Socrates and Prodicus in the Clouds

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SOCRATES AND PRODICUS IN THE CLOUDS

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II. Introduction

Aristophanes has not made the task of evaluating his portrayal of Socrates in the Clouds easy. Some details of the portrayal seem to be obviously false, such as Socrates' teaching for pay, implied at 804-813 and 876. Others seem to conform to the truth, as in the case of Socrates' comical physical appearance, alluded to at 362-363. For the most part, however, Aristophanes has probably presented not so much a false but a half-true or distorted picture of Socrates. It has been the work of some scholars to show for example that the Dinos-doctrine of the play is derived from Diogenes of Apollonia. The fact remains, nevertheless, that at one time at least Socrates was interested in physical philosophy. When it comes to the rhetorical teaching and chicanery of the Phrontisterion, the usual explanation is that Aristophanes deliberately assigned to Socrates a variety of sophistic characteristics without drawing upon the eccentricities of any particular sophist or sophists. Making the false seem true is a charge which was leveled not only at Protagoras but at the sophists as a whole and while Aristophanes may have thought that Socrates was particularly adept at the practice, any sophist could have been made to appear guilty of it. Xenophon in fact suggests that the popular view that such men as Alcibiades and Critias had learned their rhetorical art from Socrates was one of the
causes of his conviction (Mem. I. 2, 12 ff.). Thus in the case of rhetoric Aristophanes seems to have relied on the technique of distortion rather than bald invention.

Without wishing to rehearse or challenge the traditional views regarding the sources of Aristophanes' satire upon Socrates, I should like to suggest that there is one sophist whose influence upon this comedy has been overlooked or underestimated, namely the famous Prodicus. I shall argue that Aristophanes in naming Prodicus means to confess that much of the physical, metaphysical, and ethical foolery of the whole play alludes to the work of that sophist.

What little we have to go on regarding Prodicus comes chiefly from testimony, not from fragments. The testimony is usually found in Plato, while the longest fragment is the Choice of Heracles told by Socrates in the Memorabilia and not claimed by Xenophon as representing verbatim what Prodicus actually wrote in his book called the Horse. From this information, however wanting, three areas of Prodicus' teaching are discerned: 1. the right use of words, i.e., acribeia. This topic is especially evident in Plato's Cratylus and Protagoras (Diels' A 11 and 13). 2. natural science of which a part was a rationalistic view that useful things came to be revered as gods (cf. Diels' B 3 and 4, which come from Galen). 3. ethics (Diels' B 1 and 2 = Schol. Nub. 361 and Mem. II 1, 21 ff.). In addition to the references in the testimony to the specific interests of Prodicus there is repeated allusion to Prodicus' concern for money (Diels' A 1a, 3, 4, 4a, 11, 12.) Plato and Xenophon especially emphasize this theme.

These four themes, acriby, physical science, ethics, and, to a much lesser extent, money, appear as aspects of Socratic teaching and manners in the Clouds. This is the foundation of the circumstantial evidence for the view that the satirical treatment of Socrates is in fact a parody of Prodicus. It is necessary to argue from this and other circumstantial evidence, as indeed all prior arguments for the true sources of the Aristophanic Socrates have. Just because Diogenes had an important Diene-doctrine does not prove without question that Aristophanes' Dinos is derived from it and in fact it probably is not derived from Diogenes exclusively. Similarly, just because all the major philosophic nonsense in the play can be related to Prodicus does not mean that Aristophanes certainly drew deliberately or consciously upon that sophist's work. Moreover, it is not the argument of this paper that Aristophanes' Socrates is really not Socrates but Prodicus or any other sophist, as some have, but rather that the distortion of the true Socrates is partially achieved through allusion to the teaching of Prodicus.

II. Socrates and Prodicus, the Meteorosophists

In Plato's Apology, 18b, Socrates comments upon the characterization of himself in the Clouds: ἀς ἔστιν τις Ἑκάβρατης σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεξηπτηκός καὶ τὸν ἃττα λόγον κρέιττα ποιῶν.
In this passage the *meteora* and the things under the earth represent the interests of the physical philosophers while making the worse argument the better refers to the activity of the sophists. For some reason (which deserves speculation later) Plato has used *meteora* in a literal sense which quite excludes the metaphorical way it is used in the *Clouds*. At *Clouds* 358 ff. the chorus addresses first Strepsiades, then Socrates:

Greetings, ancient old man, hunter of words dear to the muses.
Greetings to you too, O priest of light-weight silliness. Tell us your desire: for we would give heed to none other of the meteorosophists of our time, except to Prodicus, to him because of his wisdom and intelligence (*sophia* and *gnome*), to you because you strut about in the streets and roll your eyes, and, barefoot, endure many evils and look at us with such majesty.

