Aristotle and Plato's Theory of Transcendent Ideas

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ARISTOTLE AND PLATO'S THEORY OF TRANSCENDENT IDEAS

I

Jaeger found evidence of Platonism in Aristotle's Eudemus, and commented that "at that time Aristotle was still completely dependent on Plato in metaphysics." Further, he discovered a fragment of Aristotle's Protrepticus (since then numbered 13) and showed in detail that there refers to Plato's Ideas. Thus, for the first time in the history of the study of Aristotle it was asserted that there was a Platonic period in the development of his thought. Among the opponents to this view was Düring, who wrote repeatedly to the effect "that Aristotle never accepted the theory of ideas" of Plato.

1. In discussing Düring's position, Cornelia J. de Vogel reformulated his question by adding the word "transcendent" to make his meaning more explicit. Thus, she asks: "Did Aristotle ever accept Plato's theory of transcendent ideas?" This addition is correct because Plato's Ideas, according to Aristotle in Book M of the Metaphysics, are the universals of Socrates made transcendent. Since transcendence is the distinguishing mark of Ideas, "Plato's Ideas" implicitly means "transcendent Ideas".

2. She is also correct from a methodological standpoint in taking into consideration such matters as Aristotle's positive theory in the second book of the Physics when she discussed whether or not Protr. Fr. 13 contains Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas. Since the question is Aristotle's acceptance or non-acceptance of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, it is unjustifiable from a methodological standpoint to limit oneself in discussing the problem to Aristotle's criticism of Plato and yet neglect the positive part of Aristotle's own thought. One should examine the constructive part as well as the destructive part to see whether or not there are any remnants of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas contained in it, not just in any respect, but solely in respect of transcendence. Such a carry-over constitutes evidence of acceptance, while the inference from the unfavorable criticism to the rejection of the theory criticized is indirect and subject to erroneous inference in many ways, e.g. one may overlook the distinctions involved in Aristotle's discussion of the problem of ἀρχήσωμεν. Let us consider the distinctions in question.

3. I have taken the term "transcendent Ideas" directly from de Vogel. The meaning of the phrase, however, requires elucidation in order to reach an unambiguous answer to the question proposed. I understand it in the following way, without assuming that de Vogel does too: "Transcendent Ideas" is a translation of ἄρχοντα ἑως. The original phrase was not Plato's, but rather was coined by Aristotle. The linguistic basis of the coinage is most likely the passage in the Parmenides: χριστός ἐν ἑλικὸν ἀναπτύσσεται, χριστὸς δὲ τὸ ἀναπτύσσεται ἐν ἑως. This is an extreme type of χριστός, the reciprocal χριστός between Ideas and their particular instances. Plato's usual form, though not expressed in technical terminology, is, e.g. the opposition between ἄρχοντα and ἄρχειν τὸ ῥίζον with the stress laid on the χριστός of the Idea. The παρόδιο with the stress laid on the χριστός, the reciprocal χριστός, between Ideas and their particular instances. Plato's usual form, though not expressed in technical terminology, is, e.g. the opposition between ἄρχειν τὸ ῥίζον with the stress laid on the χριστός of the Idea. This is one sense of "transcendent Ideas". Although it is the most prominent sense, and almost the only sense which is usually understood.
or stressed, there are two other senses which must be distinguished from it. E.g., when a carpenter looking to the Idea of Shuttle makes a shuttle, the idea transcends not only the wooden shuttle to be made (and even the one which has been made), but also the mind of the carpenter. This is the realism of Plato; the attempt in another passage to make Ideas subjective is immediately refuted. This is the second sense of "transcendent Ideas": Ideas transcend the human mind.

There is still a third sense. According to the Platonic story of "creation" in the Timaeus, God created the world looking to the intelligible pattern. Since a παραβίασις necessarily implies χωρίσμα, there is another sense of "transcendent Ideas": They transcend the divine mind.

But if, when one discusses whether Aristotle ever accepted Plato’s transcendent Ideas, he keeps in view only these three senses, it will be far from sufficient. The problem of χωρίσμα for Aristotle was very complicated. He distinguished three main types of χωρίσμα (designated χωρίσμα ἐν αὐτῷ, χωρίσμα νέω, and χωρίσμα νότος, the expressions for the first two being again various). If "transcendent" is an appropriate translation of χωρίσμον it is appropriate for the first type only. The present paper will be limited to the first type of χωρίσμα since that will be enough to accomplish its purpose and to take all the three types into consideration would far surpass its scope.

Even within this limitation one has to pay attention to three other points in Aristotle’s treatment of the problem of χωρίσμα ἐν αὐτῷ. One must on each occasion specify the following points in the given context: (1) What that is which is separate (τὰ χωρίσματα), (2) From what it is separate (τινὸς χωρίσμον), and (3) How it is separate (πῶς χωρίσμον). The three senses of transcendence in Plato’s theory all fall under point (2), but they do not coincide completely with it. There are also further distinctions among the τινῶς in the sense of "what those things are from which the particulars are separate."

