home on Earth and is still thought of as human, grievable life because he is still a willing participant in Power’s plan. It is because of this reality that Adam’s sense of exile is, at the very least mitigated, if not rendered entirely inactive. Adam quickly moves on from being an exile into a citizen of God’s new world. Adam’s exile has a determined end. Adam, the human being, is a being who is restored by Power and is aware of this redemption as an eternal debt. Adam is the ideal form of exile: an exile that is restored to peace. It for this reason that Adam’s narrative becomes problematic in the contemporary discourse of exiles, refugees, immigrants and others. Adam represents the idealized citizen, the situated being, the status quo. But his story is used by Power to represent what exile should appear as and be, existentially.

In the following chapter I examine Satan’s being via his space and character, through both literary and theoretical lenses. There is a vast and reflective disparity in the narrative. Adam is a relatively static and tragic figure. Conversely, Satan, the less than human, the war refugee, cannot be redeemed, is confined and punished, and forced into a denizen-like existence on the periphery of the poem’s world, in a camp called Hell. He is being-beginning from-the-ban
in Agamben’s sense of the word. This ban is a political ceremony. It unites the sovereign’s violence with justice and reshapes the good citizen of the West into a pursuing Angel who must chase after and castigate the Enemy. Because of this ban and its marking violence, Satan’s story is one of absurd punishments, transgressions of the ideal, and paradoxical complications which cannot be reconciled with any narrative form or any graspable frame of understanding. He attempts to defy God, shows Him no willing obedience, is a mockery of piety and attempts at every opportunity to disrupt God’s plan. His actions and their depiction are Absurd in form and Ironic in disposition. This exacerbates Satan’s own sense of his exile, making it more damning, rending and unbearable, which makes it the better depiction of exile in both the existential and worldly sense.

Satan is a subject that that contemporary philosophers are deeply invested in trying to present, (whether one calls it the banned being, the part of no part, the other, the unseen, or the exile). It for this reason that the work with Satan in Paradise Lost will be a more theoretical endeavor than the work I do with Adam. Satan presents new ways to think the other, as what I am calling “Enemy Life” whereas Adam would seem to represent a far more traditional and explored Western subject. It is with this concept of “Enemy Life” embodied by Satan that I modulate several theories of exile into accordance with the way that exile is depicted in contemporary political discourse. By reading Paradise Lost in the way that the Romantics read Milton’s text one can describe the dynamics of exilic discourse today. This will prepare the way for a renewed reading of Shelley and Byron’s Satanic works, one that show these poets as theorists of resistance, apartness and integrative exilic life.

**Framing the Narrative**

This chapter has two purposes. The first is to explore the description, events, actions and relationships of that occur and define narrative of Adam in *Paradise Lost*. For the most part, this
is the traditional reading of *Paradise Lost*. It is a reading that fixes its gaze principally upon Adam as the protagonist of *Paradise Lost*. Though it glances at Satan and Eve, it is clear the text considers Adam the true human being and supposedly the being who (Tragically) loses Paradise. (This is an important distinction and perhaps not as obvious as one might think.) Thus, I call it, loosely, the narrative of Adam.

Once one understands the narrative of Adam as a Tragedy, this understanding highlights a potential problem. The very perfection of Milton’s Tragic form and characters when compared to experiences of exile, in both the physical and existential sense do not seem natural and authentic means for representing an exiled human being.

The end of narrative of Adam suggests the opposite. Its subject/protagonist is far more in concert with the Western conception of “citizen-subject” than “exile”. It represents the form’s perfection in the body and being of its protagonist. This is problem and Milton is hardly alone in struggling (magnificently to be sure) with its implications. The West cannot seem to think the “exile” as a human being. It crafts fictions around the exile to situate them. This is precisely what *Paradise Lost* does when it makes Adam paradoxically a Tragic figure and a would-be exilic one and thus the text is a useful space to study and destructure.

This search for Adam’s paradoxical place as an exile or a situated being brings me to my second purpose. What I would make is a hinge between the interiority of the text and the exterior, real, world. The narrative of Adam is a (if not the) prototype for how exile is depicted by Power in the West. It is a form that functions to explain and control the existential and worldly sense of dis-location in human being. In a way, the narrative creates the situated Western subject. It also reinforces and justifies the hostility toward the outsider, who does not appear as a “human” exile should, but rather as a disruptive presence, an “enemy” outsider who invades and
brings chaos, conflict, hardship and death. The just Tragedy of Mankind brought about by Satan, as told by God, this is exile’s framing fiction. One must know this operant fiction if there is any hope of theorizing a way out of its frame.

I begin with an overview of the theoretical lenses I will be using. For this chapter and later ones, use the concept of what one might call a “narrative frame” to designate the overlapping conceptions of the apprehensive “frame” employed by various philosophers and the controlling “form” used by formalist critics of literature and historiography. To be clear, when I later use the words “frame” “framing” to examine the narrative I do so thinking of the “frame” as both a literary and metaphysical structure, merely appearing as a literary or metaphysical characteristic depending on the necessity of the investigation. I employ this method through the play of a few major sources.

I think of the frame through Martin Heidegger, William Spanos and Judith Butler in their respective works Age of the World Picture, The Errant Art of Moby Dick and Frames of War. The frame is a spatial technique of understanding and inherently a fiction. Butler plays between these meanings well when she says:

As we know, "to be framed" is a complex phrase in English: a picture is framed, but so too is a criminal (by the police), or an innocent person (by someone nefarious, often the police), so that to be framed is to be set up, or to have evidence planted against one that ultimately "proves" one's guilt. When a picture is framed, any number of ways of commenting on or extending the picture may be at stake. But the frame tends to function, even in a minimalist form, as an editorial embellishment of the image, if not a self-commentary on the history of the frame itself” (Frames of War 8).

The narrative frame is a border crafted around a certain volume of reality with the intent of showing something or someone within it in a particular way. Butler also elicits the idea that there is an editorial, controlling or even creative function when one frames a reality for viewing.
One of the effects of this control is that the inner space often appears as a total space when it is in a frame. As Heidegger puts it in his essay, “The Age of the World Picture”:

“This hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as a picture. What it is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth” (Age of the World Picture 129-130)

What is within this boundary does not comprise the total of the world, but a part closed off from the world that makes the world graspable or intelligible. But finding the way outside of the frame can be quite difficult if one is inside a frame so pervasive and undetectable it has become an ideology.

In *The Errant Art of Moby Dick*, Spanos applies this spatial conception of the frame and applies it in his work to the nature of fiction itself, crossing the boundaries between metaphysics and literary studies. Spanos thinks on how vision, specifically a metaphysical, Tragic vision operates to produce an arrested, static, complete, frame of being and reality:

The identification of tragedy and spatial form sublates and interiorizes the conflicting tensions of being-in-the-world (desire and loathing) into a comprehensive static figure or icon that brings peace” (Spanos 48).

Spanos is thinking of `an anthropological Tragic vision in above passage, but the critique will apply quite well to the theological Tragic vision of God in *Paradise Lost*. This divine and Tragic vision will take on an anthropological character when I demonstrate *Paradise Lost’s* prefigurative infiltration and influence on discourse later. Thus, between these three theorists, we have a sense of the “frame” as a device of apprehension, a kind of instantly and entirely visible fiction of intelligibility applied to the world we see.

In a more literary sense, I am thinking the “narrative frame” by the way of Hayden White and his use of formalism. White, in his various works, but especially *Metahistory* speaks of the
arrangement of events and actions as if they were determinative stylistic decisions on the part of the crafter that indicate the forth-coming form of the history. These “forms” stem from Northrop Frye’s work in formalism, *Anatomy of Criticism*, wherein he draws useful distinctions about the mode of poetry whether it be Tragedy, Comedy, Satire or Romance. White, in his work, internalized these literary forms and applied them to historiography and the historiographer’s poetic imagination. The premise is that:

The historian arranges the event in the chronicle into a hierarchy of significance by assigning events different functions as story elements in such a way as to disclose the formal coherence of a whole set of events considered as a comprehensible process with a discernable beginning middle and end (*Metahistory* 6).

I tend to use more of Hayden White’s more worldly iteration of formalism rather than Frye’s as a lens. It is useful to think about Milton’s poem as if it were an arranged *history*, rather than a “mere story” of the War in Heaven and the Fall of Man. The “facts” of this war and this fall are well established from biblical sources, but Milton did have to arrange them. Considering why and to what effect Milton placed certain events and actions at certain times will serve to bring the poem into proximity with the real world. “History” rather than “mere story” seems to have more heft in the pre-figurative imagination and the “fictional” nature of the “Fall from Heaven” is hardly accepted in large populations of Western Civilization. Satan and Adam’s stories of exile *are* history to many religious people and central to their form of discourse. Beyond that, we are in moment when the Presidential Administration of the United States speaks of “alternative facts” as an acceptable substitute for the disruptive truth. Clearly, we live in a time when the fanciful arrangement of history in discourse is a highly developed project of Power.
Working from this concept of the narrative form, it seems clear when we look at the arrangement that Milton is figuring forth in the events of the Fall of Man, the narrative is a high Tragedy. It is the “dying” of a semi-divine figure in Adam in a mode that may be called elegiac. This will have significant effect as the story becomes incorporated into today’s political discourse of exile, just as White suggests in *Metahistory*. Taken together, if Butler and Heidegger’s frame thinks on the outer, visible framework at it appears then perhaps what White’s arrangement of plot could be thought of as are the interior, skeletal frame which determines how it will appear.

Finally, in this work with *Paradise Lost* and Milton’s poetic imagination, I am thinking the narrative frame as it corresponds and reinforces the ideal or Platonic form. Milton’s classical education made him more than familiar with Plato, and one finds references to Phaedrus as early as 1636 in Milton’s letters. He even goes so far as to call Plato “divine” in one instance and in a letter to his friend Charles Diodati in 1637 writes:

> For though I do not know what else God may have decreed for me, this is true: He has instilled into me, if into anyone, a vehement love of the beautiful. Not so diligently as Ceres, according the fables, said to have sought her daughter Proserpina, as I seek for this idea of the beautiful, as if for some glorious image, throughout all shapes and forms of things (for many are the shapes and forms of things divine) day and night I search and follow its lead eagerly as if by clear and certain traces.” (The Major Works 717)

Milton’s sense of what constitutes perfection is deeply rooted in the dutiful contemplation of the Platonic ideal. But, just as importantly, Milton in *Paradise Lost* emphasizes the inability of humanity to full render such perfection (especially in an image or icon which Milton conceives as idolatry) and the sin it is to attempt to touch or transgress perfection’s boundaries. There is in Milton’s conception of his poem an awareness that the more perfectly his work adhered to a
preconceived form of narrative, (case in point the epic and the tragic) the greater the achievement would be in justifying and rendering visible the ways of God to men.

To reiterate, what I am explicitly trying to perform here is the involvement of the literary branch of thinking on form with the worldlier theories of the frame. There is a resonance between the spatial bodies, forms and frames that are depicted in a narrative and the meaning the narrative ultimately elicits as a work of fiction. It is by negotiating these concepts of the form and frame, by playing within their meanings, show how the space informs the essence and the essence evokes the space, that one can think the narrative frame in spatial/temporal and philosophical/literary terms, perceive both the exterior appearance of the narrative and perhaps investigate its inner machinery in a new way. Thus, I will proceed with a reading of Adam’s narrative in *Paradise Lost*, which is principally the story of his exile as Milton makes it appear according to his imitation of the divine vision of God.

**Milton, Politics, Criticism**

My reading of *Paradise Lost* and the exilic narratives of Adam and Satan proceeds from a 350-year tradition of Miltonic scholarship. This tradition, for the purposes of clarity and brevity, can be disciplined into the literary, historical, theological, philosophical and feminist modes of inquiry. More recently, there has been something of a breach with tradition of Milton and analysis of *Paradise Lost* has branched out into political, New Historical, deconstructionists and ecological models. The enormity of this critical work makes it almost impossible to trace the dialogues my critique develops from and speaks to, but there are few texts which inform my treatment of Adam, Eve, Satan as beings and exiles and what I will call the Eden and Hellspaces.

Perhaps best embodying the literary and rhetorical tradition of Milton Studies are the works of Stanley Fish, *Surprised by Sin*, published in 1967, and a more recent culmination in
How Milton Works published in 2001. Fish reads Milton as a persuasive poet and rhetorician; indeed, he argues that Milton’s value hinges on his undeniable eminence as a poet not a political theorist or site for projecting historical meaning. This, in some way, appears problematic to my approach to Milton but Fish does make an observation in an article entitled “Why Milton Matters” that, I think, characterizes the way I am reading Milton.

A criticism that focuses on aesthetic form is no less historical than any other, and, therefore, there can be no opposition between historical criticism and aesthetic criticism; rather, the opposition is between different kinds of historical criticism; and to the question which of the various histories is the one appropriate to the description and evaluation of literary works, the obvious, and indeed tautological, answer is the history of literary forms, so long as we remember that far from excluding social and political concerns, literary forms are, more often than not, their vehicles. (Why Milton Matters 8)

This last reality is at the heart of my argument going forward. I would contend that Milton’s Epic of two exiles, Adam and Satan is perhaps the vehicle for the West’s discourse of the exile. Milton’s poetry and rhetoric has shaped the forms and figures of exile in discourse now and the text presents to us a rather intricate and lengthy case to study.

Reading Milton in another way in a 1981 text, Poetics of the Holy: A Reading of Paradise Lost, Michael Lieb provides intricate groundwork in contextualizing Milton’s conception of the holy, the sacred and the profane. His biographical, historical and theological research into the make-up of Milton’s poetics speaks especially to the work that I would perform-especially as Milton’s concept of the sacred intersects with Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical interest in homo sacer. Part of Lieb’s work is eliciting the Hebrew/Greek/Protestant conception of the holy with some contrast to a Roman/Catholic conception of it. It is a distinction that Milton was particularly attuned to in his polemics on idolatry, centering on a Roman infatuation with sacred places (the pomerium the sacred boundary of Rome) and bodies
(the Catholic sacrament). Lieb also relates the poetics of the holy or the sacred in thorough relation with the profane, in language that seems to anticipate Agamben’s explorations: “[The Roman idea of the holy] returns us to the paradoxical concept implicit in the holy: pure and impure, sacred and accursed, are opposite sides of the same coin (Lieb 13).” These are crucial elements of my work as explores the sacred Edenspace, pious Adam, and in the second chapter, the paradoxically sacred and blasphemous being of Satan.

In reading the natural spaces of Milton, Ken Hiltner’s *Milton and Ecology*, published in 2003, provides an excellent intersection with my reading of Eden. In it he traces Milton’s rendering of Eden through an ecological and deconstructionist theoretical framework. In part, he argues that Eden needs understood as giving a place to prelapsarian humanity and the loss of Eden during takes that place away. Hiltner thinks Eden as home, correlating it to a tradition of country-house poetry, which takes on a particular resonance in my work on the nature of exile. The point at which we differ is in the characterization of the Edenspace itself, Hiltner thinks Eden as the place humanity is connected to, whereas I would draw attention to Eden as the “natural” space the sovereign defines, protects and oversees.

A touchstone for my work in Chapter II (wherein I consider the Satanic narrative of exile) appears in the 2013 book *Dominion Undeserved* by Eric B. Song. Song’s work in part considers the historical forces which formed Milton’s conception of imperial/national politics and mythic representation. His first chapter, The Strange Fires of Tartarus posits that Milton’s history, *A Brief History of Moscovia* and its depiction the nomadic, barbarous and inhumane Tartars, inform his representation of Satan.

Satan is aligned with the Tartar in his breaking of limits and boundaries. Satanic transgression is a dark inverse of divine creation, which begins with the establishment of limits. Appropriately, when Milton connects Satan’s journey
through chaos to the boundary-breaking of the abominable Tartars, he also describes Satan as a vulture, an unclean devourer of carrion” (Song 30-31)

It is this representation of Satan as first the impending danger, and second as the boundary-breaker, that I have particular interest as a site for theorization. Thus, my work builds from the historical realities Song elicits.

With these works as touchstones in the tradition of Milton studies, I would begin my reading of *Paradise Lost* to investigate its spaces, its language and centrally its exploration of the exile.

**The Narrative of Adam: From “Home to Exile”**

There are three major moments in Adam’s story that bear scrutiny to explore exile. They are the initial idyll condition of “home” found in Book IV, the infiltration of Satan, temptation of Eve and the noble Fall of Adam in Book IX, and finally the ameliorating vision and expulsion of Adam and Eve from Eden according to the grand design of God culminating in Book XII. Each of these moments is critical to our understanding of how Adam is framed into being an exile. It is not merely by the poetic elements and their emplotment that this reality appears. Contributing to the appearance of Adam as an exile (or at least what the West thinks an exile should be) is an array of spatial-temporal cues embedded in the text. This reading will consider these moments in chronological sequence, through the characterization of the actors and events involved and a reading of the space wherein each moment occurs.

The stance I adopt is one that has one foot set in the past and one in the present. I am reading Adam’s narrative to know the dominant story of exile *now*. Thus, throughout my reading I will be glancing ahead, interrupting the poetry with modern day resonances and attempt to bring the character of Adam in to contact with modern subjectivity. To this purpose after each major moment I will render a summation of the total effect of the literary and spatial-structural
elements found in the text and frame it briefly with respect to how the elements might work as a fictive template for our time.

The first moment I consider is the depiction of Adam and Eve in Eden before the Fall. This moment comes to us in Book IV, which is significant in that Milton has already spent three books showing the reader Satan’s great banishment from Heaven, his conditions and actions in Hell and his subsequent escape and traversal of the Wide Chaos that separates him from God and his angels. It is an arrangement of the events of Paradise Lost that seems to emphasize the evil of Satan, the justice of his punishment and therefore the danger he presents. Given this preface, Eden is already an interior, a narrative inside another. The very appearance of Adam and Eve, when they are at their most perfect in Eden, must be seen to be framed in the temporal sense by Satan’s own chaotic being and actions, for God has created them in the aftermath of the Great War. Before the creation of Eden and before the Fall of Man, so to speak, there is the threat of the Enemy and boundaries around Paradise.

Symbolic of humanity’s now postlapsarian state, it is through Satan entering the ideal space of Eden that one first encounters the human pair, in their home. This establishes what will be a major theme, the attempt of the sinful or less than perfect to touch or know or be perfect. This boundary crossing into the ideal repose of Eden takes on a certain kind of symbolic significance because of Satan’s infiltration of the Edenic site. He is outside, and in simply being outside and attempting to get inside he is disobedience, embodied. Furthering the sin of his mere presence, in Satan’s depiction is a willful disobedience defined by malice and envy. Milton describes Satan’s arrival:

Now to th' ascent of that steep savage Hill
Satan had journied on, pensive and slow;
But further way found none, so thick entwin'd,
As one continu'd brake, the undergrowth
Of shrubs and tangling bushes had perplext
All path of Man or Beast that past that way:
One Gate there only was, and that look'd East
On th' other side: which when th' arch-fellow saw
Due entrance he disdain't, and in contempt,
At one slight bound high over leap'd all bound
Of Hill or highest Wall, and sheer within
Lights on his feet. As when a prowling Wolfe,
Whom hunger drives to seek new haunt for prey,
Watching where Shepherds pen thir Flocks at eve
In hurdl'd Cotes amid the field secure,
Leaps o're the fence with ease into the Fould:
Or as a Thief bent to unhoord the cash
Of some rich Burgher, whose substantial dores,
Cross-barr'd and bolted fast, fear no assault,
In at the window climbs, or o're the tiles;
So clomb this first grand Thief into Gods Fould (Paradise Lost 4.173-193)

Milton employs an image of “the tangling bushes which perplex all path of man or beast” and figures of the prowling Wolf, and the Thief. This tangle of figures emphasizes Satan’s lack of an ideal form and bring to light the coming perfection of Eden and its human creatures. This “tangle” is represented in the space directly outside of Eden, linking the chaotic outside with the disobedient “outsider”. Satan appears spectral in this role of outsider, lacking in “true” “ideal” or “Platonic” presence: is he more a wolf or a thief? He is dis-figured in this sense, his body erased, his being made sinful, literally dis-formed. Despite that fact that his body is somewhat dis-figured, his presence and subsequent action is felt. Satan’s action, the leaping of the wall, is a boundary-crossing and the introduction of the imperfect to the perfect realm. This action prefaces our description of Eden. There is the sense that Eden has been breached and that we are only glimpsing it in an autumnal state must therefore accompany our reading.

Satan’s autumnal infiltration begets a lengthy description of Eden itself, a garden replete with bounty and a place of divinely protected innocence. I read this space utilizing the
destructuring lenses of Foucault and Heidegger. The reality produced is a physical space dominated by God’s all-seeing, all-explaining, all controlling vision.

God’s omniscience and perfection is pervasive throughout the text of *Paradise Lost*. He foretells both the Fall of Adam and the defeat of Satan during the War in Heaven. And through God’s vision, the narrative of Adam (and by extension the world it mimics and influences) represents Eden as the ideal space for mankind. It represents what “home” is and should be. “Home” here is a walled-off Paradise and this Paradise would appear to include within its boundaries the entire world. Milton is quite careful in his crafting of our first knowledge of Eden, its first descriptive lines in the poem are that of its walls:

So on he [Satan] fares, and to the border comes Of Eden, where delicious Paradise, Now nearer. Crowns with her enclosure green, As with a rural mound the champain head Of a steep wilderness, whose hairie sides [ 135 ] With thicket overgrown, grottesque and wilde, Access deni’d; and over head up grew Insuperable highth of loftiest shade, Cedar, and Pine, and Firr, and branching Palm A Silvan Scene, and as the ranks ascend [ 140 ] Shade above shade, a woodie Theatre Of stateliest view. Yet higher then thir tops The verdurous wall of paradise up sprung: Which to our general Sire gave prospect large Into his neather Empire neighbouring round. (*Paradise Lost* 4.131-144)

A certain spatiality of Eden defines our vision of its reality. The construction of Eden takes place via its walls. From these walls, Milton’s poetic eye moves in a vertical fashion placing “our general Sire” God above Eden and he has “prospect large” into his “Empire”. This omniscient, (or perhaps Panoptic) view seems to secure the place as He were a solid roof. What this suggests is a structure vulnerable and attempting to deny loss. Milton frames an Eden that is rooted in security and protection, indeed Eden appears more as a citadel or even a penitentiary
than an open city or living space. It is imposing, imperial and monumental, a space which attributes diminishment to ingress or egress.

Significantly the walls of Eden are made of nature itself: “the verdurous wall of Paradise”. The small features of this natural wall reinforce this sense of impenetrable solidity. They produce a clear concept of the inside “enclosure green” and the outside “thicket overgrown, grotesque and wilde/ access denied”. The idea of a “natural wall” is an important distinction. A wall is an artifice, but here it is rendered as natural, so much so that one can hardly imagine the world of Eden appearing otherwise. The natural world appears to be in obedience with God to make the space of Eden possible. This use of the nature as well as nature’s manifest obedience to such use is performed supposedly to protect mankind from the outside: Satan and the knowledge that he brings with him. But the walls of Eden operate as, to use Milton’s word, an “enclosure” a crafting of an interior space or even more than that a solipsistic world.

It is in this sense of Eden’s “enclosure” that this passage is linked to Heidegger’s concept of enframing. Heidegger’s enframing (or ge-stell) is mechanism designed to make something in the world appear. This frame traps the essence of knowledge and denies the ability to attain the underlying reality. This, in turn, traps the enframed to a partial truth. God’s frame of Eden performs this function. Adam and Eve are innocent or without full knowledge of the world beyond the limits of Eden. The further danger of this is that when God enframes the world, He only encounters Himself in the world: everything, every being is self-referential. This is the reality that Adam and Eve encounter in the Edenic enclosure. They are in a world framed for them by God and are denied the struggle to know the world at the revealing nexus of the exterior and interior boundaries. The natural walls of Eden create a reality where, as Heidegger puts it: “[God] becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as it regards the manner of its
being and truth” (Age of the World Picture 128). Within the confines of Eden, there can only be knowledge of a world handed down to humanity in an already obedient, controlled form. This confirms the being of God and denies Adam and Eve the freedom to determine their being in the world. They are secured in the world frame according to God.

Thus, enframing of Eden’s enclosure performs a palpable illusion of stasis. Actively viewing stasis into being, (which is rooted first in capture) includes all that is contained within it, resolving the conflict of the operant parts in a way that produces a sense of restored peace. The action is absent from this enclosure because the space has seen every movement already and isolated it into a series of suspended moments. (Readers of Keats might well think of this in terms of his famous depiction of the lovers in Ode on a Grecian Urn) Seen by the vision of God, the act of leaping of the wall by Satan is not something spontaneous or irregular, it is something inevitable and foreseen. Satan cannot constitute a disruption, he is imprisoned, rendered inert. The spatial and narrative form work together to produce a controlled reality in Eden. The Eden space, the concept of humanity’s ideal home is a confining one. “Eden” is protected by walls that appear quite natural. Home exists in obedience to an invisible omniscient Power that imprisons the agency of transgressive movement.

This is hardly the only instance of the framing of the Eden space in obedience to God’s perfection. Eden also appears as a catalog of every corner of the world. The larger world is compressed into something, at the same time, graspable and grand. It is an ideal and impossible space whose transgression and defilement constitutes a sin itself, because sin attempts to destroy the presence of God the creator. This is an action that Heidegger has described in “The Age of the World Picture”. Heidegger describes this grasping of the world in terms of how man, in such re-configuration, insists upon his own presence in relation to the frame.
Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as a picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being, to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth” (Age of the World Picture, 129-130).

This framing action and its subtle insistence, applies equally to God in this case. It affirms His role as the creator and sovereign. As Milton furthers his description:

In narrow room Natures whole wealth, yea more,  
A Heaven on Earth, for blissful Paradise  
Of God the Garden was, by him in the East  
Of Eden planted; Eden stretchd her Line [210]  
From Auran Eastward to the Royal Towrs  
Of Great Seleucia, built by Grecian Kings,  
Or where the Sons of Eden long before  
Dwelt in Telassar: in this pleasant soile  
His farr more pleasant Garden God ordaind; [215]  
Out of the fertil ground he caus’d to grow  
All Trees of noblest kind for sight, smell, taste; (Paradise Lost 4.207-217)

This is nature of Eden as the ideal “home” of Adam. Just as the first framing of Eden served to enclose the space from the world, this second passage creates the illusion that inside the walls of Eden is in fact the entire world. The passage continues, framing far off locations as if they were immediate and tangible in the Edenic space. Bringing of the world near occurs according to the will of God, who has once again made the world obedient. What this involves is an apprehension and domination of the space: through His ability to see everything in the world and bring it near, God has rendered an impossible space possible for the human beings that live within it. The inevitable loss of this ideal space would seem to parallel Adam’s own eventual and inevitably loss of semi-divinity. With the loss of Eden’s graspable world comes the realization that in exile, outside of Eden the far-off places and wonders of Earth are likely to remain beyond humanity’s grasp. Thus, the Edenic space, humanity’s ideal home made to appear as a controlled world and this formed world’s loss of integrity contributes to the exilic narrative of Adam.
But reading the Edenic world requires more than analyzing the structure of its metaphysics. There are figural complications of this space. The most overt complication of the space is found in Satan’s infiltration of Eden’s boundaries. The second, more subtle complication of the space that we find in the initial description of Eden is the Tree of Knowledge, depicted hauntingly alongside the Tree of Life. The Tree of Knowledge is the natural figure of Satan, depicted in Eden in a similar, dis-figured way. Satan and Tree reinforce the other, make each other presence less coincidental and more in need of explanation. These transgressive elements would rupture Eden if they were not explained and foretold by God. The Tree’s haunting presence produces some of the autumnal, elegiac notes. Fittingly, its complication of Edenic space serve to foreshadow and frame the coming human tragedy that Milton will enact in the moments that follow.

In last five lines of Eden’s descriptive passage Milton places the Tree of Life next to the Tree of Knowledge.

And all amid them stood the Tree of Life,
High eminent, blooming Ambrosial Fruit
Of vegetable Gold; and next to Life [ 220 ]
Our Death the Tree of Knowledge grew fast by,
Knowledge of Good bought dear by knowing ill (Paradise Lost 4.218-222)

The Tree of Knowledge’s shadow seems to loom over the rest of Eden. Like Satan, its body is not figured, not given ideal shape, size, dimension, etc., rather it is an absence. (One might even call its essence a kind of “nothing” or “das nichts” that as Heidegger suggests haunts existence as an originary, yet sourceless dread.) Young humanity knows that Knowledge is there, but Adam nor Eve can name what Knowledge or Death is, (as they say often in the text.) For now, the Tree of Knowledge is simply adjacent to the Tree of Life. But simply in being in Eden, the totality of the description that follows seems to be altered and autumnal. A few lines later,
Milton gestures to this sense that the Edenic space is composed in elegy when he begins a sequence of description (emphasis mine):

…Thus was this place,
A happy rural seat of various view;
Groves whose rich Trees wept odorous Gumms and Balme,
Others whose fruit burnisht with Golden Rinde
Hung amiable, Hesperian Fables true, [ 250 ]
If true, here only, and of delicious taste:
Betwixt them Lawns, or level Downs, and Flocks
Grasing the tender herb, were interpos’d,
Or palmie hilloc, or the flourie lap
Of som irriguous Valley spred her store, [ 255 ]
Flours of all hue, and without Thorn the Rose: (Paradise Lost 4.246-256)

When Milton indicates “Thus was the place” he suggests “this was our happy home”.

When he hints that “here only” was such delicious fruit found and that here the Rose was without the Thorn, he is lamenting that this kind of obedient and amiable nature no longer exists. The Edenic trees themselves “weep” their balm and bear delicious, golden fruit as if to foretell the sorrow the taste of another fruit, here dis-figured, shall bring. Students of Milton will note that the description has a certain resonance with the last stanzas of Milton’s earlier elegy Lycidas wherein he speaks of the uncouth swain laureled in flowers. More than this, near the end of the description, there is a sequence of classical comparisons:

…Not that faire field
Of Enna, where Proserpin gathering flours
Her self a fairer Floure by gloomie Dis [ 270 ]
Was gatherd, which cost Ceres all that pain
To seek her through the world; nor that sweet Grove
Of Daphne by Orontes, and th’ inspir’d
Castalian Spring, might with this Paradise
Of Eden strive;…(Paradise Lost 4.268-275)

The invocations of Proserpine’s fields and Daphne’s grove are not coincidental. Milton is in the mood of elegy. He conceives the Edenic space as one that sees corruption infiltrate the
ideal. The fate Ceres, being sent to live in Dis, and the Rape of Daphne by Apollo, these are allusions that speak to new death, a loss of innocence and the ideal. With these subtle nods to elegy, death and the loss of innocence, Milton deploys a great deal of flowery language, speaking of flowing rivers, fruit and nectar, and invokes classic mythological comparisons for Eden, but still Tree of Knowledge is the unseen center. Naturally then, Tree of Knowledge is out of place in Eden. The Tree is a symbol of exile, of disconnectedness and yet it connects Satan and Adam and Eve, for it is the site of the temptation. Thus, in being “out” of Eden and infiltrating it, the Tree, like Satan, is a complication of its space inside the walls, the flowers, the nectar and the flowing rivers of God’s Paradise.

To return to the narrative in Book IV, it is from Satan’s predatory, offensive, unwelcome, envious viewpoint, (one that bears a striking resemblance to Derrida’s characterization of the wolf in *Beast and Sovereign*) that one obtains the first glimpse of Adam and Eve in their bounteous walled garden. They are composed in ideal terms:

> From this *Assyrian* Garden, where the Fiend
> Saw undelighted all delight, all kind
> Of living Creatures new to sight and strange:
> Two of far nobler shape erect and tall,
> Godlike erect, with native Honour clad
> In naked Majestie seemd Lords of all,
> And worthie seemd, for in thir looks Divine
> The image of thir glorious Maker shon…(*Paradise Lost* 4.284-292)

There is a resonance between this passage and the early description of Eden. Adam and Eve are “majestic” and “lords of all”. Milton constitutes the pair in precisely the same ideal, imperial and imposing form as Eden. Thus, Milton forges a deep connection between the Edenic Space and the human beings at “home” there. Beyond this outward form, Milton also takes care to describe the interior being of our metaphorical parents:
Then was not guiltie shame, dishonest shame
Of natures works, honor dishonorabke,
Sin-bred, how have ye troubl'd all mankind
With shews instead, meer shews of seeming pure,
And banisht from mans life his happiest life,
Simplicitie and spotless innocence.
So passd they naked on, nor shund the sight
Of God or Angel, for they thought no ill... (Paradise Lost 4.313-320)

The outer nature of Adam and Eve is reflected in their inner nature. Their minds are in harmony with their bodily place. This harmony continues outward. Beyond Adam and Eve’s ideal forms and purity of essence is the nature of their relationship with Eden itself. They are masters of their space, they are situated and fulfilled. Unsurprisingly life in Eden is life without hardship:

More grateful, to thir Supper Fruits they fell,
Nectarine Fruits which the compliant boughes
Yielded them, side-long as they sat recline
On the soft downie Bank damaskt with flours...

...About them frisking playd
All Beasts of th’ Earth, since wilde, and of all chase
In Wood or Wilderness, Forrest or Den;
Sporting the Lion rampd, and in his paw
Dandl’d the Kid; Bears, Tygers, Ounces, Pards
Gambold before them, th’ unwieldy Elephant
To make them mirth us’d all his might, and wreathd
His Lithe Proboscis...” (Paradise Lost 4.331-347)

In Eden, in this unfallen state, Adam and Eve are (as Heidegger might say), at home in the world. They are safely ensconced with the boundaries of their place, never dreaming to disrupt, travel outward or seek further knowledge of their own being. In refrain, it is a form of stasis just as much as an ideal repose. The beauty, splendor, safety and stasis found in Eden and in themselves, Adam and Eve attribute to God. For that generosity and protection, they offer praise, prayer and obedient piety:

...needs must the Power
That made us, and for us this ample World
Be infinitely good, and of his good
As liberal and free as infinite,
That rais'd us from the dust and plac't us here
In all this happiness, who at his hand
Have nothing merited, nor can performe
Aught whereof hee hath need…

…Then let us not think hard
One easie prohibition, who enjoy
Free leave so large to all things else, and choice
Unlimited of manifold delights:
But let us ever praise him, and extoll
His bountie, following our delightful task
To prune these growing Plants, and tend these Flours,
Which were it toilsom, yet with thee were sweet. (Paradise Lost, IV, In 412-439)

Enclosure and oversight are inculcated in the very subjectivity of the beings that exist within it. The natural walls of Eden made in obedience to God, make for human beings who are quite walled up and obedient themselves. The harmony between exterior and interior, the innocent acceptance of the walls that make such spaces, this is what makes Eden home for mankind.

Satan’s response is a renewed and baleful hatred and envy of these new creatures and their position in the favor of God and within the boundaries of Eden:

…aside the Devil turnd
For envie, yet with jealous leer maligne
Ey'd them askance, and to himself thus plaind.
Sight hateful, sight tormenting! thus these two
Imparadis't in one anothers arms
The happier Eden, shall enjoy thir fill
Of bliss on bliss, while I to Hell am thrust… (Paradise Lost 4.502-508)

One must consider what envy is and does, as if it were given form. Envy sees the joy of another turned into the despair of the self. It is a twisting of the natural pleasure found in the ideal form into a complicated formless sin. It is the taking of the interior and forcing it out into
the exterior. Envy appears as the dissolution of the frame which allows pleasure and Paradise. This is the emotion that surrounds Eden and surely it indicates what lies beyond it.

This effectively ends the first encounter with Adam and Eve. Satan slips away and Adam and Eve go about preparing for a gentle night’s sleep. Thus, at the onset of the narrative, Adam and Eve’s existence in Eden is one under threat from the outside. Even though the threat has not materialized, it does have a disruptive presence in the text. Satan frames the boundaries of Eden both before and after our vision of the parents. The nature of the threat comes from an envious being that intends to see Adam and Eve expelled as he is expelled from Paradise. This reinforces our knowledge of Eden as a space of boundaries, of external limits that to this point in human life have not been tested. There is no contact without the outside and the foreign. The fiction of Eden is intact, but its time is limited with the coming of Satan.

Piety and obedience are what Adam and Eve pay for their upright and unfallen status, which as we have said is that of purity, innocence, nobility and virtue. Piety and obedience appear as a compliance to a regular daily ritual, which orders the pair’s time, even before they have any sort knowledge of what time means to a living and thus, dying human being. Satan’s appearance brings the end to the regularity of this ritual and the closeness of Adam and Eve with God. Mankind as it was, semi-divine beings, images of God, are now on the precipice of dying.

This is the reality of what “home” is. The Edenic Space is a naturally tightly controlled and observed place for humanity to be in. God, the Power in this place performs His observation to guarantee its security and explain its purpose. Adam and Eve, the good, the noble, the human beings, are protected within the boundaries of Eden from the outsider, Satan, who means to do them harm. The harm that befalls them comes to pass at least in part, because they have contact with this exiled figure, who has infiltrated Eden their home and brought by his very being sin,
corruption and death to all of humankind. Had Adam and Eve obeyed God and stayed within the framed world within the world, the coming crisis would not have occurred.

If what Milton puts forth of the ideal home and the Western human being holds true, we should be used to and comfortable with the concept of walls around our home to protect us from outsiders. We, Western subjects, should be at home and at ease with a form of Power overseeing our home to better secure it; home is in danger, home is at the risk of loss when it is infiltrated by the outsider.

**Crisis in Eden**

What follows this first moment is a lengthy interlude wherein Adam is warned of the imminent danger posed by Satan, and is given a version of the War in Heaven by the angel Raphael. It is not until Book IX that the temptation of Eve is depicted by Milton. This moment is the hinge for Adam’s narrative. Between the introduction of Adam and Eve and Satan’s first encounter, Milton spends five books educating the reader and Adam on the dire cost of turning away from God. There was never any chance of success that Satan might succeed in his war, God merely reserved the honor of ending of the conflict for his Son at an appointed time. This is framed as history and God is always at the end of history.

Milton has continually shown that this action only proceeds according to God’s design. In this moment of humanity’s crisis, in that is quite like the framing of the Eden space, God frames events, actions and even beings in time as if they were space. Both Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and Spanos’ essay, “Modern Literary Criticism and the Spatialization of Time: An Existential Critique” deal with the effects of framing time, making dynamic, fluidic temporal events, static, apprehendable and image-like in both art and existence. Heidegger speaks of the
necessity of re-discovering the be-ing of being in Being and Time critiquing the formal, stasis of
the obedient, orderly being as closed off to the possibilities of being inherent to existence.,
Spanos, in his essay, critiques aspects of Modernist literary art because it overemphasizes the
static form and ignores more dynamic temporal possibilities.

These concepts are lodged in the temptation. Because of the framing of time by God,
Satan’s successful corruption of humanity is not resistance by Satan, error by Eve, it is not even
a true succumbing to a condition of human being in Adam. Rather, like every act, event and
character presented in the narrative of Adam, they are acts of God ordained. The possibilities of
sinning are closed off. The Miltonic logic (found in the earlier quote from Book III) is that
though God allows the temptation, he is not responsible for it, since he has decreed that both
Adam and Eve (and through them all humanity) have free will to resist, according to how He
made them. This further develops the sense of security and stasis that is found in the physical
depiction of Eden and humanity in its ideal form.

During the crisis, there is the sense that perfection remains, by God’s vision and
ordination, untouched. Ironically, there is no drama of being in a “perfect” Tragedy. The
characters do not seem to be in the world they inhabit for themselves. They are instead
mechanisms. But beyond this, they are mechanisms without the capacity for self-movement.
They perform their function as images rather than living beings. There is no disrupting action to
provoke uncertainty. This continuous experience of God ordering time in the being of Adam, is
essential in how he embodies and experiences exile. It also informs how he (as the Western
subject) might expect exile to appear in other human beings.

Upon waking in Book IX, Adam and Eve prepare to go about their daily ritual of light
labor in obedience of God. Adam, perturbed by Raphael’s warnings about Satan, asks that Eve
stay close and that they work together. Eve, however, wishing to prove herself to Adam and to
God, heads off to a part of Eden that is secluded from Adam will work. It is in this seclusion that
the narrative focus shifts to Satan and his imminent attempt at disruption. Satan finds her,
appearing beautiful, innocent, to this point protected by God, but now in his presence exposed
and the temptation begins.

The form of temptation itself largely follows the themes of Milton’s text: the corruption
of the interior, ideal form via the introduction of an exterior chaotic element. But there are some
interesting wrinkles which define the transgression and the error of Eve. Once again Satan views
Eve with a de-formed sense of envy and malice and he selects her for temptation because
according to a divine hierarchy (God, Son, the angels, Adam Eve) she is the most susceptible
to corruption. (This hierarchy and Eve’s supposed weakness is highly problematic in any feminist
reading of Paradise Lost but this is not the argument I am making here) Thus he seduces, but he
does so in a way that seems to obey the hierarchy’s linear structure, moving from the lowest
ideal form in Eve to the next highest ideal form in Adam. Seen this way, his disobedience is not
truly disruption.

Nevertheless, Satan attempts his disobedience. This action of his part is not characterized
as something spontaneous in the poem. Instead, Satan is shown as an image, contemplating his
seduction, a viper poised with fangs drawn before the strike.

Thoughts, whither have ye led me, with what sweet
Compulsion thus transported to forget
What hither brought us, hate, not love, nor hope
Of Paradise for Hell, hope here to taste
Of pleasure, but all pleasure to destroy,
Save what is in destroying, other joy
To me is lost. Then let me not let pass
Occasion which now smiles, behold alone
The Woman, opportune to all attempts,
Satan is intent on disruption: he is driven to destroy Eve and through her Adam. Yet Satan also communicates a need to forget the horrors of Hell, to find joy once again. He feels debased and is, by pain, enfeebled. Satan suffers and he suffers however justly or not at the hands of God. One might be inclined to call his action a form of resistance to Power in defeat. But even if we might consider it resistance, it is “cowardly” and futile resistance. Satan, once an exile, now an infiltrator and seducer, attempts to corrupt the “least” of God’s creations, the being most vulnerable to harm. His image is that of a suspended threat, hanging above his would-be victim, invisible, insidious and full of the venom of envy. It is in this malingering suspension that the “serpent” thinks his plot a disruptive act. But he is unaware that God has already foretold the Fall, approving and ordaining the Fall as his will. Satan is not truly in the Edenic world acting. He is arrested in time.

Satan, a serpent, crawls to meet Eve. He tempts her to eat of the Tree of Knowledge with fawning rhetoric, comparing her idolatrously to a goddess: “Fairest resemble of thy Maker fair” (Paradise Lost, IX, ln 538) The best description of this rhetoric is found in the depiction of Satan leading Eve to the Tree: “Hee leading swiftly rowld/ In tangles, and made intricate seem strait…” (Paradise Lost 9.631-632) Satan appears to tangle the straight and narrow way and words of God. Ones hear the familiar note of chaos introduced and infiltrating perfection and in this case, leading it out of its protected enclosure. But one should note the use of the word
“seem” in this passage (and many others). In God’s reality, there is only the straight and narrow way. The “tangles” Satan would perform are never truly recognized or real.

The goal of the corruption Satan performs and how even such corruption occurs is thereby given an orderly structure. He is, in his flattery, attempting to upending the natural hierarchy and the order it provides in Eden. This attempted dis-ordering is clearly carried on throughout the temptation scene. Satan claims the tree provides divine knowledge. In a false proof, he uses himself, in the disguised or de-formed form, raised up above all other creatures, aside from Eve, whom he continues to flatter. After eating the apple Satan claims to perceive a change in his essential nature:

Sated at length, ere long I might perceave  
Strange alteration in me, to degree  
Of Reason in my inward Powers, and Speech  
Wanted not long, though to this shape retain'd.  
Thenceforth to Speculations high or deep  
I turnd my thoughts, and with capacious mind  
Considerd all things visible in Heav'n,  
Or Earth, or Middle, all things fair and good;  
But all that fair and good in thy Divine  
Semblance, and in thy Beauties heav'nly Ray  
United I beheld; no Fair to thine  
Equivalent or second, which compel'd  
Mee thus, though importune perhaps, to come  
And gaze, and worship thee of right declar'd  
Sovran of Creatures, universal Dame. (Paradise Lost 9.598-612)

The temptation of this knowledge is that it will not only enable her to understand the world as God does but to become an equal of Adam and perhaps surpass him. This seduction is a lie of course. For it is, the possibility of change, of growth, of free movement within the mind and out in the world. Such change would require the dis-ordering of the knowledge and being God has granted Eve, destroying her ideal form and eventually de-situating her from Adam and Eden those comforts of home.
Ironically and appropriately, what Satan is selling, deceitfully, is the perfection of Eve into an ideal form:

Ye Eate thereof, your Eyes that seem so cleere,
Yet are but dim, shall perfetly be then
Op'nd and cleerd, and ye shall be as Gods,
Knowing both Good and Evil as they know.
That ye should be as Gods, since I as Man, *(Paradise Lost 9.706-710)*

It is hardly coincidence that Satan would seem to be offering to clear Eve’s eyes. Milton recalls his earlier language of Satan’s dis-figurement and the Tree of Knowledge spectral haunting of Eden. Satan is selling is the dis-figurement of Eve from the visual field, that which is seen by God, by making it appear a way to see (and thus be) more perfect. The ethos of this disfiguration must be linked to the possibility of free action in time. In his fallen, chaotic and irrational state, Satan thinks himself free from the sight of God and thus free in time to determine himself. (He is mistaken in the traditional reading of *Paradise Lost.*) He would see the same disordered sense of being and time inflicted upon Eve as a form of defiance and revenge. This is the nature of Satan’s being and his seduction and this essence carried forward in the discourse of the invader-exile as this work proceeds.

But before we too are seduced into thinking this moment irregular, disruptive, or the confrontation here between equal forces, this has been foreseen by God. Satan’s being and his attempt to rupture the order of events, the structure of time and bodily form in God’s world has already been enclosed and contained. God’s essence, to be at the end of the world’s history, denies Satan’s ability to disrupt events. Ironically, this is an inversion of the usual formula of the exterior chaos invading the interior perfection. Surreptitiously, God’s mandate pervades Satan’s every action. Satan is and ever shall be the image of the serpent poised to strike, held in arrest by the Tragic vision of God. Thus, the perfection of teleological time suffuses and structuralizes and
solidifies disruption. In other words, God makes a space of what would be a disruptive time and negates it.

This same stasis will be enacted when the narrative turns its focus to Eve. Just as Satan’s seduction, Eve’s error might seem a moment of disruption but it is accounted for by our Tragic vision of events through the eyes of God. It is the desire for perfection and equality, to be seen more fully by Adam and God, and to see more of them that entices Eve to eat the Apple. She makes this known after she eats of the Apple and gains a modicum of agency. This would seem to constitute a disruption of the status quo. But what one must notice is how the poem characterizes Eve’s decision to eat the apple. It is not a back and forth. There is little internal struggle and the suspense of the outcome is never in doubt. Satan’s tangling temptation proceeds in quite the measured, continual fashion and as Milton puts it Satan “too easily into her heart entrance won” (*Paradise Lost* 9.734).

Once Eve is brought to the Tree of Knowledge, our depiction of her internal struggle is a static image of Eve holding the apple. She is suspended in time that we might gaze upon her in this moment before damnation. In this moment especially, Eve’s agency as a human being is underdeveloped. In the parts preceding this temptation Milton crafts an Eve who displays decidedly human qualities. Eve is curious, and bolder than Adam. She willingly goes out to the periphery of Eden. She would make for a better protagonist in a human Tragedy. Unfortunately, she is caught in the frame of Adam’s narrative as she is made within the Edenic space and situation. She is made of his rib, a lesser part of him. Adam, God perhaps even Milton, seem determined to cast her in a supporting role of innocent, foolish woman. Glimpsing her consciousness through this (masculine) frame, it is not a consciousness depicted as one capable of struggling away from temptation. Instead, she is (supposedly) merely caught by current of
events charted by another, (both God and his antagonistic agent Satan) mirroring the Satanic, entangling language and convincing herself to eat:

Sollicited her longing eye; yet first
Pausing a while, thus to her self she mus'd…

…what profits then
Our inward freedom? In the day we eate
Of this fair Fruit, our doom is, we shall die.
How dies the Serpent? hee hath eat'n and lives,
And knows, and speaks, and reasons, and discerns, [ 765 ]
Irrational till then. For us alone
Was death invented? or to us deni'd
This intellectual food, for beasts reserv'd?...