Has Aristophanes falsely associated Prodicus and Socrates with the physical philosophers here? Is he referring specifically or exclusively to the earlier interest of Socrates or the content of Prodicus' *Peri Physeseos*? To think so is to miss the metaphorical sense of *meteora*. At 333 there is another comic compound of *meteora*, *meteorophenakas*. The scholiast explains this as those who cheat through *meteora*, heavenly bodies, i.e., the physical philosophers. But in this context *meteorophenakes* include a wide variety of cheats, not only the *istrotechnai*, and the prophets, who might well cheat with heavenly bodies or birds, i.e. the *meteora*, but also the sophists, the *sphragidonymchargokometai*, and the dithyrambic poets who are fed by the *Clouds* because they praise them in music. Strepsiades catches up the comment by taking *meteora* literally again: "O yes, the poets are always referring to clouds and *Typhons* and air-sailing, taloned birds." What Strepsiades fails to understand and what make him so amusing throughout the play is his inability to think metaphorically, to understand in this case that poets do not cheat through references to clouds or winds or birds, but through their lofty and decorative similes and metaphors, their use of words.

Further proof of Aristophanes' intention of using *meteora* metaphorically comes in 489 ff. Socrates says to Strepsiades, "Now whenever I pitch some clever point to you concerning the *meteora*, snatch it up straightway." Humphreys, translating Kock, (Intro. 39) says that Socrates is trying "to ascertain what preparation he brings for question of natural science. He bids him quickly seize a meteorological problem that is to be cast before him." That this is, however, not the subject of Socrates' inquiry, one might have expected from the questions which lead up to 489. At 483 Socrates had begun the instruction of Strepsiades by inquiring about his ability to speak: "How's your memory?" At 486, "Have you got a talent for speaking?" At 489 then, "Let me try you on *meteora*." After diversionary tactics by Strepsiades, and a threat of a beating by Socrates, the philosopher finally puts a question to the pupil: "What do you do if some strikes you, *typtai*?" (494) Now this is not a question about *meteora* in the literal sense. Nor is the answer: "I am striken, *typtomai*." (494) The question has rather to do with one practical aspect of rhetoric, namely how to draw an indictment. The answer, again diversionary, has to do with the difference between the active and
passive voice, as is seen in the delayed appendices to the response in 495-496: ἐπιμαρτύρομαι, διμάχομαι. There is nothing wrong with the text here because the questions do not concern physical science, as Teuffel thought. One need only appeal to Thucydides to find the metaphorical use of meteorâ: "All Greece was up in the air (II 8)." There is also a passage in the Birds (1447) which shows the relation of words to meteorâ: ὅτι γὰρ λόγων ὁ νοῦς τὰ μετεωρίζεται ἐπαίρεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. There is every good reason then to see in the meteorâ of 490 and the meteorosophists of 360 reference not only to astronomical and physical science but also knowledge about words and concepts. In short the meteorâ are "high-fallutin" notions. Taken in this way "meteorosophists," although a typical compound of comedy, jibes perfectly well with what is known about the historical Socrates and Prodicus. The profit of the metaphor is taken in many ways by Aristophanes, but never better than when he proceeds to take meteorâ literally himself by bringing Socrates suspended in a basket so that he might τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα σύνεσκει(228) and when the meteorâ themselves fill the orchestra with their nebulous notions.

Clouds had long lent themselves to metaphorical use by poets, a fact to which Strepsiades alludes without understanding at 335 ff. (cf. above, p. 3). Homer speaks of the θανάτου νέφος. He makes things similar to clouds (II. 5, 522) and to mist (II. 1, 359). Sophocles uses a cloud as a metaphor for Ismene's weeping, Ant. 588. The metaphorical use is not confined to poets. Hippocrates seems to have used νεφελοειδεῖς of a urinary condition (apud Galen, Comm. 2).

