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Nowhere to run: measuring how refugee flows and rights shape civil conflict

Katherine Emma Felt
Binghamton University--SUNY, katherine.felt@gmail.com

NOWHERE TO RUN:
MEASURING HOW REFUGEE FLOWS AND RIGHTS SHAPE CIVIL CONFLICT

BY

KATHERINE EMMA FELT

BA, Pennsylvania State University, 2010
MA, Binghamton University, 2014

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David H. Clark, Chair and Faculty Advisor
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University

Benjamin O. Fordham, Member
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University

Seden Akcinaroglu, Member
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University

Stephen R. Ortiz, Outside Examiner
Department of History, Binghamton University

Dedication

To my family, here and gone, who have valued education above all else.

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Abstract

In civil wars, innocent civilians live in the shadow of violence and destruction. This can range from low-level violence to aggressive campaigns of shelling of urban areas and massacres of entire villages in rural settings. In some cases, civilians respond to this violence by fleeing from the conflict to find refuge in neighboring states; however, in other civil wars, civilians remain trapped in the conflict zone, creating humanitarian disasters. This dissertation argues that civilians will flee when they have a reasonable, safe place to seek refuge, but in the absence of a safe place to seek sanctuary, civilians have no choice to but to stay put. When civilians can flee from violence, this vents the pressure from the conflict; however, if there is nowhere to run, civilians will not only remain in the conflict zone, but will feed back into the conflict processes. Civilians are a resource in civil wars that armed actors can leverage to extract resources, pull in humanitarian aid, coopt to join the conflict, and otherwise sustain the continuation of the fighting. If civilians are trapped and vulnerable in a conflict with high levels of violence and have no paths to flight, they become easy pickings for armed actors, which in turn fuels the conflict further; this creates what I call a pressure-cooker conflict state.

To test this theory, this project introduces original data on how states treat refugees, and subsequently uses this data to create measures of the ability to flee—or "exit quality." I conduct empirical analyses using these new measures and find that, if civilians are exposed to violence, civil wars that lack safe exit options tend to be bloodier conflicts that flare quickly but also burn out sooner. This project shows, then, not only that states surrounding civil wars can shape civilians' choices to flee based on how they treat refugees, but that this also in turn shapes the development of civil wars. Shutting off

opportunities for civilians to escape from conflict is problematic not only because it creates a humanitarian crisis, but also because it can change the course of the conflict.

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Introduction

In the summer of 2014, Israel blockaded the Gaza Strip and undertook a campaign of heavy bombings and shelling in civilian-inhabited areas in an attempt to root out the terrorist organization Hamas. Gaza resident and journalist Mohammed Omer described the situation on the ground, where relentless attacks on civilian residences were wiping out infrastructure and causing massive casualties:

> The only power plant in Gaza is bombed. If that means something, it means, according to officials, that we will have about one year of no electricity and no light... Rafah crossing is closed. There is nowhere to hide. There is nowhere to run to, unlike many places or war zones. The humanitarian crises are growing in the Gaza strip... I believe that Israel, what they wanted to do is to make people turn against the resistance. In fact, it's the other way around. You find people in the street who say, "We do support resistance, because that's the only way to end the occupation."[1]

The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip literally had no way out. Flight was impossible. While scholars and policy-makers alike often assume that civilians can flee from conflict and violence, this is simply not always the case. While the blockade of Gaza is an extreme example, it is by no means an isolated event. Border closures, policies of arresting and

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[1] "Palestinian Journalist Mohammed Omer: Lifting the Blockade Isn't a Hamas Demand- It's a Human Right." Democracynow.org. July 29 2014.

detaining asylum-seekers, and abuses of refugee populations are as common as the wars and violence that drive civilians to flee in the first place.

As Omer's testimony states, when civilians have nowhere to run or hide, but are still exposed to high levels of violence and insecurity caused by conflict, they become quite vulnerable. Vulnerable populations - those without resources or the means to secure their own safety - become easy pickings for armed actors, either as targets, or as a base of support. After all, in an insecure environment that offers no escape, armed groups - even terrorists - can offer some measure of security. In these types of conflicts, in which civilians are effectively trapped and cannot escape from indiscriminate violence, they will thus be more likely to feed back into the conflict itself. These vulnerable civilians can be an important resource for armed actors, and if they are stuck in a violent conflict state, they can – willingly or not – become part of the base that fuels the fighting. This is what I call the *pressure-cooker conflict state*.

Of course, the situation is rarely as black and white as this example suggests; there is usually *some* way to flee from conflict. However, not all paths to flight are created equal, and there is a continuum along which the availability and quality of exit from conflict states can be measured.

In this chapter, I argue that restrictions on civilian flight from conflict states not only impact if and where civilians will flee, but also shape the development of the conflict itself. Specifically, if civilians are exposed to high levels of violence and infrastructure damage but lack reasonable exit options, they will be trapped without resources or security, and will thus be easily coopted by armed actors. This will provide a population from which to extract and recruit, which should in turn fuel the conflict.

However, while I initially expected pressure-cookers to see *longer* and bloodier conflicts, empirically, pressure-cookers have shorter and more intense conflicts. Where vulnerable civilians are trapped and threatened by violence, they are more likely to feed back into the conflict, driving conflicts that are more intense, but that also flare and burn out sooner.

In this project, I therefore leverage original data on state policies and practices towards refugees and asylum-seekers, in conjunction with the level of internal violence and insecurity, to generate separate measures of *exit quality* - or the factors that "pull" civilians from a conflict state - and violence, which should exert the pressure to "push" civilians from a conflict state. This allows me to examine, in later chapters, how the precise balance of the "push" and "pull" affects internal conflict dynamics. In short, I am able to leverage these measures to determine whether armed actors in the state in question are pushing people who are effectively trapped, and what this means not only in a humanitarian sense, but also for the long-term development of the conflict.

This project should connect the literatures on the macro-level characteristics of civil wars (Regan and Stam 2000, Regan 2002, Regan and Norton 2005, Collier et al. 2003), violence against civilians (Kalyvas 2006, Lyall 2009, Condra and Shapiro 2012, Wood 2010, Weinstein 2007, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004) and displacement, in terms of the prediction of refugee flows (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006, 2007, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009), the effects of migration (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Salehyan 2007), and the use of forced displacement as a strategy of conflict (Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Steele 2009, 2011). At its core, the project is about the short and long-

term internal characteristics of civil conflict: how long a conflict endures, how many casualties accumulate over the course of a conflict, and how civilians can impact both of these dynamics. However, building from the understanding of civilians as central to the development of civil wars, I give new insights on how both external and internal actors can shape these outcomes - intentionally or not - by restricting the ability of civilians to exit from the conflict.

Background on Refugee Flight Restrictions

Observationally, it is clear that states do close borders to incoming refugees and asylum seekers, or otherwise restrict their entry, fairly frequently. The refugee crisis in Syria has garnered the most substantial amount of attention in recent years; the first wave of media attention gathered some steam as bordering countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, opened and closed their borders to Syrian civilians fleeing the conflict. That coverage paled in comparison to the avalanche of media attention to European states closing their borders to Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. However, despite what seems to be a new conversation about the responsibility of sovereign states to take in civilians fleeing conflict and persecution, these types of restrictions are neither new nor unique.

In 1991, Turkey closed its border to the Iraqi Kurds fleeing from chemical weapons attacks by Saddam Hussein (Long 2010, Haberman 1991). In 1999, Macedonia left thousands of Albanian Kosovar refugees stranded when it closed its border with Kosovo to refugee flight (Rohde 1999). Kenya has a lengthy history of closing its border

to Somali refugees. [2] These are but a few extreme examples; many other states have effectively closed borders to refugees, regularly abused refugees and asylum-seekers within their territory, or jailed asylum-seekers purely for the crime of entering the state. These all constitute violations of international law, specifically the United Nations Convention of the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol. These documents define a refugee as a person that:

> owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [3]

Over time, this definition has expanded to encompass any civilians that flee across international borders due to fear for their lives or safety arising from violence and conflict. It is explicitly forbidden to refuse entry to any civilians who meet these standards, or to arbitrarily detain civilians who meet these standards for the crime of entering the country. Sending back civilians who qualify for refugee status or asylum to a country where they have reason to fear for their lives or safety - either at the border or once they have entered the state - is called “refoulement" and is a clear violation of international refugee law. [4] Nonetheless, it is quite common.

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[2] “Kenyans close border with Somalia." BBC News. January 3 2007. Mould, Hussein.; "Kenya Violates Refugee Laws by Forcing Somali Refugees Back to Somalia." New American. November 30, 2010.; Miriri, Duncan. “Kenya demands U.N. removes massive Somali refugee camp." Reuters. April 11 2015.

[3] UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1.

[4] The difference between asylum and refugee status is based on where the individual in question is located when they ask for the state's protection: if the individual is already

Violations of this law are perhaps to be expected since it lacks a strong enforcement mechanism but is costly to obey. Respecting the law, or allowing free entry to all those fleeing for their lives or safety, requires taking on some amount of cost and risk that should increase in direct proportion to the size of the incoming population. However, while the violations are common enough, it is unclear what effects these restrictions on flight from conflict states actually create. By the same token, physical and geographic barriers to flight from states in civil war can have the same effect; mountains, deserts, and oceans can all effectively make flight very risky or impossible. Yet again, it may not be feasible to exit, leaving civilians stranded.

If it is harder to get out of the conflict state, will more civilians simply stay put and die? Or, will civilians react differently to violence and insecurity if they are trapped? Since civilians are an important resource for armed actors in civil war, this also opens up another set of questions: Will armed actors be as likely to use displacement as a way to consolidate territory? Or, will this change the kind of displacement strategies they use? It certainly seems strange to expect that if displacement is a strategy or goal during conflict, that restrictions on flight would not change the dynamics of conflict or the behavior of belligerents (Steele 2011). Given the growing unwillingness of the international community to shoulder the burden of refugees since the end of the Cold War, this is an area well worth exploration:

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within the state or at the border of the state where they request protection, they will request asylum. Individuals who are already located in a state other than their home state will request to be resettled as refugees in a third country. This definition can become quite muddled, however, based on host-state legal policies and the granting of prima facie refugee status to large conflict-induced migration flows. For the purposes of this chapter, and the chapters that follow, the terms will be generally interchangeable.

> Increasingly, however, the absence of alternatives is influencing the decision to remain [internally] displaced. The growing inclination of the international community is to prevent refugee flows and restrict refugee admissions. Although the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution is enshrined in international human rights law, large numbers of persons are finding borders closed to them (Cohen and Deng 1998, 29-30).

It is the effects of these policies, and equivalent barriers to civilian flight from civil conflict, that I explore in this project. This is a valuable contribution in a number of areas. Of course, improving on existing models of refugee flight is useful for its own sake, but I also offer the empirical contribution of a disaggregated pair of measures of the "push" and "pull" forces that shape civilian behavior in conflict. Using these measures, I aim to bridge the literatures on migration and civil conflict dynamics through a study on how restrictions to civilian flight shape the resources and behavior of armed actors. This also has particular relevance to the sub-literature in civil conflict on violence against civilians, as using violence against civilians coercively should have very different implications in settings where they have no means of escape.

There are potential policy implications from this study, as it is largely policy that shapes the availability and quality of flight from conflict. If it is the case that closing international borders to refugee inflows from a neighboring state might actually create a more violent and more destabilizing conflict, this might be a good reason for states to reconsider their policies. Additionally, while it is normatively and morally unpalatable to see states close their borders to civilians fleeing conflict, this has its limits in persuading leaders to change policy. Demonstrating that there is a clear theoretical and empirical basis for expecting that trapped and endangered civilians cause broader conflict-related security issues may prove more convincing.

Existing Models of Civilian Flight

Most scholarly work on displacement from conflict can be grouped broadly into three categories: studies predicting refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) migration patterns (e.g. Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2006, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Bohra- Mishra and Massey 2011); studies of the impact of refugee populations on host communities (Black 1994, Choi and Salehyan 2013, Jacobsen 2005, Lischer 2005, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Salehyan 2007, Salehyan 2008); and studies on the use of displacement as a strategic tool in conflict (Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Steele 2011, Uzonyi 2014). In this study, I aim to unite models of the factors that drive and restrict refugee flight with theories of displacement's effect on conflict dynamics. If moving civilians is an important tactic for belligerents in civil conflict, then surely, considering how restrictions on this flight shape conflict should offer valuable insights.

I will first discuss the traditional approach to modeling migration flows in conflict; I will then explain how purposely disaggregating both the broad factors that shape migration and the different types of migration that they create allows for a better understanding of the relationship between civilian migration and civil conflict processes.

Models for Predicting Migration Flows

The existing literature on migration from conflict assumes that individuals have a choice to either flee or to stay put, and attempts to evaluate how individuals make this choice in response to the factors that push civilians to leave, and those that pull civilians away from their homes. In the case of refugees, this will entail factors that "push" or "pull" civilians outside of their home state; for the internally displaced, this will only involve movement to a new destination within the home state. Common "push" factors

include violence against civilians by the state, violence by rebels and/or dissidents, and violence between rebels and the state (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006, 2007, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009). This may be simply the level of violence, in terms of casualties, or it might be the geographic scope of the violence (Melander and Oberg 2007). In a number of studies, “push" factors are the only topic of investigation, particularly if the topic at hand is the size of migration outflows, rather than their direction (see Moore and Shellman 2004, Melander and Oberg 2006); this is based on the premise that civilians who flee their homes first choose whether to flee, and then choose their destination (Moore and Shellman 2006, 601). This is problematic because if an individual is making the decision of whether or not to abandon their home and seek refuge elsewhere, the set of available destinations must figure directly into this decision. If there are no options for flight that are superior to the current situation, then the individual in question will not flee. Separating push and pull into different stages of the decision-making process of the individual civilian implies a very strong and seemingly unjustifiable set of assumptions in this regard.

This then leads to the factors that “pull" individuals to flee, or in some conceptions, determine the destination that an individual will choose. “Pull" factors in the existing literature are usually confined to the same measures that are used to determine quality of life and security in the home state: the level of democracy in neighboring states, the wealth and wages in neighboring states, the presence of civil conflict in neighboring states, and of course the human rights practices of neighboring states (Moore and Shellman 2006, 2007). Additionally, networks available in potential host states

through a prior diaspora from the state in question might facilitate easier flight, thus acting as a “pull" factor (Schmeidl 1997, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Moore and Shellman 2006, 2007). Of course, the closer a state, the greater the “pull"; the further a potential host state is, the higher the costs to get there, which decreases the pull of otherwise attractive destinations (Iqbal 2007). On its face, this is a reasonable approach; civilians should prefer to go somewhere with superior government practices, security, and economic opportunity, that is easier to reach. However, there are a couple of serious problems with this general approach.

First, the stark problem: not all states allow refugee and asylum inflows. If the goal is to model refugee migration patterns, this is an enormous omission from existing models. Even outside of the most extreme example of a border closure, there is still a great deal of room to restrict conflict-induced migrants from entering the state. While it is easy to argue that the motivated migrant can cross a border illegally, this is not without its own costs and risks; although asylum seekers should not be punished for illegally entering the country per the terms of the UN Convention on Refugees, the simple fact is that many states will throw all illegal migrants into jail, or immediately deport them, regardless of their reason for seeking entry to the country. State policy towards the immigration of refugees and asylum-seekers, then, should figure prominently in any model of these migration flows. Migration to a particular state may actually *not* be an available choice; if the state in question is the only neighboring state - or if all neighboring states restrict refugee entry - then perhaps flight from the conflict state is not actually within the set of choices available to an individual choosing whether to flee.

This brings me to the second problem, which is perhaps more subtle but no less important: how states treat their citizens and how they treat refugees and asylum-seekers are often quite distinct. While previous studies expect that refugees and asylum-seekers will go to states that have better civil rights and human rights practices broadly, this makes the enormous and untenable assumption that refugees and asylum-seekers will have access to these same rights and protections. This is simply not the case; asylum-seekers and refugees do not generally have the same set of rights - or the same level of protection for their rights - as native citizens. Therefore, to properly measure the "pull" of outside states requires directly measuring how those states treat refugees and asylum-seekers, not just how they treat their own citizens. Considering how states treat refugees and asylum seekers - specifically, whether or not states grant them entry, and how they are treated if they are able to enter the state - should allow for a stronger understanding of not only the strength of the "pull" of outside destinations, but whether there is any pull at all.

Models of the Ability to Flee

It is therefore possible that restrictions on flight from conflict by neighboring states will shape the level of "pull" from these potential destinations, and in the extreme, may rule out external flight entirely. The existing literature does show that it matters whether people *can* flee in predicting migration; many models of both internal displacement and refugee flight consider variables that might hinder or facilitate individual ability to flee; this typically is measured in terms of economic wealth in IDP models, or in models of refugee flight, the networks available through previous refugee outflows (Okatmoto and Wilkes 2008) or the number of contiguous land borders that

asylum-seekers can cross (Moore and Shellman 2006). Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) make the only mention of the possibility of migration policy restrictions impacting flight patterns; specifically, they argue that autocracies should be more likely to restrict civilian exit from the state, while democracies should be more likely to restrict entry (33). This largely grows out of observable patterns during the Cold War; however, it is since the end of the Cold War that refugee policies have changed appreciably, and over the past twenty-five years, autocratic states figure just as prominently in the list of refoulement offenders as democratic states. It is therefore very important to consider and measure the impact of refugee and asylum policies directly.

Thus, the literature clearly says that barriers to flight matter, and I argue that major barriers to flight have to this point been neglected. If, then, migration is not equally available in all circumstances, then some civilians are unable or unwilling to flee. If they cannot or will not flee *from the state* but are still exposed to the forces that impel flight, this should have distinct implications for the nature of the civilian population left behind, and how this population will shape the continued development of the conflict. Lacking the means to vent a heavily victimized civilian population, this population will instead remain within the conflict state, feeding back into the conflict and thereby creating increasing pressure. This will manifest in destructive and unstable outcomes. For example, Okamoto and Wilkes (2008) argue that if ethnic groups lack reasonable places to flee as a refugee (as proxied by the present ethnic kin networks in neighboring states) then they will instead choose to address their grievances through rebellion. Melander and Oberg (2006) show that those with the lowest cost to flight will leave early in the conflict, leaving behind an increasingly uniform population of those unable to flee - and

perhaps those most vulnerable to the armed actors that have destabilized their state. While Melander and Oberg (2006) lump IDPs and refugees into the aggregate category of "forced migrants," disaggregating these types of flows allows for a more nuanced understanding of how barriers to flight from the conflict state - either on the individual level or at the country-level - shape conflict-induced migration.

Models for Disaggregating Migration Flows

The previous literature typically models flight exclusively in terms of refugee flows (Moore and Shellman 2007), lumps IDPs and refugees together into the "forced migrant" category (Melander and Oberg 2006), or studies micro-level internal displacement within a single conflict (Adhikari 2012, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009, Steele 2009, 2011). There are specific reasons to study each of these, but I argue that to understand how the availability of flight from violence shapes the development of the conflict, refugee and IDP flows must be modeled as separate but substitutable outcomes impelled by the same set of push factors. This follows Schmeidl's (2000) model, in which she states "Refugees and IDPs flee from similar root causes rather than responding to completely different occurrences" (152), and also follows the logic of Moore and Shellman's (2006) article, which was the first to systematically study refugee flight and internal displacement as substitutes.

If the ability to flee from the state is shaped by not only violence pushing civilians out, but also by restrictions on flight by outside states, then some conflicts will have higher levels of internal displacement simply because the option to become a refugee is not feasible or not worth the cost of the journey. I will argue in subsequent sections that IDPs and other victimized but stationary civilians have very different impacts on the

conflict that created them than refugees, who are technically outside of the conflict once they leave the state's borders. [5]

This will have implications beyond predicting migration flows. Specifically, given the importance of civilians to civil conflict, if victims of violence and insecurity cannot leave the state despite high levels of violence to push them out, this population will become volatile and vulnerable to targeting and manipulation by armed actors. This will create a fertile base of recruits and supporters, a hostage population to bring in resources through external humanitarian aid inflows, and will thus ultimately create longer, bloodier conflicts and greater instability. This is the *pressure-cooker conflict state*, subject to a positive-feedback cycle of violence by armed actors and increasing civilian support for armed actors, which in turn fuels further conflict.

In the next section, I will build on existing individual-level decision models to flee to build a more nuanced model of the availability of flight and its implications for civilian behavior in conflict.

Theoretical Foundations: Exit Quality

Individuals in civil conflicts choose whether to flee from violence and insecurity based on a rational decision calculus; they weigh their available choices and the expected utility for each choice, then select the option that maximizes their expected payoffs. In broad terms, the most basic choice available in migration studies is to either stay put or flee. In this basic choice model, an individual civilian evaluates the risk to his or her life and security posed by violence; this shapes the utility for staying put. As the level of

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[5] This is obviously not strictly true, but I will discuss this in greater detail later.

violence and the threat to the civilian's life increases, the utility for staying put should decrease proportionately. This shapes one side of the decision calculus, commonly measured in terms of the “push" factors that drive flight out of civil conflict. Generally, this means violence. In the broader terminology of the processes that drive and constrain behavior, this would equate to the *willingness* to flee; greater violence, and a greater risk to survival, means an increased willingness to pick up and leave one's home.

The expected utility of flight is shaped by factors specific to the expected benefits and costs of flight itself. While the existing literature has considered the isolated effects of push at great length and from varying perspectives, the effect of pull factors has received comparatively little attention outside of limited dyadic studies of refugee flows (Moore and Shellman 2007). I propose considering, rather than “pull" factors, the overall quality of exit options, or *exit quality*. *Exit quality* is a function of the expected quality of life in target destinations, less the costs of the journey to arrive at said destinations. There are, then, a number of factors that shape *exit quality* for conflict-induced migrants that seek asylum or refugee status across international borders: the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers in nearby states; the likelihood of gaining entry to nearby states; geographic obstacles to potential asylum states including distance, oceans, mountains, and deserts; the threat of violence en route to the destination; and of course the actual costs of not only leaving behind property, possessions, and livelihood, but also of financing the journey - a venture that frequently becomes prohibitively expensive due to a combination of visa-related migration fees by potential host states and payments to human smugglers in cases where flight is restricted. Thus, while violence drives the willingness to flee, *exit quality* determines the opportunity to flee; following the original

framework of opportunity and willingness articulated by Most and Starr (1989), I argue that while the willingness to flee may vary enormously in direct relation to the level of violence, this will only translate into actual refugee outflows if there is sufficient opportunity to flee, or high enough *exit quality*.

Specifically, I argue that increased *push* or *willingness* to flee through violence decreases the utility of staying put; thus, while it does not increase the absolute utility for flight, decreasing the utility of staying put will of course make the other option - to flee - relatively more attractive. That is, higher levels of violence against civilians will make staying a much less palatable option; it does not change the expectation of the conditions awaiting in the destination, nor does it change how difficult the journey to reach it will be. Violence against civilians does not improve *exit quality*. It does, however, make the flight option - difficult though it may be - relatively more attractive. If the level of violence is low and generally confined to fighting between armed actors, civilians will be unlikely to leave behind their homes and possessions to seek an uncertain life as a refugee in a foreign country; however, once there is widespread violence against civilians, the uncertain life abroad may be a better option than the certainty of imminent death at home. Therefore, the willingness to flee should increase along with the levels of violence and the probability of becoming a casualty.

This is perhaps easy to accept; after all, there is a consensus in the literature that higher levels of violence, and more widespread violence, will unilaterally increase the likelihood of flight (Schmeidl 1997, Moore and Shellman 2004, 2006, 2007, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Melander and Oberg 2006, 2007, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009).

However, I propose that changes in *exit quality* - or the opportunity to flee - will also shift the likelihood of flight, even as the level of violence stays constant. Thus, even if the level of violence stays the same, a sudden decrease in *exit quality* will make staying put relatively more attractive, and will therefore diminish flight. If the utility for flight, or *exit quality* is high, it will only require low levels of violence to make flight the more attractive option; however, if *exit quality* is low, even at high levels of violence, staying put may remain the best choice. Indeed, on an individual level, given the high costs sometimes entailed by flight, some individuals will never flee because they simply cannot afford it; to expect increased violence to suddenly drive these people out would be unrealistic. In the absence of *any* opportunity to flee from the conflict state, refugee outflows will be observationally equivalent between high levels of violence and zero violence; if people lack the opportunity to get out, then modeling outflows as a function of willingness alone is highly problematic. Not only will it produce biased predictions of migration, but also it will not accurately measure the true impact of violence on flight.
In short, the concepts described above can be grouped into the two main determinants of civilian behavior in conflict, as shown below:

1. **pull = opportunity to flee = exit quality**
2. **push = willingness to flee = violence**

These combine to determine whether civilians flee or stay put, and whether the civilians that stay put are likely to feed into the conflict processes or to continue with their lives unimpeded.

A contemporary illustration of this is in the comparison of Yemen and Syria, both of which are experiencing civil wars with high levels of civilian-targeted violence, but have starkly different levels of exit quality. A journalist on the ground in Yemen describes the frequent indiscriminate shellings, which not only cause high levels of civilian casualties, but also wreak havoc on infrastructure:

> ...despite the risks, many Yemenis "would rather die in their homes and suffer with their families on their own land than live an undignified and abused life as a refugee," Potter says...The war has led to a rise in malnutrition. And more than 8 million Yemenis currently lack access to basic health care. If this war had happened elsewhere, it might have caused a refugee crisis like the one in Syria. But unlike in Syria, where besieged families can flee to Turkey, Iraq, Jordan or Lebanon, Yemenis often feel trapped.
>
> To the north are the Rub' al Khali desert and the closed borders of Saudi Arabia and Oman. To the south are the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, across which lie Djibouti and Somaliland (a breakaway region from Somalia). "Neither are very hospitable to Yemeni refugees", says Potter. Embassies from neighboring countries have mostly closed in Sanaa. Yemenis who have left tend to be from wealthy families, who can afford expensive air travel and endure complicated visa requirements. [6]

In Syria and Yemen, though there are comparable types and levels of violence against civilians, driving similar willingness to flee, the difference in exit quality - or opportunity - keeps Yemenis stationary, while Syrians surge outwards in search of refuge.

The use of push and pull factors is well established in the conflict migration literature. However, it is new to explicitly think about the balance of these two. My contribution is this: I argue that the precise balance of *push* and *pull*, of motivation and opportunity, of violence and *exit quality*, will drive distinctly different civilian choices

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[6] "The Unthinkable: An ancient city plunges into darkness as a war on civilians rages." NPR, August 21, 2015

and leave behind a different civilian population. This population, in turn, will shape different conflict dynamics.

The Interaction of Exit Quality and Internal Violence

I opened this chapter with the inquiry - what happens if states refuse to let in refugees? Here, I argue that closing borders to refugee inflows - or restricting refugee inflows broadly - will severely diminish exit quality for civilians in neighboring states. If all the neighboring borders are closed, and there is effectively no opportunity to flee, then flight from a conflict state should remain at zero. This does not, however, mean that the violence that would otherwise impel them to leave will stop. This just means that these civilians will be effectively trapped inside the conflict state, exposed to violence and living in the remnants of infrastructure that survive campaigns of violence such as indiscriminate shelling.