4. From the foregoing considerations it follows: (1) In order to prove the thesis that Aristotle never accepted Plato’s theory of transcendent Ideas, one has to show that wherever in the Corpus Aristotelicum the author is concerned with the problem of χωρίσμα ἐν αὐτῷ (whether in the sense of Plato’s Ideas or his own forms), he denies χωρίσμα absolutely or at least he does not affirm it even relatively. (2) In order to disprove the same thesis, one has to show that in at least one passage where Aristotle is concerned with the same problem (whether with regard to Plato’s Ideas or his own forms) he does not deny the χωρίσμα absolutely or at least affirms it relatively. By "absolutely" is meant "without regard to what those ἐδῶ are whose separation (χωρίσμα) is in question, what those things are the separation from which is at issue and what are the ways in which the separation of the former from the latter is to be ascertained." By "relatively" is meant "with regard to the specification in each case." It is in terms of these methodological requirements that the present paper will evaluate Düring’s thesis.

II

1. We begin with the Eudemus, whose interpretation first raised the question whether Aristotle had a Platonic period. Jaeger found in the fragments of this writing evidence of Platonism in the earlier thought of Aristotle. Düring objects to this, his chief ground being that in Fr. 5 it is not Aristotle but Proclus (the man to whom the fragment owes its preservation) who is speaking. So Düring does not deny the Platonic content of the fragment since
(as a Neo-Platonist) Proclus' theory so far as the content of the fragment is concerned has its ultimate source in Plato; rather Düring denies only the Aristotelian authorship. Hence we may be brief here and content ourselves simply with pointing to the fact that in Fr. 5, the τὸν ἔκτον ὑπερήματι which is based upon Plato's Phaedr. 247a4, 248b4, 250b7, 247e3, 249a5, is Aristotle's usage and thus shows the Aristotelian authorship of the fragment. Even if we suppose that Düring is right in denying Aristotle the authorship of Fr. 5, what would this interpretation contribute to his general thesis? It proves only that Fr. 5 cannot be used to prove that Aristotle ever accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, but this is far from proving that he never accepted the same theory or even that he did not accept it at the time when the dialogue was written. (Düring does not deny that Aristotle once wrote a dialogue called the Eudemus.)

2.a. The classification of beings into categories is fundamental in Aristotle's metaphysics. Although the number and designation of categories given are not always the same, the contrast between the category of substance and the other categories is constant. Scholars of Aristotle usually designate the former the primary category and the latter the secondary categories. When relating the members of the secondary categories to substance, Aristotle usually calls them στιγμένα.

In the short treatise Categoricae are divided into four groups and there are two principles of division, inesse and predicability. On the first principle beings are distinguished into substrata and accidents (attributes); on the second, into subjects and predicates. Inesse is characteristic only of accidents in relation to substrata, which are individual substances, while predicability or prediction in the proper sense is found in every category, no matter whether it is primary or secondary. The ultimate subjects of prediction in the category of substance are particulars, the individual substances; the predicates are ὑδή and ἠφή.

From the viewpoint of the Categoricae Platonic Ideas must be assigned to various categories. Since the members of secondary categories are all inherent in the individual substances, it might be thought that here Aristotle rejected Plato's transcendent Ideas, and since the Categoricae (if it is authentic) must be an early writing of Aristotle, one might conclude that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas. But such a conclusion would be too hasty. One must first ask whether Aristotle developed his theory purposely to refute Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.

Although the negative answer is more likely than the affirmative, let us grant the affirmative answer for the sake of the argument. One still has to consider the question what those things are whose ὑδή ἠφή is at issue here. The answer is: They are universals in the secondary categories of being. What about such Platonic Ideas as the Idea of Shuttle, the Idea of Table, and Ideas of natural objects such as the Idea of Man? (Although the Socrates in the Parmenides did not positively posit the Ideas of natural objects, Aristotle reports that Plato limited the Ideas to these alone.) These became secondary substances in the scheme of the Categoricae. They are not regarded there as inherent in their particular instances. For the holder of a substantio-centric metaphysics the imminence of these Ideas in the individual substances is more important than the inheritance of the universals of secondary categories in them. Only inheritance in the first case is denied.
From here we may see that the supposition that Aristotle in the
_Categoricae_ purposely refuted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas is very
unlikely. For had he really had this purpose, he would have attacked the
transcendence of the Ideas of substances rather than those of qualities,
quantities, etc.

b. A passage in the _Analytica Posteriora_ where Aristotle criticizes
Plato's Ideas as being "mere sounds without sense"²⁷ receives undue emphases
from Düring.²⁸ In terms of our problem this passage is not very significant
for there Aristotle is still referring to "these predicates which do not signify
substance," i.e., to accidental attributes, e.g. _νεκώρ_ , and not to the
Ideas of substances²⁹; _ipso facto_ he shows that he does not intend to deny the
latter.

c. In one of the passages on demonstration in this same _Analytica_
Aristotle criticizes Plato by saying that demonstration does not necessarily
imply _εἴδι_ or "a One beside Many,"³⁰ but it does necessarily imply the
middle term in the syllogism. "A One beside Many" refers not only to the
Ideas of qualitative, quantitative nature, etc., but also to the Ideas of
substances, shuttle, table, man, etc. However, the status of Ideas is considered
not from the ontological viewpoint but from the logical: Their transcendence is
regarded as unnecessary for purposes of demonstration. Again one cannot draw
the conclusion that Aristotle did not accept Plato's transcendent Ideas by pointing
to this criticism. The legitimate interpretation is that Aristotle did not use
Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas as the basis of demonstration. That is
entirely different from rejecting it.