…So saying, her rash hand in evil hour [ 780 ]
Forth reaching to the Fruit, she pluck'd, she eat:
Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat
Sighing through all her Works gave signs of woe,
That all was lost. . (Paradise Lost IX 9.743-784)

It is fitting that the magnitude of Eve’s error is found in the environmental cues. The sin is formulated as an escape, a breach in “wound”, and of displacement in “Nature from her seat” The interior, perfect, form ruptures and mingles with the exterior chaotic element. Eve’s being and body is rendered as a known space to such a degree that Milton exteriorizes the effect of the sin on Eden with almost no resistance. In the projection of Eve’s sin upon the Edenic space, her error has been shown perfectly, which to say it has been displayed as an image. The sin and critically, Eve’s being, is frozen in time. Dynamically, in the moment, there is nothing of an internal pang or wound.

It is because of this spatialized depiction of an interior rupture, and because of the way Eve is arrested as image, holding the Apple, poised to bite, that the unfolding of events not as an error on the part of Eve. The actions if they happened of their own accord, might be considered error, but Eve’s actions are rendered images. Eve’s (supposed)lack of agency in her act of disobedience must be thought a part of God’s plan and His history of the Fall. She is almost an
automata, governed by the divine law writing history. It is because of this one could characterize her temptation and act of error as mechanistic.

The problem is that if Eve is a mechanism of God’s plan, Eve’s existence is a form of being which does not exist for itself. She is God’s. Eve in the crisis functions as the hinge that makes the Fall possible, but if she is formed perfectly for this function, she may not authentically be a human being. This problem shall continue and intensify as the crisis reaches Adam.

**The Frame of Man**

This original sin on the part of Eve might seem to upturn the divine hierarchy. Satan, a being lower than Eve in his sin-marred state, tempts Eve who is, as a woman less perfect (for *Paradise Lost*’s traditional purpose) than Adam. This might represent a kind of upheaval, how orderly this de-situation from Eden is proceeding: everything is accounted for and given its proper time. This brings the Crisis to Adam and his moment in the Crisis. In the crisis, Adam becomes the prominent figure of *Paradise Lost*. By the same note, because he is the most perfect and obedient to God, even during his Fall, Adam becomes in many ways the model for exile and Western subjectivity. Adam is what exile should be, according to Power.

Within the narrative frame of the crisis, there are two aspects of Adam’s being in time that draw interest, his nobility in love and his obedience to God. While at first “nobility in love” might seem to conflict with his obedience to God, since it causes Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit, Adam’s noble love merely points to an internalized obedience to God. The very concept of this “noble love” is a paradox forced into resolution and therefore, use. “Nobility” makes the irrational, dynamic emotion of love as something rational, static in time. “Noble” love is “perfected” love and thus to a greater extent than Eve or Satan, Adam becomes an arrested image
of being. In his most “perfect” human, God perfects Adam’s love and being in nobility, rendering it an image and making it useful to his purpose.

It is Eve’s fallen status that provides the situation for Adam’s Fall. Thus, there is a certain kind of perfect imperfecting with which Milton initiates the crisis. The threat is now emanating from inside Eden: Eve, being weak and female, was tricked seduced and tempted and allows access to Adam. Putting it another way, Eve was drawn out of Eden, into knowledge by Satan and becomes part of his entanglement. Despite this entanglement, there is the point of distinction between Eve and Adam. Adam is not tricked. He chooses knowledge and death because of his love for Eve. Where Eve did not see, and still does not see her error (she claims to see the world anew in her confession) Adam still sees according to God. When Eve returning from the site of temptation makes known her error, Adam immediately perceives calamity in her disobedience:

On th’ other side, Adam, soon as he heard
The fatal Trespass don by Eve, amaz’d,
Astonied stood and Blank, while horror chill [ 890 ]
Ran through his veins, and all his joynts relax’d;
From his slack hand the Garland wreath’d for Eve
Down drop’d, and all the faded Roses shed… (Paradise Lost 9.888-93)

Adam is aware of the sin Eve has committed, and these six lines of horror stricken arrest represent his immediate and authentic emotional reaction. This should be our first indication of Adam’s character. Eve’s disobedience is unthinkable to Adam: he cannot conceive how she could have imperfected herself in this way. He is amazed and astonished. What one might expect to follow this news is great outburst of emotion: fear, rage, confusion. But this does not occur. Instead, any emotional breach or disruption sealed off quite cleanly and quickly. Adam laments the deed and resolves to join Eve:
But after these lines of O fairest of Creation, last and best
Of all Gods works, Creature in whom excell'd
Whatever can to sight or thought be form'd,
Holy, divine, good, amiable, or sweet!
How art thou lost, how on a sudden lost, [ 900 ]
Defac't, deflourd, and now to Death devote?
Rather how hast thou yeelded to transgress
The strict forbiddance, how to violate
The sacred Fruit forbidd'n! som cursed fraud
Of Enemie hath beguil'd thee, yet unknown, [ 905 ]
And mee with thee hath ruind, for with thee
Certain my resolution is to Die…

…So saying, she embrac'd him, and for joy [ 990 ]
Tenderly wept, much won that he his Love
Had so enobl'd, as of choice to incurr
Divine displeasure for her sake, or Death.
In recompence (for such compliance bad
Such recompence best merits) from the bough [ 995 ]
She gave him of that fair enticing Fruit
With liberal hand: he scrupl'd not to eat
Against his better knowledge, not deceav'd,
But fondly overcome with Femal charm.
(Paradise Lost 9.895-999)

Adam eats and humanity’s fate is sealed: Adam and Eve shall face the “justice” or
“punishment” of God. But one should note a few curiosities in Adam’s speech. First, his first
thoughts his prime concern are to Eve’s disobedience to God, Eve’s well-being is secondary. Yet
Adam’s “certain resolution” is to die. Why does Adam not question or even consider the
decision? Because he is, in essence, static, straight. He already knows his course. The “tangles”
in Satan and that overtook Eve, have not infiltrated his consciousness. He is closer to the
perfection of God. An even more manifest answer follows: “his love had so enobled him” that he
would “risk Divine Displeasure” for Eve. But Adam’s reaction and resolution does not seem to
portray an Adam who is loving in the way that one expects love to appear. It represents love that
is a noble sacrifice, love that is an ideal, love that is a structured image. Combining nobility with
love is a frame. This explains why the usually disruptive emotion, love, whose usual depiction in
drama might see Adam, in a passion, rage against Eve, work inward to see his love for her again and then bravely resolve that he will defy God though he be damned, is here rendered as a coolly, rational decision of great certainty. This is what “noble love” seems to mean and it seems to be a paradox.

Adam’s “noble love” if it first seems paradoxical, is not disruptive. It is a manifestation of Adam’s obedience. Or put another way, “noble love” occurs because of an internalization of God’s vision. Adam takes a bit of Eden with him as he leaves. Adam’s love, an image of love, operates as precisely the type of mechanism. In classical Tragic form, the tragic hero falls because of two aspects which are linked, character and situation. This idea fits Adam rather well. He does not fail through his own imperfection but rather a quality of being, and specifically noble being, that an unfortunate situation found means to exploit. One might re-frame this and say that God has taken a kind of dominion over Adam’s emotional being. Adam loves nobly, which means he loves in a static, rational way. While love might be disruptive, noble love is useful to apprehending Adam’s being and make it useful to God.

This level of usefulness is beyond that found in Satan and Eve. Satan attempted to be his own agent, attempted disruption. “Eve’s actions were eventually made useful. But Adam’s being, his essence has been invaded, commanded and shaped by God’s frame. He attempts to adhere and correct himself to the frame and use of God, knowing such use and forthcoming discipline as justice. The most “perfect” human being, our noble Man, is the human being that has most internalized God’s rubric for being, one who has imposed upon one of most disruptive emotions a frame that serves Power. Adam has, eventually, the least agency, though he might appear the most rational. It is in this way that Adam’s noble love, which first seems to be a paradox eventually comes to mean what I would call a being-obedient.
It this this being-obedient that seems to Adam’s essence that has a great deal of resonance with the subjectivity that Foucault posits as a problem in his work and Agamben confronts in his. To put it succinctly, there is Foucault’s famous statement on subjectivity and Power-relations from his Kantian response essay “What is Enlightenment?”.

Humanity will reach maturity when it is no longer required to obey, but when men are told: ‘obey and you will be able to reason as much as you like’ (Foucault Reader 36).

With this observation on how obedience to Power suffuses rationality into the enlightened subject, Foucault renders visible the being that Adam seems to embody. Adam is quite rational, but in disposition to Power he is being-obedient. To paraphrase Foucault, Adam is a subject that makes private use of his reason but when the moment arrives to disrupt the social order of Eden he acquiesces. The order of God overtakes and defines his being and he becomes a subjected subject.

In this being-obedient, Adam’s trespass, his sin occurs in so orderly a way and in such obedience to God that it is not disruptive. The narrative of Adam, which places the emphasis on the its titular character’s correctness of being, produces an origin of exile that does not erase or negate the authenticity of Power or place in the consciousness of the soon to be exiled.

This, is in opposition to Hannah Arendt’s conception of what a displaced person is and represents to the legitimacy and authority of Power. Arendt states that the reality of the displaced person, a human being who not protected by national (or sovereign) rights is, by definition, a challenge to this form of Power. In frustration to Power, they are human beings but have none of the traits Power and its citizenry normally associate with human being. Thus, she states in The Origins of Totalitarianism (parentheses mine):
If a human being loses his political status (his or her recognition by Power) he should, according to the implications of the inborn and inalienable rights of man come under exactly the situation for which the declaration of such general (human) rights provided. Actually, quite opposite is the case. It seems that man who is nothing but a man (an exile, a refugee) has lost the very qualities which make possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man (Origins 300).

This is how Arendt and innumerable theorists have come to think the exile. The exile she speaks of is a being that essentially de-legitimates Power, particularly in its inability to protect such exposed life. Exiles and refugees do not glorify Power, nor do they find succor within its places or vision. Exiles expose and disrupt Power.

Given this, is Adam truly an exile as the world has seen it? Or is merely an exile as Power wishes to frame it, a being who despite his “lost” condition, is naturally imbued with rights and protection under God? These questions are still questions at this particular moment, the crisis, that cause displacement in Adam’s narrative. But the resolution of *Paradise Lost* indicates that whatever being Adam is, he is not an exile in the way that we conceive it now.

This the Fall of Adam and the crisis in his narrative. The initial temptation by Satan of Eve takes place in a peripheral part of Eden, that is to say, away from Adam’s (and supposedly but mistakenly God’s) view. It is of no small importance that it is Eve, (in the Miltonic order a less-perfect man, just as Adam is a less perfect God) who is truly tempted by the least perfect Satan. This reality pre-figures future narratives of exile: it is a form of in-born weakness to be in contact, congress or even conversation with the Enemy.

Further Adam, the noble good and upstanding human being, is not deceived by Satan nor Eve, he knows that in partaking of the apple he will be damned but he does so out of love. This allows him to appear as an elegiac and Tragic figure in the most perfect sense possible. But it also performs a similar function to Eve’s temptation through human weakness. Adam’s
submission to sin for love demonstrates the dire consequences of listening to those that have
been in contact with the Enemy and seduced by his influence. For as much as Milton does to
render the reader empathic to point that Adam cannot and does not wish to be separated from
Eve, there is embedded in this moment a bitterness. Had Adam been able to divorce himself from
his feeling for only a brief time, he would have remained in the near-perfection of his home,
Eden and humanity would not have fallen into exile. This momentary lapse will figure
significantly in the discourse of exile. It creates the sense that to defend the ideal, a constant
vigilance toward threat of corruption from the arriving or returning exile is required.

A Problem with the Perfect Ending

That mankind was fated to fall, the denouement and exodus of Adam’s narrative
reinforces the frame Milton has crafted throughout his epic. The final moment of Paradise Lost
perfectly ends the Tragedy. But one must question if this Tragic Form is truly the best way of
representing the exile as the world knows it. This issue arose during Crisis in Eden, but it is in
this last moment that the flaw of the perfect Tragic form becomes quite pronounced. The perfect
ending of Adam’s narrative produces a paradoxical and problematic way of representing exile.

Until this point in the story, Adam’s exile at times resonated with exilic stories we hear
today. This resonance does not altogether dissipate. Adam suffers in the denouement between the
Fall and the final exodus of Paradise Lost. But these shared notes are rather brief. Such peace is
unknown to the exile of today. The exile of the world is hounded at home, harried is exodus and
placed in camps upon his or her arrival to their new place of being. Adam’s story is unlike the
stories of exiles and refugees. Hannah Arendt demonstrates that exile is ongoing, both
existentially and in the worldly sense. The paradox is that when God is banishing Adam and Eve
from Eden in the manner that he does, he is not uprooting them into an exilic condition of being
or even body. Adam’s story of exile seems to parody these stories by so quickly re-settling Adam on Earth.

Milton’s re-settlement and situation of Adam after his banishment is the problem and paradox that occurs in Western thinking and Power relations concerning the exile. Western Power believes that, if there is ever displacement in the first place, it can “restore peace” to exiles of being and body through its discursive framing. But this ideal fails to address exile’s unavoidable disorder and ultimately in the attempt to force the exile to appear in restored peace and place, the West has done great violence to the dis-placed persons on its periphery.

One finds this impulse of Power in the last books of *Paradise Lost*. To control and explain Adam’s banishment, God numbs the trauma of Adam’s new abject lamentation and existential wandering through an image of his foretelling vision. This vision occurs after, and only after Adam renews his obedience and piety to God. After this legitimatization God calms and restores peace to Adam’s being. He grants Adam a vision of the future of humanity, of Mankind’s eventual redemption by his Son and finally by giving Adam choices and opportunities outside of Eden. Though Adam’s place is no longer Eden, he does still have a place in and under God’s vision. This makes him a subjected subject, the being-obedient, the citizen.

The juxtaposition of two scenes in Book X frame Book XII’s content. The first scene is Satan’s “triumphant” return to hell. His success in the temptation is met by the paving of the way to Earth by Sin and Death and a hollow bitter moment of victory with his fellow rebel angels, who at some point during his victory speech are transformed into serpents. It is scene that permanently makes Satan the Enemy in the discourse of exile. Satan parodies God’s justice in his assumed success: gloating at the infiltration of Eden and the destruction of Mankind’s place in the favor of God. He is an Enemy because he is a celebrator of violence and dissidence and
corruption. According to the traditional telling, this success is undermined. It is a temporary and fragile fiction. Satan has not truly corrupted or touched perfection. Milton denies Satan humanity as his prize:

So having said, a while he stood, expecting
Thir universal shout and high applause [ 505 ]
To fill his eare, when contrary he hears
On all sides, from innumerable tongues
A dismal universal hiss, the sound
Of public scorn; he wonderd, but not long
Had leasure, wondering at himself now more; [ 510 ]
His Visage drawn he felt to sharp and spare,
His Armes clung to his Ribs, his Leggs entwining
Each other, till supplanted down he fell
A monstrous Serpent on his Belly prone,
Reluctant, but in vaine: a greater power [ 515 ]
Now rul'd him, punisht in the shape he sin'd,
According to his doom: he would have spoke,
But hiss for hiss returnd with forked tongue
To forked tongue, for now were all transform'd
Alike, to Serpents all as accessories [ 520 ]
To his bold Riot (Paradise Lost 10.504-521)

This transformation has a final and appropriate reformatory truth: Satan and his followers are changed into the snakes that their essences are, according to God. The punishment appears as justice because it seems to create a harmony between the exterior form and the interior essence of the Enemy. (This concept plays a significant role on how worldly power operates, punishments against the Enemy are severe because of this impulse to re-form the flesh according to the perceived severe deformity of the essence and “correct” it to its innate unquantifiable formlessness.)

This pyrrhic victory reinforces the pervasive controlling fiction of God. Satan cannot win, nor can he even appear to succeed momentarily. He is a rebel to obedience and order and hence, must experience further suffering for such is the justice of God. Ironically, (as we shall pursue in the next chapter) this last moment of Satan in Paradise Lost is precisely the sort of ambivalent
unsettled situation that worldly exiles find themselves in. Satan is deceived that he has made a place for himself, but it is quite apparent that Hell’s confines, degradations and punishments will present themselves shortly. Satan’s uncertain, unframed and unseen future is quite hostile to his being and this is perhaps exile as we know it.

This scene of continued defiance prepares the reader for how Adam’s banishment is portrayed in Book XII. It also informs the lament of Adam for his fallen state (which begins shortly after Satan’s victory” speech in Book X). Adam’s lament is rich Jobian poetry. He conveys his despair, his sense of impending de-situation and this has resonance with Satan’s early moments in Hell in Book I.

O miserable of hap! is this the end [ 720 ]
Of this new glorious World, and mee so late
The Glory of that Glory, who now becom
Accurst of blessed, hide me from the face
Of God, whom to behold was then my highth
Of happiness: yet well, if here would end [ 725 ]
The miserie, I deserv’d it…

…God made thee of choice his own, and of his own
To serve him, thy reward was of his grace,
Thy punishment then justly is at his Will.
Be it so, for I submit, his doom is fair,
That dust I am, and shall to dust returne: [ 770 ]
O welcom hour whenever! why delayes
His hand to execute what his Decree
Fixd on this day? (Paradise Lost 10.720-772)

The language portrays an authentic, exilic state. Adam’s lamentation, like its Jobian inspiration communicates the human feeling of being cut off from the world, existential certainty and depicts the “miserie” of being an accursed and unwanted exile. There is a resonance with Hannah Arendt’s own depiction of the refugee in her essay, “We Refugees”. She describes the desperate optimism and self-annihilative character of Jewish-German refugees who experienced
unbearable conditions in their “home” and tepid and even hostile welcomes from their new countries. She describes the refugee as the desolate loss of the self. This loss is a rupture:

The story of our struggle has finally become known. We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings. We left our relatives in the Polish ghettos and our best friends have been killed in concentration camps, and that means the rupture of our private lives. (We Refugees 1)

This rupture is present in Adam’s lament. The critical difference is found in his repentance and reconciliation, and his acceptance of his punishment as just. This acknowledgement of God being infinitely above him, mutes his loss of Eden. Finally, after the crisis of the Tragedy Adam knows his place. His recognition of his sin is just as much a recognition of God. It is Adam’s lament and his manifest desire to renew his obedience to God that moves Jesus and he intercedes on humanity’s behalf speaking with his father for amnesty. As a result, humanity is spared permanent death and banishment to hell.

However, this is not the experience of the worldly exile. Pardon is not part of their story. No matter what act of penance or words of allegiance the refugee speaks Power does not pardon the exile. Even in utter, abject obedience, there is no healing of the rupture. As Arendt relates it:

Nevertheless, as soon as we were saved—and most of us had to be saved several times—we started our new lives and tried to follow as closely as possible all the good advice our saviors passed on to us. We were told to forget; and we forgot quicker than anybody ever could imagine. In a friendly way we were reminded that the new country would become a new home; and after four weeks in France or six weeks in America, we pretended to be Frenchmen or Americans. The most optimistic among us would even add that their whole former life had been passed in a kind of unconscious exile and only their new country now taught them what a home really looks like. (We Refugees 1)
In this passage one can see the desire for the refugee to assimilate into society, to once again have a home. But it is clear from later passages in which Arendt describes suicides, pervasive despair and a status of “enemy-alien” that the refugee is not afforded a pardon for their exilic transgression. Thus, Adam’s quick and easy mending of his exile, his redemption in the eyes of God, begins to sound quite hollow. It sounds more like the voice of Power emanating from a being who banishment was only cursory and whose continual recognition as a human being was never in doubt.

Adam’s act of recognition and God’s act of pardon is one that further legitimizes and solidifies God’s authority over humanity. Adam’s “miserie” is “deserv’d” God’s “reward” is by his “grace” and most importantly God’s “punishment” is “justly as his Will” and “his doom is fair”. This acknowledgement of God’s punishment as justice is aligned with Agamben’s conception of society, subjectivity, and sovereignty as he has detailed in his work *Homo Sacer*.

*Homo Sacer* explores the nature of sovereignty and the human being through the lens of what Foucault calls bio-politics. One of Agamben’s primary contentions is that there is a fundamental categorical pair inherent to Western sovereignty and subjectivity: that of bare life (zoe) and political life(bios). These two beings and their respective involvement and exclusion with/from Power are fundamental to what Agamben conceives as the paradigm for Western civilization. Agamben posits that there are two forms of life, beings which are roughly congruent to that of the (finally re-) situated Adam and dis-placed Satan, bios and zoe. Bio and zoe designate human life and bare life in Agamben’s terminology.

Exploring what constitutes the situated being or “bios” in a chapter of *Homo Sacer* entitled “Nomos Basileus”, Agamben posits that transforming of violence into justice by the sovereign lies at the foundations of sovereignty itself. Citing a fragment of Pindar which speaks
of the nomos or sovereign that “leads with the strongest hand/ justifying the most violent”

Agamben interprets this ancient text to represent the “scandalous unification of the two essentially antithetical principles that the Greeks call Bia and Dike, violence and justice” (Homo Sacer 31). Connecting this to Adam’s moment of banishment, Adam’s recognition of God’s right to banish at the threat of violence reaffirms God’s sovereignty. Experiencing banishment as he does, obediently, performs the joining of Bia (violence) and Dike (justice). In so doing Adam becomes subjected to God’s justice. He is, as Agamben would put it included, under the sovereign’s power, even at his exclusion from Eden. Adam, the citizen of the new Earth, the human being, is almost as much a form of bare life or sacred man as the far more brutally treated “enemy” Satan.

The principle distinction is that Adam’s banishment is one that reserves the full measure of its violence at the will of God, who may deign to inflict new justice as He pleases. This is, of course, precisely what Agamben argues in his work: Power operates by holding its violence in reserve, in potentia, until such as it is “forced” to force. It is because this Power of violence held in reserve that one can see that this second act of banishment, (the first being Satan) normalizes and defines what Agamben calls the “state of exception” or the time when the law is suspended by the sovereign. To put it otherwise, an “exceptional” world is one in which the sovereign, God, can interpose violence as justice at any time upon His subjects. Adam admits allows and accepts this condition, obediently, and thus remains as citizen of the new Earth, tenuously protected by God and restored to situation because of it. It is in this way that we can gain a gain a sense of what the being-obedient of Adam is. Being-obedient is a being that agrees to Power dispensing its violence/justice upon it for the sake of situation and home, to escape being-in-exile.
One can observe this theory of subjectivity and sovereignty at work in the scene that follows Adam’s lament and restoration. After the reconciliation, in the later part of Book XI and the first part of Book XII, God sends an archangel to grant Adam a vision of the human history that will follow him and his line. This vision is a departure from the Book of Genesis on the part of Milton. In Genesis Adam and Eve are merely sent away from Eden. But to restore peace to Adam and affirm his union of justice and violence, God must grant this vision of the future. Adam is situated by this vision. Consequentially. It is this vision along with the promise of God’s continued Providence in the ending lines of Paradise Lost that separates Adam’s experience permanently from that of the worldly exile.

The vision granted to Adam is too lengthy to include here (it spans Book XI and XI) but it calms Adam’s great distress. He comes to realize that though he has fallen, he has not damned all mankind. There will be great men (mostly biblical figures) that follow him and though there will be great struggle, the Son will redeem humanity and conquer sin and death on Earth. To be clear, it is not as if Adam’s own body is to be saved from the new experiences of worldly suffering and death by this vision or even the redemption itself. God makes no promises about Adam’s bodily suffering nor lifts the yoke of toil from his shoulders. But the vision is palliative treatment for Adam in exile. It is effective because it situates Adam’s being: he is once again in a definite position and relationship with God. Adam is the beginning of humanity. Humanity will toil toward a purpose. God is above humanity and before and after it. These are coordinates for Adam’s metaphysical position. It is a restorative moment for Adam. After Michael tells him of the great progress and falls of societies and biblical figures, and of Jesus’ final victory, Adam declares:
Greatly instructed I shall hence depart.
Greatly in peace of thought, and have my fill
Of knowledge, what this Vessel can containe;
Beyond which was my folly to aspire. [ 560 ]
Henceforth I learne, that to obey is best,
And love with feare the onely God, to walk
As in his presence, ever to observe
His providence, and on him sole depend, (Paradise Lost 12.556-564)

Adam’s inner turmoil is no more, and he knows his place and that he has had “his fill of knowledge…beyond which was [his] folly to aspire”. Adam will wander no more within his own mind. His existential exile is ended. He learns that “to obey is best” and that he shall forthwith “love with fear the onely God” and sole[ly] (and soul-ly) depend on Him. Adam cedes his being to God and accept that His Providence and His Tragedy will frame his life. It is the beginning of Adam’s peace and the beginning of the end of Adam’s rather short exile.

The parallel between Milton’s text and Agamben’s theory is that both are arriving at a conception of the “citizen-subject” who is more than “the simple, exposed human being.” Adam is more than an exile at the end of Paradise Lost: he is observed and destined-to-being by God. Agamben shows us the same artifice in his theory of bios/zoe: there is socio-politically defined life which is constructed upon bare life. This is a connection that requires exploration. The restoration (like the transcendental regulation of violence/justice) re-affirms Power’s control over events, spaces and bodies. When this frame fails, when the exile lingers forever on the periphery out of presence, and the bodily exile remains a being-in exile. Power cannot and does not wish to see that being as a human being.

The final exodus of Adam is a demonstration of the two possible paths for the banished. The first path is one of degradation and punishment found in Satan’s devolution. The second is Adam’s path which begins with a reconciliation with Power that solidifies Adam’s being into situation and legitimates and makes regular Power’s place, transcendentally, above. This second
path would seem to beget a journey out of Eden which proceeds not as scattering, diaspora, or any other form of exile as the world knows it but something more akin a planned journey. It is a perfect end for *Paradise Lost*: the journey of humanity is “Provided” for and the loss of Eden is made to mean something. This planned and Provided “leaving” transforms the final scenes of exodus and banishment. Adam’s banishment, and by extension, the banishment of the recognizable human being, becomes something different. It appears as an expedition, an errand in the wilderness (as Miller and Bercovitch will call it), and perhaps even a pilgrimage and an embryonic colonial effort.

The final moment in *Paradise Lost* is a worldly exile of Adam and Eve from Eden. The banishment itself is comprised of the last lines in the poem and Milton strikes a tone of somber elegy:

> They looking back, all th' Eastern side beheld  
> Of Paradise, so late thir happie seat,  
> Wav'd over by that flaming Brand, the Gate  
> With dreadful Faces throng'd and fierie Armes:  
> Som natural tears they drop'd, but wip'd them soon; [ 645 ]  
> The World was all before them, where to choose  
> Thir place of rest, and Providence thir guide:  
> They hand in hand with wandring steps and slow,  
> Through *Eden* took thir solitarie way. (*Paradise Lost* 12.641-649)

These last lines demonstrate the paradox of the poem’s final representation of Adam in exile. Adam is a parody of exile. He is not truly lost, he is guided and always with a place. Adam and Eve are walking out of Eden, looking back to where Eden still remains. Above them, guiding them is the fiery sword of God, leading them out of the Gate of Paradise. In this directional sense, their journey out Eden has purpose. They are going away from God but God is still there, nothing of their origin is dissolved and though their memories of Eden may be experienced as a loss, it is a loss, that they deserved for their transgression.
Further, all this movement outward is quite orderly: there is no haphazard flight, the armies of God do not pursue them as they pursued Satan when he was banished from Heaven, Eve does not wail, Adam does not rebel against divine edict, their train proceeds and they weep only for a moment. There is a sense of dignified endurance which seems to provide the model for human reaction to hardship according to Power. When one considers this calm procession, their behavior must seem strange: this not the behavior of uprooted human beings who have been cut off from the life they have known and now find themselves without means or the experience in this new world to survive.

This is not same description of exodus that that opens the action in Paradise Lost. There is containing of strong human eruptive emotions and actions by God’s Providence. “Providence” annuls exilic being. For there is an annulment of human feeling is found in “the world is all before them, / where to choose their place of rest and Providence their guide”. The first lines indicate an open space and self-determination and this represents the chaotic emotion and physical de-situation one might associate with the loss of Eden. But the completion of the thought: “with Providence their guide:” indicates that the world before them, their choices, actions and even emotions are in obedience to God’s will.

The very last image of humanity is the very essence of the paradox of representing exile in the Western tradition. Adam is an exile with a metaphysical and narrative place. Adam and Eve may wander, may transgress, may cross boundaries on the face of the Earth, but any such spatial movement occurs according to the illuminative power of God’s Providence. Thus, while Adam and Eve are exiled from Eden, their arrival in the world is already contoured by the divine vision. They are beings-subjected-to-Power. For the rest of their days, they will know they are under God.
This is Milton’s rather perfect end for \textit{Paradise Lost}. But it is hardly the end of this fiction. In the next chapter, what I will explore is that although this narrative is not nearly the best means for representing exile, it is the fiction that Western thinking and society has put it place to make the exile appear. Power has persuaded us that even exiles should appear as citizens, that Adam is in fact, an exile. This is apparent in recent forms of discourse that I will shortly present. Therefore, the work that we have done to understand the complexities of Adam’s Tragedy (especially in this final moment of his Tragedy) will aid us in breaking down the fiction. Looking back at this originary moment, it is somewhat ironic. Milton did not intend Adam to be the true form of an exile in the worldly sense, rather the ideal, meaningful, Tragic form of an exile. Adam \textit{should} represent what the world \textit{should} strive restore to human being. But through numerous causes, conditions and influences, the ideal end of exile replaced the actual essence of exilic being and body in Western thinking and discourse. Adam, the citizen-subject became the expectation of all exiles. It is an anthropic idolatry: confusing the human-being with the citizen-subject. It is equally an idolatry to presume that mankind can dispense justice and restore peace in the same way, from the same position as God. Milton himself protested this kind of tyranny. But clearly that is precisely what Power is attempting to do as it frames its fiction.
Chapter 2 The Treatment of Satan and the Foundations of Enemy Life

The last chapter showed Adam’s rather gentle and framed iteration of exile as a Tragic narrative that ultimately creates an obedient, citizen-like human being. This is one narrative of exile in Paradise Lost. But Adam is not the only exilic figure in Milton’s epic. The other being in exile found Paradise Lost is the far more complicated Satan. Satan represents exile as something far different than Adam. His actions and the events of his life are different. His treatment by Power is different. His space is different. So much about Satan differs that it is not surprise that he is known as the “Enemy”. But if the narrative of Adam does not present the exile as he or she actually is, it may be necessary to look for difference to describe what is falsely framed in Power’s discourse. This chapter explores the representation of Satan in exile as way of problematizing the representation of exile that Adam presents. It considers Satan as if he were a model for human subjectivity which originates in the moment of the “ban”. The Satanic exile resembles in his treatment by Power, figures of madness, criminality and unfortunate refugees.

A Satanic “narrative” does not easily appear in Paradise Lost. One cannot point to any easily understandable and meaningful literary form that accurately describes the events as Milton has arranged them. One is not “supposed” to read a narrative into Satan’s actions and indeed his “life”. He is merely the “Enemy” of Adam, Eve and God. One is obliged to frame a narrative for the Enemy. Satan’s story is fragmentary, disruptive and absurd and his presence is peripheral, antagonistic and resistant.
In the traditional reading, the closest form of narrative for Satan that one could posit is the Epic. But as a great deal of criticism of *Paradise Lost* has pointed out, if one thinks of Satan as the hero of the classic Epic, the form does not resolve and it suffers from a poor combination of Greek and Christian myth and philosophy. Satan fails to be an Epic hero and the Enemy fares poorly adhering to this frame because it insists that we compare him to idealities which are better represented in the beings of God, Jesus and Adam.

It is because of this elusive difference that the closest form one can point for a narrative of Satan is an Ironic or Mock Epic. This form appears from Milton’s framing of Satan’s struggle in which he focuses the reader’s eye through the lens of God and Power and ascertains the delusion, the criminality and the blasphemy of Satan’s being and body. When Satan is in view, the sense of parody and perversion in being is the primary means of representation. In this way Satan’s “story” is one which discloses its own absurdity and futility in its attempt to make his existence appear when his existence is denied validity from the start. In the traditional reading of *Paradise Lost*, Satan disappears as the lens through which we view his being grows indifferent to his fate.  

Satan’s narrative, like his being, appears as form transgressing form, a form which is in itself exilic. It is for this very reason of form and meaning that Adam is in many ways the preferable protagonist of *Paradise Lost*. His story, his tragedy is perhaps one humanity might wish for itself, in exile. But this is not the fiction nor the reality that authentically represents exile as we know it, see it, and experience it when its presence disrupts Western life. When it

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1 Clearly as Mock Epic, the story of Satan is incomplete, his presence dissipates as *Paradise Lost* focuses more and more on Adam and his end is a series of ellipses by Book XII. Thus, despite the strength of his early characterization, Satan is always pushed into the periphery of the larger Poem, Milton and God’s gaze always returns to Adam. Satan is always outside, always exiled. The Mock Epic that might have been written about Satan is, without investigation, too indistinct to appear.
comes to showing exile with all its complications and problems, Satan’s story is much more authentic.

Because of this elusive exilic being, the goal of this chapter will be different than the first chapter concerning Adam’s narrative. Adam represents a being that has presence through Power in the West. He is simultaneously the good-citizen and the form exiles should correspond to. The previous work shows Adam’s presence in Western thinking and the accepted discourse of exile. The remainder of this dissertation sets out to read against this dominant fiction, to try to see an equally human, exilic being in Satan. Satan, who is not always fully rendered, who appears on the periphery, who is decidedly not the fiction of human being that Power would allow and is the in fact the being Power desires to ban, chase, strike and destroy.

Satan is a being of two essential aspects. He is the Enemy-exile as framed by Power. But he is also the essential, unseen being of humanity and this is most visible in real-world exiles of the body. This chapter demonstrates how Satan’s relationship by Power and its citizens coincides and informs the relationship of real-world exilic beings and bodies. It will explore the origins for his “essence”, the nature of his “classification” and “treatment”, which build his subjectivity and create the “problems” of his resistant actions and being. Finally, this chapter will show how this Satanic being pervades beneath the surface of the contemporary discourse concerning the exile and how and why it is necessary to bring this reality to the surface. This work is intended to create a more transparent frame of the being that Satan is, the being refugee becomes through the effect of discourse, and the being that existentially we all are. In the first section, I present a genealogy of the theoretical underpinnings of my term for this being, Enemy Life. In the second section, I trace Satan’s treatment under the view of God and the violence of the ban. In the third section, I further explore the linkage between the Satanic criminal and madman via Foucault.
Then in the final section I demonstrate how in the traditional rendering of the exile, assimilative efforts are precluded via the frame of blasphemy.

**What is “Enemy Life”?**

“Enemy Life” is the human being-in-exile from social Power. It is a subject position that occurs when Power views a being to be “resistant” or “oppositional” or even simply “apart from”. Materially, Enemy Life is the form of exile that Satan presents in *Paradise Lost*. The term outlines a discourse of the Enemy-exile. It traces its roots through biopolitical theory, Milton’s Satan, and is rehabilitated by Shelley and Byron. Contemporarily, it informs our moment’s discourse. Because of this genealogy, there are two stances concerning Enemy Life. The first stance is one that views Enemy Life as Power does and thereby attempts to understand the difficult position the exilic Enemy has been placed in. (This represents the work ahead when viewing Satan in *Paradise Lost*). The second stance is one that recognizes the exilic Enemy subject position as human reality and attempts to rehabilitate that position from its long-suffering relationship with Power. (This is the work that will mostly be done by Shelley and Byron through their efforts in the Satanic School.) What the following work with Milton, Byron and Shelley should perform is to make visible the reality of the first stance and show how the second stance of rehabilitation can be used to address this problematic position.

I have already somewhat investigated what “Enemy Life” signifies in exilic discourse. The influence of the Puritan origins of American culture and a long standing literary tradition has created a consciousness of the American citizen as the “American Adam” who comes to the New World, is restored and situates himself. The “Enemy” of this Adam is the Other, the displaced person, the refugee, the tempting transgressor of the American Edenspace, the Satanic exile.
This “Enemy” does not appear naturally hostile to the citizen without the framing of Power, whose justice and legitimacy is inherently questioned by the existence of such life. According to the narrative, the Enemy is the person who does not fulfill or accept the reality that America is a new Eden and that its Power restores situation to being. Given this cultural reality, inherent to the American imagination of the transgressive figure or border-crossing enemy is an identification of that figure as Satan, the devil, a Rebel Angel. In other words, the de-situated being is a form of life which is Enemy to (human) being, an existential threat, not included in social human life. De-situated being is Life which appears Satanic, exiled, oppositional and apart from.

My account of “Enemy Life” builds Giorgio Agamben’s work in bio-politics, most particularly his works *Homo Sacer, State of Exception* and *The Use of Bodies*. Arendt, Foucault and Heidegger are all necessary components of my conception of Enemy Life and I will introduce and refer to them in the pages that follow. But the narrative and existential framework of “Enemy Life” is most adjacent to Agamben’s conceptions of sovereignty, the citizen, the denizen and exceptionalism and especially the use of the ban. It is for that reason that I will (re)introduce his work now.

In his 1995 text *Homo Sacer*, Agamben investigates the origin of sovereign power. Beginning with Aristotle, he defines power through its recognition of life. This process begins with the determination of whether life is biological, bare life “zoe” or political, framed, formed and (especially because of this political aspect) human life, “bios”. He places the origin of Power in the ability of the sovereign to banish an individual, to deprive them of this “human” life without it being considered violence. This is the deciding of what Agamben calls the “state of exception” and the individual who exists as bare, biological, non-political life. He calls this being who is banished from the polis “homo sacer” the sacred man:
“The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of *homo sacer* (sacred man), who *may be killed and yet not sacrificed*... An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is included in the juridical order [*ordinamento*] solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred tests of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries.” (Homo Sacer 8)

This bare, banned life is fundamental to Agamben’s conception of sovereign power for it places every being within the sovereign’s sphere of influence. On the other end of the spectrum of political life, the included, the citizen, is clearly inside the sovereign power and protection. But perhaps more surprisingly, the vulnerable human being who is at the very periphery of society is included as well by this act of banishing because they are still under the force of the sovereign’s ban. Of particular interest in Agamben’s conception of *homo sacer*, is a reality which Agamben invokes, but does not perhaps bring into prominence for its discursive or narrative effect, the inherent “sacredness” of the sacred man and the ritual of purification that the ban represents. This originary being and ban that Agamben supposes has a religious root structure and the irony that *homo sacer* is considered sacred, when such a being is clearly blasphemous to Power and the polis cannot be overlooked.

It is because of this original reality of *homo sacer*, alongside the enforced pervasive, vague, and indeed fictionalized danger of “terror” in the post-9/11 era that Agamben shows the polis that exists today is a perpetual state of exception. The “state of exception” is a term which he employs and defines in his work *State of Exception* first published in 2003. Agamben links the state of exception with the tactics and practices of totalitarian governments in the past and reveals this same emergency in the operations of democracies today. This “state of exception” indicates the excepting of sovereign power and *homo sacer* from “normal” administrations of justice and legality. This is because the time, according Power, has entered a moment of crisis which dictates the suspension of the usual customs of legality. A society of exception is one in
which Power, outside the juridical structures, can apprehend any individual and banish them. Because of this, our time is when “exception” is the norm and the actual functioning of our society has become one where homo sacer is every human being. Every human being is potentially at risk of being-banned.

In *The Use of Bodies*, published in 2014, Agamben further explores the nature of the body as a tool and of the relationship between biological conceptions of life and socio-political identifications of life. In the second part of his book, he traces a genealogy of the concept “life” and demonstrates the essential regulation of “forms of life” which are isolated and abjected by Power from a “form-of-life.” In this “form-of-life” which is a way of living through acts which do not define or mark being, Agamben looks to restore the potentialities of human being, re-establishing as Heidegger might put it the be-ing of being.

With the term of form-of-life, by contrast, we understand a life that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate and keep distinct something like bare life…It defines a life—a human life—in which singular modes, acts and processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all potential (The Use of Bodies 207).

What Agamben means to do by this theorization is deny Power the possibility of exploiting the state of exception that exists in the modern polis and expose the bare life within the various vulnerable human beings that live within/out the boundaries of the Western nation-states. This idea of living life is the ellipses of Agamben’s work in biopolitics— that is to say re-thinking human life through the movement of its potentialities— and it is at this junction that I would begin fleshing out what Milton and the Satanic School can add to this exploration.

“Enemy Life” as employed by this dissertation, is a term designed to connect biopolitical philosophy with the narrativity of everyday political discourse so as to elaborate a Satanic iteration of exile. The term should imply the Satanic aspects of the exile at the same time as it
frames the realities of biopolitical Power relations. It operates to show an actual, structuralized system of some of the essential concepts of biopolitics. To put it another way, Enemy Life exists to tell a “story” of “Satanic” exiles to understand their subject-position.

The desire to connect the narrative of the Satanic exile with the biopolitical subject is why both words “Enemy” and “Life” are important to the term. The Satanic narrative of exile shows the same realities as biopolitical theories of the Other. Thus “Enemy” is inseparable from “Life” in the way that Power and Western thinking have made “bare”, “mere” or (perhaps we can say) “just” life visible. “Enemy Life” these words, together, show the joining of all human life into a persistent, adversarial, and blasphemous relation with Power. Strange, outside, and disruptive, Life is the Enemy to Power. Thus, life is the site of conquest and colonization by Power. One could equally indicate this reality by calling the term “Enemy: Life” to indicate the targeting of Life as Enemy by Power (which is outside the frame).

This sense that body and being are Enemy sites of conquest and potential Power is at the heart of bio- and thanato-politics. It is also at the heart of the Satanic School’s reading that makes the Enemy the being of human being. It is in this sense that the compound term “Enemy Life” is designed to reframe the Satanic School of poetry into work which addresses bio-political theory and attempt to rehabilitate the Satanic exile. As I will read them, Shelley and Byron are poets of Enemy being and body, poets who are principally concerned with defining and representing Enemy Life as essentially human life. They are members of the Satanic School of poetry, but this school was formed to represent life.

The word “Enemy” in “Enemy Life” is crafted from and with memory of the name “Satan” in ancient Hebrew. Satan can be translated as “Enemy” or “Adversary”. In this meaning of “adversary” it can imply “one who resists”. This sense of resistance is amplified when one
recalls the Latin phrase most often attributed to Satanic being “non-serviam” (I will not serve) which seems proleptic of later iterations of resistance, especially the infamous phase of Bartleby: “I prefer not”. The word “Satan” also touches the Arabic word “shaitan” which connotes “distant” “astray” and “apart” (and perhaps I may suggest exile). This is particularly interesting if one considers Heidegger’s conceptions of Da-sein, or being-there as the human condition. This sense of the word “Enemy” therefore seems to already be quite near the way in which Agamben, Arendt and Foucault have crafted the subject-position of their respective Others.

To emphasize this conceptual overlap, the characterizations of Satan in the earlier Biblical usage show him, in the Book of Job, “roaming and patrolling the Earth”. This early Enemy therefore clearly exists in a transgressive, boundary crossing mode of being. This act of boundary crossing was noted in the earlier chapter, when Book IV saw Satan’s first entrance into Eden take the form of him leaping the natural wall. Satan is also ambivalence to physical form or body. He represents the essence of the Enemy body: transgressive, imperfect and imperfecting. This transgressive language and its connotations are a critical aspect of Enemy Life’s “ambiguity of being”. The very potentiality of being which modern biopolitics is attempting to theorize is the same being which Power is most bent on forming and failing in that, destroying.

Furthering this sense of indistinctness and corresponding danger is the ambiguous plurality/singularity inherent to this Biblical concept of “Enemy”. As it is used in the Old Testament, “Satan” can be a single being but also an entire population, the article “ha-” which sometimes attached to Satan (as in ha-Satan) indicates “The Enemy” as singular being but the more general “Satan” can mean many beings or a nation. This is a fundamental aspect of the “Enemy” in the contemporary political imagination, especially when joined with actual “Life”, that is to say, living beings who are not abstract representations but vulnerable flesh. In the
current discourse, one hears the danger of “terror” and of “terrorists” and “Islamic Terrorism”. Usually this dangerous figure is apprehended as singular body but that body is never the danger rather it is merely the form the danger has taken for a moment. One can imagine the hostility that might be brought down upon such a body if it were to come to represent in tangible form the very essence of the Enemy to Power. The body of this terrorist would be merely flesh which was connected to the Enemy but not essential to its existence and any violence committed against such a being would violence against a “nation” not a person.

This ambiguity of plurality/ singularity becomes an even more egregious tool of oppression when it is configured to apprehend more innocent and vulnerable beings. The perpetual attempt to correct the exilic figure into a form of citizenry stems from the frustration of socio-political Power in its attempt to isolate and apprehend the plurality of the many exilic beings. In its survey, it finds that no matter what form of life it proscribes as human being, no matter how many citizens it makes, there remains an enormity of Other, undefined and peripheral life it cannot address. I use this translated word for Satan, “Enemy” not despite its Biblical origins, then, but specifically for them. However secular Western culture becomes, the “Enemy” shall always have a fervent religious connotation, the Enemy will always be thought of as Satan (as the term “enemy combatant” makes clear.)

To define what the word “Life” elicits in “Enemy Life” there is also inherent ambiguousness in whether or not “Satan” represents a living being or simply an antagonistic presence which must be confronted, banished and further destroyed even after its banishment. Milton represents this in a few ways. First, rendering of the Satanic body as incorporeal and immune to lasting pain and secondly by framing Satan, an animate being as a “Serpent” who is immediately visible as less than human life. This is directly connected to a problem Agamben
presents: there is a difference in our society between simple biological life and political life or life which is recognized as human being. What should be elicited by speaking of “Enemy Life” is this ambiguity of a being who roams between an apprehendable body and a dis-figured and adversarial presence. This is the reality of human being and this may explain the nature of such Enemy Life’s relationship with Power: Life in its ambiguity, its multiplicity is quite Enemy in appearance. Hence “Life” as “Enemy Life” becomes less like a “form of life” which Power can apprehend, approve of, include or exclude or otherwise regulate and contain.

The Origin and Treatment of Enemy Life: Satan in Banishment and Further Correction

The preceding discussion gives some idea of the narrative tradition, discursive implications and philosophical genealogy of “Enemy Life”. But clearly “Enemy Life” requires further rendering in narrative frames and related instantiations. This work will begin with the narrative of Satan in Paradise Lost which largely presents the realities of Enemy Life and its treatment by Power and will continue in the works of the Satanic School.

Enemy Life appears (in the negative sense) out of the narrative described in the previous chapter. But the overall narrative of Adam is not a narrative of exile when it disrupts the everyday life of the citizen. Adam’s representation of exile is a frame of Power that occludes the truth of the exile. It is a fiction that creates the illusion that the banished can become Adam, that the exile can become the citizen. But Power frames Paradise Lost’s other exile, Satan, with a different narrative, one that is largely derived from the original moment in Paradise Lost the banishment of Satan. This banishment, the relationships it forms, is a mark that Satan seem incapable of escaping.
Book I and II is where most of the story of Satan in exile is told. They concern the time immediately after Satan’s doomed war on Heaven and God. Book I opens with the Fall of Satan and his subsequent experience of Hell. In it, one finds detailed descriptions of the Hellspace, a corrective “furnace” which seems designed to treat by confining. The primary inmate, patient and banned being of this space is the defiant, paradoxical and delusional character of Satan. Satan is physically and psychologically marked by his lost war and framed by the violence of Power’s banishment. One of the principal actions is Satan’s acceptance of his status as the Enemy, the one who resists. There is also the building of Pandemonium, a blasphemous panoptic structure which seems to parody God’s omniscience and serves as rather elegant representation of Enemy Life’s problem of assimilation. These events eventually beget Satan’s decision to infiltrate the boundaries of Eden and Book II sees him encounter his daughter/lover Sin and his incestuous child Death as he leaves Hell bound for Eden.