If a population has the opportunity to flee but lacks willingness, then refugee flows should be at zero. If a population is *willing* to flee but lacks the opportunity to do so, again, refugee flows will be at zero. These are extreme examples, but they illustrate the importance of considering these as separate processes that shape migration. Perhaps more importantly, in the case of the first situation - opportunity to flee but no willingness - we should expect the civilian population to remain in their homes and communities, productive and secure. This might characterize a conflict with very low levels of violence, which is exclusively between the rebels and the state, in one very small part of the state, far away from heavily populated areas. The second situation, however, will have very different implications; where there is high willingness to flee from the conflict state but little or no opportunity to do so, civilians will be more likely to be internally

displaced, or to stay in their homes and communities while still exposed to violence and infrastructure loss; these civilians will be less productive and quite vulnerable, leading them to seek any available security from armed actors, even if it means joining the armed actor in question.

To simplify the discussion above, I can break down the essential expectations for the set of types of civil conflict states based on the combination of exposure to violence and exit quality. This is by necessity a simplification into binary categories of high and low violence and exit quality, respectively. In reality either of these should be ranged along a continuum, with a corresponding set of continuous but constrained values for each measure. However, for the sake of clarity, I reduce this to the most extreme cases of willingness to flee and opportunity to do so. The table below shows the expected outcomes for each combination.

As shown in Table 1, the latent level of exit quality only comes into play when there is a high enough level of violence to push people to flee. That is, it does not matter whether there is an opportunity to flee unless the individuals in question are actually willing to uproot their lives. In the absence of violence - or when violence is only exchanged between armed actors - there will simply be no push to flee. In that case, an island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and a landlocked state surrounded by accessible, high-quality neighbors will be observationally equivalent. Either will be characterized by the third outcome, *stasis*, in which civilians should not change their behavior because there is no motivation to do so. Therefore, refugee outflows should remain at or close to zero, in the absence of the violence necessary to create genuine refugees.

Table 1: Types of Civil Conflict States

	High Exit Quality (High Pull/Opportunity)	**Low Exit Quality** (Low Pull/Opportunity)
High Violence (High Push/Willingness)	*Exodus*	*Pressure-Cooker*
Low Violence (Low Push/Willingness)	*Stasis*	

However, as the top row of outcomes shows, the level of exit quality becomes extremely important once violence escalates to levels that push civilians to flee abroad. Once willingness reaches high levels, the observed outcome will depend on the latent exit quality; where flight options are high-quality and easily accessible, I expect to observe high volumes of refugee outflows resulting in the *exodus* outcome in Table 1 above. In this case, as violence increases, the victimized population should vent into neighboring states, draining this vulnerable group away from the reach and control of armed actors and limiting their capacity to feed back into the conflict process. Theoretically, the scale of violence in terms of casualties is itself inherently limited by outflows, which should respond to this violence, decreasing the potential civilian targets and thereby limiting the scale of casualties. Yet, again, if exit quality is low, the population will be trapped in an increasingly violent and destructive environment, lacking any outlet to vent the pressured civilian population. This leads to the *pressure-cooker conflict state*; this is the worst-case scenario for limiting the intensity and destruction of conflict. Returning to the opening example of the Israeli blockade and bombing of Gaza, Omer's description of the devastation on the ground paints a clear picture of a pressure-cooker conflict. It is then

perhaps unsurprising that the civilians in Gaza would respond by increasing their support for Hamas, given that this was their only available path towards survival.

To better illustrate the outcomes of the interactions of violence and exit quality, I trace examples of the three types of civil conflicts: exodus, stasis, and pressure-cooker. I begin by tracing all four combinations of conditions through the duration of the conflict in Iraq (2003-present). I then give a brief description of *stasis* conflicts, and in-depth descriptions of cases of *exodus* in Syria and *pressure-cooker* conflict in the Chechen conflict.

Iraq: An Illustration of all Combinations of Exit Quality and Violence

The Iraqi conflict provides an excellent illustration of each of these outcomes over the course of the war. Initially, when the conflict began in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by the United States, neighboring states made an explicit effort to advertise that they would not take in refugees. Iran announced that its border would be closed to any civilian who tried to cross; the border with Kuwait was already walled off, a reminder of Iraq's own past invasion of Kuwait. However, despite the expectation of a massive refugee exodus on the part of neighboring states and the humanitarian community, none came. The violence at this stage of the conflict was specifically targeted at the actual armies and bypassed the civilians, who simply “hunkered down" in their homes, waiting for the violence to end. This was a clear example of *stasis*, in which low exit quality did not matter because there was no motivation or willingness to flee.

In the second stage of the Iraqi conflict (2004-2005), exit quality changed: when the massive refugee outflows never appeared, neighboring states relaxed their policies and the borders reopened. While these neighbors, like most Middle Eastern states, did not

have explicit policies in place for refugees and asylum-seekers, they did generally allow other Middle Eastern citizens to stay as "guests" in their countries. Violence did gradually pick up during this stage as the insurgency against U.S.-led Coalition forces began, but the bulk of this violence still bypassed uninvolved civilians. Yet again, though exit quality was now markedly higher, almost no one left because there was no strong push to make civilians willing to flee. Thus, the second stage remained in *stasis*, with minimal outflows of refugees.

In the third stage (2006-2007), however, the level of violence escalated dramatically. The beginning of the sectarian conflict following the al-Anbar awakening left civilians extremely vulnerable to not only being caught in the crossfire between the Iraqi insurgents and Coalition forces, but also to incredibly brutal sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias. During this stage, the *exodus* began from Iraq, sending massive outflows of civilians seeking refuge into the neighboring states of Syria and Jordan, with some outflows into Turkey and Iran, and a very limited number to Saudi Arabia (Fagen 2007, 2009).

These massive outflows drove the onset of the fourth stage (2007-2009): in reaction to high volumes of Iraqi refugees and a perceived increase in crime and terrorism rooted in those communities, neighboring states began closing their borders in rapid succession from 2006 through 2007 (Fagen 2007, 2009, Harper 2008, Hodson 2007). In addition to these external border closures, governorates within Iraq began to seriously restrict internal migration in an effort to limit the movement of insurgents and terrorists. [7]

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[7] Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC). "Challenges of forced displacement within Iraq." 29 December 2008; Norwegian

Further, most roads were largely impassable and unsafe due to the violence of armed groups and criminal gangs. The humanitarian community was in agreement that there were no viable internal exits to substitute for external exits. In this stage, the Iraqi conflict entered the *pressure-cooker* state.

Violence has since dropped off and then dramatically increased in Iraq; there are additional instances of entering into lulls of *stasis* and then again into *exodus* and *pressure-cooker* following the invasion of ISIS.

Stasis: Low Violence Conflicts

There is very little of interest to say about civil conflicts characterized by low-level, localized violence in the context of flight. This is simply because if there is nothing to push civilians to flee from conflict, then the quality of flight options does not come into play; not only is there a theoretical "push" factor missing from the model, but without evidence of violence or persecution, these civilians by definition cannot claim asylum or refugee status abroad.

The odds of identifying a conflict that never flares up sufficiently to impel some level of flight are vanishingly small; first and foremost, it is unlikely that this level of violence would qualify as a civil conflict or civil war in most current datasets. Further,

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Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC). "Iraq: a Displacement Crisis." 30 March 2007; Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (NRC/IDMC). "Iraq: Sectarian Violence, Military Operations Spark New Displacement, as Humanitarian Access Deteriorates. A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation." 23 May 2006. Though this may seem like it would be ineffective, the governorates were responsible for distributing the food rations most Iraqis relied upon for survival; without proper registration in the governorate, these rations were not accessible.

over the lifespan of a civil conflict, there will be moments characterized by a high level of violence, but these may just be punctuation to long periods in which violence decreases to the point of almost disappearing, subject only to the occasional flare-ups that signal that to some degree, the conflict lingers on. Many civil war scholars would also rightfully argue that the level of violence will vary greatly within a civil conflict state, leaving some areas free of violence, while others are subject to high levels of violence and destruction. I will delve into these distinctions in later chapters; in the meantime, it is worthwhile to think of whether the conflict is generally characterized by low levels of civilian exposure to violence.

Thus, it is more appropriate to consider periods of time in civil conflicts in which violence is at low levels, infrastructure damage is minimal, the location of fighting is confined to small and remote areas, and violence is restricted primarily to fighting between armed rebels and the state military. In these circumstances, there will be little civilian involvement, and the impact of the continued conflict will be small enough to exert little to no "push" on civilians to flee the area.

Again, these types of conflict are of little interest for this study, because they are by definition observationally equivalent between high and low exit states. The latent quality of flight options remains latent, and the conflict exerts no push for change in civilian behavior.

The Syrian Civil War: Exodus

The Syrian conflict is a classic case of *exodus*; neighboring states largely opened their borders, the international community provided high levels of aid, and Syrians pursued all available paths out of the state. As shown in Table 1, this conflict had a

combination of high exit quality and high violence against civilians, driving massive civilian flight from the conflict state, or *exodus*. As one recent news article described: "'Everyone I know is leaving," said Mohammed, 30, who climbed three mountains to make his way across the Turkish border from the city of Aleppo with his pregnant wife… *'It is as though all of Syria is emptying*.'" [8]

Following a brutal government crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 2011, the opposition solidified into an armed rebellion. The Assad regime responded with a large-scale, indiscriminate campaign of violence, most of which has been borne by civilians. The civilian-directed violence in Syria is on a massive scale and is largely inescapable. This included the use of chemical weapons against civilians in residential areas. [9] Regime forces have systematically dropped barrel bombs on civilian-inhabited areas, as one resident of Palmyra described: "Everybody can see it, but they don't know where it is going to be dropped [or if] it's going to hit them, or their neighbors...They simply wait to see whether they will die." [10] This tactic alone has drastically increased the willingness of civilians to flee:

> Beyond killing civilians, barrel bombs are playing a big part in forcing Syrians from their country. In most wars, civilians can find a modicum of safety by moving away from the front lines. But Mr. Assad's indiscriminate use of barrel bombs deep in opposition-held territory means that for many there is no safe place

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[8] Sly, Liz. "Syria is emptying." The Washington Post. 14 September 2015.

[9] Pannell, Ian. "Syria civilians still under chemical attack." BBC News. 10 September 2015.

[10] Masi, Alessandria. "The Syrian Regime's Barrel Bombs Kill More Civilians that ISIS and Al Qaeda Combined." International Business Times. August 18 2015.

> to hide. That ugly reality has played a major part in persuading four million people to flee the country. [11]

The Syrian refugee crisis has become a focal point in the international humanitarian community and media; the effects of this scale of refugee outflows have gone well beyond neighboring states in the Middle East and changed border and migration policies in the European Union as well. Four million refugees is a definitive exodus, and shows that clearly exit quality was high enough to permit flight given the willingness of civilians to flee. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey have together taken in well over 4 million Syrian refugees.[12] Of course, this does not mean that exit is available equally across the population or over time; some people cannot afford to flee; some are trapped in sieged cities; some borders have opened and closed periodically over time. However, the macro-level balance of exit quality and violence has resulted in the expected outcome of a massive drain of the civilian population out of the conflict state.

The Syrian conflict displays another characteristics of *exodus* civil conflicts: over time, exit quality degrades. The massive outflows of Syrian refugees squeezed out the available aid resources of the international humanitarian community.[13] Eventually, if large numbers of refugees flee, they will eventually wear out the welcome in their host states and cause a severe dip in the level of exit quality.

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[11] Roth, Kenneth. “Barrel Bombs, Not ISIS, Are the Greatest Threat to Syrians." New York Times. August 5, 2015.

[12] Quick facts: What you need to know about the Syria crisis." MercyCorps. February 5, 2016.

[13] Sly, Liz. “As tragedies shock Europe, a bigger crisis looms in the Middle East." The Washington Post. August 29, 2015.

The Second Chechen Conflict: Illustrating the Pressure-Cooker

The Second Chechen Conflict (1999-2009) is a strong example of a *pressure-cooker* conflict state; it was a scorched-earth campaign by the Russian state against a separatist Islamic rebellion, characterized by not only extremely high levels of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage, but also by the Russian state's intentional blockade of most exit corridors for Chechen civilians. Thus, to revisit Table 1, the Chechen conflict was a combination of low exit quality and high violence against civilians, creating the outcome of a *pressure-cooker* conflict. While its immediate effects were generally confined to the republic of Chechnya and the surrounding area of the North Caucasus and encompassed only a small portion of the Russian state, the geographic constraints imposed by the Russian government ensured that within its borders, Chechnya fit this typology quite well.

The second Chechen conflict is not a perfect example of this type of conflict because there was one exit path available to civilians, albeit unevenly over time and across the space of the republic of Chechnya. The ideal case would, of course, have exits entirely blocked; this is a rare thing to find in the world, with possible exceptions including the blockade of Gaza in 2014 that opened this chapter. The neighboring republic of Ingushetia did shelter hundreds of thousands of Chechen civilians who fled the violence and destruction of the conflict, which relieved some of the pressure pushing these people out (Nichols 2000, 248). However, it remains an excellent illustration of the types of barriers that incumbents can construct to deter not only flight abroad, but also flight within the state. Additionally, while the exit was available at times, this had its limits; not only was it unevenly accessible, but it was also an extremely low-quality exit.

The fact that anyone chose to take it speaks to the strength of the forces pushing them out, and the extremely high willingness to flee. Nonetheless, not everyone could flee, and the low quality of life in Ingushetia for the internally displaced, along with the devastation wrought in Chechnya itself, made for a fertile base of recruits and supporters to fuel the conflict.

Background

This conflict followed a long history of displacement and violence with the Russian state or the USSR, depending on the timing of the incident in question; most prominently this included Stalin's forced deportation of the entire Chechen population in 1944 to Siberia and Central Asia (Nichols 2000, 243). After Stalin's death and the official permission to return, most of the survivors did return to Chechnya (243). The tiny republic again came into conflict with the Russian state following the breakup of the Soviet Union, in which it declared its independence; this resulted in the first Chechen war, which lasted from 1994-1996. In this round of conflict, Chechnya defeated Russian forces, although at great cost in Chechen civilian lives and infrastructure: “The war had left Chechnya devastated, with much housing and nearly all infrastructure destroyed and much farmland mined or poisoned" (Nichols 2000, 245).

A power vacuum emerged in Chechnya following the departure of Russian troops, and criminality and violence thrived in the ruined economy that the first conflict left behind (Holland 2004, 335). In this environment, a militant Islamism took root, which resulted in a renewed conflict with the Russian state in 1999 as a result of Chechen rebels' invasion of the neighboring republic of Dagestan. This was part of a greater effort to create an Islamic state in the entirety of the North Caucasus region (US embassy cables

2010). When a series of terrorist bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow killed over 200 civilians, Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister of Russia, blamed Chechen terrorists and launched a scorched earth campaign against Chechnya and all of its inhabitants, lumping civilians in with rebels (Holland 2004, 335). [14] This was supposed to be a "quick anti-terrorist operation" but became a war that only saw operations officially cease a decade later in 2009, and which continues to fuel terrorist and insurgent activity to the present day.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the first and second Chechen wars together displaced more than 800,000 people (2013). The second conflict alone displaced over 300,000 (Gilligan 2010, 2). The bulk of this movement was to the neighboring republics in the Caucasus, primarily that of Ingushetia. Estimates of civilian deaths from 1994 on vary widely, but a conservative estimate runs from 65,000 to 75,000 (Gilligan 2010, 3).

Violence and Destruction in Chechnya: the Push to Flee

The violence and infrastructure damage of the second Chechen War are almost unparalleled in contemporary warfare:

> The military engagement that began in 1999 led to five months of indiscriminate bombing and caused thousands of civilian deaths. By March 2000, Russian troops had some control over most of Chechnya. Since 2000, violence has continued as Russian forces attempt to crush the opposing guerrillas, carrying out extra-judicial and summary executions, forced `disappearances', exploitation of paramilitary forces, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, rape, attacks and assassinations of civilians and virtually complete impunity for the perpetrators of such human rights abuses (Holland 2004, 335).

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[14] Mansur Mirovalev. “Chechnya, Russia and 20 years of conflict." 11 December 2014. Alljazeera.

All violence by Russian troops in Chechnya was by very definition indiscriminate, because every Chechen male over the age of ten was officially considered a terrorist, and by the same token, any person residing in Chechnya after the start of the 1999 invasion was similarly considered to be a member of the separatist rebels (Nichols 2000, 242). While Chechen rebels accounted for a much smaller portion of the violence and primarily targeted ethnic Russians or supporters of the pro-Russian regime, they also contributed to the dangers for civilians in Chechnya (Holland 2004, 335). Estimates of the total civilian casualties over the first and second Chechen conflict are, at the conservative end, 65,000 to 75,000 for the period up to 2005 (Gilligan 2010, 3).

While in the first conflict the fighting was confined to specific areas of Chechnya, making it feasible for civilians outside of these areas to safety stay put, this was not the case in the Second Chechen War. A displaced Chechen described this: “During the first war, we lived north of Grozny. At that time it was still possible to stay in Chechnya, which is no longer the case. We can neither hide nor defend ourselves" (Gilligan 2010, 36). The scope of the fighting and the violence encompassed the entirety of the region, making it impossible for civilians to find refuge in rural areas and forcing them to seek it outside of Chechnya, if at all.

As a Chechen civilian who had fled to Ingushetia stated in 2002, “It's become too dangerous to stay in Chechnya. One day can be quiet, the next day shooting and shelling break out all around. The Russians are constantly making security sweeps, and taking men away. We just couldn't bear it anymore." [15]

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[15] Fred Weir. “Russia says 'return,' but Chechen refugees stay put." Christian Science Monitor. 5 February 2002.

In addition to the casualties directly caused by indiscriminate bombing and security sweeps, this campaign decimated what remained of Chechnya's infrastructure from the first conflict. As Johanna Nichols described:

> Even more than the 1994-96 war, the one that began in September 1999 is notable for its brutality towards civilians and its levels of destruction. The capital city of Grozny, formerly home to about 400,000 people, suffered unprecedented levels of destruction in 1994-96 and has been almost entirely reduced to rubble in the present war; this must be the greatest level of destruction ever visited on any urban area in any non-nuclear war" (2000, 246).

> Nearly every ethnic Chechen who lived in Chechnya before the war has now been economically ruined. The bombardment of towns, cities, and villages has been massive and continuous, and the degree of destruction of Grozny, probably unparalleled in non-atomic warfare. The conflict has destroyed urban and rural infrastructure. Farmland and pasture has been ruined by bombing, mining, and bombing of oil refineries, waste dumps, and other toxic sources (2000, 250).

Another Chechen IDP gave a similar account of the situation in 2002: “It was just impossible to stay there. If you have any food, Russian soldiers will steal it. There is no school, no electricity, no water. Most of all there is no safety, Russian soldiers seize our men in the security sweeps, beat them and rob them. Sometimes they disappear forever.”[16] Attempts to convince Chechen IDPs to return home began as early as 2002 as part of an attempt to convey that the insurgency was defeated, but these met with fierce resistance amongst the displaced who understood the reality of the situation on the ground. Not only was there concern regarding the violence perpetrated by Russian forces, but also the criminal gangs that had flourished in the anarchic conditions in Chechnya. Vera Daudova, also a Chechen IDP, explained this in 2004: “I know that the majority of people do not want to go back to Chechnya. They are afraid to go back because there is

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[16] Weir 2002.

no security there. At any time, somebody might intrude into their homes. It doesn't matter who the intruder is. Nobody knows. All these people are in camouflage. People are disappearing in [Chechnya]." [17]

In the end, some might conclude that Putin's scorched earth campaign was brutal but effective; Russian troops were able to largely subdue the insurgency, recapture the bulk of the Chechen territory, and eventually to funnel massive funding into Chechnya to rebuild the cities and villages it had destroyed (though much of this was lost to the corruption endemic to the pro-Moscow regime, leaving unemployment and poverty at dangerous levels).[18] However, the damage done to Chechnya, both in terms of the practical loss of infrastructure and economic opportunities, and the emotional damage wrought by murdering much of the population and displacing and impoverishing the remainder, has left behind a legacy that continues to fuel insurgent and terrorist activities, long after operations were officially concluded in the Caucasus. Indeed, the extremist Islamic insurgency that took root in the devastation of the Chechen wars is still thriving under the guise of the Caucasus Emirate, and not only has it continued to conduct operations within Chechnya and across the wider Russian Federation, but it has also produced a substantial number of the most feared foreign fighters in the Islamic State. [19]

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[17] Valentinas Mite. “Russia: Chechen Refugees Face Ejection from Camps in Ingushetia." RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. 14 January 2004.

[18] Lamb, Zachary. "Instability in Russia's North Caucasus Region." Council on Foreign Relations. February 6, 2014

[19] Lamb (2014, 4).

Nearly 2,000 of the Islamic State's foreign fighters originated in the Caucasus, making Russia the fourth-largest contributor of such forces.[20]

Clearly, the combination of direct, on-the-ground violence during security sweeps, randomized shelling of Chechen cities and villages, and the utter destruction left behind meant that there was an extremely high willingness to flee. There was no real cost to abandoning a home that had already been razed to the ground and that lacked any electricity or clean water already, particularly when any means of securing a livelihood was likely long gone at that point in any case. Russian forces all effectively wiped out medical care, food, clean water, and shelter. Criminal gangs abducted Chechen civilians to secure ransoms, while Russian forces abducted males over the age of eleven into "filtration camps," where they were tortured, executed, or occasionally ransomed back to their families (Nichols 2000, 246). It is difficult to conceive of how much more could be done to push civilians out, short of actually using nuclear weapons.

The Pull to Flee from Chechnya

However, the opportunity to flee was severely limited. Flight abroad was almost entirely inaccessible; Russia began the conflict by blockading Chechnya and Ingushetia's borders, so while a few thousand were able to make it across the border early in the conflict, the rest were only able to move within Russia, and then only to Ingushetia (Nichols 2000, 246). Russia stopped permitting Chechens to apply for international passports, and Chechens were generally not permitted to move elsewhere within the Russian Federation; a system of checkpoints, both at the borders of the republic and

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[20] McCarthy, Niall. Oct 8 2015. “Where Syria & Iraq's Foreign Fighters Come From (Infographic)." Forbes.

within Chechnya itself, meant that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Chechen civilians to evade these restrictions:

> The border blockade means that buses and cars must pass through a checkpoint with strict passport control, and in general people can pass these checkpoints only if they have a residence permit for their intended destination. There are similar internal checkpoints along highways and major roads in Chechnya (12 of them, for instance, along the 25-mile stretch of highway from Gudermes to the border checkpoint at Ingushetia). Each of these too involves possible harassment, solicitation for bribes, and/or detention (Nichols 2000, 247).

Later in the conflict (primarily from 2003 onwards), the plight of the internally displaced worsened dramatically and return to Chechnya remained unsafe, so thousands of Chechens managed to make their way to Europe through Belarus or Ukraine. Though some Western European states - notably Austria - did grant asylum and assistance to Chechen refugees, those more proximate to Russia, including Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine, routinely refused asylum and deported asylum-seekers back to Russia (Gilligan 2010, 119). Thus, while some Chechens did eventually find their way out of the country, refuge abroad was largely inaccessible and highly uncertain, even after the worst of the conflict had passed.

Attempting to flee elsewhere within the Russian Federation was also problematic beyond official restrictions on leaving Chechnya itself; the racism against Chechens, which had always been present throughout the state, became pronouncedly worse when the conflict began.

> Although Chechens have long encountered racial discrimination and harassment in Russia, since the resumption of armed conflict in 1999, racial discrimination has evolved into a state-sponsored, large-scale coordinated campaign. During 2000, federal and local law enforcement agencies, by their actions, demonstrated their intention to make living conditions for Chechens in the Russian Federation outside Chechnya unbearable. This discrimination has taken several forms: forcible evictions from residences; arbitrary identity checks, forcible entrance into premises, searches, detention and beatings; fabrication of criminal accusations;

> refusal to grant the status of 'forced migrant'; denial of the right to employment, health care and education; and refused to grant sojourn or residence registration in many Russian regions. Government actions betray a strategy to keep Chechens in Chechnya' (Holland 2004, 337).

This made exit elsewhere within Russia an extremely low-quality option, and in any case, a generally unavailable path.

This leaves flight to Ingushetia as the only available option, and indeed, it was one that many Chechen civilians chose to pursue. However, not everyone could access it. Generally, while some pull factors are determined by nature, such as terrain, distance, and a lack of contiguous borders, or by behavior, such as the decision to close borders, other pull factors are structural. Structural issues, such as poverty, age, and illness, might make flight impossible on the individual level even if nature and behavior leave paths to exit otherwise open on the aggregate level. Distance, expenses, dangerous travel, and the occasional closing of the border checkpoint all curtailed access to Ingushetia, leaving many civilians with no path from the conflict. The geographic location of civilians, coupled with the locations of active fighting, determined the availability of flight in some cases:

> Not all who wish to flee are able to do so. The refugee entry point to Ingushetia is in the western Chechen lowlands, while the cities of Grozny and Gudermes are in the east, and the highlands that have seen most of the recent fighting are in the southeast. Travel to Ingushetia is difficult and dangerous for people from these areas, and the cost of transport by vehicle is prohibitive for many (Nichols 2000, 247).

Indeed, traveling through Chechnya was itself dangerous, and since civilians could only flee to Ingushetia, traveling through Chechnya was the only way to reach it. The journey was fraught with peril, so even before considering the expected quality of life in the target destination, the path to reach it may have made it too dangerous an

option to be worth pursuing. In order to get out, fleeing civilians risked being shot, bombed, or having to pay bribes in order to pass through humanitarian corridors set up by Russian troops (Nichols 2000, 248). Further, the border crossing to Ingushetia would arbitrarily close, sometimes when violence was particularly high; on one particular occasion, this left thousands stranded at the border, many of which were wounded and in severe need of assistance (247). Additionally, Chechen rebels at times prevented civilians from leaving Chechnya, as this worked against their interests (see Holland 2004 ,335): "[Chechen forces] laid extensive antipersonnel land mines in apartment buildings and around the city, obstructing [civilians'] exit from the capital" (Gilligan 2010, 41). At one point, Russian forces dropped leaflets on Grozny warning civilians to leave, and promised to stop bombing for five days so that civilians could safely leave; however, bombing resumed the next day, leaving many civilians stranded (Gilligan 2010, 38).

Once the distance, expense, and risk of the journey and border crossing were accounted for, that still left much in question at the final destination. The conditions in Ingushetia were also dire, although they of course could not compare with the devastation inside of Chechnya. Ingushetia was small, crowded, impoverished, and ill-equipped to handle the influx of Chechen refugees, which by 2000 already amounted to 250,000 people, against the 300,000 people that comprised its own population (Nichols 2000, 248; Gilligan 2010, 16). While they were generally spared the violence occurring at home, the internally displaced in Ingushetia still faced a host of problems:

“The minimum living conditions [for IDPs in Ingushetia and Chechnya] are nonetheless devastating. IDPs in Ingushetia face increased health risks, including higher incidences of tuberculosis, measles, infant mortality and HIV. Most of those displaced in

Ingushetia have little or no access to employment. Over 99 percent of the population of Chechnya and nearly all of the IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan lived under the poverty line and have difficulty meeting their basic food needs" (Holland 2004, 341).

