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HIEROCLES: THEORY AND ARGUMENT IN THE SECOND CENTURY AD

In recent years philosophical interest in Stoicism has been directed mostly at its early period, from the foundation by Zeno shortly after Aristotle's death, through its acme under Chrysippus, to the late second century BC, or perhaps into the first with Posidonius. This is right and proper. Sharp philosophical debate flourished then; fundamental issues were tackled by way of close argumentation; exciting comprehensive theories were put forward for criticism and refinement. In the decades and centuries which followed the school's influence held strong and even grew. But the philosophical standard, we tend to think, declined, at least in the preserved texts. There was no second Chrysippus. And neither was there a second Carneades to stimulate a new re-examination of the philosophical foundations laid in the days of the archai. Instead, I suppose, we tend to see the arid doxographical tradition and its hangers-on, the deliberate popularization of Cicero, the irksome inconsistency of Seneca, the homilies of Musonius and the personal reflections of Marcus Aurelius.

Naturally the revival of interest in the Stoa has focussed on the fertile early period, despite the barriers which lie in the way of reliable reconstruction. But all is not lost in the later period, which is, after all, so much better documented. We are not, in fact, reduced to a meagre diet of hand-me-down moralizing in the time after Posidonius. My present subject is only one of the points of serious philosophical interest in this later period. I will deal with Hierocles, a Stoic philosopher of uncertain provenance and probably Hadrianic date. But in doing so I do not wish to suggest that similar gems are not to be found in Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus and yes, even in Cicero. Hierocles is, I hope you will agree, worthy of more attention than he has received since his treatise on the foundations of ethics was published in its first modern edition over seventy-five years ago. The general tendency has been to use Hierocles' text primarily to shed light on the earlier Stoa, as its editor von Arnim did in his introduction, and not to consider him in his own right as a serious philosopher. Pembroke too takes this approach, assuming that Hierocles' orthodox discussion is wholly inherited from earlier sources. He is kinder to Hierocles than is von Arnim, who seems to feel that he is capable of gross blunders whenever he departs from attested theories of the school. But even Pembroke sees him as a mere packager of theories: "his personal contribution is little more than the verbal mannerisms and stock examples of the professional lecturer".

It must, of course, be conceded that it is impossible to prove that any of Hierocles' arguments were original. We know that some at least were inherited; some of his examples, too, were used by earlier Stoics, as their appearance in letter 121 of Seneca shows. And the basic doctrine Hierocles was defending was orthodox too. The hypothesis of complete philosophical unoriginality is tempting, all the more so since the style of his treatise is fluent, rhetorical and sophisticated, obviously appealing to a wider non-specialist audience.

Yet his accessible style should not prejudice us against his philosophical merits, and I suggest that the issue of Hierocles' originality in argument be left open. In a sense the uncertainty on this point is irrelevant. For the
important thing is the quality of his thought and its relevance to the philosophical issues of his day. If lively and acute debate about basic problems in Stoic ethics was still before the public in the second century AD, then that is important as a counterbalance to the often disappointing picture one gets of Stoicism in the imperial period.

We know remarkably little about Hierocles, and this is a matter for regret. Ignorance of his birthplace and early life is tolerable, although I would personally like to know if he really was the former athlete from the village of Hyllarima in Caria mentioned by Stephen of Byzantium. He has been plausibly identified with the Hierocles Stoicus, vir sanctus et gravis whose anti-Epicurean apophthegms Gellius knew through the report of his mentor Calvenus Taurus, the Platonist (Noctes Atticae 9.5.8), and this is the principal evidence used to establish his probable date. But even this much is a recent gain. It was Karl Praechter who demonstrated in 1901 that the Hierocles from whose works Stobaeus copied out extracts was in fact this second-century Stoic and not a later neo-Platonist. Von Arnim built upon Praechter's exemplary detective work when, in 1906, he showed that the author of the then recently discovered papyrus bearing the title Ethike Stoicheiosis was also the same man. Thus we have a date for the man, extensive extracts or fragments from two of his works and, as a conjecture, his approximate location. Taurus' familiarity with him suggests activity in Athens or, at the most remote, in one of the centres of higher learning in the Greek east.

This is little enough to go on; but it is something to know that our philosopher worked in the ambience of the Greek sophistic and philosophical revival of the second century AD, at a time when middle Platonism was flourishing and served to bring into fruitful contact ideas and themes from all the principal schools of Greek philosophy.