3.a. Among Aristotle's physical writings we shall first consider the
second book of the _Physics_ because de Vogel attaches considerable importance to
"the theory of teleology in nature" in this book as decisive for the question
of Aristotle's rejection of Platonic transcendent Ideas. She does not discuss
this book in detail, but assumes the theory as well-known and uses it finally
in an attempt to prove that _ποταμικ_ in _Protr._ Fr. 13 cannot refer to
transcendent Ideas. Let us quote her own words: "The theory of teleology in
nature" in _Phys._ II is "the theory of an immanent 'end', which is realized in
the natural objects, which is their 'essence' and their 'good'—this theory
which for Aristotle took the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas is
already clear in the _Prorepticus._"³¹ For the moment we shall omit the part of
this quotation which concerns the _Prorepticus_, and concentrate on the teleology
in nature in _Phys._ II.

First we have to ascertain what she means by "the theory of teleology in
nature". If she means the theory which holds that the _νεκώρ_ of natural
objects is telic, that is correct. However, Aristotle speaks not of "an
immanent end" which is realized in the natural objects, "but of a plurality of
'ends," one for each species. The generation of a human being has the _εἴδος
'ομοιωποίω_ and the generation of a horse has the _εἴδος_ for their
respective ends, but there is no common "end" or _εἴδος_ in the sense of
that toward which (_Ůσ_ ) the development of human beings, horses, etc.,
proceed.

This is a general explanation, but we need a more exact exposition of
the theory of natural generation. For this purpose the following passage will
serve as the basis of our interpretation: _μεχρὶ ἐπὶ πόσον τοῦ νυμφοῦ
ἐκάθενα ἐκ τὸ εἴδος καὶ ἡ τῇ ἐστὶ... μεχρὶ τοῦ τίνος εὐκοῦ
ἐκάθενα, καὶ περὶ πάντα ᾧ ἐστὶν ἅμα ἡ μετὰ μὲν εἴδει, ἐν ὁμόρρυπα ὁ..._³²
To know the form to the extent of knowing the end is justified by the frequent coincidence of formal, final and efficient causes. In respect of their being forms they are separate from the ἐνδομοσία, i.e., from the substrata which undergo the processes of generation, but they are immanent in the bodies of the generators. The form of man as the end of generation of a human being is separate from him who has not yet come to be, but immanent in the male parent. Thus, this passage denies the transcendence of the ἔνδομοσία as the form of man from the male parent, but affirms that the ἔνδομοσία as the end transcends that which is becoming but has not yet come to be. It must be χωριστόν τῷ ἐνδομοσίῳ, for (to borrow a word from de Vogel) it is not yet "realized". If it were not χωριστόν, the ἐνδομοσία would no longer be what it is; instead it would be a new human being. But, as a matter of fact, at the moment he is not yet there. How can it be in a thing which has not yet come to be or which does not yet exist?

To understand Aristotle's view still more precisely, one must take into consideration the difference between actuality and potentiality. The form is potentially in, and actually transcends, the substratum, the ἐνδομοσία, so long as the latter has not reached the end of the process of generation. Since for Aristotle actuality is prior to potentiality, the actual separation should be stressed rather than the potential immanence.

The alternation of two kinds of status, χωριστόν ἐνδο and ἐνδομοσία, of one and the same ἔνδοσ as the τύπος and the τύποι vary is still clearer in the sentence following the above quotation: ἐνδομοσίας τῷ ἐνδομοσίῳ τῷ ἐνδομοσίῳ. This sentence is best explained by a passage in Met.237 where it is repeated in order to explain that ἐνδοσ in the sense of form as the efficient cause of natural generation is the same ἐνδοσ in a different member of the same species (in the case of human generation the efficient cause is the form of man immanent in the male parent). In this passage the transcendence of efficient cause is not brought out as clearly as its immanence, but in Met. Aristotle answers: τὰ μὲν ὁμοίως αὐτῷ ῥεμαγεμεμένῳ ὄργα, τὰ δὲ ὅσοι ἐλικὸς ἄμα. Efficient causes (the ἔνδοσ) as they precede the final results of the process, the ἐγερόμενον, are separate from the latter and as formal causes are at the same time with, i.e., immanent in, τὰ καθ' ἐκκαταρτή.

To sum up concerning the ἔνδοσ in the sphere of natural generation Aristotle's view is: (1) ἔνδοσ, in the sense of formal cause is immanent in its particular instances (τὰ ἐνδοῖκατεῖ), but not without qualification. It is immanent in those which are actually existent as such, but separate from those which are undergoing the process of generation and have not yet come to be. (2) As efficient cause it is (a) immanent in the generator as its form and (b) separate from (i) that which is undergoing the process of generation and (ii) that which is generated. (3) As the final cause, it is similar to the efficient with respect to its transcendence and immanence in (a) and (b) (i) but different from (ii), namely, it is immanent in the ἐγερόμενον as its form. In any case Aristotle's "theory of teleology in nature" did not take the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas; both transcendence and immanence, find their place side by side in this theory, though not without qualification in each case. A more adequate interpretation would be that Aristotle
retains Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas with such modifications as the distinctions in the subject-matter itself require.

b. The primary substances in the Categoricae in fact comprise both natural and artificial objects, though no example of the latter is given there. (Such examples are abundant in other places in the Aristotelian corpus.) We may consider Aristotle's theory of genesis in the first book of the Physics to help us understand his view on the problem of χερσίως in the sphere of artificial production. According to the result of his analysis change is a process between contraries; 42 what changes is always coupled with one of the contraries at the terminus a quo and with the other at the terminus ad quem. It is never something simple, but always a duplex of ὑποκειμένος, and στάμος or εἴδος. 43 In the case of the substantial change or "simple genesis," e.g., the building of a house, before the house is built, its materials (ὑποκειμένος) such as bricks and stones lie asunder, and when it has been built they are arranged in such a way that the form of the house is embodied in it. 44 εἴδος taken together with στάμος to form a contrariety in any kind of change is employed in a general sense; when it is used to refer to change in the primary category it has the narrow sense of substantial form. 45 So the form of house is inherent in the house built. That this is Aristotle's view is testified to by his describing the house as ἀνακτίνω.

