Socrates and Protagoras

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Analyses of Protagoras' so-called 'Great Speech' are many, in the farther most part addressed to the question how the speech measures up to Socrates' probing earlier in the dialogue. Scholars used to give a number of wrong answers to this question, finding quite unnecessary fault with Protagoras' argument and attributing to him several confusions of which he is innocent. G.B. Kerferd, however, cleared the ground of this debris, and the time has arrived for examination of the Great Speech from the other side, to see why Socrates raises at the end of the Speech the particular group of questions Plato makes him raise, and whether there is any connection between the Speech and Socrates' subsequent arguments.

Some have suggested that Socrates' single quarrel with Protagoras is that the Sophist gives no clear account of the nature of goodness. It is then suggested that in the end it is the inability to say what goodness is which causes Protagoras' downfall. That there is much truth in the second part of this view the final paragraphs of the dialogue show. But the first half of it is insufficiently precise. As M.J. Gagarin has seen, if Socrates saw in the Speech unclarity purely on the question of what is Virtue, he was sufficiently trained and fearless in dialectic to ask at once that simple but far-reaching question. If he asks more specific questions, as he does, it is natural to suppose that he has specific reasons for asking them. Gagarin and L. Verdeny have rightly urged, in effect, that Socrates is
worried by the way in which terms like 'justice', 'moderation', and 'virtue' are bandied about in Protagoras' remarks without any clear statement of what they mean and how they are related. If, in fact, Socrates asks what the relationship is between Virtue and the various virtues then it is reasonable at least to ask whether there are not in Protagoras' preceding Speech some elements of unclarity, confusion and/or contradiction on this particular point. Socrates quotes, after all, from Protagoras' own words, from both myth and explanation, in posing his questions. But even this is not so exact as it might be. Since, therefore, it is the main contention of this paper that the succeeding argument is bound up very closely with the language used by Protagoras in the Great Speech, and with the structure of some of his arguments, it is well to start with the relatively uncontroversial example of the relationship between Protagoras on the virtues and Socrates' subsequent questions; and having here shown that Socrates' thinking is firmly based on what Protagoras has actually said and implied, only then to go on to the more disputable arguments which Socrates develops. We may then discover what basis for these also exists in the Great Speech. It will be easiest to consider the virtues in order.

We may start with "piety" or "holiness". Protagoras does not name this virtue at 322A, but nevertheless his words are such as to bring it to the mind of any listener (or reader, for that matter) interested in the virtues. Early man believed in
and worshipped the gods, and set about constructing temples and
culptures of them. But this is before the arrival of political
virtue on the scene (witness 321D ἡν ἑπεκκαίνη ὕποκρίσεις
political wisdom he had not, and 322B πολιτικὴ ἠσφαλεία, they had not yet the political art). If piety thus
precedes "political virtue," what does Protagoras mean by in­
cluding impiety among the list of opposites of the virtues at
323E-324A, and more positively by including holiness in a list
of virtues at 324E-325A? How, in turn, is this to be squared
with the suggestion at 323A that every piece of political ad­
vice (or all political virtue) must "proceed by way of" jus­
tice and moderation? If piety is part of virtue, such that to
do a pious action is to do a virtuous one but the converse is
not true, and justice and moderation are similar parts of Virtue,
then (obviously) to do either a just action or a moderate one
is to do a virtuous action. To conjoin justice and moderation
as at 323E, in stating that all political advice (or virtue)
must be just and moderate, may give rise to certain suspicions
in the mind of an attentive listener such as Socrates. The
omission of piety here, simultaneously with the coupling of
justice and moderation, might suggest either that piety here
is no longer a part of political virtue in the required sense
(a suggestion at least fully consonant with 322A in its context),
or that one of the following set of alternatives is true. (1)
Piety is to be equated with either justice or moderation, in
the sense that to do a pious action is to do a just action or
to do a moderate one, depending on one's choice of equation,
and to do a just (or moderate) action is to do a pious one;

(2) Piety is to be included in either justice or moderation, in the sense that to do a pious action is to do a just (or moderate) one, but to do a just (or moderate) one is not necessarily to do a pious one; (3) Piety, justice, and moderation are merely different names for the same thing, which is also called virtue, and to do an action characterizable by any one of them is by definition to do one characterizable by all of them; (4) The omission of piety is to be explained by the thought that if one possesses either justice or moderation or both one must as a matter of fact possess also the virtue of piety: that piety is in fact (though not in definition) inseparable from either or both of the other virtues mentioned.

The resemblance between this set of choices and Socrates' subsequent questioning is fairly close. (3) and (4) turn up pretty explicitly at 329C and 329E respectively, and (1) and (2) could well be regarded as subsidiary variants on (3), to be investigated only if neither (3) nor (4) turns out to be the whole truth. This state of affairs is hardly fortuitous. Nor is this passage alone in omitting piety from the list of virtues: in the myth again moderation and justice are mentioned together without piety. When Socrates cites Protagoras' own words at 329C he duly cites not only this latter coupling without piety, but also a list including piety. Such lists are found at 323E (where the vices include impiety) and 324E-325A (where "being pious" is coordinate with justice and moderation).

In short, if we take some of Protagoras' lists of virtues at
face value, we are presented with a set of coordinate parts of Virtue including piety with justice and moderation; but his omissions of piety are unfortunate for that point of view. Socrates, we may note in passing, has chosen not only his questions but also his citations with care.

This is already no trifling matter, for all that Socrates ironically labels it as such at 323E. It raises, for example, the whole question discussed in the Euthyphro, whether goodness and piety are coextensive and if so which is logically prior.

But there is more to come. Protagoras has more obscurities to offer on the next problem, that of the relationship between justice and moderation (whether expressed by ἰσότητα and ὕστις, or by ἰσότητα and δόκη). At 322B, in describing the destruction of the earliest human communities, he says "They were unjust to each other, not having the political art, so that they scattered once again and were killed." Is mutual injustice here the only consequence, or merely part of the total consequence of the lack of the political art? Is justice the whole or merely part of the political art? We are not yet told. Is lack of moderation among the reasons for men's inability to form cities, or not? Nothing in this passage makes it necessary to assume either answer to the exclusion of the other; but it should be observed that if injustice is the only consequence of lacking political art, then either justice is the same thing (under another name) as moderation or the quality of moderation is superfluous to the political art and to man's survival. Anyway, Hermes is immediately sent to bring
to men moderation and justice; and here again Protagoras fails to specify, or otherwise indicate, whether moderation is a distinct quality to be added to the justice whose necessity is already apparent or whether 'moderation' and 'justice' are virtual synonyms used together for rhetorical emphasis. The word 'and' can of course be used in Greek as in English to express either the genuine addition of things or the rhetorical conjunction of terms. What is more, the further question arises, and is left unanswered, whether the functions of ordering the cities and cementing friendships belong to moderation and justice severally and respectively, or whether the two functions belong equally to both virtues. So far Protagoras' words offer no certain answer to the questions Socrates is later to raise. Nor, in my opinion, is an answer to be seen in the pronoun used by Zeus in Protagoras' story, when he refers to moderation and justice as 'them'. Once the separate arts have been brought into the tale one might expect the virtues of justice and moderation to be separate too. But Protagoras is speaking in rhetorical style, and this pronoun is little enough to go on. The rest of the myth does nothing to clarify our problem. It contains nothing to reveal what, if moderation and justice are qualities operative in inter-personal behavior, is the relation between these qualities. Protagoras does not say clearly what different kinds of action result from the different qualities, if they are different, and he offers no other clear differentiation of them.
Similar difficulties beset the analyst of Protagoras' exposition of his myth. At 323A a sentence we have already looked at speaks of proceeding by way of justice and moderation, with an "and" as unclear as the one already discussed in the myth. The singulars "political virtue" and the like help not at all to decide whether this unity is that of a face or a large slab of gold. But 323A does yield something more definite with the words "justice and the rest of political virtue," or \(\text{δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ζωῆς Πολιτικῆς ὀνείρης}\). (The rendering 'justice and political virtue besides' is ruled out by the consideration that, in view of what the sophist has already said, it would be absurd for him to distinguish justice from the political art as two entirely separate things.) Justice is at last established as a part of Virtue. The phrase "justice and the rest of political Virtue" at 323B reinforces this point. In addition Protagoras begins to distinguish in use between moderation and justice when he says that if a man admits (truly) to not possessing justice he is accused of lacking moderation; but this is only a beginning, and is decidedly not a clear statement of a defined distinction. The lists of qualities, already discussed, at 323E and 324E also appear to separate, in the first case injustice and impiety, and in the second justice, moderation, and holiness. The second makes its trio of qualities by implication into parts of virtue, admittedly without making clear exactly what sort of part.