It is telling that Milton choose the moment of the Fall of Satan to open his epic. There is a rather beautiful symmetry in Milton’s emplottment: *Paradise Lost* begins and ends with a banishment and both includes and excludes his banned beings. In the previous section, I introduced Agamben’s work, *Homo Sacer*. At the heart of that text is the same idea: the use of the ban by the sovereign is the originary moment of social, human life.

The originary relation of law to life is not application but Abandonment. The matchless potentiality of the nomos, its originary ‘force of law’, is that it holds life in its ban by abandoning it” (Homo Sacer 23).

Agamben posits that the beginning of sovereign authority is located in the moment when the sovereign, by force, creates “justice” in the banishment of an undesirable form of life. This same reality is clearly represented in *Paradise Lost*. The ban is enforced by God as soon as Milton has finished invoking the Muse “to justify the ways of God to men”.

Th' infernal Serpent; he it was, whose guile
Stird up with Envy and Revenge, deceiv'd
The Mother of Mankind, what time his Pride
Had cast him out from Heav'n, with all his Host
Of Rebel Angels, by whose aid aspiring
To set himself in Glory above his Peers,
He trusted to have equal'd the most High,
If he oppos'd; and with ambitious aim
Against the Throne and Monarchy of God
Rais'd impious War in Heav'n and Battel proud
With vain attempt. Him the Almighty Power
Hurl'd headlong flaming from th' Ethereal Skie
With hideous ruine and combustion down
To bottomless perdition, there to dwell
In Adamantine Chains and penal Fire,
Who durst defie th' Omnipotent to Arms.  
(Paradise Lost 1.34-49)

These are the original moments of sovereignty, both in Agamben and Milton. Agamben’s ban is conceived as the moment when social life begins with the appearance of sovereign “justice” regulating violence. Milton’s ban shows us the restoration of Heaven’s purity in a way that represents God’s justice. But both Milton and Agamben identify the banning action as the moment of Power’s origin.

Milton’s text can reveal further detail about this moment when sovereignty and the banned being appear. When read through the lens of Paradise Lost, the use of the ban appears as the narrative which frames Satan’s exile. The narrative is a purifying ceremony of violence and this ceremony of banishment fictionalizes its three main participants, God, Satan the Rebel Angel and the righteous Angels into symbolic roles. The longer lasting effects of the ban mars the time of God, marks the body and being of the Enemy and transforms the subjectivity of those beings acting on the behalf of God into pursuing agents.

In this opening scene, Satan, whatever else he was before, now is a serpent non-human, a hostile poisonous creature, a dangerous entity that necessitated expulsion. This corresponds to
the figure of *homo sacer*. The condemnation of this “Rebel Angel” is for his audacious pride and his impiety in attempting to overthrow the rightful, “Almighty Power” of God. This invokes the “matchless potentiality of the nomos”. Equally important, as the moment is framed, it was inevitable that Satan fell: it was a vain attempt to war on Heaven. By all accounts this is the first time God has shown his omnipotence in a violent manner. (This new violence I investigate further) Satan is banned to a place of “bottomless perdition” which sounds in principle very much like Agamben’s state of exception: an infernal place where all the rights of being have been suspended and utter violence can be enacted.

This the ban of Enemy Life is a ceremony. It is a ceremony in the sense that it provides a network of rituals for Power to deploy the violence of the ban in a sanctified and purifying manner. This ceremony invokes the Old World jeremiad, the political sermon by which by holy writ condemned the ways of the wicked and made them visible figures to chase. To the same point, when Agamben speaks of his *homo sacer*, he cites its development out of an ancient Roman ritual.

The most ancient recorded forms of capital punishment…are actually purification rites, and not death penalties in the modern sense: the *neque fas est eum immolari* served precisely to distinguish the killing of homo sacer from ritual purifications, and decisively exclude sacratio from the religious sphere in the strict sense. (Homo Sacer 81)

Agamben moves on from this point and is interested in juridical frameworks that come into being after this ritual has dissolved from view. But it is clear from the way God banishes Satan, that these “sacred men” are not merely legal figures, they are ceremonial bodies. The ban is performed to purify physically and spiritually. It is for this reason that they are Enemy Life, Satanic exiles, because Satan’s presence both his body and being are contaminants. The violence of the ban as it is used is not just raw force, it is symbolic, religious and ritualistic, all to the
purpose of purifying and sanctifying the violence of the ban as much as it is to purifying the banned being.

This is the reality which modern discourse must come to recognize in its own framing. When the American government enacts a ban, whether it be a travel ban or a denouncement or declaration of war it is conducting this ban in a ceremonial and highly stylized form. There is pomp. There is fanfare. There are preening displays of supposed righteousness. All this is designed to distract from the reality of violence performed and create a distance from the violence until it becomes an abstract (which is to say platonic ideal of a) ceremony.

Paradise Lost intimates this idea rather well. Because of the context of the opening lines of the ban (which directly follow Milton’s dutiful invocation of the muse) there is a sense of ritualistic formality to the violence of the ban. In the lines “Him the Almighty Power/ Hurld headlong flaming from th’ Ethereal Skie”, the act of the ban, there is a stylized, symbolic form of violence. In these lines there is driving force and there is cleansing fire. Both characterize the ban God performs. Akin to the burning of a body to free it of disease and corruption, (which is an ancient Roman funeral rite) Satan is burning and cleansing the space between Heaven and Hell with the movement of his flaming body through the sky. This is how Power treats the body of Enemy Life. The body of Enemy Life is burned and banned with violence to purify its own sinful form. Perhaps more importantly, Power is burning and driving out Enemy Life to purify Heaven’s space and make a visible spectacle of God’s Almighty

\[2\] This purifying fire in sky and the assumption of aerial (or if one prefers ethereal) superiority and space is a trope to one can observe with alarming frequency in American culture. It is quite often central to the framing of our banishing violence. For example, during the second Iraqi War, the Bush Administration invoked the term “shock and awe” for the “cleansing” bombardment of Iraq and video of the violence took the form of a fiery light show which effected the fall of buildings (and the unseen people inside them).
Power. This is suggested in Milton’s phrase “from the “th’Ethereal skie”. Satan’s flaming fall restores the integrity of Heaven as an idea and an ideal space.

Linked to this fiery cataclysm, the initial ban of Satan is not enough, the punishing, cleansing and just fire inflicted upon the body of Enemy Life continues in Hell.

A Dungeon horrible, on all sides round
As one great Furnace flam’d, yet from those flames
No light, but rather darkness visible
Serv’d onely to discover sights of woe,
Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace [ 65 ]
And rest can never dwell, hope never comes
That comes to all; but torture without end
Still urges, and a fiery Deluge, fed
With ever-burning Sulphur unconsum’d:
Such place Eternal Justice had prepar’d (Paradise Lost 1.60-70)

It would seem from this description that to be banned from heaven with purifying fire is not enough. God must assure that purifying fire is a constant in Hell, such that it is a “great Furnace.” This an echo of the initial ban, a continuation of the ceremony. One that does not end with the initial strike of purifying fire but one that is a “fiery deluge of ever burning sulfur unconsumed” prepared by “Eternal Justice.” This is extenuated in the resemblance of Milton’s description of Hell with that of Dante’s. The lines: “where peace and rest can never dwell, hope never comes…” recall the perpetual chase of sinners Dante describes in an early canto. This is the image of the chase of the Enemy which will develop throughout the treatment of Satan. Even a situation in Hell is too kind a punishment for Enemy Life. The Enemy must be prodded by punishing/purifying flame, aggravated and desituated. The creation and banning of the Enemy is a purification ritual, a sacred rite of Power that is imitated with constant use.

This sense that the use of the ban use is a purification ritual has an effect on how Enemy Life’s body is conceived as a site of Power. In Agamben’s work, the violence Power frames as
justice is consequential in the need to establish the sovereign state of exception. *Paradise Lost* suggests that the purifying quality of the violence itself toward the sinful, impure body is more prominently part of the ban. It is not just an act of force but an act of symbolic significance to the culture, one that insists not only an extreme initial act of violence, but creates a sense that further violence must be pursued perpetually for justice to be carried out.

This sanctified violence may seem like the proper treatment for Satan, the embodiment of evil, corruption and impurity. He, is according to Power, not human and an existential threat to humanity. Adam, the citizen who is yet to appear (in *Paradise Lost*’s narrative) is apparently in danger of this blasphemous being. But the disruptive question that guides the Satanic School’s reading and the formation of my term, Enemy Life is: what if the human being was already *there* in the narrative’s first moment? What if Satan is the authentic human being? Then the narrative of humanity drastically altered. Power is not the protective guarantor of the Edenspace, nor the restorative presence that alleviates and ends the suffering of human being in exile. Rather, from the first, Power assaults the human being, its violence appears at the beginning of it, and continuing on, chasing after the banned being, it punishes this falling life and pushes it further into the periphery. There appears to a fundamental hostility to the human being and body in this way, one that reveals human being as an existence which should be purged. Human life then appears as Enemy Life.³

³ Moving on from the overall frame of the ban itself, three figures appear during this originary moment and define Enemy Life as it presents itself in *Paradise Lost* via their Power relation. These figures have dialogue with issues contemporary theorists of bio-politics are addressing now and show the reality of our framing of the exile. The three figures which form what one might call the “Trinity of the Ban” are God, Satan and a third figure which is only mentioned glancingly in the first pages but who is mentioned several times in later descriptions of the event. This is the “Pursuing Angel”, who was loyal to God during the rebellion and carries out his justice during the banning action and after it.

This last figure, the loyal pious Angel who pursues and wars in worship of God, is significant because it represents a departure from the assumption that the being that who not Satan is the innocent human citizen, who is manifestly uninvolved in the ban, Adam. What this figure would attempt to address in theory is the shift in the
Viewing the Enemy

Most of the narrative of the Satanic exile, should naturally seem to concern itself with the depiction of Satan. But the way in which Satan is depicted in *Paradise Lost* is in view of Power. This creates a rather obvious problem in Satan’s depiction: one is obliged to see Satan through the view of Power. Encountering him, Satan is Enemy Life according God, which makes him appear at once hostile and dangerous to Power and explained and foreseen by God’s frame. But Satan, when read as the human being, also represents Enemy Life as that which defies, subverts, disrupts and resists the frame of being by Power. He is resistant-being and being-apart, seen from two perspectives at the same time. One must be aware of this reality when reading Satan and negotiate the struggle for the framing his being. With this duality in mind, after the ban, Satan becomes the focus of a lens Power sees being through. In examining the effect of this lens one may theorize the problem of the Satanic exile and explore why Power and its captive citizen populace acts with such parodic hostility toward Enemy Life’s mere existence.

One observes the hostility of Power toward Enemy Life presents itself from the first moment of the ban. To be struck down from Heaven by God’s own thunder and laid to waste in Hell one would think would be enough punishment for any crime. But, as the rest of *Paradise Lost* shows, rather than the sovereign intent toward violence dissipating after “justice” has been dispensed, the hostility toward Enemy Life lingers and pervades every representation afterward.

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narrative of “human being” for our time. As I will posit, to be framed into an approved being during the banning crisis or the state of exception one must become an active, pursuing agent of Power. One cannot merely be a citizen who passively allows Power to dispense justice. The marks of violence that the Sovereign dispenses and reflect upon itself compel a kind of perpetual “worship”. This is the essential reality that the “Trinity of the Ban” makes appear. This “Trinity” and their roles in and after the banning action form the narrative frame of Enemy Life and its treatment in American culture today.
This hostility suggests that the originary violence of the ban itself has occluded and altered Power’s view. In Milton’s language of banishment the violence that establishes sovereign Power also paradoxically represents a disruption of the ideological stasis that enables Panopticism. In between the two infinites, the “Ethereal skie” and the final destination of “bottomless perdition” there is “hideous ruin and combustion”. The smoke that is emanating from Satan’s body implies distortion of the visual field. The moment in which sovereign power originates by force is one that it cannot clearly perceive in its omniscient anticipation or reflection.

This is how violence operates as a lens of occlusion. Because of the violence of the ban, a warped sense of Satan’s being is the almost inevitable view in the discourse of Power because the moment in which Satan is defined by a Power used to the omniscient apprehension is clouded. A condemning “view” of the being of Enemy Life is found in the identification of Satan (who is a war refugee) as a “Rebel Angel”. In the “lens” of the ban, Power mistakenly views Enemy Life as not just simple and banned but “rebellious” because of its own mistaking of its occluding violence as justice.

Agamben, citing a fragment of Pindar posits that sovereignty (Power, God, etc) comes about from the “scandalous”, “enigmatic” joining of justice and violence.

[ Pindar] defines the sovereignty of the nomos by means of a justification of violence. The fragment’s meaning becomes clear only when one understands that at its center lies a scandalous unification of the two essentially antithetical principles that the Greeks called Bia and Dikē, violence and justice. Nomos is the power that, “with the strongest hand,” achieves the paradoxical union of these opposites… In this sense, Pindar’s fragment on the nomos basileus contains the hidden paradigm guiding every successive definition of sovereignty: the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which
violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.
(Homo Sacer 24-25)

To understand Enemy Life, one must understand the weight and permanence of that welding. The joining of violence to justice is not without its marks. As I posit later, this original act leaves a visible trace on the banned body and these marks create further hostility when viewed by Power. Satan’s being is seen and marked because of this lens. What Agamben begins to suggest is that sovereignty cannot see sovereign violence as distinct from justice because the joining moment permanently occludes panopticism. In mistaking the banned being as a Rebel Angel, Power views a kind of directed insolence, pride and blasphemy into the simple being of the refugee. This explains the incredible hostility Power and its acolytes demonstrate toward beings as exposed as war-refugees.

The justice of sovereign violence and the simple and yet somehow “blasphemous” and “willful” fact of being apart from the approved form of life are issues that contemporary theorists of biopolitics have addressed before. Hannah Arendt discusses the problematic nature of de-situated life in her work *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. She examines the de-struction of the nation state in the face of rightless people who seem to question the capacity of a nation to sustain the illusion of inherent human rights. This issue comes to a crisis when the nation state is confronted with a large-scale influx of rightless people who have been banished and framed by Power to appear as undesirables. She presents the problem in this way:

The official SS newspaper, the Schwarze Korps, stated that if the world was not yet convinced that the Jews were the scum of the earth, it soon would be when unidentifiable beggars, without nationality, without money, and without passports crossed their borders. And it is true that kind of factual propaganda worked better than Goebbels’ rhetoric, not only because it established Jews as the scum of the earth, but also because the incredible plight of an ever-growing group of innocent
people was like a practical demonstration of the totalitarian movement’s cynical claims that no such thing as inalienable human rights existed and that the affirmations of the democracies to the contrary were mere prejudice, hypocrisy and cowardice in the face of the cruel majesty of the new world. (Origins of Totalitarianism 269)

What Arendt means to make visible by this observation in the chapter “The Decline of the Nation-State” is the process by which a group of powerless people and fleeing from tyranny and genocide can be made to appear as “the scum of the earth”. The refugees of whom she speaks are driven from their homes for being called undesirables and enemies. Not having means, they become undesirable in other countries, due to the fact that the nation-states are confronted with lives that do not “have” the features of human rights which make human beings. The refugees, by their very presence, affect a disrup-tion of Power and produce de-situation in otherwise situated human beings. They are visibly life, but not recognizably human. This produces hostility in governments and populations and affirms the justice of the initial ban and the judgment that brought it about. Thus the refugees become the Enemy.

How this frame of the refugee is possible is what examining the lens of originary violence attempts. In the situation Arendt describes, the frame of the war-refugee clearly induces a hostility in Power even (and perhaps especially) in the Power that “takes in” these refugees after a ban. What Milton’s text suggests is that a fundamental reason for this hostility is that Power identifies the banning action that displaces refugees almost reflexively as justice even when it occurs in a clearly unjust context. Because of this view, the refugee’s de-situated being appears something willful, deliberate, even blasphemous and rebellious. These are the errors of Power’s vision which are linked to the banning action itself and one can see these occlusions and their origin quite well in Paradise Lost.
The Rebel Angel

To further understand the occluded nature of Power’s view, one may consider the ban which punishes Satan, in connection with his rebellion against God. The actual act of rebellion may merit punishment, whether that punishment need be confinement in Hell remains debatable. It for his rebellion that Satan is identified as “the infernal Serpent”, a “Rebel Angel” an “Apostate Angel”, “th’ Arch-Enemy, and thence in Heav’n call’d Satan”. By these names, but most of all Rebel Angel, he is linked forever to a past, sinful violence which required God’s “justice” to purify.

As I mentioned in the theoretical introduction, this idea of the “Rebel Angel” coincides with Agamben’s formulation of homo sacer, in particular the ambivalence and ambiguity which is inherent to the sacredness and indeed very life of this being. Agamben explores the strange ambiguity of homo sacer, the man who cannot be sacrificed and whose murder does not constitute a crime. One can see the resemblance of this figure with Satan, who is struck down by God but not sacrificed (unlike Jesus), not by violence but “eternal justice”. Agamben links this ambiguity of being with the nature of the ban itself. Citing Schmitt in his Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, Agamben draws our attention to the essential, dual nature of the ban (and by extension the banned being):

Another Hebrew usage that may be noted here is the ban (Heb. herem), by which impious sinners, or enemies of the community and its god, were devoted to utter destruction. The ban is a form of devotion to the deity, and so the verb “to ban” is sometimes rendered “consecrate” (Micah 4:13) or “devote” (Lev. 27: z8ff.) (Homo Sacer 49)
This describes the paradox of being-banned: as much as the ban is meant to destroy, it makes meaningful the contact between the sacred and the blasphemous, in some ways erasing the distinction between the two forms of life. There is in a sense a transgression in being-banned. This is what Milton details in his ban of the “Rebel Angel”. Milton defines the banned being by an act of rebellion specifically by Satan, specifically against God. Violence and an ensuing ban, transgressive contact between the sacred and the blasphemous, is the result. One can see this in the early short description of the action Satan undertook to be framed as a “Rebel Angel”:

To set himself in Glory above his Peers,  
He trusted to have equal'd the most High,  
If he oppos'd; and with ambitious aim  
Against the Throne and Monarchy of God  
Rais'd impious War in Heav'n and Battel proud  
With vain attempt. (Paradise Lost 1.39-44)

This Satan is a “Rebel Angel” and this paradoxical being of blasphemous and sacred is found in the relationship between the two words themselves. Satan’s being acknowledges God (in “Angel”), and denies his right to rule and deliberately attempts to overthrow Him (in “Rebel”). The two words conflict with one another: how can one still be Angelic after such Rebellion, how can one rebel if one is an Angel? Satan does not belong in either space, yet the ban is passed on him and he is sent to Hell for punishment. He is, because of the ban, an ambiguous being, an “Infernal Serpent” who seems to slide between “proper” forms of life.

Developing from this ambiguity of Satan, the rebellion indicates the transgression of the proper meta-physical positions which preceded the contact and tells the narrative of the ban. The (continuing) physical sin of Satan is the invasion of the sacred, transcendental
space of God “to have equal’d the Most High” (the Sovereign). It is (according to Power) a hostile, paradoxical being and links the breach of Heaven and the assault on the Throne of God with a transgression of borders. What is perhaps not always appreciated in tradition readings of *Paradise Lost* is the extent to which God breaches the both being and form in this moment of the ban. God’s thunder strikes down Satan thus making contact and rupturing being. This is one reason why Satan needs further punishment and confinement. He initiated the contact between the sacred and the blasphemous in attempting to define his being as transcendental. Power tries to resolve this transgression, this ambiguity of being by banning, to purify its space. But the contact between the sacred and the blasphemous which produces ambiguities and occlusions of being cannot be erased.

This ambiguity becomes even more pronounced when one begins think of Satan as the human being in exile. What the term “Rebel Angel” can aid us in perceiving is the reality that Enemy Life is not conceived as human life. From the first moment. Satan is already less than, he is blasphemously a Rebel Angel, a serpent, a being which does not immediately appear as a human being. There is no “recognizability” inherent to the Rebel Angel. This is perceptible when one reads the early description of Satan’s punishment in Hell. The violence appears to be beyond the limits of human endurance yet it remains strangely serene. As Milton puts it: “torture without end/ Still urges, and a fiery Deluge, fed/With ever-burning Sulphur unconsum’d…” (*Paradise Lost* 1.67-69).

If one were to read of this kind of treatment of a human being, it would shock the conscience and provoke some sense of empathy. But when this punishment is dealt upon Satan there is no such sense. It is violence against an abstraction and an aberration. The lens of justice is in effect. Satan appears an ambiguous body and this is represented by Satan’s
various transformations (which one must note devolved into less “human” forms over the course of the epic). But in even at the onset there is a sense that Satan’s torment is not grievable (to borrow Butler’s term). A Rebel Angel is “Empyreal substance” which “cannot fail” (though clearly it can experience pain without pity). This extreme correction is possible because Satan does not instantly appear as human being in the sense that Satan’s suffering, his experience is not brought into proximity with humanity. Rather the banned being, in whatever form, the leader of an army or a war-refugee, is dangerous and rebellious. This animate, feeling, speaking, reasoning being of Satan is a Rebel Angel, an ambiguous, dangerous form which transgressively joins the blasphemous and sacred and is not in the “ideal” sense, human.

This is the reason why Satan the war-refugee, continues to be viewed as a dangerous Rebel Angel even after the war is over. It is blasphemous inherently to be a war-refugee, because being apart in the boundaries of the sovereign is linked with the ancient violence of failed rebellion.

This blasphemy is at work in the narrative Arendt relates. In Arendt’s relation of the plight of Jewish people during the early part of the 20th century, the German banishment, encampment and mission of mass murder erased the distinction between an “enemy of the state” and the desperate refugee that only wanted to get out. In our time, little has changed. Those particularly vulnerable to this effect of the ban are those whose religion already places them in the precarious position of being called “infidel” by the warped Puritan Christian ideology of 21st century America. Shortly after President Trump was elected, he signed an executive order banning refugees from Syria. He did this under the guise of “extreme vetting” to “keep radical Islamic terrorists out of the United States of America”
(Trump Signs Executive Order Banning Syrian Refugees). The rendering of the “terrorist” and the refugee with the same pen demonstrates their similar appearance in the occluded vision of Power.

What is shown in Milton’s text is this elision inherent to the ban of the Rebel Angel. It blurs the distinction between a hostile Enemy that is attacking and a being who is simply being-displaced. In Milton’s text, this link occurs during the ban itself, because of the violence of the ban. The violence of the ban itself occludes the view of Power as it frames the being of Enemy Life. Satan is a Rebel Angel, a danger, even when he is completely de-situated and without means of rebellion.

Satan in this lens never ceases to be a “rebel”. He is, no matter the moment of viewing, dangerous. Satan is called a Rebel Angel before his rebellion is depicted in Book V. When Book I opens, Satan is not rebelling. He is no longer the preeminent angel of Heaven with a third of the angelic host behind him. Satan is a war-refugee, driven from Heaven by the ban of God. This violence and his danger (whatever that might have been) is past. He is the banned being, yet he is still called a Rebel Angel indicating that some danger of rebellion still continues on in his being.

What this suggests is that Satan’s being throughout the narrative is connected to the banning action and its pervasive distortion of events. The lens of banning violence through which Power views Enemy Life, is double-sided as a framing device. It confines and it frees. The free side of the frame, God is unobserved but observing. God is placed intractably on the side of justice. As evidence of this, there is the famous invocation:

What in me is dark
Illumin, what is low raise and support;
That to the height of this great Argument
I may assert Eternal Providence, [25]
And justify the ways of God to men. (*Paradise Lost* 1.22-26)

This invocation, in which Milton asks for adequate vision directly prefaces the ban and the sight is that of “Eternal Providence”. What Milton performs by this invocation is a kind of transformation. It synchronizes the view of the events with that of God’s vision. It is a joining of vision with Power. In the previous chapter I have shown in some detail what this vision of God entails: a panoptic enclosing of space, events and world. But what is also implicit is that the reader will never view God through Milton’s depiction. The view is from God toward the rest of creation. Without reflecting backward. The purpose of this entire viewing is to present God’s justice. Between this unwillingness to look at God, and the assumption of God’s point of view for the entirety of the poem, it should not surprise that in the traditional reading of *Paradise Lost*, God is surely just in his ban and Satan is surely evil. It is unthinkable to look backward through the lens of God at God for Milton, it would be an erroneous attempt at idolatry.

But, (as Shelley and Byron would point out) claiming this vision and justice perpetually for worldly Power is not so simple. The ban cannot always be just. But the act is almost always viewed as such by Power and this view is inevitably propagated by its discourse. This has particular importance in the context of the earlier story that Arendt related about Jewish refugees and their banishment and reception. There is clearly a pre-figurative mechanism at work when the SS newspaper, the Schwartz Korps, informs the world that the refugees it is about to encounter are “scum”. The newspaper’s discourse is justifying the ways of Power to man so to speak. It places a lens on the incoming Enemy Life, synchronizing our view of the human being to its own.
What Enemy Life (as a discourse) emphasizes is that the ban is almost always viewed as justice by worldly Power. This idea is introduced in Agamben’s consideration of “Dike” and “Bia”, but Agamben does not investigate the discursive implications of this union. Enemy Life’s Satanic exile describes how this union of justice and violence becomes a political narrative Power pervades. What one can see when the story is told between God and Satan is that even blatantly unjust bans emulate in form the ceremony of the original expulsion of Satan. Banning seems righteous in this context. The use of ban by a sovereign is forcibly connected with justice in the imagination and discourse of the citizenry. Power pre-figures its justice and then sees to it that events appear to reinforce this frame. This connection is sometimes rather heavy-handedly produced and reinforced by propaganda, but this propaganda functions because of a fundamental acceptance that the sovereign ban is the form of justice. This carries on, even and especially when worldly power (perhaps errantly) attempts a self-critique. The lens of the ban remains securely in place: to see one must accept the union of violence and justice. To expel any being, this act of force can only be seen as justice by a Power that views itself consciously or not as the “Monarchy of God”.

This reality reinforces the linkage between the vulnerable war-refugee and the “Rebel Angel” who raised impious war. The extraordinary, “exceptional” violence of the ban, prefigured and prepared to be seen as justice, distorts these two beings into appearing as the same being. What matter if the being actually acts or acted against Power? The mere fact of it being-banned is criminal. This is a consequence of the initial joining of justice and violence from which sovereignty emerges. To put it another way, when Power itself uses violence to assert its origin, it cannot henceforth disjoin its violence from justice. The reality of its violence itself become a kind of blind spot, an occlusion that mars the vision of Power
when it attempts to gaze upon itself or the being it has banned. One can witness this in God’s lack of a relationship with Satan in *Paradise Lost*, nowhere in the 10,000 lines do we witness an interaction between Lucifer and God untainted by the violence which occurred between them. Nowhere does Milton attempt to remove the lens from our viewing of the events. God’s violence is justice throughout.

What this translates into is a certain skepticism on the part of any nation that might receive a war-refugee: what crime of being did these refuges commit that forced their domestic sovereign Power to bring banning Justice against them? The eye of God sees only justice in sovereign violence. This is the unobserving and unobserved freedom granted to Power in its frame of Enemy Life.

**God, Time and the Body**

Before moving to address Enemy Life itself I would address God and posit an obscured ethos. God is the most elusive and influential figure in the ongoing “ceremony of the ban”. It is difficult to characterize Him beyond “the transcendental figure” and the shaper of all-events. Milton goes out of his way to avoid idolatry. But there is some material to infer the ethos God: how and why God views and treats the body of the Enemy.

During the ceremony of the ban, Enemy Life is destroyed with an extraordinary and extreme violence, but the violence and its persistent echoes in Satan’s corrective treatment represents an ethos. The ethos of God is to erase the sin of the Satanic body it has touched during the banning action. This attempt to purify the Satanic body, the very ceremonial violence of the ban, leaves visible marks. These marks remain, as evidence of Power’s violence and its moment of origin. This is an important distinction: for the reality of Power in these marks is that it has an origin which can be viewed. The Satanic body shows the lie
of Power’s benevolence, timelessness and omnipotence. A moment of violence disrupts God’s potentiality.

This relationship between God and the Enemy Body is framed from Agamben’s stance which develops out of Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty.

“The paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order. If the sovereign is truly the one to whom the juridical order grants the power of proclaiming a state of exception and, therefore, of suspending the orders own validity, then “the sovereign stands outside the juridical order and, nevertheless, belongs to it, since it is up to him to decide if the constitution is to be suspended in toto” (Schmitt, *Politische Theologie*, p. 13).

(Homo Sacer 15)

Agamben, following Foucault, also makes an observation regarding how the sovereign prefers to remain in reserve, to preserve perpetually its right to constitute legitimate forms of Power and so remain “exceptional”:

This is why it is so hard to think both a “constitution of potentiality” entirely freed from the principle of sovereignty and a constituting power that has definitively broken the ban binding it to constituted power. That constituting power never exhausts itself in constituted power is not enough: sovereign power can also, as such, maintain itself indefinitely, without ever passing over into actuality. (Homo Sacer 47)

Stemming from this conception of sovereignty, what is of interest is an “origin” for Power. The “origin” is a moment of actual contact between the sovereign and the banned being. The ban is transgressive in this sense, bridging Power and the body. An act like the ban must have consequences for the worldly sovereign in its exception. The problem for such sovereignty is how and how well does it negotiate the transition between potentiality and actuality? How does the sovereign ban and still reserve the use of the ban?

What one can rather more easily see in *Paradise Lost* (rather than philosophical or historical texts) are the issues that arise for Power when it has to break its transcendental
position in order effect its “justice”. Or to put it another way, what is the significance of Power being “forced to use force” or to move from the reserved right to punish into actual punishment during the originary moment?

These questions of potentiality, actuality and sovereign rule seem to place Schmitt and Agamben into conversation with Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Self-Consciousness* and the master/slave dialectic he thinks drives human history. What Hegel demonstrates is the inherent antagonism of the consciousness as it interacts as with another consciousness out of the necessity to “win” freedom for itself:

Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. And it is only through staking one's life that freedom is won… (Hegel 113)

The victor of this struggle to the death becomes the master, the subjugated, the slave, who is destroyed. This struggle and the subjugation of the other consciousness by the master seems to define the Power relation between God and Satan, worldly authority and Enemy Life. What Hegel shows is the destructive nature of this struggle. The original moment of interaction is a rupturing event. It marks the beginning of the master into true self-consciousness just as much as it sublates the slave. One cannot underestimate the effect of the “master” entering into violent conflict with the slave. This violence even, in victory, makes the master, who previous to this original conflict enjoyed a primordial and undifferentiated existence.

Perhaps the most instructive description of the effect of this sovereign violence comes roughly 600 lines into Book I, at a time when Satan in the aftermath of the ban is rallying his fallen angels from their defeat. Milton describes Satan:
...he above the rest
In shape and gesture proudly eminent [ 590 ]
Stood like a Towr; his form had yet not lost
All her Original brightness, nor appear'd
Less then Arch Angel ruind, and th' excess
Of Glory obscur'd: As when the Sun new ris'n
Looks through the Horizontal misty Air [ 595 ]
Shorn of his Beams, or from behind the Moon
In dim Eclips disastrous twilight sheds
On half the Nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes Monarchs. Dark'n'd so, yet shon
Above them all th' Arch Angel: but his face [ 600 ]
Deep scars of Thunder had intrencht, and care
Sat on his faded cheek, but under Browes
Of dauntless courage, and considerate Pride
Waiting revenge: cruel his eye, but cast
Signs of remorse and passion to behold [ 605 ]
The fellows of his crime, the followers rather
(Far other once beheld in bliss) condemn'd (Paradise Lost
1.589-607)

This is a description of Satan, the fallen Angel. But there is way to read this passage
as description of God. One sees Satan through God’s eye, and perhaps there is some
measure of projection in the description. What one hears in “he above the rest,/in shape and
gesture proudly eminent/Stood like a Tower” is a description of not Satan, but God. This is
an accurate description of God’s panoptic sovereignty and as one proceeds through the
passage, the description of Satan’s “glory obscured” and his “deep scars of Thunder” shows
a God who feels some sense of contamination, loss and disfigurement.

When God’s viewing notes the disfigurement of Satan during the ban, He is noting
His own from a position of infinite sovereign potentiality. As Agamben and Schmitt are
suggesting (and Foucault as well in his outlining of the disappearance of punishment into
ideological mechanisms) sovereign power exists most potently when it is in potential, that is
to say when is not striking the ban, but holding in reserve the power of its Thunder. The
observable mark of the “deep scars of thunder” which are prominent on Satan connect God to a particular moment in time when the power to ban had to be used. God, in the moment He had to exile Satan was “forced to use force”. It was this moment, that his supremacy, righteousness and “justice” were established indisputably. But this moment is also disfigurement to God, because it ties Him forever to the Body of Satan, whom he has had to touch and whom shall forever bear the marks of violence on him. This signifies an origin which is, to God, a descent from the infinite time of the transcendental figure. 4

It is an awareness of new impurity that drives the impulse toward correction and treatment of the Enemy in Hell. What one perceives in Satan’s ban, is an outburst of hostility toward the body of the banned being on the part of the sovereign. From the first violence, the sovereign sees in the body of the banned being evidence, that they are no longer infinite and entirely outside the system. This is a critical aspect of the use of Power in its real-world iterations. Being able to point to Power’s moment of origin allows one to identify its existence as conditional, temporal and perhaps only just (and more likely injust) within a context. A moment of origin, the use of a ban, denies Power the ability to regulate its ideology out of view. The ban is always, a spectacular disruption and disclosure of true Power relations.

It is because of this reality that the treatment of such banned beings becomes an effort at annihilation, further purification and erasure. The treatment of Satan, the treatment of Enemy Life is one that pursues a disintegrative effect. The use of cleansing fire, the like

4 It is this reality that aligns rather precisely and revealingly with the Western tradition as it has emerged from the Platonic idea. The problem is and always has been the form, the body which can never correspond to the idea and whose comparison, whose contact with the idea shows the imperfection of both.
the use of a flail or whip against the heretic or the non-believer rends the flesh of the banned being, as if, at some point, when the body’s total disappearance from visibility or recognizably as animate life occurs, the first use of contaminating violence would disappear. This is the corrective treatment that God immerses Satan in by casting him in the Lake of Fire. It is also what God’s view of the Enemy continually gestures to: the Enemy becomes less and less human with each moment both further from God and less angelic. Thus body of Satan over the course of the narrative eventually disappears entirely from what it was and Satan becomes the serpent. Overtly this is a commentary on Satan, but one must perceive the distancing as an Act of God if indeed it is God’s view that frames the narrative. Understanding this ethos leads into the next section which details the carceral and corrective existence of Enemy Life.

**Criminal Pride and Madness: The Being of Enemy Life**

**The Resubstantiation of Spectacular Correction**

Enemy Life, Satan in exile, comes into being during the ban and it is, according to Power, a criminal state of being. What happens to this being after the ban? How does Power continue to perceive Enemy Life as dangerous even when such a being is clearly without means? How does Power treat Enemy because of this supposed danger? The answers appear in the “treatment” of Satan’s paradoxical complications and inherent resistance. There is a strange reckoning, a dismissive diagnosis that he is both criminally prideful and blasphemously delusional. Satan is a conflation of the criminal and madmen. Through this lens, Enemy Life’s actions, certainly those of resistance, but even those which may be assimilative or benign are “blasphemous”. Criminal, mad in simply being-itself, Enemy Life, is being-from-the-ban, built upon the “sin” of pride to the point of hubris, parody and irreconcilability.
Michel Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Madness* has theorized the exilic figure in this way, showing the crime in madness and the madness in the correction of crime. He places the ban alongside the carceral figures he considers. Foucault is also quite clear that the madman and the criminal are linked conceptually by their confinement and treatment.

In the world of confinement, madness neither explains nor excuses anything: it enters into a complicity with evil to multiply it and render it more insistent and dangerous, lending it ever new faces. (*History of Madness* 135)

Foucault’s observation in the chapter “Stultifera Navis” in *History of Madness* seems to highlight the impulse for society to banish the madman. In the 15th century, madman were imprisoned or put upon “ships of fools” to be forgotten and the details are rather proleptic of Agamben’s description of the banishment of *homo sacer*.

…the mad were brought in considerable numbers by merchants and river boatmen, and there (on board the ship of fools) thereby cleansing their home town of their presence…a place of pilgrimage that became a place of confinement, a holy land where madness awaited its deliverance but where it seems that man enacted the ancient ritual of division…All of which indicates that the departure of the mad belonged with other rituals of exile. (*History of Madness* 10)

This impulse to banish Foucault clearly retained from his earlier work, *Discipline and Punish*. In that work, it is more apparent that the imprisoning of the criminal is an act of banishment, creating at the center of a society, a carceral space. The imprisonment further develops our knowledge of the banned being under the eye of Power. One sees the “correction” of the criminal through means of various forms of torture and cruel and unusual punishment as well as the institution of a strict regimen of “instructive” activity. This correction was designed to castigate the prisoner, to free the criminal from their sinful pride and educate the observers of
the dangers of criminality, intimated by the inclusion of confessors at scenes of execution.

Foucault notably recounts the corrective measure taken against a regicide, Damiens:

…the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with Sulphur, and on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and Sulphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes… the excessive pain him utter horrible cries, and often repented: “My God, have pity on me! Jesus help me!” The spectators were edified by the solicitude of the parish priest of St. Paul’s, who despite his great age, did not spare himself in offering consolation to the patient. (Discipline and Punish 3)

In this beyond grisly and inhuman treatment, (which involves cleansing fire) there is a shadow of the all too human brutality in Satan’s own early reception in Hell:

Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace
And rest can never dwell, hope never comes
That comes to all; but torture without end
Still urges, and a fiery Deluge, fed
With ever-burning Sulphur unconsum’d… (Paradise Lost 1.65-69)

This is and was the treatment of the criminal: in the center stage of the social order an annihilative banishment. This, Foucault suggests, moved out of visibility over the course of the 18th, 19th and 20th Century. But in the present moment, the spectacle of correction is becoming once more a staple of the culture. One sees this in the proliferation of reality shows that focus the viewer’s eye on the treatment of prisoners in American correctional facilities. There appears a kind of fascination and awe generated in the public by witnessing the cramped living conditions, the dangers of murder and rape and the abuse of the guards. One might point to the vaudeville antics of President Trump as he castigates those that disappoint, denounce him or betray him, and in the extreme instances of (cyber)bullying which target the exposed people of Western
society. Perhaps a mere Panoptic ideology has become too subtle to inspire the American imagination.

One can (perhaps) look back upon the grievous treatment of the criminal and see injustice meted out by Power, and see the impossibility of a sufficient confession or correction. But nothing could have saved Damiens and it is equally impossible to imagine how Satan, the bringer of war to heaven, could be pardoned. This impossibility of correction is a reality one must grasp to truly formulate the circumstance of Enemy Life. The crime and the criminal are synonymous. The distinction between act and actor is erased in the lens of Power. Satan’s treatment illuminates this reality throughout in *Paradise Lost*. Power sees and sees to it that: “…with reiterated crimes he [Satan] might/ Heap on himself damnation.”

Satan, in this way, appears as a criminal whose part in the plan of God is to be, and be observed in “criminal behavior” providing a lesson in correction to the “good citizen”. As Foucault notes later in *Discipline and Punish*, this is the ideal point of penalty:

> The ideal point of penalty today would be an indefinite discipline: an interrogation without end, an investigation that would be extended without limit to meticulous end and ever analytical observation, a judgement that would at the same time be the constitution of a file, be interlaced with the ruthless curiosity of an examination, a procedure that would be at the same the permanent measure of a gap in relation to an inaccessible norm and the asymptotic movement that strives to meet infinity. (*Discipline and Punish* 227)

This is precisely Satan’s condition from the moment of the ban. The Enemy is not granted relief, status, humanity, he is merely observed and his further crimes are catalogued. Adam is redeemed, Jesus is never parted from God’s favor, but there is no opportunity granted to Satan for him to free himself from damnation or receive any sort of pardon for his sin. He is permanently criminal, permanently under observation and torturous, demeaning correction.
Alongside this reality of a criminal, who has the use of his “reason”, the situation of correction that more aptly describes Enemy Life is that of the “madman” who has often been “treated” just as harshly as the criminal. Throughout *History of Madness* Foucault describes the brutal therapies and corrective regimens which supposedly would “cure” madness. In the chapter “Doctor and Patients” he details a “purification” treatment for madness and its ethos:

The dream was of a total purification, the simplest but also the most impossible of cures…Corruption, however, was not simply to be prevented, it was to be destroyed as well. For that reason, there were therapeutics that attacked the changes themselves, and sought either to change the course of the corrupted matter or to dissolve the corrupting substances; techniques of diversion, and techniques of cleansing…physical methods that tended to lacerate the surface of the body…a similar effect could be achieved by burning and cauterizing the body. (*History of Madness* 310)

One notes the tendency toward a purification ritual in the treatment of the banned being, the madman. The cauterization of the body should recall Satan’s fiery fall. The dissolving and lacerating treatments highlight Power’s attitude toward the inherently “corrupt” or sinful body: it must be destroyed to restore Power’s purity. It is not insignificant that madness is a kind of contagion or infectious disease. It justifies the use of a camp, makes it appear a quarantine, links the banned being with a biological danger and this in turn makes madness appear more criminal.

Inside the practice of “medical” confinement, is the further difficulty for the madman: he or she is given less or even no opportunity to confess. The confessor is the doctor administering the treatment and this doctor is the same instrument of Power who performed the diagnosis of “madman”. As Foucault points out, the mad must be brought to Reason, the doctor must pronounce them “cured”. This corresponds quite well with the role God plays in *Paradise Lost*: Satan is not cured but Adam is restored to his “reason”. The “mad” are almost entirely reliant on
Power to recognize their “correction” to grant them sanity, reason and indeed humanity. These, attributes, sanity, reason, humanity, become framed as their redemption and this simple humanity remains withheld if their correction is insufficient. This is perhaps the more authentic view of Enemy Life in our time: the being who is apart from Power is not simply criminal, he or she is “mad” and less-than-human in being-apart.

When one sees Enemy Life as a “madman” in Power’s asylum as much as a “criminal” in a prison, correction may be truly impossible for the exile. What the diagnosis of “madman” emphasizes is Power as the diagnostician. Madness is seen into every act. This is quite pronounced in Paradise Lost: all of Satan’s actions are seen as delusions and in “reality” his agency is subordinated to the will and plan of God. Satan’s primary “delusion” is that he is the equal of God. Milton crafts this state using the words “pride” and “sin” to indicate the blasphemous criminality of this delusion and associating it with the justice of the ban.

Th' infernal Serpent; he it was, whose guile
Stird up with Envy and Revenge, deceiv’d [ 35 ]
The Mother of Mankind, what time his Pride
Had cast him out from Heav'n, with all his Host
Of Rebel Angels, by whose aid aspiring
To set himself in Glory above his Peers,
He trusted to have equal’d the most High, (Paradise Lost 1.34-40)

It is with this first invocation that Satan’s pride becomes his dominant trait and his most persistent delusion in the poem. Every further action and decision that Satan undertakes references his pride, which hides from him the truth and presents an alternative reality. It is the occlusion through which he views the world. But it is Milton, seeing through God’s eyes in the moment of the ban that first call Satan “prideful”.

Satan’s pride might be thought self-awareness and his attempt to establish his own agency in his life. He consciously, because he is conscious (in a way that Adam and Eve are not
early on), struggles against the chartered progress of his life. There seems to be aspect of being-apart in Satan’s pride. Heidegger in *Being and Time* frames this concept as the “disclosedness” and “thrownness” of *Dasein* and in so doing shows conscious apartness an essential aspect of human existence. The potential for being called a madman by Power is always a risk for the human being. The human being’s self-awareness and apartness aggravates and provokes Power. This is especially relevant to figures of resistance and the refugee, but also materially connects these “peripheral” figures with all of humanity. Being-apart becomes an act of pride and an act of pride becomes a proof of madness to Power. The implication is that the human being who is “apart” is mad and enemy to Power. As Heidegger frames it, there is no other way to be for human beings. Life is Enemy to Power.

Developing this framing of delusive pride, there is a moment which shortly follows the ban wherein Satan lifts himself off the lake of fire.

So stretcht out huge in length the Arch-fiend lay
Chain’d on the burning Lake, nor ever thence
Had ris’n or heav’d his head, but that the will
And high permission of all-ruling Heaven… (*Paradise Lost* 1.209-212).

Satan then battles through the horrid winds that whip against the lake of fire to the banks of Hell.

Forthwith upright he rears from off the Pool/
His mighty Stature; on each hand the flames/
Drivn backward slope thir pointing spires, and rowld/
In billows, leave i’th’ midst a horrid Vale (*Paradise Lost* 1.221-224)

Clearly, a moment of the refugee, this is also moment in which one might be tempted to compare Satan to Homer’s Achilles fighting the river. There is in Satan’s action a kind of nobility, a defiant striving (to borrow later Romantic language) against the horrendous situation of life he has been consigned to. But the lens of the “high-permission of all ruling heaven” denies
Satan agency, makes it a parody of the earlier epic. If he has raised his head, it is because God has allowed it as part of his further treatment, if he battles the scorching winds it is a battle quite in vain. Satan, however, believes that it is he who has performed this act of resistance.

Satan’s delusion, his blasphemous pride, is that he can oppose or even resist Power. This “truth” must inform any further conception of a social ideology. Power’s lens creates an ideology in which the possibility of resistance or disruption is framed as a mistaken criminal delusion.⁵

One sees this same repetition and elision of “delusional, criminal being” carried out over and over again throughout Paradise Lost. Satan does not perceive the truth of God and his delusions become more pronounced as his correction continues. He believes in himself and hence becomes further delusional, and blasphemous. What this results in is two parallel realities which appear at the same time but whose content is quite differing. At one point Satan attempts to come to grips with his new reality in Hell:

Is this the Region, this the Soil, the Clime,  
Said then the lost Arch-Angel, this the seat  
That we must change for Heav’n, this mournful gloom  
For that celestial light? Be it so, since he [ 245 ]  
Who now is Sovran can dispose and bid  
What shall be right: fardest from him is best  
Whom reason hath equald, force hath made supream  
Above his equals. Farewel happy Fields  
Where Joy for ever dwells: Hail horours, hail [ 250 ]  
Infernal world, and thou profoundest Hell  
Receive thy new Possessor: One who brings  
A mind not to be chang’d by Place or Time.  
The mind is its own place, and in it self

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⁵ This sense of Power that resistance is blasphemous delusion is clearly present in the American discourse of exile. The narrative of most popular protests, including the Occupy Wall Street movement and even the Standing Rock Oil Pipeline protest was that this resistance while perhaps well-meaning was, ultimately, delusional and destined to be “fruitless”. Greg Gutfeld, a Fox News contributor succinctly makes this point. He presented story in which he claimed the Occupy Wall Street Movement which he calls “a soiled diaper”, an “infantile agitation” and “an orgy of trash, vandalism, drugs and assault” and Bernie Sanders belong together because Sanders represents someone “who spent decades living in a world untethered to reality or history”(Gutfeld).
Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n. [ 255 ]
What matter where, if I be still the same,
And what I should be, all but less then he
Whom Thunder hath made greater? Here at least
We shall be free; th' Almighty hath not built
Here for his envy, will not drive us hence: [ 260 ]
Here we may reign secure, and in my choyce
To reign is worth ambition though in Hell:
Better to reign in Hell, then serve in Heav'n. (Paradise Lost 1.242-264)

This speech would not be out of place in a clinic for the “madman”. Viewed through the
eyes of Power it can only be seen as progressively delusional because Power is seeing pride in
Satan. Satan is still in the immediate aftermath of his banishment and for a moment he seems to
be dealing with his new reality. The is supposedly the effect of the corrective regimen of Hell.
But then, after the lines: “Be it so, since he /Who now is Sovran can dispose and bid/What shall
be right: fardest from him is best/Whom reason hath equald, force hath made supream /Above
his equals.” wherein Satan seems to be quite close to admitting his madness and beginning his
correction, Satan seems to dive again toward a delusion. He swerves away in exodus (Farewel…) from God and his reason, embraces Hell as his new kingdom, and claims that the experience has
not changed him at all. “A mind not to be chang’d by Place or Time/The mind is its own place,
and in it self/ Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.” This appears as delusional and
strangely, willfully so. It seems that Satan is choosing this blasphemous delusion to Power. It
indicates (to re-purpose our Fox News contributor’s language) a mind “untethered to reality”. It is
the ultimate delusion to Power for someone to prefer to “reign in Hell, then serve in Heaven”
for it confounds and conflates the most evident truth of being. It parodies Reason with Unreason
(to use Foucault’s language) and this far from being a way to investigate reality becomes a site
for condemnation. Thus this speech, read in this way, becomes a mark of Satan’s pride and his
inability to accept the fact that God has won and is in every way his superior. This speech read in
this way is precisely the view of Enemy Life that Power holds. Yhe figure of resistance is so close to being-brought-to-reason in their criminal madness but insolently willfully choses not to be treated for their condition. Hence the frustration of Power and the increased severity of their correction.