However, we cannot infer from this that Aristotle here rejected Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas because—as Solmsen properly notes here the problem of the status of the form, whether it is transcendent or immanent, is not even under discussion. 47 The theory as it stands deviates from Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, but it was not meant to deny the Platonic theory.

Even if we ignore Solmsen's warning, another point must be taken into consideration: The establishment of inherence is ultimately based upon the acceptance of the χερσίως as a κύκτωτον. Since that which changes is never a simplex, but always a duplex, then just as it is coupled with the form at the terminus ad quem of the process it is coupled with the στάμος at the terminus a quo. That is, at this terminus the form transcends the substratum. Here in the sphere of artefacta as in the sphere of natural generation, transcendency and immanence, with the necessary modifications, are found side by side; one cannot conclude in simplistic fashion that Aristotle here either did or did not accept Plato's theory of transcendent ideas.

We must also ask how the form of a manufactured object as efficient cause is related to the τεχνίκη. The relation is more complicated than that of the form as efficient cause of natural generation to the male parent. In a certain sense, it is true that in the one case as in the other the form is not transcendent. But the πάσι is different. The efficient cause of building a house is immanent in the house-builder not as his substantial form but as an art; the efficient cause of human generation is immanent in the male parent not as a τεχνίκη but as his εἴδος. Since art or science is an εἴδος, a quality, the form of the house is immanent in the τεχνίκη in the way that an accidental attribute is in an individual substance. This still not the whole explanation of the relation between the form of an artefact and the artisan; it is only the first half, and the second half still remains.

4. In order to complete the unfinished discussion, let us consider first a passage from Met. Z7 and then in the following section we shall discuss the Protrepticus. (This order should not be taken as having any chronological implications.) In the passage from Met. Z7 Aristotle analyzes another kind of artefacta, namely, health. The production of health is a process consisting of
two parts, the first of which is γονή and the second ἕδος. The problem is how to restore health to the patient. The γονή starts with the definition of health, the art of medicine, in the physician's mind. "Since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy this must first be present, e.g., a uniform state of body, and if this is to be present there must be taut; and the physician goes onthinking thus until he reduces the matter to a final something" which he can do and then he does it. Here the γονή stops and the ἕδος begins. The second process runs in the direction opposite to the first process and ends in the presence of health in the patient's body. In the whole process of restoration of health the ἕδος depends upon the γονή. So far, this is the same as the conclusion we reached at the end of the previous section, i.e. the efficient cause of artificial production is the ἕδος ἐν τῷ ὄρθρῳ or the τέχνη γονῆς.

The ἕδος is strictly determined by the essence of health, whose definition is the medical art in the physician's mind, for if he deviates even a little in his thinking from the essence of health the actual health could not be produced in the body of the patient. The essence of health is the cause in the strict sense of the health which is restored, if the medical art is said to be the cause, it is simply for the reason that the science works in virtue of its objective content, i.e. the essence of health. The essence of health as the object of knowledge transcends the mind of the physician. It is an ἐν κύριῳ τῷ ἐν ἔτειναι ἑπεξε ναί κύριῳ τῷ ἐν ἔτειναι.52 Thus we are referred first from the ἔτειναι as a form of quality to art of knowledge, and then from knowledge referred again to form as an ἐν κύριῳ τῷ ἐν ἔτειναι. The second reference is just the one Plato made in the refutation of a possible subjectivization of Ideas in the Parmenides.53 In view of this similarity, one can hardly say that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.

What is true of the ἕδος of health is equally true of the ἕδος of house and the like. These are also ἐν κύριῳ, which do not depend on the knowledge of artisans, but rather the knowledge of artisans depends on them. From this we can see quite clearly how the second reference is necessary in Aristotle's metaphysics. The knowledge of building a house or architecture as the efficient cause precedes the house to be built. Since knowledge is an ἔτειναι and house a substance, it would follow that quality is prior to substance - and this is impossible according to Aristotle. By the second reference the efficient cause is referred to the essence of house, essence being a substance. Thus the possibility of a contradiction to his substantio-centric metaphysics is avoided. The result is that the essence of house as efficient cause transcends the house to be built.

5. The Protrepticus, especially Fr. 13, is the passage most often debated so far as the question "Did Aristotle ever accept Plato's transcendent Ideas?" is concerned. Jaeger paraphrases αὐτῶν ἦσστε ἐστὶ θεᾶς as the spectator of Ideas. Düring, among others, objects quite strenuously to Jaeger's interpretation. He understands the word αὐτῶν in the phrase in question as αὐτῶν τοῦ ἐν κύριῳ and advises us that "the expressions αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ and αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα should be interpreted against the background of Ἀναλ. Post. A 21.36 Supposing we follow his advice, what can the κύριος in Fr. 13, (which in his view is the κύριος of αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ), mean? Among the principles of the demonstrative science (according to Ἀναλ. Posteriora) are: Axioms (such as the law of contradiction, the law of excluded middle), and definitions peculiar to each special science. Are the laws made by the philosopher the copies of such axioms or definitions? Could such imitations make up the laws of any state? Moreover, the original form from which the philosopher copies his laws is by implication ὅπως ἦσστε. Aristotle, however, never called axioms and definitions "εὐείωσ". Of which of the two is this an appropriate epithet, the first principles
of demonstrative science or Platonic Ideas? Finally, in the next sentence we read:

μένος ὑπὸ τὸν ψυχὴν βαθὺν, ἡμῖν καὶ ὑπὸ τῇ θείᾳ. According to Düring, ψυχὴ refers to the ψυχή in line 10 or to ἀντίς ὑπὸ ἀληθείαν in line 15. How can ψυχὴ in the sense of "the principle of order and stability" and ἀντίς ὑπὸ ἀληθείαν, interpreted "against the background of Anal. Post. A 2" in the sense of principles, axioms, definitions, etc., of demonstrative science, mean the same thing? No such difficulties occur if ἀντίς ὑπὸ ἀληθείαν refers to Platonic Ideas and ψυχὴ is used in the vague sense of "reality", and referring to Plato's theory of Ideas in the sense of "the World of Ideas." 58

Despite de Vogel's expression of gratitude to Düring "that on this point [his interpretation of Protr., Fr. 13] he led the way to a better understanding", 60 she does not follow his lead. Instead she offers her own view on the fragment. Her interpretation is based upon her interpretation of Fr. 11 of the same work. On the latter she comments: "Here, then, we have essentially the whole theory of teleology in nature, known to us from Phys. II. The theory of immanent 'end'... which for Aristotle took the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, is already clearly present in the Prorepticus." 61 Then she says of Fr. 13: "Seeing...Fr. 11 behind I feel almost sure that we have to understand the author in this sense [in the sense of immanent forms], not in that of Plato's transcendent Ideas. 62

If what we said above (Pt. II, 3 a) about her interpretation of the theory of teleology in nature in Phys. II is correct, this theory did not take the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas in Aristotle's thought. Hence, we may be brief and content ourselves with asking a simple question: If ἀντίς ὑπὸ ἀληθείαν refers to immanent forms, ἡμὶν ὑπὸ τῇ θείᾳ are they immanent? Surely they cannot be immanent in the existing laws, "whether of Sparta or of Crete or of any other state". To copy from empirical laws is just what a good lawgiver will not do. 63 Immanence in the laws yet to be made is sheer nonsense. How can the lawgiver copy anything from the laws which are not yet made? Does he copy from his thoughts? This subjective interpretation already shows the transcendence of Ideas; they transcend (in the sense of preceding) the laws to be made. His thoughts are "borrowed" (i.e. "copied") "from nature and reality". Finally, in replying to the question of ὑπὸ τῇ θείᾳ the Ideas are supposed to be immanent, one must answer ἡμὶν ὑπὸ τῇ θείᾳ. Thus the forms in question are just Plato's transcendent Ideas, "viz., the forms in nature [Düring]." 65

The forms involved in Fr. 13 are forms of another kind of artefacta; they are ἐδῶ of value. They together with the ἐδῶ of health and the like form a group of forms of non-substantial artefacta different from the forms of substantial artefacta, such as the ἐδῶ of house. Both kinds are ὑπὸ διήκοντα in imitation of which artefacta are made. The archetypal character implies their χωρίσθαι. The forms of value differ again from the ἐδῶ of health and the like by being at the same time ideals, standards of value. As such, they can only be approached: they are never perfectly reach by human creation. This ideal character guarantees that they always transcend human creation and the created.

III

Before concluding this paper we wish to go a step further so as to see what was the chief difficulty Aristotle found in Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas and what he really did in his treatment of the problem of χωρίσθαι. This procedure will result in a more positive explanation of Protr. Fr. 13 than what was indicated earlier in Pt. II, no. 5.
In Met. A 9, which is the main source of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's metaphysics, he says: 'would be μετέχον διατροφήν ὁμοιός τις τοῦ θεοῦ σωματικῶν τοιαύτους καὶ μεθομένους; for (1) they cause no change in the physical objects nor (2) help towards (a) the knowledge of these objects or (b) their being.66 The reason for "(2)" is that Ideas are not forms immanent in the physical objects. The reason for "(1)" is that Ideas are neither causes of the motion of heavenly bodies nor of the generation of perishable objects. The causes of change are God in the first case and the generator or artisan in the second. They are particulars; they are not Ideas. But, as we saw above, in natural generation the efficient cause should be extended further to ψυχή, the form which is immanent in the generator; in artificial production the efficient cause is instead the Ideas (e.g. ζεῦς ψυχής) in the sense of the science which as a quality is immanent in the mind of the artisan. Except in the case of cosmic motions, the difficulties of Plato's theory all lie in the χωρισμός of the Ideas. This χωρισμός is an impossibility:

"ιδεῖται ὅτι χωρὶς τῆς οὐσίας οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐξόριζαν. Then Aristotle concludes with a rhetorical question ὅτι ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσίας χωρὶς οἶκος"67

But why did Plato hold to the χωρισμός of Ideas? To answer this question we must begin with an analysis of Plato's Ideas. They are, using Aristotelian terminology, formal causes, the principles of particulars being so-and-so. Let us call this aspect of Ideas the aspect of essence.68 Υπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ πάντα τὸ καλά καλά. Beauty itself is the cause of bodies, minds, institutions, etc., being beautiful, or the Idea of Equality is the cause of sticks and stones being equal. But there is no beautiful instance which is not also ugly; equal sticks and stones always fall short of the Idea of Equality. Ideas are perfect. This is another aspect of Ideas. Let this aspect be called the aspect of ideal. This double aspect is most obvious in the Idea of the Good, the chief Idea among all Ideas, which is itself the highest value and at the same time the ἀριθμότης of being and becoming.69