This traditional metaphorical use made the clouds suitable patrons of the meteorosophistry of this play, that is, of a science in which there is a narrowing of the distinction between physical things and concepts. The conflation of things and words is reflected in a number of the chief gags of the play. In broad outline it is represented by the contrast between what Strepsiades wants to learn and what the Phrontisterion studies, a contrast summed up neatly in Strepsiades' words at 165 ff.:

σαλπιγξ ὁ προκτὸς ἔστιν ἄρα τῶν ἐμπιδῶν
ὁ τρισμακάριος τοῦ διεντερὴματος
ἡ βαρὰς φεῦγας ἄν ἀπορύγω δὴμην
δοσὶς δοίοις τούτοις τῆς ἐμπίδου.

At 137 thought itself is a living thing: "You have caused the thought I was working on to abort." This passage should be compared with the suggested equation of φροντίδας and πέτος at 734. Strepsiades is under the covers trying to come up with something, but all he has so far is τὸ πέτος ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ. The substantive nature of concepts is also seen in the representation of astronomy and geometry as physical things. Clearly the Scholast ad 200 and 201 noticed the peculiarity of abstract nouns referring to τῶν φιλοσόφων σκεψάμενος ἄφαμα, ἢ σφαῖραν, ἢ χαραγμάτων. It is because of the substantive nature of thought that Socrates is brought in suspended in a basket, so that νόημα and φροντίδα λειτουργήθηκε, might be mixed with air of like nature. It is in keeping with this that the clouds bestow upon men the various parts of rhetoric (314 ff.):
Thought, speech, intelligence are derived from things, clouds, who are therefore honored as divinities. In turn the parts of rhetoric are things. When at 321 Strepsiades yearns "to prick thought with thought," his metaphor again emphasizes the substantive nature of words and thoughts.

At 424 Socrates hails a triad of divinities: Chaos, Nepheleia, and Glotta, but from Strepsiades' petition to the Clouds (430) to make him the best speaker of all Greece, the triad appears in fact to be a trinity. Chaos (= aer according to the Scholast) is the name for the place and substance of the Clouds, while Tongue represents the rhetoric over which they preside. These triummeteora are thus metaphors which embody both the cosmic physis of the philosophers and the logoi of the sophists. The substantiation of abstractions in this play in fact seems to anticipate the ideal theory of Plato and doubtless reflects Socrates' own interest in universal definitions. But a closer look at some of the sport with words in the play reveals an affinity to two aspects of the teaching of Prodicus, his orthoepia and his theory of the origin of the gods, namely that useful things come to be revered as divinities.

Prodicus' rationalistic theology and his interest in words is demonstrated by Aristophanes' Dinos. This meteorological force displaces Zeus because it is responsible for the useful works attributed to Zeus by mythology. Not anthropomorphic gods but things are shown to be responsible for the weather. The substance of these phenomena are often revealed in their names. Thus Strepsiades sees the point of Socrates' comparison (392-393) of thunder to gastric disturbances in the very name of thunder: βρογη. It sounds so like its true substance: πορογη. Similarly, the function of the Dinos is also revealed in the name. Whatever the importance here of the Dinos of Diogenes, Aristophanes' Dinos, masculine like the god it displaces, is a pun on the word for a kind of pot. There is also a play on the dual genitives of Zeus, Zenos and Dios. Divinity is as it were implied in the name of the awesome (deinos) pot (Cf. LSJ s.v. deinos).

John Ferguson has already pointed out the repetition of the Dinos-Dios joke in the Wasps (618), where Aristophanes recalls his pun on the pot. The Prodican element, however, is not only the punning, for that is also the heart of Aristophanes' own wit. It is especially the notion that useful things have been deified. It is in keeping with this idea that in the reversal of the play Strepsiades demotes the Dinos from divinity on the grounds that it is a mere pot (1474). 16