Thus Protagoras creates a more or less clear impression in his listener's mind. But his line of argument between the
two lists is such as to destroy one's confidence again. Socrates is invited at 324A to believe that the practice of punishing the unjust demonstrates the punishers' belief in the possibility of acquiring Virtue. The aim of punishment is deterrence from injustice and this aim shows the teachability of Virtue. It is not merely that this section exhibits a rapid interchange between 'Virtue' and words formed on the root 'dik-' signifying (for the purposes of ethical discourse in Classical Attic Greek) 'just'. The point is that the whole argument, as it stands, depends for its validity on the assimilation or the indissoluble connection of justice to moderation, and indeed to Virtue. For if justice and moderation were distinct qualities, separate parts of the overall quality of Virtue, then a man who has only one of them need not have the whole of Virtue unless it is impossible to possess one of these distinct parts without the other(s). It follows from this that when Protagoras says that the purpose of teaching justice (or deterring from injustice) indicates belief in the teachability of Virtue he is assuming Athenian belief either in the identity of justice and Virtue, or the inevitable accompaniment of justice by moderation. Whether such inevitability is the result of absolute similarity or of some other indissoluble connection is not here important. If Virtue and justice are neither identical nor indissolubly connected, the teachability of justice will not necessarily be the teachability of Virtue as a whole, and Protagoras' argument will formally fail. The failure could be rectified by stating that justice is only an
example, and/or that punishment is equally a deterrent from other vices. But as the argument stands, it fails.

Does Plato treat the failure as merely formal? Hardly: for when Socrates asks his questions at the conclusion of the Sophist's exposition, the first includes the query whether the word 'justice' denotes a part of Virtue or the whole, the second is whether the parts of Virtue (since Protagoras opts for parts) are all alike, like the parts of a slab of gold, and the third is (granted a difference between the parts) whether they are all so bound together that one may not be had without the others. The resemblance between the choices open to Protagoras after the argument of 324A-C and the choices offered him by Socrates at 329C-E is striking, far too striking to be put down to coincidence. It shows us Socrates framing his questions with eyes glued both to Protagoras' use of words and to the detailed structure of the Sophist's argument.

There is nothing more that is relevant to the present issue till 325D. In the meantime the great men tells his audience that people do believe Virtue teachable, and in that belief set about teaching it, from cradle to grave. They set about educating the younger generation in Virtue as a whole (simply "to ensure that the child will turn out best," 325D). Parents tell their children, "This is just, that unjust, and this is seemly, that is unseemly, and this is holy, that is unholy and do these but do not do those." The relations between what is just, what is seemly and what is holy are not articulated; the terms concerned could, but need not, be merely
different words for the same thing. Teachers, on taking over from parents, pay less attention to their subject than to \( \varepsilon \nu \nu o \alpha \iota \omicron \omicron \alpha \upsilon \alpha \), orderliness; the literary side of education is designed to give by precept and example (just like the parents at 325D) instruction in what to do. The musical teaching, and this is an important sentence, the musical teaching of the citharist inculcates moderation and the avoidance of any wrongdoing in the young. Let us translate the last phrase more literally: "they care for moderation and that the young may do no evil," \( \sigma \omega \phi \rho \theta \sigma \sigma \omega \nu \nu \nu \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon \pi \gamma \rho \varepsilon \lambda \sigma \omega \nu \tau \varepsilon \iota \kappa \alpha \lambda \omicron \upsilon \omega \mu \nu \nu \nu \omicron \omega \mu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \n
laid by Socrates before Protagoras. The third alternative is a highly unlikely one: it is that moderation is here added to the avoidance of evil and distinguished from it. So strong a distinction between moderation and "doing nothing evil" would run clean counter to a deep current in Classical Greek thought. One may retain a suspicion that the motive for Protagoras' mentioning both moderation and the avoidance of wrongdoing was, in the fictional context, either to explain the complex term "moderation" and delimit its meaning in this context, or merely (once again) to add rhetorical emphasis. But this time these considerations have less bearing than earlier on the conclusions the sharp critic would be justified in drawing from his words. The crucial thing is that Socrates' group of questions fits the ambiguities of this passage also.

One wants to ask further what the connection is between the avoidance of wrongdoing, moderation and the things the young were told by their parents on the one hand to do, on the other hand not to do. If moderation and avoidance of wrongdoing are the same, then the connection is obviously of the closest. And the avoidance of injustice will then be part or whole of moderation. What the relation is for Protagoras and his critic between justice and the avoidance of injustice is a question to be deferred a little.

There is more still to perturb the seeker after Protagoras' meaning. When the teachers of music and gymnastic have played their part, the city steps in, compelling citizens to live by the laws. It thus guides the conduct of life, teaching how to
rule and be ruled. There is no suggestion that this includes only part of Virtue, or that it excludes any part of Virtue. Indeed, it is regarded at 326E as evidence of a concern for Virtue, quite simply. No man must be altogether without knowledge of Virtue. If flute-playing were essential to cities (sc. as Virtue or the political art is) people would be as un­grudging with instruction in it as now in things just and lawful. This new pairing of terms is not so important as what follows. But "just" and "lawful" must be related somehow; either they are coextensive, or they are entirely distinct or one is included in the other. On the face of it the relation of inclusion is less likely, less common in rhetorical Greek. Then in the next sentence we have, more significantly, the replacement of "things just and lawful" by "justice and Virtue", for which is substituted in turn "things just and things lawful." Again it is most likely that justice is either equivalent to Virtue or wholly distinct from it. The hypothesis of equivalence is perhaps the most reasonable. Socrates is fully justified by this passage alone in inquiring whether Protagoras believes in the theory that justice etc. are parts of Virtue or are somehow equivalent to it. A similar type of ambiguity recurs at 327C-D, where men educated by the laws are just, and are compelled to take an interest in Virtue.

In short there are signs that not only in the case of piety but also in those of moderation and justice Protagoras has not made up his mind, and is therefore unclear, on exactly the points which Socrates (after some thought, 328) decides to raise with him.
The question of wisdom and political art in the Speech of Protagoras is of more evident importance for the rest of the dialogue, and the tension between wisdom as a part of Virtue and an art as the whole of the citizen's Virtue has received its share of scholarly comment.\(^{11}\) A point already raised by G.N.A. Grube needs integrating into the present context.\(^{12}\)

In the myth proper, at 321C-D, Prometheus is related to have stolen \(\tau\iota\nu\ \varepsilon\nu\tau\varepsilon\chi\nu\nu\ \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{i}\acute{a}m\ \sigma\omicron\nu\ \pi\omicron\acute{e}l\acute{e}\), the wisdom involved in the arts, together with fire, and given it to Man. There follows a sentence of great interest, \(\tau\iota\nu\ \mu\acute{e}v\ \o\omicron\nu\ \pi\omicron\acute{e}l\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \beta\acute{i}o\nu\ \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{i}\acute{a}m\ \α\nu\delta\epsilon\eta\mu\omicron\sigma\omicron\tau\eta\ \varepsilon\omicron\chi\varepsilon\nu,\ \tau\iota\nu\ \delta\acute{e}\ \pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\tau\acute{i}c\acute{a}m\ \o\omicron\acute{u}k\ \varepsilon\iota\chi\varepsilon\nu\). "the wisdom concerned with livelihood man thus possessed, but the political one (or the political [art]) he did not possess."\(^{13}\)

The symmetry of this sentence would have us supply 'wisdom' or the place-filler 'one' where the Greek has only "the political" in the feminine accusative to agree with the feminine noun for 'wisdom'. This would pretty clearly suggest the equivalence of political Virtue with wisdom - or rather a particular kind of wisdom. But the ellipse of the feminine 'art' with certain adjectives structured like 'political' is familiar enough in Greek, and Protagoras' audience might take him simply to mean 'the political art', as opposed to the wisdom concerned with technical skills and winning a livelihood. It deserves mention that this in itself would justify Socrates in inquiring at 329E whether Protagoras believes wisdom also to be a part of Virtue different from each of the others, even though it appears in none of the lists of the virtues in the Great Speech itself.
Plato's reader, like Protagoras' hearer, would like to know precisely how wisdom stands. Furthermore, whether the structure of this sentence is Platonic or Protagorean, it so happens that Protagoras, though permitting the reader to suppose his belief in a political wisdom synonymous with Virtue, never actually utters the words 'political wisdom'. Therefore, when Socrates asks him if he thinks wisdom a part of Virtue, Socrates is not going flatly against the sophist's expressed views, and Protagoras does not have ringing in his ears his own denial. The question is sensible, and the answer not self-evidently foolish.