Plato was attracted by the fact that things are so-and-so, but no one of them is perfectly so-and-so. In order to explain this phenomenon he posited Ideas with the double aspect of essence and ideal. His explanation is the theory of μετέχον. Particulars are so-and-so because they partake of the nature of their Ideas. E.g., equal sticks participate in the Idea of Equality; hence they are equal. Their participation, however, involves a limitation of their possession of the attribute of being equal to a certain extent and is, therefore, an approximation to the Idea; they can never reach its perfection. The approximation is due to the double aspect of the Idea. The aspect of essence makes them like the Idea, and the aspect of ideal keeps their likeness to the Idea from coinciding with the ideal perfection.

Although this double aspect explains certain facts, it fails to explain certain other facts. So far as the aspect of essence is concerned, the nature of the Idea is shared by the particular instances. The Idea cannot be apart from them. If it were not in them, they would not be what they are. So far as the aspect of ideal is concerned, the Idea cannot be reached by them; it must be apart from them. This dilemma of ἀριθμότης and χωρισμός is obvious in certain Ideas, e.g. in the Idea of Shuttle or Bed or the like. But Plato did not speak about these Ideas in detail; he was rather interested in such Ideas as Just itself, Good itself, Beauty itself, etc., which are also ideals. Such a one-sided emphasis is quite understandable in terms of the origin of his Ideas in the objects of Socrates' definition which are τὰ θεῖα.70 Aristotle saw the difficulty, and pointing, e.g. to a house, says: This house would not have come to be if the form of house were apart from it,71 and we have already discussed his general formulation of the difficulty.72 In cases like these Plato's theory must be modified.
Aristotle's modification was to separate the two aspects, retaining the aspect of essence for his substantial forms and leaving out the aspect of ideal.73 Substantial forms can be reached by particulars; when they are reached, they are immanent in the actually existent particulars. E.g. this animal is either a man or not a man. If it is a man, there is no variation of his being more or less a man.74 So long as the ἄνθρωπος is undergoing the process of development, the form Man transcends it, or more exactly actually transcends it. As soon as it reaches the end of the process, it is actually so-and-so formed, i.e. the form is actually immanent in ἄνθρωπος. The transcendence refers to the ἄνθρωπος, the immanence refers to the ἄνθρωπος. There is an alternation in terms of the end having or not having been reached, but there is no alternation of the end in terms of having been reached in a higher or lower degree, since essence is divorced of value. The same is true of the forms of artefacta. When Aristotle criticizes Plato's transcendent Ideas, he means that the exclusion of the aspect of essence in the substantial forms is necessary.

There is another group of forms. They are Ideas of value. They are ideals and can only be approximated, never reached. Hence they are transcendent. The objects which the philosopher or the true statesman beholds in Protr. Fr. 13 are such Ideas. That they are Ideas of value is evident from their status as standards of value judgements.75 That they cannot be reached is clear from the fact that the good lawgiver does not look to the empirical laws for legislation. The reason for this is that no empirical laws reach the ideal perfection. They approach the ideal more or less; what most fully conforms to it is the best.76 The aspect of ideal entails transcendence. Here, Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas as having a double aspect is perfectly correct; it needs no modification and Aristotle simply accepted it in Protr. Fr. 13.77

IV

1. We may sum up the results reached as follows:
   A. Ideas without regard to categorial distinction:
      They are transcendent without further specification (Eud.)
   B. Ideas with regard to categorial distinction:
      I. as universals in the secondary categories:
         They are inherent in the primary substances (Cat.).
      II. as substantial forms:
         1. as ἰδεῖα (or ἰδέα) they are not inherent in the primary substances (Cat.)
         2. as forms of natural objects:
            a. as formal cause the ἰδεῖα is:
               (i) immanent in the generator
               (ii) transcending the ἰδεῖα
               (iii) immanent in the ἰδεῖα
            b. as efficient cause:
               (i) immanent in the generator as its form;
               (ii) separate from
               (α) what is undergoing the process;
               (β) the generated;
            c. as final cause:
               (i) immanent in the generator as its form;
               (ii) separate from
               (α) what is undergoing the process of being generated;
               (β) immanent in the ἰδεῖα as its form (Phys. II, Met. A, Z);
         3. as forms of artificial production, e.g. house, parallel to 2 (Phys. I, Met. A, Z);
            a. with the exception that as efficient cause and as final cause the ἰδεῖα
               is immanent in the ἰδεῖα as art or science in his mind (Met. A, Z);
            b. with the peculiarity that as essence of the artefactum it transcends
               his knowledge or skill (Met. X, E).
Appendix: as forms of non-substantial \textit{iprefacta}:

a. as forms of physical qualities created by man, e.g. health; the same as 3.

b. as forms of value: they transcend the particular instances and the minds of agents (Protr.) 79

Aristotle did not discuss the third type of transcendence of Plato's Ideas, (Ideas transcending God's mind). But his view may be obtained from Met: They are separated from God's mind in the sense that God does not think of them at all. 80