III. Nestle's Reconstruction of Prodicus' Horae and Aristophanes' Allusion to it in the Birds

Thanks to the studies of Wilhelm Nestle ("Die Horen des Prodikos," Hermes, 1936, pp. 151-170), it is possible to be a good deal more confident
about the content and purpose of Prodicus' *Horae*, the work from which Xenophon excerpted the parable of Heracles at the Crossroads. He takes the title to be genuine and to refer to the *Seasons* as goddesses of fertility. He suggests that the title alludes to a cult of the *Horae* in Prodicus' native Geos which had to do with the myth of Aristaios, who became through the nurture of Ge and the *Horae* a bringer of civilization (cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* 9, 59 ff., Fr. 251). Thereby the *Horae* themselves came to be revered as responsible for the spread of civilization. To ascertain the nature of the content Nestle follows the view of Welcker, against Diels that Themistios, Or. XXX, draws upon a speech of Prodicus in praise of farming. In this short oration Themistios calls upon the gods who oversee farming and receive in turn at their annual sacrifices what the *Seasons* have produced from the earth. He goes on to recall that it was the wisdom of Prodicus to derive all religion from the needs of farming. From this Nestle argues that Xenophon (*Oec.*) drew upon Prodicus when he maintains that all techniques derive from the hardships and necessities of farming. This is also a theme of the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*, where it is given as *Προδότικος τού σφαιρού οπωσδήποτε* (368 C and 366 C). It is then very likely that Prodicus developed in the *Horae* a theme reflected in Euripides (*Suppl.* 202) and other fifth-century authors that all virtue sprang from farming. In addition the pseudo-Platonic *Eryxias*, spoken by Prodicus, makes use of word play to set forth the concept of the *chresimôn*, which Nestle feels could have been worked into the essay on farming. In sum Nestle assigns to the *Horae* two chief interests of Prodicus: his interest in words and his notions concerning the origin of religion. These would have been combined with the moral essay on Heracles, which itself would have provided a compelling example in an extended treatise on the origin of civilization. Nestle reconstructs the *Horae* something like this: At first human life was only nomadic. With the development of agricultural societies and their milder manners, people began to worship as gods all things which made their life more comfortable: stars, sun, moon, water, rivers, springs, lakes, and the sea. Men also honored things produced by these divine powers, namely grain, bread, and wine. Then they discovered that the arts agriculturæ were invented by human beings and transferred their reverence to these. Heracles may have entered into the treatise either as an inventor or (more likely) as an example of how *pohoi* (e.g., like those of farming) lead to virtue. For his labors Heracles was then revered as a god of civilization, just like Aristaios in myth of the Cean cult of the *Horae*.

Not only does Nestle very neatly group together in one book the chief aspects of Prodicus' teaching, but also he shows that Aristophanes knew the book and parodied it in the *Birds*. "Was hier Aristophanes den Vögeln zuschreibt (in the parabasis, especially 708-722), das war bei Prodikos das Werk der Horen." The whole passage deserves closer observation. At 690 ff. the *Birds* invite the audience to come and give ear to their teaching:

> ἵν' ἀκουσαίτες πόντος παρ' ἡμᾶς ὁρέας περὶ τῶν μετεσφαρίων,
> φύσιν οἵανην, γένεσιν τε θεῶν, ποταμῶν τ', Ἐρέσους τε,
> Χάους τε,
> εἴδοτες ὁρέας, παρ' ἐμοὶ ἑρέτικφ κλαίειν εἴπητε το λοιπόν.
In referring to Prodicus by name the Birds recognize that in their intention of explaining the meteorai and the origin of the gods they are covering topics treated by Prodicus. At 708 ff. they go on to refer to the horae:

πάντα δὲ θευτοῖς ἔστιν ὁρ' ἀμών τῶν ὅρνεσαν τὰ μέγιστα.
πρότα μὲν ὄρας φαίνουμεν ἡμεῖς ἔρος, χειμῶνος, ὄπωρας.

Besides the actual mention of horae here, both by way of alluding to Prodicus' Horae and of asserting their priority to them, the Birds go on in the lines following to demonstrate their usefulness in all the important aspects of human affairs, παντά τα μέγιστα: sowing, weaving, shearing, selling, prophesying. Like the Seasons the Birds bring farming and from farming comes commerce and religion (prophecy). They are used as the mantic-muses of every season (723 ff.):

ην οὖν ἡμᾶς νομίσατε θεοῖς,
ἐξετε χρήσατε μάντεσι-μούσαις.
ἔρος ἐν ἄρας, χειμῶνι, θέρει,
μετρφι πνίγει.