The position is equally tricky at 324D. Protagoras mentions the problem raised by Socrates about good men: the problem is why good men teach their own sons in other subjects fit for teaching, and make them "wise" in those skills, but make them no better than anyone else in that virtue at which they themselves are good. Here again Protagoras does not openly give voice to an expression of the give-away type of 'wise at Virtue', but nevertheless the difficulty, which he is here sharpening in order to refute it, is much sharper if being good at the Virtue of good men is regarded as precisely parallel to being wise at other skills. The casual (but not too casual) reader would most naturally suppose that Protagoras thought Virtue a kind of wisdom, even though he does not himself formally call it such. The question Socrates asks is further justified.
Deferring the discussion of the relation of 'wisdom' to 'art', we pass to courage. This receives a unique treatment. Protagoras does not mention it directly at all in the Great Speech, in either myth or argument. Socrates' question at 329E, whether courage also is not a part of Virtue, might seem to be merely a piece of opportunism in response to the immediate stimulus of Protagoras' statement at 329 E that men can be brave without being just. But here also there are utterances and omissions in the Great Speech which are relevant. At the outset, in Protagoras' description of the primitive state of Man (322B), Man is said to have had arts and crafts sufficient for a livelihood. But they did not have "the political art, of which a part is the art of war." This is important as being the only time in his Speech that the sophist explicitly mentions a part or parts of Virtue or of the political art. It is an essential handle for Socrates' dialectic which Protagoras thus casually hands to him. The passage is also interesting in other ways. What is the relation of the art of war to courage? No hint here, but later it becomes moderately clear that Protagoras follows the instinctive belief of most people in deeming courage an essential condition of skill in war. This emerges at 326B-C. The sophist, recounting the gymnast's share in education, announces that bodily training has the purpose of enabling the body to serve a sound intellect, and of avoiding the necessity, supposedly consequent on physical weakness, of being let down by cowardice "in war and other avocations".
This makes courage, though not exclusive to war, belong in part to the conditions appropriate to success in it. To show cowardice in war is evidently deemed bad by Protagoras as by virtually every other Greek. Courage (or at least the absence of cowardice) is a part of what makes one good at war; and so in Protagoras' sense of 'art' it is presumably part of the art of war, which in turn is part of political Virtue. The weakest possible position on this is that Socrates is justified once more by the tenor of the Great Speech, and not only by the opportunity offered at 329E, in asking the speaker whether courage also is not a part of Virtue in the required sense.

As for omissions, the most important is the neglect on Plato's part -- or the avoidance on Protagoras' -- of the provision of any passage in which it is implied, even as a possible inference, that courage is the whole of Virtue. There is no need to read any such implication into the phrase "both in war and in other avocations" quoted above; "other" here may well be meant all-inclusively, but "avocations" or 'avocations' does not mean here 'actions' but 'spheres of action' in a sense exemplified by war. It would be a mistake to read into this any notion, for example, of courage in the battle against one's baser self, which would link courage with moderation. Protagoras here has in mind, as his reference to bodily weakness shows, physical courage in the face of external dangers. So courage alone of the virtues has not, in the Great Speech or its immediate sequel, any connection in Protagoras' mouth with the other virtues or
with Virtue itself. Nobody has the right to be surprised that when, at 349D, Protagoras regroups his forces after the first encounter with Socrates, the position he abandons is that the other virtues are distinct from one another, the position on which he takes his stand is one sharply distinguishing courage from the rest. Whether or not the Great Speech is Protagorean down to the kind of detail we have been discussing (a question probably unanswerable), Plato is not constructing this dialogue at random, but rather with the most careful attention to the precise implications of Protagoras' initial grand pronouncement. Socrates' questioning serves to draw out and clarify those implications.

Protagoras' ambiguities and occasional implicit contradiction of himself thus amply justify and explain Socrates' choice of questions to bring up when he stops speaking. They might even go far to explain why Socrates wishes to hear Protagoras expatiate further (a desire expressed at 328E). Are the virtues then parts of equivalents of Virtue? If distinct parts, are they nevertheless as similar as the parts of a piece of gold, so that to possess any one of them is to possess gold? Or are they such that the possession of any one of them guarantees by a chain of implication the possession of each of the others? In answer Protagoras is unhesitating and unequivocal:

He separates the virtues from Virtue and from each other, and apparently wishes to deny any mutual implication. It is possible to be courageous without being just, and again to be just
without being wise. But Protagoras cannot, as we shall see, easily shake off his earlier remarks. They have already excited Socrates' suspicions, and caused him to ask for clarification. How much worse Protagoras' plight will become we shall see in the sequel.

II

Protagoras distinguishes the parts of Virtue from one another in virtue of their having, like the part of the face, different functions, and being also in other respects different. One is not the same sort of thing as another. Neither the virtues themselves nor their functions are alike (330A-B).

Having elicited this, Socrates proceeds to examine the nature of each. After, somewhat unnecessarily, asking if he may introduce the term 'justice' into the argument Socrates asks whether justice is just or unjust. Protagoras admits justice to be just, and to be the sort of thing to be just. I agree with D. Savan that this is best taken to mean, in effect, that justice has the function of producing (in some sense) just actions. 14 Similarly holiness is holy, and is evinced (in some sense) in holy or pious actions. Now Protagoras denied that any one virtue was the same sort as the others: and Socrates next inquires whether justice is therefore not the sort of thing to be holy (i.e. to produce holy actions), and whether holiness is not the sort of thing to be just (i.e. to issue in just actions). The alternative which Socrates offers is that
Justice is the sort of thing to be not-holy, and holiness the sort of thing to be not-just; that justice issues in actions not-holy and in fact unholy, and holiness in actions not-just and in fact unjust. Socrates would himself prefer to say that holiness issues in just actions and justice in holy ones, and that justice and holiness are either identical or extremely alike, but Protagoras demurs, being willing to admit Socrates' choice only for the sake of the argument, and being prepared to deny any resemblance between holiness and justice of the kind that Socrates wishes. What he does not do is to point out that not-just is different from unjust; that as many moderns have reminded us, contradictory is not synonymous with contrary. 15

Scholars have spilled much ink on the question whether the commission of this fallacy by Socrates (if it is a fallacy) was intentional on Plato's part or not. There is indeed no single short cut to an answer, but it may be helpful to put the argument in its context, including the Great Speech of Protagoras. Contraries and contradictories are slippery things, but it so happens that there is a surprisingly large number of inferences from contradictory to contrary or parallels drawn between them in that speech. Some of them are perhaps more easily justified than others, but the list below attempts completeness.

(1) According to Protagoras there was a stage when Man did not have the political art (321D); at 322B the mere absence of the political art (negative) means apparently that men commit injustice (contrary). (2) Those should be killed who are
unable to possess their share of justice and moderation (322D). Simply because they lack, and are unable to acquire, these qualities they are described as a "disease of the city"; it is hard to think of them as other than actively unjust. A complicated difficulty arises over the pair of analogies with flute-playing. At 323A Protagoras in drawing a distinction between the other virtues and political Virtue contrasts (a) boasting that one is good at flute-playing when he is not and (b) saying that one is unjust even when he is. There is a rhetorical parallel here between the man not good at flute-playing and the unjust man, apparently a parallel between contrary/contradictory. 323B furnishes a further rhetorical parallel between the known unjust whose madness consists in confessing the truth and the not-just man who madly does not claim to be just. Protagoras again encourages (though he does not formally compel) his audience to equate the unjust with the non-just. At first sight the problem might seem to be solved at 327A-C, where Savan has rightly observed the suggestion of a possible tertium quid. There we have an analogy between the good man and the expert flautist, the total ignoramus of flute-playing and the man who is so extreme that the most unjust man might seem just in comparison with him. The tertium quid between these is the adequate flute-player, apparently the analogue of the normally unjust man. This analogy by itself can be made to work out if we suppose that the one who plays the flute not-well at 327A is at least a flautist of a sort, only not an expert one; and this
is a plausible interpretation of the Greek expression ἃν ψηλότερός αἰσθώντα. But in the earlier passage there is no participle to limit the sense of the negative phrase ἃν μὴ ἔστω (323Β'), and there the negative ought to cover both contrary and neutral (or intermediate); and there the plain negative is indeed parallel to the contrary - or what looks like a contrary. If we let Protagoras off the hook in this second passage the first swallowing of hook line and sinker becomes harder to understand, and even more evidently mistaken -- provided just and unjust are indeed contraries. (4) Another suggestive sentence appears in Protagoras' argument about punishment. At 324Β rational punishment is supposed to be motivated by the desire to ensure that the man punished does not again commit injustice; ἐνα μὴ ἀθις ἀθικὴν. This intention Protagoras regards as showing the punishers' belief that Virtue is teachable. This implies that not to commit injustice is a sufficient condition of Virtue (either directly or through the mutual implication of the individual virtues). This in turn implies that non-injustice is justice, without there being any third state which is neither justice nor injustice. Otherwise there is nothing to connect non-injustice with Protagorean Virtue. Protagoras, to be sure, does a little to blur the point by inserting the apologetic-sounding sentence "at least he punishes for deterrence' sake," ἀποτροπῆς γὰρ ἐνεκὴ κολῆσε. But the apologetic tone of "at least" should not be taken too seriously. This is, after all, the only proof Protagoras offers for the proposition that the Athenians believe Virtue teachable. He
cannot undermine it too far. He must believe, or at least wish to convince others, that the argument is sound. If the avoidance of injustice is not either equivalent to or (in one of the two ways mentioned above) a sufficient condition of Virtue, he has not formally proved his point. (5) At 325A, in a conditional (but not, in Protagoras' eyes, counterfactual) sentence, the protasis includes the suggestion that a man must not act without Virtue but with it; the man who has no share in it is to be taught (logically enough) and punished. Punishment fits only ethically wrong, not ethically neutral action. Similarly at 325B-C the penalty for not learning the lesson of Virtue is death; the possibility of being neither virtuous nor vicious is here excluded from consideration. Protagoras' brilliant rhetoric makes no clear distinction between negative and contrary. He deals largely in black and white, usually ignoring the possibility of gray. In the Great Speech he is in full rhetorical flow. Typical of the Speech, though not in any sense mistaken in logic, are those parents who tell their children, "These things are holy, those unholy," and do not stop to consider, so far as Protagoras is concerned, that there might be some actions which are neither, where the category 'holy' or 'unholy' does not apply.