There is an alternative way to read this speech. If one does not immediately accept Power’s view that Satan is delusional and criminal for his opposition to God, then the speech becomes resonant with a figure of resistance attempting to negotiate for himself a new situation for his being. Satan appears as a refugee struggling with the ban: “fardest from him is best”. There is an inescapable pathos in the lines: this the seat/ That we must change for Heav’n, this mournful gloom /For that celestial light.” Satan appears to make the best of an intolerable condition and regain some sense of self in the Sulphurous treatment of Hell. In this reading, Satan appears to be quite human. His suffering in exodus is real. His sense of being-displaced is evident. And his “delusions” appear the kind of lies to oneself that one feels one has to tell in order to continue living at all. The lines “Here at least: We shall be free; th’ Almighty hath not built/ Here for his envy, will not drive us hence:/ Here we may reign secure…” would not seem out of place if one were informed that a Native American spoke them after having been driven out onto a reservation. Thus Satan is authentically being-in-exile, and the exile appears as Enemy Life.

The distinctness of the two readings of the same speech is telling. What does not change, what is common in both, is the pride of Satan. In the traditional reading, pride is the source of sin and the source of Satan’s delusion. But in the alternative reading, pride is the aspect of Satan which allows him to continue, to resist and this is a human quality. Power’s issue rendered quite clearly: it does not permit being to be in disobedience, to be “proud” of its apartness which is to
present apartness at all. Apartness must be criminal madness. The strangeness of the situation is that it is Power’s ban that reinforces and makes permanent this “criminal, delusional” being-apart. Pride is a blasphemy. Pride is madness, because God’s justice is absolute and assured. This is Satan’s “delusion” and this is precisely the danger built into the representation of the exile as a carceral figure or a figure of resistance. Resistance is delusionary in the eyes of Power. As Foucault puts it in particular resonance with Satan’s depiction by Power:

“The madman is the other in relation to the others, the other, in the sense of an exception, amongst others, in the sense of the universal…the madman is self-evidently mad, but his madness stands out against a backdrop of the outside world, and the relation defines him, exposes him wholly, through objective comparisons, to the gaze of reason…The madman becomes relative, the better be stripped of his powers, once that uncanny presence within, perilously close…lurking in the heart of reason, he is now expelled to a different realm, where the danger he presents is disarmed” (History of Madness 181).

This is the treatment of Satan, the delusionary criminal of being: a quarantine and a slow stripping away of his powers and pride. Most astoundingly, this is the treatment of the being who is simply apart and war-refugee. The figure of Enemy Life, who displays no objective signs of madness, is treated as a mad by Power because it is delusion, pride, blasphemy to present resistance to Power even in simply being.

**Parody and Assimilation**

The elision of the criminal and the madman is Satanic frame of exile, the being of Enemy Life, and now one can return to the original issue that Hannah Arendt raised in *Origins of Totalitarianism*. Why is it possible for Power to frame the exile as the scum of the earth and why does it do so? Clearly, the elision of criminal and madman embodied in the resistant-by-being exile presents part of the answer. But another part of the reality is that Satan’s actions might not definitively be considered resistance but, parodically, an attempt at assimilation. In the
construction of the palace of Pandemonium in Hell, it becomes clear that if resistance appears mad and criminal to Power, then equally assimilation also appears blasphemous, evil, idolatrous and defiantly parodic. Assimilation appears to negate the force of the ban and introduce an “undue” complication into the visual field of Power. This is a destruction of Power’s ability to overview not only the exiles within its boundaries, but also the “good citizens” who proffer worship and obedience.

The moments wherein Satan communicates his intent to “reign in Hell” and to subvert God’s rule is where one might suppose the problem of Satan’s being exists. But it is an occluded view to think that the exile is always a willful, resistant figure. Hannah Arendt in her essay “We Refugees” presents another kind of difficulty for the exile: assimilation in their new “home”. “We wanted to rebuild our lives, that was all. In order to rebuild one’s life one has be strong and an optimist. So we are very optimistic”(We Refugees). Going on, Arendt writes after cataloguing all that the refugee has lost she conveys the uncertainty of re-situation and adaptation to a new home:

“Nevertheless, as soon as were saved-and most of us had to be saved several times-we started our new lives and tried to follow as closely as possible all the good advice our saviors passed on to us. We were told to forget; and we forgot quicker than anybody could imagine… The more optimistic of among us would even that their whole former life had been passed in a kind of unconscious exile and only their new country now taught them what a home really looked like. (We Refugees 111)

This passage communicates the earnest desire for Jewish refugees to re-create themselves in their new homes in France, Britain and America, to become “good Americans”, good citizens. This would seem to place the refugee in precisely the position Power desires for its prospective citizens: ready to be redeemed, under its gaze. But there is suspicion in the Western nation-states that receive these refugees. A partial explanation for this phenomenon is the distorting effect of
the ban on Power’s view, its inability to accurately see (or resolve) the exilic, transgressive figure. This inability to see the fine details of simple human being is what first causes the problem in the relation between Power and Enemy Life. But there is more to this problem, which Satan presents.

There is a passage of Book I wherein Satan and his followers construct the Palace of Pandemonium. The construction of the palace begins on line 670 and ends roughly with the end of Book I in line 798. In the description, Milton conveys the decadence of the construction and the blasphemous impiety the palace represents. He shows the horrid criminal delusion of the Rebel Angels: even in their corrective confinement they would continue to blaspheme. In so doing, he invokes comparisons to the Tower of Babel and speaks of how Satan and his devil’s palace outshine even the works of the richest kings, connecting the Rebel Angels idolatry with fallen humanity’s.

This judgment on the construction develops from God’s lens. But there is a more intricate way of reading this passage: this construction is not immediately tied with Satan’s stated goal of continued resistance to Power. It is an act that appears somewhat spontaneously.

There stood a Hill not far whose grisly top [ 670 ]
Belch'd fire and rowling smoak; the rest entire
Shon with a glossie scurff, undoubted sign
That in his womb was hid metallic Ore,
The work of Sulphur. (Paradise Lost 1.670-674)

Milton proceeds to frame the construction a blasphemy, having Mammon, the embodiment of greed, lead a devilish engineering corps to excavate the site. But if one sets aside the supposed blasphemy of Satan and considers the act of building Pandemonium, it appears a form of emulation of God’s tactics of observation. The Rebel Angels construct within their own space a palace from which they may survey their new home. They reproduce by artifice the
“natural” panopticism of God, re-establishing an orderly hierarchy in Hell via the same architect that made towers in Heaven:

The hasty multitude [ 730 ]
Admiring enter’d, and the work some praise
And some the Architect: his hand was known
In Heav’n by many a Towred structure high,
Where Scepter’d Angels held thir residence,
And sat as Princes, whom the supreme King [ 735 ]
Exalted to such power, and gave to rule,
Each in his Hierarchie, the Orders bright. (Paradise Lost 1.730-737)

The act not directly initiated toward resistance or further rebellion. It occurs because of opportunity and an impulse to recreate heaven’s hierarchy. This is an interiorization of one of the fundamental tenets of God’s rule: overview and enclosure. Thus, the construction of Pandemonium recalls the lines Milton used to build the Edenspace and its natural wall.

The most noticeable difference between these two constructions is the apparent “naturalness” of each. Eden’s walls are a construction of soothing natural beauty which produces an “authentic” desire for piety to God. Hell’s Pandemonium is a tower of golden artifice that blasphemes in desiring worship for itself. But the walls of Eden and God’s view into the Edenspace perform the same organizational task of “Empire” that Satan’s palace of Pandemonium performs in Hell. Both constructions point toward a shared conception of how to distribute Power. This artifice conforms and emulates the essence of the original structure. There is a mistaken piety, a false worship directed not only to the Rebel Angels themselves but also to God’s mechanism. Milton’s much condemned idolatry is an aberrant form of assimilation, the Rebel Angels are showing the “truth” of God’s Power by emulating it. This is (Foucault argues) the natural internalization of the Panoptic ideology, the reproduction of the means of surveillance into a disciplinary society.
At the other extreme, with panopticism, is the disciplinary-mechanism: a functional mechanism that improves the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for society to come. (Discipline and Punish 209)

Foucault points to a society where internalized panopticism creates a self-regulating subject. But despite this attempt to self-regulate, the construction is problematic for Power. Satan’s structure, a blasphemous artifice, shows the parody of the original “truth” and Power of God. The desired self-regulation is a blasphemy. In this paradox, one may say to blaspheme is the sincerest form of prayer. Blasphemy is on some level acknowledging and admitting the “truth” of Power. But blasphemy is least accepted form of piety to Power. Power searches the act of conformity and finds that the assimilation is insufficient. Such assimilation would seem undo the work of the ban, readmitting Enemy Life into the realm of the recognizable and the grievable. To admit that Enemy Life through its own actions might negate the effect of the ban is not an acceptable state of affairs for Power. The potential or possibility of assimilation introduces too many complications too many uncertainties of the included being. If Power has banned, it must then reserve the right to lift the ban.

A mere show of obedience, the building of Pandemonium in almost unconscious worship does not satisfy Power. Power requires a penetrative, pervasive and total restructuring of being, requires absolute assuredness that its worship is authentic. It requires the kind of prostration that one sees from Adam in Books X and XI. Satan’s non-serviam remains the last words he has spoken and without the obsequious display of penitence, Power remains unmoved and unwilling to re-admit Enemy Life to human being.

This concept of problematized obedience and the suspicion of worship is interwoven with Satan’s being. Satan wishes to be God throughout Paradise Lost because God is the Power Satan
desires to embody. All of Satan’s being, his speech, thoughts, his emotions, his unconscious drives they are focused, fervently (and perhaps Freudianly) on God. Satan’s obsession with God, in its own way represents a parody of worship. The critical difference is that Satan’s worship is problematized. As opposed to Adam who, akin to the Kantian subject, obeys freely, Satan’s parodic and often disruptive “obedience” struggles to determine his subjectivity. If Satan does obey, it certainly not because he wishes to.

Perhaps the best moment to observe this problematized, parodic “obedience” and its “danger” is prior to the infiltration scene. In two speeches Satan has something akin to a questioning introspection on whether or not he should continue on his course of corrupting and destroying mankind. These speeches begin in line 32 in Book 4 upon his first entrance into Eden and then upon seeing the human beings for the first time at line 358.

In the first speech, one sees a moment where Satan considers how easy it would be to repent and seek reconciliation:

What could be less then to afford him [God] praise,
The easiest recompence, and pay him thanks,
How due! yet all his good prov'd ill in me,
And wrought but malice; lifted up so high
I sdeind subjection, and thought one step higher [ 50 ]
Would set me highest… (Paradise Lost 4.45-51)

This is a being in a mode of questioning, which has not settled on itself. Within this same speech, Satan turns away from repentance and attempt to reestablish a sense of self and self-determination:

…O had his powerful Destiny ordaind
Me some inferiour Angel, I had stood
Then happie; no unbounded hope had rais'd [ 60 ]
Ambition… (Paradise Lost 4.58-61)
Satan then appears to truly alternate or at least meditate on both courses and then in despair as much as his “disdain” he chooses to continue on:

…Me miserable! which way shall I flie
Infinite wrauth, and infinite despaire?
Which way I flie is Hell; my self am Hell; [ 75 ]
And in the lowest deep a lower deep
Still threatning to devour me opens wide,
To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heav'n.
O then at last relent: is there no place
Left for Repentance, none for Pardon left? [ 80 ]
None left but by submission; and that word
Disdain forbids me, and my dread of shame
Among the Spirits beneath… (Paradise Lost 4.73-83)

The language Satan uses to describe his condition is particularly telling. Wherever he flies is Hell, for he is Hell embodied, Hell in being, a paradoxical state, an uncertain one and one that Power only “solves” by discarding the notion that it can address it. Power simply uses Satan’s being as a tool for another being’s narrative. After choosing his inevitable course Satan seems to realize his new condition his new (de-)situation of exile:

This knows my punisher; therefore as farr
From granting hee, as I from begging peace:
All hope excluded thus, behold in stead [105 ]
Of us out-cast, exil'd, his new delight,
Mankind created, and for him this World.
So farewell Hope, and with Hope farewell Fear,
Farewel Remorse: all Good to me is lost;
Evil be thou my Good. (Paradise Lost 4.103-110)

Satan, despite what he thinks, despite his obsession, resistance and defiance, is following the events God has laid out. But the blasphemy one reads into Satan’s meditation is found in awareness that Satan does not perform in pious obedience to God. He is not willfully, totally God’s agent. It is not even that he dis-obey, it is that Power perceives that his obedience is
forced and coordinated transcendentally. This is the true dis-obedience of Satan: he renders the usual acts of obedience as parody.

Satan infiltrates the Edenspace and spies Adam and Eve. This provokes a crisis in Satan and he speaks to himself first in an admiration for humanity which must seem strange coming from the Enemy:

Creatures of other mould, earth-born perhaps, [ 360 ]
Not Spirits, yet to hea'nyli Spirits bright
Little inferior; whom my thoughts pursue
With wonder, and could love, so lively shines
In them Divine resemblance, and such grace
The hand that formd them on thir shape hath pourd... (Paradise Lost 4.360-365)

This view causes Satan to waiver, perhaps more subtly this time but it is a pause and this part of the passage is not unlike similar scenes in Macbeth and Othello. Satan seems to here be searching for both mettle (like “bold” Macbeth) and motive (like the Satanic precursor Iago):

...Happie, but for so happie ill secur'd [ 370 ]
Long to continue, and this high seat your Heav'n
Ill fenc't for Heav'n to keep out such a foe
As now is enterd; yet no purpos'd foe
To you whom I could pittie thus forlorne
Though I unpittied: League with you I seek, [ 375 ]
And mutual amitie so streight, so close,
That I with you must dwell, or you with me
Henceforth; my dwelling haply may not please
Like this fair Paradise, your sense, yet such
Accept your Makers work; he gave it me, [ 380 ]
Which I as freely give; Hell shall unfold,
To entertain you two, her widest Gates, (Paradise Lost 4.370-382)

Satan is shoring up his resolve: why would Satan need to call himself “unpittied” if he felt nothing for the human beings? There also anxiety in Satan’s attempt to bring Adam and Eve to dwell with him. Satan desires to share the same dwelling these well-provided creatures. One should note the language of transgression and security, home and exile at play in “happie ill
secured”, “ill’fenced, “dwelling” and “Paradise”. Satan’s being is quite desituated and this points to the reality which lays at the heart of Enemy Life’s problematic Power relations: Power cannot solve the fundamental uncertainty of human being. Despite its many structures, investigations and ideological configurations, human being is exilic and simultaneously Enemy. Satan’s hesitation to obey and his unwillingness to serve show, in parody, this reality to Power.

After this hesitation, Satan goes forth. There is an indication of obedience but this act is hardly satisfactory to Power. The fear for Power is that Satan’s parody, his blasphemy, his transgression is contagious. This is a danger that Power perceives, even though it has consistently presented a frame that everything that is proceeding according to a pre-determined plan. This intolerance toward an uncertainty of being, toward disobedience is carried over into God’s treatment of Adam and Eve after the temptation. How have they disobeyed if it is truly God’s tragedy? At most they have presented only internal disobedience: their actions are in accordance with God’s will. Satan’s blasphemy introduces doubt into the apprehension of Power: can acts of piety and worship on the part of even its citizens be trusted?

This is the issue in the conclusion of Satan’s speech. Satan obeys God’s plan, but he does with a blasphemous being:

Thank him who puts me loath to this revenge  
On you who wrong me not for him who wrong'd.  
And should I at your harmless innocence  
Melt, as I doe, yet public reason just,  
Honour and Empire with revenge enlarg'd, [ 390 ]  
By conquering this new World, compels me now  
To do what else though damnd I should abhorre. (Paradise Lost 4.385-392)

Despite Satan’s internal struggle before bringing about the fall, one notes his “compulsion” toward revenge upon God, which obeys the design of God. This is ultimately,
compliance. But it is an insufficient compliance and this marks him as the Enemy. Power intuits that Satan, if he were able to adequately resist and rebel from the divine plan would do so.

This inherent resistance becomes built into the palace of Pandemonium. God ascertains that if Power could be constructed in any other way, the devils might design it, but Power’s form is compulsory and so the devils’ emulation is blasphemous. The building of Pandemonium does not begin from a position of willful resistance. Pandemonium is built out of necessity of a meeting place. Yet Power sees it resistance and parody and this is because it is Satan and his Rebel Angels performing the act. Power sees into the act itself the paradoxical resistant being of the Enemy.

This problem is what Agamben addresses in *The Use of Bodies.* He argues that the human being is most naturally conceived as in a being-in potential, when it is not prescribed by actions. “form-of life is a being of potential not only or not so much because it can do or not do, succeed or fail, lose itself or find itself, but above all because it is its potential and coincides with it” (*The Use of Bodies* 208). Political reality is defined by the elimination of this potential, leaving only the figure of bare life as the final remaining and exilic form of life.

It is also above all because in the meantime bare life, which was the hidden foundation of sovereignty, has everywhere become the dominant form of life. Life, in the state of exception that has become normal, is the bare life that in all spheres separates forms of life from their cohesion into a form-of-life (*The Use of Bodies* 209).

Power’s viewing of the building of Pandemonium is an act which denies Satan his potential to be his own, apart. It is in this way the “being” and “form” of parodic assimilation is depicted in Milton’s text. The depiction is elegant: Satan’s being and Satan’s structure, Pandemonium are essentially the same, they are being-apart and a structural parody of piety. But it is this kind of problematic assimilation that Power perceives in the attempts of the worldly
exile to assimilate into its society. The Satan exile attempts to prove themselves a good citizen seem only a blasphemous, idolatrous, parody of assimilation to Power.

This is the lasting problem that Arendt’s refugees encountered in their struggle to find new home countries, the same problem that the “Dreamers” face today during the Trump Administration’s tenure. The “Dreamers” are a population of about 800,000 who were brought into the United States at a young age usually under 16 from various countries, often Mexico, Latin and South America. Most have grown up in the United States and speak English as their first language. They have assimilated as well as perhaps any immigrant can, complied with federal laws and subjected themselves to identifying themselves to the American government.

Yet President Trump, through his proxy, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, has seen fit to declare that their protection under the law from deportation rescinded. The stance of the Administration was appropriately paradoxical. In one moment, the Attorney General claimed that the DACA program that allowed the Dreamers to stay was causing humanitarian problems on the national borders. In the next, President Trump stated that he had compassion for the young people who were affected by his decision and did not want to “throw them out” because they were “good, educated and accomplished young people who have jobs, some serving in the military?” (DACA Judge…) What this speaks to is the viewing of the Dreamers’ efforts to assimilate as a parody or a blasphemy of the behavior of “good citizens”. Despite the fact that so many Dreamers have gone on to become productive members of American society, they are viewed with a suspicion of the “worship” they seem to offer.

Power views the Dreamers’ fervency to assimilate transformed into the same parodic blasphemy as Pandemonium’s construction. The exile’s industry appears as something sinister
and exploitative. The Rebel Angels’, the Dreamers’ work appears to erode some vital part of the world they inhabit.

Ransack’d the Center, and with impious hands
Rifl’d the bowels of thir mother Earth
For Treasures better hid. Soon had his crew
Op’nd into the Hill a spacious wound
And dig’d out ribs of Gold. Let none admire [ 690 ]
That riches grow in Hell; that soyle may best
Deserve the precious bane. (Paradise Lost 1.686-692)

This is the same vitriol that Mr. Sessions deployed when he announced the end of DACA:

The effect of this unilateral executive amnesty, among other things, contributed to a surge of unaccompanied minors on the southern border that yielded terrible humanitarian consequences. It also denied jobs to hundreds of thousands of Americans by allowing those same jobs to go to illegal aliens. (Jeff Sessions Spews…)

The Dreamers’ effort to assimilate their desire to work and contribute was transformed into a transgression, a sin, a blasphemy. Their “Dreaming” mocked the American Dream of the good citizen. If they were working, it was to exploit their nation, if they were toiling it was to build a blasphemous community and temple. Clearly, this comments more upon Power than Enemy Life. It is a projection of Power’s own exploitation of the world. The devil’s work is linked with humanity’s later corrupted and corrupting toil, for the passage moves into a comparison with Babel. This is the problem for the Enemy in its relation with Power. Its attempt to assimilate is parodic in a way that reveals the truth of Power’s means and expectations.

6 In fact, Milton’s passage resonates quite loudly with Heidegger’s problematizing of Power and its heavy handed technological graspings for the truth of world and being, in his essay “The Question Concerning Technology”.
One comes to appreciate the paradoxical problem of Enemy Life: the ban expels and attempts to purify and correct, but effect of the correction, so vigorously pursued by Power is suspected. There is hardly an act of worship, of service paid to ideology, that can convince Power that Enemy has been brought to Reason. So thoroughly is Enemy Life viewed as criminally mad and blasphemous in being that attempts at assimilation and even emulation are seen as parodic impiety.

**The Loyal and Pursuing Angels**

To close this chapter and its exploration of Enemy Life as it is defined by Satan’s correction and treatment, I want to gesture to the last figure involved in Milton’s depiction, the loyal angels of God who waged sanctified war and pursued Satan as he falls. The loyal angels are not given much personality or subjectivity. They are the sterile instruments of God, carrying out his orders as if they were automatons. Little notice is given to this beings, but I would bring into view a few passages which detail their existence. The nature of a loyal and pursuing angel, who furthers the ban and continually emulates it, seems to be rather representative of the subjectivity that Power would inculcate in the human being through its discourse. During Milton’s time and context, one might well be able to conceive the human being in Adamic terms. But it may be that the being of the loyal and pursuing angels is the coming being according to Power’s plan.

The first passage that characterizes the loyal angel in *Paradise Lost* is found early in Book I, during a speech that Satan gives to his fellow fallen angels in Hell:

…But see the angry Victor hath recall’d His Ministers of vengeance and pursuit [ 170 ] Back to the Gates of Heav’n The Sulphurous Hail Shot after us in storm, oreblown hath laid The fiery Surge, that from the Precipice Of Heav’n receiv’d us falling, and the Thunder,
Wing'd with red Lightning and impetuous rage, [ 175 ]
Perhaps hath spent his shafts, and ceases now
To bellow through the vast and boundless Deep.
(*Paradise Lost* 1.169-177)

This is Satan’s description of the Fall, the ban, and in it one sees an angry sovereign who strikes with Thunder to chase the Rebel Angels out of Heaven, performing the act of exile. The line “Ministers of vengeance and pursuit” is a rather tightly bound paradox of a being that contains purified violence. Within this line, God’s justice approves and encourages the “angel” to chase after and destroy the war-refugee after the battle for Heaven has been lost. This is an act of worship and devotion, the performance of what is due unto the sovereign Power. The angel, exists immersed in the extraordinary violence of the banning act. Yet somehow, in fact, because of this participation the angel remains pure and is further purified.

This sterilization of banning violence, the extension of the justice of the sovereign onto His loyal agents makes seemingly any act undertaken during this pursuit acceptable. There is a strange distancing from God at work in the loyal angel. The loyal angel in this moment is outside the boundary of Heaven in the Chaos between realms, far from God but included by His edict (which He might rescind). It this being that God makes the most use of, to separate himself from the marking violence of the ban. One might note such a being’s precarity and see the thin, almost transparent boundary that separate such existence from that of Satan. It is only use and loyalty to God between them.

The nature of this pursuit far from God, this living for the chase is striking if one considers its implications. The pursuing angel seems is posed as a figure that knows no rest, that lives and worships Power in the purification of the exile. This is the mode of being that
God consecrates during the banning act and one should recognize its inverse relationship to the Rebel Angel.

Alongside this characterization of a pursuing angel who is God’s minister is the refraining feature of loyalty in the angels of God. Milton depicts this aspect of the angelic throughout *Paradise Lost* but perhaps most notably in the moment of Satan’s initial rebellion. Milton depicts the angel Abdiel, the only sane and loyal angel amidst the crowd of rebels in Book 5. Abdiel objects to the initial rebellion and declares Satan mad, delusional, evil and soon to be punished for his disruption of the divine order.

…O alienate from God, O spirit accurst,
Forsak'n of all good; I see thy fall
Determin'd, and thy hapless crew involv'd
In this perfidious fraud, contagion spred [ 880 ]
Both of thy crime and punishment: henceforth
No more be troubl'd how to quit the yoke
Of Gods Messiah; those indulgent Laws
Will not now be voutsaf't, other Decrees
Against thee are gon forth without recall; [ 885 ]
That Golden Scepter which thou didst reject
Is now an Iron Rod to bruise and breake
Thy disobedience. (*Paradise Lost* 5.876-889)

In this passage, there is a culmination of all the elements of Enemy Life: madness, criminality, contagion and correction. But more than that, this is the discourse of the exile professed by the loyal angel, the ideal servant of God. One can begin to appreciate the extent to which Power’s ideology should be absorbed by its ideal subject. The professions of Abdiel show his loyalty but they also show what loyalty to Power is. Loyalty to Power is the internalization of an ideology and it is not an optional reality. Milton shows the choice that Satan, Adam and Eve all should have made if they were to avoid the violence of the ban. Angelic purity and angelic loyalty are thereby entangled. As if to finally and totally
reinforce this reality, Milton makes Abdiel’s departure from the masses of would be rebel
angels the last image of Book V:

So spake the Seraph Abdiel faithful found,
Among the faithless, faithful only hee;
Among innumerable false, unmov’d,
Unshak’n, unseduc’d, unterrifi’d
His Loyaltie he kept, his Love, his Zeale; [ 900 ]
Nor number, nor example with him wrought
To swerve from truth, or change his constant mind
Though single. From amidst them forth he passd,
Long way through hostile scorn, which he susteind
Superior, nor of violence fear’d aught; [ 905 ]
And with retorted scorn his back he turn’d
On those proud Towrs to swift destruction doom’d. (Paradise Lost
5.896-907)

Abdiel’s example of a “faithful amongst the faithless” points toward a particular
xenophobic and dangerous conception of the subject. Only Abdiel is granted subjectivity,
individuality, the rest of the angels are merely a horde, an “innumerable” mass. He is the
only recognizable figure. Abdiel’s movement amongst the crowd, “unmov’d, unshak’n,
unseduc’d, unterrifi’d” suggests an insularity inherent to his being: the emotion, the voices
of the rebel angels do not sway him in the least. In the security of Abdiel’s exodus, there is
some element of self-righteousness at work. This is only exacerbated by the fact that he
would not “swerve from truth” or “change his constant mind”. These are dangerous qualities
in a participatory society. It would lead loyal citizens to view themselves as holy warriors
engaged in a state of civil (cultural) war, owing more to the sovereign than to their fellow
human beings, the faithless.

After Abdiel’s show of loyalty, every act is made to appear justified, sane even
supreme and transcendental whatever the consequence it has upon another being. Shortly
after departs Satan’s company, one finds him amongst the ranks of loyal angels, a soldier in Heaven’s war. It is in the build up to the initial battle that Abdiel again remonstrates Satan:

This is servitude,  
To serve th' unwise, or him who hath rebelld  
Against his worthier, as thine now serve thee, [ 180 ]  
Thy self not free, but to thy self enthrall'd  

(Paradise Lost 6.178-181)

After the chiding, there is violence:

So saying, a noble stroke he lifted high,  
Which hung not, but so swift with tempest fell [ 190 ]  
On the proud Crest of Satan, that no sight,  
Nor motion of swift thought, less could his Shield  
Such ruin intercept: ten paces huge  
He back recoild; the tenth on bended knee  
His massie Spear upstaid; as if on Earth [ 195 ]  
Winds under ground or waters forcing way  
Sidelong, had push't a Mountain from his seat  
Half sunk with all his Pines. Amazement seis'd  
The Rebel Thrones, but greater rage to see  
Thus foil'd thir mightiest, (Paradise Lost 6.189-200)

This scene has a dramatic effect and a lesson according to the traditional reading of Paradise Lost. There is no standing against the Power of God: He imbues His loyal angels with the force to stand against and destroy the being who was once the foremost angel in Heaven. One should also note the (self-)righteous subjectivity in Abdiel. As a loyal angel and an extension of God’s violence, Abdiel has a distinct awareness that his side of the war is just and that his actions are sacred. All this serves in the traditional reading of Paradise Lost. But it represents the being of a holy warrior perhaps a bit too well, making the position of a loyal angel a bit too secure its knowledge and its violence. The entirety of description of Abdiel striking Satan is a glorification of violence against the Enemy. Abdiel’s “noble stroke” prepares a dangerous stance for loyal supporters of Power. It would emulate God’s ban as transcendental violence, violence that is just, violence that purifies. This is an
extreme and dangerous stance to encourage: one deployed all too often in the support of fascist regimes and terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this being is the one that God encourages and extolls, setting such nobility above even the depiction of Adam.

In the two major reading of *Paradise Lost* one may see the human in Adam or perhaps if one is of a more rebellious bent, in Satan. But alongside these figures for the human exists a being in a similar relation with Power, the loyal angel. One does not typically think of the loyal angels as being human and this particular moment they are not recognizably so. However, given their use by Power, their capacity for distancing violence and their self-righteous immunity within an ideology, one can see the appeal of the loyal angel as a subjectivity to worldly Power. It is because of this appeal, the extremist politics of our moment and its correspondence to unfeeling fanaticism through history that the being of a loyal angel is a being which is poised rather threateningly to become the human being, further imperiling Enemy Life.

**The State of Enemy Life**

Satan is an exilic figure, who is treated as a contaminant, a delusive criminal who mocks Power in his essential impiety and shows of false worship. Power sees this being in Enemy Life because of the obscuring effects inherent to its first violence and an aggressive instinct toward the being that has marred its transcendental existence. To remedy and correct this being it deploys ceremonial and consecrated violence which is intended to purify itself. It is for this reason that the body of the Enemy is treated with disintegrative force. Power performs this violence not only through the use of the ban and corrective procedures but through the inculcation of a servant-subjectivity whose worship and loyalty emulates and further exacerbates the effect of the ban.
This reality is the reality that real-world exile experiences on a day to day basis. Whether it is the war-refugee, the immigrant, or the African-American citizen, there is consistent framing on the part of Power to represent these figures as Enemy Life. They are a form of life which is delusional in resistance, blasphemous in being simply by being banned, serpentine, less than human and entirely unsuitable to be integrated or involved in human society. This is what Enemy Life, the human being in exile represents. The exile is the Enemy, a being-apart existentially, an impurity, and a figure that Power must strike, correct and call upon its followers to further destroy.
Chapter 3 Escaping Tradition in *Prometheus Unbound*

The last two chapters posited two narratives and subjectivities of exile that emerge from *Paradise Lost*. The narrative of Adam represents exile according to the view of Power when it approves or recognizes the exile as human. The treatment of Satan shows a reality of exile which corresponds with figures of exile whom Power does not wish to see, or, suffer under its framing gaze. It is this second figure that produces the discourse and the subject position of Enemy Life. Enemy Life provides a means to conjoin biopolitical philosophy with the narrativity of everyday political discourse as grounded by relationships found in Milton’s Satan. The previous chapter began forming this way of representing the exile largely through demonstrating the problems that the Satanic exile, Enemy Life, suffered. The next two chapters focus on demonstrating how the Satanic School attempted to recover from the problematic subject-position of being the Enemy. They focus on a reading of two primary texts of the Satanic School which directly refer to Milton’s work—*Prometheus Unbound* and *Manfred*—with some concluding attention to Byron’s further revisions in *Don Juan*. The three poems progressively humanize the Satanic character and develop the greater range of human being itself. It is in this way that the Satanic School poeticizes and theorizes of the potentialities and possibilities of Enemy Life.

As a poet and political writer, Shelley was a visionary prophet of an anarchist utopia that had seen the end of tyrants. He followed the philosophy of his father-in-law William Godwin’s work *Political Justice*. Similar in progressive politics, though not an anarchist, Byron moved in a different current as a poet. His early work (at home, in England) appears self-involved and
existentialist, but in self-imposed exile to Italy and Greece, he addressed the demon inside himself with revisionary familiarity. Because of the radicality of their political stance and poetic vision, Byron and Shelley were vilified and marginalized in the early nineteenth century, in ways that secure their identification as what I refer to as (following Southey) the “Satanic School.”

Immediately prior to this, beginning roughly in 1790, the first generation of British Romantics, Wordsworth, Coleridge and Blake, had taken steps toward Satan’s rehabilitation. Most of this rehabilitation occurred through the work of Blake, who was, like Shelley and Byron, progressive politically and the most dedicated to the idea that Satan was the hero (or to use his term “Messiah”) of Paradise Lost. Wordsworth and Coleridge’s poetic contributions to the Satanic exile were lesser and framed as an emergent humanism. They placed Man in the position of God, rather than attempting a bolder inversion of roles. This is the more traditional iteration of British Romanticism. It is the formulation of the subject as semi-divine (and in many ways akin to Adam before the fall) through the transcendent qualities of his poetic and personal genius. This humanistic movement is found in fragmentary form in Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” and, at length, in Wordsworth’s Prelude. In Wordsworth, the arc of his humanist Romanticism is particularly well wrought. As the poet moves from “Tintern Abbey” to “Nutting” to “Intimations of Immortality” his subject grows far more uncertain of his place and far more eager to make concessions to a truly transcendent God. But both Coleridge and Wordsworth’s interest in depicting a transgressive-transcendental human being waned as they aged and they became more orthodox.

Blake makes more extensive use of the Satanic being throughout his work. Blake identified the being of Satan as not only the human being, but also a desirable being and Milton’s most sublime creation. As he put it in his “Marriage of Heaven and Hell”:

...
The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels & God, and at liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because he was a true Poet and of the Devil's party without knowing it (“Marriage of Heaven and Hell” ln 23).

Blake, writing in the late 1780s and 1790s, is probably the most direct spiritual precursor to Shelley and Byron’s works. Blake prophesied a change forthcoming in European culture as the Enlightenment ethos of rationality slid into dormancy for a few decades as strong emotion erupted and became a political force.

It is this strong emotion (energy and desire as Blake would put it) and the privileging of the human being as an ethos that best defines British Romanticism and makes it distinct from the period that preceded it. Since the time of Milton, the Enlightenment’s discourse of reason and civility had suppressed and contained the populace of the West. The shared sentiment of Kant’s dictum that (I paraphrase) “to obey was the best public use of reason” suppressed expressions of individualism. The general philosophy that mankind could be perfected through his reason, his science, and his piety toward God gave the people, especially the increasingly literary public, a goal to strive toward. However, as the Age of Enlightenment progressed, philosophers like Rousseau and Hume, the conflict arising from American Revolutionary War, and the increasing industrialization of Europe began to introduce doubt in these principles of obedient orthodoxy. Doubt in Reason and doubt in God weakened their effectiveness as containment measures. With this weakening, widespread poverty, resentment of the aristocracy and a long history of suffering, an outburst of emotion as a historical and artistic period seems as if it should have been expected.

The historical referent for and subsequent monument of that outburst was the French Revolution, which roiled from 1788 to 1799 and saw the fall of the French Monarchy and the rise of Napoleon. It is the French Revolution that essentially marks the divide between the first
generation British Romantics and the second generation of Byron, Shelley and Keats. The period of the French Revolution was a time of chaos and a sense of possibility that the ideals of true democracy and populism might be codified into a European government. In the event, this possibility gave way to a more pronounced iteration of Empire in Europe and the West. Byron, a more astute political obverse than his reputation intimates, seems to have captured this change as it was emerging. In *Childe Harold*, he crafts a description of the eve of Waterloo that develops through the sound of French field cannons approaching an English dance, transforming the voices of the party into those of militaristic alarm.

It is this disintegrative transformation during the emergence of modern Empire that Saree Makdisi investigates in his work *Romantic Imperialism: Universal Empire and the Culture of Modernity*. Makdisi reads the Romantics much as I do, as figures at a critical, perhaps too-scored away hinge in history:

‘Most historians of empire’ writes Edward Said in *Culture Imperialism*, ‘speak of the “age of empire” as formally beginning around 1878 with “the scramble for Africa”. A closer look at the cultural actuality reveals a much earlier, more deeply and stubbornly held view about overseas European hegemony; we can locate a coherent fully mobilized system of ideas near the end of the eighteenth century… (Makdisi 8)

He also contends that in their moment the Romantics were attempting to articulate resistance to an emerging modernist Imperial process.

I would argue that the romantic period in Britain marks the earliest sustained (though largely doom) attempt to articulate a form of opposition to the culture of modernization- including but not limited to imperialism-from its very beginning (Makdisi 9)

Makdisi suggests the paradox of the Romantic moment. Shelley and Byron lived their (short) adult lives and composed their major works at a time when a way out of the Western tyrannies seemed to be forthcoming. They found themselves enmeshed in a social order that was
producing the very concept of modern Empire. It is useful to reflect on their reaction to this paradox, (and the history that produced it) and consider it not only with our own time but also with Milton’s. The French Revolution affected the world view of Shelley and Byron, just as the English Civil War affected John Milton. But where Milton viewed the chaos of his time and became more conservative, Byron and Shelley saw in the French Revolution a possibility for progress and the empowerment of the populace. Clearly, Byron and Shelley thought there was more to be gained from departing from the tradition and the social order than remaining securely within it.

This was a radical, progressive position and outlook on European History, one that saw the use of “extreme” rhetoric both privately, and more problematically, publicly. Both Shelley and Byron made public statements, defenses and speeches for progressive causes. Shelley without the title or the personal charm of Lord Byron, suffered for his outspokenness in particular. It was for political (and supposedly moral) radicality and religious heresy that Shelley and Byron’s poetry was referred to by the establishment of England as the Satanic School. The term arose from the critique of a contemporary and frequent nemesis of Byron, the parochial Robert Southey. Southey in his *Vision of Judgement*, a prose/poetic work in defense of the King, declared publicly that Byron’s verse was a “monstrous combination of horrors and mockery, lewdness and impiety…” (Southey xvii). Further, Southey proclaimed that Byron and those who shared his poetic and political inclinations were:

Men of diseased hearts and depraved imaginations, who, forming a system of opinions to suit their own unhappy course of conduct, have rebelled against the holiest ordinances of human society, and hating that revealed religion which, with all their efforts and bravadoes, they are unable entirely to disbelieve, labour to make others as miserable as themselves, by infecting them with a virus that eats into the soul! The school which they have set up may properly be called the Satanic school; for though their productions breathe the spirit of Belial in their lascivious parts, and
the spirit of Moloch in those loathsome images of atrocities and horrors which they
delight to represent, they are more especially characterised by a Satanic spirit of pride
and audacious impiety, which still betrays the wretched feeling of hopelessness
wherewith it is allied. (Southey xx-xxi)

One can see the appeal, the glamour of the Satanic School when put in these terms.

Southey’s social condemnation must have produced a pleasing contempt in Byron almost as
much as his poetic critique offended him. But clearly this label and rhetoric was a message to
Shelley and Byron: their politics would not be tolerated in “good” society. It is quite clear that
Shelley and Byron’s exile from Britain though in some ways self-imposed for reasons of debt
and poor (and outrageous) conduct was hastened by the sneering political jabs of the
establishment.

Despite its origins, the term, “the Satanic School”, is not inaccurate. But it is certainly not
accurate in the way that Southey intended it: to expel Byron and Shelley from the tradition. The
Romantic upstarts are better thought of as the Satanic School, I contend, in that they preferred
the poetry of Milton in *Paradise Lost* over nearer contemporaries. They found Milton poetically
more gifted and philosophically more insightful and his Satan the more intriguing depiction of
the human being. Their specific debts to Milton have been well-documented in classic studies of
Romanticism such as in Harold Bloom’s work *Percy Shelley: The Triumph of Life*, and *The
Visionary Company*, as well M.H. Abrams *Natural Supernaturalism* and this tradition of
scholarship is carried on recently in books like Johnathon Shears’ *The Romantic Legacy of
'Paradise Lost': Reading Against the Grain.*

Thinking the Satanic School as a legitimate artistic movement rather than a parochial
term of derision, produces quite a different conception of what “the Satanic School” was. Shelley
and Byron both were vocal in making the difference known. In Shelley’s famous preface to his
major and perhaps definitive prophetic work, *Prometheus Unbound* one sees his view of Milton’s Satan:

The only imaginary being resembling in any degree Prometheus is Satan; and Prometheus is, in my judgement, a more poetical character than Satan, because, in addition to courage, and majesty, and firm and patient opposition to omnipotent force, he is susceptible of being described as exempt from the taints of ambition, envy, revenge, and a desire for personal aggrandizement, which, in the hero of *Paradise Lost*, interfere with the interest. (*Prometheus Unbound*)

This “patient opposition to omnipotent force” is an admirable trait is attributed to Milton’s Satan. Shelley thinks this characteristic worth salvaging for his Prometheus and his practice of living in the world. After hearing Shelley’s positive view of “the Enemy” which nonetheless marks the flaws of his character, it is not an accurate critique to say that Byron and Shelley were bent on corrupting humanity. Shelley defends Satan in recognition of his suffering in *Paradise Lost* and the injustice of God’s punishment. It is the sense of addressing injustice at the hands of Power that resonates most clearly with Shelley’s work. Shelley’s numerous political essays and poems, including his “Declaration of Rights”, “Masque of Anarchy” and “England in 1819” in all make the case for the toppling of tyrants and the further establishment of the rights of man as a first principle. Shelley saw, through an anarchist utopian lens, the general populace treated by European tyrants as God had treated Satan. His project, beyond aesthetics, thereby became an address of the people. He saw the people deserved a voice that could sound not only just the escaping rage and envy of Satan but also the approaching tremor of progress and revolution. In Shelley’s prophecy of a coming community, this conversion of rage and envy constituted the release of the Enemy-subject position from confinement, treatment and frustrated revenge. This reality he represents in *Prometheus Unbound*. It is in this way that Shelley refers to Milton for his creation of Satan and begins to reframe the Enemy into a more human being. This is the true tactic and guiding principle of the Satanic School. Shelley reveals the Enemy as the
human being and commences to free the Enemy from his degradations both those self-inflicted and those Power has inflicted.

Byron for his own witty and insolent part, praised Milton as a poet in Don Juan. He also managed to fire back at Southey:

Thou shalt believe in Milton, Dryden, Pope;  
Thou shalt not set up Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey;  
Because the first is crazed beyond all hope,  
The second drunk, the third so quaint and mouthy…
(Don Juan 1.1633-1637)

Byron was perhaps less inclined to make the kind of pompous assertions of usurping Milton’s legacy than Shelley. But there is still a similar intent: to reveal the Enemy as the human and redeem that subject-position. Byron’s work in the Satanic School has a more fluid evolution. He shows the influence of Milton’s Satan, quite obviously in Cain and Books 3 and 4 of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage. Then, he transforms the Satanically influence Byronic Hero in Manfred, metabolizing his own Enemy subject position through the playful, polytonal and ironic stance of Don Juan.

What is ironic regarding Southey’s critique is that Byron’s early visions of the Satanic exile is rather insular and less immediately political. Byron’s original vision of “Satan” is an existential one which recognizes the annihilative and paradoxical impulses in the human being. It is a version of Satan that has passed through Wordsworth’s dilemmas with the natural world and found that the world itself may be hostile or at the least indifferent toward human life. Byron’s vision of the Satanic exile moves farther than Shelley’s spirit Alastor or Prometheus, into a human subjectivity which is grand, perhaps grandiose, but sublime because of the strength of its own emotion and will. Strangely, this represents the greater danger to the tradition of exiles and
exilic narratives than Shelley’s reframed political Enemy. Byron’s work reveals the Enemy in every human being rather than soliciting sympathy for rebels against European Monarchy.

This vision of the Satanic hero, a “half-devil, half-dust” (to paraphrase) appears in its most mature form as a self-destructive, defiant subject in *Manfred*. *Manfred* represents a point at which British Romanticism’s theme of strong emotion and humanism appeared most in concert with the narrower political dimensions of the Satanic School. But the true testament to Byron’s intellectual rigor is his revision of this archetype of the Byronic Hero. Byron transforms the permanently alienated and solidly oppositional subject into a being of continual parodic and polytonal exile in *Don Juan*. This represents an enormous effort of poetic imagination. It effects a kind of self-saving mechanism, wherein the Enemy is transformed from a confrontational and violent being into one that represents resistance in its elusive persistence. This is Byron’s legacy and what I would posit as the final revisionary movement of the Satanic School: a movement toward moving life.

These improvisations on Milton, the embodiment of the Western Tradition, show that Shelley and Byron were not content to simply allow Southey and the establishment to label them impious prideful upstarts. If they were members of a Satanic School, it was because they admired Milton and his Satan, not because they were nothing more than impudent Rebel Angels. Neither would either claim that Milton’s Satan truly embodied the movement of their respective poetic and political projects. Rather they claimed, “the Satanic School” for their own purposes. Milton’s Satan taught them what it was to be a human being, and they, in turn, re-made Milton’s Satan in their own image. Shelley and Byron drew out Satan a certain revolutionary, prophetic spirit that they deemed necessary for social improvement and subjectivity. What both Shelley and Byron performed is not a reiteration of Satan, but a rescue of the human being in him. It is
this movement that theorists of bio-politics are attempting to theorize now: what is the “way out” (to invoke Foucault’s sense of history and subject). Thus, Byron and Shelley’s work in the Satanic School seems to be the logical place for a discourse of Enemy Life to develop further.

**Prometheus Unbound**

Shelley’s 1820 masterpiece *Prometheus Unbound* is a complicated text. It appears a four-act lyrical drama, but eschews any pretense of being a stage play. In terms of content, it is an amalgam of Miltonic influence, *Prometheus Bound* by Aeschylus, Shelley’s reading of Gnostic philosophy, contemporary political works and Western poetry. There are a number of ways to read this text: one can speak of Shelley’s aesthetic rigor in representing the Sublime, offer Prometheus and Demigorgon as embodiments of proto-Marxist ideology, or read Asia as an elusive feminist character struggling to emerge from Shelley’s pompous declarations of the equality of men. Such is the richness of Shelley’s work that these are all readings that find sufficient textual evidence to support them.

Most recent in this tradition of scholarship (and a rather relevant interlocutor to my reading) is *Black Prometheus: Race and Radicalism in the Age of Atlantic Slavery*. In *Black Prometheus*, Jared Hickman traces two opposing iterations of the myth of Prometheus through various texts. He rejects European Romanticism’s formulation of the myth as it plays a role in confirming dispersing Power. He places emphasis on an African or African-American slave Prometheus developed through figures like Frederick Douglass in *My Bondage, My Freedom*. In this way, Hickman considers the role of race and Euro-Christian imperialism and a white washing of Prometheus in Shelley’s work. He posits a new anthropocentric theology of global Romanticism formulates a white-savior myth disguised as a narrative of self-emancipation.
In principle, I agree with Hickman’s argument: his work addresses and makes way for the agency of the Other with a special fidelity to the power of narrative as a means of pervading ideology and empire. Yet, I find that his reading of *Prometheus Unbound*, functions as it does through a somewhat traditional reading of the text and Prometheus as a subject. The hinge of his reading, that Shelley’s Prometheus represents freedom through submission and a new (white) god of liberation is dependent on an implicit separation of Shelley’s Prometheus from its Satanic roots. This is an understandable movement, as one might read Shelley’s preface to *Prometheus Unbound* as intent to purify the Satanic being. But Shelley’s Promethean poetry is inescapably influenced by Satan, the exile, the very antithesis of the Euro-Christian subject Hickman suggests colonial Europe was producing. Hickman is not wrong that Shelley’s Prometheus does attempt to embody a Euro-Christian model of emancipation. But equally present in Shelley’s work are relationships and realities that break down this traditional narrative model and the subjectivity it supposedly produces. If Shelley’s Prometheus is caught in this project of empire, then he is also undergoing agony to get out of it.

