Aristotle and Plato's Theory of Transcendent Ideas

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I

Jaeger found evidence of Platonism in Aristotle's Eudemus, and commented that "at that time Aristotle was still completely dependent on Plato in metaphysics." Further, he discovered a fragment of Aristotle's Protrepticus (since then numbered 13) and showed in detail that there refers to Plato's Ideas. Thus, for the first time in the history of the study of Aristotle it was asserted that there was a Platonic period in the development of his thought. Among the opponents to this view was J. During, who wrote repeatedly to the effect "that Aristotle never accepted the theory of ideas" of Plato.

1. In discussing During's position, Cornelia J. de Vogel reformulated his question by adding the word "transcendent" to make his meaning more explicit. Thus, she asks: "Did Aristotle ever accept Plato's theory of transcendent ideas?" This addition is correct because Plato's Ideas, according to Aristotle in Book M of the Metaphysics, are the universals of Socrates made transcendent. Since transcendence is the distinguishing mark of Ideas, "Plato's Ideas" implicitly means "transcendent Ideas".

2. She is also correct from a methodological standpoint in taking into consideration such matters as Aristotle's positive theory in the second book of the Physics when she discussed whether or not Protr. Pr. 13 contains Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas. Since the question is Aristotle's acceptance or non-acceptance of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, it is unjustifiable from a methodological standpoint to limit oneself in discussing the problem to Aristotle's criticism of Plato and yet neglect the positive part of Aristotle's own thought. One should examine the constructive part as well as the destructive part to see whether or not there are any remnants of Plato's theory of transcendent ideas contained in it, not just in any respect, but solely in respect of transcendence. Such a carry-over constitutes evidence of acceptance, while the inference from the unfavorable criticism to the rejection of the theory criticized is indirect and subject to erroneous inference in many ways, e.g. one may overlook the distinctions involved in Aristotle's discussion of the problem of ἐνισχήσει. Let us consider the distinctions in question.

3. I have taken the term "transcendent Ideas" directly from de Vogel. The meaning of the phrase, however, requires elucidation in order to reach an unambiguous answer to the question proposed. I understand it in the following way, without assuming that de Vogel does too: "Transcendent Ideas" is a translation of ἐνισχήσεως. The original phrase was not Plato's, but rather was coined by Aristotle. The linguistic basis of the coinage is most likely the passage in the Parmenides: ἐκ τῆς ἀυτῆς καὶ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως ἐνισχήσεως. This is an extreme type of ἐνισχήσεως, the reciprocal ἐνισχήσιος between Ideas and their particular instances. Plato's usual form, though not expressed in technical terminology, is, e.g., the opposition between ἐκ τῆς καὶ ἐκ τῶν τῆς ἐνισχήσεως with the stress laid on the ἐνισχήσεως of the Idea. The παρά in a context like this Phaedo passage indicates transcendence. The Idea of the Equal transcends the corresponding instances of equality in the sense that it is separate from them. So do other Ideas.

This is one sense of "transcendent Ideas". Although it is the most prominent sense, and almost the only sense which is usually understood
—or stressed, there are two other senses which must be distinguished from it. E.G., when a carpenter looking to the Idea of Shuttle makes a shuttle, the idea transcends not only the wooden shuttle to be made (and even the one which has been made), but also the mind of the carpenter. This is the realism of Plato; the attempt in another passage to make Ideas subjective is immediately refuted. This is the second sense of "transcendental Ideas": Ideas transcend the human mind.

There is still a third sense. According to the Platonic story of "creation" in the Timaeus, God created the world looking to the intelligible pattern. Since a τιμᾶν necessarily implies χωρίσμα, there is another sense of "transcendental Ideas": They transcend the divine mind.

But if, when one discusses whether Aristotle ever accepted Plato's transcendent Ideas, he keeps in view only these three senses, it will be far from sufficient. The problem of χωρίσμα for Aristotle was very complicated. He distinguished three main types of χωρίσμα (designated χωρίσμα τοιούτου, χωρίσμα νέως, and χωρίσμα νήσου, the expressions for the first two being again various). If "transcendent" is an appropriate translation of χωρίσμα it is appropriate for the first type only. The present paper will be limited to the first type of χωρίσμα since that will be enough to accomplish its purpose and to take all the three types into consideration would far surpass its scope.

Even within this limitation one has to pay attention to three other points in Aristotle's treatment of the problem of χωρίσμα τοιούτου or χωρίσμα τοιούτου. One must on each occasion specify the following points in the given context: (1) What that is which is separate (τι χωρίστον), (2) From what it is separate (τινός χωρίστον'), and (3) How it is separate (πώς χωρίστον'). The three senses of transcendence in Plato's theory all fall under point (2)14, but they do not coincide completely with it. There are also further distinctions among the τινός in the sense of "what those things are from which the particulars are separate."

4. From the foregoing considerations it follows: (1) In order to prove the thesis that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, one has to show that wherever in the Corpus Aristotelicum the author is concerned with the problem of των χωρίσματα τοιούτου (whether in the sense of Plato's Ideas or his own forms), he denies χωρίσματα absolutely or at least he does not affirm it even relatively. (2) In order to disprove the same thesis, one has to show that in at least one passage15 where Aristotle is concerned with the same problem (whether with regard to Plato's Ideas or his own forms) he does not deny the χωρίσματα absolutely or at least affirms it relatively. By "absolutely" is meant "without regard to what those εἶδος are whose separation (των χωρίσματα γίνομεν) is in question, what those things are the separation from which is at issue and what are the ways in which the separation of the former from the latter is to be ascertained." By "relatively" is meant "with regard to the specification in each case." It is in terms of these methodological requirements that the present paper will evaluate Düring's thesis.