Before analysis of these flights of philosophical oratory, it is necessary to step aside and look at negative and contrary in some ethical contexts other than those of this dialogue of Plato's. The words 'just' and 'justice' are used in Greek as
in English of actions or of men. If actions are described as just, it may be, according to the feelings of the describer, because they fall within a set of rules for justice, whatever the source of the rules; it may be because the actions concerned were done in a certain way, with certain accompanying graces, or as M.F. Burnyeat has it, in a certain style; it may be that before the word 'just' is considered fully applicable the action must result from a certain disposition. Now if the action is commended for falling within certain rules, those rules may be either positive, instructing the persons regulated to take certain positive steps; or they may be negative, telling us to avoid certain types of act. In the first case there may be a class of actions which will be permissible, but of which it would be wrong to say either that they are just or that they are unjust - for example (in a normal context) choosing to eat sausages rather than egg for breakfast. In the second case there can not be any such class; anything not actually forbidden may be said to be a just act, and there is no third choice; an action is either forbidden or not forbidden. In this case the choice of sausages would clearly be just. If just acts are those performed in a certain style, similar considerations apply. If the style is positively enjoined upon the agent, then there may be a class of actions neither just nor unjust; lacking the necessary style to earn the title 'just', but not reprehensibly lacking. On the other hand, if the requisite style is a matter of avoiding certain reprehensible styles, then there
again cannot be such a third class of actions. If the matter be one of disposition, again similar considerations apply; except that it may be that here the third class, where possible, may be larger than in the first two; for it may include actions which, though in other circumstances describable as just, do not happen in the particular case to be accompanied by the required disposition. Such actions or acts are not normally describable as unjust, whatever extremist philosophers may have said.

Appliances to individual human beings, the words behave somewhat differently. A man is, for normal language, just if he normally or for the most part does just actions. If a man is unjust he will not normally, when confronted with a choice between just and unjust acts, choose to act justly, but will, with varying frequency, choose to act unjustly. Suppose a man to be neither just nor unjust: he may then be supposed to act justly in about half of the situations in which he has a choice between just and unjust, in the other half he acts unjustly. What he does in choices morally indifferent, or between acts equally just or equally unjust, has nothing to do with his being just, or unjust, or not-just. One would be hard put to it to find anyone other than the half-and-half man who is neither just nor unjust, unless it be a hermit, or a Robinson Crusoe before the arrival of Friday. Perhaps even a Robinson Crusoe might be a just man, even if no evidence were available to prove it; but this is a question on which not all philosophers would agree.
It is time to return to Plato's text. Protagoras' first inference of the kind we are investigating was from the non-possession of the political art (including justice) to the commission of unjust acts against each other the moment human beings came together. Now men without the virtue (among others) of justice might still do just actions in one of two ways; either by chance (divine chance, for Plato) or because they did not have the full virtue, but nevertheless had an inferior form of it which helped to stabilize actions in the strait and narrow path of justice. Of course, for Plato, in some of his moods, the two are not altogether as distinct as we should wish; either can result from right opinion. Protagoras does not allow explicitly for degrees of justice such that only above a certain level is the word 'justice' applicable properly; but he does not deny this either. If we divest Protagoras' myth of the gods in whose existence he had himself no firm belief, we are left surely with a gradual progress towards a just and stable society, in the course of which the word 'just' will slowly become more applicable, until it is as fully applicable as one can reasonably expect. It would be hard to suggest that until this society arrives, no just actions will be done; but it is equally indefensible to suggest that no unjust action will be performed. Is this an adequate defense of Protagoras' apparent inference that the absence of the political art entails the presence of sufficient injustice to submit the whole of society? Arguably not: for it does not follow from the absence of political art that that enormous proportion of unjust acts will
be performed. Protagoras does not prove that no just acts would be performed in a society devoid of justice; he does nothing to disprove for example, the suggestion that in such a society, moral choice being random, an equal number of just and of unjust acts would get done, leaving society perhaps staggering, but still on its feet. Protagoras is vague about how much injustice it takes to make society impossible. A society thus staggering might, by what Plato would have called "divine chance," cohere. Protagoras' inference from the absence of justice to the commission of sufficient unjust acts to undermine society is not obviously cast-iron. It is not obviously fallacious either, but in view of its dubious-looking general appearance Socrates could feel after it that another inference from contrary to contradictory was worth trying out on Protagoras, just as he felt the questions of 329-330 to be worth asking. It is not plain from the Great Speech that Protagoras is clear about contraries and contradictories; and Socrates could be fishing.

The next example, number (2) above, is even less clear. If a man is wholly incapable of a just act, then indeed the sooner the city is rid of him the better. In any choice between just and unjust he will choose the unjust, and the results will certainly make him a plague. If a man is merely incapable of learning to be more often just than unjust, or of acquiring a fixed disposition to do just acts, he is always likely to be a nuisance, but he will not necessarily be so disruptive that the only thing to do with him is to cast him
out. If Protagoras is talking obvious sense, he must be referring to the man incapable of a just act; but then it is not clear that to have no share in justice means that all the agent's actions will necessarily be either neutral or unjust. Here too there is a certain fuzziness about Protagoras' interpretation of the negative. It is again not clear whether he is simply deducing contrary from contradictory or going through a more careful process of reasoning.

Certainly at (3) Protagoras shows signs of awareness that there might be a tertium quid, though not any high degree of awareness. We have a parallel between someone not good at an art and an unjust man. This will hold only if an unjust man is the negative of a just man - but this we have seen to be dubious. The passage may indirectly throw light on Protagoras' thinking elsewhere. It may be that Protagoras is thinking throughout of Virtue as an art or craft, like flute-playing in which non-expertness implies actually bad performance if there is any performance. But Socrates could be pardoned for not deducing this, in the light of difficulties over the question how far Protagoras is consistent in treating Virtue as a craft. And what of the middling performer, the middling expert?

Number (5) is somewhat similar to (1) and (2), but is easier to excuse. The man without any share of Virtue may do virtuous things by chance. But sooner or later he will do some deed worthy of punishment. It is only in form that this is an argument from contradictory to contrary.
But (4), the last we need discuss, is a little different. The phrase "in order that he may not again ἄνθρωπος" must mean "in order that he may not again commit an unjust act; even if the sense did not require this, the state of injustice is virtually ruled out by the choice of the Aorist Subjunctive. But nevertheless there remains a choice between an act contrary to rule, an infringement of the correct style, or (to look at the matter through the eyes of the punisher) a question of forming a disposition or developing a capacity. One, more rudimentary, problem may here be brushed aside; that is the question how a man is deterred, by being punished for one particular kind of unjust act, from committing another sort of unjust act. Most of us would doubt the psychology of such a notion of deterrence; the fivefold classification of Virtue is an inadequate basis for penology. But, leaving that aside, the passage implies that anyone who does not commit an act of injustice, or act in an unjust way on any particular occasion, is just. Here the rules for just actions or the instructions for a just 'style' of action would have to be negative, or prohibitive, in character. Otherwise the avoidance of injustice or of unjust action will not constitute justice, as Protagoras' argument requires. If Protagoras' punishers are thinking in terms of (say) forming a disposition, the disposition concerned must be one which entirely or virtually entirely avoids certain types of act. The acts one is thus disposed against are unjust acts; one may be disposed to do only just things or to do only things either just or neutral, but what constitutes the disposition in
this passage is the avoidance of certain types of action, rather than the commission of certain types. The avoidance of injustice in this passage is treated as not merely a necessary but a sufficient condition of justice. This could be formally correct only if justice is a matter of obedience to prohibitions.