A complete review of Hierocles' work would be out of place here. What I propose is a consideration of two important questions concerning the traditional Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis, in an attempt to see the sort of position Hierocles takes on these central questions, to determine something about the intellectual milieu in which he operated and about his philosophical style. The larger goal will be to present a partial picture of Stoic philosophical activity in this later period which, I hope, will justify the belief that philosophically interesting Stoicism did not die out with Posidonius.

The two questions are these: why does Hierocles devote so much of what survives of the Stoicheiosis to the problem of self-perception? and second, what is the relationship between the egoistic oikeiosis with which all animals are said to begin life and the fundamental oikeiosis to other human beings which supports the Stoic conviction that other-regarding behaviour is essential to living the rational life? Both of these questions arose in the earlier Stoa, and it seems that on neither point did they succeed in satisfying their critics. The debate on these, as on other points, continued. A notion of Hierocles' position provides more than just evidence for and confirmation of earlier views. It tells us what sort of philosopher he was and what sort of debate went on in his own day.

The attention given to self-perception by Hierocles is striking. Only twelve columns (of about sixty lines each) are preserved in any form, some of them so fragmentary as to be useless. Yet by the beginning of column 9 he has
advanced to a consideration of the telos, the goal of life which is rooted in the oikeiosis to oneself which exists from birth. By column 11 the discussion has advanced to the three (5) different kinds of oikeiosis (to oneself, to other men and to external things); presumably their respective roles in the good life are being considered. Columns 1-8, then, deal with foundational matters, the psychological facts about human and animal nature which determine what the good life in fact is. Of this stretch of text, the first half column describes the conception and maturation of the embryo until, at the time of birth, its phusis becomes a psuche and it itself becomes an animal for the first time. Then five full columns are devoted to the question of self-perception. The balance of this part of the treatise, about 1 1/2 columns, argues that animals are in fact endowed with an orientation to self-love and self-preservation.

Human beings are not singled out for special treatment at this point—all animals are under review. This is the normal Stoic procedure when dealing with this theme: human nature as the natural basis for ethics is considered first in those points which it shares with all animals. Man's moral evolution is portrayed as a growth from his non-rational, animal origins to his adult and characteristically human rational state. But the emphasis on perception is disproportionate, and Hierocles himself notes this at the outset (1.31-37). He reminds his audience that two psychological faculties are characteristic of animals, horme and aisthesis, and says that the former can be dispensed with for his present purposes:

Next one must keep in mind that every animal differs from the non-animal because of two things: perception and impulse. We have no need of the latter for present purposes, but it seems right to say a few things about perception. For it contributes to a knowledge of the primary oikeion, and we have said that this theory will be the best starting point for the 'Foundations of Ethics'.

Now, if we compare Hierocles' treatment to others, in Cicero (De Finibus 3) and in the summary of Chrysippus' views preserved by Diogenes Laertius (7.85-86), the amount of space devoted to aisthesis and sunaisthesis is startling. Cicero (3.16) begins with a general statement of the oikeiosis relationship and merely notes in passing that perception of self is a necessary condition: fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. Chrysippus' account is similar:

They say that the animal has its primary impulse to preserving itself since Nature oriented it to itself from the beginning, as Chrysippus says in book one of his On Goals, saying that the primary oikeion for each animal is its own constitution and awareness of this (i.e. self-perception, reading sunaisthesis for the mss' suneidesin).

Note here the prominent place of the concept Hierocles dismisses, horme. This emphasis continues through 86 and is also found in Cicero's version (appeterent). Even more passing references to the doctrine of oikeiosis are more likely to stress the desiderative rather than the perceptual basis of it. (6) Hierocles' decision to focus on self-perception as the central question is both deliberate and unusual.

But while this decision is notable in contrast to the orthodox emphasis of
Chrysippus and Cicero (whose probable source is Diogenes of Babylon), it is not unparalleled. One of Seneca's most valuable letters (121) is devoted entirely to the theme of self-perception in animals in the context of the theory of oikeiosis. Sources for his discussion are named: Archedemus and Posidonius. Neither of these men was unoriginal, although Posidonius' departures from orthodoxy were more significant. It is apparent that one or both of them had faced critics who denied the existence or significance of self-perception. Seneca seems to feel that this is still worth discussion, although we may wonder whether any contemporary critic lurks behind his imaginary interlocutor. This is the same issue to which Hierocles devotes so much space.