They will not remain aloof in the clouds like Zeus, but will bless men with children, plenty, life, peace, youth, laughter, dancing, feasting, and -- creme de la creme, birds' milk. Aristophanes is in short putting into the mouths of the birds Prodicus' arguments for the Seasons as the patrons of civilization.

If, however, Aristophanes' Birds are a parody upon Prodicus' Horae, his Clouds are even more so. They are in fact closely related to birds at 337 and like the Birds are responsible for poetry and language, as we have seen. In both the first and second parabasis, moreover, the Clouds develop extensively the argument for their usefulness, primarily through their regulation of celestial phenomena and bodies. At the beginning of the first epirrheme (577) the Clouds claim to be of all the gods the most beneficial to the city:

πλείτα παρ θεοῖς ἀπάντασιν ἀφελούσαις τὴν πόλιν ...

Thereupon they give examples of their moral influence upon the city (re-calling the argument of 346 ff. on the moral effect of the ability of the clouds to take different shapes). They control the thunder and split the heavens in disapproval of the election of Cleon as general, while the Moon threatens to leave her course and the sun to refuse to shine again. The antepirrheme develops the usefulness of their companion meteor, the Moon, who benefits all (611):

ἀφελούσ' ἤμας ἀπάντασ ό λόγοις αλλ' ἐμφανός.

The list of benefits of the Moon occupies the entire antepirrheme (607-626). Similarly, the second parabasis, which may be a vestige of an earlier edition of the Clouds, also pleads for the usefulness of the Clouds. But this time their control of morals is explicitly tied to their control of meteorological phenomena. If in season, ἐν ὅρᾳ (1117), the jurors of the comic contest
are just (by virtue of giving the prize to their chorus) and wish to reap a rich harvest, the Clouds will rain on their land before their neighbors'. Then they will guard their crops against drought, δύσμοιν (1120), and downpours, ἐπομπῆς (1120). On the other hand the man who dishonors them will produce nothing at all. They shall destroy his crops with hail, σφεναίναις and χαλαίναις (1125, 1127). All these meteorological difficulties are included in the list of evils for farming in Xenophon (Gec. 5, 18) and the Axiom (366 C) which Nestle (p. 157) thinks is derived from Prodicas' Horae. Immediately following this self-accolade, Strepsiades enters again, terrified by the approach of the old and new day, when he must pay his debts or be liable for indictment. He is in very fact threatened by the season. But Pheidippides is now returned to him from his schooling in the Phrontisterion and is greeted by his father as the Soter of his house. As if to prove the contention of the Clouds in the preceding epirheme, Pheidippides now offers the soteria of a meteorophagia: he rescues his father with the New Moon and an admixture of word play (1169 ff.).

The agon between Better and Worse Reason is another sign of Aristophanes' allusion to Prodicas' Horae.21 There were doubtless many essays or epideixis of this type in this age of the Dissoi Logoi. While the agon as a whole is surely a typical Aristophanic invention, in spirit it is very similar to the epideixis of Prodicus and was thought so even in antiquity. Lucian conflates the two works in his own autobiographical account of his choice of vocation.22 There are also strains of specific similarity between the two works which argue for influence by the Prodicus parable or allusion to it. In the first place Heracles and Pheidippides are set before a choice which is in one respect alike. Theirs is not to choose goal, but rather method. Achilles' famous choice was one of goal: should he choose glory or mediocrity? The method depends upon goal --- short and difficult life, or long and easy. Heracles on the other hand must ask, "Shall I attain glory by following the way of Vice or of Virtue?" (Cf. Sallust, Cat. II.1: Nam gloriam, honorem, imperium bonus et ignavus quaestus sibi exoptant; sed illa vera via nititur, huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque felaciae contendit.) There is never a question of what the goal of Pheidippides' life is. It is spelled out in the last part of his name. His father, too, has only one goal in mind: to escape indictment. He wants his son to learn both arguments, both methods, so that he can use them to his own purposes. This self-serving attitude bears no resemblance to Heracles, but the emphasis on method does: How shall I be happy? In the Memoria Horaces introduces the parable of Heracles by a citation of Hesiod, Erga 287 ff., where there is to be sure a contrast in goals, namely between goodness and badness, but the emphasis is on the road to each. To the latter the road is easy, to the former it is long, rough and steep, though easy once the top is reached. Nestle believes with others that Prodicus actually cited the famous Hesiod passage in his essay on Heracles. Heracles' choice thus is whether to attain his happiness through pono or without effort at all. Vice (perhaps alluding to the gluttonous, Eubulus Heracles of the comic and satyric tradition) offers him all the pleasures of the flesh without hindrance or difficulty (Mem. II 1. 23-25):