At this Protagoras' listeners ought to prick up their ears and look for signs in the Protagorean society of something more than mere prohibitions in ethical matters. He might indeed find them in the instructions of the parents to the children; but it is to be hoped that those instructions were clearer to the children than they are to the analyst. The instructions are "These things are just, those unjust... do these but do not do those." Supposing all three sets of opposed kinds of act in this passage are to be taken with the closing imperatives, the parents do not actually say that certain positive injunctions must be followed to achieve justice. They divide the relevant actions into (at least) two classes, the just and the unjust. The injunction to do the former need not imply any theory of the distinction between just and unjust, being compatible either with the assumption that there is a third set neither just nor unjust or with the contradictory assumption. Protagoras does not therefore make his position clear; and the negative view of moderation taken at 326A does not help to decide the problem of justice. What Protagoras says in this part of the Great Speech is thus compatible with his having made the mistake of illegitimately deducing contrary from contradictory. The mistake in question would be the inference implied, in the passage
about punishment, from non-injustice to justice; from the avoidance of unjust acts to the possession of justice. Socrates would be particularly prone to take this inference as an illegitimate one since he at least probably regarded justice as something more than a mere avoidance of injustice.

Another place to find some positive injunctions is in Protagoras' statements about the laws of the city. The city, at 326C ff., compels its citizens to live according to the laws, offering the laws as an example, and the process is compared to one used by teachers of writing. The teachers trace an outline of the letters for their less advanced pupils to follow. This comparison indicates a positive statement by the laws of what is to be done; whether the laws in fact did give such a positive guide to one's conduct in ancient Athens is here beside the point, since our present interest is in Protagoras' views. But at 326D Protagoras says that whoever 'goes outside' these rules, these lines traced out by the city, is punished by the city. Here again the victim of punishment might complain that it was possible to go outside what the city positively enjoined without committing a crime; the city did not dictate in its laws one's choice of breakfast. The city has no right to punish all who go outside the laws unless the laws are negative or partly negative in character, and unless it is the negative part(s) of the laws which are under consideration. The point is all the more relevant in that Protagoras closely associates what is lawful with what is just, and further declares that the city's
laws are the indication of its interest in the citizens' Virtue. We are thus uncertain whether Protagoras is clear on the question whether the acts which are unlawful and hence unjust are necessarily endowed with a quality of injustice contrary to, rather than merely contradictory of, the quality of justice.

Apart from observing the possibility that Protagoras slips in these last passages over contrary and contradictory, Socrates could also observe (a) that Protagoras in his speech proceeds with a surely unusual frequency from a statement about an ethical contradictory to one about the relevant contrary; (b) that it is also far from plain whether Protagoras is in a position to justify even those inferences of this kind other than the last one we have discussed. It need not surprise us in the face of these observations that Socrates should find it worth his while to try out on the Sophist an inference from contradictory to contrary; to try on him the deduction from the premise that holiness produces non-just actions to the conclusion that holiness produces unjust actions. Nor is it shocking that Socrates should find Protagoras, with the black and white of his own rhetoric dancing before his mind's eye, unable for the moment to see the subtle shades of gray that he can on occasion recognize — or else unwilling in the face of Socrates' evident skill to attempt the distinctions necessary to attack Socrates' inference without demolishing his own. Certainly interpreters of this argument of Socrates should bear in mind the possibility that the chief remaining fallacy in it is no more Socratic than it is Protagorean.
When Protagoras agrees formally to the notion of the ethically indifferent at 351D it is only after he has cut his losses by abandoning some previous positions; then, in sober argument, he can detail the three classes, good, bad, indifferent. But in his Great Speech he gives only intermittent and feeble signs of having thought the matter out and none of caring about it. In Socrates' first joust with him he is still so under the spell of his own rhetoric that he is unable or unwilling to make the effort to undo that rhetoric's effect.

When Socrates uses a form of inference which is incorrect but at least on the surface, hard to distinguish from some of his own arguments, then it is not easy for the Sophist thus early in the game to adjust himself to new rules more exacting than those of rhetoric. When he has had time to think and is no longer bound by his own previous remarks Protagoras is a very different philosopher.

But Protagoras and Socrates are to some extent at least—how great an extent is of course uncertain—puppets in the hands of Plato. We shall have to ask ourselves eventually what Plato stood to gain by so portraying Protagoras appearing to make mistakes and Socrates turning the tables on his adversary by committing similar errors. But first let us look at more of Socrates' attacks.
After the brief tussle with degrees of similarity and identity at 331C-332A has led to the abandonment of this line of reasoning, Socrates starts on another tack. The ensuing argument has struck some as wildly fallacious: and Protagoras' answers seem too readily to give the game away. But re-examination will suggest that some facets of the Protagoras' original manifests account fairly well for many at least of this argument's disturbing features.

On the surface the chain of questions beginning at 332A is simple, and may be summarized as follows: διαφωσσω, or folly, exists, and has an opposite, namely σοφία, or wisdom? Yes. When men act rightly and beneficially, do they then σωφροσύνη (act moderately and/or sensibly) or the opposite? Clearly they display moderation. Conversely, those who act not-rightly act foolishly, and do not behave with moderation? Yes. Therefore, acting foolishly is the opposite of behaving moderately, and folly the opposite of moderate behavior? Yes. So, folly having been declared opposite to both wisdom (σοφία) and moderation (σωφροσύνη) must be identical, since one term can have only one opposite.

Several peculiarities of this argument have drawn adverse comment. The first and chief of these is the over-all equivocation on which it rests. διαφωσσω has two different senses, and may legitimately have two opposites, one to each sense. Surely Socrates is here at his most trivial and Protagoras at
his least percipient. Shorey was more trenchant: "That, of course, is sophistry." Socrates, say the critics, is either forgetful of logic, or concerned only to beat the sophists at their own game. But neither hypothesis is very convincing. Plato's Socrates is not always logical, but the illogicalities are not usually as transparent as these. Beating the Sophists at their own game would be more purposeful in this particular case if it were not clear that Protagoras is an opponent to be taken seriously, and that Socrates is the first in this dialogue to sin with anything like since blacity: Protagoras has indeed implicitly contradicted himself, but he has used no argument a tenth as thick-headed as this one appears to be. In any case Socrates purports to be playing a different game -- that of dialectic as opposed to speechifying; it remains to be explained why he should play it to all appearances so poorly.

To explain this we may put another question to the text: is there any reason why Protagoras cannot take the obvious way out, and distinguish two senses of 'folly' (φβροσύνη)? Why can he not say that φβροσύνη, 'folly' means sometimes 'foolishness' or 'lack of good sense' and sometimes 'self-indulgence'? Let us see what effect such an escape would have on his total position as previously taken up in this dialogue. Protagoras would be required to say that Socrates' argument would be mistaken because there are two sorts of 'folly', one intellectual and one moral. Socrates, he would then say, is equivocating on these two senses. If he were indeed to proceed in this way, the results would be far-reaching. We have seen how Protagoras
in the Great Speech avoids explicitly equating Virtue with the intellectual quality of wisdom; and how he nevertheless utters a sentence at 321D which could be taken to mean (though it is not the only possible meaning) that Virtue is a kind or part of wisdom. We recall also that at 324D Protagoras uses 'make wise' in parallel with 'make better'. The antithesis in that passage is ruined if there is a distinction between being made wise at something and being made good at it. It is now relevant to enlarge on some related problems in the Speech.

That 'wisdom', or 'a wisdom', is in certain contexts interchangeable with 'art', is well known. Protagoras himself speaks of a particular kind of wisdom as embedded in art, at 321D, referring to the same thing as the "craftsman's art" at 322B. In the relevant kind of context Protagoras can therefore use either 'art' or 'wisdom' salva veritate. Now he is also made to call Virtue an art, which might seem to indicate that he would call it also a wisdom; and in that case he is on dangerous ground in making wisdom a part of Virtue. It is true that Socrates neatly presses the notion of Virtue as an art on Protagoras in a series of adroit questions usefully documented by Gagarin. But intellectualist ethics come quite naturally to Protagoras; he is an intellectual, he teaches things of the intellect, and later in the dialogue he accepts without hesitation or doubt the primacy of intellect in determining human conduct (352B-D). It is not for
nothing that the title "sophist" in which Protagoras takes so much pride is related to the word for 'wisdom'.