So it is clear that his problem is a traditional crux of Stoic theory. Similarities with material in Seneca show that Hierocles exploited traditional theories in dealing with the question. But there are differences between Hierocles' and Seneca's discussions. Seneca treats the issue as a mere detail of traditional Stoic theory, not crucial for the practical matters of ethics; it is a peripheral dogma of the sort that Epictetus too deprecates. Accordingly it is dealt with almost apologetically in an isolated letter devoted exclusively to the theme.

But Hierocles builds the discussion of self-perception into the fabric of his 'Foundations of Ethics' allowing it, moreover, to dominate the early pages of the work. It is not a peripheral issue; it is a central part of the psychological theory which is of vital importance for ethics. Moreover, the issue is a focus of live debate for Hierocles, not a footnote to the history of school doctrine.

The discussion of self-perception can be approached from two points of view. First, we may try to get some notion of the significance of this issue for Hierocles and of his motivations for concentrating on it. Accurate perception of the important issues is a valuable trait in a philosopher and that alone would justify more respect than is usually given to Hierocles. Second, we may look at the arguments themselves in an attempt to appreciate their force and effectiveness. Here too, I would argue, Hierocles is more interesting than he is usually given credit for. His arguments are varied and (some of them, at least) acute. Even the more rhetorical elaborations contain more of philosophical interest than might appear at first sight.

Hierocles' main points are that all animals do in fact have a perception of themselves, that it begins with birth and is continuous throughout life and that such self-perception is the necessary condition for any perception of external objects. After a discussion of oikeiosis itself he returns (at the end of column 7) to self-perception and its character, apparently claiming that our perception of self becomes more accurate and thorough as we mature (cf. Seneca Letter 121.10-13). Where our text becomes unusable at 8.27 Hierocles has embarked on a comparison of Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' views on this topic. This renewal of the predominant theme almost seems to reduce the discussion of oikeiosis itself to the status of a digression.

Why this obsession with one theme, to the disadvantage of horme and of oikeiosis itself? One reason, perhaps the reason, emerges clearly from Hierocles' text itself. His polemical remarks, some of them quite sharp, are directed against some unnamed critics who deny the existence of self-perception. Hierocles is in a debate with opponents who have kept the issue alive down into the second century AD. Who are these people?
This question will be easier to deal with when Hierocles' arguments have been considered, since the arguments themselves clarify the position he takes and bring out several relevant features of the Stoic position.

The main discussion runs from 1.37-6.24. The theme is introduced with a characteristic rhetorical flourish (1.37-39): "One ought not to be unaware that the animal perceives itself right away, as soon as it is born". This is followed by an unflattering reference to those who are too slow-witted to see the point. But Hierocles first digresses (1.40-3.54) in order to prove to others even more bereft of sense that animals ever have self-perception at all.

In addition to arguments which he passes over (3.52-54—another rhetorical touch), Hierocles gives two sets of arguments for this claim. Each one consists of a general statement about animal behaviour elaborated by a number of often quite interesting examples to support the generalization.

First (1.51-2.3) he argues that all animals perceive their own limbs and organs and grasp their proper functions. Unfortunately his account of the position of his opponents is obscured by gaps in the papyrus (1.44-1.50), although it is obvious that their error begins in supposing that nature gave animals perception only for the purpose of grasping external objects and not also for perception of themselves. This limited role of perception is disproved, he claims, by the fact that animals do know a good deal about themselves. Birds perceive that wings are for flying; land animals perceive what their various limbs are for. He then appeals to humans: we know instinctively what functions our eyes and ears are meant to serve. A human will never get this wrong and try to hear with his eyes or see with his ears (nor to walk with his hands or grasp with his feet). The argument is not fully developed, but its force can be brought out by further reflection. The fact that irrational animals display the same sort of certainty in their behaviour shows that it is instinctive and not a matter of rational inference or experiment. Moreover, we do not in fact learn by trial and error that eyes are for seeing etc. This is a necessary and not a contingent fact, Hierocles reasonably assumes. There would be something mildly absurd in the picture of a new-born child trying to focus his ears on a new sight and then, realizing that this was no good, trying it next with his nose and finally hitting on the eyes as the appropriate organ. No, the fact that this coordination of organ and function is automatic argues for an inborn self-awareness.