In the Chechen case, then, there is an extremely high push, creating an almost unparalleled willingness to flee amongst civilians, coupled with a very low, intermittently-available, but nonetheless widely-utilized opportunity to flee. The fact that anyone, let alone hundreds of thousands of Chechen civilians, chose to flee under these conditions speaks directly to the strength of the forces pushing them out; under less dire conditions, it is difficult to imagine that so many would choose such a path. Without any available exit, it is likely that the insurgency would have gained further strength; as it was, the minimal exit opportunity that remained was still an insufficient substitute for many who instead were radicalized and joined the insurgents. The long-term economic consequences of the destruction of Chechnya have also left many young people without alternatives to joining the continuing insurgency, at it is frequently the only means of employment available to them.[21]

Additional Theoretical Concerns

Criminality and Predation

The Chechen example leads to an additional concern regarding the feedback cycle of violence and poverty that plagues trapped civilians in *pressure-cooker* conflict states. In civil conflict, civilians have varying levels of access to economic activity and production. In some cases, if the war is geographically contained in a small area of the

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[21] "US embassy cables: Chechnya, the once and future war." The Guardian. 1 December 2010. Cables originally from May 2006.

state and violence does not spill over beyond that area, most economic activity will continue unimpeded. However, in other cases where the conflict impacts wider proportions of the state, the negative externalities of conflict will severely decrease economic capacity. This is the most common scenario (Murdoch and Sandler 2002, Murdoch and Sandler 2004). The violence of civil conflict not only drives the loss of physical capacity through the destruction of both public infrastructure and private property, but also sends workers and investment capital fleeing for safer climes. Travel routes for carrying traded goods through and out of the state are also likely to be blocked or otherwise insecure due to potential or actual violence en route, further crippling the economy. There is little incentive to invest in education, business growth, or other foundational necessities for a strong economy when any of these investments is likely to be lost to violence and other destruction (see Murdoch and Sandler 2004, Kathman 2011, Costalli and Peschedda 2014). This is true both for the government, which is likely to divert funds away from building the economy and towards fighting the rebellion, and for private investors (Kosuke and Weinstein 2000). Civil conflict is so crippling to the economy that it damages the economies of neighboring states as well (Murdoch and Sandler 2004). While typically the macroeconomic consequences of civil war are the most visible and receive most scholarly attention, there is also good reason to give particular attention to how this impacts civilians directly.

In the presence of widespread violence and the destruction of infrastructure and property, the means of eking out a livelihood for individual civilians should diminish substantially. This has obvious consequences related to the general discussion in this chapter: where it becomes more difficult to survive in one's current location, the utility of

staying put should decrease and flight should become a relatively more attractive option. If, however, the exit quality is still too low to make flight feasible, then the civilian in question remains trapped inside a conflict state without the means to produce sufficiently for the survival of himself or his family. This will should ultimately drive increased pressure on civilians, compounding the impact of the *pressure-cooker* conflict through higher levels of criminal activity in the state and increasingly violent tactics to extract resources from the remaining civilians. Criminality and predation are one mechanism through which the pressure-cooker effect takes place, and in conjunction with the direct pressure from one-sided violence, this should push more civilians to feed into the conflict processes and to undermine the conditions that would allow for functioning peace.

It is easy to draw a direct line to the earlier expectation: if civilians cannot produce enough to survive, and lack the ability to flee, they should be more willing to cooperate with or fight for any armed group that will provide them with some means of survival. Indeed, armed groups often hijack the distribution of humanitarian aid inflows in order to bring civilians under their control.[22] The loss of work and productive capacity can directly drive civilians into cooperation with armed groups in order to secure food and shelter; even in the absence of high levels of civilian casualties through indiscriminate violence, a trapped population without access to these basic necessities is still extremely vulnerable.

However, over and above the direct insecurities created by infrastructure damage and economic loss, there remains yet another impact of the loss of economic self-

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[22] Chris Arsenault, February 5 2015, "Food Hijack by Islamic State fuels debate over transparency of aid" Reuters.

sufficiency in conflict zones: where legitimate means of production vanish, those who are trapped within the conflict state are more likely to predate on each other. This is especially likely in the presence of indiscriminate shelling in urban areas, or scorched earth tactics in rural areas. With no other way to produce, and with law and order in a state of flux, trapped civilians are more likely to simply steal whatever they can from each other. Aid workers may be particularly lucrative targets, but fellow civilians are more plentiful. Of course, the threat of kidnapping and extortion should push out any civilians who remain with the means to leave; however, for those individuals who lack such means, or those areas where refugee flight is inaccessible across the board, the situation becomes all the more dire.

This was a prominent issue in the conflict in Chechnya, the classic example of a *pressure-cooker* conflict state. The Russian government shut down all pathways for flight out of the region and simultaneously laid waste to its major cities and agricultural areas. Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya, was "almost entirely reduced to rubble" in "the greatest level of destruction ever visited on any urban area in any non-nuclear war" (Nichols 2000, 245). The farmland was "mined or poisoned" (Nichols 2000, 245). With nowhere to go and a complete loss of not only local infrastructure and economy capacity, but also bureaucratic oversight and security, crime flourished, leaving vulnerable civilians to be preyed upon by their neighbors.

> Chechnya sank into lawlessness and economic chaos; some war veterans became leaders of paramilitary, radical fundamentalist, or criminal groups and fomented civil war, assassinating several high government officials. Kidnapping gangs, secure in implicit impunity for crimes against Chechens and crimes committed in Chechnya, operated in and near Chechnya, terrorized the local population, and drove out nearly all international observers and aid agencies (Nichols 2000, 245).

Nichols (2000) estimates that about a thousand hostages were taken during this period in the Chechen war. As she explains, although fellow Chechens were not able to pay particularly large sums in ransoms for their kidnapped relatives, kidnapping remained lucrative because there was so little overhead due to the lack of legal and security oversight.

This example shows clearly that the combination of the power vacuum in contested conflict zones and the loss of economic capacity can create ideal conditions for criminal gangs to flourish; this is particularly true in cases where there are no viable substitutes such as flight from the conflict. While the Chechen example is particularly illustrative in the context of low exit quality, criminal gangs that kidnap and extort civilians are a common feature of civil wars: Syria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and many other civil wars share this feature.[23] This is all the worse, then, for the civilians that are trapped in these areas, and it should be little surprise that any armed group or paramilitary organization that offers some measure of protection from criminals, possible protection from the violence of the opposing forces, and access to food and shelter, will be met with open arms. FARC, Colombia's long-enduring insurgent force, is perhaps the most well-known for using these tactics, but they have also flourished in other areas, including Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, and Haiti.[24] The targeting of civilians by criminal groups

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[23] Glen Johnson, Aljazeera "Syria's rising abductions: A spate of kidnappings over the past year adds a new dimension to the devastating civil war" 14 October 2013; BBC 2013

[24] David Williams, "Kidnapping is big business in Colombia." CNN.com, May 7 2001.

has also plagued the Syrian civil war, where a black market for kidnapping sprung up in the midst of the outbreak of violent conflict.[25]

Of course, when the economic capacity of the conflict area dips, so too does the amount of resources that armed actors can easily extract from the area. The shrinking resource base will make the civilians who hold these resources less willing to give any part of it up, since they will need more of it, if not all of it, to survive - and it may well still prove insufficient. This can lead these armed groups to use more violent and coercive tactics in order to continue to fund their enterprise; they thus take up the behavior of criminal groups, kidnapping and extorting through violence in order to continue squeezing resources out of impoverished civilians.

Therefore, the conclusion is this: any individual civilian who cannot sufficiently produce for him or herself should already be more willing to cooperate with armed groups in civil wars for food and shelter. However, on top of this, other civilians in the area who face the same challenges - who are attempting to fill the gap left by lost jobs, businesses, and farms - may turn to criminal activity out of necessity. These new criminals, then, are kidnapping and extorting their neighbors, who are already in dire straits themselves. In this insecure environment, this type of criminal activity will provide an even stronger impetus for civilians to put their trust in armed groups. Not only might armed groups provide food and shelter, but they can also offer some measure of security, from not only the violence of war, but also the criminal activity of other civilians. This will, of course, impact the poorest individuals the most; these are the very people who are least likely to be able to flee in the first place.

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[25] Glen Johnson. 14 October 2013. "Syria's rising abductions." Al-Jazeera English

Uncertainty

Obviously, if civilians in conflict zones are facing a rational decision calculus to either stay put or to flee, and these civilians have expectations about the quality of life and likelihood of survival for each of these choices, they will always face some degree of uncertainty. To an extent, this is true for staying put: will the fighting continue, or will there be a cease-fire? Will the front lines of violence move closer to or further away from their homes? Will their village lose power or be bombed or burned to the ground, will there be a massacre like the ones that have taken place in other villages, or will the worst of this pass them by? However, the degree of uncertainty for fleeing will almost always be much greater than for staying in place; this is because not only do potential refugees face the same uncertainties about the future that plague staying put, but they also face a significant amount of uncertainty about the realities of the present situation. This is not just a problem of the unknowable circumstances of the future in a war zone, but is actually a problem of bad and incomplete information about the current state of affairs on the ground in potential host countries. The lack of certainty about the reality on the ground is thus what differentiates fleeing and staying put in this regard, and is therefore the focus of this section.

Realistically, when civilians make the choice to flee, they are unlikely to have perfect information about their likelihood of being permitted to enter another state, or the availability of asylum/refugee status, or even the probability that they will survive the journey. War zones are notorious for bad information; official channels of communication are often disrupted, unavailable, or distrusted, leaving word-of-mouth through networks of friends and family as the main method of communication. Of course,

this high-stakes game of whisper-down-the-lane is unlikely to communicate such vital information with a high level of accuracy.

Indeed, there is a small but fairly consistent body of literature addressing how well refugees understand the conditions for asylum-seekers and refugees in their host countries before leaving. Most of this literature suggests that they either have very little understanding of these conditions, or, even knowing that they were in for a long and difficult journey that might end with indefinite detention or refoulement, felt it was worthwhile anyway (Crawley 2010, Gilbert and Koser 2006, Spinks 2013, Richardson 2010). This literature argues that it is thus unrealistic to expect changes in policy or practice towards refugees and asylum seekers to change their decision calculus prior to fleeing from conflict zones.

However, there are reasons to doubt these findings. Most of this work is based on surveys of refugees who were already in the destination country; knowing that this group of people chose to flee despite having bad information does nothing to tell us about the people who chose to stay. This is a serious selection bias. Further, just because some individuals felt it was worthwhile to flee even though they expected low-quality conditions in their host countries does not automatically mean that efforts to deter asylum-seeker inflows through tougher policies were ineffective. Rather, this just means that for those people, the situation on the ground in their home state was bad enough that even a low-quality exit was a better choice than staying put. For others, though, whose situation was perhaps poor but not quite as desperate, decreasing the quality of the conditions for asylum-seekers may have prevented them from attempting to flee;

restricting studies to those have already made the journey removes this equally if not more informative portion of the population from consideration altogether.

Additionally, this body of work is almost exclusively focused on OECD states (e.g. Australia and Western Europe). It is perhaps unsurprising that a civilian facing indiscriminate shelling in Syria might not have a good idea of the asylum policies in Denmark or New Zealand; these are distant states that the average Syrian would have little exposure to in the course of their typical daily life. Any other Syrians who had fled there would have a difficult time communicating the conditions back to those still at home. However, most refugees simply flee across a contiguous border to a neighboring country; the Syrian in question would instead be considering the expected conditions in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, or the neighboring Gulf States, for example. It is far more reasonable to expect that the average Syrian facing the violence and destruction of the conflict would have a somewhat accurate idea of what they would face in these states, and be able to use that information to make a reasonably informed decision to flee or to stay.

However, even Syrian civilians fleeing the war know that, for example, Europe has better protection of refugees than the neighboring Gulf States. A news article from late 2015 belabors this point:

> Why [do] refugees want to go the Europe? The answer is simple: Europe has the best laws for them. None of the six Gulf Cooperation Council states has signed the UN convention on refugees, which has governed international law on asylum since World War Two. The convention defines the status of refugees and the duties and rights of governments. In practice it means that there are no standardized procedures to deal with large numbers of people arriving from abroad seeking help.

> Critics say that many of the Syrians cited as having taken refuge in the Gulf states are in fact affluent citizens looking to sit out the war in comfort, rather than fleeing families forced out of their homes.
>
> Receiving refugee status in European states gives migrants the right to stay in the country indefinitely, guarantees access to social support, accommodation, schooling for children, language courses, and help with training for the job market.
>
> Crossing into [Gulf state] countries neighboring Syria, which do not have a recognized refugee status, may be possible but often means staying in refugee camps with no jobs, meagre living conditions and no prospects.[26]

The almost uniform unwillingness of Syrian civilians to attempt flight into the Gulf States - coupled with the strong border control exercised by Gulf State governments - results in rather good information about the barriers to flight across these borders, and the low quality of exit expected in these states.

There are some facets of exit quality that are easier to predict than others; geographical barriers and climate, for example, are fixed and known quantities. Mountains, oceans, deserts, and distance are all consistent and should be known to those considering flight. When it comes to policies, some are better established and thus easier to predict; if states have gained a reputation for mistreating or refusing entry to asylum-seekers, they may be known for this and thus be better understood by civilians contemplating flight. It is also reasonable to expect that, as in the example of the Syrian above, potential refugees will have better information about more proximate states, not only because they will have a better understanding of how these states have treated fleeing populations historically, but also because it will be much simpler for refugees and asylum-seekers on the ground to communicate this information back to those still in the

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[26] "Why aren't rich Gulf states welcoming Syrian refugees, or are they?" Euronews, September 30 2015.

conflict zone.[27] For this same reason, over the course of a conflict, civilians on the ground should have better information about what they would face if they flee, simply because the first waves of refugees will have already tested those waters. This will also extend broadly to cases in which ethnic kin communities are larger in the target destination, because they will be more likely to convey information about conditions back to those still within the conflict state.

There is certainly anecdotal evidence to suggest that potential refugees internalize their expectations about conditions in destination countries, and that at times they will not attempt to flee in the first place because of these expectations. One civilian in Yemen facing the violence of Saudi-led airstrikes stated that "fleeing the country is not a viable option for him because he is a Yemeni national with no other citizenships. 'There is no other place I can go to even in Yemen itself,' he said." [28]

Assuming that potential refugees do have a concrete expectation about the conditions they will face, though perhaps the expectation is incorrect, then the following should hold: In reality, it probably only matters if would-be refugees perceive conditions to be worse than they actually are and stay put, never verifying the actual conditions if they should flee. In this case, the model has a problem because people that should flee will stay, despite the higher level of exit quality. If, on the other hand, refugees perceive

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[27] "Anecdotal evidence from the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, suggests that many of those now fleeing Syria are increasingly aware of the situation in Lebanon and Jordan - both of which have tightened up entry restrictions - and so are attempting to head to Europe instead.", from Sam Jones and Kareem Shaheen. 11 September 2015. "Destitute Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon may return to warzone." The Guardian.

[28] Morgan Winsor. 27 April 2015. "Yemen Crisis 2015: Trapped Civilians Face Saudi-Led Airstrikes, Houthi Crossfire, Power Shortages and Hunger." International Business Times.

conditions to be better than they actually are, they will update their information upon actual exposure to these conditions upon attempted or actual flight from the country; if they find the border closed, then of course they will observably remain in the country, and at that level the implications are the same as if they had known the border would be closed in the first place. Even if these civilians are able to flee abroad but find conditions to be so low quality that they realize they should have stayed, this need not be a problem for the model, because in such circumstances typically these refugees will simply return. Though it is not always a simple and straightforward task, it is by and large much easier to get back into the conflict state than it is to be admitted to another state as an asylum-seeker or refugee.

Indeed, the clearest observable implication of this uncertainty (about both present and future conditions in destination countries) is in the return of refugees to their home state while conflict conditions remain constant. While the going assumption is that the fear of violence, and the possibility of injury or death, will push people out in the same manner across all conflicts and over time, the return of refugees from safe, if otherwise intolerable exits, shows that even in the face of danger at home, a lack of viable alternatives can still make remaining at home - or returning there - preferable. If you have no means of income, and no food or shelter in your host country, the risk of death by violence may be preferable to the certainty of starvation abroad. The recent swell in returnees to Syria (in fall 2015) is a strong example of this. A recent BBC article described the situation for Syrian refugees in Jordan, who were beginning to return to active conflict zones in droves after the conditions in Jordan became particularly dire:

> Increasingly, Syrian refugees in Jordan are in dire financial straits. The UN says 86% now lives below the Jordanian poverty line of 68 Jordan dinars ($96) a

> month. The government does not allow most to work legally and no longer provides free medical care. At the beginning of last month, 229,000 living outside refugee camps had their aid from the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) totally cut due to a lack of international donations. [29]

This article describes the situation of one Syrian refugee in Jordan: "Khaled was well-off in Syria but now his savings have run out. He shows me a photograph of his large house in Deraa. His parents are there and have told him the situation is calm now. 'It's been terrible; shelling and barrel bombs almost every day. People dying. For the last 20 days there's been talk of a truce, I can't deny I'm scared, but you only die when your time is up. We don't have a life here." [30]

A spokesman from the World Food Program in Jordan stated that "the people here are telling us that they would go back to Syria - back to an active war zone. That must mean that they have really reached rock bottom to make that choice." [31]

Thus, while there is absolutely reason to expect uncertainties, it is still very reasonable to expect that potential refugees will have some sense of what they should face in host countries, particularly those that neighbor the conflict state, which are of the greatest interest for this study. This is where most people flee, and it represents the most direct and accessible path away from the dangers of civil conflict. The topic of uncertainty and its variation is vast and ripe for in-depth exploration, but it is secondary to the main purpose of this project, and because I focus on states that neighbor those in

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[29] Yolande Knell. 12 October 2015. "Desperate Syrian refugees return to war zone." BBC News, northern Jordan.

[30] Knell (2015).

[31] Sam Jones and Kareem Shaheen. 11 September 2015. "Destitute Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon may return to warzone." The Guardian.

active civil wars, the OECD states that claim their asylum seekers are ignorant of policy are also generally outside of the scope of the relevant exits for this study as well. At most, these regions (e.g. Western Europe) may represent a viable exit option, but the distinctions of specific policies within them are both unlikely to be clear to would-be refugees, and unlikely to specifically shape patterns of out-migration from a conflict zone in different ways.

The Plan

This chapter has introduced the idea that state practices towards refugees and asylum-seekers can impact whether civilians choose to flee from violence in civil wars. I further have argued that how civilians react to violence – specifically, whether they flee or remain within the conflict state – will shape the ongoing dynamics of the conflict. To facilitate this understanding, I have introduced the concept of *exit quality*, for which I will develop a measure of the expected utility for flight from a civil conflict; high *exit quality* conflicts are surrounded by states that treat refugees and asylum-seekers well, while low *exit quality* conflicts are typically surrounded by states that close their borders to refugees, abuse refugees and asylum-seekers, or routinely jail these populations as illegal immigrants or criminals.

In civil wars surrounded by neighbors that welcome and protect refugees – conflicts with high *exit quality* - escalating indiscriminate violence should push civilians to flee the state. On the other hand, if neighboring states treat refugees poorly – that is, if *exit quality* is low – civilians will be less likely to flee. Instead, they will remain trapped within the conflict state, exposed to increasing violence and danger. This leads to a *pressure-cooker conflict state*, in which civilians are unable to escape and thus feed back

into the conflict. Civilians are at minimum a resource for armed groups, and may actually chose to join the conflict as combatants for protection or to gain access to the resources that these groups have – resources which likely become scarce elsewhere due to the ongoing conflict. I argue that this will lead to more violent conflicts – not only in terms of violence against civilians, but in terms of casualties from battle – and that these conflicts will flare and burn out sooner. However, while these conflicts may end sooner, the sheer destruction will leave behind a legacy of instability and destruction that is likely to contribute to long-term terrorism, insurgency, and general instability.

To test this requires generating a measure of conflict-level *exit quality*. To this point, however, there has been no comprehensive data available on state practices towards refugees and asylum-seekers. As this is obviously a necessity to measure exit quality from conflict, in Chapter 2 I introduce a new dataset on state practices towards refugees, the Refugee Rights dataset, which covers all states in the international system for each year from 1993-2014. The Refugee Rights dataset includes indicators for refoulement, government abuse of refugees, cooperation with UNHCR, protection from abuse by non-state actors, and the legal system for refugees and asylum-seekers. This chapter includes preliminary theoretical expectations on the characteristics of states that drive better or worse respect for these rights; empirical tests confirm that wealthier states, and states that face high volumes of refugee inflows, are more likely to abuse the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers.

Chapter 3 takes the next step towards generating a measure of conflict-level *exit quality*. Using the Refugee Rights dataset, data on the respect for human rights of native citizens, and data on civil conflict intensity, I build measures of the *destination quality* of

individual states. Using factor analysis and item response theory, I confirm that there are two distinct dimensions of *destination quality*: the treatment of refugees, and general security. I use item response theory to generate scores for each of these two dimensions. I then run face validity models of dyadic refugee flows from civil war states to neighboring states. These models confirm that the interaction of destination quality and violence against civilians drives refugee flight.

Chapter 4 tests the interacted effect of violence against civilians and exit quality on civil conflict duration and intensity. To create the measures of exit quality, I aggregate the individual destination quality scores of states neighboring each civil war. I evaluate each measure of destination quality – refugee rights and general security – separately. Lower levels of general security in neighboring states drives longer civil wars *if violence against civilians is high*, however, at low levels of violence against civilians, high and low general security surrounding a conflict has no impact on its duration. However, general security has no impact on conflict intensity (battle deaths). The findings are clearly distinct for refugee rights (the second dimension of exit quality). Low levels of refugee rights in neighboring states drive more intense conflicts if violence against civilians is high, but refugee rights do not impact intensity if violence against civilians is low. The results for duration are somewhat mixed; initially, it does seem that low refugee rights and high violence will drive shorter conflicts. However, robustness tests show that generally, it actually appears that conflicts with low refugee rights and high violence will end sooner than those with high refugee rights and high violence. It seems that the *pressure cooker conflict state* is ultimately an accurate analogy: trapping civilians in a violent conflict creates a more violent conflict that ultimately burns out sooner. General

security, on the other hand, creates a more stable region that can prevent outside resources from flowing into the conflict and sustaining it.

Finally, I conclude in Chapter 5 by reviewing the findings and suggesting directions for future work in this area. Ultimately, this project shows that there are consequences when neighboring states fail to protect refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing civil wars, and these consequences extend beyond the humanitarian costs. When civilians are trapped in violent and dangerous civil wars, they can easily be pulled into the conflict and feed its progression. This effect is distinct from the effect of a generally "good neighborhood", in which there is no other civil conflict or repression. Stable neighbors help to dampen the continuation of conflict, but neighbors that welcome refugees ultimately vent pressure from violent situations and dim the intensity of violent conflicts.

Chapter 2: The Refugee Rights Dataset

Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce a new dataset on state treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. This dataset is meant to measure the *pull* factors, or the *opportunity* to flee, specific to refugees and asylum-seekers. It is comprised of hand-coded annual scores drawn from the State Department Human Rights Reports, covering the post-Cold War period, from 1993-2014, for all states in the international system. These data, which cover practices including government abuse of refugees and the forced return of refugees and asylum-seekers (or *refoulement)*, are a necessary step towards creating accurate measures of exit quality. Measures of exit quality that include the treatment of refugees specifically, and separately from the treatment of native citizens, are vital to test the theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state. I expect that civilians respond differently to violence based on how they expect to be treated if they flee, but to predict how this will impact civilian behavior and in turn the progression of civil conflicts, I first need to measure how refugees expect to be treated. This dataset allows me to measure this expectation of exit quality, and in turn to test whether civil wars with high levels of violence against civilians will progress differently based on how neighboring states treat refugees fleeing the conflict.

However, the data are also a valuable contribution in their own right. I argue that greater attention to varying respect for refugees' rights is necessary for three reasons beyond generating a measure of exit quality: first, because the rights of refugees may be in contention with the rights of native citizens; second, because studies predicting the direction of refugee flows should consider not only the treatment of citizens in host states but the actual treatment of refugees and asylum seekers; and third, because varying respect for the rights of refugees may increase or decrease the negative externalities commonly associated with refugee populations such as conflict over resources, terrorism, and civil war. In the following sections, I introduce and explore the data, and advance and test some preliminary theoretical expectations on what drives variation in state treatment of refugees. This is valuable because it allows for a better understanding of what makes some states attract refugees, while others repel them. In more specific terminology, this develops expectations about the correlates – and perhaps the causes – of the factors that pull refugees, or more succinctly, of exit quality.

Literature Review

The extant literature on government respect for human rights focuses on either general respect for human rights, or on rights specifically for citizens (e.g. Poe and Tate 1994, Poe et al. 1999, Cingranelli and Richards 2010). There is a particular interest in rights that are coded into international law, because there is some consensus, or at the very least a focal point, against which to compare both state practices and law. Most of the scholarly focus is on physical security rights, as these are the most basic rights upon which most people can agree (Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Wood and Gibney 2010). Specifically, in one of the most prominent measures of physical security rights, these

rights include freedom from political imprisonment, torture, extrajudicial killing, and disappearance (Cingranelli et al. 2014). These rights are also the primary focus of most of the policy community's attention to human rights. Other work on the state's respect for human rights includes women's rights, workers' rights, and civil liberties, all of which have garnered some attention and all of which have some degree of presence in the quantitative empirical literature (e.g. Mosley and Uno 2007). [32] However, these are all built on the understanding of the government's responsibility to - and reliance upon - its own citizens. The forces that shape respect for the human rights of citizens may well differ from the forces that shape respect for the rights of non-citizens. In particular, the treatment of refugees is of interest, because while they are non-citizens, they also benefit from rights coded into international law (UN 1951, 1967).

With a couple of notable exceptions, the quantitative political science literature has done little to measure or directly theorize on the drivers of state practices towards refugees and asylum seekers (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004).[33] The actual treatment of refugees by governments deserves attention for several reasons.

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[32] The CI-RIGHTS database, for example, has coded measures of all these rights (see Cingranelli and Filippov 2018).

[33] The World Refugee Survey (WRS) has produced annual refugee grades on several dimensions, though there has been little analysis of these grades. However, there are a few issues with the WRS coding procedure. First, the limited coverage of states is likely biased by the fact that these are the states that receive the most refugees: thus, the states that are best able to deter refugees from entering in the first place may never even make it into the sample. Second, in some cases it aggregates fundamentally different concepts. This is a particular concern with regard to the refoulement/physical protection score; this score aggregates the functionality and "fairness" of the asylum system, incidents of refoulement, and physical violence against refugees or asylum seekers by the government. These are concepts that are best examined individually to accurately determine how willingness and capacity affect each. Third and finally, the U.S.