2. The table shows clearly that in none of the passages discussed does Aristotle deny the \textit{trivis} of Ideas absolutely. He denies it relatively and also affirms it. Only a failure to analyze the problem will lead one to the proposition that Aristotle always accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas or that Aristotle never accepted it. One is no more tenable than the other. The A-proposition is not made by anyone. The E-proposition is fought for by Dürer. To disprove the E-proposition a single I-proposition is enough, and each of the cases discussed above provides the basis for an I-proposition. The historical truth is not what Dürer supposes it to be, but rather that Aristotle accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas with modifications as the distinctions in the subject-matter under discussion on each occasion required. In so far as Ideas were ontological forms they were modified. The modifications are seen in Pt. II, nos. 2-4. In so far as Ideas of value were ideals, no modifications were needed; Plato's theory was simply accepted (Pt. II, no. 5). As for the Eudemus (Pt. II, no. 1) which was one of Aristotle's early writings, it appears likely that at the time of its composition he had not distinguished \textit{trivis} and \textit{trivis}, in attacking the problem of \textit{trivis} of Ideas - in fact this did not constitute a problem in this dialogue at all, at least not in its extant fragments - Aristotle simply followed Plato.

Notes:

2. This fragment (Jamb. Protr. 10) was not included in V. Rose Aristotelis quod ferebantur librorum fragmenta; R. Walzer numbers it as Fr. 13 in his Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta, 1934. Sir David Ross includes it as Fr. 13 in his Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, 1945.
6. 4, 1078b 30-32.
7. Op. cit., pp. 181-184. My approval applies only to her method; with (1) her interpretation of Phys. II, (2) the application of her interpretation to Protr. Fr. 11 and (3) the inference on the question of the Platonic element in Protr. Fr. 13, I can in no way agree. For (1) cf. below II, 3a; my comments on (2) and (3) will be reserved for another occasion.
8. 130b 2-3. Cf. e.g. Met A 9, 991b 1-3.
9. Phaed. 74 a 9-12.
11. Parm. 132 b-c.
14. Plato did not make a distinction among Ideas with respect to χρυσός; all of them are equally transcendent.
19. I regard the first part of the *Categoricae* as authentic, but my justification of
20. 2, 1a 20-b6. This view cannot be given in just a note.
22. The example of Ἀἴνηιον (Cat. 4 2a1) need not be taken as referring to
Aristotle's own school. Νέκτωρ is also mentioned in Plato's *Euthyd*. 271d.
Protagoras was said to read his book On the Gods in the Lyceum (Dioq.
Laert. IX 54). So the Lyceum must have been a well-known place in Athens.
Hence Aristotle made use of it as an example to illustrate the category of
place.
23. 130c.
25. Cat. 2, 1a 20-22.
26. Such a metaphysics is already there in Cat. 5, 2b 6-6c (Oxford Edition).
27. 122, 83a33, Oxford translation.
29. 83a 30-35. The same example (Ἀἴνηιον) is used here as in Cat. 2.
30. I 11, 77a 5-9.
34. "194b9-15 is a "difficult passage", as A. Mansion observes in his *Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne*, 2d e., p. 204, n. 17.
"The reading and punctuation of this sentence [194b 10-11] were debated by
the ancient commentators [See Rougad loc., Aristotle's *Physics*, p. 510-511]
"..." (P.M. Cornford's note to P. H. Wicksteeed's edition and translation of
Aristotle's *Physics*, vol. I, p. 125, n.d.). I accept Ross' reading and
punctuation, but this does not remove all the difficulties. The clause, καὶ
περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐγώ καὶ ὑποτελεῖται μὲν ἐν δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ὀλίγῳ ὁποῖον (b12-13)
still needs explanation. What does παῦν refer to? What does ἐν δὲ mean?
The translations of R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (The Works of Aristotle,
vol. 2), H. Carteron (French translation) and W. Charlton (Aristotle's
Physics, I, II) do not suggest any answer to the first question. Wick-
steed translates it by "forms"; Ross understands it the same way in his
commentary (ap. *Cit.*, p. 510 on 194b 10-15). If they are correct, the
text would mean καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑποτελεῖται μὲν ἐν
...this leads to the second question, what does ὀλίγῳ mean? ὀλίγῳ cannot refer to
the same thing as ἐν δὲ refers to. If it did, what could the whole expres-
Sion mean? Ross interprets ὑποτελεῖται ἐν δὲ by "separable in thought";
Wicksteed by "conceptually...detachable"; Charlton by "in account". It
is true, of course, that Aristotle often uses the expression ὑποτελεῖται ὁποῖον
. But in such contexts ὁποῖον means a definition (cf., e.g. *Met. E* 1, 1042a 28-29) which is objective, and not the same as "in thought", which is
subjective. ὀλίγῳ is even further removed from the notion "conceptually".
Aristotle's standing ter inology for these English translations is rather
νοητόν (e.g. Phys. II 2, 193b34). If these translators and commentators are
correct, why should Aristotle have not written καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῳ καὶ
χρυσός μὲν ὑποτελεῖται...? That would be his usual style and its meaning would
also be clear. He had no reason to prefer the obscure expression to the clear one. ἔλος has an objective sense; it means in respect of species or form, in contrast to ὁμοιόμορφος (e.g. Met. Δ 9, 1018a 6; cf. ibid. 6 1016b 31-32), e.g. two members of the same species, which have the same form, are ἄφθονα ὁμοιόμορφος and ἐπεξ ἐπεξήγησα τινα; two members of two different species, which have different forms, are ἐπεξ ἐπεξήγησα ἄφθονα; one and the same individual is ἀφθονόνως.