[ἐπί] τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ἀνδρίν οἶκαν ἄξω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν οὐδενός ἀγευστος ἔση, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἀπειρος δια-
βιοση... ἢ ἡγ ἐς ποτε γέννηται τις ἥποψα ὁπάνεας ἀρ' ἐν ἡπτα ταῦτα, οὐ δόθος μη τα ἄγαν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιόντα καὶ ταλαιπωρώντα τῷ σωματί καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζονται, ἀλλ' ὅς ἐν οἴ ἄλλοι εργάζονται, τούτοις σὺ χρήση, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος δειν ἐν δυν- ἀτόν ἔ τι κερδάναι.

It is suggestive of Prodicus' influence upon this agon that in the beginning of Worse Reason's rebuttal Heracles is used as an example of how the easy road leads to virtue (1044 ff.):

WR: By what reasoning do you object to warm baths?
BR: Because it makes a man base and cowardly.
WR: Hold on! I've got you now.
Tell me: which mortal child of Zeus do you think has the noblest soul? And did the most labors
καὶ πλείστους πόνους πονησαί;
BR: In my opinion none other than Heracles.
WR: Well, did you ever know the baths of Heracles to be cold?
And who is braver than he?

Here Worse Reason has assumed for the moment that the argument concerns not the goal of education, but the method. A traditional virtue, bravery, is shown by his example to be attainable through the new paideusis, which includes all the easy living associated with the new gymnasia. Like Vice in the Choice of Heracles, Worse Reason offers the easy road to the very goal praised by his opponent. And as in the Prodicus parable, the student is in this particular exchange Heracles.

IV. Conclusion

The argument may be recapitulated as follows: While Plato's Socrates would deny the description of himself as a meterorosophist on the grounds that the term associates him wrongly with the physical philosophers, Aristophanes' metera are bodies which metaphorically include all lofty knowledge, both about things and about words. In this sense Socrates and Prodicus are rightly grouped together as meterorosophists at Clouds 361. Socrates is also shown to propound in the play doctrines concerning the nature of the gods which reflect the well-known view of Prodicus (anticipating somewhat Euhemerus) that men have made gods of useful things. This doctrine of the chresimon is the best confirmatory evidence that the Clouds themselves, just as the Birds, are meteric choruses inspired by the Seasons of Prodicus, which contained the Choice of Heracles, alluded to in the Contest of Better and Worse Reason. The character of Prodicus, finally, pervades the whole play in the form of sport with the use of words, the very grounds for Rademacher's view that Prodicus is alluded in the battle of words between Aeschylus and Euripides in the Frogs (see note 3, above).

The sum of the evidence seems to suggest two very specific reasons for naming Prodicus at 361, with one minor, questionable exception, the only sophist named besides Socrates and his disciple, Chaerephon. First, the interests of Prodicus and the historical Socrates were quite similar,
especially in regard to the intermediate position they seemed to have occupied between the physical philosophers and the rhetoricians, their interest in language, and their emphasis on ethics. This intermediate position is perhaps reflected in Prodicus' definition of sophists as μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε άνθρωπος καὶ πολιτικοῦ (Diels B6).24

The second reason is that the name of Prodicus quickens the attention to the role of Prodicus in the whole play.

It is consistent with Aristophanic style to draw attention to allusions of this type by naming names. *Frogs* 75 ff. offers an interesting parallel. There Heracles asks why Dionysus doesn't wish to bring Sophocles back to life. Dionysus gives two reasons: He wants to see what Iophon can do without Sophocles and besides Sophocles is too mild mannered. He needs a rascal like Euripides in case he has to make a run for it from Hades. What Aristophanes probably intends to imply in this passage is that Euripides is a figure more suited to comedy than Sophocles, an implication which is a slap at his rival comedian of 405, Phrynichus, who made Sophocles play a role in his *Muses* similar to that of Euripides in the *Frogs*.25 Just as the reference to Sophocles seems to have had more than mere general significance, so also the reference to Prodicus directed the audience's attention to the Clouds' rival μετέορα, the Horae, not to reject them, but to acknowledge them as having inspired their own existence in this play. By this explanation it becomes quite clear why the Clouds bow to the sophia and gnome of Prodicus: He had in effect invented them. And why then does he not become an actual character of the play? Because Socrates is funnier, because he struts in the streets and rolls his eyes and makes priestly faces as he endures his shoeless existence.