II

1. We begin with the Eudemus, whose interpretation first raised the question whether Aristotle had a Platonic period. Jeager found in the fragments of this writing evidence of Platonism in the earlier thought of Aristotle. Düring objects to this, his chief ground being that in Fr. 5 it is not Aristotle but Proclus (the man to whom the fragment owes its preservation) who is speaking. So Düring does not deny the Platonic content of the fragment since
(as a Neo-Platonist) Proclus' theory so far as the content of the fragment is concerned has its ultimate source in Plato; rather during denies only the Aristotelian authorship. Hence we may be brief here and content ourselves simply with pointing to the fact that in Fr., 5, the ἔνημερωμένον which is based upon Plato's Phaedo. 247a4, 248b4, 250b7, 247e3, 249a5, is Aristotle's usage18 and thus shows the Aristotelian authorship of the fragment. Even if we suppose that during is right in denying Aristotle the authorship of Fr. 5, what would this interpretation contribute to his general thesis? It proves only that Fr. 5 cannot be used to prove that Aristotle ever accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, but this is far from proving that he never accepted the same theory or even that he did not accept it at the time when the dialogue was written. (During does not deny that Aristotle once wrote a dialogue called the Eudemus.)

2. a. The classification of beings into categories is fundamental in Aristotle's metaphysics. Although the number and designation of categories given are not always the same, the contrast between the category of substance and the other categories is constant. Scholars of Aristotle usually designate the former the primary category and the latter the secondary categories. When relating the members of the secondary categories to substance, Aristotle usually calls them ἔνημερωμένα.

In the short treatise Categoricae19 ἔνημερωμένα are divided into four groups and there are two principles of division, inesse and predicability. On the first principle beings are distinguished into substrata and accidents (attributes); on the second, into subjects and predicates. Inesse is characteristic only of accidents in relation to substrata, which are individual substances, while predicability or prediction in the proper sense is found in every category, no matter whether it is primary or secondary.20 The ultimate subjects of prediction in the category of substance are particulars, the individual substances; the predicates are ἔνημερωμένα and ἐν ἐν.21

From the viewpoint of the Categoricae Platonic Ideas must be assigned to various categories. Since the members of secondary categories are all inherent in the individual substances, it might be thought that here Aristotle rejected Plato's transcendent Ideas, and since the Categoricae (if it is authentic) must be an early writing of Aristotle,22 one might conclude that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas. But such a conclusion would be too hasty. One must first ask whether Aristotle developed his theory purposely to refute Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.

Although the negative answer is more likely than the affirmative, let us grant the affirmative answer for the sake of the argument. One still has to consider the question what those things are whose ἐν ἐν is at issue here. The answer is: They are universals in the secondary categories of being. What about such Platonic Ideas as the Idea of Shuttle, the Idea of Table, and Ideas of natural objects such as the Idea of Man? (Although the Socrates in the Parmenides did not positively posit the Ideas of natural objects,23 Aristotle reports that Plato limited the Ideas to these alone.24) These became secondary substances in the scheme of the Categoricae. They are not regarded there as inherent in their particular instances.25 For the holder of a substantio-centric metaphysics26 the imminence of these Ideas in the individual substances is more important than the inherence of the universals of secondary categories in them. Only inherence in the first case is denied.
From here we may see that the supposition that Aristotle in the *Categories* purposely refuted Plato’s theory of transcendent Ideas is very unlikely. For had he really had this purpose, he would have attacked the transcendence of the Ideas of substances rather than those of qualities, quantities, etc.

b. A passage in the *Analytica Posteriora* where Aristotle criticizes Plato’s Ideas as being “mere sounds without sense”\(^27\) receives undue emphasis from Düring.\(^28\) In terms of our problem this passage is not very significant for there Aristotle is still referring to “these predicates which do not signify substance,” i.e., to accidental attributes, e.g. ἀετός, and not to the Ideas of substances\(^29\); *ipso facto* he shows that he does not intend to deny the latter.

c. In one of the passages on demonstration in this same *Analytica* Aristotle criticizes Plato by saying that demonstration does not necessarily imply ἀλήθεια or “a One beside Many,”\(^30\) but it does necessarily imply the middle term in the syllogism. “A One beside Many” refers not only to the Ideas of qualitative, quantitative nature, etc., but also to the Ideas of substances, shuttle, table, man, etc. However, the status of Ideas is considered not from the ontological viewpoint but from the logical: Their transcendence is regarded as unnecessary for purposes of demonstration. Again one cannot draw the conclusion that Aristotle did not accept Plato’s transcendent Ideas by pointing to this criticism. The legitimate interpretation is that Aristotle did not use Plato’s theory of transcendent Ideas as the basis of demonstration. That is entirely different from rejecting it.

3.a. Among Aristotle’s physical writings we shall first consider the second book of the *Physics* because de Vogel attaches considerable importance to “the theory of teleology in nature” in this book as decisive for the question of Aristotle’s rejection of Platonic transcendent Ideas. She does not discuss this book in detail, but assumes the theory as well-known and uses it finally in an attempt to prove that ὁμοίως ἐνεργεῖν in *Protr.* Fr. 13 cannot refer to transcendent Ideas. Let us quote her own words: "The theory of teleology in nature" in *Phys.* II is "the theory of an immanent 'end', which is realized in the natural objects, which is their 'essence' and their 'good'—this theory which for Aristotle took the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas is already clear in the *Protrepticus.*\(^31\) For the moment we shall omit the part of this quotation which concerns the *Protrepticus*, and concentrate on the teleology in nature in *Phys.* II.