The first and most important reason for giving attention to state practices towards refugees is to measure the exit quality, or pull, of states that neighbor civil conflict. Exit quality, in conjunction with violence against civilians, will shape the pull, or opportunity to flee, and the push, or willingness to flee, respectively. Measuring how states treat refugees should allow for better prediction of both refugee migration patterns *from civil wars* and civil conflict development generally. In conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians, specifically, refugee rights in neighboring states should condition whether civilians respond by fleeing (if refugees are treated well), or by staying in the conflict state and feeding back into the conflict processes (if refugees are treated poorly). Thus, for understanding how civilians impact civil conflict development, measuring exit quality is absolutely vital.

The second reason for devoting attention to how refugees are treated is for broader studies on the migration of refugees and asylum-seekers. These studies are suffering from serious omitted variable bias by excluding how states deal with refugees. In studying the push-pull forces that impel, deter, or generally direct migration, we should be considering not only how refugees expect to be treated in a potential host-state, but also *whether that state will let them in the first place* (Davenport et al. 2003, Moore and Shellman 2006, Schmeidl 1997, Steele 2009). After all, just because a potential destination may "pull" migration with a high standard of living, economic opportunity, and civil and political rights, does not mean that said state simply permits would-be asylum seekers to enter. Most refugee movements are between states with low levels of

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Committee for Refugee and Immigrants ceased producing the WRS reports and the associated scores after 2009.

human rights practices; this is in part because these states tend to cluster together in space, but it is also because the most desirable target states are often incredibly difficult to get into.

Of course, we should also consider how asylum seekers expect to be treated in host states: if they are likely to be put into detention camps upon arrival or suffer abuse at the hands of the state, they should weigh these risks carefully when choosing a destination. From the point of view of potential refugees, there is an overarching risk that even if they are able to enter an asylum state, they will not be able to access the human rights, civil rights, wealth, and other opportunities and protections that native citizens enjoy. Generally, if we as scholars only consider how the state treats its citizens when predicting migration flows, we are seriously neglecting the very real fact that the migrants in question will not have access to those same rights in many (if not most) cases. The reality is that refugee policies and rights should shape if, how, and to where refugees flee. Individuals seeking to flee their countries should have some awareness of how refugees specifically are treated in other states. Rationally, they should incorporate their expectations for the treatment of refugees into their decisions of whether and where to flee. Nonetheless, abuses of refugees do not automatically deter all future refugee inflows; even poor conditions for refugees may be preferable to horrific conditions at home.

Third, from a normative standpoint, considering only how states treat their own citizens may paint an overly rosy portrait of their rights practices. The European Union, for example, uses harsh and aggressive measures to deter asylum seekers, which clash with the EU's generally high standard of respect for human rights (USCRI 2008).

Additionally, given that respecting the rights of citizens requires resources and refugees can create a very real drain on state resources, it reasonable to expect that there may be a trade-off between the amount of support the state can devote to refugees' rights while still respecting those of its own citizens.

The fourth and final consideration for direct theorizing and data on state practices towards refugees is that the treatment of refugee populations may condition the relationship between refugee inflows and the negative externalities they create. These include resource shortages, terrorism, and civil conflict onset (Black 1994, Lischer 2005, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Salehyan 2008, Choi and Salehyan 2013). It is possible that greater respect for and attention to the rights of refugees might help to prevent their radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups and militias. However, it is also possible that restricting refugee access in the first place and keeping the population more secure by restricting movement may temper the likelihood that refugee flows present a threat to the state. Either way, given the recent surge of attention to the problems that refugee populations cause, it is only logical to consider how the state's treatment of refugees might shape these outcomes.

Theorizing on State Practices Towards Refugees

The definition of refugees and the rights accorded to them by international law grew out of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and were specifically codified in the UN 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967

Protocol. [34] According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is defined as "[a person] who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion" (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The Convention also stipulates that refugees and asylum-seekers should not be punished for illegal entry or stay (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The most prominent of the rights for refugees in the Convention, however, is the right to non-refoulement, which asserts that: "no one shall expel or return any refugee against his or her will to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom" (UN 1951 Convention, 3). The definition of *refoulement*, then, is the forced return of refugees, asylum-seekers, or individuals who would qualify for this status to a geographic territory where they have reason to fear for their lives or freedom. Additional rights stipulated for refugees include access to primary education, the right to work, and access to courts.[35]

At present, 145 states are participants in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Clearly there is a broad consensus that these are the agreed-upon definitions of refugees and their rights. However, the degree to which states uphold the rights enumerated in these documents varies greatly. The normative push for respecting these rights is often in conflict with the difficulties that a large refugee population creates for the government. I

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[34] The 1967 Protocol effectively removed the geographic and temporal restriction from the 1951 Convention, which limited its coverage to events in Europe occurring before 1951, though states could still restrict their coverage in that manner if they so chose.

[35] Exceptions are for individuals who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, or for Palestinians who are protected under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA).

argue that states' respect for the rights of refugees is a function of both willingness and capacity (Jacobsen 1996, Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004). That is, there are varying factors that may influence a government's inclination to take on refugees, and a separate set of factors that should influence its capacity to do so.

State Inclination to Respect Refugee Rights

The most obvious indicator of a state's inclination to respect the rights of refugees is participation in the international treaties that define and enumerate these rights. I expect participants in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol to have better relationships with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and therefore to be more likely to cooperate with it in times of crisis (see Jacobsen 1996). However, while membership will likely have a positive correlation with respect for refugees' rights, it is unlikely to be causal; rather, it is more likely that participation in these treaties simply reflects a greater likelihood to respect these rights in the first place (Keith 1999).

Hypothesis 1: *States that are participants in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol will have higher respect for refugees' rights.*

By the same logic, if respect for the rights of citizens is part of an underlying dimension of respect for overall human rights, then states that have better respect for their citizens' basic human rights should be more likely to respect the basic rights of refugees as well. If, however, respect for human rights is a simple function of citizens' domestic demand for their own rights and not in any way concerned with the dignity of the person, then there should not be a relationship between these two outcomes. Yet, if respect for physical integrity rights is non just a function of the *desire* to respect human rights, but is also the result of a well-controlled state security apparatus (see Englehart 2009), then this

respect should extend beyond native citizens to asylum-seekers and refugees. It may therefore be difficult to entirely separate inclination and capacity in the impact of human rights respect of native citizens on the respect for the rights of refugees.

Hypothesis 2: *As the level of government respect for citizens' human rights increases, the level of respect for refugees' rights will also increase.*

Regime type may also exert a normative influence on the level of respect for the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. Democratic states should have inherently greater respect for the civil rights of their citizens than autocratic states, and should therefore have greater overall respect for human rights (Gibney 2009). By extension, these states should show higher levels of respect for the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. However, it is less clear whether this is actually a reasonable expectation the effect of regime type on refugee practices, since democracies should carry out the will of their citizens, and in many cases citizens will resent the burden of a refugee population and the problems this causes for resource distribution.

Hypothesis 3: *The level of democracy will impact respect for refugees' rights.*

A final consideration on state inclination to host refugee populations is the effect of ethnic kin networks. That is, if the potential host state is home to an ethnic group that has ties to the refugee population, this should affect the level of protection that the state affords the refugees in question. However, again, the direction of this effect is murky and should ultimately be conditional on the state's relationship with the ethnic group; if there is no tension between ethnic groups, or the ethnic group is in the majority in the state, then the presence of an ethnic kin network should have a positive effect on the level of respect for refugees' rights. In contrast, if there is a fragile balance between ethnic

populations that an influx of refugees could upset, or if the ethnic group in question is problematic for the host state, this should decrease the level of respect for refugees' rights. The plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq is an excellent example of this dynamic: though this group has often had a strong case for asylum - including Saddam Hussein's genocide in 1988 – Turkey is consistently reluctant to permit more Kurds to enter, due to its long and troubled relationship with its own Kurdish population.[36]

Capacity

The state's capacity – often defined in terms of wealth, military strength or bureaucratic effectiveness – generally speaks to its overall strength and ability to carry out the goals that it sets (Braithwaite 2010). The most obvious effect of capacity on rights is direct: respecting any human rights requires resources, and weak states lack the capacity to effectively enforce respect for human rights (Englehart 2009). If one can accept that the respect of physical integrity rights depends on state capacity, it should be a much smaller logical leap to accept that respecting the rights of refugees will require resources and manpower. After all, refugees often require the support of the host state to survive. Therefore, we might expect that higher-capacity states would be more likely to *be able* to respect the rights of refugees. However, this is actually a more complex concept than it may seem at first glance: increased capacity can also increase the ability of the state to keep refugees out in the first place or actively violate their rights once they enter the state (see Jacobsen 1996). This may well tie into Braithwaite's (2010) finding that state capacity conditions the likelihood that civil war spreads spatially: high-capacity

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[36] To effectively evaluate the relationship between ethnic kin networks and state practices towards refugees requires dyadic data including the composition of refugee populations, so I am not able to test it in this chapter.

states are better equipped to stem and secure the inflow of refugees that Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) find spreads conflict.

These high-capacity, resource-abundant states should also be more attractive targets for would-be refugees, which can decrease state willingness to take on refugees – at least compared to the number of refugees that wish to go there in the first place. Since demand for entry is so high, these states have incentive to diminish the ability of asylum seekers to enter. Thus, these states may have the perverse outcome of both increased incentive and increased capacity to keep refugees out and restrict the rights of those who do make it into their borders.[37] I therefore expect that states with more resources should actually be less likely overall to respect refugees' rights.

However, there is reason to expect that the effect of state capacity is likely conditional on the regime type. Autocratic states, without the constraints of a liberal democracy, are most likely to abuse refugee rights if they have the wealth to attract refugees and the resources to curtail refugee entrance, movement, and other refugee rights. More democratic states, however, should be more constrained in their reaction to potential or actual refugee inflows, so the impact of wealth should be smaller or non-existent at the highest levels of democracy.

Hypothesis 4: *The impact of state capacity (resources) is conditional on the level of democracy. At low levels of democracy, as state capacity (resources) increases, the level of respect for refugees' rights will decrease. However, at high levels of democracy, state capacity (resources) will not impact respect for refugees' rights.*

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[37] These states should also have greater pull for economic migrants, making it more difficult to distinguish between true refugees and economic migrants seeking a way in the door.

Additional Influences

There are several other factors that should shape state practices towards refugees. First, the size of the state's native population should shape the level of respect for refugees' rights, simply because states with larger populations will be less affected by each additional refugee. Therefore, states with larger populations should be better equipped to handle refugee inflows, so the larger a state's population the greater its expected respect for refugees' rights.

Actual exposure to refugees should also have a very direct effect: simply put, more refugees should increase the likelihood that states have the opportunity to abuse the rights of refugees. Many isolated island states have never had asylum requests.[38] The size of the refugee population should also shift the capacity of the state to respect the rights of existing or would-be refugees. Simply put, a larger refugee population should drain the resources of the state, decreasing the level of respect that the state shows for refugees.

Hypothesis 5: *States that host larger refugee populations should have lower respect for refugees' rights.*

A neighboring civil war should have a similar effect: the state will be more likely to face a problematic refugee population, but it will be an even greater concern because this population may harbor rebels and terrorists, presenting a threat to the state (Choi and Salehyan 2013). This should lead to decreased respect for the rights of refugees. Carter and Poast (2015) find that while refugee inflows do not predict the building of permanent structures at borders, the threat of a neighboring civil war will do so. It is likely that states

[38] For this very reason, I include robustness checks in the empirical portion that control for the number of contiguous land borders.

will simply restrict the ability of refugees to enter the state and to move within the state to deal with the security problem that refugees present, which may be why Carter and Poast do not find evidence for the effect of refugee populations on permanent border structures. After all, it is well established that refugee populations from civil war states bring along a number of negative externalities in terms of security for their host states (Gleditsch and Salehyan 2006, Salehyan 2007, 2008, Choi and Salehyan 2013). However, states should be particularly motivated to protect their security in whatever manner they can in the face of potential conflict spillover (see Jacobsen 1996), so I expect neighboring conflict to drive decreased respect for the rights of refugees.

In the next section, I outline the methodology I use to test these expectations, including the collection of a new annual state-level dataset on respect for the rights of refugees.

Research Design

Dependent Variables: State Practices towards Refugees

To measure state practices towards refugees, I undertook a data collection effort to create annual scores on several dimensions based on a reliably produced source document. To this end, I used State Department Annual Reports from 1993 through 2014 to construct the Refugee Rights dataset: a twenty-two year dataset of the practices towards refugees of the full sample of states in the international system. Some had insufficient information, but this still generated a sample of 175 states. Unfortunately, in these reports the coverage on issues such as freedom of movement for refugees and asylum seekers, their right to earn a livelihood, and their access to courts was spotty at best. However, there is consistent reporting on the legal state of the asylum system,

incidents of refoulement, government violence towards refugees and asylums seekers, protection of refugees and asylum seekers from violence by other (non-governmental) actors, and cooperation with the UNHCR to provide services and protection to refugees. Considering that these should be the most basic concerns of refugees, this is a reasonable indication of both the expectations of refugees regarding their welfare, and the general practices of states towards asylum-seekers and refugees. The reports do not give detailed enough information to create a fine-grained breakdown of the scores in an internally consistent manner. Therefore, I instead use a 0 – 1 – 2 scale, in which zero indicates the lowest level of protection of these rights and two indicates the highest level of protection.[39] [40] I code five categories on this scale: (1) legal system for asylum and protection of refugees; (2) refoulement; (3) governmental violence against refugees/asylum-seekers; (4) protection from violence by non-governmental actors and (5) cooperation with the UNHCR.[41] Across all the scores, higher values indicate a higher level of respect for the right in question.

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[39] The distinction between a 1 and a 0 is based on whether the abuse of the right in question is isolated or widespread/systematic. If there are isolated incidents based on individual failures – but little reason to expect this is a consistent or systematic problem – the score is a 1. If the abuse is widespread or there is evidence of an underlying systematic issue creating the abuse, the score is a 0.

[40] The use of this 0-1-2 scale is loosely modeled after the CI-RIGHTS/CIRI physical integrity rights indicators, which are also built on annual human rights reports.

[41] The measure of the legal system is only a measure of the policy, and does not take actual practice into account. As stated earlier, refoulement is the forced return of refugees, asylum-seekers, or individuals who would qualify for this status to a geographic territory where they have reason to fear for their lives or freedom.

Table 2: Frequencies of Refugee Rights Scores

	Refoulement		Government Violence		Protection from non-state violence		Cooperation with UNHCR		Legal System	
0	616	18.1%	652	19.2%	313	9.2%	108	3.2%	994	29.2%
1	370	10.9%	147	4.3%	60	1.8%	238	7%	550	45.4%
2	2,414	71%	2,601	76.5%	3,027	89%	3,054	89.8%	1,856	54.6%
Total	3,400	100%	3,400	100%	3,400	100%	3,400	100%	3,400	100%

Table 2 shows the frequencies of each of the refugee rights scores. *Refoulement* measures whether a state has refused entry to individuals who were seeking asylum or who would qualify for asylum; has forcibly expelled any individuals already present in the country who did or could qualify for asylum or refugee status; or has undertaken general practices that would have this impact (e.g. wholesale closing of borders or screening practices that keep the individuals from applying successfully for asylum).[42] *Government violence* measures the equivalent of physical integrity rights, but specific to the refugee and asylum-seeker population. This can also include those who *might* have technically qualified for asylum or refugee status, but who were never given the chance because of flawed refoulement practices. For example, if a state beats back asylum-seekers at borders, both preventing entry and physically abusing them, this would be codeable as government abuse. Arbitrary detainment and long-term detainment against international refugee law also qualify as government abuse. Extortion and harassment of refugees and asylum-seekers by state security forces also qualify. *Protection from non-*

[42] Determination of whether an individual might qualify for asylum is based on UNHCR definitions, not on internal national definitions, which often diverged from international norms.

state violence measures the exposure of refugees and asylum-seekers to abuse from any actor *other* than the host state's security forces; this includes societal violence by native citizens, violence by rebel forces within the state, and violence by security forces from states *other* than the host state. *Cooperation with UNHCR* measures the extent to which the state cooperates with the UNHCR overall; if the states restricts UNHCR access to refugee and asylum-seeker populations, or otherwise curtails the UNHCR's ability to carry out its directives in the state, this qualifies for a lower score on this measure. Finally, the *legal system* measures whether the state has implemented a legal system to process and protect refugees in accordance with the international norms laid out in the UNHCR 1951 treaty and 1967 protocol.[43]

Independent Variables

To measure the level of human rights afforded to citizens, I use the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Physical Integrity Rights score, which ranges from 0-8, where 0 indicates the lowest level of respect and 8 indicates full respect (Cingranelli et al. 2014).[44] This score encompasses torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and disappearance. To measure regime type, I use the Polity IV data, which ranges from -10 (complete autocracy) to 10 (full democracy) (Marshall et al. 2013). [45] To capture overall state capacity – with a focus on access to material resources – I use the size of the

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[43] For a full description of the coding procedure, please see the Appendix of this chapter.

[44] In this chapter, I only use the data covered by the original CIRI data (through 2011); in subsequent chapters, I add in the data covered in the extended CI-RIGHTS data (in the models that run through 2014).

[45] I recalculated this by adding ten points so that it ranges from 0 to 20 in my data to avoid any issues working with negative numbers.

economy, or gross domestic product (GDP) as reported by the World Bank (2012).[46] I use the UCDP-PRIO definitions of civil war, which includes both internal armed conflicts and internationalized external armed conflicts, to control for the effect of internal conflict on practices towards refugees (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). I also use this definition to measure for the binary presence of civil conflict in a bordering state. Following standard practice in the literature predicting human rights, I control for the total size of the population using the Gleditsch (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP Data. The binary indicator of participation in the UN Treaties on the rights of refugees (UN 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol) data comes from the World Refugee Surveys (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Finally, to control for the size of the refugee population, I use data from online statistical database of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. [47]

Results

The refugee rights scores range from zero to two, so I use an ordered logistic regression model. The results are in Table 3 and 4; Table 3 uses the basic model for predicting individual refugee practice scores, while Table 4 adds an interaction term between regime type and wealth to test the conditional impact of wealth based on regime

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[46] As this measure is skewed, I use the natural log of GDP. I measure this in the previous year to avoid problems of reverse causality.

[47] Summary statistics for all measures available in Table 2 and in Appendix A in Table 12. The measure of the refugee population is also used in the natural log form, and lagged one year to avoid reverse causality. It only includes refugees from within 950 km to conform to practices in the quantitative refugee literature, notably Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006).

type.[48] I predict each outcome (refoulement, government violence, protection from non-governmental violence, the legal system towards refugees and asylum-seekers, and cooperation with UNHCR) separately. [49]

Human rights towards citizens are significant in predicting government violence towards refugees, protection against other violence, and cooperation with UNHCR. It seems intuitive that it would impact the level of governmental violence towards refugees because the types of abuses coded in the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights score are the same as those that would be coded as government violence here; only the population being abused (or not) changes. This also does suggest that either the normative notion that respect for human rights of citizens extend to refugees and asylum seekers – or that a state security apparatus that does not engage in corrupt abuses of citizens will likewise be restrained in violating the traditional physical integrity rights of refugees and asylum seekers. The fact that physical integrity rights of citizens also predict the level of protection from other violence (societal, by rebel forces, or by neighboring state security forces) lends some support to the argument for the capacity of the security apparatus driving the impact of the CIRI measure, as this would explain the ability to restrain other actors from abusing refugees and asylum seekers. However, notably, there is no impact on refoulement; therefore it seems that while states that respect the human rights of their

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[48] Table 13 in Appendix A shows the results for the basic ordered logistic model with the addition of an indicator of the number of UNHCR refugee-specific agreements that the country has signed (of the UNHCR 1951 Treaty and the associated 1967 Protocol). I run these separately as the signatory indicator is likely to soak up a great deal of variation because it will vary little over time within individual countries.

[49] I also ran a regression predicting refoulement that includes safe country of origin/transit restrictions as a violation of refoulement; the results are essentially unchanged.

citizens are less likely to physically abuse refugees within their borders, this has no impact on the likelihood that they will close borders to asylum-seekers, return these populations to countries where they fear for their life and well-being, or otherwise restrict entry for would-be refugees and asylum-seekers.

The results from the interactive model are shown in Figures 1 through 5. Each figure plots the out of sample predicted probability of scoring a "2" – the highest score – on one of the five measures of refugee rights. These probabilities are plotted for high and low GDP states across all levels of regime type (democracy).[50] Figure 1 shows the probability of a 2 on the refoulement score. Across all levels of democracy, wealthy states are more likely to refoule; however, the gap between wealthy and poor states shrinks at the highest levels of democracy, suggesting that regime type can constrain the refoulement abuses of high capacity states. This is not the case in the protection of refugee populations from non-governmental violence, shown in Figure 2. In protection, there is no appreciable difference between high and low capacity states across all levels of democracy.

Wealthier states are more likely to engage in government abuse refugee and asylum-seeker populations at any level of democracy, shown in Figure 3.These differences actually become more pronounced at higher levels of democracy. Since government abuse includes detention, this might also reflect the propensity of high capacity, highly democratic states to detain refugees for extended periods of time. This pattern is also reflected in the prediction of cooperation with UNHCR, shown in Figure 5: there is no difference between high and low capacity states if they are autocratic, but as

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[50] High GDP (ln) is set at 14, while low GDP (ln) is set at 6.

states become more democratic, low capacity states are actually more likely to fully cooperate with UNHCR. This might be explained in part by the greater need of low-capacity states for the resources, personnel, and bureaucratic oversight that the UNHCR provides. Autocratic states may be more willing to forego UNHCR aid in order to retain complete control over the management of refugee populations within their own borders. Finally, Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of a fully implemented legal system for refugees and asylum-seekers in accordance with the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. This is the only plot that exactly matches the expectations from Hypothesis 4; with the least democratic governments, high capacity states are less likely to implement a full legal system for refugees and asylum-seekers. However, as states become more democratic, this difference disappears. At least in terms of the legal system for the protection of refugee populations, regime does constrain high-capacity states from ignoring the rights of refugees.

Contiguous civil conflict is one of the most robust predictors of abuses of the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers; it has a significant and negative effect on every outcome with the exception of the legal system. This speaks very strongly to the negative reaction of governments to the refugee populations created by neighboring civil wars. The possible presence of terrorist, rebel groups, and other dangerous populations amongst the refugees might trigger this reaction. Notably, though unsurprisingly, contiguous civil conflict also makes it more likely that refugee-type populations will be abused by groups other than their host state government – while this may well include native citizens, it likely is also shaped by rebel forces and or the security forces of the neighboring conflict state.

Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011)

VARIABLES	(1) Refoulement	(2) Government Violence	(3) Protection from Violence	(4) Legal System	(5) Cooperation with UNHCR
Legal System (Refugees)					0.617***
					(0.143)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	0.0886	0.112**	0.141**	0.0857	0.187**
	(0.0548)	(0.0571)	(0.0663)	(0.0571)	(0.0911)
Regime (Polity)	0.0269	0.0137	-0.0477**	0.0697***	0.0717***
	(0.0198)	(0.0245)	(0.0226)	(0.0200)	(0.0246)
Civil War	0.270	-0.0259	-0.0348	-0.123	-0.315
	(0.292)	(0.290)	(0.340)	(0.290)	(0.310)
Contiguous Civil Conflict	-0.979***	-0.631***	-0.552**	0.0555	-1.166***
	(0.200)	(0.238)	(0.252)	(0.213)	(0.305)
GDP_{t-1} (ln)	-0.311***	-0.391***	0.103	-0.150	-0.371***
	(0.0980)	(0.107)	(0.119)	(0.101)	(0.137)
Refugee $Population_{t-1}$ (ln)	-0.0742***	-0.187***	-0.223***	0.0683**	0.0186
	(0.0273)	(0.0280)	(0.0475)	(0.0278)	(0.0356)
Population (ln)	0.157	0.347**	-0.148	0.0652	0.174
	(0.134)	(0.149)	(0.175)	(0.151)	(0.177)
Constant cut1	-3.754***	-3.527***	-4.856***	-0.318***	-4.703***
Constant cut2	-3.092***	-3.244***	-4.609***	0.465***	-3.221***
Observations	2,905	2,905	2,905	2,905	2,905
Clusters	163	163	163	163	163
Wald χ^2	80.20	81.38	55.8	28.47	129.0

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table 4: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011)

VARIABLES	(6) Refoulement	(7) Government Violence	(8) Protection from Violence	(9) Legal System	(10) Cooperation with UNCHR
Legal System (Refugees)					0.631***
					(0.140)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	0.0827	0.115**	0.142**	0.0741	0.188**
	(0.0555)	(0.575)	(0.0657)	(0.0565)	(0.0896)
Regime (Polity)	-0.0856	0.0556	0.0058	-0.140	0.243**
	(0.0782)	(0.0812)	(0.0961)	(0.0990)	(0.110)
GDP_{t-1} (ln)	-0.451***	-0.341**	0.167	-0.430***	-0.225
	(0.145)	(0.157)	(0.177)	(0.161)	(0.176)
Regime * GDP_{t-1} (ln)	0.0102	-0.0038	-0.0048	0.0194**	-0.0147
	(0.0072)	(0.0076)	(0.0089)	(0.0089)	(0.0092)
Civil War	0.246	-0.0125	-0.0127	-0.180	-0.258
	(0.293)	(0.292)	(0.343)	(0.296)	(0.313)
Contiguous Civil Conflict	-0.964***	-0.638***	-0.555**	0.0805	-1.183***
	(0.197)	(0.238)	(0.252)	(0.212)	(0.311)
Refugee $Population_{t-1}$ (ln)	-0.0742***	-0.187***	-0.223***	0.0669**	0.0156
	(0.0272)	(0.0280)	(0.0477)	(0.0278)	(0.0355)
Population (ln)	0.155	0.347**	-0.153	0.0740	0.173
	(0.135)	(0.149)	(0.180)	(0.148)	(0.172)
Constant cut1	-5.290***	-2.980**	-4.199***	-3.253**	-3.074**
Constant cut2	-4.625***	-2.697**	-3.952***	2.459	-1.591
Observations	2,905	2,905	2,905	2,905	2,905
Clusters	163	163	163	163	163
Wald χ^2	78.73	89.73	54.64	36.41	122.6

Robust standard errors in parentheses/ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Figure 1: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Refoulement Score=2



Figure 2: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Protection Score = 2



Figure 3: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Government Abuse Score = 2



Figure 4: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Legal System Score = 2



Figure 5: Out of Sample Predicted Probabilities of Cooperation with UNHCR Score = 2



Larger refuge populations are also frequently significant in predicting practices towards refugees; this matches my expectations, and conforms to more general patterns of human rights abuses (see Cingranelli and Richards 2010). With more refugees, there are more opportunities for abuse; further, with more refugees there is a greater tax on the state's resources. The size of the refugee population is a significant and negative predictor of refoulement, government violence, and protection from violence. However, it has no impact on cooperation with UNHCR, and has a positive impact on the legal system. The effect on the legal system does wash out with the inclusion of UNHCR treaties (see Model 9). This may speak to the fact that with larger refugee populations, states are more likely to undertake the effort of implementing fully functional legal systems to handle refugees, rather than dealing with them in an ad-hoc manner.