These conclusions are totally at variance with the discussion of this passage by Dover in the introduction to his new edition: "Nn. 358 ff. are intelligible as comedy only if we believe that Aristophanes shared the popular esteem of Prodikos as an artist, and regarded Socrates, by contrast, as a pretentious parasite who inexplicably fascinated some wealthy young men but had nothing coherent to say and produced nothing of any artistic merit." (This last smacks of the publish-or-perish principle.) "Socrates lacked charis; and he was indifferent to what Ar., in common with most of his audience, regarded as the good things of life. That is why he was chosen as the victim of a comedy which set out to exploit the humorous potentialities of intellectual activity."26

In this judgment Dover ignores the real similarity between the interest of Prodicus and Socrates. While he may be right that Plato's references to Prodicus are not unfriendly, he ignores also the repeated emphasis, especially in the Platonic testimony, upon Prodicus' concern for money.27 Even if we assume that the charge was true and that Socrates himself stolidly refused to accept money for teaching and in fact disclaimed the ability to teach, it seems very plausible that Plato would have preferred to emphasize these differences than to attempt to disassociate Socratic thought from that of Prodicus. To make money the distinction between the two men would have been clear enough even to Strepsaiades. But to have sought before the Athenian discasts of 399 to undo the conflation of the thought of Socrates and Prodicus, which had its basis in fact and was capitalized upon by Aristophanes, would have required a subtlety of argument too fine for court-room oratory.
In spite of Plato's effort, however, the tendency to associate Socrates with Prodicus was not to await the aberrations of modern scholarship. Ancient testimony (Diels\textsuperscript{6} A 1= Suidas) even reports that Prodicus was required to drink hemlock for corrupting the youth (presumably such as his students Euripides, Thucydides, and Theronmenes, cf. Schol. \textit{ad Nub. 361})\textsuperscript{26}. But even false inference can be instructive and in this case it adds support to the evidence that Socrates and Prodicus were associated and perhaps confused in the public mind in their own day. This paper has attempted to show that Aristophanes had a hand in this process.

If the previous conclusions are correct, it is possible to make more use of the \textit{Clouds} as testimony for Prodicus than has hitherto been seen and to reaffirm Nestle's views concerning the general content of the \textit{Horae}.

\textbf{NOTES}

1. So. C. H. Whitman, \textit{Aristophanes and the Comic Hero}, (Cambridge 1964), p. 141 ff...
2. Cf. Starkie, \textit{ad} 230: "[Diogenes'] theory of air dominates this play."
   Cf. also "Diogenes", a paper presented to SAKP in 1968 by John Ferguson.
3. Some have referred in a general way to reflections of Prodicus in the play. Cf. Whitman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 142: "...this was an inspired piece of poetic invention to gather together the Weaker Discourse of Protagoras, some of the rhetorical claims of Gorgias, the air physics of Diogenes, the linguistic studies of Prodicus, and the ethic of Antiphon, or some of his predecessors, into one character." I shall argue that there is much more of Prodicus than linguistic studies in the play. W. Schmid, \textit{Griechische Literaturgeschichte}, 1,4, pp. 262-3 (see also n. 10 below), goes as far as anyone I have read in associating ideas of the play with the ideas of Prodicus. He also seems to incorporate more than anyone else (certainly than Diels-Kranz) the conclusions of Nestle discussed below concerning the content of Prodicus' \textit{Horae}. See esp. \textit{op. cit.}, 1,3, p. 44. L. Rademacher, \textit{RPh} 1914, 69, pp. 87-94, cautiously suggests that Euripides is made to reflect the notions of his teacher, Prodicus, in his attack upon Aeschylus' use of words in \textit{Frogs} 1177 ff. The likelihood of this suggestion is enhanced by Nestle's demonstration of the allusion to Prodicus in the \textit{Birds} (see below), and by the conclusions of this paper.
6. Cf. Starkie, \textit{ad loc.}, who compares \textit{meteologos} (Plato, \textit{Rep.} 488 E) and other terms which give a more or less literal meaning to \textit{meteora}.
7. Starkie, \textit{ad loc.}, cites Plato, \textit{Polit.} 299 for the connection between astronomy and medicine. Starkie is again, of course, taking \textit{meteora} literally.
8. Teuffel, \textit{ad} 488 and 490, sees in the apparent discrepancy between the \textit{peri tón} \textit{meteora} and the question which actually follows evidence that the text has been shortened by Aristophanes in this second edition of the play. At 1284 ff. Strepsiades refuses the second creditor, Amyntas, his money because of his ignorance about \textit{meteora}. Amyntas cannot answer his question about rain, a meteorological phenomenon about which (pace Teuffel) Strepsiades has received ample instruction. On the other hand, the first creditor, Pasias, is denied his petition because he confuses the gender of words (1214 ff.). What Teuffel did not understand is that \textit{all} the teaching of Socrates, both astronomical and
rhetorical, was peri τὸν μετεώρον.