First we have to ascertain what she means by "the theory of teleology in nature". If she means the theory which holds that the ἐνεργεῖν of natural objects is telic, that is correct. However, Aristotle speaks not of "an immanent end" which is realized in the natural objects, "but of a plurality of 'ends," one for each species. The generation of a human being has the ἐνεργεῖν τὸ πάθη τῆς ἐνέργειας and the generation of a horse has the ἐνεργεῖν τῶν ἐνέργειαν for their respective ends, but there is no common "end" or ἔνεργεια in the sense of that toward which (ἐνέργεια) the development of human beings, horses, etc., proceed.

This is a general explanation, but we need a more exact exposition of the theory of natural generation. For this purpose the following passage will serve as the basis of our interpretation: ἀληθὲς ὁ πᾶσον τῶν γνωστῶν ἐνεργεῖν τὸ ἔνεργον καὶ ἦ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἦ ὁ πᾶσον τῶν τίμων ἔνεργεια ἐνεργεῖαι, καὶ περὶ πάντων ἔστιν εἰς ἄρτι καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἐν ἑαυτῷ αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἐνα οὕτως ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶν.\(^32\)
To know the form to the extent of knowing the end is justified by the frequent coincidence of formal, final and efficient causes. 33 ἱνθατα is not clearly explained by Ross; it refers to the ends of generations of natural objects. In respect of their being forms 34 they are separate from the γραμμεια, i.e., from the substrata which undergo the processes of generation, but they are immanent in the bodies of the generators. The form of man as the end of generation of a human being is separate from him who has not yet come to be, but immanent in the male parent. Thus, this passage denies the transcendence of the ἔνδος ἀνθρώπου as the form of man from the male parent, but affirms that the ἔνδος as the end transcends that which is becoming but has not yet come to be. It must be ὕπαιτον τοῦ γραμμεια, for (to borrow a word from de Vogel) it is not yet "realized". If it were not ὕπαιτον, the γραμμεια would no longer be what it is; instead it would be a new human being. But, as a matter of fact, at the moment he is not yet there. How can it be in a thing which has not yet come to be or which does not yet exist?

To understand Aristotle's view still more precisely, one must take into consideration the difference between actuality and potentiality. The form is potentially in, and actually transcends, the substratum, the γραμμεια, so long as the latter has not reached the end of the process of generation. Since for Aristotle actuality is prior to potentiality, 35 the actual separation should be stressed rather than the potential immanence.

The alternation of two kinds of status, ὕπαιτον ἔνδος and ἐνθατα, of one and the same ἔνδος as the ἔνδος and the ἕνθατα vary is still clearer in the sentence following the above quotation: ἀνθρώπως ἔνδος ἐνθατα ἐνθατα ἔνδος. 36 This sentence is best explained by a passage in Met. 237 where it is repeated in order to explain that ἔνδος in the sense of form 38 as the efficient cause of natural generation is the same ἔνδος in a different member of the same species (in the case of human generation the efficient cause is the form of man immanent in the male parent). In this passage the transcendence of efficient cause is not brought out as clearly as its immanence, but in Met. A both are equally clearly stated, ἐπι μὲν οὖν τοῦτο τὸ τελεῖον παρὰ τὸν σωματικὸν οὐσίαν, ἐπι ὑπώτας τοῦ ἔνδος . 39 ἄλλο εἴπερ, ἐπι τοῦ ὑπώτας. 40 We ask: Πῶς?

Aristotle answers: τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αὐτὰ ὡς προερχομένα ὑπάρχον, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐκ λέγοντος μικρό. 41 Efficient causes (the ἔνδος) as they precede the final results of the process, the γραμμεια, are separate from the latter and as formal causes are at the same time with, i.e., immanent in, τὰ καθ' ἐκματισμοῖ.

To sum up concerning the ἔνδος in the sphere of natural generation Aristotle's view is: (1) ἔνδος in the sense of formal cause is immanent in its particular instances (τὰ καθ' ἐκματισμοῖ), but not without qualification. It is immanent in those which are actually existent as such, but separate from those which are undergoing the process of generation and have not yet come to be. (2) As efficient cause it is (a) immanent in the generator as its form and (b) separate from (i) that which is undergoing the process of generation and (ii) that which is generated. (3) As the final cause, it is similar to the efficient with respect to its transcendence and immanence in (a) and (b) (i) but different from (ii), namely, it is immanent in the γραμμεια as its form. In any case Aristotle's "theory of teleology in nature" did not take the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas; both transcendence and immanence, find their place side by side in this theory, though not without qualification in each case. A more adequate interpretation would be that Aristotle
retains Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas with such modifications as the distinctions in the subject-matter itself require.

b. The primary substances in the Categoricae in fact comprise both natural and artificial objects, though no example of the latter is given there. (Such examples are abundant in other places in the Aristotelian corpus.) We may consider Aristotle's theory of genesis in the first book of the Physics to help us understand his view on the problem of ἀρχή in the sphere of artificial production. According to the result of his analysis change is a process between contraries;42 what changes is always coupled with one of the contraries at the terminus a quo and with the other at the terminus ad quem. It is never something simple, but always a duplex of ἐνόημον, and στήμος or ἔδος.43 In the case of the substantial change or "simple genesis," e.g., the building of a house, before the house is built, its materials (ἐνόημον) such as bricks and stones lie asunder, and when it has been built they are arranged in such a way that the form of the house is embodied in it.44 ἔδος taken together with στήμος to form a contrariety in any kind of change is employed in a general sense; when it is used to refer to change in the primary category it has the narrow sense of substantial form.45 So the form of house is inherent in the house built. That this is Aristotle's view is testified to by his describing the house as σύμβετον.