Thus, I read *Prometheus Unbound* in a few ways which affect a Satanically influenced exile, exposed and Enemy Life. The first part of this reading is the revealing and release of Prometheus, the Satanic exile, as the human being in its relationship with Power through the poetry and narrative itself. This mostly occurs in the opening act, wherein Prometheus suffers under the ban and correction of Jupiter, in the subject-position of the Enemy. Throughout the opening act, Shelley changes our perception of this experience into a reality which produces human empathy. The effects of this re-framing appear during the latter three acts through Asia’s search for a principle of eternal, just revolution and lasting egalitarian society, and Demigorgon’s subsequent actions to topple tyranny and usher in a new age of universal love.
This provides a new narrative frame for Enemy Life, resonating with, yet emerging from the traditional depiction of Satan in *Paradise Lost*. *Prometheus Unbound* also provides a site at which to theorize Enemy Life in resonance with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Judith Butler, Jean Luc Nancy, and Giorgio Agamben. Shelley negotiates the tensions between traditional visual phenomenology and a “listening subject”. He frames the Enemy with “grievable” pity and indexical force as way to point to Power’s injustice. He introduces a destructive reading of some of Wordsworthian Romanticism’s essential tropes, and in this way, Shelley demonstrates techniques which reveal Enemy Life as human.

It is this process of revealing the Enemy as human through a new narrative and theory of life that the contemporary moment requires. In reading Shelley, not only that the Enemy is human, but their collaborative involvement in the social order plays an essential role. This meaningfully parodies Agamben’s conception of *homo sacer* who is included by exclusion. Enemy Life comes to represent defiant apartness as a disruptive presence. It is a being that asks for aid and thereby makes the injustice of a social ideology visible. Enemy Life opens itself to inclusion in its erasure of the original moment of sovereignty.

The opening act of *Prometheus Unbound* depicts the familiar Enemy to Power and, at the same time, reveals him as the human being. Shelley performs this movement by invoking the poetic presence of Milton’s Satan and then shifting the perspective on his character. During this same opening act, what one detects are multiple threads of knowing the Enemy subject, two of which are in something of a state of tension. The first thread in tension is formed in the more traditional mode of Western thought and poetry. It is a political-philosophical discourse deployed by Prometheus which can be connected to Heidegger’s concepts of human being and phenomenology. The second thread pulling at this discourse is a subtler revealing that occurs in
an elusive, agonistic, audial negativity. This thread roughly corresponds to Nancy’s theories of a “listening subject”. Though there is tension between these modes of revealing the human being, ultimately their purpose is similar enough to coalesce toward a being in the world. Whether he searches in the tradition, or against it, with destructive vision or a searching agonistic cry, Shelley is (like Foucault) looking for way out of Power, subject, and human history. Thus, in a contrapuntal way, Shelley alters the frame of the Enemy, the human being.

Prometheus at the Mercy of Jupiter and The Frame of the Preface

Reframing the Enemy is what Shelley sets out to do in his preface to the poem:

The moral interest of the fable, which is so powerfully sustained by the sufferings and endurance of Prometheus, would be annihilated if we could conceive of him as unsaying his high language and quailing before his successful and perfidious adversary. The only imaginary being, resembling in any degree Prometheus, is Satan; and Prometheus is, in my judgment, a more poetical character than Satan, because, in addition to courage, and majesty, and firm and patient opposition to omnipotent force, he is susceptible of being described as exempt from the taints of ambition, envy, revenge, and a desire for personal aggrandizement, which, in the hero of Paradise Lost, interfere with the interest. The character of Satan engenders in the mind a pernicious casuistry which leads us to weigh his faults with his wrongs, and to excuse the former because the latter exceed all measure. In the minds of those who consider that magnificent fiction with a religious feeling it engenders something worse. But Prometheus is, as it were, the type of the highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature impelled by the purest and the truest motives to the best and noblest ends. (Prometheus Unbound 1)

From this passage, Shelley’s goal is to re-frame of the Satanic character into the figure of Prometheus, who he envisions as an ideal and human character in his political allegory. But addressing Hickman’s recent reading, there are two senses of Shelley’s goal. The primary sense of how Shelley will perfect Satan is through the greater representation of several positive qualities and the addition of new aspects which make him a “purer” and “nobler” character and in his estimation a more human one. This is the work of Shelley the political philosopher and perhaps in Hickman’s view, the participant in emerging project of a European global empire. But
the secondary sense of this passage is one which is implied, but equally at the center of the Satanic School’s project of rehabilitating the Enemy subject position. Shelley seems to believe that Prometheus’ greater purity will consequentially make him more pitiable and more sympathetic to his readers than his progenitor. Thus, he puts forth his Prometheus, but one should notice that Shelley does not forswear Satan, instead he speaks of Satan (somewhat egotistically) as the only figure worth mentioning as being a human being as Prometheus is. In effect, Shelley wishes to make the Satanic exile appear more human and his Prometheus is directly linked to that project.

Hickman’s works shows that the visual appearance of greater “purity” and nobility in Prometheus is perhaps not the method or work of an ally to the exilic figure. It may even be claimed by power as the traditional model for an emancipation narrative. However, alongside this narrative, there is a less visual framing of the Enemy. There is a being who becomes recognizably human via his annihilative, transgressive “cries” and the engaged, sympathetic relationships he has with the other characters. Reading *Prometheus Unbound* across the grain of its traditional scholarship, the rehabilitation of the Enemy emerges through the sympathy and efforts of those figures he is invisibly connected to. This provides a rough outline of my reading of *Prometheus Unbound*.

From the outset, Prometheus and Satan are entangled. There are large-scale narrative parallels of the Greek myth of Prometheus with Milton’s own Greco-Christian epic. Mythically, both Satan and Prometheus represent an older strata of being than humanity-- Satan, an angel, Prometheus, a Titan. Both disobey the edicts of Power and disrupt the order of Heaven in the assumption that they know better than their ruler. The nature of this sin is also closely linked. Prometheus is punished for bringing knowledge (in the form of fire) to mankind, just as Satan is
punished for tempting mankind with knowledge. As a result of their actions, Prometheus and Satan are punished extensively for this sin. It is in this way that Prometheus’ and Satan’s stories overlap in terms of their theme of transgression and the ambivalent relationship humanity has with knowledge and God.

The major difference between the characters is the frame of their story. Satan is made the peripheral antagonist in his story, whereas Prometheus is rendered a pitiable hero of his. This end does not dissolve these figures’ resonance. To contrary, it involves them with each other more deeply. This is the genius which no doubt inspired Shelley to rework both figures. By design, Shelley is trying to perfect Satan into a vision of a truly sympathetic, initially Tragic and then ultimately human Prometheus. He is trying to make the peripheral Enemy appear.

Opening the Ban

In the language and setting that opens *Prometheus Unbound*, Shelley directly invokes Milton’s Satan. Prometheus is tied upon an icy rock at the top of the world (the Indian Caucasus or as it is now known the Hindu Kush). He is at the mercy and under the correction of Jupiter, who has punished him for bringing fire to mankind. At his feet, in supplication, are Ione and Panthea, and Shelley sets the scene at night, as dawn breaks.

Hickman, in his analysis, investigates this geography and posits that Shelley’s intent was an appropriation of the *Hindu Kush*, as *Caucasian* which is to say Eurocentric and white-supremacist.

The irony of Curran’s 1975 thesis from the vantage point of forty intervening years of critical race studies is that he manages to descry universalism in Shelley’s generative obsession with and generous estimation of the geography of the Caucasus, the centerpiece of contemporary theories of white supremacism (*Black Prometheus* 222).
But this is an opening as in *Paradise Lost*, that begins not with a white “universalism” but rather the worn away features of the banned being. It begins at the boundary between worlds, Asia and Europe, Earth and Sky. Belonging to neither realm, the human or the divine, Prometheus is in an undefined zone of correction. How could an exile claim or appropriate such a space? Prometheus, the fallen Titan, represents life at its utmost exposure to Power. In this exposure, Prometheus is an exile from the world, his love Asia, the spirits of the world and the very humanity he took pity on. This metaphysical position is a strange commingling of both Adam and Satan. Prometheus is rendered highly visible to Jupiter, like Adam in his garden, yet he is in the condemned posture of torture like Satan. Further complicating this position is the addition of the Ione and Panthea, kindred spirits who are there to bear witness to Prometheus’ suffering.

The additional framing changes the image of the banned being: if Ione and Panthea are there to attend Prometheus, he must be life that is, to borrow from Butler “grievable”. As Butler outlines in *Frames of War*, grievability denotes that a life “matters” because it is attached to, cared for from the onset of its existence.

Precisely because a living being may die, it is necessary to care for that being so that it may live. Only under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of life appear (*Frames of War* 14).

This is the condition that Shelley is providing for his Enemy. The subtle additional of Ione and Panthea, witnesses to the correction, creates a point of contact between Enemy Life and the human being at the onset of the poem. Their presence breaks the frame of justice in an action which Butler alludes to several times in her work as a necessity for recognizing a life:
When those frames that govern the relative and differential recognizability of lives come apart—it becomes possible to apprehend something about what or who is living but has been generally ‘recognized’ as a life (*Frames of War* 12).

This single change of frame, even if it complicates the view of the Enemy, hardly severs the link between Satan and Prometheus. Prometheus’ first speech echoes Satan’s early words in the aftermath of his lost war, but almost immediately, Shelley transforms Satan’s being. Where Satan rages, Prometheus cries out and his cries are not only for himself but the greater world.

Monarch of Gods and Dæmons, and all Spirits
But One, who throng those bright and rolling worlds
Which Thou and I alone of living things
Behold with sleepless eyes! regard this Earth
Made multitudinous with thy slaves, whom thou [1.5]
Requitest for knee-worship, prayer, and praise,
And toil, and hecatombs of broken hearts,
With fear and self-contempt and barren hope.
Whilst me, who am thy foe, eyeless in hate,
Hast thou made reign and triumph, to thy scorn, [1.10]
O'er mine own misery and thy vain revenge.
Three thousand years of sleep-unsheltered hours,
And moments aye divided by keen pangs
Till they seemed years, torture and solitude,
Scorn and despair, — these are mine empire: — [1.15]
More glorious far than that which thou surveyest
From thine unenvied throne, O Mighty God!... (*Prometheus Unbound* 1.1-17)

One cannot help but hear the words of Satan after his own ban. Much of the language is quite similar in tone and rhetoric. Satan and Prometheus’ speeches are a lament of their fallen, Enemy condition and an address to Power about their suffering. Prometheus and Satan are clearly beings in resistance to Power, in a “mutual league” of “misery” “ruin” and “scorn”. But the differences between Shelley’s Prometheus and Milton’s Satan are rather pronounced as well. This can be attributed poetically to the fact that Prometheus has suffered for a much longer period, (three thousand years) before the drama begins. This differs from Satan, who
immediately after the ban, proceeds with fresh antagonism. This reality shapes Prometheus in his role as Enemy to Power. It is a far more understandable position of “patient opposition to omnipotent force” if one has been suffering under harsh corrective treatment for the majority of known human history. At the very least, Prometheus is not an impulsive being who relishes the possibility of conflict and violence.

Prometheus is also allowed his own view of the events past, present and yet to come. This is in implied in the lines: “Which Thou and I alone of living things/ Behold with sleepless eyes!” and further developed in the lines: “eyeless in hate” and “surveyest From thine unenvied throne.” Prometheus sees the world, himself, tyranny better than the tyrant Jupiter whose vision is obscured. Prometheus’ viewing should be understood for its agonistic, annihilative and destructive qualities as a way to introduce Prometheus the Enemy into a dialogue with Heidegger’s human being. Prometheus is a being who sees, feels and hears under correction, in agony. This is depicted in the metaphor of the fire he bears and brings to humanity which illuminates and destroy simultaneously. Thus, Prometheus cries: “moments aye divided by keen pangs/Till they seemed years, torture and solitude, /Scorn and despair…”

This reality (particularly in its Grecian mythic origins) is tied to the way in which Heidegger conceives the complicated process of “revealing” aletheia— the linked “truth” of humanity-in-the-world-- and the techne of enframing. In his essays “Question Concerning Technology” and “The Age of the World Picture” Heidegger explores the human relationship with discovering and representing the truth of the world which he finds central to dilemma of human being.

To what extent is man capable of such a revealing Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not have control over unconcealment itself… (Question Concerning Technology 18)
Part of the argument that Heidegger makes is that the human being encounters a difficulty in representing truth because of the distorting effect of the processes of discovery and representation. The truth, aletheia, is often obscured because the human interposes himself in the viewing. Because of this, the subject is always visible in this effort of revealing. What Heidegger presents alternatively is a mode of revealing that perpetuates a subjectivity of questioning, that does not enframe the world and its beings into static, disposable objects of knowledge. He gestures toward poiesis, a moment of revealing he traces back to (fittingly) the ancient Greeks:

Every occasion for whatever passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing is poiesis, is bringing forth (Question Concerning Technology 10).

What Heidegger is intent on is reclaiming the stance of questioning in the human being. Heidegger attempts to destructively view the traditional viewing of the world/subject. He sketches a kind of negativity or neutralization of the philosophizing, prophesying phenomenal subject. He invokes the ancient Greek human being:

To be beheld by what is, to be included and maintained by its openness and in that way to be borne along by, to be driven about by its oppositions and marked by its discord—that is the essence of man in the great age of the Greeks (Age of the World Picture 131)

This Heideggerian human being seems quite agonistic, quite apart and Enemy.

Prometheus struggles with this same problem. Prometheus views the world in opposition to Jupiter, prophesying the future, destructing the viewpoint. But even as his philosophy discloses a certain kind of truth, the very structure of his speech represents a barrier to Prometheus’s ultimate purpose of radical change in the world and Enemy subjectivity. There is a paradoxical tension in Prometheus’s viewing. He is viewing the world (in agony) and attempting to imagine a new world. This, perhaps, cannot be truly resolved via a reiteration of the visual world/subject.
This leads Prometheus, almost about to fall, almost into the discord of a questioning stance. It is this reality, alongside a sublime disintegration of his subjectivity that will eventually necessitate Prometheus’ recanting of his curse against Jupiter.

The ability to destructively view apart from Power and the questions it produces about the Enemy’s world view are also a critical narrative difference in Prometheus’ s being. In the previous chapters I have outlined the lengths to which Power goes in order to frame Satan as a being without accurate vision. Prometheus has destructive vision, he has access to the truth of himself and his world in a way that Satan attempts but is denied. Developing from this annihilating view, Prometheus does not merely look upon himself, but the world and its people who are made “multitudinous slaves”. It is through this vision that Prometheus sees, the problematic nature of Jupiter’s tyranny in his requests for “knee-worship, prayer, and praise, /And toil…”. It is perceiving this and the “broken hearts… fear and self-contempt and barren hope” that both despairs and angers Prometheus, not his own suffering in and of itself.

It is this observation that made Prometheus Jupiter’s “foe”, but the movement is also designed to connect Prometheus to the human populace. Himself in a very tangible form of bondage, Prometheus sees his own condition in the people of world, who suffer under the tyranny of Jupiter. This language parallels Satan’s various statements of non-serviam (“Glory never shall he extort from me”) as well as Adam’s many enclosed proclamations of worship (…the Power/That made us, and for us this ample World/Be infinitly good, and of his good/As liberal and free as infinite,). Through Prometheus’ view, the reader can see resistance as a moral necessity and being-obedient as a servitude “barren of hope”.

Agony and Negativity

It is with the framing of Prometheus’ agony as contact with human suffering that his position as the “foe” or Enemy is materially changed but not relinquished as a subjectivity. In Milton, the suffering of Satan and the violent God inflicts are framed as justice. This agony does not disrupt Satan’s subjectivity from its frame, he remains entirely Enemy, unrecognizable. In Shelley’s rendering, the questioning of “justice” is made insistent by the punishment’s severity:

Almighty, had I deigned to share the shame  
Of thine ill tyranny, and hung not here  
Nailed to this wall of eagle-baffling mountain, [1.20]  
Black, wintry, dead, unmeasured; without herb,  
Insect, or beast, or shape or sound of life.  
Ah me! alas, pain, pain ever, for ever!  
No change, no pause, no hope! Yet I endure…  

…Ah me! alas, pain, pain ever, for ever! [1.30]

The crawling glaciers pierce me with the spears  
Of their moon-freezing crystals, the bright chains  
Eat with their burning cold into my bones.  
Heaven’s wingèd hound, polluting from thy lips  
His beak in poison not his own, tears up [1.35]  
My heart; and shapeless sights come wandering by,  
The ghastly people of the realm of dream,  
Mocking me: and the Earthquake-fiends are charged  
To wrench the rivets from my quivering wounds  
When the rocks split and close again behind: [1.40]  
While from their loud abysses howling throng  
The genii of the storm, urging the rage  
Of whirlwind, and afflict me with keen hail. (Prometheus Unbound 1.18-43)

The depiction of Prometheus’ agony changes our perspective on the punishment. It does not appear justice but torture. Prometheus is clearly in pain, enough that what he says may very well be a scream and this is vastly different from the depiction of Satan. Satan may be thunder-
scarred and reduced in essence, but Prometheus’ grievous wounds are constantly re-opened and his tolerance for such treatment is eroded. Shelley, who is so often referred to as an abstract poet, depicts the bodily suffering of Prometheus with a great deal of attention to the physical suffering wounds his character endures.

The second half of the above passage is entirely focused on the experience of torture and its implements. The line “To wrench the rivets from my quivering wounds” is particular graphic, reminiscent of a crucifixion (and almost proleptic of *Discipline and Punish*). The description is far more horrific that Milton’s who only speaks briefly of the marks on Satan’s body and describes Satan as made of “empyreal substance”. It seems so simple a concept: to have Prometheus appear grievable, all Shelley had to do was represent nearly the same torture that Satan endures but let Prometheus and his body cry out the horror of his wounds.

Beyond merely indicating the Enemy’s grievability as a subject and gaining narrative sympathy for Prometheus, there is another function of being at work. This particular passage is the annihilation of Prometheus’ traditional agency/subjectivity. The annihilation occurs at the moment where Prometheus cries out “Ah me” and disappears into his pain. In the aftermath, Prometheus becomes a kind of being who exists in a negativity. His being becomes absent and apart, represented by torture implements used on his body. 7

Elaine Scarry gestures toward this idea of the (Enemy) being’s disintegration and the body’s annihilative cry in her work on the relationship between pain, power and subjectivity, *The Body in Pain*:

7 This theory of subjectivity is rather in concert with Keats’ own forays into negativity of which Shelley might well have here partaken in. This scene along with Prometheus’s later dialogue with his mother, the Earth seems to resonate with Keats’ Hyperion.
Intense pain is also language-destroying: as the content of one’s world disintegrates, so the content of one’s language disintegrates, as the self disintegrates, so that which would express and project the self is robbed of its source and subject (Scarry 35).

What Scarry is establishing in her work is the power dynamic between torturer and the tortured body. She makes apparent the disintegrative effect torture has upon a subject, to the extent that the being becomes first reduced to a body, and then to a voice, which eventually can only speak the words of the torturer. This is a rather harsh way of representing traditional Power relations, but it is entirely consistent with a concept of Enemy Life since Scarry’s word “disintegrates” seems to inherently suggest a Satanic apartness and negativity.

In Shelley’s work, the effect of Prometheus’ torture is equally profound, but Shelley suggests the possibility of a twisting escape from this exposed condition of being. The annihilative “cry” of Prometheus into nothing, effecting his negativity and resonance with other beings and the world, even the immediate “room” (to borrow Scarry’s framing of the place of correction) of his torture operates as last defense mechanism. It is an utter purge of being. This self-purging cry disintegrates the Power relationship. In a way that emerges out of his own cyclical conception of life and death, Shelley posits that the being under corrective torturous treatment can find a way out of the Power relationship with the torturer. He reclaims the destructuring effect of the torture on the body as a way to access the human being’s original pliability. There are possibilities of a new human life in the death of the traditional subject.

In a strange way, this moment, as theory of a new subjectivity, dialogues with Jean-Luc Nancy’s work in Listening. It seems almost as if Prometheus was precisely the philosophical subject Nancy has in mind when he opens his critique of traditional subjectivity and philosophy:
Isn’t the philosopher someone who always hears (and who hears everything) but who cannot listen, who more precisely, neutralizes listening in himself so he can philosophize? (Nancy 1)

Prometheus can be accused of being the being that hears everything—only to philosophize. But in the moment where Prometheus is under torture and his body is crying out there is a destructuring of this reality at work. One knows the being of Prometheus through the resonance of his cry. The high-minded prophecies are drowned out and equally, the frame of Power is submerged. What one listens to is the unjust exposure of being to Power and the purging of that correction, emanating unwilled from Prometheus’s body. This is being in agony, being-apart, being the Enemy.

Nancy is intent on theorizing this mode of being when he describes his listening subject. He even hints at the “extremity” of this subject-position which evoked Prometheus’ agony:

To be listening is always to be on the edge of meaning, or in an edgy meaning of extremity, and as if the sound were precisely nothing else than this edge, this fringe, this margin” (Nancy 7).

This is the first instance of Prometheus’s being, being revealed as a resonant and self-purging cry but it is not the last. Shortly, this being, will resound between Prometheus and his Mother, the Earth in a different relationship but to similar effect.

To refrain, although the moment is clearly influenced by Satan’s punishment, the Titan’s treatment is a human being suffering, disintegrating. Whatever stoicism there was in the Satanic character, that superhuman ability to endure is gone. Prometheus is not so much a devil in hell as he is a human being upon a cruel instrument of an Inquisition. He feels the pain, voices it, and in his cries one cannot but feel some measure of human empathy. Shelley’s Prometheus manages to accomplish what Satan never could: he demonstrates the injustice of God(Jupiter’s) punishment
because such treatment is cruel and horrifying when inflicted on a being which seems horribly human.

In this depiction of torment and actual pain, of being-broken down and being-rather forcible configured into a stance of questioning and negativity, Shelley suggests a way out of the traditional Power relationship. In this early moment of torture, there is an escape of the subject inward, to such an extent that there is almost nothing left of the Enemy being. But in that nothingness, that state of receptive negativity, there is a potential for a new subjectivity.

**Breaking the Narrative**

Prometheus’ speech continues and eventually he prophesizes the downfall of Jupiter:

> The wingless, crawling hours, one among whom
> — As some dark Priest hales the reluctant victim —
> Shall drag thee, cruel King, to kiss the blood [1.50]
> From these pale feet, which then might trample thee
> If they disdained not such a prostrate slave. (*Prometheus Unbound* 1.48-52)

This language recalls Satan’s own declaration of revenge upon God. Clearly there is, in both Prometheus and Satan, an instinct to further rebellion and retribution. But Prometheus’ for revenge upon Jupiter is different. Prometheus speaks of “wingless crawling hours” that will see the toppling of Jupiter. He is envisioning a day of reckoning, rather that raising of an army. This lessens the threat Prometheus can pose and revealing Prometheus (and perhaps Satan’s) words the fruitless cries of a beaten being.

But if the threat of Prometheus is lessened, one should not mistake what these words perform, for in the echo of the threat, there is a transformation. The later lines of Prometheus’ cry evoke the scenario of Christ on the cross and the de-struction of the Power dynamic: ‘kiss the
blood/ from these pale feet”. This suggests the transformative power of Prometheus’ body. Something in the agonistic body transforms, de-structs and uncouples sovereign violence/justice.

This is the moment at which Prometheus as a being is at his utmost potentiality. He is about to prophecy the future, beget action. And it is here that there is a slight, and purposeful delay. Prometheus pauses in his speech, changes his tone and purpose entirely:

Disdain! Ah no! I pity thee. What ruin  
Will hunt thee undefended through wide Heaven!  
How will thy soul, cloven to its depth with terror, [1.55]  
Gape like a hell within! I speak in grief,  
Not exultation, for I hate no more,  
As then ere misery made me wise. The curse  
Once breathed on thee I would recall.  (Prometheus Unbound 1.53-59)

These lines are critical to Shelley’s rehabilitation, they make his crafting of the Enemy subject-position tenable. It is a moment of revealing akin to the Heideggerian concept. In the movement from “Distain” to “Ah no! I pity” Prometheus looks inward, discovers the truth of his relationship with Power and begins to re-shape the relationship. From the abyss, Prometheus prophesies and there is an inversion of Power. The torture that Jupiter treats Prometheus with rebounds upon itself in futurity in a way that reveals the smallness of Power, that arrests, and terrifies. In this grazing encounter with the sublime, Shelley demonstrates that Prometheus, unlike Satan, can do something unexpected, that he can break from the past, disrupt the present and change the future.

After this disintegrative and sublime moment, Prometheus turns away from thoughts of revenge on Jupiter and feels a swell of pity for the tyrant. He presents an entirely new possibility of (Enemy) life in relation to Power. This is a moment where one sees the possibilities of Enemy Life. This kind of pity is seldom seen in Satan who only briefly pities Adam and Eve before he tempts them. In Prometheus, pity is pronounced, it is prominent, it is a humane attribute which
appears from the experience of pain. This is how misery makes Prometheus wise, unlike his truly Satanic precursor.

Emerging from this sublime moment, Prometheus embodies the reality that the Enemy is better suited to judge and dispense justice than the Sovereign, having suffered under the violence of justice himself. Shelley posits that Prometheus is a more experienced being than Jupiter, that he surpasses the sovereign in “moral” force. This is a radical reworking of the Satanic character, but it is not completely out of resonance with Milton. Milton’s Satan often declares that he has learned from his lost war and that his treatment by God is injustice. The difference is in the framing. Prometheus is not deemed delusional in his narrative. His suffering is real and he is capable of disruption, change and progress toward judgment and wisdom.

In this revealing, the perception of Jupiter’s justice/violence is altered. When Prometheus recants’ his “curse” and instead feels pity, the entire schema of purifying violence and ritual of the ban collapses. The sublime experience of the banned being seems to tangibly uncouple the sovereign’s heretofore unassailable union of violence and justice. Violence is a “curse” which contaminates both the victim and the invoker, involving them together as transgressive and ultimately human figures of violence and oppression. It is in this way, precisely Prometheus’ experience intends, that one can question the long-held notion that the regulation of violence is origin of (human)sovereignty. With this reality in place, Prometheus’ humanity becomes much more visible, appearing out of the original subject-position of the Enemy.

Framing the Sublime as Performance

For the purposes of aesthetics, it might be enough to simply call Prometheus’s sudden change the effect of the sublime-*something* that defies and eludes an explanation, but makes
being grievable and uncouples sovereign justice and violence. But if the purpose is to theorize and reveal Prometheus as the human being that breaks from traditional subjectivity, then perhaps adding some structure around the sublime moment is appropriate.

Moving against the traditional reading, what one might consider is not just the transformed view of this torturous spectacle, the apotheosis of Prometheus, but the involving function of Prometheus’ sublime encounter. Prometheus is breaking down as a subject, and already there is a kind of catalytic effect in witnessing his dis-integration. But, in the abyssal moment of Prometheus’ change, from revenge to pity and absence, there is something there that demands the involvement of an audience, (though they are silent, out of frame much like Ione and Panthea). The suddenness and enormity of the change begs investigation and questioning. What has happened in Prometheus’ consciousness, where did this change in being originate and how is it entangled with the agony that he has endured under the treatment of Power? These are the questions and there are no graspable answers. But an explanation might be that as an observable phenomenon, Prometheus’ sublime bodily experience points to itself as tactic for aligning the audience and Prometheus into the same stance of being.

Judith Butler frames this gesture of the body pointing to itself as a performance in her *Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly*:

> After all there is an indexical force of the body, that arrives with other bodies in zone visible to media coverage, it is this body, and these bodies…or bodies like this body that live in the condition of an imperiled livelihood, decimated infrastructure, accelerating precarity (Notes 10).

What Butler is negotiating is a way to transform the public view through the collective presence and even use of bodies. Shelley’s intent for Prometheus is quite the same, he points to Prometheus even in his preface as embodying the “moral interest of the fable”. It is in the context
of Butler’s thinking that one should recall the initial scenario of *Prometheus Unbound.*

Prometheus chooses to both transgress against Jupiter in front of the world and his fellow deities. Prometheus wants an audience. There is a performative and indexical function inherent to his “sin”, one that Shelley arrived at in a rather blasphemous (and prescient) commingling of the Satanic character with that of the Christ myth. Prometheus is a figure like Christ that (performatively) suffers for mankind, the differing difference is Prometheus’s lack of fidelity to God, which frames his act as a transgression rather than a purification.

Thus, Prometheus as the being that dared this trespass becomes an involving, performative agent alongside the initial disconnectedness of his egotistic, even narcissistic martyrdom. This represents not only a break with the usual framing of Enemy subjectivity but also seems to break down a trope of Wordsworthian Romanticism: the utterly isolated individual who sees everything sublimely, but has little care to communicate his vision to rest of the world. This departure becomes an important distinction: the Wordsworthian subject appears in parallel with traditional, hierarchical subjectivity, merely supplanting God with Man.

In many of Shelley’s works he subscribes to the doctrine of an elevated individual who can see for the world. He even claims that “poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world” in his well-meaning “Defence of Poetry”. But *Prometheus Unbound* posits a more populist act of resistance rather than an elitist “Defence”. Even if Prometheus is elevated his audience, Ione and Panthea, are quite near him and eventually will carry his message to his rather more active partner Asia. This early sublime moment only truly functions with witnesses who can perceive his disintegration, his negation and his eventual re-emergence as an entirely grievable human being. Prometheus’ suffering, while it disintegrates him, is *for* mankind. He is attuned to them and the attendee audience to him. The sublime encounter, as much as sends
Prometheus inward, has an aspect which escapes outward and invites collaboration. In this way, the audience partakes in the sublime transformation of the Enemy into the human.

This is an entirely different conception of a sublime encounter than the Wordsworthian model. Perhaps the nearest theoretical model for this involving concept of a sublime, disintegrative moment would be Nietzsche’s sketch of the enacting of an ancient Greek drama wherein the audience becomes entangled, in a Dionysian state, with the experience of the performer in *The Birth of Tragedy*:

> The Greek man of culture felt himself neutralized in the presence of the satiric chorus…felt that the state and society, and in general the gaps between man and man, give way to an overwhelming feeling of oneness, which leads back to heart of nature…

> …For we must know, in the rapture of the Dionysian state, with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence, there is a lethargic element, wherein all personal experience of the past is submerged. (*Birth of Tragedy* 60-61)"

Here Nietzsche, (like Heidegger and of course Shelley himself) is reaching back to the Greek conception of humanity, gesturing toward a de-structuralist stance, an annihilation, which breaks down the separation between individuals as a mode of being. Nietzsche’s conception of the satiric chorus and actors in Greek drama are rather congruent with Ione, Panthea and Prometheus in Shelley’s work. It is with this framing that (in rather a delightfully blasphemous parody of the Eucharist ritual and parallel to the fire-bringing act) the audience can partake in the experience of disintegration and de-struction through the body of Prometheus.

Prometheus’s speech continues, but it is (for our purposes) merely the development of the themes already established. Prometheus renders the Enemy subject position more human by revealing the extent of the injustice performed by the Tyrant Jupiter in his exercise of the ban. By
scoring off some of the more reprehensible details of the Satanic character, pity and sympathy become far easier to come by for Prometheus. Shelley makes the Enemy visibly a pitiable and sympathetic and human character, one that collaborates with an audience. In that collaboration, the Enemy points to itself as apart, under de-struction, in an agony which submerges the typical features of the subject. This is a promising break with Enemy Life as the West has inherited it.

**Prometheus and The Earth**

The further humanization and revealing of the Enemy takes place in the relationships that Shelley depicts between Prometheus, his mother the Earth, Mercury and the Furies. The poem progresses with Prometheus forgoing revenge and experiencing pity for Jupiter. It is at this point that he bids the spirits of the world to speak with him. Eventually, they appear before him, express their sympathy for him and declare the rule of Jupiter a tyranny. But no expression is more poignant than when Prometheus cries out and The Earth, Gaia, Prometheus’ mother appears before him and proclaims:

> The tongueless Caverns of the craggy hills  
> Cried, "Misery!" then; the hollow Heaven replied,  
> "Misery!" And the Ocean's purple waves,  
> Climbing the land, howled to the lashing winds, [1.110]  
> And the pale nations heard it, "Misery!"  

Prometheus responds in despair, asking why the Earth and his brethren are silent in knowledge of his suffering:

> Mother, thy sons and thou  
> Scorn him, without whose all-enduring will  
> Beneath the fierce omnipotence of Jove, [1.115]  
> Both they and thou had vanished, like thin mist  
> Unrolled on the morning wind. Know ye not me,  
> The Titan? He who made his agony  
> The barrier to your else all-conquering foe?...
Why scorns the spirit which informs ye, now
To commune with me? me alone, who checked, [1.125]
As one who checks a fiend-drawn charioteer,
The falsehood and the force of him who reigns
Supreme, and with the groans of pining slaves
Fills your dim glens and liquid wildernesses:
Why answer ye not, still? Brethren! (Prometheus Unbound 1.113-130)

There are a number of ways this dialogical lamentation by the Earth and Prometheus moves Prometheus from the Enemy subject-position and makes him tangibly a figure of pitiable humanity. The first appears out of another trope of Romanticism: the externalizing movement of the speaker’s experience and emotion as projected out onto the world and its eventual acceptance and return.

This externalizing movement long been part of the reading of Romanticism-- since the time of Wordsworth, in fact. It appears rendered in M.H. Abrams’ lengthy exploration of the period in Natural Supernaturalism as Wordsworth’s (and inherently his disciples) program of poetry:

“For the poet will proclaim how exquisitely an individual mind-and perhaps the developing mind of generic man as well-is fitted to the external world, and the external world to the mind and how the two are able to beget a new world… (Abrams 27)

This is the relationship that exists in the cries of Prometheus and the cries of the Earth. The world and being are entangled. In the tradition of Wordsworth, this movement involves a certain amount of agency or direction on the part of speaker, and grants him or her a kind of divinity or privilege (in)sight, hence the importance of the individual mind of the poet. But this externalizing movement departs from that tradition. The movement begins from a speaker without agency, who has experienced a disintegration of his subjectivity under the correction of Power. Prometheus’ response to his mother’s voice shows a being who feels abandoned, without the means to repair his de-situation. The Enemy is emptied. and he believes that his conflict was
initiated not on his own behalf, not just for the many faceless beings of humanity, but for his mother, the Earth, who suffered an “all-conquering foe” in the tyrant Jupiter.

This movement represents another departure from the traditional subject and space-structuring of *Paradise Lost*. (God viewing down omnisciently and Satan delusionally attempting the same in a reiteration of sovereign agency.) In tension with this original reality, Prometheus’ lamentation, echoed by his mother, is not the apprehension of the world that occurs from God’s panoptic view. It is not a viewing at all. The externalizing movement is communicated by auditory cues in a form of an isolated search which suspends his subjectivity and philosophy. Prometheus’ agonistic cry denotes a “listening being” in the way that Nancy formulates it.

To understand the transformation of externalizing trope, one might note Nancy’s description of sound’s referrals and its resonance with the description of Wordsworth’s “program”:

Sound is also made of referrals: it spreads its space, where it resounds while still resounding “in me” as we say…In the external or internal space it resounds, that is, it re-emits itself while still actually sounding which is already re-sounding since there’s nothing else but referring back to itself (Nancy 8).

The transgressive quality of sound, which passes through external and internal space indifferently, seems to operate much as the Wordsworth’s conception of the relationships between mind and nature via the visual field. What Nancy’s concept seems to better realize is a natural fluidity between subject and object. There is a sense that through the awareness of the sound of oneself that less information (or knowledge) is lost in the referral, especially because the subject is neutralized by the process.
This is the mode of externalization that is taking place via Prometheus’ cry out to the Earth. In its pathos, Prometheus’ cry washes over his subjectivity and transgresses through his being. One might call it a *piercing* cry. In his agony, Prometheus cannot “view” himself as an object. He can, in (perhaps Keatsian) negativity, merely cry out and listen for himself being brought by his Mother, the Earth. It is in this way that the auditory search of Prometheus is not hierarchical, but in essence, horizontal and collaborative. It does not conquer nor control. The Earth’s relationship with Prometheus is defined by auditory cue which searches for a listener, another, an ally, some sense of comfort. It is the Mother-Earth that comforts Prometheus, not because he demands it, but because he too is deserving of comfort. It is in this way that Shelley moves the Enemy into the realm of the human and attempts to re-think what the human being is. Beyond merely being an object which is apprehended by a sovereign vision, the being of the Enemy sounds a piercing, transgressive cry which begs comfort and collaborative aid.

Beyond this rather significant twist on the trope, by having the world cry out “misery” Shelley renders Prometheus’s suffering more evident and his being more human in the poetry itself. Misery appears in the world as “hollow Heaven” and an “Ocean lashed by winds” amongst other images of a stricken world. These are descriptors which communicate an empty visual field and agony via a sound, respectively. Prometheus’ suffering is not only his own, but also the Earth’s. This reality might be conceived differently if Prometheus were not an Enemy to Power, if he were determinedly projecting his pain out into the world. This would be a movement very much like Satan’s attempt make a heaven of hell. But Prometheus is prostrate, yet still the Earth, (his mother) hears and is touched by his pain. The Enemy’s pain is not apart-from but connected to and felt by the world. It is the sounding and resounding of pain by subject and world. The world that Shelley envisions hears the Enemy as its suffering son and his wounds are
transfigured on the surface of the Earth. This is how Shelley conceives the Enemy subject position, a far cry from the disconnected treatment and sterilizing and even purifying punishment of Satan in Hell.

Shelley further develops Prometheus’ being in the speech that shortly follows the initial dialogue between Prometheus and the Earth. The Earth seeking to comfort Prometheus recounts both her joy at his birth and her grief at his fate at the hands of Jupiter. Affirming their bond, confirming his desolate cry for her she says:

I am the Earth,
Thy mother; she within whose stony veins,
To the last fibre of the loftiest tree
Whose thin leaves trembled in the frozen air, [1.155]
Joy ran, as blood within a living frame,
When thou didst from her bosom, like a cloud
Of glory, arise, a spirit of keen joy!...

…When Plague had fallen on man, and beast, and worm,
And Famine; and black blight on herb and tree;
And in the corn, and vines, and meadow-grass,
Teemed ineradicable poisonous weeds [1.175]
Draining their growth, for my wan breast was dry
With grief; and the thin air, my breath, was stained
With the contagion of a mother's hate
Breathed on her child's destroyer…

(Prometheus Unbound I 152-180)

These lines postulate the response, the resounding of the world and other beings to the searching desolate cry of the Enemy. Its sound triggers recollection and moves the Earth from “stony veins” to “clouds of glory” a transformation which indicates a return to animate life. This is how Enemy Life’s disintegrated being touches, transgresses and even seems to restore other beings-in-the-world.

The lines also provide Prometheus with an understandable narrative. Prometheus was once beloved and is still grievable. He once appeared “a spirit of keen joy” to his mother and
upon his fall, his mother fell into such a grief that she was incapable of containing her sorrow to the extent that all her aspects which touch human life suffered. There is an elegance in Shelley’s representation of the Earth as both the world and a mother. A mother’s reaction to such suffering is understandable, but by crafting a linkage between world and mother, Shelley makes it apparent that this should be a universal, human reaction to the treatment of an Enemy to Power.

**Defying the Ban, Claiming the Human**

At this point, the narrative briefly flashes back to Prometheus’ ancient confrontation with Jupiter. The phantasm of Prometheus proclaims:

Fiend, I defy thee! with a calm, fixed mind,  
All that thou canst inflict I bid thee do;  
Foul Tyrant both of Gods and Human-kind,  
One only being shalt thou not subdue. [1.265]  
Rain then thy plagues upon me here,  
Ghastly disease, and frenzying fear;  
And let alternate frost and fire  
Eat into me, and be thine ire  
Lightning, and cutting hail, and legioned forms [1.270]  
Of furies, driving by upon the wounding storms.  

Ay, do thy worst. Thou art omnipotent.  
O'er all things but thyself I gave thee power,  
And my own will. Be thy swift mischiefs sent  
To blast mankind, from yon ethereal tower. [1.275]  
Let thy malignant spirit move  
In darkness over those I love:  
On me and mine I imprecate  
The utmost torture of thy hate;  
And thus devote to sleepless agony, [1.280]  
This undecaying head while thou must reign on high.

But thou, who art the God and Lord: O, thou,  
Who fillest with thy soul this world of woe,  
To whom all things of Earth and Heaven do bow  
In fear and worship: all-prevailing foe! [1.285]  
I curse thee! let a sufferer's curse  
Clasp thee, his torturer, like remorse;  
Till thine Infinity shall be
A robe of envenomed agony;  
And thine Omnipotence a crown of pain, [1.290]  
To cling like burning gold round thy dissolving brain.

Heap on thy soul, by virtue of this Curse,  
Ill deeds, then be thou damned, beholding good;  
Both infinite as is the universe,  
And thou, and thy self-torturing solitude. [1.295]  
An awful image of calm power  
Though now thou sittest, let the hour  
Come, when thou must appear to be  
That which thou art internally;  
And after many a false and fruitless crime [1.300]  
Scorn track thy lagging fall through boundless space and time.  
(Prometheus Unbound 1.262-301)

There is much one can make of Prometheus’ speech and the blend of Shakespearean and Miltonian influence in its crafting. One hears notes of King Lear in the early description of the elements’ assault on him. This may be as good an indication as any that Shelley is revealing the Enemy-exile as the human being. The heath scene which this speech echoes is a moment in Shakespeare’s tragedy where the aged king is calling his intensely human soul into being while absolutely and utterly isolated and exiled:

Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! rage! blow!  
You cataracts and hurricanoes, spout  
Till you have drench’d our steeples, drown’d the cocks!  
You sulphurous and thought-executing fires,  
Vaunt-couriers to oak-cleaving thunderbolts,  
Singe my white head! And thou, all-shaking thunder,  
Smite flat the thick rotundity o’ the world!  
Crack nature’s moulds, an germens spill at once,  
That make ingrateful man! (King Lear III.ii 1-9)

The language resonates and this should already indicate that Prometheus is rather human in his struggle with Power. But the way this language produces a sense of humanity is quite striking when one considers what has already been theorized of the ban. What Lear and Prometheus’ intertwined language shows is a demand to be (further) stricken in defiance of
supreme violence. The banning action was and continues to be demanded because it creates, in a flash, the human condition: exilic and Enemy. Shelley formulates human being quite like Agamben does in the early moments of *Homo Sacer*. The differing difference is that Lear and Prometheus seem to sense possibilities of being emerging from the “crack” of the ban which destructures traditional subjectivity. They claim the space of apartness, the zone of indistinction, as the human condition and think *from* it, human being begins.

It is in this context that there is (in Lear and) Prometheus a decidedly incriminating tone to this defiance, which invites the use of the sovereign ban. With the invocation “Fiend, I defy thee! with a calm, fixed mind, /All that thou canst inflict I bid thee do”. “Strike me down!” Prometheus invites violence, that the world might better see Jupiter’s monstrosity. Prometheus, in this way, wrests agency from Jupiter, using the banning action to point to himself as an Enemy made in and by injustice. This is a reiteration of the indexical function that the Enemy embodies in Shelley’s view.

If Prometheus touches the human through his dialogue with Lear, there is also a spectral presence of Milton’s Satan in this first stanza. One recalls Satan shortly after the fall:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{…What though the field be lost? [ 105 ]} \\
\text{All is not lost; the unconquerable Will,} \\
\text{And study of revenge, immortal hate,} \\
\text{And courage never to submit or yield:} \\
\text{And what is else not to be overcome?} \\
\text{That Glory never shall his wrath or might [ 110 ]} \\
\text{Extort from me. To bow and sue for grace} \\
\text{With suppliant knee, and deifie his power… (Paradise Lost 1.105-112)}
\end{align*}
\]

This Satanic stance surely informs the lines which Prometheus speaks, representing an utter resistance and apartness from God/Power. But given that this influence is interwoven with that of Shakespeare’s quite human Lear, this resistance to Power takes on a different character.
Prometheus deploys language of the Enemy and the human at the same time. The two discourses are entangled, interwoven working to the same rhetorical end: to show the Enemy is a human being. As much as Shelley invokes the classic myth, he is moving Prometheus in to the realm of the human, perhaps to the same degree that Shelley imagined Milton to have moved Satan.

Shelley further moves the Satanic defiance into a more human context, beginning with his description of Prometheus’ “calm, fixed mind”. Nowhere in the lines devoted to Satan in *Paradise Lost* is there a sense that his *non-serviam* originates in calm determination. The Enemy in that poem is envious, vengeful, delusional. Here, the Enemy appears far more rational, as if his objections and disruptions of Power stem from principles not merely emotions. This is an Enemy whom one can see as having a valid (metaphysical and philosophical) position, even in displacement or being-apart. Prometheus is “fixed” which is to say resolute but also clearly indicates stability, and less overtly, a position, a stance to be in. A stance which Prometheus, apart from Power has made for himself and others in his defiance.

This calm resoluteness affects the narrative of defiance Shelley is building. Over the course of the first half of the speech, Shelley shows that Prometheus understands what Satan never could: that his war with God/Power is, in a certain way, a hopeless struggle. Prometheus cannot overcome Jupiter, yet still he defies him: “Ay, do thy worst. Thou art omnipotent./O'er all things but thyself I gave thee power./And my own will.” It is an interesting almost paradoxical statement of Enemy apartness. Jupiter is seemingly omnipotent, but Prometheus is able to deny him his free will and Prometheus does not at any point embark upon a delusion of self-aggrandizement.

This is quite a change from Satan’s statement that he is: “One who brings/A mind not to be chang'd by Place or Time. /The mind is its own place, and in it self/Can make a Heav'n of
Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.” It demonstrates Prometheus’ clarity of vision and thereby shifts his representation. Prometheus is not criminally mad and he is capable of the same rationality usually attributed only to “obedient humanity”. This is a being who does not necessarily set out to defy Power in pride or madness, rather the Enemy appears to experience a separation of consciousness from Power’s ideology and merely seeks to retain that separation. This alteration seems a far lesser transgression and legitimizes Prometheus’ resistant stance.  

Now clearly his own paradoxical being, a blend of the human and the Enemy, in the last half of the speech, Prometheus characterizes the ban as a double-sided curse. This curse will eventually rebound and effect the isolation exile and destruction of the Tyrant Jupiter. This is the uncoupling of the sovereign violence and its supposed justice in the same moment as the union is supposedly achieved. Equally interesting is the further context that Shelley has created. In the opening speech of the drama, Prometheus, recants his own curse. In this way Prometheus seeks a way out from the cycle of revolution and violence, of ban, upon ban, upon ban that has plagued human history.

During his confrontation with Jupiter, Prometheus posits a sovereign who by the violence of the ban is cursed by the sufferer:

I curse thee! let a sufferer's curse
Clasp thee, his torturer, like remorse;
Till thine Infinity shall be
A robe of envenomed agony;
And thine Omnipotence a crown of pain,

---

8 It is through this same language that Prometheus’ defiance represents the possibilities of human resistance when it confronts the infinities of Death, Time, God, Nature and perhaps sovereign Power itself. It is this way that Prometheus’ essential divinity at a Titan is brought into immersive contact with the human condition. Byron in his own works in the Satanic School will further explore this theme, (especially in Manfred) but Shelley’s use of it here fills the confrontation between Prometheus and Jupiter with a noble and quite human pathos.
To cling like burning gold round thy dissolving brain. *(Prometheus Unbound* 1.286-291)

Prometheus demonstrates an unperceived action that occurs when the sovereign ban is carried out. Prometheus is attempting to afflict the sovereign with the effect of his own violence through his vocal protest and the infliction of “remorse”. “Remorse” seems to be a guilt-stained parallel of the pity and grievability of Prometheus’ other more humane relationships. In this way there is a certain amount of resistant agency on the part of the banned being during the banning action. The intent of this resistance is that when the sufferer can make their suffering apparent and visible, the transcendental action of the ban becomes a form of ban upon the sovereign itself. Shelley posits this in the lines “Till thine Infinity shall be/ A robe of envenomed agony;/thine Omnipotence a crown of pain”. This suggests that the transcendental violence of the ban, which places Power perpetually outside the world, inherently exiles it. This is the sufferer’s curse that corresponds to the sovereign’s ban. It appears an effective tactic, for the sovereign, via this protest, becomes placed in a similar position as the banned being. The endless potentiality of nomos thereby becomes a “zone of indistinction” as Agamben puts it, or to use Shelley’s language a “endless” “self-torturing solitude.”