9. Ἔλλας ὑπάκοα μετέωρος ἢ μετέωρος also Thuc. VI, 10 and Polybius II, 107,6


13. Cf. Frogs 818 ff. for an extended set of metaphors which convey the substantive nature of words. The practice, of course, is not derived from Aristophanes alone or from the sophists. Homer's ἐπα pteroventa as formulaic represent probably a pre-Homeric expression of the notion that words are things.


16. The Dinos may have been represented before the entrance of the Phrontisterion as a pot. See Starkie, ad loc., on the scholiast's explanation of the passage.

17. Cf. Diels' B 5 (Sext. adv. math. IX 18): "Prodicus of Ceos says that the ancients believed that the sun, moon, rivers, springs, and everything which benefits our lives were gods because of the benefit coming from them, just as the Egyptians regard the Nile as a god, and for this reason bread is considered Demeter, wine Dionysus, water Poseidon, and fire Hephaestus, and indeed each of the most useful things."


20. It would be interesting to know more about Aristophanes' own Horae. W. Schmid, op. cit., 1,4, p. 196 sees in Fr. 569 ideas similar to those of Prodicus' Horae, (as reconstructed by Nestle).

21. Starkie, Appendix ad 889-948, has already compared Prodicus' Heracles parable to this agōn: "The prosopopeia seems to have been suggested by Prodicus, in whose allegory Vīrūte and Vīce offer themselves, in the guise of maidens, to the choice of the youthful Heracles." He goes on to compare the choice between the two kinds of life presented by Euripides in the Antiope, the vita contemplative and the vita activa. Joël has argued that Aristophanes was drawing upon the lost Protreptikos peri dikaiosynēs of Antisthenes.

22. Cf. Lucian, Somn. 6 and 9, concerning which F. G. Allinson, Lucian, Selected Writings, (New York 1905), pp. 1 ff.: "...the imaginative boy, sobbing himself to sleep, thinking always of the roller and the terrible uncle, may have dreamed his own version of that early sermonizing story, 'The Choice of Heracles.' The trained writer Lucian afterwards makes it a neat enough theme, dresses it up, and conversant now with Aristophanes, adds reminiscences of the contest between the Just and the Unjust Argument in the Clouds."

23. There is also an obscure Simon at 351, called a sophistes by Schol. V, which Rutherford emends to nosphites.

24. For similarities of Socrates to the sophists, particularly with respect to Prodicus' study of synonyms, see W. Schmid, op. cit., 1,3, p. 252.

25. See N. Demand, "The Identity of the Frogs," CPh 1970, 65, pp. 83-87, who argues that Aristophanes' unseen and uncostumed chorus of frogs was an addition intended to ridicule Phrynicus, whose name means "frog-like."


27. W. Schmid, op. cit., 1,3, p. 42, n.3, doubts whether Prodicus was rightly charged with greed for money.

28. Cf. v. Fritz and Freeman, locc. citt. Schmid, op. cit., 1, 3, p. 43, thinks the legend was spun from Aristophanes Fr. 490 k.