The actual (non-refugee) population of the state has very little impact on practices overall; however, larger states are significantly better in avoiding governmental violence against refugees and asylum-seekers. This does conform to my initial expectations, suggesting that larger states are better prepared to handle refugee inflows and less likely to abuse these groups.[51]

Discussion

The results from the empirical tests show clearly that different types of rights and protection for refugees – each representing a different element of the pull factors in neighboring states - do have distinct drivers. The finding that human rights practices for citizens do typically translate into better respect for the rights of refugees that are already within the country suggests some level of support for the notion that normative rights matter. This suggests that states that respect human rights generally will exert a stronger pull on potential refugees, not only because of the general lack of repression, but also because these states are more likely to respect refugee rights.

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[51] In the set of models in Appendix A (Models 11-15 in Table 13) that include the sum of UN refugee treaties signed (of the UNHCR 1951 Treaty and 1967 Protocol), UN refugee treaty signing is a significant and positive predictor of everything with the exception of protection from non-governmental violence. It is not clear that this is necessarily causal, but more likely is a proxy for a general predisposition to respect the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. Including this does wash out some of the significance of other variables, most notably in the model predicting the legal system (Model 9). The size of the refugee population and the level of democracy both lose significance, leaving the UN treaty indicator as the only significant variable in the model. Finally, the implementation of a legal system for refugees does predict higher levels of cooperation with UNHCR, though this is only significant at the $p < 0.10$ level with the inclusion of the actual treaty signing (separate from implementation).

However, this is tempered by the finding that wealthier states are more likely to both practice refoulement and to violate the physical integrity rights of asylum seekers, in terms of both arbitrary detention and violence by government agents. These effects were generally not tempered by regime type. This does make sense given the increased demand for asylum in richer states, and their greater capacity to keep unwanted asylum seekers out or detained if they enter the country illegally. Even if relatively poor states would prefer to keep refugees out, a combination of porous borders and limited manpower and bureaucratic capacity may make it impossible for these states to effectively restrain refugee inflows. Richer states may also be therefore be better equipped to refuse help from the UNCHR, making it more likely that they will restrict UNHCR access to asylum-seeker and refugee populations. Of course, this effect disappears in autocratic states, suggesting that autocracies may be more willing to forego UNHCR assistance across the board in order to maintain complete control over refugee populations within their borders. Thus, while the wealth of high GDP states may exert an independent pull on refugee inflows, their increased likelihood of refoulement and abuse may diminish this pull, although in some cases regime type will weaken this impact.

The consistent finding that contiguous civil conflict increase incidents of refoulement supports the arguments that the security threat presented by these refugees drives down respect for refugees' rights in an attempt to protect the state. This might also provide another reason that state capacity conditions the deleterious impact of refugee flows from neighboring civil wars; higher capacity states are more likely to restrict these refugee flows and to systematically detain them within the country. This will once again translate into a decreased level of pull for refugee inflows; however, this may not be

enough to outweigh the risks and immediate dangers of remaining within the conflict state.

Conclusion

With the new dataset on state practices towards refugees, I am able to evaluate the drivers of refugee rights systematically through regression analysis. This allows for a better understanding of what types of states are most likely to be good destinations for refugees, or to exert the strongest pull. Up to this point, this type of modeling has only been used on respect for the rights of citizens, or at best across the population of the country as a whole. I find that capacity, regime, norms, and security concerns all have influences on the level of respect for the rights of refugees. In turn, these factors all influence the expected quality of life of states that neighbor civil wars, and therefore shape both the *pull* from civil wars and consequently the development of these conflicts.

In the next chapters, I will use this dataset to construct a measure of the *destination quality* of each state for would-be refugees and asylum seekers. Using measures of the individual destination quality of states neighboring civil conflicts will allow me to then generate an aggregate measure of the total *exit* quality from each conflict. Using the information on refugee rights in states around civil wars therefore allows me to test how the combination of exit quality, or pull from surrounding states, and violence against civilians shapes refugee outflows and civil conflict dynamics. I can thus determine whether states with high levels of violence against civilians and low exit quality are indeed longer, bloodier conflicts; that is, I can test whether the pressure-cooker conflict theory holds.

Chapter 3: Fight or Flight? Measuring Exit Quality

Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have argued that civil wars can become longer, bloodier conflicts if civilians attempting to flee violence are unable to leave the conflict state. This the pressure cooker at work; widespread violence and human desperation combine to create mounting pressure, which will continually build on itself if civilians lack reasonably safe places to which they can flee. It is the availability of refuge that determines whether this dynamic comes into play. When civilians have nowhere to seek sanctuary, violent civil wars can become more brutal, racking up increasing casualties not only amongst civilians, but also on the battlefield. Trapped civilians cannot escape the violence, so they cannot avoid being victims of it; in turn, civilians are more likely to feed into the conflict by supporting armed actors for protection and resources, or even by becoming combatants themselves. The availability of refuge is what determines whether violence against civilians creates a pool of resources to feed conflict, or drains resources to starve it.

Chapter 2 introduced a new dataset on state practices towards refugees and evaluated the characteristics that drive states to be better or worse hosts of refugees and asylum-seekers. The Refugee Rights data are important because they present original

indicators of the opportunities civilians have to flee civil war. Going forward, the key question will be whether states' treatment of refugees actually does shape civilian flight and broader civil war dynamics as the pressure cooker theory suggests. Toward that end, this chapter sets out to develop a single measure of exit quality rooted in the new data described in Chapter 2.

Exit quality should include both the quality of the treatment of refugees and the level of general physical security in the states that neighbor civil conflicts. In this chapter, therefore, I use established statistical methods including factor analysis (FA) and item response theory (IRT) to create a set of unidimensional measures of the latent *destination quality* of each individual state-year in the international system covering the years 1993-2014. *Destination quality* measures expected quality of life for refugees in a single potential destination. For example, in the Syrian Civil War, a civilian contemplating flight might consider the destination quality of Jordan specifically, or might weigh this against the destination quality of Lebanon or Turkey. *Exit quality*, then, is simply the aggregation of *destination quality* for all states neighboring a civil war state, and measures how safe a potential asylum-seeker can expect to be overall if they attempt to flee. In the Syrian case, this would comprise the full set of potential destinations surrounding the conflict. These concepts are discussed in greater detail in the beginning of this chapter.

As stated above, a key question is whether exit quality shapes refugee flight as the pressure cooker theory suggests. Testing this is central to this chapter, and should reflect on the validity of the constructed measure of exit quality. I therefore use a model of dyadic refugee flows from civil conflict states to neighboring states to evaluate the face

validity of the individual measures of destination quality. The next chapter examines how exit quality influences the dynamics of civil wars, and will use aggregated measures of overall exit quality to test this. In both this chapter and the next, the importance of human movements and human suffering are key to whether civil wars become pressure cookers of elevated violence, deprivation, and suffering.

The Need for Unidimensional Measures

The theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state is built on the impact of variations in *exit quality* in conflict zones. Specifically, it is built on the interaction of exit quality and the level of violence directed against civilians. In civil conflicts where there is little to no violence against civilians, civilians should have limited cause to fear for their physical security and should thus be relatively less impacted by the conflict in general. They will be unlikely to attempt to flee, and less likely to impact the conflict if they cannot flee. However, in civil conflicts where there are high levels of violence against civilians, specifically one-sided violence that civilians cannot avoid, these civilians will be pushed to respond. If there are good options for flight – or high-quality destinations that treat refugees well and are generally considered safe - neighboring the conflict state, they will be more likely to flee to those neighboring states. However, where the neighbors surrounding the conflict state are low-quality destinations – or treat refugees poorly, and are generally considered to be unsafe - civilians are more likely to remain within the conflict state, and to feed into the conflict itself, driving longer, bloodier civil wars.

To test the impact of *exit quality* of the civil conflict requires first generating a single, unidimensional measure of *exit quality* for each civil conflict that I can model

directly. However, to get to the exit quality, I first need to general unidimensional measures of the latent *destination quality* of all states that neighbor civil wars. In this chapter, I use both existing data on general physical security protection within individual states, and my new dataset of states' practices towards refugees, to create unidimensional measures of the latent continuous dimension of *destination quality*. This follows the example of Treier and Jackman (2006), who use the various Polity IV indicators to generate a measure of the latent level of democracy. Specifically, each individual indicator is considered an observable indicator of the otherwise unobservable level of democracy; in the same manner, I use the individual indicators from the data introduced in Chapter 2 on Refugee Rights and the indicators from CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and the UCDP/PRIO level of civil war to measure the underlying dimension of *destination quality*.

To better conceptualize the difference between *destination quality* and *exit quality*, consider the two hypothetical conflict states illustrated in Figure 6. On the left panel, the landlocked conflict state A is surrounded by neighboring states B-G. On the right panel, conflict state H has one neighbor (state I), but otherwise is surrounded by water. Referring back to the left panel, each individual state (state B, state C, state D, state E, state F, and state G) has its own individual destination quality. For example, state G may welcome refugees, have generally high levels of human rights practices, and be free from any of its own internal conflict. State G would then have very high *destination quality*. State E, on the other hand, might refoule and arbitrarily detain refugees, abuse its own citizens, and be fighting off an internal armed conflict. State E would have low destination quality. Each of the other individual states will have their own distinct

destination quality based on these considerations. However, to truly consider the full *exit quality* of the civil conflict in State A, all of these individual destination qualities must be aggregated. Yet, if we consider the conflict state H in the right panel, the destination quality of its only neighbor, state I, would be equivalent to the entire exit quality for state H, as there is nowhere else to go.

Figure 6: Hypothetical Exit Quality v. Destination Quality Scenarios



Figure 6 shows two hypothetical civil conflict states A and H (in gray). A is a landlocked country surrounded by six neighboring states B-G, while H is a coastal country with a single neighbor (I). The exit quality for state A is an aggregation of the destination qualities of states B-G, while the exit quality for state H is equivalent to the destination quality of state I.

In order to create an actual measure of destination quality that I can use for modeling and testing, I need as condensed a measure as possible. While it would be ideal in some ways to have just one single measure and unilaterally consider that to be the sole measure of destination quality, this approach has some weaknesses. Most immediately,

there are simply too many characteristics of potential destination states to meaningfully and consistently encompass in a single measure. These might include: the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers, respect for the physical security rights of native citizens, respect for civil rights, regime type, involvement in a civil or international war, wealth, the presence of ethnic kin networks or diaspora communities, and the level of criminal/gang activity. Measuring all of these is beyond the scope of this project, and indeed, forcing all of these into a single measure would make the interpretation of that measure quite difficult. Therefore, for the purposes of testing my theory, I focus on creating measures of destination quality within each potential asylum state encompassing: (a) the treatment of refugees/asylum-seekers, and (b) general physical security. Each of these is useful in its own right, and modeling these separately allows for a more nuanced understanding of the characteristics of neighboring states that can impact refugee outflows from civil wars and in turn the development of said wars.

Methodology

To create the destination quality measures, I start with two sets of data. The first is the data described in Chapter 2 on state practices towards refugees (or, more succinctly, "Refugee Rights"). As discussed in the previous chapter at greater length, these measures include refoulement, government violence against refugees, the legal structure for granting asylum/refugee-status, cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and protection of refugees and asylum-seekers from violence by non-state actors. All of these are scored as a 0, 1, or 2, depending on the level of respect for these practices, in which a score of 0 indicates widespread or systematic abuse and a score of 2 indicates no credible reports of abuse.

The second group of data that I use to create measures of destination quality uses broader information on the level of physical security within a potential destination state. This includes general information on the respect for the physical integrity rights of native citizens drawn from the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights data up to 2011, and from the updated CI-RIGHTS dataset from 2012-2014 (Cingranelli et al 2014, Cingranelli and Filippov 2018). The measures cover extrajudicial killing, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearance. These are also scored 0-1-2, in which a 2 represents the highest level of respect, and a 0 represents the lowest level of respect. To these I add a measure for the presence of a civil conflict within the destination state, sourced from the UCDP-PRIO conflict dataset. This is also a simple 0-1-2 measure. However, in this case, this is measuring whether there is no conflict (0), a low-scale conflict (1), or a widespread conflict (2). I reverse the order of the scores so that higher scores represent a safer destination, matching the ordering of the CIRI and Refugee Rights scores.

This still leaves me with ten data points for each neighboring state in each conflict-year, or at best, a set of five data points measuring Refugee Rights and five data points measuring general physical security. It would be very difficult to properly evaluate the interactive effect of destination quality and civilian-directed violence with so many measures of destination quality with which to contend. These are also measures that are unsurprisingly correlated, which would distort regression models that included all of them.[52] Further, considering each of these in isolation would likely obscure the effect of

[52] See Table 15 in Appendix B for the full correlation matrix of these variables.

overall treatment of refugees and overall physical security within the state, which is after all the actual interest of the project.

I therefore turn to a set of tools used to reduce a multiple correlated data points into single dimensions. The main tools used in the social sciences to accomplish this are Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Factor Analysis (FA), and Item Response Theory (IRT). PCA is used to condense data with the understanding that it is *creating* a unidimensional measure out of the data, rather than assuming there is an underlying, latent dimension that drives the data and backwards engineering a measure of that underlying dimension from the data, which is the purview of the FA and IRT strategies. PCA also assumes there is no measurement error in the data, which may be problematic.[53] As my theory is built on an underlying dimension of exit (destination) quality, I focus on FA and IRT, both of which grew out of Classical Test Theory. [54]

Factor Analysis is frequently used to take large sets of survey responses and tease out underlying dimensions driving patterns of responses. For example, in surveys of student evaluations of teaching administered at the end of a college course, certain questions may get at the underlying dimension of *how accessible* an instructor was, while other questions might instead speak to the *how well the instructor knew the subject*. Each of these are important measures of teaching quality, but the underlying dimensions may well be distinct, and even run counter to one another in some cases. I use FA to explore

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[53] See Baglin (2014, 2).

[54] I did also estimate PCA scores for robustness checks; they performed generally in the same manner as the factor analysis and IRT scores. For more information on the PCA estimation, see Appendix B.

the distinctions between general physical security and the treatment of refugees/asylum-seekers, and to confirm that these two underlying dimensions, while correlated, are indeed distinct.

Item Response Theory is similar to factor analysis in that it seeks to derive a measure of an underlying dimension (or multiple underlying dimensions).[55] However, IRT generates not only a measure of the underlying dimension(s), but also a measure of how effectively each individual test item is at evaluating that underlying trait.[56] IRT has principally been used to evaluate the effectiveness of tests and their individual questions (Rasch 1980, Cai et al. 2016, 298).[57] For example, IRT might be used to evaluate the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) to determine how well an individual question could distinguish between a high-aptitude and low-aptitude test taker; very easy questions that everyone could get right would not be useful in identifying individual aptitude.[58] By the

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[55] The main difference between the IRT and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) models are that IRT assumes a non-linear relationship between the underlying trait of interest and the individual item responses, while CFA assumes the relationship is linear (Reise et al 1993, 557).

[56] Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) can also measure item difficulty and discrimination; however, it is a simpler and more direct extension of the IRT models, particularly within Stata 14, so I favor IRT for these measurements.

[57] Obviously, IRT has grown to have much broader applications than this; for example, Laver et al. (2003) use IRT to estimate political party ideological positions, Bonica (2013) uses an IRT count model to estimate the ideologies of political candidates and PACs, and Reed et al. (2008) use it to estimate state preferences based on United Nations voting patterns. As discussed previously, Treier and Jackman (2006) use IRT to estimate latent democracy measures.

[58] In fact, not only is IRT used to evaluate the SAT, but employees of the Education Testing Service (ETS), the company that creates and administers the SAT, have

same logic, very difficult questions that nobody could get right would also be poor tools for identifying aptitude levels. Aggregating points naively – giving equal weight to each question, scoring based on the percentage answered correctly, and ignoring how effectively the test as whole parses out the aptitude of the test-taking population – might give a very inaccurate score. IRT therefore gives measures not only of the latent trait (e.g. aptitude) of individual test-takers, but also gives measures of the difficulty of each individual test item and how well it discriminates between test takers. *Difficulty*, then, measures the aptitude level at which a test taker would have a 50/50 shot at getting the correct answer to a specific question; in classical test theory, this would equate to the proportion of test-takers who answered the question correctly (Reckase 2009, 26). *Discrimination*, on the other hand, measures how well a question distinguishes between test-takers with a different level of the latent trait. If there is little difference in the probability of a correct answer between high and low aptitude test takers, than that question does not discriminate well.

The ordinal IRT model that I use follows the example of Treier and Jackman (2008), who use ordinal measures of democracy from the Polity IV dataset to create a measure of the latent level of democracy. In my case, I am using the data points from the Refugee Rights dataset and the human rights and general security data to measure latent *destination quality*. In both cases, it is not possible to directly observe the quantity of interest (democracy or destination quality), but it is possible to use observable indicators

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contributed greatly to IRT's development and expansion over time (Carlson and von Davier 2013).

of that underlying dimension to create Bayesian measures that can be assigned to each individual country-year of interest.

I extend the strengths of these modeling strategies that have been built primarily for evaluating surveys and tests – but have found increasingly broader applications within political science (see e.g. Laver 2003, Treier and Jackman 2008; Reed et al. 2008; Treier and Hillygus 2009; Bonica 2013) - to evaluate the number of dimensions in my data on destination quality, which data points are best measuring the underlying dimension(s) of the data, and in turn to generate a scale of the underlying dimension(s) and to score individual countries on that scale.

Preliminary Scores of Destination Quality

After running the entirety of the data points through factor analysis, it appears that there are likely two distinct underlying dimensions driving the data.[59] However, there is one dimension that overwhelms all of the others. Simplified factor loadings are displayed in Table 5 below; for the full factor loadings, please refer to Table 14 in Appendix B.

The first factor – or underlying dimension – explains most of the variance in the full dataset, with an eigenvalue of 4.07. The CIRI/CI-RIGHTS data on the physical integrity rights of native citizens – or, more concisely, repression - and the UCDP/PRIO measure of civil conflict load very heavily onto this factor. Protection of refugees from non-state violence also weakly loads onto this dimension, which does make sense because in states where general physical integrity is not well-protected, this will likely spillover into the refugee population – particularly where civil conflicts are concerned.

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[59] As the data are ordinal, I use polychoric factor analysis.

The second factor explains much less of the variance in the overall data with an eigenvalue of 1.43, and appears to be measuring refugee rights distinctly, as none of the CIRI/CI-RIGHTS or civil war measures have loaded onto this factor over 0.3. The law on refugees and asylum-seekers only weakly loads onto this factor, suggesting that legal practices are less informative with regards to refugee rights than the other data points. Refoulement and cooperation with UNHCR load very heavily, followed by government violence and protection from non-state violence.

Based on these initial findings, it does not seem that there is evidence for evaluating exit quality as a unidimensional measure; despite the extremely high eigenvalue on the first factor, it is most appropriate to consider it two-dimensional because the second eigenvalue is still greater than one and the two factors have distinct variables loading onto each one. After running the same data through an IRT model, it is clear than compressing all eleven data points into a single score means that the bulk of that score is driven by the general physical security data points (CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and UCDP/PRIO), the same scores that loaded so heavily onto the first factor.[60]

I therefore run a factor analysis model and an IRT model, running each set of data (general physical integrity and refugee rights) on its own. I emerge with two sets of destination quality scores: *general security* and *refugee rights*. Moving forward, I evaluate the performance of each of these in turn. As the IRT scores correlate quite closely with the factor analysis scores, I primarily use the IRT-generated scores of destination quality.

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[60] See Appendix B for a full accounting of the results per test item from the IRT analysis.

Table 5: Factor Loadings for Destination Quality Data

		Factor Loadings	
Item	Source	Factor 1 (General Violence)	Factor 2 (Refugee Violence)
Law	Refugees	-	0.3808
Refoulement	Refugees	-	0.7773
Cooperation with UNHCR	Refugees	-	0.7353
Government Violence	Refugees	-	0.5041
Protection from non-State Violence	Refugees	0.3363	0.5041
Killing	CIRI	0.8603	-
Disappearance	CIRI	0.8164	-
Torture	CIRI	0.7485	-
Political Prisoners	CIRI	0.6772	-
Civil War	UCDP/PRIO	0.8315	-
Eigenvalue		4.0768	1.4277

* N=3,535
** Factors loadings under 0.3 are omitted

The destination quality scores are the estimates of the latent destination quality traits: refugee rights and general physical security. Summary statistics for the scores are shown in Table 6. The estimated scores are of theta, the latent trait measure within the IRT framework. The scale of theta – or the latent traits – ranges from about -2 to .7 (in the case of refugee rights alone) or to 1.5 (in the case of general physical security alone).

The lowest scores correspond to the worst practices, while the highest scores correspond to the best practices.

Table 6: Summary Statistics for Destination Quality Theta Scores (IRT)

Destination Quality Measures (Theta)	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Refugee Rights	3,851	-0.0018	0.7446	-2.3727	0.6828
General Physical Security	3,851	5.16e-06	0.8854	-2.2049	1.4679

Figure 7: Scatterplot of Selected IRT Scores - Refugee Rights v. General Security



The scatterplot above shows the country labels for selected country-years' IRT scores of refugee rights and general security, respectively. These are snapshots of a single point in time within the sample for each of the countries displayed; some countries will change position over time, and many even change quadrants within the timespan covered by the sample.

Across the continuums of refugee rights scores and general security scores, there are states that fall into all combinations of values. Selected countries are labeled in Figure 7, which is divided into four quadrants splitting high/low refugee rights scores, and high/low general security scores. Uruguay, for example, has very high general security and very high refugee rights, and would thus be a uniformly high quality destination for any potential refugees or asylum-seekers in the area. By the same token, Sri Lanka is very low on both refugee rights and general security, and would thus be a uniformly low-quality destination should a civil war break out in a neighboring state. However there are plenty of countries that do not fit so neatly into a unidimensional approach; for example, Nigeria has low general security but reasonably good respect for refugee rights. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates scores well on general security, but has poor respect for refugee rights. All quadrants are well populated (see Figure 27 in the Appendix for the full scatterplot). It is therefore quite clear that it is worth considering these dimensions in isolation, as they are not even visually correlated and do seem to be measuring distinct characteristics. Further, the data do contain examples of most combinations of these two characteristics.

For another illustration of the destination quality scores, refer to the maps in Figures 8 and 9. These figures are the real-world applications of the hypothetical maps in Figure 6. Figure 8 shows the destination quality - specifically, the Refugee Rights score – for all the neighboring states within 950 km of landlocked Zambia in 2010. Lower scores correspond to worse destination quality; clearly, Kenya is the worst destination in terms of how refugees are treated, while Mozambique and Namibia have the highest possible score for Refugee Rights. This is analogous to Country A in Figure 6; by the same logic,

the exit quality for Zambia will be the aggregation of all of these individual destination quality scores.

Figure 8: Refugee Rights Scores around Zambia (2010)



This map is the real-world equivalent of Country A from Figure 6. It shows the level of respect for refugee rights for all countries within 950 km of Zambia, a fully landlocked country in Africa. Higher scores indicate higher levels of respect; Mozambique and Namibia have the highest levels of respect for refugee rights – or destination quality - at 0.683, while Kenya has the lowest level of respect – or destination quality - at -1.409. The exit quality for Zambia is the aggregation of all of these individual scores; for example, if I use the mean destination quality of neighbors to measure exit quality, Zambia's exit quality in 2010 would be -0.283.

Figure 9: Refugee Rights Scores around The Gambia (2010)



This map is the real-world equivalent of Country H from Figure 6. It shows the level of respect for refugee rights for all countries within 950 km of the Gambia, a coastal country with one country that shares its borders in Africa. Higher scores indicate higher levels of respect; Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, and Burkina Faso have the highest levels of respect for refugee rights – or destination quality - at 0.683, while Senegal has the lowest level of respect – or destination quality - at -0.594. The exit quality for the Gambia is the aggregation of all of these individual scores. If considering only bordering countries, the exit quality of the Gambia would be equal to the destination of quality of its own direct neighbor, Senegal. In this case, the exit quality would be -0.594. If considering all neighboring states within 950 km, Zambia's exit quality in 2010 would be the mean of their individual destination quality scores, equal to 0.381.

Figure 9 shows all states within 950 km of the Gambia, a coastal country with only one state that shares a contiguous land border (Senegal). This is analogous to Country H, on the right panel of Figure 6. If the measure of exit quality was restricted to states that directly border the Gambia, its exit quality would be exactly equal to the destination quality of its sole neighbor, Senegal. Even though there are numerous states within 950 km, unlike in the case of Zambia, the Gambia has only one direct land route for flight: into Senegal. To reach any of these other countries and take advantage of their higher destination quality, any civilian fleeing the Gambia would have to either go through Senegal or attempt to flee by boat. Thus, in some sense, we could consider that the Gambia has fewer paths to flight and fewer substitutable options, while Zambia has a full eight states sharing a land border. However, if the measure of exit quality does include all states within 950 km equally, the Gambia's exit quality would be the aggregation of all of these states' destination qualities.

Face Validity Test

The goal of this chapter is to generate measures of destination quality, which I will then aggregate to measure exit quality for each civil war state in the next chapter. This will be used for testing whether civil conflict dynamics respond to changes in exit quality as the pressure cooker theory suggests. However, this response is built on the idea that exit quality should first and foremost influence civilian flight. The pressure cooker theory expects that, faced with violence, civilians will flee when exit quality is high but will stay put when exit quality is low. In this section, I begin by running models of civilian flight to evaluate the face validity of these exit quality measures. Specifically, these models test the hypothesis that exit quality is positively related to refugee flows.

To undertake the most direct test of the measures I have generated thus far, I use individual state measures of destination quality to run a basic model predicting dyadic refugee flows from civil conflict states to immediate neighbors. Based on the arguments from the previous chapters, I would expect that generally, higher levels of destination quality should drive higher levels of dyadic refugee inflows. Specifically, considering a dyad of origin state and destination state, better general security and better refugee treatment in the destination state should both increase refugee inflows. I also expect that there should be an interactive effect between the level of violence against civilians in the origin state and destination quality, much the same as I would expect this interactive effect in predicting how civil wars develop. At low levels of violence against civilians, high and low quality destinations should see the same volume of refugee inflows, both of which should be low because there is little reason to flee. However, at high levels of violence against civilians, high-quality destinations should see greater levels of refugee inflows than low-quality destinations.