This is the curse that Prometheus places on Jupiter during the moment of their confrontation. If Prometheus should be banned, then the sovereign who banned him unjustly surely deserves an equal fate. But Shelley proceeds further than this, because it is this congruency that he views as the problem. Prometheus realizes, after three thousand years of history repeating itself, that his sufferer’s curse is not the best way out of the Power relationship. He has experienced the brutal effects of the ban and thereby has the bodily knowledge, the scars that prove bans and curses cannot work. And finally, after undergoing a disintegration of his subjectivity, after crying out in agony for aid, he comes to realize that his prophesy of the
downfall of the Tyrant cannot unfold justly in the pain of his sufferer’s curse. Misery has made him wise, or perhaps as one might reframe it, the Enemy subject position has granted him insight and possibly a way out. It is for this reason that Prometheus’ rescinds his curse and thereby enables his fellow beings to act on his behalf to restore him.

**Mercury and the Furies: Divergent Participants in the Ban**

The opening act progresses to a moment where Mercury, the messenger of the gods, arrives at the site of Prometheus’ torture alongside the Furies, guiding them to carry out their work. Mercury witnesses Prometheus’ affliction and briefly intervenes on his behalf, halting the further punishment of his agents, the Furies. In these lines, Shelley invokes echo of Milton’s pursuing loyal angels in the Furies. He also foils these figures with a Mercury who is moved to pity by Prometheus’ condition. In the negotiation of these two beings, Shelley theorizes a new view of the Enemy and reveals a change in a figure aligned with the dispersal of Power. Through the diverging course of Mercury and the Furies, Shelley demonstrates that those who perform the correction of the Enemy can have the ban’s injustice revealed to them. Equally, those that are not capable or willing to pity are not “good citizens of Power” but accomplices to atrocity. This stance restores agency, the possibility of breaking *out*, to the peripheral parties in the banning act, representing the new possibilities Prometheus reveals as a transgressive, Enemy, a bringer of (self) knowledge.

When they are introduced, Mercury and the Furies both agents of Jupiter. Panthea and Ione proclaim their arrival together:

Ione: …A Shape comes now,  
Stretching on high from his right hand  
A serpent-cinctured wand.  
Panthea: Tis Jove's world-wandering herald, Mercury...
(now spying the furies)

...These are Jove's tempest-walking hounds,
Whom he gluts with groans and blood,
When charioted on sulphurous cloud
He bursts Heaven's bounds. (*Prometheus Unbound* 1.322-334)

But from this arrival together, the Furies and Mercury proceed diverge in their treatment of Prometheus. The Furies are intent on their torturous work and quickly take to performing it:

First Fury: Ha! I scent life!
Second Fury: Let me but look into his eyes!
Third Fury: The hope of torturing him smells like a heap
Of corpses, to a death-bird after battle.
First Fury: Darest thou delay, O Herald! take cheer, Hounds
Of Hell: what if the Son of Maia soon
Should make us food and sport — who can please long
The Omnipotent? (*Prometheus Unbound* 1.337-343)

It is at this point that Mercury drives the Furies back and immediately makes known why he does so in his address of Prometheus:

Mercury: Back to your towers of iron,
And gnash, beside the streams of fire and wail, [1.345]
Your foodless teeth…

(To Prometheus)

...Awful Sufferer!
To thee unwilling, most unwillingly
I come, by the great Father's will driven down,
To execute a doom of new revenge. [1.355]
Alas! I pity thee, and hate myself
That I can do no more: aye from thy sight
Returning, for a season, Heaven seems Hell,
So thy worn form pursues me night and day,
Smiling reproach. Wise art thou, firm and good, [1.360]
But vainly wouldst stand forth alone in strife
Against the Omnipotent; as you clear lamps
That measure and divide the weary years
From which there is no refuge, long have taught
And long must teach. Even now thy Torturer arms [1.365]
With the strange might of unimagined pains
The powers who scheme slow agonies in Hell,
And my commission is to lead them here,
Or what more subtle, foul, or savage fiends
People the abyss, and leave them to their task. [1.370]
Be it not so!...

(Prometheus Unbound 1.344-370)

It is in this way that Mercury, the messenger of the gods, is shown to be, an unwilling and at least uncertain ally of Jupiter. Conceptually, there is no figure in Milton that corresponds to him, the only being near his existence are the angels that defend Eden, but they are made so as not to be swayed. Mercury represents a being that is open to persuasion and to his credit, his inescapable reaction to Prometheus’ torture is one of pity. This is a reiteration of the reframing of the ban that Prometheus performs through his agony. Mercury hates himself because he cannot help Prometheus and because the sight of his “worn body” “pursues” him in “smiling reproach”. In a shadow of the banning act, the spectral chase of Prometheus’ worn body, (akin to the pursuit of the angels and furies) is a haunting of Mercury which wakes him from his complicity. This clearly an effect of the indexical force of the body that was invoked earlier.

Prometheus’ agonistic body has not only an effect on Ione and Panthea but also a less attuned being or audience. Prometheus’ representation theorizes that the Enemy that can sufficiently disrupt the accepted viewing of its existence. Disruption of Power’s schema is possible. It is possible to show sovereign justice as violence to the passerby, the disinterested observer: thus Mercury calls Jupiter the “Torturer”. The Enemy can involve against the designs of Power, and thereby make allies. His exile from the community is not immutable. In fact, creating this social bond through observation may be the only task he can perform as his subjectivity disintegrates. This is clearly progress from the Enemy of Paradise Lost, who despite his rallying of the fallen angels both in heaven and hell can only parodically emulate the
hierarchy of heaven and as a commander re-think the old forms of discipline in his relation to other beings.

It is because of this involving disruption that Mercury perceives and declares not only that the ban of Prometheus is unjust but also that the Enemy of Jupiter is “wise” firm and “good”. Mercury also confirms that Prometheus’ perception of his situation as accurate when laments that: “But vainly wouldst stand forth alone in strif/ Against the Omnipotent”. This acknowledgement of existence and perception represents the kind of recognition that Satan never receives in *Paradise Lost*. Mercury, a being not bound to Prometheus can see that the Enemy is not monstrous, mad or criminal. It is from this relatively simple but empathic moment of recognition and pity that Mercury’s alliance with Jupiter, his bond, his participation in the society Jupiter oversees begins to fray: “Be it not so!” Mercury proclaims, declaring the act reprehensible and violence, not justice.

This exclamation represents the possibility of revealing the Enemy as a human being to those not necessarily disposed to see them so. It is the potency of Prometheus’ indexical function, his willingness to be banned, to endure defiantly the torture of the ban, and to confront the injustice of it which makes this revelation possible.

But this passage develops Prometheus’ being further as a performative agent. Shelley seems to zero in on the nature of this ability as the exchange between Mercury and Prometheus continues. Prometheus reiterates his defiance, despite Mercury’s request to submit and prophesying a new vision:

... I will not yield.
Let others flatter Crime, where it sits throned
In brief Omnipotence: secure are they:
For Justice, when triumphant, will weep down
Pity, not punishment, on her own wrongs…

(To which Mercury replies:) “Oh, that we might be spared: I to inflict
And thou to suffer!” (Prometheus Unbound 1.400-412)

These lines work toward revealing what it is to be an Enemy to Power in Shelley’s viewing. Prometheus will not flatter Power by submission or recognition. He will speak to truth to Power, no matter the consequence.

This is a twist on the Enemy being, one that seems to be in dialogue with a concept Foucault plays with in his work exploring parrhesia, or the practice of truth-telling. Foucault explored this concept as a possible political mechanism in the later part of his career. The work Courage of Truth, a manuscript of his last class at College de France, describes the practitioner of parrhesia:

The parrhesiast gives his opinion, he says what he thinks, he personally signs, as it were, the truth he states, he binds himself to this truth, and he is consequently bound to it and by it (Courage of Truth 11).

Prometheus, bound by the truth he has and would speak to Power, is a practitioner of parrhesia. He risks his entire being in the encounter. Perhaps showing the particular cluster of destructuring that Foucault and Shelley are exploring is Foucault’s description of what parrhesia is in the Greek tradition of Demosthenes:

Parrhesia is therefore ‘telling all,’ but tied to the truth: telling the whole truth, hiding nothing of the truth, telling the truth without hiding it behind anything (Courage of Truth 10).

This definition seems to align rather well with the Heideggerian concept of “revealing” that Shelley’s Prometheus seems to embody metaphorically as the bringer of fire. Inherent to Prometheus’s parrhesia is the performative aspect of the practice (which ties his speech and his body intrinsically together). Foucault speaks of parrhesia as a game that sovereign parrhesiast
and audience “play”. This is quite close to this scenario one encounters between Prometheus, Jupiter and Mercury. The difference is merely for whom is the game played and the stakes of the game itself. (In fact, it is, more succinctly put, the difference between the playful game and the somber ritual of the ban.) Quite aware that he places his life at stake that he risks the ban, Prometheus performs defiant truth-telling. He does so not for Power, but for the audience, among whom Mercury is one, to evidence the truth. This would seem to shift the focus of the game of parrhesia from the sovereign to the audience, as the parrhesiast is speaking Truth for them.

This scenario is precisely aligned with the myth that Shelley is tapping into. It also rather poignantly frames an essential reality: Power as it is constituted is unwilling to engage in the “game” of parrhesia. It views and calls such beings Enemies, exiles, protesters, rioters, dissidents and denizens and treats them as such. The practice of denouncing the media, watchdog organizations, activists is an active measure against the practice of parrhesia, emulating the ceremony of ban in its combustive rhetoric, attempting to cleanse Power from its blasphemy contact with transgressive exilic figures.

It is through witnessing of Prometheus’s courageous truth telling and the agony it produces that Mercury finally seems able to see. This allows him to accurately reflect on his complicity in the work of punishment that Jupiter has laid out for him. The reaction is one of appropriate horror: “Oh, that we might be spared: I to inflict/And thou to suffer!”. He is “woke” to use the current popular parlance.

In this way, one gains another aspect of Shelley’s Enemy. Prometheus exists, defies, resists as way for the observer, the passerby, even the participant in Power’s rituals to see and experience the disintegrative effects of the ban. Shelley also makes a compelling argument for the practice and performance of truth-telling. It may be that the Enemy will never unseat Power
from its discipline, but the persuasive effect of his agony may reframe the reality of the Enemy
(and themselves) to those who witness the ban. The Enemy body speaks. This transforms the
scenario one observed with Milton’s Satan. Unlike Satan, who supposedly corrupts and deludes
Eve with dangerous knowledge, Prometheus elicits self-knowledge in the form of his own
sacrificial body, freeing those that look on him from the delusions Power has crafted about their
existence. This knowledge is partaken not only by Prometheus’s allies, but in Mercury, who
though he is at first a participant in Power’s plan, becomes a collaborative figure of resistance.

The Furies

It is for this performance of truth-telling and revealing that the Furies call Prometheus:
“Champion of Heaven's slaves!” It is a term of derision, indicative of how these cruel creatures
of punishing Power are represented: Prometheus, the Enemy, is deemed so because he acts on
behalf of humanity rather than Power. The Furies appear to be beings who are not just
instruments of Punishment, but beings who take joy in and embody degradation and torture.
They are beings without pity. Because of this, they are beings bound to a daily cycle of violence
that comes to form the longer cycle of human history and traditional subjectivity.

The Furies frame a dark destiny for humanity, one that is logical progression of their role
as the executors of Power’s “justice”. The First Fury makes this known in their introduction:

We are the ministers of pain, and fear,
And disappointment, and mistrust, and hate,
And clinging crime; and as lean dogs pursue
Through wood and lake some struck and sobbing fawn, [1.455]
We track all things that weep, and bleed, and live,
When the great King betrays them to our will. (Prometheus Unbound
1.452-457)
This is how Shelley frames those beings who willing participate in Power’s administration of punishment. The Furies are “ministers of pain” which suggests that they offer the sovereign worship by violence. It is a reiteration of the banning ritual, the Furies cleansing themselves of pity in their chase. Even this in cleansing however, the Furies live an exilic, fringe existence. In their dark way, they recall the citizen, Adam guided by providence, as they are guided by Jupiter to their work. The Furies represent a vision of humanity that has been purified of pity. They clearly do so when they attack Prometheus. But what is communicated in the lines above (especially “We track all things that weep, and bleed, and live”) is the target of the Furies violence matters little to them. This is rather more bloodthirsty compared to Milton’s angels: “His Ministers of vengeance and pursuit” as Satan calls them in Book I, but the intent is same and the phrasing is resonant.

Shelley is framing the Enemy-pursuing angels into Furies, the former a relatively pure instrument, completely subjected to use of God, the latter beings who take sport in killing flies (to borrow once again from Lear). The depiction is a condemnation of complicity with Power, the reaping of the benefits of the sovereign compact which expels and exposes the Enemy. There is no way to remain angelically pure, a good citizen, if one is performing torturous work. The purifying ritual is a bloody one.

Such daily work is an apocalyptical destiny for the human being and human societies. Shortly after their arrival, The Chorus of the Furies sing a song which seems diametrically opposed to the utopian, prophetic visions of Prometheus:

From the ends of the earth, from the ends of the earth, [1.495]
Where the night has its grave and the morning its birth,
Come, come, come!
Oh, ye who shake hills with the scream of your mirth,
When cities sink howling in ruin; and ye
Who with wingless footsteps trample the sea, [1.500]  
And close upon Shipwreck and Famine's track,  
Sit chattering with joy on the foodless wreck;  
    Come, come, come!  
Leave the bed, low, cold, and red,  
Strewed beneath a nation dead; [1.505]  
Leave the hatred, as in ashes  
    Fire is left for future burning;  
It will burst in bloodier flashes  
    When ye stir it, soon returning:  
Leave the self-contempt implanted [1.510]  
In young spirits, sense-enchanted,  
    Misery's yet unkindled fuel:  
Leave Hell's secrets half unchanted  
    To the maniac dreamer; cruel  
More than ye can be with hate [1.515]  
    Is he with fear.  
    Come, come, come!  
We are steaming up from Hell's wide gate  
    And we burthen the blast of the atmosphere,  
But vainly we toil till ye come here. (Prometheus Unbound 1.495-520)

This is the song of the Furies as they begin their work torturing Prometheus. It is an invocation of the apocalypse, not just in Biblical or metaphorical terms but in worldly reality: the refrain “come, come, come” is addressed to the worst parts of humanity and human beings. Follow us in this chase, the Furies sing, that we might bring Hell with all its indiscriminate disciplines to Earth. Thus, rather disturbingly, the song functions to unite the Furies in their zeal to destroy the Enemy’s body, and create a violent, frenzied state in its purging pitiless emptiness. One can appreciate the parody that this song of the Furies seems to present: it represents an outward abyss which threatens’ to engulf Prometheus as he descends and disintegrates from his subjectivity. The song of the Furies, a song of conflagration and homogenization, seems to seek to drown out the agonistic cry of the Enemy being as it searches.

Filling in the visual field of the song, the imagery of embered ashes giving way to future violence suggests that these creatures of torment would see malice and resentment sewn into the
fabric of human society and the human being and this is made explicit in the lines: “Leave the self-contempt implanted/ In young spirits, sense-enchanted,/ Misery's yet unkindled fuel”. This is clearly a song that brings death and life into a tightly bound relationship: the life of a “Fury” is a life that is devoted to bringing forth violent punishment and death. A Fury is the poetic embodiment of thanato-politics.

One should not delude oneself that Shelley depicts these Furies as merely supernatural agents in his political allegory. Barely beneath the surface is the reality of a human being in compact with tyrannical power. This song of the Furies and their daily cyclical action of punishment represents the Enemy’s view of the supposedly human continuation of the ban’s union of violence and justice. Punishment is how Shelley views traditional subjectivity, human being as it has been constituted. The participation of the Furies in emulation and further pursuit of the banning action is the act that disperses Power’s discipline. The action is dual-sided: the furies in their punishment further destroy the Enemy to Power and (in their song and their punititive action) make themselves less capable of pity and therefore human in the process. Thus this “song” of torture and self-effacement is the dialectic force that Shelley posits as the engine of the Western cycle of tyranny. This is the being that Shelley is attempting to find his way out of.

Thus, in this representation of the Furies, the wretched reality is made sensible. Prometheus, because he is the Enemy and because he is now visibly human, brings a self-reflective knowledge about society’s ideology. What one sees through him, in him and his agony is an interpolated frame of the entire system of Power relations, the world-view which becomes projected and instantly visible. This is a function of his being as it is witnessed in its truth-telling performance. The Enemy can involve the disinterested other because of the extremity of his
condition and defiance and equally expose the atrocity of Power and the pitiless “human beings” who are Power’s accomplices. Shelley is quite astute, Prometheus is a bringer of knowledge, he is a lens that performs reframing, driven by pity, driving human beings in turn to pity him.

**Ending the Opening Act: Prophecy and Collaboration**

In the denouement of this scene of torture, the opening act concludes with Prometheus prophesying a future which perceives the end of tyranny. Shelley ties the violence with the revealing work Prometheus has already performed quite closely. Prometheus experiences the sublime once again in the throes of agony and reports this truth while still recovering:

*Ah woe!*
*Ah woe! Alas! pain, pain ever, for ever! [1.635]*
*I close my tearless eyes, but see more clear*
*Thy works within my woe-illumèd mind,*
*Thou subtle tyrant! Peace is in the grave.*
*The grave hides all things beautiful and good:*
*I am a God and cannot find it there, [1.640]*
*Nor would I seek it: for, though dread revenge,*
*This is defeat, fierce king, not victory.*
*The sights with which thou torturest gird my soul*
*With new endurance, till the hour arrives*
*When they shall be no types of things which are…*

*… There are two woes:*
*To speak, and to behold; thou spare me one.*
*Names are there, Nature's sacred watchwords, they*
*Were borne aloft in bright emblazonry:*
*The nations thronged around, and cried aloud,*
*As with one voice, Truth, liberty, and love!*
*Suddenly fierce confusion fell from heaven*
*Among them: there was strife, deceit, and fear:*
*Tyrants rushed in, and did divide the spoil.*
*This was the shadow of the truth I saw. (Prometheus Unbound 1.634-655)*

The meaning of this prophecy stems from the song of the furies which proceeded it. There is a tension between the two world-views and destinies. The contextual frame provides a new understanding that the Enemy’s prophecy can trusted precisely because it is apart,
oppositional, exile, Enemy. It is not a matter of seeing the world with the traditional subject’s agency: “I close my tearless eyes, but see more clear/Thy works within my woe-illumèd mind./Thou subtle tyrant!” Prometheus’ “woe-illlumed mind”. The “image” that the audience receives is not an image communicated by light, but an enshrouded truth from the grave as Shelley puts it, or the abyss. In a moment of humility, Prometheus makes an effort to suggest that his prophecy is not an accurate, static and complete image which he has mastery of. He speaks of the fact that he does not seek it, the grave’s truth, and that this prophecy is the “shadow of the truth he saw.” This is a recapitulation of the entire movement of Act I. Prometheus is destructing the tradition and attempting to find a new way out.

This is the same framing, the same Enemy subject position that Shelley has crafted throughout the opening act. The Enemy reveals a deep truth through the disintegrative performance of his body and a sublime encounter which suggests a movement away from the traditional visual metaphysics. In this way, Prometheus’s prophecy represents an interjection, a rewriting of the narrative of his Enemy existence. But now, one sees beyond the present moment, beyond the ban, so speak, and beyond the de-struction of the traditional subject. Prometheus shall remain defiant and Jupiter is “defeated” by his torture, it is not “victory”.

This interjection of a new and more accurate resounding prophecy also represents a practical way in which Prometheus as Enemy Life should be conceived. Prometheus perceives a “vision” of coming world where the sounding of “Truth, liberty, and love!” are the tenets of justice. The sublime truth is brief, and swiftly obscured by “Tyrants rushing in” but Prometheus hears it. He experiences it and he performs a breaking with the past, out of the tradition, Power relations, subjectivity. Most importantly, he communicates it to those whom he is bonded to.
Thus Prometheus entrusts his future freedom to other parties, namely Panthea and Ione, who will seek out his partner Asia in the acts that follow. This is a critical gesture of collaboration one that echoes the collaborative cry of Prometheus’ earlier disintegration. It shows the product of the tension between Shelley’s destruction of traditional visual phenomenology and Wordsworthian Romanticism. Prometheus does not save himself. He does not return from the hellspace of the mountaintop, a messiah. Instead, he speaks out his prophecy to his attendee audience. And in doing so, he demonstrates the necessity of saving the Enemy. The Acts that follow see Asia seek out the necessary elements that will produce change in the world. This is how Shelley finally frames the Enemy in Prometheus Unbound, not with a solid boundary but with a communicative transgression of boundaries. Shelley’s Enemy being is a being which sounds in exodus.

The Enemy’s Allies: Asia and Demigorgon

In order to maintain the focus of this work on the Enemy, I can only briefly address the work that Asia performs as the partner of Prometheus and his ally against the tyranny of Jupiter. But it is important to define the actions that Asia performs because, without her, Prometheus would remain bound and the rehabilitation of the Enemy would not occur. Asia is a complex being, full of hope, ability and agency who only needs the merest push to send her seeking for the means to free her friend and partner. She is a being that is defined by potentiality and by her acts. It is in this way that Shelley presents an Enemy who is connected, involved and even dependent to another (human) being, despite Power’s attempts to permanently banish him from such contact.

I would characterize Asia, the partner of Prometheus the Enemy, through two early passages in Act II and then connect her with the figure of revolution, Demigorgon. Act II opens
with Asia alone, elsewhere in the mountains, suffering as one might imagine a loved one would suffer if a tyrant found reason to punish and correct them for some slight or sin. This naturally speaks to rebounding effect of the ban. A being made an Enemy-exile makes exiles of those connected to them. Asia, perhaps unable to witness her partner’s suffering first-hand, finds herself waiting for news of Prometheus and for the coming of a springtime for her desolation and thus invokes this season of change to come.

From all the blasts of heaven thou hast descended:
Yes, like a spirit, like a thought, which makes
Unwonted tears throng to the horny eyes,
And beatings haunt the desolated heart,
Which should have learnt repose: thou hast descended [2.1.5]
Cradled in tempests: thou dost wake, O Spring!
O child of many winds! As suddenly
Thou comest as the memory of a dream,
Which now is sad because it hath been sweet;
Like genius, or like joy which riseth up [2.1.10]
As from the earth, clothing with golden clouds
The desert of our life.
This is the season, this the day, the hour;…
(Prometheus Unbound 2.1.1-13)

Asia’s speech has with Prometheus’ prophecy in Act I. The imploring invocation of Spring to arrive and inherently renew the world connects Asia to Prometheus. She is his partner, parted from him as he is parted from the world by the ban which Asia recalls in the lines: “blasts of heaven” and “cradled in tempests”. This speaks to her memory of the past and her anticipation of the “many winds” which shall bring change. One should also perceive her readiness to act upon the coming of spring and her embodiment of potentiality. Her declaration: “Thou does wake O Spring!” is insistent and knowing, but it is receptive, with a fidelity toward sensory and temporal cues that would communicate what to do. Despite the subtle suddenness of spring, which appear only as a memory in dark, deserted times, Asia is keenly aware that “this is season, this the day, the hour”. The time is now for her to begin her work. She awaits only a word from
Panthea about her partner to begin in earnest. This is the being Shelley frames human being with, this is the stance the Enemy needs to be moved into. Further, Shelley shows that the Enemy is not alone in his prophetic agonistic visions. There are others, out there in the world with similar visions, who might be stirred to action if given the merest impulse to move.

This is the word that arrives from Panthea, who brings the prophecy of Prometheus and indeed his very being, (contained within her eyes no less) transformed into a sublime guiding shadow of himself. As Asia relates it he is become the spirit of change and guidance itself, a dream as Shelley calls it:

Asia: (In Panthea’s eyes) here is a change: beyond their inmost depth I see a shade, a shape: 'tis He, arrayed [2.1.120] In the soft light of his own smiles, which spread Like radiance from the cloud-surrounded moon. Dream: “Follow! Follow!” (Prometheus Unbound 2.1.119-122)

This is the transformation of Prometheus, his decorporalization. The language is intentionally elusive, intentionally obscured. Prometheus is no longer merely a body under the treatment or ban of Power. He is now a voice, a message, a dream that allies communicate to one another that would lead the way out of the tyrannical society. The Enemy has become, in way the recalls his own initial cries to his Mother Earth, an indexical, audial cue. He is an echo of the sublime, words that haunt, stir, and provide hope. This “Follow Follow” which Prometheus has become spurs Asia to find the means to free the Enemy from his torturous exile. As Asia frames it:

It passes now into my mind. Methought As we sate here, the flower-infolding buds Burst on yon lightning-blasted almond-tree, [2.1.135] When swift from the white Scythian wilderness A wind swept forth wrinkling the Earth with frost: I looked, and all the blossoms were blown down; But on each leaf was stamped, as the blue bells
Of Hyacinth tell Apollo's written grief, [2.1.140]
O, FOLLOW, FOLLOW! (Prometheus Unbound 2.1.133-141)

Asia transforms herself and perhaps in the world itself in hearing Prometheus’s agonistic and sublime dream. The passage is full of movement: from the elusive “‘it’ passes now into my mind” to the bursting of the flowers to the sweeping of the wind to blossoms blowing down. It recalls Shelley’s “Ode to the West Wind”. This is the arrival of Spring and this is the restoration or re- framing of the world and the “self” the world is linked to. This restoration occurs via the “word” and “the wind” which to say not visual, but auditory means of interaction. It is in this way that Shelley has attempted theorize a way out of the traditional forms of world and subject.

Asia and Panthea, receptive agents of Prometheus’s instruction to “follow” embark on a journey to seek something which they do not know. They act: travel and search until eventually they come upon a rocky precipice which leads into what they will discover as the Cave of Demigorgon. Their journey represents a wandering search for means to free Prometheus from Jupiter: in the political allegory Shelley is crafting, the means for humanity to free itself from a society of tyranny. This is the being Shelley is positing for humanity. They find Demigorgon, the sublime, gazeless spirit of revolution after a scene which is framed by a rather lengthy description of an avalanche which signifies the toppling of a tyranny. After a descent into the center of the Earth (and by extension the center of the human being) Asia acts again, initiates a dialogue with Demigorgon. It is classically, an interrogation, a search for the truth:

Asia: Who made the living world?
Demogorgon: God.
Asia: Who made all
That it contains? thought, passion, reason, will, Imagination? [2.4.10]
Demogorgon: God: Almighty God.
Asia: Who made that sense which, when the winds of Spring
In rarest visitation, or the voice
Of one beloved heard in youth alone,
Fills the faint eyes with falling tears which dim [2.4.15]
The radiant looks of unbewailing flowers,
And leaves this peopled earth a solitude
When it returns no more?
Demogorgon: Merciful God.
Asia: And who made terror, madness, crime, remorse,
Which from the links of the great chain of things, [2.4.20]
To every thought within the mind of man
Sway and drag heavily, and each one reels
Under the load towards the pit of death;
Abandoned hope, and love that turns to hate;
And self-contempt, bitterer to drink than blood; [2.4.25]
Pain, whose unheeded and familiar speech
Is howling, and keen shrieks, day after day;
And Hell, or the sharp fear of Hell?
Demogorgon: He reigns. (Prometheus Unbound 2.4.7-28)

Demigorgon’s disclosure “He reigns” is the reappearance of Shelley’s deep truth (in a
cave not unlike Plato’s). Asia’s search and her interrogation, sparked by Prometheus’ voice,
reveals that God and Jupiter are not the same being, which is to say that the sovereign is not the
creator, not a transcendental figure. In this sublime encounter, just as Prometheus’ before it, there
is a fundamental dis-junction of justice and Power. Asia’s final question “who made terror,
madness, crime, remorse…” involves Foucault conception of the corrected being and exposes the
reality that sovereign Power necessitates and perpetuates the existence and use of Hell.

It is because Asia elicits this reality from Demigorgon that this moment is the second and
equal hinge of the drama. It recalls the first, (Prometheus’ agonistic disintegration) and reframes
it, showing more of the process of interrogation of subjectivity that Prometheus’ initial scene
conceals to suggest. But more than just recalling Prometheus’ disintegration, it frames the
sublime encounter as a dialogue between Asia and Demigorgon. It represents building from the
revealing moment. The symmetry is rather elegant. In Prometheus’ sublime encounter, there is
an internalized destructuring of reality. This centers being in potentiality. In Asia, the sublime
encounter appears in the externalizing action which moves centered potentiality into reality. If
Prometheus’ moment destructures the tradition and the subject, then Asia’s dialogical moment begins the process of re-making the tradition and the subject. It is in this way that Prometheus and Asia’s sublime encounters are linked, bound in a cycle whose furthermost edges of being escape tyranny’s own enclosure. This is what is suggested in the imagery of Asia’s two passages. The first passage invokes the cycle of spring through death, (the relationship of Prometheus and Asia) The second passage frames a world which is bound by a devolving cycle, a spiral of death which is the tradition of tyranny (as represented by the Power relationship between Jupiter and Prometheus).

Thus, one sees the ally, the partner of Prometheus the Enemy, begin to build from the prophecy he embodied. From this scene, the remedying work of the drama accelerates precipitously and soon after, Demigorgon confronts and topples Jupiter, dragging him down back into the abyss. Asia and Hercules free Prometheus from his bondage and they go about creating a better way of life for themselves and mankind.

The Enemy Reframed

In many ways, Shelley’s *Prometheus Unbound* works to invoke the biopolitical and narrative framing of the Satanic exile and problematize its existence. Shelley makes a concentrated effort to reveal Satan to be the human being. At the same time, Shelley rehabilitates the Enemy from its treatment by Power. In this rehabilitation, Shelley theorizes new forms of life, subjectivities and relationships for the Enemy. Shelley’s work has an almost desperate sense of escape, a seeking for a way out, for spring during winter. Clearly this resonates with our moment’s experience of the Western tradition. Shelley’s crisis, which appears so often in the agonistic mode of his poetry, mirrors our own. The tradition of being is in tension with the instinct to destruct the tradition. This is a stance of being-apart, or perhaps being-contemporary
(in Agamben’s sense of the word). Thus, what Shelley does in his work is make being-apart which is the Enemy being open to inclusion in the social structure.

The last reality that appears from Shelley’s struggle is that Prometheus ends as something quite different than Satan. Satan is from beginning to end, the Rebel Angel, an adversary to God, in perpetual struggle to overthrow and replace the tyrant. Shelley’s Prometheus begins from this position, but he changes his role from simply Enemy to that of a protestor, a performative agent, a being that gather a coalition and makes injustice visible. Prometheus reveals what the performative protestor actually is: not just a figure that is opposition to Power, but a being that attempts to be outside of the known social space, that reveals new forms of life for the human being to be in. Enemies, in this regard, become immeasurably valuable to the flexibility of our viewing of history, society, thought and perhaps critically, being. Prometheus’s representation of the Satanic exile enhances the recognizability and multiplicity of the life of Enemy Life. Power still calls this being the Enemy, still enforces its ban upon such life, but there are advantages of such a re-framing by Shelley. Prometheus, because of his apartness, because of the destructive questioning agony of his existence, can negotiate new ways of being for himself, persuade the passerby and become an echo which has resonance for others.
Chapter 4 Transgression, Movement and Byronic Exile

Shelley rehabilitates the Enemy-subject position in *Prometheus Unbound* by uncoupling the sovereign linkage between justice and violence. He does so via an agonistic visionless vision of the “truth” and the invitation of alliance and action. Reading Shelley’s work, discloses his idealistic strain of radical progressive politics. It presents an excellent nexus of theory and a long-term strategy for revealing the human being as the Enemy-exile and questioning the long-established formulation of the Western subject. But Shelley’s work has limits on what it can accomplish immediately to address the suffering of Enemy Life. Complementing this limit, Lord Byron’s work in the Satanic School, and his exodus out of it, demonstrates a de-struction of the Enemy that is similar in its ultimate aim, but tactically quite different.

Nowhere is this difference more pronounced than in Byron’s final major work in the Satanic School, *Manfred*. In *Manfred*, Byron, like Shelley before him, invokes a great deal of Satan from *Paradise Lost* and shows this character to be in essence the embodiment of the human being. Byron, however, takes a far less overtly political approach and instead of crafting a far-off prophecy of a utopian anarchist society, explores the problems of being the Enemy existentially. The result of this exploration is a meditation on the tension between defiant, painful life and suicide, the incestuous relationship with knowledge that human beings experience and the overwhelming guilt and sinfulness that the human being feels in isolation and exile. These are the themes that define Enemy, exilic experience for Byron and he reveals these positions within the scope of the human. The closet drama *Manfred* comes to stage (or frame) the human being engaging in a kind of tactical scenario, trying to find a way to survive being the Enemy and make this subject-position a viable stance to be in.
Because of what transpires in *Manfred*, and linked to its theme, Byron’s later major poem *Don Juan* echoes in many ways the poem’s essential struggle. *Don Juan*, if it can be considered with the previous works of Milton, Shelley and even Byron himself, must be conceived as a revisionary effort so complete that the frame of the Enemy as it has been traditionally rendered becomes almost transparent or even erased. Reading *Don Juan* after *Manfred*, *Manfred* becomes a metabolizing of being the Enemy. *Manfred* explores how to integrate being-apart into a social tapestry. It is because of the struggle in *Manfred* that *Don Juan* can represent Enemy Life in its exilic and transgressive aspects in a fluid, kinetic and humane manner.

Thus what Byron ultimately represents to the discourse of Enemy Life is the de-struction of the idea of an Enemy Life itself. Transgression, sin, knowledge, death, contamination, once clearly attributed to the dangerous outsider in Milton, or the included but distinctly apart figure of resistance in Shelley, all become so integrated and understandably part of the human condition that they no longer can be thought apart from it. Enemy and Life are attached and moving in orbit of one another. Enemy Life dissolves and becomes Life, which immediately recalls its Enemy aspect. This is a technique of reframing that our moment, like Byron’s, should be interested in exploring.

**The Existential Enemy**

*Manfred* is the most of complete of Byron’s works in the Satanic School. Written during a foray into the Swiss Alps in 1816, it is a closet “metaphysical drama” to use Byron’s description, with gothic, and dark Romantic features. The titular character is defined from the onset by his apartness from the world and his defiance of both human constraints and supernatural judgement or influence. The working of the drama appears to be Tragic, but because of Manfred’s immutability, the tensions are more linear and the closet drama unfolds in a
perpetual march toward a certain end, an exodus which produces meaning mostly through the gestures of struggle that Manfred makes while journeying. This struggling exodus, when read as a “metaphysical drama” becomes Byron’s representation of what it is to be a human being. This human being is Satanic in its poetic influence, and what Byron performs in elaboration on the Satanic character makes Manfred a theorization on subjectivity which dialogues in conversation with the work of Foucault, Said, Agamben and Butler.

Though there are many depictions of Manfred’s struggle to (simultaneously) live and leave throughout the text, there are three moments which best render the problems and possibilities Byron thinks inherent to an Enemy form of life. They are, sequentially, Manfred’s initial, precarious position in the first two scenes of the drama, the ritualistic summoning of Astarte undertaken by Manfred in the presence of Arimanes, and the final scene of Manfred’s perpetual defiance and exodus which ends the play. These scenes form a frame which darkly reflects the Adamic narrative with a Satanic protagonist. Thus, Byron reveals an internalized Satanic character in his human being, and demonstrates that acts of apartness and recognition of human bonds are necessary to a new negotiation between the subject, the (banning) sovereign and the world. Manfred is a poem that has productive dialogues with the work of theorists of exile as it attempts to show an Enemy human being struggling with the ideological constraints of life under Power, negotiating a place for transgression and apartness and then re-integrating these Enemy movements into the human society and being. In his own way, Byron is theorizing a way out of the traditional subject, searching for an equilibrium that balances the infinities of world, knowledge and time and even Power with the finitude of being so as to make the exilic Enemy known as the human being.
Manfred on the Precipice

The first moment of *Manfred* occurs in the first two scenes of the drama and sets the stage for the Enemy’s transformation into an entirely recognizable human being. In this moment, Byron represents Manfred as a being in crisis: caught between the transgressive, defiant nature of Satan and the melancholy of Adam after the fall. As a result of this initial crisis, the drama becomes a negotiation between the two stances of being. The resolution of *Manfred* is ambivalent, but the interest of *Manfred* is not so much the end, rather it is the struggle to reconcile these seeming oppositional beings. Thus, *Manfred* conceptually is rather well placed to address the congruent issue of integrating Enemy Life with more socially situated humanity.

Almost in direct address of this supposed separateness, Byron opens his drama with Manfred under the effect of a ban:

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Manfred: The lamp must be replenish'd, but even then
It will not burn so long as I must watch:
My slumbers -- if I slumber -- are not sleep,
But a continuance of enduring thought,
Which then I can resist not: in my heart
There is a vigil, and these eyes but close
To look within; and yet I live, and bear
The aspect and the form of breathing men.
But grief should be the instructor of the wise;
Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most
Must mourn the deepest o'er the fatal truth,
The Tree of Knowledge is not that of Life.
Philosophy and science, and the springs
Of wonder, and the wisdom of the world,
I have essayed, and in my mind there is
A power to make these subject to itself--
But they avail not: I have done men good,
And I have met with good even among men--
But this avail'd not: I have had my foes,
And none have baffled, many fallen before me--
But this avail'd not: -- Good, or evil, life,
Powers, passions, all I see in other beings,
Have been to me as rain unto the sands,
Since that all-nameless hour. I have no dread,
And feel the curse to have no natural fear,
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Nor fluttering throb, that beats with hopes or wishes,
Or lurking love of something on the earth.—
(Manfred 1.1.1-27)

With this opening, Manfred is exiled, cut off and in pain. He is quite alone, in a Gothic gallery at midnight. This situation is in concert with Prometheus and Satan before him: one can think this space as the worldly iteration of the Hellspace or the rocky Hindu Kush. It is a sacred corrective space, seemingly profaned by his presence. One cannot help but notice the burning, near-empty lamp, a flame, which recalls Satan’s fiery fall and Prometheus’ flame of knowledge. Byron links this flame to the knowledge that is “sorrow” for the duty to replenish the lamp prevents his rest just as his tormenting thoughts do. This first image, rather neatly, even mimetically (in Auerbach’s sense of the word) contains the whole drama of Manfred itself. Far from the flames of Hell or a sacred flame human knowledge, this fire is merely a lamp which provides little light and insubstantial warmth. Yet, the flickering flame and the duty Manfred owes to it is quite enough to keep one torturously awake at night. An exhausted fire, such is the tradition of knowledge as Manfred inherits it, so many years after humanity’s original sin.

Once beyond this first and rather meaningful image, there is resonance between Milton, Shelley and Byron in the characterization of Manfred. Manfred’s invocation that “grief should be the instructor of the wise” recalls Prometheus’ “misery hath made me wise”. Byron also blends Adam and Satan in this early moment. Byron’s reference to the Tree of Knowledge and “philosophy and science” (which are Adamic gifts) as well as Manfred’s assertion that his mind holds power over his situation (which defines Satanic prideful apartness) involves the Satanic narrative as well as suggesting the Adamic. Both Enemy and human life appear entangled in Manfred’s consciousness. It is in this way that one sees the bridging of Satan’s fall and
lamentation with Adam’s later lamentation after eating the apple. Satan’s lamentation in Book I strikes a certain note:

Is this the Region, this the Soil, the Clime,
Said then the lost Arch-Angel, this the seat
That we must change for Heav’n, this mournful gloom
For that celestial light? Be it so, since he [ 245 ]
Who now is Sovran can dispose and bid
What shall be right: fardest from him is best
Whom reason hath equald, force hath made supream
Above his equals. Farewel happy Fields
Where Joy for ever dwells: Hail horrous, hail [ 250 ]
Infernal world, and thou profoundest Hell
Receive thy new Possessor: One who brings
A mind not to be chang’d by Place or Time.
The mind is its own place, and in it self
Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n. (Paradise Lost, 1.242- 255)

Adam’s lamentation in Book X is in some ways similar:

O fleeting joyes
Of Paradise, deare bought with lasting woes!
Did I request thee, Maker, from my Clay
To mould me Man, did I sollicite thee
From darkness to promote me, or here place [ 745 ]
In this delicious Garden? as my Will
Concurd not to my being, it were but right
And equal to reduce me to my dust,
Desirous to resigne, and render back
All I receav’d, unable to performe [ 750 ]
Thy terms too hard, by which I was to hold
The good I sought not. To the loss of that,
Sufficient penaltie, why hast thou added
The sense of endless woes? (Paradise Lost 10.741-754)

What one perceives in Satan’s speech is a lament for his exterior condition, his banishment in Hell and a stance of defiance. What one notices in Adam’s is a bewailing of his interior conditions, his new knowledge, distance from God and a sense of utter devastation in his now worldly condition. Both lamentations clearly inform the way in which Byron constructs Manfred’s being. The combination of despair and defiance in Manfred seems to produce a
distant indifference in his character: Manfred knows that he has sinned, yet the term of his banishment has gone on for so long that he finds apartness an empty space. Thus, even from the opening, Manfred bridges Satan and Adam. Yet for the moment, there is clearly conflict within Manfred as he negotiates between a stance of defiance and one of despair. (This despair will become more prominent in the second scene of this moment wherein Manfred considers suicide.)

Developing from this conflict, and symbolic of it, there is a tendency in Manfred to be both inwardly and outwardly apart and connected to the world at the same time. Whether he “looks within” objectively or disconnectedly, does good and evil for the world and has it done on to him, at this point Manfred cannot settle into a position. He is essentially in state of restless exile. In this tenuous and unfinished bridging between Satan and Adam, Manfred appears as a being who is almost unconsciously attempting to undo the force of the ban. Manfred is hardly content to exist in his state of miserable indifference. He is a being searching for position, whether within the realm of Adam or Satan, and it seems very likely in both at the same time that will make him whole, integrated again.

This dilemma, this conflict made in linking Adam and Satan is aligned with the problem that Giorgio Agamben addresses in his work, The Use of Bodies. In The Use of Bodies, Agamben thinks on the original divergence between bios and zoe--, socially included and sacred life and bare, exposed life and the goal of dissolving this seemingly insoluble binary. The goal is to reintegrate social life with bare life, to make it impossible to expose bare life as political material. He suggests that this may be performed by linking being to the potentiality to act in a chapter called A Life Inseparable from Its Form:

A life that cannot be separated from its form is a life for which, in its mode of life, its very living is at stake, and in its living, what is at stake is first of all its mode of life. What does this expression mean? It defines a life-human life-in which
singular modes, acts, and processes of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all potential. (The Use of Bodies 207)

What Agamben gestures to is a restoration of every particular being (in its own singularity to invoke one of his earlier phrases) to human being. He does this by allowing ways of being and acts of being to be characterizations of a being’s moment. Yet Agamben declines to define being as a mode or an act. Agamben is searching for a space to facilitate a re-integration of being with the social human being. Byron explores precisely this same idea. Manfred represents a being which is Enemy to Power, and Byron consistently shows Manfred’s irreducible humanity in an internal conflict which is defined by inconsistent acts and modes. Byron forms an Enemy and exilic being which is significantly quite human. Thus, a major movement in Manfred will be incorporating Enemy apartness and defiance with the human being. To put it another way, Byron explores how Adam and Satan can exist together in the same being and by extension the same society.

**The Internalized Ban**

In the opening moment, there is a significance in Byron’s transformation of the semi-divine figures (Prometheus, Adam, and Satan) who exist in the mythic and Platonic realms into a mortal character in the real world. In this transformation, Byron again brings his Satanic figure into contact with the human being, explicitly placing the Enemy at the center (in the human consciousness itself), rather than the periphery. This is an evolutionary difference and a significant re-framing of the way Enemy Life is represented. As the fire to the lamp, Byron is naturalizing the Enemy condition, altering the mythic conflicts that once represented it and internalizing them. It is in this way that although Manfred contains supernatural elements, that these elements must clearly be read with an awareness that they are players in what is a psychological drama.
It is fitting then that Manfred’s torment is not a physical reality of displacement or overt correction but an existential experience. The ban is internalized. Exterior apartness becomes replicated within his consciousness and tied to his apartness in incestuous damning knowledge. This is first indicated when Manfred deploys language which leads inward: “in my heart/ /There is a vigil, and these eyes but close/To look within; and yet I live”. This is the language of internalization, Byron’s Manfred closes his eyes and “looks” within. What Manfred encounters there, inside, is a knowledge which is tied to sorrow. From this, there is an understanding that Manfred means his own sinning mortality, characterized in the last lines as a complete indifference to good and evil, life and death, man and God.

Given this internalized reality, Byron departs from Shelley and Milton. One does not witness the banning act of Manfred, nor does the ban take on a spectacular form of violence. Surprisingly, Byron’s ban is rather subtle. The drama begins with Manfred lingering in the effects of a ban, (which he calls a curse much like Shelley):

...I have no dread,
And feel the curse to have no natural fear,
Nor fluttering throb, that beats with hopes or wishes,
Or lurking love of something on the earth. (Manfred, 1.1.25-29)

This is language of life which is not life, life that is indifferent, static and dead, Life that is and has been made Enemy, even to itself. One might call it a description of clinical depression or a description of traditional subjectivity as it is constituted at the end of history- or to Byron’s way of conceiving it human being in the position of knowledge. But most certainly, this is language of Enemy exile. Manfred as a being is apart from the world itself and from a “love” which characterizes recognizability, grievability and connection with humanity. All of this separation and exilic being appears in Manfred not as the result of exterior force, but from the conflict of a consciousness struggling to negotiate a place.
This form of internalized exile is a being which Foucault renders visible in *Discipline and Punish* and that Freud conceives of in his work *Civilization and its Discontents*. Both Foucault and Freud point to this internalized exile as a fundamental part of the human being in society, rather than to its manifestation as the exterior Enemy.

For his part, Foucault refers to a form of internalized ban in his work. Most often he does this using the term “ideology” or by euphemistic phrases such as the deployment of disciplinary or Panoptic mechanisms. What this amounts to in Foucault’s view is a self-regulating and disciplining society, wherein the citizens correct their being themselves. As Foucault describes this system:

> In short, it arranges things in such a way that the exercise of power is not added on from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the functions it invests, but is so subtly present in them as to increase their efficiency by itself increasing its own points of contact. The panoptic mechanism is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and function, it is a way of making power relation function in a function, and of making a function function through these power relations. (*Discipline and Punish* 206-207)

This is Foucault’s description of the final form of the panoptic apparatus, which pervades Western thought. What this description entails is the immersion of the subject in a social system defined by unobservable observance, to the point where its assumption of Power (and in Agamben’s schema the right to ban) becomes a fact of existence. It is through these micro-processes of Power that Foucault formulates a subjectivity that bans itself from being, or at the very least, being in a stance apart from approved models of citizen-like subjectivity. What Foucault describes as Panoptic ideology can be conceived as anticipatory and preclusive form of the ban. It is a ban in its most elusive form, it shapes the forms of life a subject can develop into, prefiguratively restraining the human being into a position of servility. This restraint does not just operate on the Enemy, but the included, participatory citizen as well. Power can passively
form subjectivity. This is the reality that Foucault posits for the human being and already in Manfred’s opening speech there is a struggle to articulate this same artifice.