After accepting from Socrates at 319A the suggestion that his subject is "the political art," Protagoras admits the expression to his own vocabulary at 322B (twice). There it represents the sum of moderation and justice or the quality for which moderation and justice are different names. Then, however, at 322C "the arts" (τεχνές) are distinct, and moderation and justice are added to Man's equipment after the arts. Next, in the following section, Zenas suggests that there would be no cities if moderation were confined to a small number of experts like the other arts. This clearly puts Virtue back among the arts again. The impression that Virtue belongs among the arts is deepened by Protagoras' use of ἕλκης. Παραποτεχνίς. ἔλλησις τεχνών μυθικής, a carpenter's or other craftsman's 'virtue', with reference to the same thing as at 322B with the expression 'craftsman's art'. The distinction between Virtue and art seems here on the point of vanishing. At 322E the words "political Virtue" mean the same as the earlier "political art." "Virtues" again, at 323A, means the same as 'arts', and is replaced by the word "art" in the singular later in the sentence. The locution "this virtue" at 323B likewise seems to presuppose a set of other 'virtues', no doubt those referred to at 323B. But at 326E and 327E 'Virtue' is employed by itself as if it were a sufficient designation for moral or "political" Virtue, without specification. 327B, 327C ("a craftsman in this matter," i.e. in justice) and other less clear passages all tend to assimilate Virtue to the arts. The upshot is that Virtue is
an art throughout the Great Speech except for the single pas
sage in Hermes' address to Zeus. Protagoras has in large
measure committed himself to the intellectual nature of Virtue,
to its assimilation (epistemologically) to an art.

To say this is not to deny the obvious fact that Protagoras
is deeply concerned to show at least one major difference be-
tween the political and the other arts. He has to show that
though few are expert in the others, the political art is open
to all, and indeed known in some degree by all. The distinc-
tion is fundamental to Protagoras' whole position. But that
does not make Virtue any the less an art, something one can
learn and teach, something at which one can be skilled, in
Greek sophos, often rendered 'wise'.

Believing these things the sophist not unnaturally finds
it difficult to distinguish in a moral context between moral
folly and intellectual folly. If he were to turn round now
and say that in the sphere of moral actions there were two
sorts of folly, one moral and one intellectual, he would have
to specify which was which. If he were then to say that the
intellectual alone was the opposite of 'wisdom' then he would
have to explain the moral importance he attaches to 'wisdom';
if he supposed the intellectual alone to be opposed to 'modera-
tion' he would be going against a large element in Greek thought,
as well as his own previous remarks according high moral import
to 'moderation'.

There does appear to be another way out for Protagoras,
but it seems excluded by the context. He could, evidently, say
that moral folly is merely a species of intellectual, that it is only a (kind of) folly which is opposed to a (kind of) wisdom when the word 'folly' is used as the opposite of 'moderation'. But this is surely ruled out by the manner in which the conversation leads up to the introduction of the opposition between 'wisdom' and 'folly'. The 'wisdom' which Protagoras agrees at 332A to oppose to 'folly' is essentially moral in nature. He has agreed at 329E-330A that wisdom is a part of Virtue, and the discussion has from that point on concerned itself with two parts of Virtue. Protagoras must know perfectly well that the 'wisdom' he is asked to oppose to 'folly' is moral. In such a context it is most natural also to take 'folly' as moral in tone, since it is moral action which is under discussion.  

Μηνοεί, folly, had long had associations with the absence of κερή, Virtue. Such associations stem from the prudential nature of much early Greek morality, and the emphasis it laid on competitive success rather than on what A.W.H. Adkins has called the quiet values. The whole context, in both the narrow and the wider sense, is enough to encourage both a Protagoras and a Plato to forget the possible non-moral interpretation of 'folly' and 'wisdom' alike. This is not the moment in the dialogue for resurrection of the εὐεχλευσ ὁφία, the wisdom embedded in the crafts, which Protagoras earlier distinguished from political Virtue.

The general point made so far is that the obvious way out of Socrates' argument here is not the easy escape for Protagoras in this dialogue that it has been taken to be. Simply to call
that argument fallacious, though true, is not to exhaust its description. The reasoning is, like part of his previous argument, **ad hominem**. This function of the argument is thrown into sharper relief by yet another interesting passage of the Great Speech. At 323B Protagoras is contrasting the art of flute-playing with political Virtue. If anyone falsely boasts of being a good flautist he is either laughed at or objected to, called mad, and his condition is labelled madness. But if he lays false claim to Virtue this is put down to moderation, rather than madness. Here moderation, apparently the same moderation that is at least part of Virtue, stands in direct contrast with the state of madness. One does not laugh at moral delinquency, though one may (however unjustly) at mental derangement. Either may be the object of annoyance. It is therefore at least partly mental derangement that Protagoras has in mind here. It is not of course explicit that the contrast is between diametrical opposites, such as Socrates is talking about at 332B-333B. But that hardly matters: the moral and intellectual sides of life are merged by the contrast between madness and moderation in a single category, and Protagoras could not unscramble them without having to think rather carefully about the implications for this piece of rhetoric. It is not likely to be fortuitous that Socrates' argument depends on an association thus exemplified in Protagoras' own words.

Another familiar feature of Socrates' line is the apparent inference from contradictory (non-moderation) to contrary
(folly) at 332E. This need not be a mistake; moderation is a negative matter in all probability at 326A, and further discussion of this is unnecessary. But it is worth observing the infinite gentleness with which Socrates leads Protagoras across the gap. We shall see how firmly this argument also is embedded in its context. First, Socrates asks, do you admit the existence of folly (λογοχορία)? Is wisdom its diametrical opposite? Neither of these questions is easy to reject; both look like common sense, and after opposing madness and σωφροσύνη at 326A Protagoras is in no mood to protest these points.

When men act rightly and beneficially, do they then act moderately-cum-sensibly (σωφροσύνη), or in the opposite way? Here Protagoras should perhaps have asked for a rephrasing of the question. But he has scarcely had a chance to recover from Socrates' exploitation of the Great Speech in the argument that what is not-just is unjust. So he neglects once more the possibility of a tertium quid, and plunges on: folly is after all difficult to associate with right and beneficial action. Socrates eases his path. After connecting up the verb and noun 'moderation' and 'behave-moderately' Socrates asks the crucial question. "Those who act not-rightly act foolishly, and not sensibly-cum-moderately, in respect of this particular kind of action?" This is an awkward one. Those who act rightly (positive) are moderate (positive). Now in addition those who act not-rightly (negative) act foolishly (θέσοντες with δ-privative, in origin a negative form), and in so acting are not moderate (negative). Therefore acting foolishly is the opposite of acting
moderately. This is only a good conclusion if either the legitimacy of reasoning for contradiction to contrary is recognized or moderation is a merely negative concept. Socrates need accept neither form of this dilemma: but Protagoras has accepted the second and does nothing to show his rejection of the first. The crucial word is surely ἀφάντως, which though negative in origin and appearance can also, like a number of other ἀ-privative words function as an opposite. Socrates paves the way by using ἀφάντως first in a sentence full of negatives, and only then suggesting its function as an opposite. The transition is the more readily acceptable since in Greek there is no obvious opposite for 'rightly', and the phrase 'not rightly' functions like the English 'wrongly', as an opposite as well as a mere negative. (Indeed it is far from clear that actions or agents can be not-right without being wrong: does the saying 'My country right or wrong' omit a viable third alternative?) So the statement that those who act not-rightly act unsensibly (or foolishly) is doubly ambivalent as between contrary and contradictory. It sounds in any case reasonable to one with an intellectualist bias, just as the proposition that acting foolishly (φροντὶς etymologically 'without sense') is the opposite of acting moderately (σοφρονὶς, etymologically 'with sound sense') sounds reasonable to any ear attuned to Greek - even if the latter does not follow from the premises leading up to it in the Protagoras. Although there are a number of legitimate excuses for Protagoras here. Even if he has here committed the error of deducing a true contrary
from a contradictory, he may at all events be forgiven a little confusion.

Whether these considerations adequately defend Socratic integrity in argument is another question. Socrates, most probably does not suppose either that ἀναλογία is a purely negative concept or that it is reasonable to argue from a contradictory to a true contrary. We behold here a spectacle very like that of skilled legal counsel leading a witness unperceived by the judge. The best defense of Socrates' behavior is that he is again making use of Protagoras' earlier statements and for arguments. It is one of the purposes of this paragraph to draw the distinction between excuses valid for Protagoras and excuses valid for Socrates.