To test the impact of the scores directly – and to connect this with the general theory of pressure-cooker conflict states – I interact one-sided civilian deaths with each measure of exit quality. One-sided violence measures violence by armed actors directly against civilians; that is, it includes violence such as massacres and summary executions, but does not include violence that is the unintentional byproduct of battles or deaths from malnutrition or disease resulting from conflict.[61] The outcome variable - refugee flows – is generated using UNHCR data on refugee stock and calculating the difference in the

[61] The one-sided violence data are from Eck and Hultman (2007).

refugee stock from the previous year to the current year. The vast majority of refugee flows (68%) are at or below zero; as such, I use both an OLS regression model predicting the natural log of refugee flows to correct for skewness and a logit model predicting the presence of any positive refugee flows.[62] The full sample includes all dyads covering 1993-2014, but I focus on refugee flows from civil war states to neighbors within 950 km.

While I would generally expect higher levels of both refugee rights and general security to drive higher levels of refugee inflows, the findings from the previous chapter suggest that this may be somewhat more complicated to model. That is, because wealthier, higher capacity states – and states that host greater refugee populations – are more likely to abuse refugee rights, it is reasonable that the states that are receiving higher levels of refugee inflows respond with refugee abuse, resulting in lower scores. This would create endogeneity between the outcome variable of refugee flows and the independent variable of refugee rights. To deal with this problem, after running the preliminary face validity models, I also run an instrumental variable regression for the refugee rights model.

In all of these models, in accordance with general standards in the literature, I control for wealth in both the country of asylum and the country of origin (GDP per capita from the World Bank Database). I also control for the general level of physical integrity rights in the origin country (CIRI/CI-RIGHTS), the level of the civil war in the

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[62] Refugee flows are calculated by subtracting the current year's population from the previous year's population. If the current year's population is smaller than the previous year's, that indicates that refugees have been returning to their home state, resulting in negative refugee flows. This is why refugee flows can be below zero.

origin state (UCDP/PRIO), the size of the population in the origin state (World Bank Database), a binary measure indicating the presence of a contiguous land border, and the minimum distance between the origin state and the asylum state (Gleditsch and Ward 2001). In each model evaluating the interactive impact of a violence against civilians and one destination quality IRT score (General Security or Refugee Rights, respectively), I control for the other IRT score.

The results of the logistic regressions using each of the IRT destination quality scores are displayed in Table 7. The General Security Score predicts the presence of positive refugee flows out of civil war states, while there is no clear effect of the Refugee Rights Score on positive refugee flows. The out of sample predicted probabilities in Figure 10 confirm that generally, higher levels of general physical security do predict the presence of positive refugee flows, although the refugee rights score does not.

Figure 10: Out of Sample Predictions of Refugee Flows (ln) - General Security Score



High destination quality neighbors (in general security) are significantly more likely have positive refugee inflows from civil conflict states at civilian deaths up to 10,000.

Table 7: Logistic Regression Predicting Positive Refugee Flows

VARIABLES	(1) Refugee Rights Score	(2) General Security Score
Full Score (IRT)		
General Security (IRT)	0.144***	0.133***
	(0.034)	(0.035)
Refugee Rights (IRT)	0.053	0.052
	(0.032)	(0.032)
Civilian Deaths	-1.57e-07	2.30e-07
	(3.74e-06)	(4.37e-06)
IRT Score * Civilian Deaths	-1.63e-06	7.98e-07
	(4.96e-06)	(4.76e-06)
Physical Integrity (Origin)	-0.161***	-0.161***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Minimum Distance (Dyad)	-0.0005***	-0.0005***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Contiguous Border	0.453***	0.452***
	(0.073)	(0.073)
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum)	0.203***	0.203***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin)	-0.184***	-0.184***
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Population (ln) (Origin)	-0.173***	-0.173***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Level of Civil War (Origin)	0.280***	0.280***
	(0.058)	(0.058)
Constant	2.109***	2.109***
	(0.390)	(0.390)
Observations	7,718	7,718
Chi2	430.8	430.7

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table 8: OLS Regression Predicting Refugee Flows (ln)

VARIABLES	(3) Refugee Rights Score	(4) General Security Score
Full Score (IRT)		
General Security (IRT)	0.126***	0.123***
	(0.0371)	(0.0372)
Refugee Rights (IRT)	-0.0275	-0.0333
	(0.0347)	(0.0346)
Civilian Deaths	1.00e-05**	1.65e-05***
	(4.32e-06)	(5.08e-06)
IRT Score * Civilian Deaths	-1.82e-05***	1.29e-05**
	(5.74e-06)	(5.49e-06)
Physical Integrity (Origin)	-0.192***	-0.192***
	(0.0191)	(0.0191)
Minimum Distance (Dyad)	-0.00103***	-0.00103***
	(0.000103)	(0.000103)
Contiguous Border	0.888***	0.887***
	(0.0806)	(0.0806)
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum)	0.185***	0.186***
	(0.0238)	(0.0238)
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin)	-0.263***	-0.263***
	(0.0250)	(0.0250)
Population (ln) (Origin)	-0.219***	-0.219***
	(0.0217)	(0.0217)
Level of Civil War (Origin)	0.523***	0.524***
	(0.0646)	(0.0646)
Constant	5.591***	5.586***
	(0.418)	(0.418)
Observations	7,718	7,718
R-squared	0.112	0.111

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results from the OLS regression predicting logged positive refugee flows – shown in Table 8 - are generally consistent with the logistic regression. The one major difference is that civilian deaths in the origin state are a positive and significant predictor of refugee flows in the OLS regression, but is not significant in the logistic regression.

This is likely because it is easier to see an impact on the level of refugee flows than on the presence, as there is likely not a single threshold at which civilian deaths will impel outwards migration. In both sets of models, the control variables perform as expected. Better physical integrity in the origin state decreases refugee outflows, while greater distance between the origin and asylum state decreases refugee flows. A shared (contiguous) border increases refugee flows, unsurprisingly. Greater wealth (GDP per capita) in the origin state decreases refugee outflows, while greater wealth in the asylum state increases flows. Civil wars with greater levels of battle deaths drive out higher numbers of refugees. The one odd result in the control variables is that the total (logged) population of the origin state is a negative and significant predictor of refugee flows in both sets of models. This might indicate that in larger states, there are more internal options for flight, making refugee outflows less likely.

The performance of the general security score conforms to the standard expectations in the refugee literature: states that respect their own citizens' human rights do attract higher levels of refugee inflows. However, across both the OLS and logistic regression models, refugee rights remains stubbornly insignificant in predicting refugee flows. This is likely due to the endogeneity of the refugee rights score and the measure of refugee outflows; indeed, after running an exogeneity test, it is clear that these are indeed endogenous.

Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Regression

Specifically, refugee rights and refugee flows are endogenous because not only should higher refugee rights pull in larger refugee flows, but increased refugee inflows should also push down the level of respect for refugee rights. In short, there is a

simultaneity problem. This is not just a theoretical issue, but was actually one of the findings in the previous chapter testing the key drivers of changes in the treatment of refugees. Larger refugee populations in the previous year robustly predicted more refoulement, more government abuse of refugees, and poorer protection from non-governmental abuse. In a way, this is almost paradoxical; better treatment of refugees drives more refugee inflows, which in turn causes worse treatment of refugees. Thus, without correcting for the bias introduced by the simultaneity of these variables, it is unsurprising that refugee rights does not initially appear to be a significant predictor of refugee flows.

To deal with this endogeneity, I therefore use an instrumental variable approach to model this relationship. Using instrumental variable regression allows me to introduce additional measures that should be correlated with my *x* variable – in this case, refugee rights – but not with my *y* variable – refugee flows, except for the impact that it might have *through* refugee rights (see Sovey and Greene 2011). My instrumental variable regression includes two exogenous instruments: (1) the level of ethnic fractionalization (from Fearon 2003) and (2) the level of women's empowerment.[63] More ethnically diverse countries (those that are more fractionalized) should be more willing to respect the rights of refugees, because the native population is already diverse and is less likely to feel threatened by new refugee inflows. In particular, ethnically homogenous refugee inflows are less likely to potentially tip a critical balance of ethnic group power within the asylum state, which is one reason that these governments might fear and react

negatively to new refugee inflows, up to and including restricting entry of potential asylum-seekers and refugees (see Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). My second exogenous instrument is the level of women's empowerment from the Varieties of Democracy (2017) dataset. This is an index constructed through Bayesian factor analysis weighting that includes women's civil liberties, women's civil society participation, and women's political participation (see Sundstrom et al. 2015).[64] The reasoning for this instrument is that a state that is likely to respect the rights of refugees is likely to also respect the rights of other minority groups and groups that are traditionally disadvantaged. Thus, states that respect the rights of women are more likely to also respect the rights other disadvantages and underrepresented groups – including refugees and asylum-seekers. However, there is no direct reason to expect that women's empowerment in society should drive refugee inflows.

[64] This measure is based on the following information: (1) freedom of domestic movement for women; (2) freedom from forced labor for women; (3) property rights for women; (4) access to justice for women; (5) freedom of discussion for women; (6) civil society organization women's participation; (7) female journalists; (8) lower chamber female legislators; (9) power distributed by gender (see the V-Dem Codebook: Coppedge et al. 2017:67-69).

Table 9: OLS and IV Regression Predicting Refugee Flows (ln) on Refugee Rights

VARIABLES	(5) OLS (No Instrument)	(6a) IV (First Stage)	(6b) IV (Second Stage)
Women's Empowerment		0.375***	
		(0.0523)	
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.136***	
		(0.0410)	
Refugee Rights (IRT)	-0.0355		5.197***
	(0.0346)		(0.781)
General Security (IRT)	0.129***	0.275***	-1.394***
	(0.0371)	(0.0130)	(0.248)
Civilian Deaths	1.02e-05**	1.48e-06	-3.05e-06
	(4.33e-06)	(1.48e-06)	(9.08e-06)
Physical Integrity (Origin)	5.197***	0.0208***	-0.313***
	(0.781)	(0.00649)	(0.0429)
Minimum Distance (Dyad)	-0.00103***	0.000176***	-0.00201***
	(0.000103)	(3.50e-05)	(0.000259)
Contiguous Border	0.885***	0.0511*	0.475***
	(0.0806)	(0.0272)	(0.172)
GDP/PC (ln) (Asylum)	0.184***	-0.105***	0.801***
	(0.0238)	(0.00848)	(0.0987)
GDP/PC (ln) (Origin)	-0.263***	0.0472***	-0.567***
	(0.0250)	(0.00875)	(0.0646)
Population (ln) (Origin)	-0.219***	-0.105***	0.801***
	(0.0217)	(0.00848)	(0.0987)
Level of Civil War (Origin)	0.524***	0.0250	0.365***
	(0.0646)	(0.0220)	(0.135)
Constant	5.602***	0.833***	-0.476
	(0.418)	(0.159)	(1.258)
Observations	7,718	7,001	7,001
F test of Excluded Instruments	-	-	30.62
			(0.000)
Sargan-Hansen *J* Statistic	-	-	0.093
(χ^2 *p*-value)			(0.760)

Standard errors in parentheses/ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9 shows the results of a slightly simplified version of the OLS regression predicting refugee flows (Model 5) based on refugee rights originally presented in Table 8 (Model 3). For consistency, I omit the interaction term, as the interpretation of interaction terms in IV regression is difficult and complex. The results are generally consistent with the model including the interaction; refugee rights are not a significant predictor of refugee flows, while civilian deaths do increase refugee flows. Model 6a and Model 6b show the first and second stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regression, respectively. The second-stage model (Model 6b) is the IV equivalent to the OLS model (Model 3). The IV regression shows that when instrumented, refugee rights are a highly significant positive predictor of refugee inflows. This matches my initial expectation: higher levels of refugee rights should increase refugee flows, after correcting for endogeneity. For a visual of this relationship, Figure 11 shows the out of sample predictions of the natural log of refugee flows across the continuum of refugee rights. The y axis shows the natural log of refugee flows, which has compressed the number of refugees to correct for the skewed distribution of these flows. The predictions veer below zero at the lowest levels because the OLS model makes no assumption of an outcome variable bounded at zero. However, if these negative predicted flows were instead modeled as the raw number of predicted flows, rather than the natural log, they would simply be expected to be at zero. It is then only the positive expected flows that are truly informative (starting at an instrumented refugee rights score of about 0.5), and the increases here are more dramatic when converted back from the natural log, as the increases appear exponential rather than linear.

Figure 11: Out of Sample Predictions for Instrumented Refugee Rights with 95% Confidence Intervals



As the instrumented measure of refugee rights in a given destination state increases, the predicted level of dyadic refugee flows from neighboring civil conflict states significantly increases.

The next step is to evaluate the IV regression model. First and foremost, the Hausman test rejects the null that the measure of refugee rights is actually endogenous, supporting the use of the IV regression approach. The first-stage model shows that the instruments are both highly significant positive predictors of refugee rights. This, in conjunction with the *F* statistic of 30.62, which is well over both the traditional cutoff of 10 and the Stock-Yogo 10% maximal value critical value for weak instruments, suggests that the excluded instruments are indeed significant predictors of refugee rights and can serve as instruments for this variable (Staiger and Stock 1997, Stock and Yogo 2005). The Sargan-Hansen test also fails to reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated

with the error term; in effect, it fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid. Overall, the IV regression is supported by diagnostic testing, and suggests that after correcting for endogeneity, higher respect for refugee rights does drive higher refugee inflows.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I used the data I introduced in Chapter 2 on refugee rights, as well as data on general physical security, to create scores of destination quality in potential asylum states neighboring civil wars. Factor analysis and Item Response Theory confirm two distinct dimensions within the data, from which I derive two scores of exit quality to use in subsequent modeling: the level of refugee rights and the level of general security.

Before moving to testing whether the pressure cooker theory is correct in terms of predicting the dynamics of civil war, I first need to show that the element driving the entire mechanism – civilian response to variation in exit quality – actually operates as I argued in Chapter 1. In a basic set of face validity tests I predict the likelihood of positive refugee flows and the volume of refugee flows from civil war states to neighboring states based on the destination quality scores. The models in this chapter do provide evidence that civilians behave as though they are both aware of the circumstances they will face if they flee, and that they make decisions about whether and where to flee based on this information. This not only provides support for the face validity of the measures, but also is also evidence that the central mechanism underlying the pressure cooker theory operates as I have argued.

The next step is to determine whether the civilian behavior shaped by exit quality does in fact influence the dynamics of civil war. That is, do poor options for flight not

only suppress refugee outflows, but also in turn drive pressure-cooker-like outcomes including longer and bloodier civil wars? That is the topic of the next chapter: testing the pressure-cooker theory of civil conflict.

Chapter 4: Exit Quality and Civil War Duration and Intensity

Introduction

In this project, I have articulated a theory connecting civil war outcomes to civilians' ability to seek refuge in surrounding states. Specifically, in Chapter 1, I argue that when there are high levels of violence against civilians, the ability to flee to a neighboring state should shape civil war duration and severity. If there are no safe and viable destinations nearby, violence against civilians should drive longer and bloodier civil wars. This is the pressure-cooker theory of civil conflict. This theory suggests that how states treat would-be refugees and asylum-seekers can directly impact how neighboring conflicts develop. In the previous chapters, I have built measures of exit quality; initial testing in the last chapter shows that not only do these measures have face validity, but also the underlying mechanism of civilian response to exit quality works as expected. In this chapter, I set out to finally test whether this mechanism actually does impact civil conflict outcomes. That is, do neighbors that welcome refugees act as a place to vent the pressures of civil conflict? Further, in the absence of safe, welcoming neighbors, do the pressures of civil wars compound themselves, leading to longer, bloodier conflicts, and ultimately to humanitarian and geopolitical disasters?

In order to test this theory, Chapter 2 introduced a new annual dataset measuring how states treat refugees. Chapter 3 condensed this new data, along with existing data on human rights and security, into two measures of destination quality for each state: general security and refugee rights. In this chapter, I aggregate the destination quality scores of the neighbors surrounding civil conflicts into two separate measures of exit quality from the conflict as a whole. I then use these measures to evaluate how general security and refugee rights surrounding a war impact civil war duration and severity across varying levels of violence against civilians. I find support for my overall expectations: at high levels of exit quality, high levels of violence against civilians drive longer conflicts with higher battle deaths. However, after running a series of robustness checks, the findings are somewhat more nuanced: generally, in conjunction with violence against civilians, lower refugee rights surrounding the conflict create more intense and rapid conflicts, while lower general security surrounding the conflict state drives longer conflict duration. This suggests that in part the general security dimension is measuring the impact of overall regional instability, while refugee rights are measuring the impact of trapping civilians within the conflict state.

The Theory of the Pressure-Cooker Conflict State

Civil wars, which have increasingly dominated over international wars in resources, attention, and deaths in the since the end of World War II, are not made equal.[65] Some civil wars flare briefly only to abate just as quickly, while others stretch on for decades, eventually becoming so deeply ingrained in the local culture that it becomes

[65] See Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 563) and Fearon (2003, 276-277).

difficult to separate the two.[66] Some civil wars have few casualties, with insurgents hiding in difficult-to-reach areas and avoiding much direct confrontation with the state, while others are far bloodier and see huge losses in battle on both sides.[67] Within a single conflict, battle deaths may skyrocket one year, only to drop down to minimal levels for many years after. Scholars in political science have undertaken a number of high-quality studies predicting civil war duration and severity, and have found a number of different factors driving how conflicts develop.[68] In this chapter, I aim to add an additional explanation for the length and intensity of civil conflicts: the interaction of violence against civilians and exit quality.

While it is not altogether new to argue that violence against civilians might impact conflict dynamics (see Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, Lyall 2009), it is new to argue that the opportunities to flee from this

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[66] Examples of short-lived conflicts include the Insurgency in Macedonia in 2001, which lasted 106 days and the 1998 internationalized internal conflict in Lesotho, which only met the UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset conflict conditions for six days. Longer conflicts include the Colombian Civil War, which lasted over 50 years, and the civil conflict in the Philippines, which has lasted over 45 years.

[67] One example of low-intensity conflict is the Insurgency in Ogaden (in Ethiopia), which has lasted since 1994, but has never risen above 42 battle deaths per year according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The Syrian Civil War was very high intensity, with estimated annual battle deaths of 38,480 (2012), 68,503 (2013), and 54,547 (2014). For an example of a conflict that has varying intensity over time, the Sri Lankan Civil War flared from 17 battle deaths in 2002 up to an estimated 10,165 battle deaths in 2009.

[68] These include geographic characteristics such as the conflict's distance from the capital (Buhaug et al. 2009) or rough terrain in the form of mountains and forested areas (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), the relative strength of rebel groups (Cunningham et al. 2009), third-party interventions (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Cunningham 2010), control of valuable natural resources (Fearon 2004; Ross 2004), and state capacity (De Rouen and Sobek 2004), among others.

violence will condition its impact. As discussed at length in Chapter 2, most studies that investigate the violence against civilians as a cause of conflict outcomes - rather than as a byproduct of conflict outcomes (e.g. Valentino et al. 2004) - are focused specifically on counterinsurgency efforts and the distinction between indiscriminate and selective violence (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, Lyall 2009). The findings are inconsistent; some find evidence that indiscriminate violence backfires, while others find evidence that it weakens the opponent. What is missing from these studies is that sometimes, civilians can leave, and at other times, civilians simply have nowhere viable to go. This should shape how they respond to violence, and should in turn drive how violence against civilians shapes civil war dynamics.

I argue that how civilians respond to violence will shape the length and intensity of civil wars. In the presence of neighboring states that not only are generally secure for the native population, but also respect the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers that are coded into international law, civilians should be more likely to respond to one-sided violence by fleeing. That is, with high exit quality, increasing levels of one-sided violence should not impact civil conflicts, or may even decrease the length and severity of conflicts because the flight of civilians is a drain on the resources within the state. However, if there are no viable neighbors to which to flee, either because there are no nearby states or because those neighbors are generally not secure or abuse refugees, increasing levels of violence against civilians should drive longer conflicts with more battle-deaths. This is because civilians trapped in a conflict become, at minimum, cannon fodder, and can easily be coopted into the conflict as they become a fungible resource that can tapped by armed combatants. Feeding the pool of resources for combatants

should extend the life of the conflict, and should also increase the number of bodies these groups can put into battle, and thus lose in battle.

I therefore expect an interactive effect between exit quality and civilian fatalities to drive civil war duration:

Hypothesis 1: *At low levels of violence against civilians, there will be no difference in civil war duration between conflicts with high and low exit quality. At high levels of violence against civilians, conflicts with low exit quality will last longer.*

By the same logic, I expect an interactive effect between exit quality and civilian fatalities to drive civil war severity, or the number of battle deaths:

Hypothesis 2: *At low levels of violence against civilians, there will be no difference in civil war severity between conflicts with high and low exit quality. At high levels of violence against civilians, conflicts with low exit quality will have higher levels of battle deaths.*

I evaluate two distinct dimensions of exit quality, driven by a combination of theory and empirical outcomes from the previous chapter. The two measures are *general security* and *refugee rights*, both of which should impact conflict duration and severity. *General security* measures the overall safety of neighboring states, focusing on the respect for human rights of native citizens and the presence of civil conflict within those states. *Refugee rights* measures how safe refugees can expect to be if they attempt to flee to a neighboring state; will the government refuse entry, throw refugees in jail, or cut the refugee population off from access to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)? Although I would expect each of these two measures of exit quality

to have the same impact on conflict duration and severity, these are distinct dimensions and it is possible that they will perform differently.

Measurement

To test the impact of exit quality on civil conflict duration and severity requires two distinct models. The first set of models predicts civil conflict duration using a Cox Proportional Hazards model.[69] [70] The second set of models predicts the natural log of annual battle deaths, as measured in the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset (Allansson et al. 2017) using OLS regression.[71] In both sets of models, the main independent variables are the measures of exit quality and violence against civilians.

There are two measures of exit quality used in turn: general security and refugee rights. As discussed above, the general security score is built using an Item Response Theory (IRT) estimation of the underlying level of general security based on the four indicators of physical integrity rights in the CIRI/CI-RIGHTS datasets (torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance), in combination with the UCDP/PRIO measure of the level of civil conflict (Cingranelli et al. 2014; Cingranelli and Fillipov 2018). This creates a general security IRT score for each country/year in the

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[69] I use the Cox Proportional Hazards Model because it requires no assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard for civil conflicts, which allows for a focus on testing the causal impact of the theoretical variables without forcing a possibly inaccurate baseline hazard parameter into the model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 47-48).

[70] Conflict duration data is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset - Version 17.2 (2017). I use the date at which the conflict reaches the minimum of 25 battle deaths as the beginning of the conflict. The data are structured to allow for multiple failures for conflicts that end and later reemerge.

[71] This follows the standard of using OLS regression in the civil conflict severity literature (Lacina 2006; Heger and Salehyan 2007, Lujala 2009).

data, which should measure how safe the country is generally, but specifically for native citizens. This can also be considered "baseline safety" – if native citizens and residents are not safe from abuse by the government or violence from civil war, then there is no reason that refugees should be exempted from these dangers. The refugee rights score is also built using an IRT estimation of the underlying level of respect for the rights of refugees, based on the five variables from the new dataset: refoulement, government abuse, cooperation with UNHCR, protection from non-state violence, and legal rights of refugees. This produces a score indicating how well refugees are treated in each country/year.

This leaves two country-year level measures: *refugee rights* and *general security*. However, to actually use these measures to predict civil conflict outcomes requires aggregating them on the civil war/year level. Therefore, for each measure of exit quality (general security and refugee rights), I take the mean of the respective IRT score for all neighboring states within 950 km of the civil war state's borders.[72] I also lag these measures one year; this is in part because of the endogeneity discussed in the previous chapter. Specifically, if a civil conflict has high levels of violence that push civilians to flee into neighboring states, those neighbors might respond by abusing the new influx of refugees. This might make it appear that refugee rights were lower than they actually were at the time that civilians responded to the violence. Using the measures of exit quality one year prior helps to correct for this. However, there are also theoretical reasons

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[72] I use the Gleditsch and Ward (2001) minimum distance data. I also aggregate this using the maximum score, rather than the mean score; for discussion of these outcomes, see the Appendix.

to use the lagged measure. For civilians in a civil war to incorporate information about how neighboring states treat refugees into their decision on whether or not to flee, new information has to filter back from the neighboring states into the conflict zones. It is reasonable to expect that it will take time for new information on abuses of refugees to reliably make its way. Brand new information might be met with skepticism; only with some time and consistent reporting should this information truly shape decision-making.

To properly evaluate the two measures of exit quality requires interacting these variables with the level of violence against civilians. To measure this violence, I use the UCDP/GED One-sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007, Allansson et al. 2017). This data only considers violence that was specifically targeted against civilians and in which civilians were clearly not combatants; it does not include secondary civilian casualties from battle or from war-related starvation, disease, or other maladies.[73] I aggregate the One-Sided Violence Data to annual basis for each country using the best estimate of total fatalities. I then interact this term with refugee rights and general security, respectively. The models are broadly as follows, in which X represents a vector of *k* control variables, α represents the constant, and ε represents the error term:

1. Civil Conflict Duration = $\beta_1(\text{General Security}_{(t-1)}) + \beta_2$ (Civilian Deaths) + $\beta_3(\text{General Security}_{(t-1)} * \text{Civilian Deaths}) + \beta_k(X_k) + \varepsilon$

[73] The One-sided violence data do not distinguish between indiscriminate and selective violence, and are thus not directly comparable to studies on counterinsurgency built on this distinction. However, the purpose of this study to is to evaluate the impact of aggregate international violence against civilians on the overall duration and severity of conflict, and for these purposes, the data are a good fit.

2. Civil Conflict Duration = β_1 (Refugee Rights$_{(t-1)}$) + β_2 (Civilian Deaths) + β_3 (Refugee Rights$_{(t-1)}$ * Civilian Deaths) + $\beta_k(X_k)$ + ε
3. Battle Deaths = α + β_1 (General Security$_{(t-1)}$) + β_2 (Civilian Deaths) + β_3 (General Security$_{(t-1)}$ * Civilian Deaths) + $\beta_k(X_k)$ + ε
4. Battle Deaths = α + β_1 (Refugee Rights$_{(t-1)}$) + β_2 (Civilian Deaths) + β_3(Refugee Rights$_{(t-1)}$ * Civilian Deaths) + $\beta_k(X_k)$ + ε

I include a fairly standard set of control variables in each model. Most importantly, I control for the omitted exit quality score. That is, in the models interacting general security and civilian deaths, I control for the level of refugee rights. By extension, in the models interacting refugee rights and civilian deaths, I control for general security. This allows me to hold the excluded dimension of exit quality constant, and better evaluate the impact of the dimension of exit quality under scrutiny. I also include measures of biased intervention by external actors, regime type, the natural log of the total population, the natural log of GDP per capita, and the nature of the conflict – specifically, whether the conflict is fought over control of territory or control of the government. [74] [75]

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[74] Regan (2002) and Cunningham (2010) show the impact of external interventions on civil war duration.

[75] Intervention data and the reason for the conflict (territory v. government) are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (2017). Regime type is from the Polity IV Dataset (2017). The total population and GDP per capita are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators Databank.