However, we cannot infer from this that Aristotle here rejected Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas because—as Solms properly notes here the problem of the status of the form, whether it is transcendent or immanent, is not even under discussion.46 The theory as it stands deviates from Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, but it was not meant to deny the Platonic theory.

Even if we ignore Solmsen's warning, another point must be taken into consideration: The establishment of inherence is ultimately based upon the acceptance of the ἄρχη as a σύμβετον. Since that which changes is never a simplex, but always a duplex, then just as it is coupled with the form at the terminus ad quem of the process it is coupled with the στήμος at the terminus a quo. That is, at this terminus the form transcends the substratum. Here in the sphere of artefacta as in the sphere of natural generation, transcendence and immanence, with the necessary modifications, are found side by side; one cannot conclude in simplistic fashion that Aristotle here either did or did not accept Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.

We must also ask how the form of a manufactured object as efficient cause is related to the τεχνής. The relation is more complicated than that of the form as efficient cause of natural generation to the male parent. In a certain sense, it is true that in the one case as in the other the form is not transcendent. But the ἔδος is different. The efficient cause of building a house is immanent in the house-builder not as his substantial form but as an art; the efficient cause of human generation is immanent in the male parent not as a τεχνή but as his ἔδος. Since art or science is an ἐξίς, a quality, the form of the house is immanent in the τεχνής in the way that an accidental attribute is in an individual substance. This is still not the whole explanation of the relation between the form of an artefactum and the artisan; it is only the first half, and the second half still remains.

4. In order to complete the unfinished discussion, let us consider first a passage from Met. Z7 and then in the following section we shall discuss the Protrepticus. (This order should not be taken as having any chronological implications.) In the passage from Met. Z7 Aristotle analyzes another kind of artefacta, namely, health. The production of health is a process consisting of
two parts, the first of which is ἱδέα and the second ἱδέα. The problem is how to restore health to the patient. The ἱδέα starts with the definition of health, the art of medicine, in the physician’s mind. "Since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy this must first be present, e.g., a uniform state of body, and if this is to be present there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking thus until he reduces the matter to a final something" which he can do and then he does it.49 Here the ἱδέα stops and the ἱδέα begins. The second process runs in the direction opposite to the first process and ends in the presence of health in the patient’s body. In the whole process of restoration of health the ἱδέα depends upon the ἱδέα. So far, this is the same as the conclusion we reached at the end of the previous section, i.e., the efficient cause of artificial production is the ἱδέα ὑπ’ ἑυρήκης or the τέχνη ἱδέα.

The τέχνη ἱδέα is strictly determined by the essence of health, whose definition is the medical art in the physician’s mind, for if he deviates even a little in his thinking from the essence of health the actual health could not be produced in the body of the patient. The essence of health is the cause in the strict sense of the health which is restored,50 if the medical art is said to be the cause, it is simply for the reason that the science works in virtue of its objective content, i.e. the essence of health. The essence of health as the object of knowledge transcends the mind of the physician.51 It is an ἀγαθόν ἱδέα ὑπ’ ἑυρήκης, as a form of quality to art of knowledge, and then from knowledge referred again to form as an ἱδέα ἀγαθόν ἱδέα ὑπ’ ἑυρήκης. The second reference is just the one Plato made in the refutation of a possible subjectivization of Ideas in the Parmenides.52 In view of this similarity, one can hardly say that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.

What is true of the ἱδέα of health is equally true of the ἱδέα of house and the like. These are also ἀγαθά ἱδέα, which do not depend on the knowledge of artisans, but rather the knowledge of artisans depends on them. From this we can see quite clearly how the second reference is necessary in Aristotle's metaphysics. The knowledge of building a house or architecture as the efficient cause precedes the house to be built. Since knowledge is an ἵδεα and house a substance, it would follow that quality is prior to substance - and this is impossible according to Aristotle.53 By the second reference the efficient cause is referred to the essence of house, essence being a substance. Thus the possibility of a contradiction to his substantio-centric metaphysics is avoided. The result is that the essence of house as efficient cause transcends the house to be built.

5. The Protrepticus, especially Fr. 13, is the passage most often debated so far as the question "Did Aristotle ever accept Plato’s transcendent Ideas?" is concerned. Jaeger paraphrases αὐτῷ τῷ ἑπάνω ἐδίκαιον as the spectator of Ideas. Dühring, among others, objects quite strenuously to Jaeger’s interpretation. He understands the word αὐτῷ in the phrase in question as αὐτῷ τῷ ἑπάνω ἐδίκαιον, "(that which is exact in itself") and advises us that "the expressions αὐτὰ τὰ ἑκκρίβη and αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα should be interpreted against the background of Anal. Post. A 2. "56 Supposing we follow his advice, what can the ἅπαξ ἱδέα in Fr. 13, (which in his view is the ἅπαξ ἱδέα of αὐτὰ τὰ ἑκκρίβη), mean? Among the principles of the demonstrative science (according to Analytica Posteriora) are: Axioms (such as the law of contradiction, the law of excluded middle), and definitions peculiar to each special science. Are the laws made by the philosopher the copies of such axioms or definitions? Could such imitations make up the laws of any state? Moreover, the original form from which the philosopher copies his laws is by implication.57 ἢ ἐκ τούτου Aristoteles, however, never called axioms and definitions "devine". Of which of the two is this an appropriate epithet, the first principles
of demonstrative science or Platonic Ideas? Finally, in the next sentence we read
μόνος γὰρ τοὺς τὰς ψυχὴς βίον τε καὶ τοὺς τὰ δέιχν. According to
Düring, ψυχή and also δέιχν refer to the αὐτός in line 10 or to
αὐτός τὰς ἀκρίβειας in line 15. How can ψυχή in the sense of "the principle of
order and stability" and αὐτό τὰ ἀκρίβειας, interpreted "against the
background of Anal. Post. A 2" in the sense of principles, axioms, definitions,
etc., of demonstrative science, mean the same thing? No such difficulties occur
if αὐτός refers to Platonic Ideas and ψυχή is used in the vague sense
of "reality", and referring to Plato's theory of Ideas in the sense of "the World
of Ideas".