The duel between Socrates and Protagoras over opposites has one more oddity to be discussed. When Protagoras agrees that right action arises when moderation is present, and wrong action when it is absent (332A-B), he seems to be giving away much of the position he stood originally to defend. He is trying to substantiate the view that justice, wisdom, holiness, courage, and moderation are separate and distinct parts of virtue, coordinate like the parts of a face. But one is hard put to it to find any function for the other parts of Virtue if all actions are right or wrong according to the presence or absence of moderation in the agent. If moderation is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of right (presumably virtuous) action, one of the following alternatives would appear on the face of it to be true. Either (a) moderation is simply
equivalent to Virtue or (b) any other part of Virtue must necessarily be accompanied by moderation. Yet Protagoras firmly denied both these alternatives at 329C-E - or at least denied in general that the possession of any single virtue implied possession of the rest. This suggests two questions; why does Protagoras thus surrender his position? and why does Socrates not immediately accept the surrender? The second question admits only of conjecture; a plausible one might be that Socrates (and Plato) wish to wring more contradictions out of the situation before bringing the debate to an end; and in particular that Socrates wishes to argue at greater length and with greater explicitness for the unity of Virtue in knowledge. The first question takes us back to Protagoras' Great Speech yet again. We recall that Protagoras used the expression σοφίας πως τε ἐπιμέλεισθαι καὶ ὑπηρεσίαν νῦν μὴ γίνετι, "they take care of self-control and that the young do no evil." One possible interpretation of that sentence, we saw, took it to mean that the presence of moderation ensured the absence of bad actions; the whole of Virtue if one adds that a contrary can in an ethical context be deduced from a contradiction that would make moderation impossible. Another took it to imply that moderation was the inescapable accompaniment of the possession of any other of the virtues. Protagoras has already committed himself to a position somewhat like that which he takes up in response to Socrates' probing at 332A-B. Plato's Socrates is merely bringing out Protagoras' stated though confused opinions on the relations of Virtue and the virtues. If
Protagoras surrenders his defensive position it is because he is not clear precisely where he stands. To change the metaphor, he is caught in a web largely of his own weaving.

If we can thus explain both Protagoras' peculiar admissions and Socrates' dubious arguments from the implications of the sophist's previous remarks, then we can hardly, without oversimplification, accuse Socrates of bare fallacy. We may not like Socrates' methods of defeating a distinguished opponent in debate, but Protagoras has, in the last resort, himself to blame for the predicament in which he finds himself. He pays the price for letting his rhetoric run away with him.

IV

The next subject raised is the relationship of moderation and justice. Socrates asks if, in Protagoras' opinion, a man can, while being unjust, be 'moderate' in respect of the act of injustice he commits or the state of injustice he manifests. Protagoras disclaims agreement with this ambiguous suggestion the first time round. He assents to it eventually, in a slightly different form, only for the sake of the argument. One of the difficulties of the ensuing argument is that the same verb (οὐ ἄσκεσκε) can mean either to be unjust or to commit an injustice. It is not clear whether Protagoras is being asked to agree that an unjust act can be a moderate act, or whether he is only being asked to say that a generally unjust man, with a disposition to do acts describable as unjust, can
on occasion commit a moderate act. The second version Protagoras could accept - indeed he must, for he has said that the virtues are like the parts of the face, and it is possible to be deaf without being blind. The other verb important here (σωφρονεῖν), is fortunately not ambiguous to quite the same degree, and means usually to be moderate, rather than to perform one moderate action. Certainly Protagoras and Socrates are intelligible so far as this word is concerned without relying on the possibility of talking about moderate actions. It appears then that if Protagoras has understood Socrates, the latter is asking whether a man can be moderate in respect of an unjust act he commits, and it is this that Protagoras rejects as shameful.

He allows, however, that there are many people who would accept this thesis, and agrees for the sake of argument to defend it. The agreement (in so far as to commit him to anything) commits him apparently to the view that injustice is a sensible thing to do, a reasonable set of rules to live by. But Protagoras is no immoralist like the Thrasymuchus of Rep. I.

Socrates in reply suggests that moderation (σωφρονεῖν) implies being of good sense (literally, ‘thinking well’). Protagoras of course can no more separate the moral from the intellectual aspect of moderation now than in the preceding argument; he has to go along with this, willy-nilly. From ‘having good sense’ Socrates proceeds to ‘deliberating well’. Here we are in an area of ambiguity. After a flirtation with the intellectual side of moderation, we may now be back in the moral. It depends on whether the ‘well’ of ‘deliberate well’
refers to morally good deliberation or to successful deliberation. The immediate acceptance by Protagoras proves little, since, as we have seen, Protagoras is in no position to argue the matter out even if he begins to smell the ambiguity. To this step is added the rider that the good deliberation is in respect of the unjust action which we have been considering all the time. Protagoras again does not like this: perhaps it suggests that the unjust act can be good, which he does not wish to admit, even though in the Greek context the view was not wholly implausible. Protagoras again signals his assent for argument's sake: "So be it" (έρω έρω). Socrates now asks a question not easy to follow. He asks whether this good deliberation in respect of an unjust action takes place when in the unjust action the agent(s) 'do(es) well', or when he does badly. Here we are ensnared in another ambiguity, since, as is well known, to do well can mean in Greek either to act well or to fare well. But I doubt if Socrates relies at all heavily on that ambiguity here. Good deliberation as a consequence of good sense seems more likely to result in acting well than in receiving a regard - in so far as the Greeks really were capable of distinguishing the two. Anyhow, Protagoras agrees that one does well in deliberating well in the process of injustice. Good deliberation, even in the act of injustice, is successful deliberation with good (not necessarily morally good) consequences. Socrates' next question is harmless enough, and Protagoras agrees that there are some good things. The next question in this chain is whether those actions are
good which are beneficial to man.

Where is the argument leading at this point? It is not possible to be certain, and it does not perhaps matter very much. But at least we can see if there is any plausible continuation which makes Protagoras' contribution less irrelevant than some think it. If the unjust act can be good, or a man can be good in respect of an unjust act, then at once Protagoras' position is undermined: the noun of the adjective 'good' in Greek is of course Virtue, and injustice cannot be a virtue. But Socrates can hardly have intended to take that line, or he would not have brought in the then unnecessary notion of 'beneficial'. One argument he could be laying the foundation for is that the injustice in question is beneficial to man: from this he could proceed either to say that Protagoras purports to teach a virtue whose opposite is beneficial to man, or that Protagoras in the myth advanced the view that the advent of the virtues including justice was beneficial to mankind. Either way the point lies not in the argument itself but in positions taken up by Protagoras: the second denies him the possible escape route that justice need not be beneficial to its agent or to the community. If Protagoras is behaving as though he expected this line of attack, then we should have an explanation of why he should be a little anxious. But in Greek it is difficult to deny that what is good is beneficial, and Protagoras can do no more than say that a thing can be good even without being beneficial to man. Injustice therefore can be 'good' in some sense, as Protagoras has had to admit, without
its being beneficial to Man - a position he cannot now consistently take up. To counter this move it is understandable that Socrates should ask the further question whether Protagoras means to separate good and beneficial altogether, or is content with distinguishing good from beneficial to Man. If the former, then Protagoras is going to run into problems of ordinary language, in which 'good' apparently did (when used of things) imply 'beneficial'. If the latter, then Protagoras is going to be compelled to find some candidate for the post of beneficiary of injustice other than Man. No wonder Protagoras is floundering at this point. Instead of giving (he has not yet been asked to) a beneficiary of injustice, he takes refuge in generalities, saying that there are some things which are beneficial to Man and some which are not (an irrelevant): some which are neither to man, but are one of the other to horses - a relevant point: and then goes on to give examples of the generally relative nature of 'good'-ness - 'good' replacing 'beneficial' in the course of the argument. The digression, however, returns speedily to the subject of Man, with the mention of olive-oil, which is bad for animal hair, but good for human, and for the human body in general. Finally Protagoras comes up with the point that 'good' is so various in application that a thing can be 'good' for one part of man, but not for another. This last point is likely to be especially useful to him, since it might, if he thinks fast enough, enable him to find a distinction along these lines between justice and injustice -- the one being good and therefore beneficial to man
in one respect, the other in another respect. This would save
the Sophist's bacon by enabling him to admit that injustice in
successful deliberation is good for man, without being appar­
ently forced to make injustice a virtue or to question whether
justice is after all beneficial to mankind. What Protagoras
is doing is both to play for time and to maneuver for position.

But Socrates understandably does not see why, in a set
match of this kind, his interlocutor should be allowed to do
either of these things, let alone both. He accordingly feigns
a poor memory -- this from one who has been able to quote with­
out difficulty from Protagoras' earlier lengthy harangue -- and
brings the discussion up short. Which side would have carried
the day in the incomplete argument is of course impossible to
say, but Protagoras has by now made some points which are
clearly going to delay the Socratic victory, even if they do
not prevent it. This line of argument will not therefore pro­
vide an immediate coup de grace, and Socrates escapes by
pleading a breach of his rules by Protagoras.

But this is only a series of guesses, and one can hardly
extract any evidence worth the name from this passage for the
general thesis that Protagoras' difficulties stem from his own
previous admissions as much as from Socrates' present arguments.
All that is possible in this case is to show plausibly how this
incomplete argument could be interpreted without being incon­sistent with this general thesis. In doing so it is interest­
ing to find that Protagoras' burst of rhetoric is neither
wholly irrelevant nor wholly to the point, but is rather a
curate's egg of a speech.
But we have not yet answered the question what Plato had to gain by playing this kind of trick on his characters. If the whole were a verbatim historical account of an actual occasion we should have no worries; Socrates would then be shown putting his dialectical techniques to uses admittedly ad hominem but not dishonestly so. No-one could blame Socrates for using premisses or types of inference in which he does not himself believe if his opponent does apparently believe in them. To apportion blame in this way would be to misunderstand the nature of dialectic. What is at first sight puzzling is that a great philosopher near the height of his powers should compose a dialogue in which one protagonist's mistakes or dubieties of premiss or argument are shamelessly taken advantage of by the other. What did Plato think he was proving in the arguments we have dealt with in this paper?