Table 10: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting Civil Conflict Duration

VARIABLES	(1) General Security	(2) Refugee Rights
General Security$_{t-1}$ (Mean)	0.0104	0.0751
	(0.192)	(0.204)
Refugee Respect$_{t-1}$ (Mean)	0.195	0.190
	(0.159)	(0.162)
Civilian Deaths	4.57e-05	-3.41e-05
	(2.85e-05)	(6.81e-05)
General Security$_{t-1}$ (Mean) * Civilian Deaths	0.000406	
	(0.000379)	
Refugee Respect$_{t-1}$ (Mean) * Civilian Deaths		5.58e-05
		(9.89e-05)
Battle Deaths (ln)	-0.206***	-0.205***
	(0.0676)	(0.0646)
Total Population (ln)	-0.120**	-0.126**
	(0.0533)	(0.0537)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.0152	-0.00841
	(0.0742)	(0.0720)
Regime	0.000186	-0.00211
	(0.0129)	(0.0129)
Conflict over Territory	0.306**	0.318**
	(0.147)	(0.147)
Intervention (Government)	-0.0101	-0.0108
	(0.305)	(0.306)
Intervention (Rebels)	0.101	0.0858
	(0.348)	(0.342)
Intervention (Both)	0.161	-0.0204
	(1.252)	(1.142)
Civil Wars	104	104
Civil War Failures	152	152
Observations	693	693
Wald $\chi^2_{(12, 12)}$	72.09	37.89
Log pseudo likelihood	-524.58	-526.87

Coefficients are reported
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 12: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t-1) and High Civilian Deaths



At high levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding general security last significantly longer than conflicts with high surrounding general security.

Figure 13: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t-1) and Low Civilian Deaths



At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding general security last the same amount of time as conflicts with high surrounding general security.

Figure 14: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t-1) and High Civilian Deaths



At high levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding refugee rights last significantly longer than conflicts with high surrounding refugee rights.

Figure 15: Predicted Civil Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t-1) and Low Civilian Deaths



At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding refugee rights last significantly longer than conflicts with high surrounding refugee rights, though the difference is slightly smaller than at high levels of civilian deaths.

Results

The results for the Cox proportional hazards models predicting conflict duration are shown in Table 10.[76] Model 1 evaluates the impact of general security interacted with civilian deaths, while Model 2 focuses on refugee rights interacted with civilian deaths. While it is perhaps interesting that in Model 1, neither general security nor civilian deaths are significant alone, this is an interactive model with two continuous variables and as such, properly evaluating this requires plotting predicted outcomes across the two variables. For models that predict how long a given process will endure until failure – which in this case corresponds to how long a civil war will endure until it ends – the appropriate way to visualize impact is to plot survival curves. Survival curves represent the probability that a process will survive across increasing time since the process began. To evaluate my models, the survival curves predict the probability that a civil war will continue as the time that has elapsed the beginning of the civil war increases up to 25 years.[77]

Figure 12 shows the predicted survival curves for civil conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians. It is clear that conflicts with low exit scores in general security last significantly longer than those with high exit scores in general security *if there are high levels of violence against civilians.* However, if there are low levels of

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[76] All of the Cox Proportional Hazards models use the Efron method for handling tied events, as this is more accurate than the Breslow method (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 55).

[77] While the maximum length of a conflict within the sample is 65 years, 88% of conflicts in the sample are less than 25 years long, so this is a reasonable cutoff for the out-of-sample predictions of survival.

violence against civilians, as shown in Figure 13, civil conflicts with high and low levels of general security in surrounding states are indistinguishable. This supports the hypothesis that exit quality should only matter in the presence of high violence against civilians, and that lower exit quality should drive longer civil wars.

The next model to evaluate, Model 2, interacts refugee rights and civilian deaths. Again, the results in the table are not impressive, but are also not terribly relevant for an interactive model with two continuous variables. The plots for Model 2 are displayed in Figures 14 and 15. Figure 14 shows the survival curves for civil conflicts with high levels of civilian deaths; it is clear in these projections that conflicts surrounded by neighboring states that treat refugees poorly should have conflicts that last significantly longer than civil wars surrounded by states that welcome refugees. In Figure 15, the gap between high and low exit quality states has narrowed slightly, but it is still clear that, in the case of refugee rights - low exit quality states should have longer conflicts than high exit quality states. The gap in expected duration is still smaller with lower levels of civilian violence, suggesting support for my initial hypothesis, though the support is not as strong as it was in the model using general security.

The models predicting civil war severity, measured as the natural log of annual battle deaths, are shown in Table 11. The out of sample predictions for Model 3, which predicts battle deaths based on the interaction of general security and violence against civilians, are in Figure 16. Here, it is clear that there is no significant difference in severity between conflicts with high and low levels of general exit security across levels of violence against civilians. This suggests that, at least in terms of general security, exit quality may not influence civil conflict severity.

Table 11: OLS Regression Predicting Annual Battle Deaths

VARIABLES	(3) General Security	(4) Refugee Rights
General Security$_{t-1}$ (Mean)	-0.169	-0.185
	(0.140)	(0.139)
Refugee Respect$_{t-1}$ (Mean)	-0.124	-0.0573
	(0.103)	(0.104)
Civilian Deaths	1.07e-05***	7.08e-05***
	(3.30e-06)	(2.51e-05)
Refugee Respect$_{t-1}$ (Mean) * Civilian Deaths		-9.93e-05***
		(3.68e-05)
General Security$_{t-1}$ (Mean) * Civilian Deaths	1.66e-05	
	(1.90e-05)	
Total Population (ln)	-0.0551	-0.0540
	(0.0352)	(0.0351)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.206***	0.215***
	(0.0450)	(0.0449)
Conflict over Territory	-0.754***	-0.733***
	(0.119)	(0.118)
Intervention (Government)	0.853***	0.850***
	(0.195)	(0.193)
Intervention (Rebels)	0.626	0.386
	(0.512)	(0.509)
Intervention (Both)	0.780	0.901
	(0.636)	(0.617)
Constant	4.859***	4.754***
	(0.652)	(0.650)
Observations	728	728
R-squared	0.179	0.190

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 16: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on General Security (t-1)



Across all levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding general security have no significant difference in annual battle deaths from conflicts with high levels of surrounding general security.

Figure 17: Predicted Battle Deaths Based on Refugee Rights (t-1)



At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, civil conflicts with low levels of surrounding refugee rights have no significant difference in annual battle deaths from conflicts with high surrounding refugee rights. However, as one-sided civilian deaths increase, conflicts with low refugee rights have higher levels of annual battle deaths.

However, the results of Model 4, shown in Figure 17, tell a different story. In this plot of out sample predictions, based on the interaction of refugee rights and violence against civilians, up to 2,200 civilian deaths high and low exit quality conflicts are indistinguishable. At 2,400 civilian deaths and above, civil conflicts with low quality refugee rights in surrounding states do have higher predicted levels of battle deaths, and the gap between the 95% confidence intervals on the predictions of battle deaths increases as civilian deaths increase. This does lend support for the hypothesis, at least in terms of refugee rights.

Discussion

The results of the models predicting civil war outcomes show evidence in support of the theory of the pressure cooker conflict state; however, it does appear that of the two dimensions of exit quality, general security performs better in the models predicting civil war duration, and refugee rights performs better in the models predicting civil war length. Additional results based on varying specifications of the aggregations of exit quality are discussed in the Appendix; these results generally follow this pattern. Specifically, across all specifications - based on using either the maximum or the mean IRT score of each dimension, and measuring this score either in the current year or lagged (in the year prior) - the general security measure's performance consistently predicts conflict duration in accordance with the expectations of my theory. However, only one of the four specifications of general security is significant in predicting battle deaths. The reverse is true when considering the refugee rights score: almost all of the specifications support the expectations of the theory when predicting battle deaths, but only one of four predicts refugee rights in accordance with the hypotheses. The most interesting part of this is that

in the three specifications of refugee rights that do not predict conflict duration in accordance with the hypotheses, the result is robustly th oe opposite of what I originally anticipated: at high levels of one-sided violence against civilians, conflicts surrounded by poor refugee rights end sooner than those in neighborhoods with strong respect for refugee rights. Appendix C is devoted to exploring this in depth.

The fact that the general security dimension and the refugee rights dimension perform differently in predicting civil war outcomes lends further support to the approach of considering these as two distinct dimensions. It is also worth considering why these dimensions would perform differently. General security represents the baseline safety of states neighboring a civil conflict. Holding refugee rights constant, lower general security increases conflict duration if there are high levels of violence against civilians, but does not impact conflict duration at low levels of civilian-directed violence. This is shown in Figure 12, which plots the predicted duration of civil conflicts under conditions of high violence against civilians. When general security is low, the conflicts are predicted to last much longer than when general security is high. Figure 13 displays the expected duration of civil conflicts under conditions of low violence against civilians. In this case, the predicted duration is indistinguishable between conflicts with high and low surrounding general security. However, variations in general security have no impact on conflict intensity, as shown in Figure 16. One possibility is that general security is acting as a proxy for state capacity and stability. If neighboring states are repressing their own citizens and are fighting their own internal conflicts, it is likely that there is conflict spillover regionally, driving longer periods of instability throughout the region. Strong and stable neighboring states are better positioned to prevent conflict spill-over into their

own borders, and are also less likely to feed into conflict processes. In particular, stronger and more secure neighbors should be less likely to allow refugee camps to become rear bases for rebels (e.g. Salehyan 2007), and should also be less likely to allow rebels to operate within their borders generally. This should also halt the black market flow of goods, money, and manpower into the conflict state. In this manner, more secure neighbors can prevent the displacement resulting from civil conflicts from creating processes that feed back into, and thereby lengthen the conflict.[78]

Conversely, holding general security constant, civil wars surrounded by states with low refugee rights have higher battle deaths in the presence of high levels of violence against civilians, but battle deaths are not impacted by violence against civilians if there are neighbors that respect the rights of refugees. However, refugee rights do not appear to have the anticipated impact on conflict duration. Indeed, as discussed in the Appendix, most specifications of refugee rights perform counter to my initial expectations: generally, low refugee rights in combination with high violence against civilians actually drives shorter, but more intense conflicts. One possible explanation for refugee rights impacting severity is simply that more trapped civilians will translate to more people becoming combatants – willingly or not – and thereby drive up casualty counts. This might either be simply because there are more people at risk of dying in battle, but it could also be that, if human lives are abundant and other resources are scarce, human lives become cheap and are thus expended more freely by the leaders of armed groups. However, it also stands to reason that low refugee rights traps resources

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[78] This would match the description of the spatial spread of conflict driven by refugee flows in Salehyan (2006).

and civilians within the conflict state, and in combination with the pressure exerted by one-sided violence, drives the conflict to flare early and to also burn out sooner. Thus, the pressure cooker conflict should have much higher rates of battle deaths over time, but will also cease quickly. On the other hand, if there are high levels of violence and surrounding states allow asylum-seekers and refugees entry, they allow this pressure to vent, so it does not build up in the same way; this leaves lower rates of battle deaths annually, but also allows conflicts to stretch on much longer before they in eventually either come to a head or wind down into a de facto peace.

Future Work

These models have, necessarily, been built on a number of simplifying assumptions, creating a macro-level, highly aggregated evaluation of the hypotheses. This is valuable as it gives a clear first cut test of how the treatment of refugees can interact with violence against civilians to impact conflict dynamics. However, there are certainly some assumptions that could be relaxed in future work to create more nuanced investigations. I discuss some of the most immediate options below; this is not a comprehensive list.

The first area that could benefit from relaxed assumptions is geography. Civil conflicts – at least insofar as active fighting and violence against civilians are concerned - are usually contained to specific geographic areas of the state. The most obvious update to this model would be to include only geographically relevant neighboring states based on the actual location of the conflict. Particularly in large states where the conflict is only active in a very small area, it is quite possible that some neighboring states are too far away to be relevant, and should thus not be included in a measure of exit quality.

This leads to another potential confounding factor: some states will have more viable internal displacement options than others. If a civil conflict is fought in only one very localized area of the state and there safe areas to which to flee inside of the state itself, this may negate the need for high-quality exit options outside of the state.

One additional element that could benefit the model is the consideration of disaggregation of which actors are actually targeting civilians. In conjunction with the identification of territorial control (between rebels and the state), this may generate more nuanced expectations regarding conflict dynamics and outcomes. Since rebels are typically the weaker side, they are more likely to benefit from the resources that the trapped population provides; however, for this to happen, they have to actually have access to the trapped population. If the civilian population is trapped in securely government-held territory, and the government is markedly stronger than the rebels, this might not make for longer conflicts. However, if the civilian population is exposed to high levels of violence and trapped in a rebel-held area, that should extend the length of civil conflicts.

Conclusion

In some civil conflicts, civilians can easily flee from violence into neighboring states, where they find safety and shelter. In other conflicts, neighboring countries close borders to asylum-seekers and refugee flows, treat asylum-seekers as criminals and throw them into jail, or physically abuse refugees. The theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state argues the following: if there is little to no violence against civilians, it should not matter how neighboring states treat refugees. However, as violence against civilians escalates, how neighboring states treat refugees becomes increasingly important. The

measure of how safe neighboring countries are for would-be refugees is the *exit quality* of a conflict. In conflicts with high *exit quality*, violence against civilians will drive them to flee. In conflicts with low *exit quality*, there are not viable options for flight, so violence against civilians will instead trap these civilians in a pressure-cooker: they cannot leave, so instead they feed into the conflict itself. This should drive more intense and longer conflicts. This is the pressure-cooker theory posited at the start of this project.

This chapter evaluates two dimensions of exit quality: general security and refugee rights. Empirical tests find that both can drive longer conflicts in combination with high levels of violence against civilians. However, general security is the more robust predictor of conflict duration, and the only measure that consistently performs as initially expected. Though refugee rights does weakly support the initial expectations for duration, changing the specification of the measure almost uniformly results in expectations of shorter and more intense conflicts when low refugee rights are combined with high levels of one-sided violence against civilians. This may suggest that general security impacts conflict contagion and instability in the region, while refugee rights directly shape the pressure cooker conflict state, creating more intense and rapid conflicts where exit quality is poor and combatants directly target civilians with violence.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This dissertation opened on the story of the 2014 shelling and blockade of Gaza, and the utter destruction that civilians trapped in Gaza faced. In the summer of 2014, under the constant bombardment of Israeli bombs and lacking any means of escape, civilians identified Hamas as their only path forward. In 2018, the story in Gaza looks much the same. The blockade of Gaza, put in place a decade ago after Hamas took control, is still in place. In recent weeks, Hamas has pushed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians in Gaza to gather at the border and engage in violence directed at Israeli soldiers:

> ...it was billed as an independent Palestinian protest campaign. But actually Hamas, which controls Gaza, was a driving force. It called from mosque loudspeakers, encouraging people to gather at the border. And according to the Israeli army, there were more than 30,000 Palestinians at six different spots along the border. Israel responded to Palestinians throwing rocks, firebombs, burning tires. Israel fired tear gas and live fire. It was the most violence in Gaza since the Gaza war in 2014... People in Gaza tend to call it an open-air prison. Hamas took control of Gaza by force a decade ago. And since then, Israel and Egypt have imposed a blockade on Gaza. That prevents most people from being able to leave. It restricts what goods can enter Gaza. All of this is to try to pressure Hamas.[79]

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[79] Estrin, Daniel. "16 Palestinians Killed, Hundreds More Wounded In Voilence Near Gaza Border. 30 March 2018. Transcript from *All Things Considered*, NPR. Retrieved from: https://www.npr.org/2018/03/30/598386478/14-palestinians-killed-hundreds-more-wounded-in-violence-near-gaza-border

However, it seems that the pressure intended for Hamas has generally landed on the shoulders of the civilians trapped within the blockade. Rather than weakening Hamas, this pressure has left the terrorist organization as the only path for survival and resistance for the trapped civilian population. Returning to the terminology of this project, this has created a pressure-cooker conflict; the pressure on the civilians has no way to vent because of the blockade, and thus actually pushes more fuel into the conflict. It is then perhaps unsurprising that, not only has Gaza not recovered from the conflict in 2014, but Hamas will continue to leverage its one internal resource to sustain the fight: the trapped civilians.

This project argues that governments' choices to respect, or to violate, international human rights law on refugees has real and immediate impacts on the development of civil conflicts. The United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol encode the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, and the responsibilities of states to protect these rights. Specifically, this includes protection from expulsion or the forcible return to the country from which they have fled, protection from penalties for entering the country illegally seeking asylum, and access to representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. These documents were written as extensions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which articulated the most basic rights of life, freedom from torture, and arbitrary arrest or detention, all of which apply equally to those seeking asylum and refugee status abroad. Treatment of refugees varies widely across time and space; some states welcome refugees openly and protect these populations, while others gun them down as they attempt to cross the border and jail any that do succeed in entering the state. As with most international human rights

laws, there is functionally no direct punishment for governments that abuse the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. However, that does not mean these actions are without consequences.

I argue that one important consequence of abusing the rights of refugees is in the development of civil conflicts. Civil wars are one of the primary causes of refugee flight. Generally, this is a reaction to the violence of the conflict; civilians realize that their lives and well-being are threatened, and thus make the decision to seek safety across international borders. However, if neighboring states regularly abuse refugees or simply refuse to permit refugees to enter, civilians should be less likely to respond to violence by fleeing. Put more succinctly, civilians will not flee to safety if there is no safety to be found.

Civilians are a vital resource in civil wars. They can be used to extract fungible resources such as food, supplies, funds, and manpower; they can be coopted for intelligence; they can be recruited as armed combatants; they can be used to bring in outside resources from the international humanitarian community; they can be used as human shields. If civilians flee, the pool of resources available to armed actors shrinks. If civilians are exposed to violence from the conflict – but they cannot flee – they are far more likely to be forced to interact with armed actors, and to thus feed back into the conflict processes in some way. This is what I call a *pressure-cooker conflict state*.

I therefore introduce the concept of *exit quality*, the measure of the expected quality of life as a refugee or asylum-seeker. If the states surrounding a civil conflict are welcoming to refugees and provide high levels of protection, exit quality will be high; if, however, neighboring states refuse entry to refugees, abuse refugees, and detain them for

years on end as criminals, exit quality will be low. In conflicts with low levels of violence against civilians, exit quality will not matter because there will be no cause, or willingness, to flee. Without a push to leave, the quality of opportunities for flight is irrelevant. However, in civil conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians, distinct patterns will emerge: if violence is high and exit quality is high, civilians will flee. If violence is high and exit quality is low, civilians will stay put and become part of the conflict dynamics. This will drive more resources into the conflict, resulting in more intense civil wars. While I initially also expected this to drive longer civil wars, the impacts on conflict duration are somewhat mixed.

I introduce an original dataset on Refugee Rights, which I combine with existing human rights and conflict data to create two separate annual measures of neighboring *exit quality* in civil wars: *general security* and *refugee rights*. General security measures the overall level of human rights for native citizens and levels of internal conflict in surrounding states. Refugee rights specifically measures how neighboring states treat refugees. Empirical tests show that at high levels of violence against civilians, conflicts with low general security in neighboring states last significantly longer than conflicts with high general security. At low levels of violence against civilians, general security levels have no impact on conflict length. General security has no impact on the intensity of civil conflicts in terms of battle deaths.

Refugee rights, on the other hand, have a significant impact on conflict intensity; at high levels of violence against civilians, civil wars surrounded by low refugee rights have higher battle deaths than those in high refugee rights neighborhoods. The results on duration are especially interesting; while one specification does show weak support for

longer conflicts in states with high violence against civilians and low refugee rights, most alternative specifications tell a distinctly different story. Conflicts with high violence against civilians and low neighborhood refugee rights actually tend to end sooner than those with high violence and high neighboring refugee rights. This actually lends greater credence to the *pressure-cooker conflict state* terminology: trapping civilians and related resources within a dangerous and violent conflict pushes the conflict to become more intense, but also pushes it to burn out sooner. It is also possible that while pressure-cooker civil wars end sooner, they will leave behind a legacy of violence, destruction, and victimization that drives long-term terrorism and low-level insurgencies, particularly considering the Chechen case study in the Chapter 1, as well as the case of Gaza that appeared in both Chapter 1 and the start of this chapter.

This dissertation makes several important contributions. First, it introduces an original dataset on Refugee Rights, covering the bulk of the post-Cold War period (1993-2014) for all states in the international system on an annual basis. I have also conducted preliminary tests of the main causes of variation in refugee rights, which show that overall, greater inflows of refugees and higher levels of wealth tend to drive worse treatment of refugees. Second, I have shown that how states treat refugees is distinct from how states treat their own citizens, and that using measures of governmental respect of native citizens to proxy governmental respect of refugees and asylum-seekers is patently incorrect. Third, the dissertation introduces the theoretical notion of exit quality, which should allow for better theorizing of any civil conflict processes related to civilians (or indeed any models of civilian migration), because the availability of exit should vary greatly and should condition civilians' behaviors. Finally, this project has shown that

abuses of refugee rights – even holding general security and respect for human rights constant – will shape conflict dynamics. Overall, it appears that abusing refugees and asylum-seekers will keep more people trapped inside of violent conflicts, creating a vicious cycle in which conflict intensity escalates further. However, these more intense conflicts do also tend to end sooner. General security in neighboring states, on the other hand, does help to contain civil conflicts and to prevent outside resources from sustaining the fighting.

Future Research

This dissertation has focused entirely on the macro-level of conflict, and this has been a very deliberate decision. To effectively evaluate the broad impact of states' refugee policies on conflict requires measuring the policies at the level at which they occur: this is national and in the available reporting, it is annual. Finding effects even at the highest levels of aggregation should speak to the strength of these effects. However, civil wars benefit from study and measurement at lower levels of aggregation. The study of the impact of exit quality should be no exception. Disaggregating in terms of geography, time, and actors could offer substantially more nuanced and specific tests of the interaction of exit quality and violence.

Civil conflicts generally do not occur over the entire geographic space of the conflict state. Active fighting is usually restricted to smaller areas; indeed, some of the most nuanced notions of geography in civil conflict break down the area into zones of control. As originally described by Kalyvas (2006), these range from those areas held securely by the state, to areas that are in contention and have active fighting, to areas that are held securely by rebels. If there is one-sided violence against civilians, it may be

confined only to areas of active conflict; if there are areas that are secure and free of active violence, it is possible that civilians will be able to move internally within the state instead of fleeing the state altogether. Indeed, internal displacement is far more common than seeking refugee status abroad (Norwegian Refugee Council 2017). While the internally displaced are outside of the scope of this project, which seeks to determine the impact of respect for – or abuse of – the rights of refugees, broadening the scope of *exit quality* to include viable internal displacement options would allow for a more refined understanding of the relationship between violence, displacement, and the role of civilians in armed internal conflicts.

Another geographic area for disaggregation is in the measurement of exit quality specific to outside states. Here, I have used the aggregation of all neighboring states, but if the model is measuring violence that occurs in only one small area of the state, it would make the most sense to focus on the exit quality of neighboring states that are proximate to that area. Particularly in large states, a neighboring state that borders a completely different area of the country may not actually be a relevant exit option.

Zones of control matter not only for geographic disaggregation, but also for a more micro-level investigation of the actors in civil conflicts. In this study I have focused on the overall threat to the lives of civilians, making no distinction between violence committed by rebels and violence committed by agents of the state. While this simplification was necessary at this stage, there is a rich area of study open to the impact of exit quality, conditional on which actor is actually using one-sided violence against civilians. This would be particularly fruitful in combination with examining which actor has control of the territory in which civilians are threatened; if the rebels are using

violence against civilians in government-held territory, that may have very different implications than rebels using this tactic in their own-territory, or in contested areas.

Building on the disaggregation of geography and actors would also allow for exploration into the impact of changes in exit quality on whether armed actors choose to use violence against civilians in the first place. This may be the most exciting extension of this project: to determine if changing exit quality changes the strategic behavior of armed groups. Can closing borders around a conflict push soldiers to stop committing abuses against civilians? Or, will it encourage further abuses? Finding answers to these questions would have enormous implications for both the scholarly community and the policy community.

At a time when internal conflict has increasing negative externalities, a more finite understanding of these types of conflict dynamics is vital. As this project has demonstrated, abuses of civilian populations have consequences that extend far beyond national borders. Even the most seemingly helpless civilians attempting to survive the violence of civil wars impact how conflicts develop, and how neighboring states and the international community choose to treat these civilians has serious geopolitical impacts. How states treat refugees and asylum-seekers may actually be one unanticipated way of shaping violent civil conflicts, and at the very least, neighboring states should consider this when deciding how to react when a wave of civilians fleeing conflict arrives at their doorstep.

Appendix A: Refugee Rights Coding Procedure and Summary Statistics

Coding Procedure from State Department Annual Report

Legal System for Asylum & Protection of Refugees

This variable is coded on policy ONLY, not practice.

0: There is no legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees.

1: There is some legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees, but it does not conform to the United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees and the United Nations 1967 Protocol. Safe country of origin/transit regulations will also downgrade a score of 2 to a 1.

2: There is a legal system in place for asylum seekers/refugees that conforms to the United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees and the United Nations 1967 Protocol.

Refoulement

0: There is widespread/systematic refoulement, including closing borders to asylum seekers. Alternatively, the state will receive a zero score if there is a description of "no governmental protection from refoulement" in the year.

1: There are isolated incidents of refoulement and/or border closures to asylum seekers. Alternatively, the state will receive a one if there is a description of "some protection

from refoulement" by the government in the year, but no indication of systematic/widespread refoulement.

2: There are no reported incidents of refoulement and/or border closures to asylum seekers. Alternatively, the state will receive a score of two if there is a description of the government providing protection from refoulement, but no indication of any refoulement incidents.

Government Abuse of Refugees/Asylum Seekers

0: The government engages in widespread/systematic violence against refugees/asylum seekers, and harassment of refugees/asylum seekers. Widespread forced detention also qualifies for a score of zero.

1: The government engages in isolated incidents of violence against refugees/asylum seekers, and harassment of refugees/asylum seekers. Isolated incidents of forced detention also qualify for a score of one.

2: There are no reports of the government engaging in any type of violence, harassment, or forced detention of refugees/asylum seekers.

Protection from Abuse by non-Governmental Actors

0: Refugees and/or asylum-seekers are subject to widespread/systematic violence by non-governmental actors; this can include native citizens, rebel forces, or governmental actors from other states that make incursions into the country's borders to abuse refugees.

1: Refugees and/or asylum-seekers are subject to isolated incidents of violence by non-governmental actors; this can include native citizens, rebel forces, or governmental actors from other states that make incursions into the country's borders to abuse refugees.

2: Refugees and/or asylum seekers are not subject to any incidents of violence by non-governmental actors.

Cooperation with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

0: The government does not cooperate with the UNHCR in most areas, and the UNHCR is generally restricted in carrying out its operations within the state.

1: There is some major restriction on the UNHCR's ability to operate within the country, but it still is able to conduct some operations.

2: The report states that there is full or general cooperation with the UNHCR and makes no further note of any major restrictions by the government or its agents on UNHCR operations within the country.