In the clause in question ἔλος must mean the same as ἔλος in b10 means, namely "form". Then ἄφθονα cannot refer to forms. Its meaning follows from the preceding clause b11-12 with supplementation as suggested by Mansion (op. cit., p. 204, n. 17). It refers to τὰ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῶν, the ends of generations of natural objects. It may seem that ἐν ἑαυτῷ could have its usual meaning "in respect of species", because the ἐλογος of the generation of man and the ἐλογος of the generation of horse are separate in kind. But it cannot have this meaning here because in the context Aristotle does not speak of the different kinds of species. From b9 on, he is speaking of the coincidence of formal and final causes. I understand the clause in question as meaning "in respect of their (ends) of natural generation" being forms, they are separate" - but from what? From those whose ends they are, i.e. from the χρωμάτων. But these ends in the sense of forms are immanent in the bodies of the generators.

35. For the sake of convenience, cf. Met. Δ 8; priority is not limited to the temporal (for the different senses of priority cf. Met. Δ11).

36. 194b 13.
37. 7, 1032a 24-25.
39. For the omission of 1070a 14-15 cf. below p. 6.
40. 1070a 13-17.
41. Ibid. a21-22.
42. 5, 188a 19-b8. For the sake of brevity we may neglect the intermediate states.
43. 7, 190a 13-16, b23-24, b11-13.
44. In general, see 190b 9 ff. The example of ὁλοκαίμνη is mentioned in 190b8, ἔλος is mentioned in b28 and ὁμοιόμορφος in b20.
45. This sense of ἔλος is confirmed by the term ὁμοιόμορφος in 190b20. For the sense of ὁμοιόμορφος see Met. 28, 1033b 6.
46. Phys. I 7, 190b11.
47. Aristotle's System of the Physical World, p. 86.
48. Met. A 3, 1070a 14-15. That the ἔλος of an artefactum is the τῆς ὁμοιόμορφος is also asserted in Met. Z 7. See the following section for the discussion of this passage.
49. 1032b 15 ff., Ross' translation.
50. Met. Z 7, 1032b5-6, 11-14. ἀφροδίτις is a λόγος, a λόγος τῆς ὑγείας. This λόγος has an objective content, which is the essence of health. Therefore the ὑγεία ἀφροδίτις is the cause of ὑγεία ἀφροδίτις ὑγεία. For the relation of the medical art, the λόγος τῆς ὑγείας, to its objective content, see the following note.
51. Cf. Met. P 5, 1010b 30-1011a 1. There Aristotle speaks of the priority of the ὑποκειμένον which cause sensation over the sensation. For the sensation is not of itself but of the substrata. Parallel to this perceptual realism there is in his epistemology an intellectual realism. Intellectual knowledge, like perceptual knowledge, is an affection by the intelligible (De an. III 4, 429a 13-15). In the case of ἀφροδίτις, the art is determined by the essence of health. So the latter is τὸ κατ' ὑποκείμενον τῆς ὑγείας of the restoration of health. For the concept of "most precise cause", see Phys. II 3, 195b 21-25, though there (for the sake of illustration) the ascent is only from the τῆς ὁμοιόμορφος to the art.
52. Met. E4, 1027b 31, K8, 1065a 24.
53. 132 b-c.
54. See, e.g. Met. Z13, 1038b 26-28. For the argument for the priority of substance, see Z1, 1028a 30ff.
55. Mid-Fourth Century, p. 47.
56. Ibid. p. 48.
58. Mid-Fourth Century, p. 49.
61. Ibid. p. 282.
62. Ibid. p. 284. She interprets the fragment against the background of Phys. II rather than "against the background of Anal. Post. A2" as Düring advises.
63. Her interpretation of Fr. II is also questionable; I shall reserve my comments on it for another occasion.
64. Ross' Fragmenta, p. 48, lines 19-23.
65. The quotation is from De Vogel, op. cit. p. 281.
66. 991b8-14.
67. Ibid. 991b1-3.
68. The term "essence", τὸ Τὶ ὅψιν ἐναλλ., is borrowed from Aristotle, but it is not an anachronism since the Aristotelian concept is traceable to Plato (cf. Crat. 386a d-e).
69. Rep. VI 511b.
71. Met. 28, 1033b 19-21.
72. Pt. III, second paragraph.
73. In this way, one group of Plato's Ideas, i.e. ontological Ideas, were turned into Aristotelian essences. By "separate" it is not meant that the essence is not good, but that value does not belong to essence although it does belong concomitantly.
74. Cat. 5.2b26-27, 3b33-4a9.
75. Ross' Fragmenta, p. 48, lines 5-7.
76. Ibid. p. 49, lines 19-23, 8-9.
77. This interpretation is not incompatible with the general theory in the Categories that the universals in the secondary categories are immanent in the primary substances. There Aristotle does not have Ideas of value in view. This is evident from his regarding διαίρεσις as a διάδεια (8, 10b 30-32). His approach is ontological or psychological, but not from the viewpoint of value.
78. For the distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, see above, p. 5.
79. The passages treated are selective. Some of them are discussed by others in the controversy over the question of Aristotle's Platonic period; some are important for an adequate answer to the question formulated by De Vogel. The order of the passages discussed is not intended chronologically. The effectiveness of this paper does not depend on the selection or the ordering of its materials. For any one of these passages provides a basis for a proposition contradictory to Düring's thesis that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.
80. 9, 1074b23-27, 33-34.

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