Despite de Vogel's expression of gratitude to Düring "that on this point
his interpretation of Protr., Fr. 13] he led the way to a better understanding", she
does not follow his lead. Instead she offers her own view on the fragment.
Her interpretation is based upon her interpretation of Fr. 11 of the same work.
On the latter she comments: "Here, then, we have essentially the whole theory of
teleology in nature, known to us from Phys. II. The theory of immanent 'end'...
which for Aristotle took the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, is
already clearly present in the Protrepticus". Then she says of Fr. 13: "Seeing
...Fr. 11 behind I feel almost sure that we have to understand the author in this
sense [in the sense of immanent forms], not in that of Plato's transcendent Ideas.

If what we said above (Pt. II, 3 a) about her interpretation of the theory of
teleology in nature in Phys. II is correct, this theory did not take the place of
Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas in Aristotle's thought. Hence, we may be
brief and content ourselves with asking a simple question: If αὐτός refers
to immanent forms, ἐν τοῖς are they immanent? Surely they cannot be imman-
ent in the existing laws, "whether of Sparta or of Crete or of any other state".
To copy from empirical laws is just what a good legislator will not do. Immanence
in the laws yet to be made is sheer nonsense. How can the legislator copy anything
from the laws which are not yet made? Does he copy from his thoughts? This
subjective interpretation already shows the transcendence of Ideas; they transcend
(in the sense of preceding) the laws to be made. His thoughts are "borrowed"
(i.e. "copied") "from nature and reality". Finally, in replying to the question
of ὑπὸ τοῖς the Ideas are supposed to be immanent, one must answer ὑπὸ τοῖς
ψυχῆς. Thus the forms in question are just Plato's transcendent Ideas, "viz.,
the forms in nature [Düring].

The forms involved in Fr. 13 are forms of another kind of artefacta; they
are ἔθιμα of value. They together with the ἔθιμα of health and the like
form a group of forms of non-substantial artefacta different from the forms of
substantial artefacta, such as the ἔθιμα of house. Both kinds are
παράδειγματα in imitation of which artefacta are made. The archetypal character
implies their χρύσισίδα. The forms of value differ again from the ἔθιμα
of health and the like by being at the same time ideals, standards of value. As
such, they can only be approached: they are never perfectly reach by human creation.
This ideal character guarantees that they always transcend human creation and the
created.

III

Before concluding this paper we wish to go a step further so as to see what
was the chief difficulty Aristotle found in Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas
and what he really did in his treatment of the problem of χρύσισίδα. This pro-
cedure will result in a more positive explanation of Protr. Fr. 13 than what was
indicated earlier in Pt. II, no. 5.
In Met. A 9, which is the main source of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's metaphysics, he says: *παραγωγής δὲ μὲν ἐνδοτήρων ὑπὸ τοῦ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τὰ ἐγέρτο τοὺς ὑποστάσεως τῶν κατατάξεως καὶ μεταμόσχευσις.* For (1) they cause no change in the physical objects nor (2) help towards (a) the knowledge of these objects or (b) their being. The reason for "(2)" is that Ideas are not forms immanent in the physical objects. The reason for "(1)" is that Ideas are neither causes of the motion of heavenly bodies nor of the generation of perishable objects. The causes of change are God in the first case and the generator or artisan in the second. They are particulars; they are not Ideas. But, as we saw above, in natural generation the efficient cause should be extended further to ψύκσ, the form which is immanent in the generator; in artificial production the efficient cause is instead the Ideas (e.g., ἴδεια τῆς ψυκῆς) in the sense of the science by which a quality is immanent in the mind of the artisan. Except in the case of cosmic motions, the difficulties of Plato's theory all lie in the χωρικός of the Ideas. This χωρικός is an impossibility: ἰδείς εἰσὶ χωρὶς τὸν ὑπάρχον καὶ ὑπὸ ὑποτάσσεα — ὥστε τὸ πραγματωδὸν υπόστας χωρὶς εἶναι. 67

But why did Plato hold to the χωρικός of Ideas? To answer this question we must begin with an analysis of Plato's Ideas. They are, using Aristotelian terminology, formal causes, the principles of particulars being so-and-so. Let us call this aspect of Ideas the aspect of essence. 68 Τὸ καὶ πάντα τὶ ἐν τῷ καὶ πάντα. Beauty itself is the cause of bodies, minds, institutions, etc., being beautiful, or the Idea of Equality is the cause of sticks and stones being equal. But there is no beautiful instance which is not also ugly; equal sticks and stones always fall short of the Idea of Equality. Ideas are perfect. This is another aspect of Ideas. Let this aspect be called the aspect of ideal. This double aspect is most obvious in the Idea of the Good, the chief Idea among all Ideas, which is itself the highest value and at the same time the ἑτοίμη τῆς ἐπιστολῆς of being and becoming. 69

Plato was attracted by the fact that things are so-and-so, but no one of them is perfectly so-and-so. In order to explain this phenomenon he posited Ideas with the double aspect of essence and ideal. His explanation is the theory of μέθεια. Particulars are so-and-so because they partake of the nature of their Ideas. E.g., equal sticks participate in the Idea of Equality; hence they are equal. Their participation, however, involves a limitation of their possession of the attribute of being equal to a certain extent and is, therefore, an approximation to the Idea; they can never reach its perfection. The approximation is due to the double aspect of the Idea. The aspect of essence makes them like the Idea, and the aspect of ideal keeps their likeness to the Idea from coinciding with the ideal perfection.