Table 12: Summary Statistics for 1993-2011

VARIABLES	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
Refoulement	3,227	1.53	0.78	0	2
Refoulement (Safe Transit)	3,227	1.44	0.84	0	2
Government Violence	3,227	1.58	0.79	0	2
Protection from Violence	3,227	1.81	0.58	0	2
Legal System - Asylum	3,227	1.25	0.88	0	2
Cooperation with UNHCR	3,227	1.87	0.42	0	2
Physical Integrity Rights (CIRI)	3,063	4.79	2.26	0	8
Regime (Polity)	3,067	13.17	6.60	0	20
Civil War	3,252	0.16	0.37	0	1
Contiguous Civil Conflict (100 km)	3,252	0.51	0.50	0	1
GDP_{t-1} (ln)	3,244	10.58	2.00	5.41	16.39
Refugee $Population_{t-1}$ (ln)	3,244	6.05	4.43	0	15.24
Population (ln)	3,252	9.02	1.65	5.34	14.10
Total Borders (COW)	3,252	5.92	3.47	0	22
Land Borders (COW)	3,252	3.56	2.52	0	14
Sea Borders (COW)	3,252	2.36	2.51	0	11
UNHCR 1951	3,252	0.74	0.44	0	1
UNHCR 1967	3,252	0.75	0.43	0	1
UNHCR Refugee Treaties	3,252	1.49	0.86	0	2

Table 13: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Refugee Practices (1993-2011)

VARIABLES	(11) Refoulement	(12) Government Violence	(13) Protection from Violence	(14) Legal System	(15) Cooperation with UNCHR
Legal System (Refugees)					0.277*
					(0.155)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	0.0767	0.104*	0.135**	0.0852	0.170*
	(0.0560)	(0.0574)	(0.0659)	(0.0610)	(0.0902)
Regime (Polity)	0.00981	0.00168	-0.0500**	0.00945	0.0626***
	(0.0174)	(0.0218)	(0.0231)	(0.0212)	(0.0212)
Civil War	0.232	-0.0677	-0.0547	-0.281	-0.343
	(0.285)	(0.284)	(0.350)	(0.296)	(0.315)
Contiguous Civil Conflict	-0.984***	-0.619***	-0.537**	0.110	-1.126***
	(0.200)	(0.239)	(0.250)	(0.200)	(0.313)
GDP_{t-1} (ln)	-0.283***	-0.364***	0.114	-0.0758	-0.344**
	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.121)	(0.0961)	(0.140)
Refugee $Population_{t-1}$ (ln)	-0.0832***	-0.191***	-0.223***	0.0412	0.0146
	(0.0264)	(0.0278)	(0.0458)	(0.0264)	(0.0328)
Population (ln)	0.154	0.345**	-0.144	0.0808	0.133
	(0.136)	(0.142)	(0.175)	(0.140)	(0.170)
UN Refugee Treaties	0.378***	0.271**	0.126	1.328***	0.526***
	(0.114)	(0.136)	(0.196)	(0.148)	(0.164)
Constant cut1	-3.263	-3.065	-4.548	1.533	-4.693
Constant cut2	-2.586	-2.779	-4.300	2.544	-3.190
Observations	2,905	2,905	2,905	2,905	2,905
Clusters	163	163	163	163	163
Wald χ^2	80.68	90.86	60.98	119.6	135.7

Robust standard errors in parentheses/ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Appendix B: Methodology for Creating Destination Quality Measures

Chapter 2 introduced original data on state practices towards refugees, or more concisely, refugee rights. This included five measures, coded on a 0-1-2 scale: (1) Refoulement, (2) Government Violence against Refugees/Asylum-Seekers, (3) Cooperation with UNHCR, (4) Law on Refugees, and (5) Protection from Other Violence. However, to test the theory that the *destination quality* of neighboring states – aggregated to proxy the *exit quality* from a civil war state – has an interactive effect on the length and severity of the civil war, I need distinct unidimensional measures.

The first step is to proxy the *destination quality* of each state/year in the dataset that could potentially neighbor a civil war. To adequately capture *destination quality*, however, requires considering both how the refugee/asylum-seeker population is treated and the overall state of human rights protection within the country. To this end, I consider not only refugee rights, but also general human rights as measured in the CIRI physical integrity rights scores, including (1) Torture, (2) Political Imprisonment, (3) Extrajudicial Killing, and (4) Disappearance. I also include the UCDP/PRIO measure of civil conflict within the country to proxy broader threats to well-being from general violence.

I use three methods for reducing multiple outcome variables to unidimensional measures: Principal Component Analysis (PCA, Factor Analysis (FA), and Item

Response Theory (IRT). Two of these methods (PCA and FA) also allow for an exploratory test of the number of underlying dimensions within the data. IRT generates measures that show how well each variable discriminates between high and low destination quality states. I produce several scores that can be, in turn, tested within the models in the next chapter, in which I predict civil war duration and intensity.

Principal Component Analysis

The first tool that I use to evaluate the dimensionality of the data is PCA. PCA is a primarily non-theoretical tool meant for condense collinear data into a reduced set of variables. This is distinct from Exploratory Factor Analysis because of the lack of theoretical reasoning. As Baglin (2014,2) describes:

> Factor analysis is concerned with identifying the underlying factor structure that explains the relationships between the observed variables. On the other hand, PCA is used to reduce a large number of interrelated variables into a smaller set of "components" with minimal loss of information. For example, a researcher with multicollinearity issues in a multiple regression model might use PCA to cluster highly related variables into a single predictor to avoid biased parameter estimates. PCA does not attempt to explain the underlying population factor structure of the data and makes the often, unrealistic, assumption that each variable is measured without error. EFA, on the other hand, is based on the common or shared variance between variables, which is partitioned from the left-over variance unique to each variable and any error introduced by measurement. Hence, EFA is more theoretically aligned to the goals of exploring the dimensionality of a scale proposing to measure a latent variable.

Since PCA is a non-theoretical strategy to condense variables into one component, it is a reasonable starting strategy to determine whether it makes sense extract a single unidimensional measure of destination quality. Initial PCA analysis suggests that while there is one overwhelming component within the data, there are still two additional components (the last of which is borderline at best per traditional Kaiser rules, with an

eigenvalue of 1.14). This suggests that two dimensions are present in the data. A scree plot of the eigenvalues is shown in Figure 18.

Factor Analysis

The next step is conducting exploratory factor analysis for three reasons: (1) to confirm two dimensions, as shown in the PCA results; (2) to determine whether the refugee rights scores are picking up on something different from the CIRI/civil war data – which also justifies my initial argument for considering these separately – and (3) to test whether using a unidimensional model could still make sense.

Figure 18: Scree Plot from PCA Results



The scree plot from PCA shows two component dimensions that are well above the minimum eigenvalue of one, and a third dimension that is borderline.

In the Factor Analysis models, I use a polychoric correlation matrix rather than a Pearson correlation matrix. This is appropriate because my data are all ordinal: "Pearson correlations assume data have been measured on, at least, an equal interval scale and a

linear relationship exists between the variables. These assumptions are typically violated in the case of variables measured using ordinal rating scales" (Baglin 2014, 2). Using the Pearson correlation matrix with ordinal data in Exploratory Factor Analysis causes spurious multidimensionality, biased factor loadings, and underestimated relationships between ordinal variables, which is why it is generally recommended to use the polychoric correlation matrix in EFA with ordinal data (Baglin 2014; Timmerman and Lorenzo-Seva 2011; Olsson 1979; Bernstein and Teng 1989; Garrido et al. 2013; Holgado–Tello et al. 2008).

Once the factor analysis is run, it is preferable to rotate the factor loadings in order to better interpret them, and therefore to better interpret which variables are most associated with each factor (or dimension). Either orthogonal or oblique rotation can be used; orthogonal rotation constrains factors to be uncorrelated, facilitating the simplest interpretation, whereas oblique rotation allows correlation, thus allowing for a more realistic representation of the loadings. In practice, I ran both and the predicted scores are correlated at .97 for both the first and second factors, so it doesn't seem to matter which method I use in this model. I therefore elect to use orthogonal rotations; the full set of the loadings from the orthogonal and normalized rotation is shown in Table 14.

There is one factor that does seem to overwhelm the others (eigenvalue of 4.08), though there is a second that could be worth inclusion, as it does have an eigenvalue over 1 (1.43). The remaining factors were well below 1. The first factor explains 72.6% of the variance in the data; the second factor explains 25.4% of the variation in the data; together they explain 98.1% of the variation.

Based on the exploratory factor analysis, it does appear that there are two distinct dimensions underlying the abuse of refugees' rights and generalized violence within the country. The first factor accounts for a much larger share of the variance, but there are clear patterns of each of the sets of data loading onto separate factors. It is also worth noting – here and moving forward – that the greater variation in the CIRI data (due to more comprehensive and consistent reporting in the source material) is likely overwhelming the refugee rights data.

Table 14: Orthogonal Rotated Factor Loadings

		Factor Loadings	
Item	Source	Factor 1 (General Violence)	Factor 2 (Refugee Violence)
Law	Refugees	0.0691	0.3808
Refoulement	Refugees	0.0600	0.7773
Cooperation with UNHCR	Refugees	0.2120	0.7353
Government Violence	Refugees	0.1626	0.5041
Protection from non-State Violence	Refugees	0.3363	0.5041
Killing	CIRI	0.8603	0.1239
Disappearance	CIRI	0.8164	0.1989
Torture	CIRI	0.7485	0.1429
Political Prisoners	CIRI	0.6772	0.2747
Civil War	UCDP/PRIO	0.8315	0.1553
Eigenvalue		4.0768	1.4277

* N=3,535

Item Response Theory

As discussed in the chapter, IRT is similar to factor analysis but it useful because it also allows for estimation of parameters evaluating the performance of the individual items used to estimate the underlying dimensions. This gives information on how well the variables distinguish between states at varying levels of refugee rights and general security. Stata 14 does not allow for multidimensional IRT estimation, so based on the

clear indication of two distinct dimensions at work from the factor analysis results, I run two separate unidimensional models. The first model, general security, includes the CIRI/CI-RIGHTS and UCDP/PRIO indicators that loaded onto the first factor. The second model, refugee rights, includes all of the new data on the treatment of refugees, all of which loaded onto the second factor.

All of the output from the two-parameter graded response IRT models, including the *difficulty* and *discrimination* parameters, is shown in Tables 15 and 16. The *difficulty* parameters show the theta score at which a state would have a 50% probability of scoring at or above the level listed. For example, in Table 15, a state with a refugee rights theta score of -1.0968 would have a 50% chance of receiving a score of 1 or higher for the Refoulement score, while a state with a refugee rights theta score of -0.6762 would have a 50% chance of receiving a Refoulement score of 2. The visual representations of the difficulty scores for each parameter are shown in Figures 20 and 21, which show the Item Characteristic Curves (ICC). The difficulty scores are the marked theta values on the x-axis, which have a corresponding probability of 0.5. The discrimination parameter for each item is the second parameter displayed in the output in Tables 16 and 17. The *discrimination* shows how effectively the item differentiates between comparable levels of theta; in the ICC graphs in Figures 25 and 26, the *discrimination* is shown as the slope on each curve. Law has a *discrimination* score of 0.5284, and so has a relatively flat slope in Figure 25. At close levels of theta, the probability of reaching a given score will be very similar, so it does not discriminate well. Refoulement, however, has a *discrimination* score of 2.5409, and therefore has a very steep slope in Figure 25. Even at close levels of theta, there are distinctly different probabilities of getting a given score.

The item information functions (IIF) shown in Figures 21 and 22 show how much information each item provides to estimate theta, or the latent trait – in Figure 21 this shows how much information each constituent item gives to estimate the refugee rights score, while in Figure 22 shows how much information each item gives to estimate the general security score. The unimodal IIFs for the refugee rights score are likely a reflection of how compressed the difficulty scores are for each item; the bimodal IIFs for the general security score are a reflection of the wider spread on the difficulty scores to reach a 1 and a 2 for each item. Refoulement by far offers the most information for estimating refugee rights, followed by Cooperation with UNHCR, and then by Government Abuse. Protection from Abuse offers a lower amount of information, and Law offers almost no information. It is also worth noting the levels of theta at which information is highest – Refoulement and Government Abuse peak at higher levels of theta than Cooperation with UNHCR and Protection from Abuse; however, all of the constituent items have information peaking well below theta scores of zero. On the other hand, the general security items offer higher levels of information, and do so at levels ranging from negative to positive values of theta. This suggests that the items making up the general security scores generally offer better information on and distinctions between states at different levels of the IRT general security score; this is consistent with my previous expectations, given the much greater variation in the CIRI/CI-RIGHTS scores, driven by the better and more comprehensive reporting on repression of native populations in the source materials.

The summed IIFs create the Test Information Function (TIF). Each TIF is plotted in Figures 23 and 24. As shown in Figure 23, the refugee rights data provide the most

information for states located at theta of about -1. Moving to theta scores above or below -1, the standard error increases, and the amount of information about the underlying dimension of refugee rights decreases. In Figure 24, the TIF shows that there is a similar maximum information peak at -1 for the general security score; however, the overall level of information provided across levels of theta is much higher than in the refugee rights TIF plot.

Finally, it is possible to evaluate how the theta scores derived for each dimension would perform if the items were instead measured in a simple additive index. The Test Characteristic Curves in Figures 19 and 20 how varying levels of theta would match to additive index scores. Based on the collapsing intervals on the y-axis at higher levels of the index score (and higher levels of theta), it is clear that particularly for the refugee rights scores, there would not be a true linear relationship between the underlying dimension of refugee rights and the score an additive index would generate. The one-unit interval changes at the highest (and also at the lowest) levels would be far less meaningful than the one-unit interval changes in the mid-levels of the index score. While this is not as strong a problem for the general security score, it is still a clear pattern, suggesting that using IRT estimation of the underlying dimensions was a better option for accurate measurement than adding the constituent scores into an index.

As a final method of comparing the IRT-generated theta scores of the underlying dimensions of refugee rights and general security, refer to the scatterplot of the two values in Figure 27. All parts of the plot are populated, suggesting that not only are these distinct, but it should be feasible to find most of the theoretically possible combinations of the two scores actually populated in the data. The straight vertical and horizontal lines

in the plot approaching the maximum values of each score are reflective of the collapsing and clustering of the scores at the highest levels, where they cannot score higher than the maximum value and thus end up appearing roughly the same. Selected country/year values from the full scatterplot are shown in Figure 7 within Chapter 3.

Table 15: Correlation Matrix of All Variables

SOURCE	VARIABLES	*Law*	*Refoule*	*Coop. UNHCR*	*Govt Abuse*	*Protect Abuse*	*Kill*	*Disap-pear*	*Torture*	*Political Prisoner*	*Civil War*
Refugees	*Refugee Law*	1.000									
Refugees	*Refoulement*	0.192	1.000								
Refugees	*Cooperation with UNHCR*	0.240	0.384	1.000							
Refugees	*Government Abuse*	0.101	0.389	0.221	1.000						
Refugees	*Protection from Abuse*	0.057	0.222	0.125	0.375	1.000					
CIRI	*Killing*	0.050	0.111	0.134	0.151	0.242	1.000				
CIRI	*Disappearance*	0.099	0.103	0.198	0.157	0.188	0.531	1.000			
CIRI	*Torture*	0.049	0.126	0.083	0.152	0.187	0.542	0.356	1.000		
CIRI	*Political Prisoners*	0.198	0.183	0.218	0.153	0.133	0.450	0.434	0.453	1.000	
UCDP/ PRIO	*Civil War*	0.089	0.096	0.105	0.142	0.188	0.483	0.548	0.290	0.376	1.000

Table 16: IRT Graded Response Model - Refugee Rights

	Coefficient	Std. Error	$p < \|z\|$	95% Confidence Intervals	
Law					
Discrimination	0.5284	0.0472	0.000	0.4360	0.6208
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-1.7697	0.1585	0.000	-2.0804	-0.4590
(=2)	-0.2357	0.0672	0.000	-0.3674	-0.1041
Refoulement					
Discrimination	2.5409	0.2254	0.000	2.0990	2.9827
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-1.0968	0.0426	0.000	-1.1802	-1.0134
(=2)	-0.6762	0.0308	0.000	-0.7366	-0.6158
Cooperation with UNCHR					
Discrimination	2.0086	0.1337	0.000	1.7465	2.2706
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-2.4919	0.0993	0.000	-2.6865	-2.2973
(=2)	-1.6886	0.0610	0.000	-1.8082	-1.5690
Government Abuse					
Discrimination	1.6857	0.1164	0.000	1.4575	1.9138
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-1.2294	0.0549	0.000	-1.3369	-1.1219
(=2)	-1.0205	0.0472	0.000	-1.1130	-0.9281
Protection from Violence					
Discrimination	1.2437	0.0961	0.000	1.0554	1.4321
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-2.2207	0.1245	0.000	-2.4648	-1.9767
(=2)	-2.0577	0.1143	0.000	-2.2818	-1.8335

Observations: 3,834

Table 17: IRT Graded Response Model - General Security

	Coefficient	Std. Error	$p < \|z\|$	95% Confidence Intervals	
Extrajudicial Killing					
Discrimination	3.0365	0.1339	0.000	2.7740	3.2987
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-1.0013	0.0307	0.000	-1.0615	-0.9441
(=2)	0.0937	0.0237	0.000	0.0473	0.1402
Disappearance					
Discrimination	3.0577	0.1491	0.000	2.7656	3.3499
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-1.5520	0.0419	0.000	-1.6342	-1.4698
(=2)	-0.8429	0.0279	0.000	-0.8975	-0.7882
Torture					
Discrimination	2.3977	0.1009	0.000	2.1999	2.5955
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-0.1514	0.0254	0.000	-0.2012	-0.1016
(=2)	1.3493	0.0396	0.000	1.2717	1.4268
Political Imprisonment					
Discrimination	1.7822	0.0699	0.000	1.6463	1.9202
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-0.8731	0.0549	0.000	-0.9436	-0.8025
(=2)	0.1022	0.0286	0.000	0.0463	0.1582
Civil War					
Discrimination	3.1175	0.1772	0.000	2.7701	3.4649
Difficulty					
(>=1)	-2.0053	0.0560	0.000	-2.1150	-1.8955
(=2)	-1.1686	0.0327	0.000	-1.2326	-1.1045

Observations: 3,851

Figure 19: Test Characteristic Curve for Refugee Rights



Figure 20: Test Characteristic Curve for General Security



Figure 21: Item Information Function for Refugee Rights



Figure 22: Item Information Functions for General Security



Figure 23: Test Information Function for Refugee Rights



Figure 24: Test Information Function for General Security



Figure 25: Item Characteristic Curves for Refugee Rights



Figure 26: Item Characteristic Curves for General Security



Figure 27: Scatterplot of IRT Theta Scores - Refugee Rights v. General Security



Appendix C: Additional Models of Civil Conflict Duration and Intensity

The results from the various specifications of each dimension of exit quality are summarized below. There were four variations of each dimension (refugee rights and general security), based on the combination of taking either the maximum score of all neighbors within 950 km of a civil conflict state, or the mean of all these scores, and measuring this either in the current year *t* or the previous year *t-1*. Each cell indicates whether the results support the hypotheses.

Table 18: Summary of Whether Results Support Initial Hypotheses

	Refugee Rights		General Security	
	Duration	Battle Deaths	Duration	Battle Deaths
$Mean_{(t)}$	No	**Yes**	**Yes**	No
$Mean_{(t-1)}$	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	No
$Maximum_{(t)}$	No	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**
$Maximum_{(t-1)}$	No	No	**Yes**	No

There is a fairly clear pattern that across various specifications, refugee rights best predicts conflict intensity (in annual battle deaths), while general security best predicts the duration of the conflict. What is perhaps more puzzling is that, while general security ceases to have any significant effect predicting battle deaths in specifications other than at the maximum of all neighboring states at year t-1, in the three specifications where refugee rights predicting duration does not perform as the theory would anticipate, refugee rights actually has the opposite effect: conflicts with higher levels of surrounding refugee rights last longer.

Figures 28-33 rerun the models from the chapter predicting conflict duration and intensity using the current year (*t*) mean, rather than the lagged (*t-1*) mean. As in the original model, high civilian deaths are set at 2,000, and low civilian deaths are set at 10. Figure 28 shows the predicted the natural log of annual battle deaths across increasing levels of one-sided civilian deaths for high surrounding refugee rights and low surrounding refugee rights (high exit and low exit, respectively). In this model, it is actually much clearer that within "pressure cooker" states – those without viable exit options and with a great deal of pressure exerted by violence against civilians – conflicts become more intense as the pressure increases. Figure 29 again shows that general security in surrounding states has no discernable impact on the intensity of conflicts, regardless of the level of violence against civilians.

Figures 30 and 31 show the expected duration of conflicts at high and low levels of surrounding general security, at high levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 30) and at low levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 31). Consistent with the models from the chapter using the lagged mean of general security

scores, at high levels of one-sided violence, low exit quality conflicts tend to last longer, while high and low exit quality conflicts are indistinguishable in duration where one-sided violence is low.

What is more interesting is the output in Figures 32 and 33. These figures show the expected duration of conflicts at high and low levels of refugee rights, within the context of either high levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 32) or low levels of one-sided violence against civilians (Figure 33). In Figure 32, the results have actually flipped dramatically from the original hypothesis and the results presented in the chapter for the lagged mean of refugee rights. Here, at high levels of violence against civilians, low exit quality in refugee rights drives *much* shorter conflicts. Turning to Figure 33, the results are once again flipped; at low levels of violence against civilians, low exit quality conflicts again last longer.

The results from Figures 32 and 33 are actually consistent with the results from using the maximum score for refugee rights, either in the current year *t* or the previous year *t-1*. So, in three out of four specifications, it appears that trapping civilians in dangerously violent conditions drives conflicts that are both shorter and more intense. At first glance – as is clear from Table 18 – this is inconsistent with my initial hypotheses predicting longer and more violent conflicts. Instead, these are shorter and more violent conflicts.

Figure 28: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (*t*)



At low levels of one-sided civilian deaths, conflicts with high and low refugee rights have the same predicted annual battle deaths; as civilian deaths increase, low refugee rights conflicts are increasingly more intense.

Figure 29: Predicted Battle Deaths (ln) Based on General Security Mean Score (*t*)



There is no significant difference in predicted annual battle deaths between high and low general security conflicts across all levels of one-sided civilian deaths.

Figure 30: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t) and High Civilian Deaths



Conflicts with low general security in surrounding states last significantly longer than conflicts with high general security in surrounding states at high levels of one-sided civilian violence (shown at 2,000 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year).

Figure 31: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on General Security Mean Score (t) and Low One-Sided Civilian Deaths



Conflicts with low general security in surrounding states last the same amount of time as conflicts with high general security in surrounding states at low levels of one-sided violence (shown at 10 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year).

Figure 32: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) and High Civilian Deaths



Conflicts with low refugee rights in surrounding states end significantly sooner than conflicts with high refugee rights in surrounding states at high levels of one-sided civilian violence (shown at 2,000 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year).

Figure 33: Predicted Conflict Duration Based on Refugee Rights Mean Score (t) and Low One-Sided Civilian Deaths



Conflicts with low refugee rights in surrounding states last significantly longer than conflicts with high refugee rights in surrounding states at low levels of one-sided violence (shown at 10 one-sided civilian deaths in the conflict-year).

However, this is the theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state. A pressure cooker works by trapping heat and steam within a closed vessel in order to raise the temperature higher and heat the contents quicker. If civil conflict states without viable exit options trap civilians – and thus resources – within the state, increasing pressure on these civilians should drive more resources into the conflict quicker, creating conflicts that flare more intensely and then also end quicker. While this was not the original expectation of the theory, this outcome actually may make more sense; if all of the resources are driven into the conflict earlier, it should also burn out sooner. Thus, the naming of this theory as the "theory of the pressure-cooker conflict state" was perhaps more apt than even I anticipated at the outset.

What is of equal importance is that, again, refugee rights and general security perform differently. Indeed, in this example they actually are cross-cutting; holding refugee rights constant, poorer general security in combination with high levels of civilian violence drives longer conflicts, which makes sense as this allows for continued resource flows into the conflict because of regional instability. On the other hand, holding general security constant, poorer refugee rights in combination with high levels of civilian violence drives shorter conflicts of higher intensity, because civilians – as resources for combatants – are trapped inside the conflict. This drives conflicts that flare and come to a head rapidly, but also burn out sooner.

Table 19: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting Civil Conflict Duration with Exit Quality Measures at Mean Score (*t*)

VARIABLES	(1) General Security	(2) Refugee Rights
General Security (Mean)	0.0437	0.0955
	(0.184)	(0.185)
Refugee Respect (Mean)	0.156	0.241
	(0.169)	(0.176)
Civilian Deaths	9.40e-05	-0.0002**
	(6.18e-05)	(8.62e-05)
General Security (Mean) * Civilian Deaths	0.000230	
	(0.000185)	
Refugee Respect (Mean) * Civilian Deaths		-0.0006**
		(0.00028)
Battle Deaths (ln)	-0.272***	-0.278***
	(0.0707)	(0.0703)
Total Population (ln)	-0.0369	-0.0462
	(0.0683)	(0.0672)
GDP per capita (ln)	-0.0950	-0.0877
	(0.0887)	(0.0871)
Regime	-0.0166	-0.0210
	(0.0145)	(0.0147)
Conflict over Territory	0.379**	0.382**
	(0.187)	(0.184)
Intervention (Government)	0.261	0.245
	(0.349)	(0.354)
Intervention (Rebels)	0.281	0.240
	(0.441)	(0.429)
Intervention (Both)	0.238	0.217
	(1.074)	(1.042)
Civil Wars	108	108
Civil War Failures	161	161
Observations	729	729
Wald $\chi^2_{(12, 12)}$	68.83	73.46
Log pseudo likelihood	-603.09	-602.27

Coefficients are reported
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 20: OLS Regression Predicting Annual Battle Deaths with Exit Quality Measures at Mean Score (*t*)

VARIABLES	(3) General Security	(4) Refugee Rights
General Security (Mean)	-0.139	-0.142
	(0.136)	(0.135)
Refugee Respect (Mean)	-0.213**	-0.168*
	(0.100)	(0.100)
Civilian Deaths	-9.70e-06	-5.19e-05**
	(2.15e-05)	(2.07e-05)
Refugee Respect (Mean) * Civilian Deaths		-0.000213***
		(7.58e-05)
General Security (Mean) * Civilian Deaths	-3.32e-05	
	(5.15e-05)	
Total Population (ln)	-0.0578*	-0.0557*
	(0.0339)	(0.0338)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.203***	0.203***
	(0.0431)	(0.0431)
Conflict over Territory	-0.741***	-0.747***
	(0.115)	(0.114)
Intervention (Government)	0.874***	0.868***
	(0.187)	(0.187)
Intervention (Rebels)	0.662	0.771
	(0.492)	(0.487)
Intervention (Both)	0.684	0.614
	(0.607)	(0.617)
Constant	4.886***	4.858***
	(0.631)	(0.628)
Observations	765	765
R-squared	0.175	0.179

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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