Freud, in *Civilization and its Discontents*, explores this same relationship between social ideology and the subject’s constituting consciousness, but conceives it as a more active measure. Naturally, he posits this in his own language. Freud speaks of the renunciation of certain aggressive instincts as necessary to initiate a civilization and of civilization’s further need to colonize its values in the individual, as a check on the destructive impulses of the id. As Freud puts it:

> Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it, and by setting an agency within him to watch over, like a garrison in a conquered city. (*Civilization and its Discontents* 114)

Freud calls civilization’s mastery over the individual the function of guilt, the super-ego, the conscience. In the further scope of his work, he delineates the conflict between the id and the super-ego within the subject as he or she attempts to pursue pleasure in life. But the image of the garrison in the conquered city is strikingly resonant with the theories of Panopticism that Foucault would later develop. Freud does not speculate so much on the methods and tactics that civilization deploys to contain the aggressive instinct, but his insight does provide an image of what an internalized ban might look like: artificial structures, walls, that divide, claim and surveil even the unconscious of a human being. This is language that has been deployed in this work before: it easily recalls the Hellspace of Satan and our sense of how the Enemy exile is treated. But what *Manfred* suggests is that Freud’s description of the garrison equally describes the Edenspace of Adam. Manfred, in this way, bridges the Enemy and the human being, Satan and Adam.
Conflict, Constraint and the Subject

Byron demonstrates the full effect of the internalized ban in the second scene of the drama, wherein Manfred contemplates and attempts suicide. Within the characterization is a desire to leave or escape from life, or more specifically, the constraints of life as it has been traditionally defined. Thus, Byron presents Enemy exile, incorporated into the human being, as both a banishment and a tortured desire for departure because of the internalized structure which is centered in his being.

In Manfred’s second major soliloquy, Adamic and Satanic existence is torturous and conflicted when contained within the same being. Manfred has already asked for forgetfulness from the several spirits he has summoned. He has condemned and dispatched them for seeking his fealty and been further tortured by the appearance of a phantom, whose origins remain uncertain. The next scene begins with a position of utmost (Butlerian) “precarity” and crisis. Manfred stands atop the cliffs of the Jungfrau and stares down into the abyss:

The spirits I have raised abandon me--
The spells which I have studied baffle me--
The remedy I reck'd of tortured me;
I lean no more on super-human aid,
It hath no power upon the past, and for
The future, till the past be gulf'd in darkness,
It is not of my search.-- My mother Earth!
And thou fresh breaking Day, and you, ye Mountains,
Why are ye beautiful? I cannot love ye.
And thou, the bright eye of the universe, 10
That openest over all, and unto all
Art a delight -- thou shin'st not on my heart.
(Manfred 1.2.1-14)

With these lines, Manfred performs a torturous and kinetically charged breaking, disavowing “superhuman aid”. He perceives the beauty of the world and yet resists its power. In the same movement, looking to the “bright eye of the universe” (a Panoptic sort of deity) he
denies it access to his heart. The lines, “It hath no power upon the past, and for/ The future, till the past be gulf’d in darkness, /It is not of my search.—” cut Manfred off from time itself, focusing his existence merely in the present, in the nexus of potentiality and act. This will be become typical of the characterization of Manfred. Moment to moment, his emotions and his being are in a state of flux, swaying back and forth, inward and outward, the waves of consciousness crashing within him without anticipatable direction. However, Manfred’s consciousness is crashing around something centered within it. Byron refers to this as guilt, Manfred’s secret sin and his knowledge and one can immediately understand this as the internalized ban.

This swaying motion then is truly the language of exile. It is the language of a subjectivity trying to cut off that which stabilizes and constraints it. It is an agony not unlike the physical disintegrative agony that Prometheus undergoes upon his own mountaintop. There is a similar call to the “Mother Earth”, yet Manfred’s cry is different, the Earth- the world- does not answer. Manfred is estranged, exiled. There is no one to hear him. Equally, Manfred is incapable of touching the world. He is resistant to such an act: he cannot love its beauty.

This reinforces the reality that Manfred’s being-- his supposed sin and guilt, human knowledge itself, is the origin of his conflict. Manfred claims the experience entirely for his own, for the human being itself. In his re-siting of this agony as existential, he is also, denying the transcendental ban. The efficacy of this denial is suspect, but it does seem to perform an act of being for itself. Manfred seems to be a being that cannot help but re-open his own wounds and one gets the sense that it is because the original injury has not healed properly. But this early act of denial, so very like the Satanic defiance, initiates the constant reiteration of such acts in Manfred as being the essence of being. (This emphasis on the meeting point between the
potentialities of being and the acts of being will become more meaning in the ending moment of
the drama.) The soliloquy goes on:

And you, ye crags, upon whose extreme edge
I stand, and on the torrent's brink beneath
Behold the tall pines dwindled as to shrubs
In dizziness of distance; when a leap,
A stir, a motion, even a breath, would bring
My breast upon its rocky bosom's bed
To rest for ever -- wherefore do I pause?
I feel the impulse -- yet I do not plunge
I see the peril -- yet do not recede;
And my brain reels -- and yet my foot is firm:
There is a power upon me which withholds
And makes it my fatality to live;
(Manfred 1.2.12-25)

This is Manfred’s conflict, the essence of his being. He is at a great height, elevated
above all creation, and yet a “breath” from a fatal fall. This is poignant commentary on the
human condition. The position and Manfred’s agonistic experience of it invokes the Heidegger
formulation of being—both in the world and caught by time from Being and Time when Heidegger
speaks to the nature of Dasein’s worldly alienation and its concealed falling prey:

Entangled being—in the world, is not only tempting and tranquillizing, it is at the
same time alienating… [Alienation] drives Dasein into a kind of being intent
upon the most exaggerated “self-dissection”… The tempting and tranquillizing
alienation of falling prey has its own kind of movement with the consequence that
Dasein gets tangled up in itself…. We call this kind of movement of Dasein in its
own being the plunge. (Being and Time 171)

With this discourse, Heidegger gestures to a concealed struggle within and without the
human consciousness as it exists as being-in (and out of) the world. The plunge that Heidegger
speaks of is precisely the same reality Byron describes in Manfred.

But more than the exterior metaphysical position which embodies the Heideggerian
theory of alienating being, Manfred’s interior oscillation between desiring death and refraining
from it is particularly informative. It defines the human condition for its stubborn defiance of existential agony and it does so in a way that links such existence to Satan. In this moment.

Manfred is in resonance with the passage in Book IV wherein Satan pauses, outside the boundary of Eden, before committing to his course of temptation.

Me miserable! which way shall I flie
Infinite wrauth, and infinite despaire?
Which way I flie is Hell; my self am Hell; [ 75 ]
And in the lowest deep a lower deep
Still threatening to devour me opens wide,
To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heav'n. (Paradise Lost 4.73-78)

Satan’s conflict informs Manfred’s. The chasm and Hell share the sense of a devouring abyss. The narrative moments are also linked. Satan is about to transgress the boundary of Eden, bringing with him sin, death and knowledge to mankind, while Manfred hovers near the act which shall bring about his death because of his sin and state of knowledge. But what is extenuated in Manfred is the rapidity and extremity of his despair, He is caught between, in exodus of both of life and death in the four lines: “To rest for ever -- wherefore do I pause?/I feel the impulse -- yet I do not plunge/I see the peril -- yet do not recede; /And my brain reels -- and yet my foot is firm:” These lines and the conflict they detail are explained to us by the following two lines: “There is a power upon me which withholds /And makes it my fatality to live.” These two lines gesture to the problem of Manfred’s being, a constraint he intuits exists within him.

This constraint is the internalized ban and one comes to appreciate Byron’s insight. Byron is positing that the conflict between the Adamic and Satanic modes of being might not exist were it not for the boundary, the garrison, the panoptic structure that seems set up centrally in the human being. He outlines this reality in the lines that directly follow:

If it be life to wear within myself
This barrenness of spirit, and to be
My own soul’s sepulchre, for I have ceased
To justify my deeds unto myself--
The last infirmity of evil (Manfred 1.2.26-30)

The word “sepulchre” is at the center of Byron’s meaning. It informs a being which is entombed by constraint, which is dead in life and hardly recognizable, even by Manfred himself for he says “if it be life...”. Manfred is “barren of spirit” in his current existence which recalls the origins of being that Agamben locates in Aristotle (bios and zoe), that Hegel frames in his Phenomenology of Spirit as distinguishing lord and bondsman, and to which Butler refers when she speaks of grievability: “Without grievability, there is no life, or, rather there is something living that is other than life” (Frames of War 15)

This is the reality of the human being as Enemy Life, the reality that Byron is trying to presence with Manfred. Byron ties the divisive of conflict of being directly to a form internalized ban which constrains the human being. He does so in lines that follow his experience of the plunge:

[an eagle passes]

Thou winged and cloud-cleaving minister
Whose happy flight is highest into heaven
Well mayst thou swoop so near me -- I should be Thy prey, and gorge thins eaglets; thou art gone
Where the eye cannot follow thee; but thine
Yet pierces downward, onward, or above
With a pervading vision. -- Beautiful!
How beautiful is all this visible world!
How glorious in its action and itself;
But we, who name ourselves its sovereigns, we,
Half dust, half deity, alike unfit
To sink or soar, with our mix’d essence make
A conflict of its elements, and breathe
The breath of degradation and of pride,
Contending with low wants and lofty will
Till our mortality predominates,
And men are -- what they name not to themselves
And trust not to each other. (Manfred 1.2.28-47)
In these lines, Byron clearly invokes language from Shelley’s *Prometheus Unbound* inviting the disintegrative correction. But note the naturalization and internalization of the banning schema. Manfred grants the eagle powers of Panoptic viewing and punishment, and then further than that, takes on these capabilities for himself. Manfred views the world, finds it, and equally himself, beautiful, yet again, he is repelled from a true, (and Wordsworthian) communion. His vision becomes terrible, penetrative and all-invasive. He sees, sublimely through himself to a being that is half-dust and half-deity. This is commentary on human being in and of itself existentially, but also speaks to the colonial effort of Power as it tries to replicate itself within the human being. As much as Manfred appears to be a being attempting a transcendental position (or rather the elimination of any transcendental position) he is experiencing the internalization of a rather restraining conception of deity as it is linked to the social order. The half-deity he may be becoming is idolatrously formed in the image of God.

Thus this way of characterizing Manfred is a clear transgressing and bridging of both Adam and Satan. And through this bridging one begins to see both their beings in a new way. Adam’s being is the colonized being of the superego and the good citizen, while the Satanic being is the being of the exilic id and pre (anti-, post-, etc)-social apartness. Both of these beings are centered in Manfred they are “a conflict of elements” that contend until “death predominates” which is either the actual physical death of the subject or the utter domination and elimination of conflicted, exilic human being. Consequentially, as Manfred puts it “men are-what they name not to themselves/ and trust not to each other”. This is so much to say that because human beings are essentially embroiled in this colonial war for their subjectivity that are not the beings they think they are and not what perhaps they should be.
Taken together, these first two soliloquies characterize Manfred’s exilic existence at the onset of the drama. They constitute a moment and the problem that Byron is addressing: the internalized structuralized ban, the Enemy form of life, which is set rather rigidly within the human being. The rest of the drama will attempt to dissolve and deny this constraint which makes Manfred an exile. But first I would like to reflect on the narrative framing that Byron has set up as it relates communicating the essence of Enemy Life to a general audience.

**Narrative Implications of the Internalized Ban and the Conflict of Being.**

In a subtle touch, Manfred is saved from his intended suicide by a passing Chamois Hunter who reaches out to save the des-paired Manfred just as he about to leap to his death. Clearly this saving contact is symbolic of Byron’s view of being: at the precise moment when being is poised to fly from all flesh, into utter estrangement and exile (to that undiscover’d country) a human tether reemerges and grounds it. The human is in this way bound to the Enemy and its precisely this reality of the human bond that Byron will explore going forward.

But to think outside the poetry itself one might consider the narrative frame produced from this act and the cumulative moment of the first two scenes of *Manfred*. In *Manfred* Byron has framed the use of the ban and the existence of the banned as something quite natural. He has departed from mythic and religious figures and instead shifted our attention to a human being, elevated in some ways to be sure, but human nonetheless. Byron shows the Adamic and Satanic co-existing in conflict and this informs the narrative frame of *Manfred* as well. Manfred’s position in these early moments is one that equally reflects the swaying “precarity” of both Satan before he tempts Eve in Eden and Adam as he lingers in despair after coming into full knowledge and sin. *Manfred* links the two moments in *Paradise Lost*, renders them inseparable and makes of the two distinct beings a single amalgamation.
What is essential to detect in these decisions and this amalgamation is a decidedly
different way of revealing and rehabilitating Enemy Life than that of Shelley and *Prometheus
Unbound*. As the previous chapter details, Shelley’s work in *Prometheus Unbound* focuses on
creating a sense of pity for the Enemy, the Satanic exile, Prometheus. Shelley does so by
representing Prometheus— a Satanic, Enemy or at least othered being— as a figure meriting pity.
In so doing he reveals that Prometheus in his status as a resistant figure of performance is human
enough that we, his human audience should feel as if Prometheus is like us. Shelley is intent on
bringing the Satanic into contact with the human.

Byron proceeds with *Manfred* from a different perspective. In *Manfred* from the onset,
Byron’s intent is that human beings come to recognize that the Enemy being exists inherently
alongside and within the human. He is depicting an Enemy Life which inseparable from human
Life and this precisely aligned with Agamben’s theories on how to bridge the bios/zoe
distinction:

> The wager here is that there can be a *bios*, a mode of life, that is defined
solely by means of its special and inseparable union with *zoe*, and has no
other content than the latter… ([*The Use of Bodies*](#) 219).

While Byron’s tactic may at first seem a minor distinction, it has significant effect on the
narrative framing of Enemy Life. The reality that every human being contains within them an
Enemy mode of being elegantly side-steps the worldly scenario that Shelley’s work seems to
insist upon: Byron’s Enemy being is not locked into a struggle with the sovereign from the onset.
The human, Enemy being does not have (self-)identify as a protestor, a figure of resistance.
Byron thinks there are more ways of being the Enemy, that the human being can struggle with
the internal constraints of being as much as devote oneself to dismantling the exterior structures
of Power. This allows Byron’s Enemy to appear as a more universal figure: a dark Adam
perhaps, but hardly the riotous Rebel Angel which so alarms the sedate citizen. One can view Manfred’s struggle of consciousness and understand it in human and existential terms without imagining oneself to be a political radical. While this may cause some initial dismay, the tactic significantly shortens the imaginative distance between Enemy and human being. It takes precious little to experience Enemy apartness when such a being appears merely an acidic stance toward one’s own existence. It may be that in this case a more aesthetic and existentialist concept of the Enemy is the more politically practical and productive way to represent, and with their consent, reintegrate them. Byron’s method of rehabilitating Enemy Life as it is viewed by an audience may be the more persuasive because it asks less. Narratively, Byron is dissolving the distance between Enemy and human life as he is conceptually dissolving the distinction between them. This would seem to be the end of goal of any discourse which seeks to make a home for exiles the erasure of Enemy Life into irreducible Life.

**The Bond and the Ban**

With this frame set up, Byron continues on, sending his titular character outward on a compulsive journey of (self-)discovery. Manfred reveals that his guilt stems from a sin committed against what appears to be a now deceased romantic partner, his other half, Astarte. It is in this way that Byron frames *Manfred* in parallel to a particular moment in *Paradise Lost* wherein Eve has eaten from the Tree of Knowledge and so is damned to die, but Adam has not yet partaken and thus is cut off from her existence. The state is as intolerable to Adam as it is intolerable to Manfred. But, inversely, it causes Manfred guilt rather than his partner and it is concert with this inversion that he seeks out the rather diabolical Arimanes, a Zoroastrian/Persian deity of twin spirits, to summon his own redeemer rather than seeking the forgiveness of God.
This scenario reframes the entire schema of transgression, sin and knowledge, (all composite elements of the ban) as it has been represented in *Paradise Lost*. Manfred, instead of seeking to maintain his innocence, almost compulsively pursues contact with Astarte and incestuous love/knowledge/sin/death that she represents. He does so because his previous contact with sin and death, knowledge and apartness when conditioned by Astarte’s love seems to allow Manfred to live as a human exile in the social order. In this way Byron theorizes that a human bond transcends the ban, even if it cannot alter its separating violence. Fittingly, Astarte in this final meeting reveals to Manfred how to die as an exile. Thus Manfred’s drama enters its crisis and what one perceives, in a dark reflection of the Adamic narrative, is that by transgressing, by contacting the dead, by willfully acting as an Enemy, by being the banned being, Manfred learns how to be human.

In the opening of the second act of *Manfred*, shortly after being rescued by the Chamois Hunter, Manfred departs once again from his human company and seeks out an encounter with a Witch of the Alps. His purpose is the same: to speak and see his lost love, in essence to be with her. When questioned by this Witch, Manfred discloses, in a lengthy soliloquy the nature of his existence and the reason he must see Astarte out. It is in this soliloquy that Manfred details a human existence which is recognizable and at the same time exilic and Enemy. He tells the witch:

```
Well, though it torture me, ’tis but the same;
My pang shall find a voice. From my youth upwards
My spirit walk’d not with the souls of men,
Nor look’d upon the earth with human eyes;
The thirst of their ambition was not mine,
The aim of their existence was not mine;
My joys, my griefs, my passions, and my powers,
Made me a stranger; though I wore the form,
I had no sympathy with breathing flesh,
```
Nor midst the creatures of clay that girded me
Was there but one who but of her anon.
I said, with men, and with the thoughts of men,
I held but slight communion...” (Manfred 2.1.49-61)

It is through these first lines that Manfred again gives expression to an essential being which is both Adamic and Satanic in nature. Clearly, Manfred is a human being enmeshed in the social order, but when he declares that his spirit does not walk with the souls of men he is suggesting an otherworldly, exilic nature. What is perhaps more telling of this existence are lines “made me a stranger; though I wore the form, I had no sympathy with breathing flesh.” This is clearly language of the Enemy, the tempting shapeshifting serpent, made more prominent by its proximity to the idea of a communion which invokes a holy ritual (so much like the ban) to produce a collective concept of humanity. One should also note the phrase “breathing flesh” which alludes to Manfred’s own deadness and points toward a future contaminating contact with the dead, an inversion of the purification ritual. Manfred goes on and gives further insight to his exile, he speaks of a relationship with the natural world, the pursuit of knowledge and the constraints of being in relation to other human beings.

...but instead,
My joy was in the Wilderness, to breathe
The difficult air of the iced mountain's top,
Where the birds dare not build, nor insect's wing
Flit o'er the herbless granite; or to plunge
Into the torrent, and to roll along
On the swift whirl of the new breaking wave
Of river-stream, or ocean, in their flow.
In these my early strength exulted; or
To follow through the night the moving moon,
The stars and their developement; or catch
The dazzling lightnings till my eyes grew dim;
Or to look, list'ning, on the scattered leaves,
While Autumn winds were at their evening song.
These were my pastimes, and to be alone; (Manfred 2.1.61-75)
This description of Manfred’s early experiences of Nature is pronouncedly different from his experience of it in the first act. Manfred gives voice to a human being who is at home in the World, who experiences being alone, being outside the walls of Eden, as a form of positive, spiritual solitude. This state of exile-with-the-world appears as Manfred’s communion. In it one can glimpse the outline of Adam in Eden before the Fall but equally one can see the isolation, the extremity of Satan’s Hellspace. Byron’s technique thus appears again: the human manifests the Enemy. The further question is why such isolation preferable to Manfred that he would forgo society for this self-imposed exile? Manfred seems to answer this question in the next lines:

For if the beings, of whom I was one, --  
Hating to be so, -- cross’d me in my path,  
I felt myself degraded back to them,  
And was all clay again. And then I dived,  
In my lone wanderings, to the caves of death,  
Searching its cause in its effect; and drew
From wither’d bones, and skulls, and heap’d up dust,
Conclusions most forbidden. Then I pass’d
The nights of years in sciences untaught,
Save in the old-time; and with time and toil,
And terrible ordeal, and such penance
As in itself hath power upon the air,
And spirits that do compass air and earth,
Space, and the peopled infinite, I made
Mine eyes familiar with Eternity,
Such as, before me, did the Magi, and
He who from out their fountain dwellings raised
Eros and Anteros, at Gadara,
As I do thee; -- and with my knowledge grew
The thirst of knowledge, and the power and joy
Of this most bright intelligence, until – (Manfred 2.1.76-95)

With these lines Manfred makes clear that he experiences society with humanity at constraint, no doubt reflecting the internalized constraint detailed in the previous section. Manfred cannot stand to be around other human beings for around them he feels as clay, inanimate not alive. As a form of self-exile and perhaps self-regulation, he bans himself from
their company. It is in this context that Manfred begin his quest for knowledge. Countermanding the idea that exiled life is not living, this pursuit clearly animates him, providing a Promethean spark. Thus the pursuit of knowledge appears as the essence of life. It is also a quest which is decidedly exilic and transgressive in its character, touching this life with death. One perceives this in the lines “…And then I dived/ in my lone wanderings, to the caves of death,” whereupon Manfred comes to “conclusions most forbidden.” This gestures toward the Tree of Knowledge and invokes the suicide attempt of the first Act. In this way the movement ties knowledge, life and death together: Manfred’s knowledge is forensic or use to Wordsworth’s phrase “we murder to dissect”. All this leads toward reality in which Manfred appears to become more alive, less restrained as he sinfully pursuits a knowledge which is linked with death. This is, ultimately the Satanic School’s reading of the temptation of humanity in *Paradise Lost*. Manfred embodies the reality that Adam becomes more human in his contact with forbidden knowledge.

Further developing the nature of his transgressive, human knowledge, it is at this point that Manfred focuses on the origin of his renewed self-torture. He describes his partner and his loss of her:

She was like me in lineaments -- her eyes,  
Her hair, her features, all, to the very tone  
Even of her voice, they said were like to mine;  
But soften'd all, and temper'd into beauty;  
She had the same lone thoughts and wanderings,  
The quest of hidden knowledge, and a mind  
To comprehend the universe: nor these  
Alone, but with them gentler powers than mine,  
Pity, and smiles, and tears -- which I had not;  
And tenderness -- but that I had for her;  
Humility -- and that I never had.  
Her faults were mine -- her virtues were her own--  
I loved her, and destroy'd her! (*Manfred* 2.1.105-116)
What is important to note is Manfred’s identification of Astarte as a second self that departs: the passage begins with “like me” then distinguishes Astarte by “Pity, smiles and tears”. Astarte is thereby formulated as an exilic being and in some ways representative of a part of his own consciousness. She represents the estranged self, the self that is banished into the periphery of human awareness. One can think this as the Jungian anima, the Freudian secondary process or even given her death the human being’s Heideggerian awareness of mortality, but in whatever framing, Manfred’s struggle to negotiate his Enemy and human beings through contact with Astarte appears partially as interior one. This identification prepares the way for the forthcoming moment wherein Manfred and Asarte are rejoined, adding a crucial dimension to the contact. She is within him and yet apart from him, mirroring his consciousness which is isolated and exiled.

But to link this internalized reality with a familiar external one, this description of Astarte is akin to that of the early description of Eve’s in Eden:

“For softness shee and sweet attractive Grace…
Shee as a vail down to the slender waste
Her unadorned golden tresses wore [ 305 ]
Disheveld, but in wanton ringlets wav’d
As the Vine curles her tendrils, which impli’d
Subjection, but requir’d with gentle sway,
And by her yielded, by him best receivd, (Paradise Lost 4.298-309)

But in Manfred’s description is modified so that the beauty of Astarte is rendered precisely because of her possession and indeed embodiment of knowledge. Astarte is beautiful because she has mind to comprehend the universe. This opposes the later description of Eve and her newfound knowledge by Adam after the temptation:

O fairest of Creation, last and best
Of all Gods works, Creature in whom excell’d
Whatever can to sight or thought be formd,
Holy, divine, good, amiable, or sweet!
How art thou lost, how on a sudden lost, [ 900 ]
Defac’t, deflourd, and now to Death devote? (Paradise Lost 9.896-901)

In this way Byron seems to bridge Eve’s fallen and unfallen state in Astarte.
Knowledge that is beautiful, sin that is desirable, this is a being Astarte represents in even in
death, perhaps especially in death. Hardly disfigured for her knowledge, and depicted as
possessing greater qualities than Manfred, Astarte is clearly the more perfect and human being:
“Her faults were mine-her virtues were own” as Manfred says. It is in this way that Astarte, like
Eve before her, appears mortally and utterly human (and critically to a feminist reading) before
Manfred. She is a being perfected by her transgression toward knowledge and she embodies a
being that seems to resolve the conflict between social structure and consciousness within her.

This is the being that Manfred loved, apparently destroyed and whose loss along with
his ambivalence toward the world and its constraints is destroying him. One cannot
underestimate this reality of Manfred’s love and its effect on his being. It is quite clear in the text
that Manfred was quite displaced in the world before he encountered Astarte. His love for her
made such an existence tolerable and more than that, a life worth living. His bond with her made
him human. Thus just as one witnesses in Prometheus Unbound, love and care create
grievability, presence the human in exilic life.

But Byron goes farther than this, in his rendering the severing of the bond between
Manfred and Astarte is what ultimately configures his being as irredeemably apart and
tempestuously conflicted. This severing makes the entire world, even the Nature he once felt at
home in, hostile and Enemy. While she was alive, Astarte’s and Manfred’s bond seems to have
circumvented the conflict within Manfred. The internalized ban was mitigated by the
transgressive knowledge Astarte communicated; her love balanced the conflict within Manfred.
Without this love, Manfred became unbalanced, untethered, precariously poised above the abyss, at the distal point of existential exile. Byron in this this way emphasizes the bond over the ban as the critical structure which determines the human being’s appearance as an Enemy exile. Love’s erasure, more so that the ban’s force, has made Manfred Enemy Life.