Although this double aspect explains certain facts, it fails to explain certain other facts. So far as the aspect of essence is concerned, the nature of the Idea is shared by the particular instances. The Idea cannot be apart from them. If it were not in them, they would not be what they are. So far as the aspect of ideal is concerned, the Idea cannot be reached by them; it must be apart from them. This dilemma of ἐνδοτήρων and χωρὶς εἰσὶ is obvious in certain Ideas, e.g., in the Idea of Shuttle or Bed or the like. But Plato did not speak about these Ideas in detail; he was rather interested in such Ideas as Just Itself, Good Itself, Beauty Itself, etc., which are also Ideas. Such a one-sided emphasis is quite understandable in terms of the origin of his Ideas in the objects of Socrates' definition which are τὰ ἡθικὰ. 70 Aristotle saw the difficulty, and pointing, e.g., to a house, says: This house would not have come to be if the form of house were apart from it, 71 and we have already discussed his general formulation of the difficulty. 72 In cases like these Plato's theory must be modified.
Aristotle's modification was to separate the two aspects, retaining the aspect of essence for his substantial forms and leaving out the aspect of ideal. Substantial forms can be reached by particulars; when they are reached, they are immanent in the actually existent particulars. E.g. this animal is either a man or not a man. If it is a man, there is no variation of his being more or less a man. So long as the ἱ πομενος is undergoing the process of development, the form Man transcends it, or more exactly actually transcends it. As soon as it reaches the end of the process, it is actually so-and-so formed, i.e. the form is actually immanent in it. The transcendence refers to the ἐγγενής; the immanence refers to the ἄγγελος. There is an alternation in terms of the end having or not having been reached, but there is no alternation of the end in terms of having been reached in a higher or lower degree, since essence is divorced of value. The same is true of the forms of artefacta. When Aristotle criticizes Plato's transcendent Ideas, he means that the exclusion of the aspect of essence in the substantial forms is necessary.

There is another group of forms. They are Ideas of value. They are ideals and can only be approximated, never reached. Hence they are transcendent. The objects which the philosopher or the true statesman beholds in Protr. Fr. 13 are such Ideas. That they are Ideas of value is evident from their status as standards of value judgments. That they cannot be reached is clear from the fact that the good lawgiver does not look to the empirical laws for legislation. The reason for this is that no empirical laws reach the ideal perfection. They approach the ideal more or less; what most fully conforms to it is the best. The aspect of ideal entails transcendence. Here, Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas as having a double aspect is perfectly correct; it needs no modification and Aristotle simply accepted it in Protr. Fr. 13.

IV

1. We may sum up the results reached as follows:
   A. Ideas without regard to categorical distinction:
      They are transcendent without further specification (Eud.)
   B. Ideas with regard to categorical distinction:
      I. as universals in the secondary categories:
         They are inherent in the primary substances (Cat.)
      II. as substantial forms:
         1. as ἴδεα (or ἴδεας) they are not inherent in the primary substances (Cat.)
         2. as forms of natural objects:
            a. as formal cause the ἴδεα is:
               (i) immanent in the generator
               (ii) transcending the ἐγγενής
               (iii) immanent in the ἄγγελος
            b. as efficient cause:
               (i) immanent in the generator as its form;
               (ii) separate from
                  (α) what is undergoing the process;
                  (β) the generated;
            c. as final cause:
               (i) immanent in the generator as its form;
               (ii) separate from
                  (α) what is undergoing the process of being generated;
                  (β) immanent in the ἴδεα as its form (Phys. II, Met. Α, Ζ);
            3. as forms of artificial production, e.g. house, parallel to 2 (Phys. I,
               Met. Α, Ζ):
               a. with the exception that as efficient cause and as final cause the ἴδεα
                  is immanent in the ἴδεα as art or science in his mind (Met. Α, Ζ);
               b. with the peculiarity that as essence of the artefactum it transcends
                  his knowledge or skill (Met. Γ, Ε).
Appendix: as forms of non-substantial artefacta -
    a. as forms of physical qualities created by man, e.g. health; the same as 3.
    b. as forms of value: they transcend the particular instances and the minds of agents (Protr.) 79

Aristotle did not discuss the third type of transcendence of Plato's Ideas, (Ideas transcending God's mind). But his view may be obtained from Met. A: They are separated from God's mind in the sense that God does not think of them at all. 80

2. The table shows clearly that in none of the passages discussed does Aristotle deny the οἰκοδόμος of ἐγγὺς absolutely. He denies it relatively and also affirms it relatively. Only a failure to analyze the problem will lead one to the proposition that Aristotle always accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas or that Aristotle never accepted it. One is no more tenable than the other. The A-proposition is not made by anyone. The E-proposition is fought for by Düring. To disprove the E-proposition a single I-proposition is enough, and each of the cases discussed above provides the basis for an I-proposition. The historical truth is not what Düring supposes it to be, but rather that Aristotle accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas with modifications as the distinctions in the subject-matter under discussion on each occasion required. In so far as Ideas were ontological forms they were modified. The modifications are seen in Pt. II, nos. 2-4. In so far as Ideas of value were ideals, no modifications were needed; Plato's theory was simply accepted (Pt. II, no. 5). As for the Eudemus (Pt. II, no. 1) which was one of Aristotle's early writings, it appears likely that at the time of its composition he had not distinguished θεvertising ideas, and πᾶς ξυριστός in attacking the problem of ξυριστός of Ideas — in fact this did not constitute a problem in this dialogue at all, at least not in its extant fragments — Aristotle simply followed Plato.