If my thesis is correct, the answer is that Plato need not have thought was proving anything positive here; least of all need he have supposed that he was proving the unity of the virtues. What he should have deemed himself to have proved is that for one holding Protagoras' views on the distinctions between the virtues it is not possible to say some of the things that Protagoras has said or to argue in some of the ways in which the Sophist appears to argue. If this were the whole point, and if Protagoras were the only person to hold such views and to speak in such ways we should have to draw one of
two conclusions; either Plato has set up an Aunt Sally for himself to knock down, a proceeding whose purpose might well for ever escape our insight: or we have here a piece of genuine history -- not indeed verbatim but giving at least the gist of Protagoras' own historical words, whether written or spoken.

But this is not yet a necessary conclusion, and I am unable to bring myself to believe that it is the whole story even if it should be proved one day to be a partial truth. The fact is that Protagoras is (obviously) not the only person to believe that there are differences between the virtues; and there is no need to suppose him to be the only person to argue from contradictory to contrary. Even Socrates does so from time to time. Witness for example Crito 48B-D, where Socrates first says he is going to consider the question whether his proposed escape is just or not, and then says that he is going to consider what he just said, namely whether the escape is just or unjust. It is perhaps significant that the tone of much of Socrates' remarks in the Crito is rhetorical. Other mistakes or dubieties from our portion of the Protagoras are easily found elsewhere also; the Greeks habitually moved from intellectual to moral nuances of the word sôphrosynê without making trouble about it. In tying Protagoras in knots Plato is also tying up many ordinary speakers of ordinary Greek. Where a modern philosopher would give us the bare bones of the distinctions necessary, what Plato does is to show us what calamities befall those who neglect them. Where the modern often aims at simply dispelling the confusions to which ordinary
language is liable, Plato's purposes may be suspected of greater complexity. Plato wishes to prepare the way for the Socratic paradoxes, perhaps to show that they are less paradoxical than they appear. This in the sense that though some popular ways of thinking treated wisdom as a separate virtue, though other distinctions between virtues were familiar to popular speech, there were nevertheless some strands of thought among "the many" which if taken to their logical conclusion were liable to end in the paradoxes. This has sometimes been seen as the point of the concluding argument of the Protagoras, and if this is right the two main ethical arguments of the dialogue would on the present interpretation hang the more closely together.

It is true that another reading of the evidence here analyzed is possible. Plato may himself have been unclear about the extent to which the ethical concepts he is dealing with depend on positive injunctions and how much on mere prohibitions. He may not have seen that there are distinctions between the intellectual and moral spheres which in the last resort tend to undermine the central Socratic paradoxes. But at present it seems more likely that in the composition of the Protagoras he betrays his understanding of these things. First, Socrates' initial questions by way of response to Protagoras' Great Speech show that Plato and his principal character have thought very deeply about Protagoras' Speech and its precise implications. Secondly it is odd, if Plato did not see these problems, that there are remarks embedded (by whomsoever) in Protagoras' Speech which raise exactly the questions raised
by Socrates' arguments. The whole composition bears the marks of deliberate design. But whichever view of Plato's insight be taken, it is to be hoped that scholars will at least pay him the compliment of refusing to dismiss the arguments in the first round between Socrates and Protagoras as merely and obviously fallacious.
Footnotes


4 Gagarin, loc. cit.; Versecayi, Socratic Humanism, p. 26, p. 22, believes that Protagoras unified Virtue (the Sophist does indeed refer to Virtue as "one thing"), and rightly adds, "Socrates attacks Protagoras in the following not because he united all virtues but because he failed to specify in what manner and on what basis virtue is one, and what this virtue's nature is."

5 The antecedent of the relative may be either ἀλήθεια or ἀληθινός: see Adam (ἀληθινός ἀλήθειαν) and the translations of Guthrie and Jowett-Ostwald (ἀληθινός). But I doubt if the difference is great for the purposes of my argument, since "all political advice" in the context must be advice about what is politically virtuous, and if all such counsel must recommend what is just and moderate, then political virtue must in some sense consist in what is just and/or moderate.

6 322A makes a point of belief in and worship of the gods, before men have political virtue (322B) and even before they have fully the techniques necessary for physical survival. Political wisdom is still in Zeus' hands, inaccessible even to Prometheus (321D-322A). Whatever the "divine portion" (ἡμέρα πολιτείας) is at 322A, it does not include any part of political virtue so far as we are told.

7 I take it that the myth ends at 322D where the tale of Protagoras comes to an end. Kerferd (JHS 73, 1953, p. 42) has the "myth proper" ending here, but the Logos beginning only at 324D. This on the grounds that at 324D Protagoras says (Kerferd's translation) "For this point, Socrates, I shall not now (ἐδώς) tell you a myth, but a Logos." The passage between (322D-324D) Kerferd regards as "an explanation and application of the myth." But this argument does not hold water. By "I shall no longer tell you a myth." Protagoras is merely drawing attention to the fact that the myth said nothing about the problem he is about to breach. On the previous subject he had
a tale to tell; on this one he does not, but deals solely in Logos. The distinction between Logos and "explanation and application of the myth" is, I think, illusory. I believe Guthrie's translation shows his agreement with me on this point.

This issue is often obscure by modern translations. To take the ones deservedly most used in the English-speaking world, Guthrie and the Loeb have here "wrongdoers," and Jowett-Ostwald "evildoers," for the Greek ἀδικεῖν meaning of course "unjust" and "wrongdoers" and "evildoers" are such general words as to give the reader no hint that any particular type of wrongdoing even could be meant, no hint of any problem in the relationship between wrongdoing and injustice. (Similarly, to render ἀγαθόν as 'good' with Guthrie at 323C is to miss the distinction Protagoras himself draws between "justice" and "the rest of civic virtue." ) The translators have smoothed away the rough places of the argument. The Bude "un coupable" for ὀσμόνδ also obscures the point.

There is no need at this point of the dialogue to distinguish too sharply between Protagoras' opinions and the Athenians'. Socrates has admitted the Athenians' wisdom (319B) and Protagoras not only has not denied it but has accepted their beliefs as reasonable (322D). The basis of Protagoras' argument at 323A-C is general human reactions. The argument discussed in my text here is actually the basis on which Protagoras describes the conclusion as "reasonable" at 324C.

10 See Helen North Sophrosyne esp. pp. 89ff.
11 See e.g. Gagarin TAPA 100 (1969) pp. 142-144, Gigon Phyllobolia Von der Mühll pp. 104-105.
12 Classical Quarterly 27 (1933) p. 204, n. 5. Grube there wrote "... at 321D (Protagoras) speaks of ἐπισκόπειν σωφρύς. But he nowhere puts σωφρύς in the foreground of his reaching ... " and in his text "The absence of wisdom is conspicuous, and must be deliberate on Plato's part." I am unable to agree with all of this, but it points in some of the right directions for inquiry.

13 Apart from Grube, Jowett-Ostwald, Guthrie and Lamb in the Loeb all insert "wisdom!" Croiset and Bodin in the Bude have simply "la politique."

Savan op. cit. (previous note) pp. 133ff, attempts to absolve Socrates of this fallacy also, but does not I think go far enough. He says rightly that the paradigm of the face and its parts dominates the argument, and remarks that seeing makes no sound and hence sight must be inaudible. Further, hearing is invisible. "The analogy," he proceeds, "requires us to say, therefore, that justice (understood as ἰσότης) is unholy; and that holiness (understood as ἁγίος) is unjust. The argument requires us to say not only that justice is not holy but also that it is unholy, not only that holiness is not just but also that it is unjust. This consequence is too monstrous to be acceptable." This would be more convincing if either it were clear that 'invisible' is an opposite, and not a negative word, or that 'unjust' were a negative word and not an opposite. But Savan fails to assimilate the two terms in such a way as to make his very important argument hang together at this point. It is not immediately clear from Plato which alternative Socrates has in mind, if indeed he has either clearly before him. But this topic is due for extended treatment below.

17 What Plato Said, p. 126.
19 The word 'other' is here omitted by Jowett-Ostwald; a puzzling omission.
20 Gagarin, op. cit. (n. 3) pp. 142-144.
21 Adkins Merit and Responsibility esp. Chaps. I-IV. I am not in general convinced by the criticisms of H. Lloyd-Jones in The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley, 1971) in so far as they concern Homeric and Archaic Greek thought.
22 On this see Adkins Merit and Responsibility esp. p. 286.
23 At 336A Socrates accuses him of neglecting both brevity and relevance; neither accusation is wholly false.