It is therefore unsurprising that Manfred would seek this balancing force out as he languishes in the opening act. Manfred is driven to the precipice because death has claimed Astarte and there is a sense that he will be reunited with her in the knowledge of death. This precisely the scenario that one observes in Adam seen through darker lens. When Adam ate from the Tree of Knowledge to join Eve, it was a sin and brought him death. When Manfred attempts suicide and when (shortly) he seeks out the dead he is attempting to cleanse himself of guilt by joining Astarte in a state of knowledge. The difference between guilt and sin is palpable but what one should observe in both scenarios is that is the human bond that drives both Adam and Manfred into banishment and death. Manfred has already disclosed this reality but as Adam put it:

```
However I with thee have fixt my Lot,
Certain to undergoe like doom, if Death
Consort with thee, Death is to mee as Life;
So forcible within my heart I feel [ 955 ]
The Bond of Nature draw me to my owne,
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine;
Our State cannot be severd, we are one,
One Flesh; to loose thee were to loose my self. (Paradise Lost 9.952-959)
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What this emphasis on the “Bond of Nature” then seems to theorize is precisely the same idea that Shelley is intent on in *Prometheus Unbound* in his linkages between Prometheus and the Earth and between Prometheus and Asia. Love-- connection to other beings-- makes a human being, and human love has always been linked to sin and transgression elements of the Enemy. What Byron adds in his representation informs this reality further one sees that love is
centered in the ban itself as a hidden element. Principally it is not banishment nor any form of further correction that, in itself, creates exilic Enemy Life, life which the human being is bent on destroying. Rather it is the simultaneous or progressive shearing of the connection between beings that de-situates a life and this shifts Power away from the sovereign. Thus what Manfred reveals of Adam is that even had Adam not partaken of the Tree of Knowledge, he would have still become an exile for he would have been separated from Eve. Manfred lingered in precisely this deadened and tortuously constrained form of life. In order to be able to be-apart from the world Manfred feels compelled to reestablish that bond even through death.

Symbolically, what this points to is somewhat dark but practical tactic of processing the ban. There is no reversal of the ban found in the human bond. Exile seems to be the lot of the human being. But in the bond, so long as the bond is sought out, there is amelioration, mitigation and meaningful defiance precisely because it is a transgressive, bridging experience. What is more, Byron’s theorization of the concept is perhaps more impactful than Shelley’s because of the context of the bond in the drama. Whereas Shelley gestures to the bond in a political context, utilizing indexical force to make “allies”, the origin of Byron’s bond is more universal. Byron’s human bond is associated externally with Romantic love, but more subtly, internally, the text suggests that Astarte represents an existential community of human beings created by a knowledge of death. Byron is suggesting that because humanity is temporal and aware of it, a shared fate should bind its constituents together.
The Necessity of Transgression

This emphasis on the importance of the transgressive, human bond (and the acts that it leads to) frames the fulcrum of the drama. Manfred, after his confrontation with the witch, departs for the summit of the Jungfrau and enters the temple of Arimanes. This journey clearly parallels Eve’s venture to the periphery of Eden, as well as the search of Asia for the Cave of Demigorgon. But Byron thinks the transgressive act, sinning, the moment of contact itself quite differently. He treats it as an almost compulsive act on the part of Manfred who must again contact Astarte, his love, his exiled other half, in order to find peace in his life and death. He does so in summoning ritual which for all its diabolical framing appears as precise mirror to the purification ritual of the ban. It is this transgressive contaminating sinful act of summoning that makes Manfred, a desperate exile, human. In their contact, Astarte teaches Manfred how to die in exile as she taught him how to live an exile. This spans their separation, the distance between life and death, human being and Enemy exile.

At the edges of this scene are the issues of constraint and obedience, in juxtaposition with the central, transgressive pursuit of knowledge, love and the estranged self which completes the human being. What Manfred as a drama ultimately produces from this confrontation is the reality that because external constraint by sovereignty is essentially a Faustian pact which would determine the boundaries of one’s life. Consequentially, the human bond established by knowledge of death and love necessitates the transgression of those limits in order to begin being human. In this way Manfred reveals that the human is and must be at least in part exilic theorizing a new stance of being which incorporates the Enemy.

Framing the transgressive moment, Act Two, Scene Four begins with a dialogue between Manfred and Arimanes and a conflicted intermingling of human, Enemy and Power.
The essential tension is familiar: Arimanes a rather tyrannical iteration of Power would have Manfred bend the knee before him to seal a Faustian pact. Manfred, pursuing renewed contact with Astarte, is disinclined to do so but still must negotiate through the position of obedience in order to glimpse her.

The scene opens focusing on Arimanes, attended by various dark spirits including Nemesis, a fury (which links Shelley’s work with Byron’s). Arimanes is described in rather diabolical language rendering him a figure of terror, injustice and domination. A Hymn of Spirits praise him:

Hail to our Master! -- Prince of Earth and Air! --
Who walks the clouds and waters -- in his hand
The sceptre of the elements, which tear
Themselves to chaos at his high command!
He breatheth -- and a tempest shakes the sea;
He speaketh -- and the clouds reply in thunder;
He gazeth -- from his glance the sunbeams flee;
He moveth -- earthquakes rend the world asunder.
Beneath his footsteps the volcanos rise;
His shadow is the Pestilence; his path 10
The comets herald through the crackling skies;
And planets turn to ashes at his wrath.
To him War offers daily sacrifice;
To him Death pays his tribute, Life is his,
With all its infinite of agonies --
And his the spirit of whatever is! (Manfred 2.4.1-15)

Arimanes’ lieutenant, Nemesis, further declares:

Sovereign of Sovereigns! we are thine
And all that liveth, more or less, is ours,
And most things wholly so; still to increase
Our power increasing thing demands our care
And we are vigilant -- Thy late commands
Have been fulfilled to the utmost. (Manfred 2.4.23-28)

It is in these descriptions that Arimanes echoes Shelley’s own tyrant Jupiter and thereby posits, in precisely the same way, a fundamental injustice of worldly power and the essential cruelty of its loyal citizen-acolytes. This injustice is re-emphasized in the parody of
worship that the dark spirits offer Arimanes, render the devotion of Adam, Eve and the loyal angels of heaven as obsequious praise, and in fact, a constraining ritual which binds their existence into an exploitative hierarchy. At the same time, Arimanes’ characterization suggests a link between those parts of his being that are God-like and those which are more Satanic in origin. The first part of the first passage deploys language which typically reserved for God images of the scepter, walking on water and various ethereal or heaven-associated shows of Power. The second half of the first passage introduces language of the infernal, the Satanic: contaminating pestilence, fire in the sky, ash and sacrifice. It is in this way that Byron characterizes a deity of dual spirits, a central Sovereign and a peripheral Enemy. This is the being that Manfred seeks out, precisely for the reason that Arimanes is an external reflection of Manfred’s internal turmoil: one notices that deity and the devil in Arimanes are rendered separate poetically and the result is an image of apocalyptic conflict. Power that grants favor through constraints, that exists as a clear division of being, this is the boundary of experience that Manfred the human being must transgress through and beyond.

Byron is positing poetically an exploratory stance for Manfred which is congruent with Foucault’s own philosophical ethos, what he calls a limit attitude:

We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression. (*Foucault Reader* 45)

It is in this fashion of limit-testing that Manfred proceeds in his venture, his entire “blasphemous” and sacrilegious pursuit of contact with the dead Asarte, his other half, is a
project designed to transgress the limits of his humanity in exile. Appropriate their role then and immediately upon his arrival Arimananes and his spirits demand a show of worship from him to constraint Manfred in a Power relationship. But Manfred is immune and defiant, focused only his pursuit and whatever means that might bring him to her. He refuses such self-abasement and claims his grief and guilt for his own:

ALL THE SPIRITS
Prostrate thyself, and thy condemned clay
Child of the Earth! or dread the worst.
MANFRED:
I know it;
And yet ye see I kneel not. (Manfred 2.4.34-37)

As a theory of Power relations, this stance is radical restructuring of the usual mechanics. The previous model for human being, Adam, would kneel in this scenario, while the model of Enemy Life, Satan, would deny and violently defy any edict of Power. Both of these actions are operable within the structure of the sovereign and the ban, inclusion and exclusion. Manfred does not kneel, in that he is Satanic, but critically, he does not embark upon a quest to revenge his ban and reiterate it. This is not as Foucault would put it a “gesture of rejection.” Instead, intent only on his lost love, Manfred voids such mechanics, he declares that his being and his suffering are his own, completely internalizing the ban until its force only touches his being:

…-- many a night on the earth,
On the bare ground, have I bow’d down my face,
And strew’d my head with ashes; I have known
The fulness of humiliation, for I sunk before my vain despair, and knelt
To my own desolation. (Manfred 2.4.37-42)

Manfred’s utterance is clearly a characterization of his exilic existence without his partner Astarte. But this statement also essentially recognizes is that the fallen state, the exilic
state of being is the condition of humanity. Manfred’s internalization of the ban in this moment becomes an encompassing of its limits to the point he can move beyond it. This is an existential act, an exilic leaving (proleptic of Beckett’s Hamm and Clov) which nullifies the Power relationship. It is a breaking through of Power’s limits that lodges the contingent pieces of its apparatus inward, and out of reach. As a process it seems to recognize the linkage between the existential sense of apartness that the subject experiences by being (as Heidegger has explored) and the weaponization of the banning act (which Agamben places at the unseen center of social sovereignty). The act of claiming the existential apartness of the human destructs the efficacy of the ban as the frame of Enemy Life.

Accepting a worldly exile is Manfred’s way of neutralizing the force of the sovereign ban, but it does not solve his apartness and his internal conflict. The newly human “limit attitude” merely presents its greater scope. Manfred still feels as an Enemy. In this “desolation”, Manfred’s only way forward is push up to and past the boundary of human and exile, life and death, in a mirror of the original transgressive act undertaken by his iteration of Eve. He must transgress to be. And in a strange yet appropriate way this mode of being seems to sanctify Manfred and secure him from the threats of Arimanes’ followers. It is as if Manfred has become existentially an untouchable, a being with roots in the original conception of homo sacer, the sacred man. or as the First Destiny describes Manfred:

…This man
Is of no common order, as his port
And presence here denote; his sufferings
Have been of an immortal nature, like
Our own; his knowledge and his powers and will,
As far as is compatible with clay,
Which clogs the ethereal essence…
…the passions, attributes
Of earth and heaven, from which no power, nor being,
Nor breath from the worm upwards is exempt,
Have pierced his heart; and in their consequence
Made him a thing, which I, who pity not,
Yet pardon those who pity. He is mine,
And thine, it may be -- be it so, or not,
No other Spirit in this region hath
A soul like his -- or power upon his soul. (Manfred 2.4.50-72)

What Manfred appears as in these lines is truly exilic: he is neither of the sacred or profane, neither immortal nor tethered to humanity. He is “exempt”, being-apart. But also, at the same very much of this moment and this place where is he is “clay”. Manfred, in this way, depicts the banned being in a which restores our sense of the sacred man before the ambiguity regarding his bodily availability for sacrifice and murder was introduced into the juridical structure of the West. This is the unresolvable position that Agamben focuses on as an origin in Homo Sacer, and the union he would seek to restore in his later Use of Bodies: the joining of bios/zoe or in other words the incorporation of the exilic into the human. But to continue on: Manfred cannot be touched and this must be seen as linked to his purpose and the immunity it conveys. Manfred cannot be touched for he is a participant in a sacred and transgressive ritual: the contacting of his other half, his humanity, his death.

It is in a summoning ritual that Manfred demands that Arimanes and his followers contact Astarte. Astoundingly, Arimanes complies the request, almost entirely put aside, symbolically demonstrating that God has been removed from the act of transgression that Manfred is claiming for humanity:

MANFRED: Thou canst not reply to me.
Call up the dead-my question is for them.
NEMESIS: Great Arimanes, doth thy will avouch
The wishes of this mortal?
ARIMANES: Yea. (Manfred 2.4.78-82)
With the transgressive act now entirely within the purview of the human, Nemesis and Arimanes at Manfred’s behest perform the summoning, calling the spirit of Astarte to appear. Yet Manfred desires more than a vision of her and both Arimanes and Nemesis are unable to compel Astarte to speak and are repelled from power over her. Arimanes, the figure of Power fades away and Manfred alone continues on, beseeching her to speak with him:

Hear me, hear me --
Astarte! my beloved! speak to me:
I have so much endured -- so much endure --
Look on me! the grave hath not changed thee more
Than I am changed for thee. (Manfred 2.4.117-121)

This must be understood as life touching death, but this is also the human touching the human, the exiled-in-life touching the exiled-by-death and thus coming into full knowledge (or to think this in Hegelian terms “consciousness”) of itself. Manfred’s act constitutes an utter transgression of the limits of human experience, one that he performs because a human bond, love, compels him to. In this moment, Manfred embodies an inversion of the ban and its ethos. The ban is formulated as purification ritual that creates a separation between human and Enemy Life defining both. What Manfred is intent on performing is precisely the opposite: his is a summoning ritual, a drawing near that creates an integrated Enemy/human being and contaminates such distinctions through contact with the dead. This ritual is not of the ban, but of the bond. Byron is positing the human is the being that touches knowledge/sin/death/love in its contact with another human being which is identified with and associated as the self. He continues on:

‘...Thou lovedst me
Too much, as I loved thee: we were not made
To torture thus each other, though it were
The deadliest sin to love as we have loved…
  ...I cannot rest.
I know not what I ask, nor what I seek:
I feel but what thou art -- and what I am;
And I would hear yet once before I perish
The voice which was my music -- Speak to me!
(*Manfred 2.4.139-153*)

This language recalls the language of the Fall in *Paradise Lost*, a moment which in even Milton’s rendering has a Satanic origin and human implications. This plea on the part of Manfred deliberately inverts moment when Eve seeks to rejoin Adam after eating from the Tree of Knowledge. She, in a moment of anxiety and guilt, wonders if he will accept her in her fallen state and then resolves that such is the nature of their bond that she must be with him even if it means being together, alongside death:

But to *Adam* in what sort
Shall I appeer? shall I to him make known
As yet my change, and give him to partake
Full happiness with mee, or rather not,
But keep the odds of Knowledge in my power [ 820 ]
Without Cопartner?...
…This may be well: but what if God have seen
And Death ensue? then I shall be no more,
And *Adam* wedded to another *Eve*,
Shall live with her enjoying, I extinct:
A death to think. Confirm’d then I resolve, [ 830 ]
*Adam* shall share with me in bliss or woe:
So dear I love him, that with him all deaths
I could endure, without him live no life. (*Paradise Lost* 9.815-833)

Here, Manfred, on the other side of death and knowledge, is the guilty party, and he must beg for Astarte’s voice so that he may die. The sin of partaking in forbidden knowledge is far overshadowed by enormity of the loss of Astarte and Manfred’s need for her to balance himself. The sin is in being parted. In this Byron is capitalizing on Eve’s “resolution” and that within Adam’s brief speech shortly before he eats the fruit:

The strict forbiddance, how to violate
The sacred Fruit forbidd’n! som cursed fraud
Of Enemie hath beguil’d thee, yet unknown, [ 905 ]
And mee with thee hath ruind, for with thee
Certain my resolution is to Die;…
...Flesh of Flesh,
Bone of my Bone thou art, and from thy State [ 915 ]
Mine never shall be parted, bliss or woe. (Paradise Lost 9.903-916)

This moment is perhaps underappreciated in Paradise Lost; Milton is ambivalent to Adam’s expression of his bond. But Byron reinvokes Adam’s connection to Eve (and hers to him) focusing our attention on his resolution not to be parted from her. It is a moment, mere seconds prior to the eating of the apple, but it is a meaningful shift because it sites the origin of humanity in the bond, a transgressive act that compels Adam to maintain his connection with Eve, not the ban. The ban is subsequent to this act, it punishes it, it embeds itself in the human consciousness via ideologies. But the ban appears after the human being emerges.

Thus Byron is suggesting that this moment where Manfred is essentially throwing his entire being out into the abyss to contact Astarte is when Manfred becomes human. This is where Byron locates the human being existentially: in the act of limit-testing, of transgressing. One should note that the Satanic aspect of Manfred’s consciousness has become somewhat muted. His awareness of his own Enemy existence is not altered nor negated, rather the Enemy has become integrated into the human during this transgressive moment.

Manfred, alone, has gone as far as he can. All that remains of this process is Astarte’s answer. Fittingly the contact is brief, elusive and meaningful. Astarte communicates a single sentence: “Manfred! To-morrow ends thine earthly ills./Farewell(Manfred II.iv 172) Naturally, Manfred wants more than this revelation, he would beg her forgiveness for his secret sin, the sin of his being. He calls outs: “One word for mercy! Say, thou lovest me (Manfred II.iv 174) But Asarte does not say anything further merely speaks his name and disappears. She does not forgive him, does not offer words of comfort. She leaves, leaving Manfred only with the knowledge that he will die and that he has succeeded in contacting her. Manfred for his part
subsides into silence, stillness. Strangely his conflict seems resolved. He has contacted Asarte. He has become human. He will die. What has been communicated between him and Astarte to soothe his being is quite elusive. But clearly the crisis has passed and one can speculate that it was the act itself of contacting the exilic other half of himself, reflected in the exiled existence of a loved other that allowed this cessation. It is this way that Manfred appears represent a humanity that must accept being-Enemy, being-apart from, being-disruptive-to-itself as a mode, an act of itself. Willfully contacting this transgressive element of the self appears to be the only way of recognizing it and negotiating a cohabitation.

Byron is clearly thinking about this issue of Enemy/human existentially, but beyond the frame, one must immediately perceive the parallels of this stance as it pertains to a social structure. Byron is positing a social structure which is organized by a lateral principle of transgression. He is suggesting the way in which one becomes human is in the act of contacting the exile, performing an act of recovery, in the hope resolving the conflict between a situated, constrained being and a desolate estranged one. It is a series of notes that he will make significant use of in his later revisionary work, Don Juan.

After Manfred’s resolution, one spirit comments that “He is convulsed -- This is to be a mortal/ And seek the things beyond mortality (Manfred II.iv 182-183)”. Shortly thereafter Manfred departs the company of the spirits and Arimanés, at peace with himself and benignly regarding the dark spirits he once tested his will against: “Even as thou wilt: and for the grace accorded/ I now depart a debtor. Fare ye well(Manfred II.iv 193-194)” He returns to world and the Act ends.
In this last movement of Act II, at the end of Manfred’s existential, exilic crisis, when one witnesses the integration of the Enemy into the human to such an extent that the joining term Enemy Life is put under erasure, (as Derrida might say) one sees a potentiality. There is a potentiality to connect the conflicted being Manfred represents with a social component of Foucault’s limit attitude and of particular importance going forward, Edward Said’s project in “Reflections on Exile”. Involving Said’s work at this junction creates a further dialogue between Byron’s existential exile and the worldly exile Said, Arendt and others are attempting to present in contemporary discourse. It is in this way that Enemy Life and all the movements and nuances it has gained through Milton, Shelley and Byron came brought into direct relation with the narrative and conceptual frames of exiles that are defining their existence now.

In the essay “Reflections on Exile” Said explores the decentered pathos of exile, the problems of exile and contributions an exilic mode of being and exiles themselves can make to a society. He is thinking in parallel to Byron in this regard. In characterizing the cruel tests of a life in exile Said notes in the second sentence that “[Exile] is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home.” This is quite akin to Manfred’s estranged existence at the onset of the drama. In a sentence that Byron could have written, Said describes the problem of exile’s dislocation: “The pathos of exile is in the loss of contact with the solidity and the satisfaction of earth: homecoming is out of the question” (Reflections on Exile 142).

Problematising the social component of such a life, Said goes on to add that there is sense that nationalism and its ideologies prey upon exilic life, corrupting it into a reconstituting monomania so as to change displaced life into a form which is productive to its project.
Exiles feel, therefore an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to see themselves as part of a of triumphant ideology or a restored people. The crucial thing is that a state of exile free from this triumphant ideology-designed to reassemble an exile’s broken history into a new whole-is virtually unbearable, and virtually impossible in today’s world” (*Reflections on Exile* 140-141).

This is precisely what one has seen in Byron in his early self-conflict: his suicide attempt is reflective of an exile’s despair of regaining home. One might also suggest that Byron’s work in the second act reflects an attempt to address being-an-exile specifically without reconstituting power or triumphant ideology-only apartness itself.

Structurally then, Said’s seems to move in concert with Byron’s. In the later part of his essay, Said begins to theorize what the potentialities of the exile are, what and how the exile sees and what can be gained from incorporating their viewing into the human subjectivity. He speaks of the strange newness that the exile brings to a viewing of the world, following Foucault’s limit-attitude and invoking Adorno as a model he suggests that:

To follow Adorno is to stand away from ‘home’ in order to look at it with the exile’s detachment…The exile knows that in a secular and contingent world, homes are always provisional. Borders and barriers, which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory, can become prisons, and are often defended beyond reason or necessity, Exile cross borders, break barriers of thought and experience. (*Reflections on Exile* 147)

Byron in his scene of crisis and creation seems to be presenting precisely the same reality. Said goes on describe a particular benefit of this exilic viewing, what he calls a contrapuntal awareness:

Seeing ‘the entire world as a foreign land’ makes possible originality of vision. Most people are principally aware of one culture, one setting, one home; exiles are aware of at least two, and this plurality of vision gives rise to awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an awareness that-to borrow a phrase from music-is contrapuntal. (*Reflections on Exile* 148)
What Said seems to be gesturing toward in his use of the idea of the musical counterpoints is an enriched experience of reality, one that is developed in tandem at the same moment. Byron’s moment of contact between Manfred and Astarte is representative of this principle. Manfred’s experience, his awareness is enriched at the moment when his estranged counterpoint, that being which was introduced at the beginning of his composition, returned to touch him as he reached out to touch her. Byron’s guiding principle throughout the drama has always been the same: humanity is an entangled and estranged duality. Manfred is only half a human being without Astarte. Astarte and Byron are incestuous soulmates. They are connected throughout life and separated by death. Arimanès is a dual-spirited deity and devil. All of this leads to reality that Byron is attempting to present that point needs and invokes counterpoint. The struggle for Manfred is the struggle for most worldly exiles: how to negotiate the sound of both notes so that they are contrapuntal, not cacophony, not conflict. What this elicits by the end of Act II of Manfred is a human being that know that it is leaving as it arrives, that becomes human life when it dies. Fundamentally, Manfred represents a being that is apart because it is in, at first terrible and then still constant motion and it is this way that Byron elicits Said’s notion of exilic life:

Exile is life led outside the habitual order. It is nomadic, decentered, contrapuntal; but no sooner does one get accustomed to it than itself unsettling force erupts anew. (Reflections on Exile 149)

It is this contrapuntal reality which is will make an even more pronounced appearance in Byron’s later work Don Juan. It is in that work that Byron’s depiction of exilic Enemy takes on its mature form. But it is clear from what has proceeded in Manfred’s struggle that this earlier work is the moment Byron was negotiating a way to integrate two complementary realities, human and Enemy exile. Thus Said’s work provides a meaningful frame for Byron: he connects
the denouement of *Manfred* with the beginning of *Don Juan*. Said’s work performs this connection precisely in the way he describes the appearance of exilic life as an “unsettling force that erupts anew”. This is exactly what one perceives: Manfred defiantly subsides and then just as one is left with the pathos of “winter” (as Said says through Wallace Stevens) a resurgent spring. In the same movement, Byron is completely integrating Enemy life with human being. What one will perceives going forward in Act III of Manfred and onward into *Don Juan* is that when the human reappears in *Don Juan* it is a human being that can and indeed necessarily must invoke and encompass being the Enemy to render itself entirely.

**Rites of Departure**

In Act III, after his moment of transgressive contact, Manfred seems to have resolved the conflict of his exilic being. He appears at peace, his being in harmony with itself and serenely dissonant with the world as he prepares to leave:

> There is a calm upon me --  
> Inexplicable stillness! which till now  
> Did not belong to what I knew of life…  
> …It will not last,  
> But it is well to have known it, though but once  
> It hath enlarged my thoughts with a new sense,  
> (*Manfred* 3.1.6-16)

Thus the last Act of Manfred is a framed as an exodus from the constraints of the old familiar world. An old Abbot serves to represent this world, instructing Manfred to repent and to accept God and His earthly iterations and institutions, (limits, orthodoxy, homogeneity, etc) before he dies. Manfred has no interest in this, instead he goes to death by himself to meet his other half. He does in a rather particular way: through reiterated acts of defiance that defend apartness itself within a social construct. What is of particular importance to the discourse of Enemy Life, this defiant apartness is no longer characterized as hostile, blasphemous dangerous
and Satanic. Rather Manfred’s defiance in the Third Act is an expression of his humanity, which he continues to reiterate moment to moment in his somewhat acidic but reasonably civil exchanges with the Abbot and the more forceful rejections of a visiting spirit.

In regard to the Abbot, it is noteworthy that Manfred greets the Abbot with courtesy, for despite the Abbot’s rather genial demeanor, he represents a society which would once again constrain Manfred with its ideology. Aware of this danger, yet immune to it, Manfred welcomes him to his Castle and conversing with him at length in a dialogue that sees the Abbot chase Manfred to capture him, re-invoking corrective treatment as if it were the sacred boundaries of

ABBOT: My son! I did not speak of punishment,
But penitence and pardon; -- with thyself
The choice of such remains -- and for the last,
Our institutions and our strong belief
Have given me power to smooth the path from sin
To higher hope and better thoughts; the first
I leave to heaven -- 'Vengeance is mine alone!'
So saith the Lord, and with all humbleness
His servant echoes back the awful word.
(Manfred 4.1.57-65)

One notes the nature of the kindly old abbot’s offer which he characterizes specifically not as “punishment”: humble yourself fallen child before the institutions of Power, acknowledge the world’s dominion over your body and soul and renew your torment until your death and you will be cleansed. Manfred thoroughly rejects this offer and the supposed purification rituals it entails:

Old man! there is no power in holy men,
Nor charm in prayer -- nor purifying form
Of penitence -- nor outward look -- nor fast --
Nor agony -- nor, greater than all these,
The innate tortures of that deep despair,
Which is remorse without the fear of hell,
But all in all sufficient to itself
Would make a hell of heaven -- can exorcise
From out the unbounded spirit, the quick sense
Of its own sins, wrongs, sufferance, and revenge
Upon itself; there is no future pang
Can deal that justice on the self-condemn'd
He deals on his own soul.
*(Manfred 4.1.66-78)*

Thus Manfred rejects the Abbot’s offer, claiming the hell that he knew within himself
and his existence’s futurity for his own and making the “unbound spirit” a figure of free-
movement, both internally and externally, central to the human being. It is this figure, the human
being whose is existence is a departure that can determine its own and only its own “justice”.
(Manfred’s responses, are in this way, proleptic though not as terse or neutral as Bartleby’s
singular one.) At each moment in the dialogue with the Abbot, he continually and positively
rejects the offers of orthodoxy and exposes it as visible constraint. Manfred will not acquiesce,
nor repent he chooses a human life which is exilic:

**ABBOT**
And why not live and act with other men?

**MANFRED**
Because my nature was averse from life;
And yet not cruel; for I would not make,
But find a desolation—Like the wind,
The red-hot breath of the most lone Simoom,
Which dwells but in the desert, and sweeps o’er
The barren sands which bear no shrubs to blast,

And revels o’er their wild and arid waves,
And seeketh not, so that it is not sought,
But being met is deadly; such hath been
The course of my existence; but there came
Things in my path which are no more.
*(Manfred 4.1.141-152)*
One will note in the language that Manfred deploys, that of a desert wind, a symbol which conveys isolation, invisibility, and irresistible movement. The wind in the desert has only the desert as its origin and the desert as it subsides. The wind “sweeps o’er barren sands which bear no shrubs” suggesting a transgression of deadened life, skeletal constraint. The wind is an invisible play in an empty space. This is what Manfred envisions his being to be. The movement of the wind is especially important to the overall understanding of Manfred’s meaning. The sense is that if Manfred wished to define himself within some other mode of being, rest or more pronounced movement—he could choose to. Manfred in this way seems to claim apartness, moving apartness, exile as an entirely viable stance (or rather series of stances) for humanity.

Noticing the pattern of the dialogue between the Abbot and Manfred and symbol that Byron deploys to relate the exilic human being, it is important to perceive what Byron is establishing as a principle for integrating the exile into a society. Byron is rejecting the notion that the sovereign can include an exilic figure in its rubric through the capturing use of the ban and ideological mechanisms. Instead, Byron suggests that the human exile is a figure which is enmeshed in a dissonant and disruptive dialogue with society. This figure is not only a part of the society but a necessity for the social fabric to produce richer human experiences, for Manfred does not deny the Abbot a dialogue, nor does Manfred refrain from speaking to Herman in a gesture of farewell. Manfred’s various acts of leaving the usual limits of the social human being open up its boundaries and allows interior motion and insight.

This insight and its window into Manfred’s being is a carefully constructed one as the drama concludes. After leaving the Abbot’s company and bidding farewell to his servants and acquaintances, Manfred reflects poignantly on the setting of the sun and then shortly afterward in the twilight evokes memories of Rome in a rather elegiac mode:
A noble wreck in ruinous perfection!
While Caesar's chambers, and the Augustan halls,
Grovel on earth in indistinct decay. --
And thou didst shine, thou rolling moon, upon
All this, and cast a wide and tender light,
Which soften'd down the hoar austerity
Of rugged desolation, and fill'd up,
As 'twere, anew, the gaps of centuries;
(Manfred 4.4.28-35)

This image of the ruins of Ancient Rome is a critical one for Byron’s meaning. There is in Romantic tradition a danger inherent to the exilic and elevated individual. As has been noted before, the Wordsworthian model of communion with the sublime exhibits a problem in its spatial metaphysics. Essentially the problem is that the sublime speaker will not descend from the mountaintop of his transcendental experience. In this way he will remained forever apart and above the rest of humanity and the once exilic figure becomes transformed into a God-like figure, a rather static and purified and even privileged iteration of exile to say the least.

Byron’s image of a moonlit and fallen Rome, once so glorious, the epitome of worldly Power, now isolated by centuries and a desolation is a deliberate de-struction of this model. The ruins of Rome as recalled by Manfred now are clearly a projection of his being. There is a recognition in this projection that he has been “Augustan” but twilight and the “gaps of centuries” await all humanity. Byron is intent that as Manfred began half-dust and half-deity, so shall he end. Manfred is refusing to disassociate the human part of his being, he wants the dust, death, contamination and sin. He wants his life in its particular apartness. He would not see himself ascend beyond any capacity for him to fall. Manfred’s exodus is not apotheosis (and this possibility of human movement will develop further in Don Juan)

This is why upon the arrival his death, one sees Manfred reject the offers and threats of the hellish, “thunder-seared” (clearly a reference to Milton’s description of Satan) Spirit that comes to claim him. The Spirit attempts to claim Manfred for “thy many crimes”.
Opposing this, Manfred’s responses are series of denials and interrogations as to the legitimacy and justice of the Spirit’s power:

“I am prepared for all things, but deny
The power which summons me. Who sent thee here?...
…I knew, and know my hour is come, but not
To render up my soul to such as thee:
Away! I'll die as I have lived -- alone. (Manfred 4.4.97-101)

What Manfred is here defending is a human apartness. It is a refusal to consign his crimes with that of a purely evil Enemy being. To transgress, to be, in Manfred’s view must remain a potentiality of the human being not a static site for Power-construction and eternal correction. Thus at the end of the dialogue Manfred thoroughly rejects the Spirit and his capacity to judge him and attach criminality to his being for his supposed crimes:

What are they to such as thee?
Must crimes be punish'd but by other crimes,
And greater criminals? -- Back to thy hell!
(Manfred 4.4.143-145)

It is with this final rejection of a supernatural, spiritual or transcendental constraint on his being that Manfred dies. This is an important reality to note for it clearly tethers Manfred to the human being in the form of the Abbot beside him, who despite the attempts to capture Manfred within an ideology remains human.

Exploring the nature of that tether, there remains the symbolism of Manfred’s last act: He reaches out to the Abbot, not begging for inclusion but offering contact:

'Tis over -- my dull eyes can fix thee not;
But all things swim around me, and the earth
Heaves as it were beneath me. Fare thee well --
Give me thy hand. (Manfred 4.4.167-171)

The language here is sparse, but one should not overlook the lines. Manfred’s vision fails him which is to say his capacity to statically apprehend and thereby dominate the world
vanishes. In its place, the experience is one of displacement: “all things swim around me” and “the earth heaves”. But rather than merely evoking an observable exile, this “swimming” seems to symbolize a new mobility in both the reality of the world and in Manfred’s human being. In its dark and dimming way, it suggests the promise of a new, unfixed world, one in which the internalized conflict of the ban is dissolved. It is in this fluidity of being that Manfred reaches out to contact and depart: “fare thee well-give me thy hand”. This is a gesture which formalizes a way to depart from the social order and limits. Manfred is defending his right to be apart from, claiming apartness for himself, yet he is negotiating laterally with the Abbott, continuing the dialogue until the last moment, creating a social place where inclusion in maintained by equal participants within a temporary boundary.

It is this last gesture that one might linger on: it represents something that is perhaps not considered enough in terms of theorizing a model of social dialogue and dissent. Classically, the ancient Greeks and other foundational civilizations of the West placed emphasis on the gesture of welcome, an inclusive movement that brought the outsider, even the Enemy, inside.(One can see this theme carried out repetitively in Homer’s epics and ignoring this custom is condemned quite resonantly in Odysseus’ encounter with the Cyclops.) How one received a guest to one’s home was an essential test of one’s civilization. The other half of this gesture seems to have gone under theorized or at least submerged as a concept: what is the corresponding gesture for farewell? What is tested in the act of leaving, being or society? Clearly, the use of the ban as the origin of sovereignty points to a weaponization of this lapse in leaving, but what perhaps Manfred points to in his final lines is that if the gesture of welcome to a society is contingent upon the society, then perhaps the leaving of a society should be
delegated to the leaving party, the would be exile, the being-astray. It would appear in Manfred that when those apart can choose their time of leaving they can do so amicably.

It is for this reason that Astarte’s words to Manfred are those of departure: “farewell” and equally that Manfred’s to the Abbott’s are of exodus: “Fare thee well-give me thy hand” One can understand this as a resounding of the transgressive contact in Act II’s crisis. Manfred, now dying, leaving, makes contact with the Abbott. The meaning is found in the parallel: Manfred seems to be attempting to perform the same transgression as Astarte, he would attempt to elicit a new transgressive knowledge in the Abbott, a stand-in for the traditional iteration of humanity. Manfred leaves the drama with the outcome of this contact unknown, as Astarte before him. But the hope, if there is hope, is that Manfred has made transgression more thinkable as an aspect of the human being. This is represented symbolically in the fact that Manfred and the Abbot are both still alive in this moment of contact. In a concept that has clear bio-political resonance, the dialogical distance between life and life, even in leaving, should be lesser than that between life and death.

Thus it would appear that the end of the drama, Manfred is representing Enemy Life in a new way. He presents, (in way that evokes resonance with a fortunate fall reading of Paradise Lost) his own Enemy-apartness linked with a drawing-near to humanity. In this way, his status as Enemy brings with it a form of movement, bringing an identification of such being as Life. It is a way of formulating a scenario wherein the appearance of an Enemy necessarily produces and in some way proclaims the arrival of the human Life. It is this sense of potential arrival and ensuing movement of being that Byron seems to utilizing as a representative mode in his final major work Don Juan.
Moving and Being: The Erasing Revision of Enemy Life

With this last moment in *Manfred* the work within what is properly thought of as the Satanic School and its representations of exile seems to close. Byron’s last major poetic work, which he began in exile and never formally ended because of his untimely death, the satirical and ironic *Don Juan* appears to entirely out of concert with the voices of Milton, Shelley and even Byron himself. The main character, Young Juan, at first glance, bears no resemblance to the grand, grandiose and sometimes grandiloquent Satanic protagonists of the previous works. But *Don Juan* precisely for this reason of its breaking the tradition, for its discordant and dissonant notes needs to be thought alongside these more static and Satanic representations of exile. *Don Juan*, the exuberantly human erupts from the silence of *Manfred* to provide a counterpoint and to be purposely connected with the silence. Thus with *Don Juan*, Byron revises the ending of *Manfred* and reinvigorates the exilic and now quite human subjectivity, showing us life which retains and reiterates the traces of Enemy transgression and apartness but in a way that is known through contemporary (in Agamben’s sense of the word) destructive meanings and fluid movement.

Free movement, if nothing else is at the essence of exile and if any narrative can fluidly frame the exile leaving, it might be *Don Juan*. The poem, Mock Epic in register, concerns the various dalliances, (entirely human and understandable transgressions as Byron depicts them), of a young aristocrat in Spain. A youthful, romantic exuberance results in Juan’s impromptu departure from his home country, a shipwreck, the making of a new home in the Cyclades, a banishment into slavery by a pirate-king, a stay at a harem, participation in a Russian-Turkish battle, an interim at Catherine the Great’s court and eventually an arrival in England. Clearly the scope of *Don Juan* and his many situations and de-situations creates a sense of improvisational
fluidity. At every port and under every kind of threat to his life, Young Juan has need to adapt and find his situation and somehow he manages to.

It is a long journey for Juan, but what one should like to examine, briefly, as a way of exodus from Enemy Life, is the structural composition of *Don Juan* both in the narrative design and linguistic play in the first four cantos. These cantos and their composition represent not only a contrapuntal resurgence of Byron’s voice after a long silence at the end of *Manfred* but also perhaps the integrative and final revision of Enemy Life. This resurgence in *Don Juan* defines a subjectivity which evokes the Saidian conception of exile, being-de-centered, eruptive while also eliciting an essential fidelity to the movement of being which one might suggest a critical aspect of exilic subjectivity both for itself apart and for exile to have resonance with more situated beings.

This reading of *Don Juan* as a revision of the Satanic School of poetry and its worldly, biopolitical counterpart in Enemy Life, hinges on the work of Edward Said as he discusses the idea of musical counterpoint in his “Reflections on Exile” (and further expounds on the concept in *Culture and Imperialism*). It also improvises upon concepts linked to this contrapuntal discourse that David Bartine and Eileen Maguire formulated in their articles: "Contrapuntal Critical Readings of Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park*: Resolving Edward Said's Paradox." and “Contrapuntal Critical Reading and Invitations to Invention.” Bartine further explored this contrapuntal discourse in direct relation to Said’s conception of exile in his 2015 article “The Contrapuntal Humanisms of Edward Said”.

To reinvoke Said’s position that the exile possesses a contrapuntal awareness, one recalls the late passage in “Reflections on Exile”
Seeing ‘the entire world as a foreign land’ makes possible originality of vision. Most people are principally aware of one culture, one setting, one home; exiles are aware of at least two, and this plurality of vision gives rise to awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an awareness that—to borrow a phrase from music—is contrapuntal. (Reflections on Exile 148)

It is this stance of “seeing” in relationship to the essential task of listening (in Nancy’s sense), which is inherent to a musical counterpoint that David Bartine and Eileen Maguire find a differing dialogue with Said in their work. In the Contrapuntal Critical Reading articles, they develop the possibility of a use of “dissonant counterpoint” alongside Said’s use of a harmonic “atonal counterpoint” as way to discover resistant acts in literature, which they trace against Said’s reading of Austen.

Bartine and Maguire argue that one of the essential aspects of employing a dissonant contrapuntal analysis would be a renewed emphasis on the temporal-audial reality of an event rather a visual-spatial reality:

> We believe that the model of counterpoint most appropriate for a critical reading of Mansfield Park and for discussion of Rozema's film version is a dissonant model that must not be limited to spatial concerns but must take into account a temporal dimension of dissonant counterpoint. (“Contrapuntal Readings” 43)

The benefit that they find in thinking the dissonant counterpoint with its added temporal range is that there are inherently more varied possibilities of meaning within a composition when meaning can be achieved in contemporary rather than a simultaneous sense:

> However, by limiting his contrapuntal reading of Mansfield Park, as he says he will, to the spatial dimension of counterpoint, Said suppresses consideration of a dimension of counterpoint which, in its attention to temporal and rhythmic patterns and disruptions of patterns, can provide insights not only into the novel itself but into Rozema's film adaptation of the novel as well as rich clues for contrapuntal reading practices in general. (“Contrapuntal Readings” 43)

Bartine and Maguire in making this argument recognized the perhaps perilous ground Said was siting his contrapuntal analysis. The danger in denying a temporal dimension to
counterpoint, of the exile seeing simultaneous dimensions is that the exile in this position becomes recaptured as a traditional subject, apprehending only static images of reality. This reiterates a mode of inquiry that reverts to binary structures and perhaps the traditional, Western phenomenology of the subject. It is with this awareness of the exile’s spatial precarity that in his later article “The Contrapuntal Humanisms of Edward Said”, Bartine materially connects this concept of dissonant counterpoint with its renewed fidelity to developing complex temporal meanings to a discourse of exile. He begins with this critique of the exile Said seems to represent with simultaneous awareness:

I will argue that such a combination of fixity of standpoint and observational movement (a fixed or static position of observational power that allows for observational movement above various objects of attention) is ultimately descriptive of the experience of Said’s exile, who views the old and new worlds from the position in which he or she exists as exile. (“Contrapuntal Humanisms” 67)

Bartine goes on from this to argue for the use of dissonant counterpoint as an analytical technique specifically for its capacity to preserve the quality of movement in the sensory field of listening and in the subject. Referencing Nancy’s work in Listening he crafts the distinction:

Cast in terms of Nancy’s distinction between simultaneity and contemporaneity, Said’s downplaying of temporality is also a diminishing of the importance of movement in favor of the nonmovement or stasis that Nancy associates with the simultaneity of visual perception. Nancy says, “Whereas visible or tactile presence occurs in a motionless ‘at the same time,’ sonorous presence is an essentially mobile ‘at the same time. (“Contrapuntal Humanisms” 67)

It is this quality of movement, discovered in sonorous, contemporary knowledge that elicits an enriched reading of Don Juan, especially in its representation of exile. I would relate this way of knowing to Byron’s own contaminating, dialogical method, the one which he seems to have struggled to form in Manfred and then deployed in Don Juan.
Listening to Irony in Byron’s Don Juan

Don Juan is a musical poem, one that disguises its depth in the catchiness of its many melodies and its playful ironic hooks. What I would investigate of the poem’s music is its rhythms, its contrapuntal audial-temporary movements to harmony and equally, its gestures toward dissonance. Thinking of it structurally, one hears this in the small scale of Byron’s ottava rima stanzas, in the eliding vocal movements between the speaker’s view and Young Juan’s experience, and in the large scale, in oscillating and transgressive pattern of his cantos (clearly “canto” invites a musical analysis). The result of listening to the composition in this way is a (further) perception of the complex and rather unique form of what I would call mobile, yet familiar Irony, that Byron, with a contemporary sense, is deploying. This transgressive mode of Irony and the narrative frame of exile it produces seems to precisely address a reality that I introduced in the first chapter of this work, the Tragic, static and ultimately disposable frame of the exile, as represented by Adam.

Listening to a stanza of Don Juan requires more attention than one might initially expect, given that the poem appears so light-hearted and earnestly satirical in its early moments. While manifestly bound to a rhyme scheme, Byron is hardly consistent in the interior structure of his stanzas, the melody and the rhythm of the words and lines varies quite jauntily. Overall, the impression is one almost gregarious movement, and a playful ambivalence toward structured time, such as appears from the opening stanza:

I want a hero: an uncommon want,
When every year and month sends forth a new one,
Till, after cloying the gazettes with cant,
The age discovers he is not the true one;
Of such as these I should not care to vaunt,
I ’ll therefore take our ancient friend Don Juan—
We all have seen him, in the pantomime,
Sent to the devil somewhat ere his time. (Don Juan 1.1-8)
This language is a departure from that *Manfred*. (Although one cannot help but notice the invocation of the “devil” once again in Byron’s work.) The poetry is ephemeral, effervescence. It is also contemporarily temporal in its detailing of a hero’s time is that of an event and in the fact that speaker is reaching back to find Don Juan out of time’s supposed continuum. Already Byron is entailing the reader to synthesize meaning from his work in a rather more complex way that simple linear progression. *Don Juan* is fundamentally about eventual times, (most often the times of innocence and experience) brought into dialogue as a way generate enriched contemporary meanings.

Actually *listening* to the opening lines of *Don Juan* reveals more of this dimension of Byron’s mode. Because of the rhyme scheme and the tone of the poetic voice there is a melody with plays out as the syllables (what could be thought of as notes) sound. This is in many ways, the “home” of the poem. From the first gesture of invocation “I want a hero” through the first six lines, to ‘our ancient friend Don Juan” Byron is creating an audial narrative of progression. The syllables lead on and on and on breezily, innocently-until the break in the sixth line where there is a disruption, a discontinuity. It is palpable break- it is an event unto itself for its time of unfolding only loosely connected to the progression that preceded it. It is a moment when the unseen speaker seems to be, now in experience and knowledge, reflecting on the words he has just spoken. Because of this break, the last two lines’ sound and surface meaning are different, bitter, more intimate, with less of a mind to entertain in song than to express. This are dissonant lines. Yet Byron’s composition does not forswear what came before; the stanza is not broken apart, no Ironic distance or static space is produced. The rupture and the dissonant lines occurs contemporarily *with* the more harmonious and pleasing syllables that sounded first, modulating them into meaning with relationship to its own evocations. One perceives this in the content of
the lines as well: the speaker after the breaks gestures toward involvement by way evoking a more familiar communal experience of “seeing, in the pantomime”.

Thus, even in this first stanza one in which the variety of audial-temporal movement is relatively limited, one gets a sense of Byron’s new mode of representing the exilic subject. The audial-temporal experience of Byron’s language creates a sense of expectation, of narrative, and perhaps the hope of resolution—and then departs from expectation. This first stanza is only relatively simple iteration of this technique. Later stanzas’ movement through syllables, breaks and silences will become even more complex and further meanings are exchanged between stanzas and through series of stanzas in relation to other series and in fact in passages’ often ironic and deflating relationship to Byron’s previous poetry. This complex array grows even more pronounced as one encounters the added multifocal and contemporary range of the speaker’s voice, who often appears in a position of (temporal) exile and apartness but is still materially connected and involved in Don Juan’s fresh experiences.

Linked to this, Byron’s work also has an innovation of Form, one that I do not think is evoked as well without the audial element playing its part to engineered it or the work Byron performed in Manfred. Manifestly Don Juan represents a Mock Epic. It is satirical in tone and uses Irony to produce its meanings. But Byron’s particular mode of using Irony must be closely linked to the audial-temporal realities we have just listened to. The Ironic mode of Byron utilizes a capacity that Northrop Frye identified in his work Anatomy of Criticism:

“The term irony, then indicates a technique of appear less than one is, which in literature becomes most commonly a technique of saying as little as possible, or in a more general way, a pattern of words that turns away from direct statement of its own obvious meaning.” (Frye 40)

What Frye has identified seems at the crux of Said’s contrapuntal analysis, if the purpose is fidelity to movement as Bartine and Maguire suggest. Irony does seem to be essentially elusive
or differing. It is to use Frye’s language “a pattern of words that turns away”. It is for this reason that one might suggest that Irony, like the contrapuntal, is the more natural mode of representing exile.

The danger of this Irony is the same danger that Said encounter in his work, that the leaving, the turning away becomes a permanent distance. Frye identifies this danger in his work but perhaps expresses it in language that reiterates traditional metaphysics’ capacity for capture:

Complete objectivity and suppression of all explicit moral judgements are essential to this method. Thus pity and fear are not raised in ironic art: they are reflect to the reader from the art. When we try to isolate the ironic as such, we find that it seems to be simply the attitude of the poet as such, a dispassionate construction of literary form, with all assertive elements, implied or expressed, eliminated. Irony, as a mode, is born from the low mimetic; it takes life exactly as it finds it. (Frye 40-41)

In this statement of what Irony and does one cannot help but notice the privilege Frye seems to extend to high-mimetic art. Whether it be the “raising” of pity and fear or the instinct to isolate and apprehend, or the labelling of Irony as a low-mimetic mode, Frye does seem disinclined from Irony and understands it mostly in terms of the spatiality of the form, its distance, the distance of its writer from his subject. (This is the same lapse as Saïd’s in his Reflections and thereby speaks to the ease with which one can be re-captured by the traditional modes of inquiry,) Frye does, however, see its transgressive (“suppressing moral judgement”), reflective (“reflect to the reader”) and associative (“life exactly as it finds it”) movements. From these movements (rather the implied positions) a contemporary Irony can take its cue.

Because Byron’s Irony is an Irony which does not simply dissociate or distance as a critical lens. One does not laugh at Juan’s pain when he experiences Ironic reversals of fortune. Instead when Byron depicts reality from an Ironic distance there is often quite a returning movement that shortly follows, moving the representation back to center in preparation for the
next excursion outward. This movement is an involving, joining and contrapuntal gesture. It is transgressive act that understands the human being through sin. This becomes a prominent theme when one listens to the exchanges between the speaker’s voice of experience as it countervails Juan’s innocent action. This happens quite often in Don Juan but perhaps nowhere quite so humanely in the early going as when Juan is in the throes of adolescent love:

He thought about himself, and the whole earth  
   Of man the wonderful, and of the stars,  
   And how the deuce they ever could have birth;  
   And then he thought of earthquakes, and of wars,  
   How many miles the moon might have in girth,  
   Of air-balloons, and of the many bars  
   To perfect knowledge of the boundless skies;—  
   And then he thought of Donna Julia's eyes.

In thoughts like these true wisdom may discern  
   Longings sublime, and aspirations high,  
   Which some are born with, but the most part learn  
   To plague themselves withal, they know not why:  
   'T was strange that one so young should thus concern  
   His brain about the action of the sky;  
   If you think 't was philosophy that this did,  
   I can't help thinking puberty assisted. (Don Juan 1.729-744)

In the first seven lines of the first stanza, what one hears in Byron’s language is something akin to a spiraling ascent. The melody is uninterrupted and Juan driftingly ascends, alongside the syllables which reach an almost Platonic and transcendental limit with “perfect knowledge of the boundless skies”. And then rather than a break- an energetic bounding to “Donna Julia’s eyes”, sends Juan hurtling down like Phaeton, eliciting a humane Irony which is dissonant from the lines that preceded it. This stanza might rest at this moment, but it does not halt entirely. Instead, the next stanza rises to meet the rest before it completes its fall and transfers the focus to the speaker. The speaker then embellishes upon Juan’s theme, musing on the sublime, but in rather more amused mode which proceeds inward from “aspirations high” (a
syllabic counterpoint to “boundless skies”). But critically to the point of counterpoint, the speaker in his part of the composition does not seek to silence Juan’s musing. There is no banning act, instead the speaker is contaminated. The speaker is, in his Irony still playing similar notes, thinking on the sublime, reflecting on the self. He is merely adding depth and the character of age in resonance with Juan’s rather lofty high notes. In this way Byron is deploying Irony not as an endpoint, something that stops motion and (thereby constrains being) but as a counterpoint that keeps motion moving by participating in it, accepting it and redirecting it. One finds it to be an especially humane form of Irony: it does not use Irony from a distance to de-structure and critique, (as the later modernists often do) rather Byron’s Irony is sympathetic and involving.

Once again this merely a relatively simple example of how Byron produces mobile Irony. But, to say the least, in the stanzas’ audial structure, the expectation of resolution is if not entirely dismissed then at least diverted by movement. This elusive mode of Irony, appearing in Frye’s formal conception of the mode, yet distinctly apart from it, is the sort of audial decentering that Said and Bartine are intent on listening for in the representation of the exile.

A New Exile

Byron is producing his composition with exile in mind and he is intent on using his mobile Irony to do it, not just in the moment to moment of his language but also in the larger scale of the composition’s major movements. This one can immediately infer from the perpetual leaving of Don Juan throughout its sixteen cantos, but the first Four cantos are especially attuned to a similar structural, contrapuntal theme as the stanzas that they are comprised of. These cantos establish what one should now perceive as a decentering pattern in content and form, (which I will attempt to broadly frame within a crucial moment). In Canto I Juan is at home and humanely sinning in Spain. In Canto II Juan becomes at first something akin to a cosmopolitan and then
more strenuously dislocated via a shipwreck. In Canto III Juan arrives on a Greek Isle as a
refugee and attempts to make a new home. In Canto IV this new home is dissolved and Juan is
again displaced. It is in this way that Byron is involving the experience of home and exile
together inextricably, linking them through a dissolving voice that knows no boundary or sin
between Enemy and human Life, the cosmopolitan and the exile.

My intent for this section is to listen to the first four cantos as they establish themselves
in counterpoint to one another. Therefore, I apologize if the analysis does not pursue the textual
hinges of each canto in depth, the concept I am trying to elicit is one of a contrapuntal Ironic
narrative form (perhaps organizational principle is less spatial), how it functions to express the
themes and problems of exile.

To begin with the beginning in Canto I, what one notices Young Juan is that he is not a
banned being, an exile, an Enemy from the onset. Instead, Juan is a situated being with a history
and an aristocratic family. He is loved, perhaps too much by an overbearing mother, and inhabits
a safe secure world. In short, he is human. The conflict of the first canto rises from a place
originally associated with sin, (recalling *Paradise Lost*) young love. This love is forbidden by
social convention since Juan loves Julia, a married woman, a few years older than him and his
mother’s friends. However, the framing of this supposed transgression is rendered quite
differently than Milton’s Tragic emplottment. Byron depicts an “original sin” that is essentially
harmless, understandable and to be comedically expected:

    And Julia sate with Juan, half embraced
    And half retiring from the glowing arm,
    Which trembled like the bosom where ’t was placed;
    Yet still she must have thought there was no harm,
    Or else ’t were easy to withdraw her waist;
    But then the situation had its charm,
    And then—God knows what next—I can't go on;
    I ’m almost sorry that I e'er begun…
...And Julia's voice was lost, except in sighs,
    Until too late for useful conversation;
The tears were gushing from her gentle eyes,
    I wish indeed they had not had occasion,
But who, alas! can love, and then be wise?
    Not that remorse did not oppose temptation;
A little still she strove, and much repented
And whispering 'I will ne'er consent'—consented. (Don Juan
1.913-936)

It is in this way that one comes to understand the nature of transgression not as a
violation, not as the contamination of the Enemy but as aspect of Life. The entire situation of
marital infidelity is rendered with such impish good humor, that the reaction of Julia’s much
older husband, Alphonso becomes comical in its desire to see justice done to the love-sick
youths. In relation of Don Juan to the previous traditional works of exile and Enemy Life, this
opening canto seems to playfully counterpoint the form of narrative, High Tragedy with a low-
mimetic art of Irony. Juan, to deploy Frye’s language reflects the reader as they are not as they
ought to be. Within the composition itself, the canto, in a sense, with its motion, Irony and
urbane transgression is Don Juan’s musical home, it is where life lives.

Nevertheless, because of this entirely human and trifling sin Juan is not so much forced,
but perhaps politely asked to leave his native country. He disembarks in Canto II, decidedly not a
refugee but perhaps a rather-well funded exile or even a cosmopolitan. This rather gentle
iteration of the ban, however, does give rise to a more potent one. Juan’s well-supplied ship is
captured in a sudden storm and Juan is de-situated from all his former means and consigned to a
cannibalistic existence in a life raft. It is here that Byron deploys his Irony particularly well in
achieving a departing dissonance in his composition. He relates a scenario wherein the
conditions of life are so extreme that their reality dissolves into the comical. Thus Byron
produces the scene in two complementary moments. The first moment is somber melody:
“…-the burning sun
    Blister’d and scorch’d and stagnant on the sea,
they lay like carcases; and hope was none…
and you might see the longings of the cannibal arise/
(Although they spoke not) in their wolfish eyes” (*Don Juan* 2.569-576)

The second moment is an ironic dissonance wherein Byron relates why the mate was not eaten by his shipmates:

    He had been rather indisposed of late,
    and that chiefly proved his saving clause,
    was a small present made to him at Cadiz
    by general subscription of the ladies. (*Don Juan* 2.645-649)

The dark (blue) humor does not diminish the sense of pathos however, rather it
pronounces it further. What one perceives again is an entangled fluid and enriched reality: a
Vaudeville exposure mingles (like Pagliacci) with the horror of life adrift and a much darker and contaminating sin is made understandably human. Critically, Byron’s Irony once again does not produce an arrest of motion; it does not halt our sympathy for Juan. The grief and our sense of the human is quite near.

This is as much linked to the contrapuntal emplotment of the narrative as it is the particular depiction. (It is useful to think of this in terms of eventual time to perceive the congruency between the moment to moment Irony of the stanzas and the larger canto to canto Irony. The eventual time of Irony is indifferent to the size of the points.) One has spent an entire canto (as a moment) with Juan as a being like ourselves. The audience has known him as a loved being, drawn near him as a cosmopolitan and now via a most understandably unjust application of the ban (a storm at sea, the moment of counterpoint) he is become exposed and bare life, an exile, a cannibal. This is a dissolution, a corresponding dissonance that follows the resumed harmony of a supposed adventure (or even colonial) narrative. It is the ease of this transformation, the dissonance’s equal availability, possibilities, and presence that Byron’s work
is particularly good at emphasizing. With the progression of a few hundred lines, Juan has gone from a doted-on child to a being adrift on the sea, burnt under the sun and forced to eat his personal tutor. The thinness of the distinction between human being and exile, the involvement of these contrary beings, their mobility in this way becomes immediately apparent via the Ironic counterpoint of the cantos.

The end of Canto II sees Juan, the lone survivor of the shipwreck, making landfall swimming to shore and near-death crawling onto the beach of an isle in the Cyclades. Musically this is the involvement, the carrying over of dissonance further into the composition, one imagine disjointed notes lingering, threatening their dissipation into silence. In this kind of precarity, Juan’s pathos is clearly an exile that we are familiar with: he is barely recognizable as life. Fortunately, Juan is found by a young girl, Haidee and meaningfully offers care to a stranger:

[Haidee] Recall’d his answering spirits back from death;  
and bathing his chill temples, tried to soothe  
each pulse to animation, till beneath  
its gentle touch and trembling care, a sigh  
to these kind efforts made a low reply.” (Don Juan 2.900-904)

This is once again a familiar movement, carried on in Canto III: the contact between two people one near death, the other alive elicits humanity and life in both. This is the rehabilitation of Enemy Life. It is a home-coming and it represents a theorization of how the exile, the Enemy, the being that is supposedly dissonant, should be received after crossing through a boundary. Haidee accepts and cares for Juan, touches him and he replies. Thus what Canto III presents (with recalling memory of Cantos I and II) is the natural, synthetic meeting of home and exile; it blends dissonance with harmony in coexistence. As if consciously symbolizing this and naturally enough Juan and Haidee fall in love, making a somewhat subversive home together in the palace of her father, Lambro a pirate-king. But the emphasis I would again place on this canto is not
necessarily the reappearance of romantic entanglements for Juan. This is secondary, something that develops after harmony has been reestablished as a pattern for the experience of home. Rather the crucial moment the one wherein Haidee offers care to the stranger who in dire desituation she found collapsed at the boundary of her home country. This is where Byron sites the meeting of human and exile.

But if this home-coming represents the humane way of accepting the exile, then surely given Byron’s technique, this humanity must be experienced with its counterpoint. And thus in Canto IV, Byron provides one, with the return of the pirate king Lambro, who finds in the exilic Juan not a being in need of care, but a threat, an interloper and merely a seducer of his beloved daughter. All of this is quite ironic given that Lambro himself is depicted to be a slaver, a raider of ships, a plunderer of other people’s wealth and a bringer of violence to every place he visits with malicious intent. (In this, one cannot help but think of Derrida’s work in *Beast and Sovereign*, which ties the loper and the laurel-wearer together.) A plunderer, a killer, a sea-wolf, yet, at home, Lambro is king of his island and sees into Young Juan the violence he seems to embody.

In this way Byron depicts the “reconstitution” of home under the discipline of a sovereign. Ironically, because the return of the sovereign would seem to indicate the arrival of order, this home-coming produces dissonance rather than harmony. Lambro rends the rehabilitation that Haidee performed. Where Haidee welcomes Juan and there is a synthesis of exile and home, Lambro’s view of Juan’s integration into his home creates a conflict. Pursuing a father and a sovereign’s justice, Lambro nearly kills Juan, Haidee intercedes and saves Juan’s life at the cost of her own, suffering a fatal brain hemorrhage upon witnessing her father’s violence toward the man she has come to love. In half consciousness, she lingers for days before
dying with Juan’s unborn child, manifestly changing the island and the world: “The isle now all desolate and bare, its dwellings down, its tenants past away (Don Juan 4.569-570) Juan is subsequently sold into slavery at Lambro’s direction. In effect he is banned, once again exilic, once again at sea: “Wounded and fetter’d, cabin’d, cribb’d, confined/ some days and nights elapsed before that he/ could altogether call the past to mind/and when he did, he found himself at sea…(Don Juan 4.593-596)”.

It is in this rupture that Byron depicts the reappearance of the ban at the end of Canto IV, juxtaposing it with the gesture of welcome that Haidee performed so shortly before in the beginning of Canto III. To place the cantos alongside one another: the result of welcoming and caring for the exilic Juan in Canto III is life and love and the creation of a new home. The result of viewing Juan as a reflected embodiment of Lambro’s violence is death and the re-constitution of the same constraining forms of Power-relationships that have become ossified in the West: the exile as Enemy, Power as justice.

It is through the Ironic counterpoint of these cantos that the diverging outcomes of Juan’s existence as an exile can be further appreciated because both outcomes are explored in mobile relation to one another. It is for precisely this reason that Byron’s mobile Ironic narrative frame is so apt at representing the complex, decentered life of the exile. In the movement of Canto I to Canto II home dissolves to exile. From Canto II to Canto III home is regained in new form. And in moving from Canto III to Canto IV integration becomes framed by Power into constraint and conflict. No home is safe, there is always movement and danger: this is the essence of Byron’s Ironic narrative frame and his mode of representation. Equally and perhaps because of this, one gets a sense that the congruent counterpoints of Enemy and Life, which seemed so clearly
defined in Milton’s work, are quite entangled and perhaps more meaningful because of it. This is ultimately the genius of *Don Juan*: it represents exile in a mode which is inherently exilic.

**Exodus**

The final movement of this chapter is to link this contrapuntal Ironic representation of exile found *Don Juan* in dissonant counterpoint with the representations of exile that Milton first presented in *Paradise Lost* and that Shelley and Byron developed through the Satanic School and out of it. What *Don Juan* performs when one listens to its complex audial counterpoints is essentially the framing of exile with an attention to the movement of being, disrupting the instinct for Tragedy that Milton Shelley and Byron in his early years explored. This movement, *Don Juan’s* elusiveness, in a larger sense its particular impiety, transgression and mockery is an essential decentering. It denies a reader (a viewer) the understandability and disposability which follows Tragedy: there is always some part of *Don Juan* that is not fully present, and perhaps just behind the moment on its surface. *Don Juan* provides the reader with constant yet complex involvement, drawing them near, asking them to continue listening intently for the notes of dissonance that may, at any moment, arise. *Don Juan* is a frame of being that moves while being.

In being a frame for being that also moves with being, (forgive the Heideggerian turns of phrase) *Don Juan* performs a process which I think is critical to the entire concept of “creating a discourse of Enemy Life”. This is the erasure of the term Enemy Life or at least the term’s submergence. What I mean by this is that after observing the enormous variety of contaminating exchanges that take place between the human being and the exile, most pronouncedly in *Don Juan* but also in *Prometheus Unbound* and *Manfred* before it, it no longer seems possible to keep human and exile distinct from one another in any meaningful way. The apartness of exile is drawn near to the human, inextricably. The purpose of a discourse of Enemy Life, (which
inhomogeneously linked to a concept of the Satanic School) is to make the Enemy appear, but not to let the Enemy linger in exposed prominence under a gaze. Rather Enemy should be joined in innumerable ways to Life and then that bond formed, the concept should, like a cast, to fall away and allow being to be. To put it another way, ultimately the goal of speaking about Enemy Life is to hear Life and hear, moving behind it, however subtly, a necessary dissonance which is apart but part nonetheless.

The danger of this erasure, that one must evoke even during this moment of exodus is one of ambiguity. In the desire to hear Enemy Life erased into Life, one is essentially attempting to recreate the supposed original existence of the human being, affecting the unity of bios/zoe as Agamben puts it. The danger of this movement that sovereignty remains, perpetually opposed to such ambiguity and would resolve such life with a new application of the ban. This is why one must be especially attuned when listening to political speech on the nature of what human life is, for in being inattentive one might well miss the subtle separation, the silencing of Enemy dissonance that proclaims a forthcoming ban.
**Exodus**

It is with this gesture toward the revisionary movement of *Don Juan* that I end my reading of Milton, Shelley and Byron. *Don Juan* completes a cycle of exilic literature by opening exile to a new mode of depiction. Placing this cycle of Milton, Shelley and Byron within the larger tradition of exilic literature, Milton links to Shakespeare’s tragic *Hamlet* and *King Lear* and Byron’s work is proleptic of the modernists’ Ironic efforts in *Ulysses* and *Endgame*. Beyond this established continuum of the canon, all three poets have influential roles in defining and modulating the contemporary discourse of exile in both its Adamic and Satanic iterations.

Within the scope of the four major chapters, I have shown the contemporary realities of exile that one hundred and thirty years of literary inquiry has produced. In *Paradise Lost*, I traced two competing narratives of exile in Adam and Satan, and examined the construction of Eden and the theoretical underpinnings of the use of the ban. *Paradise Lost* creates one half of the reality for Satanic exile, the half of the Enemy Life which is viewed by Power. In my work with the Romantics, I evoked the other half. I turned to the radical Romantics to recover alternative theoretic models of the exile. In *Prometheus Unbound*, the exile appears from a tension between traditional and audial-agonistic exilic subjectivity as Shelley attempts to find a way out of the Western Tradition. Distinguishing Byron’s efforts to rehabilitate the Satanic exile from Shelley’s, the emergence of a limit-attitude in *Manfred* produced a mobile form of Irony in *Don Juan*. This last effort on the part of Byron seems to be the most promising way of restoring life to the Enemy-exile, because it prefers not to define any form of life, merely notes the complex meanings of human acts in relation with one another.

My contemporary interest in *Paradise Lost* is how the two narratives of exile, Adamic and Satanic, came to be produced and reproduced in Western discourse. In the rhetoric of Power,
the exile has come to mean the Enemy. I place this phenomena in entanglement with Milton’s figuration of exile and home. The West’s xenophobia and understanding of walls as natural protective structures develops from the primordial image of Satan leaping the garden walls of Eden “like a grand thief.” The philosophical impasse at “What it is to be an exile?” is framed by the tidy resolution of Adam’s exodus. And as a lasting legacy of Adam’s exile, there is a conceptual misunderstanding that exile can end and that Power must resolve it.

In dissolution of this reality, the treatment of exiles is informed by Satan’s narrative. Following Milton and Agamben’s understanding of social origins, it appears that human being begins with the use of the ban. This ceremony of violence and its representative discourse is a purification ritual, first deployed by Power and then reiterated via Power’s “loyal angels”. It is the purifying, cleansing by fire that defines the exiles’ treatment in contemporary society. Purification is the treatment of a blasphemous being that cannot, in their “madness”, assimilate without presenting a parody of worship to Power. This is the exile as the world presents them now. This is how the world views Enemy Life and this is how Satan appears in Paradise Lost.

Clearly, there is a need to understand the language that Power deploys to build an Enemy. Equally, there is a need to find language to question that concept until it becomes malleable again. Understanding the movement, the de-centeredness of exile, which is the human being, requires both these destructuring modes of inquiry. This is how one rehabilitates a Satanic iteration of exile. This is what I have tried to elicit in pivoting the exploration of the Enemy into the literature of the Satanic School.

Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound presents a rehabilitation of the Satanic exile as the figure of resistance. In this figure of resistance, Shelley theorizes a subjectivity of exile that departs from the tradition of Power viewing the exile. Prometheus attempts to re-define himself as a
subject. He remains defiantly apart, and yet, plays an integral even central role in the social construct. This is exile as it could be in contemporary society. The technique that Shelley offers to make this form of life is agonistic. He posits the destruction of the traditional subject and forms of knowledge as a sublime, involving performance. This not only reframes our understanding of the exile but also restructures our viewing of spectacular correction. Shelley makes the exile an essential figure, because, in their apartness, the exile can erode the narrative of Power and with a resonant cry engage a listener.

Byron’s *Manfred* and *Don Juan* approach exile from a different stance than Shelley or Milton, though he does appropriate narrative and thematic elements from both. In *Manfred*, Byron theorizes an exile which is both existential and social, developing a discourse which touches both Foucault and Freud. Through *Manfred*, the exile becomes a figure of necessary transgression, a being that searches for limits of (self-)knowledge in the breaking of transcendental boundaries. It is in this way that Byron places his iteration of exile in tension with the exile of *Prometheus Unbound*. Manfred represents the exile as the being that can re-construction a tradition of knowledge that has eroded, whereas Prometheus represents the exile as being that initiates de-construction. Thus, within the Satanic iteration of exile (unlike the Adamic iteration), there is a tradition of building human being and society and deconstructing these same concepts. These are the movements that Byron became aware of in Manfred and he models the dynamic in his final work *Don Juan*.

The dynamic of exile is why I place emphasis on *Don Juan*. Following work done by Said in his concept of musical contrapuntal analysis, *Don Juan* is a representation of exile that does not come to rest. Exile in *Don Juan* is always a series of ellipses; the exile has no “home”. This mode is achieved in part through Byron’s deployment of satirical irony in both the large and
small structures of the poem. It is through moving, de-centered irony that Byron plays between the Adamic young Juan and the Satanic voice of the experienced speaker. Similar deflating movements occur in Byron’s canto and stanza structure. This is an exile, an Enemy which cannot be parted from the human. Transgression, boundary-crossing in *Don Juan* always brings both the human and the exile in its representation. This gesture constitutes the integration of the term Enemy Life and its erasure. Enemy Life gives way to Life in *Don Juan* and it is this recognition that effects the true rehabilitation of the exile.

There is a contemporary purpose to the rehabilitation of the Satanic exile. Foucault and Agamben (among others) as theorists of biopolitics have demonstrated at the center of the social construct there is a paradox. This paradox is two competing forms of life which are irreconcilable. Agamben denotes this through his use of the two terms, *bios* and *zoe*. My formulation of Enemy Life is a term designed to elicit the elision of these terms. “Enemy Life” is designed to present the biopolitical realities of Satanic exile and then, in the same movement, present a body of literature focuses on escaping from that confinement.

The hope of my work is that by speaking of Enemy Life, the Satanic form of exile there can be a recognition of the treatment of exiles in our time. The reality is that the banishment and further treatment of Satan in exile is precisely the treatment that Power corrects exiles with today. If such treatment can even be justified upon the being that brought the fall of Mankind, it seems incredible that such harsh measures would be fit for a fellow human being. Yet these measures of correction persist not only in what the West depicts as the war-torn regions of the world but within the Eden of the nation-state. In Syria and Israel, along the borders of the United States and within the racialized boundaries of “civilized” cities- everywhere- there are exiles.
Power, our tradition sees them as the Enemy, but alternatively our literature, beginning with Genesis and carrying on until now, shows them to be human.
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