Notes:

2. This fragment (Jambl. Protr. 10) was not included in V. Rose Aristotelis quae ferebantur librorum fragmenta; R. Walzer numbers it as Fr. 13 in his Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta, 1934. Sir David Ross includes it as Fr. 13 in his Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, 1945.
6. 4, 1078b 30-32.
7. Op. cit., pp. 181-184. My approval applies only to her method; with (1) her interpretation of Phys. II, (2) the application of her interpretation to Protr. Fr. 11 and (3) the inference on the question of the Platonic element in Protr. Fr. 13, I can in no way agree. For (1) cf. below II, 3a; my comments on (2) and (3) will be reserved for another occasion.
8. 130b 2-3. Cf. e.g. Met A 9, 991b 1-3.
9. Phaed. 74 a 9-12.
11. Parm. 132 b-c.
12. 28e – 29a.
14. Plato did not make a distinction among Ideas with respect to χωρίς τοῦ ἓν; all of them are equally transcendent.
17. Eranos. 1956, p. 115 (ap. de Vogel, op. cit., p. 273.)
19. I regard the first part of the Categoriae as authentic, but my justification of
20. 1, 1a 20–b6. /this view cannot be given in just a note.
22. The example of ἀνάκτοφος ) Cat. 4 2a1) need not be taken as referring to
Aristotle's own school. ἀνάκτοφος is also mentioned in Plato's Euthyd. 271d.
Protagoras was said to read his book On the Gods in the Lyceum (Diog. Laert. IX 54). So the Lyceum must have been a well-known place in Athens.
Hence Aristotle made use of it as an example to illustrate the category of
place.
23. 130c.
25. Cat. 2, 1a 20-22.
26. Such a metaphysics is already there in Cat. 5, 2b 6-6c (Oxford Edition).
27. 122, 83a33, Oxford translation.
29. 83a 30-35. The same example (Ἀνάκτοφος ) is used here as in Cat. 2.
30. I 11, 77a 5-9.
34. 194b9-15 is a "difficile passage", as A. Mansion observes in his Introduction
à la Physique Aristotélicienne, 2d e., p. 204, n. 17.
"The reading and punctuation of this sentence [194b 10-11] were debated by
the ancient commentators [See Rosèad loc., Aristotle's Physics, p. 510-511]
"..." (P.M. Cornford's note to P. H. Wicksteed's edition and translation of
Aristotle's Physics, vol. I, p. 125, n.d.). I accept Ross' reading and
punctuation, but this does not remove all the difficulties. The clause, καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾗ κυριότατα μὲν ἐδέλθε, ἐν ᾗ γὰρ (b12-13)
still needs explanation. What does τῶν refer to? What does ἐδέλθε mean?
The translations of R. F. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (The Works of Aristotle,
vol. 2), H. Carteron (French translation) and W. Charlton (Aristotle's
Physics, I, II) do not suggest any answer to the first question. Wick-
steed translates it by "forms"; Ross understands it the same way in his
commentary (op. cit., p. 510 on 194b 10-15). If they are correct, the
text would mean καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐν ᾗ κυριότατα μὲν ἐδέλθε...this
leads to the second question, what does ἐδέλθε mean? ἐδέλθε cannot refer to
the same thing as ἐδέλθε refers to. If it did, what could the whole expres-
son mean? Ross interprets κυριότατα ἐδέλθε by "separable in thought";
Wicksteed by "conceptually...detachable"; Charlton by "in account". It
is true, of course, that Aristotle often uses the expression κυριότατα ἐδέλθε
. But in such contexts ἐδέλθε means a definition (cf., e.g. Met. H 1, 1042a-
28-29) which is objective, and not the same as "in thought", which is
subjective. ἐδέλθε is even further removed from the notion "conceptually".
Aristotle's standing ter nology for these English translations is rather
νομικόν (e.g. Phys. II 2, 193b34). If these translators and commentators
are correct, why should Aristotle have not written καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐν ᾗ κυριότατα ἐδέλθε

That would be his usual style and its meaning would
also be clear. He had no reason to prefer the obscure expression to the clear one. ἐντὸς has an objective sense; it means in respect of species or form, in contrast to ὑπὸ (e.g. Met.Δ 9, 1018a 6; cf. ibid. b 1016b 31-32), e.g. two members of the same species, which have the same form, are ῥᾷτα ὑπὸ and ἑτέρα τῷ ῥᾷτῳ; two members of two different species, which have different forms, are ἑτέρα ὑπὸ ; one and the same individual is ἐν τῷ ῥᾷτῳ.

In the clause in question ἐντὸς must mean the same as ἐντὸς in b10 means, namely "form". Then ῥᾴτα cannot refer to forms. Its meaning follows from the preceding clause b11-12 with supplementation as suggested by Mansion (op. cit., p. 204, n. 17). It refers to τὰ ἑνὶ τοῦ the ends of generations of natural objects. It may seem that ὑπὸ could have its usual meaning "in respect of species", because the ἐντὸς of the generation of man and the ἐντὸς of the generation of horse are separate in kind. But it cannot have this meaning here because in the context Aristotle does not speak of the different kinds of species. From b9 on, he is speaking of the coincidence of formal and final causes. I understand the clause in question as meaning "in respect of their (ends) of natural generation" being forms, they are separate" - but from what? From those whose ends they are, i.e. from the ὑπὸ . But these ends in the sense of forms are immanent in the bodies of the generators.

35. For the sake of convenience, cf. Met.δ 8; priority is not limited to the temporal (for the different senses of priority cf. Met.Δ11).

36. 194b 13.
37. 7, 1032a 24-25.
39. For the omission of 1070a 14-15 cf. below p. 6.
40. 1070a 13-17.
41. Ibid. a21-22.
42. 5, 188a 19-b8. For the sake of brevity we may neglect the intermediate states.
43. 7, 190a 13-16, b23-24, b11-13.
44. In general, see 190 b9 ff. The example of ὄλημα is mentioned in 190b8; ἐντὸς is mentioned in b28 and ὑπὸ in b20.
45. This sense of ἐντὸς is confirmed by the term ὑπὸ in 190b20. For the sense of ὑπὸ see Met. 28, 1033b6.
46. Phys. I 7, 190b11.
47. Aristotle's System of the Physical World, p. 86.
48. Met.Α 3, 1070a 14-15. That the ἐντὸς of an artefactum is the τῇξις is also asserted in Met. Z 7. See the following section for the discussion of this passage.
49. 1032b 15 ff., Ross' translation.
50. Met. Z 7, 1032b5-6, 11-14. ἱπτῶμα is a λόγος, a λόγος τῆς ὑγείας. This λόγος has an objective content, which is the essence of health. Therefore the ὑγεία ἱπτῶμα is the cause of ὑγεία ἑρμηνεύω ἱπτῶμα. For the relation of the medical art, the λόγος τῆς ὑγείας, to its objective content, see the following note.
51. Cf. Met.Ν 5, 1010b 30-1011a1. There Aristotle speaks of the priority of the ὑπόκειμα which cause sensation over the sensation. For the sensation is not of itself but of the substrata. Parallel to this perceptual realism there is in his epistemology an intellectual realism. Intellectual knowledge, like perceptual knowledge, is an affection by the intelligible (De an. III 4, 429a 13-15). In the case of ἵπτῶμα, the art is determined by the essence of health. So the latter is ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῆς ἑρμηνείας of the restoration of health. For the concept of "most precise cause", see Phys. II 3, 195b 21-25, though there (for the sake of illustration) the ascent is only from the τῇξις to the art.
52. Met. E4, 1027b 31, K8, 1065a 24.
53. 132 b-c.
54. See, e.g. Met. Z13, 1036b 26-28. For the argument for the priority of substance, see 21, 1028a 30ff.
55. Mid-Fourth Century, p. 47.
56. Ibid. p. 48.
58. Mid-Fourth Century, p. 49.
61. Ibid. p. 282.
62. Ibid. p. 284. She interprets the fragment against the background of Phys. II rather than “against the background of Anal. Post, A2” as During advises.
63. Her interpretation of Fr. II is also questionable; I shall reserve my comments on it for another occasion.
64. Ross’ Fragmenta, p. 48, lines 19-23.
65. The quotation is from De Vogel, op. cit. p. 281.
66. 991A8-14.
67. Ibid. 991b1-3.
68. The term “essence”, ὁ τι ἐστι ἄλη is borrowed from Aristotle, but it is not an anachronism since the Aristotelian concept is traceable to Plato (cf. Crat. 386a d-e).
69. Rep. VI 511b.
71. Met. 28, 1033b 19-21.
72. Pt. III, second paragraph.
73. In this way, one group of Plato’s Ideas, i.e. ontological Ideas, were turned into Aristotelian essences. By “separate” it is not meant that the essence is not good, but that value does not belong to essence although it does belong concomitantly.
74. Cat. 5.2b26-27, 3b33-4a9.
75. Ross’ Fragmenta, p. 48, lines 5-7.
76. Ibid. p. 49, lines 19-23, 8-9.
77. This interpretation is not incompatible with the general theory in the Categoriae that the universals in the secondary categories are immanent in the primary substances. There Aristotle does not have Ideas of Value in view. This is evident from his regarding ἄρμοστη as a ἄρκηα (8, 10b 30-32). His approach is ontological or psychological, but not from the viewpoint of value.
One might object by pointing to the definition of moral virtue in Eth. Nic. as an ἐχθροπεία... II6, 1106b36.) But virtue as ἐθικ is only one of its aspects, the ontological aspect; it still has another aspect, the aspect of value. The double aspect is most clearly seen in Aristotle’s additional explanation given after the definition of moral virtue in order to prevent a possibly one-sided conception. He says διὸ κατὰ καὶ τῆς ὅλης καὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τι ἐστιν ἤθικα μετέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐν ἡξεν, καὶ λέγεται ὁ κατὰ πράξιν καὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ (Ibid. 1107a 6-8).
78. For the distinction between ὄνομα and ἐνεργεία, see above, p. 5.
79. The passages treated are selective. Some of them are discussed by others in the controversy over the question of Aristotle’s Platonic period; some are important for an adequate answer to the question formulated by De Vogel. The order of the passages discussed is not intended chronologically. The effectiveness of this paper does not depend on the selection or the ordering of its materials. For any one of these passages provides a basis for a proposition contradictory to During’s thesis that Aristotle never accepted Plato’s theory of transcendent Ideas.
80. 9, 1074b23-27, 33-34.

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