Seneca (letter 121.5-9) provides an argument of similar nature (121.5: membra apte et expedite movent non aliter quam in hoc erudita) and the differences in the treatment suggest that Hierocles is contributing something of his own here. Seneca explicitly uses the contrast of instinctive and learned behaviour, which Hierocles has suppressed. Perhaps Seneca's greater completeness is to his credit. Hierocles assumes this traditional point. But Seneca bends his argument to a different purpose. He is concerned to argue against a hedonistic interpretation of such behaviour (and gives in 121.8 good examples in support of this), whereas Hierocles is not. The anti-hedonistic focus goes back to Chrysippus (D.L. 7.85-86). But for Hierocles, whose opponents are not hedonists, this point is unnecessary. It is reasonable to suppose that he is deliberately shaping traditional arguments to the current dialectical challenge, which was narrowly focussed on perception of the self.

The second argument (2.3-3.52) is based on the fact that animals know
instinctively how to use their natural weapons to defend themselves. Contra von Arnim (pp. xx-xxi), this is not merely a special case of the first argument. For it involves an important new point, that such behaviour presupposes perception of others as well as demonstrating self-perception (as Hierocles points out at 3.20-23, cf. 3.50 kai). It also prepares the listener for the theme of self-preservation treated later. Since this too is a behavioural argument, we have a series of examples again. These carry the main burden of proof, although the particular points are interspersed with generalizations (2.7-9; 2.18-20; 3.46-52 in conclusion). The richness of the examples of animal behaviour gives the section of the treatise the appearance of a bestiary. Bulls, snakes, turtles, lions, snails, bears, deer, beaver, young birds and more exotic beasts as well march vividly through Hierocles' columns. His presentation is lively and entertaining. This shows that his purpose is not just to edify and to convince, but also to reach a general, non-specialist audience. It does not show that Hierocles is a mere rhetorician. It would be impossible to discuss all the inmates of Hierocles' zoo here. One or two of his examples suffice to indicate the character of this argument. He is arguing that animals are naturally aware of those features of their nature which have been provided by nature for the purpose of their own protection (2.3-5) and that they are also aware of the natures of other animals—potential predators. Deer (2.46-3.2) provide a particularly useful example, since there is a marked discrepancy between the real defensive equipment (fragile-looking legs which are capable of great speed) and apparent defensive gear (the horns—impressive to look at but not as useful and often a hindrance to flight if they have grown too large). Deer, Hierocles says, are aware of this automatically and instinctively rely on fleet-footedness for self-defence. They even reduce the dangers of excessively large antlers by knocking them off on hard objects. If one were to attempt to infer by appearances how a deer should protect itself, one would not have such a sure grasp of the truth as the deer's own self-perception gives it. Similarly, bears (2.27-31) are instinctively aware of the vulnerability of their heads to blows—not what one would expect by looking at them. Serpentine behaviour is also used (3.2-9): when slithering to safety they do not, it is alleged, do the obvious thing and slide head first down their holes—for that would leave their tails undefended. Instead, being aware of their strengths and weaknesses, they back down the hole, covering their retreat with their fangs. The famous 'spitting snake' (2.12-18) yields another illustration. Its venom is, allegedly, cast not injected by a bite. This is odd, and one wonders how these snakes realize this about themselves. Surely not by observation or experience. No. They are simply aware of their own natures and act accordingly, the fruit of self-perception.

This argument relies for its effectiveness on the belief that an awareness of the animal's own nature is either the only or the most obvious explanation for such behaviour. This sort of inference from effect to cause can be precarious if other explanations suggest themselves. For some of Hierocles' examples this is definitely possible; imitation of parents, trial and error and the observation of other animals are contenders for the explanatory role he assigns to self-perception. On this point the present argument is more vulnerable than the first one, and this may explain why it is developed at such great length and with so many examples. For if self-perception is the obvious explanation for some of his cases and if one also assumes a certain uniformity in the natural behaviour of animals, then cases for which a range of explanations are possible will themselves be most economically explained by self-perception. The large number of examples reinforce one another if a common hypothesis can account for all the phenomena.
Another threat looms for this argument. If the animals mentioned do not in fact behave as is claimed, then the inference to self-perception as the explanation for it is worthless. I am not enough of a zoologist to be sure, but it sometimes seems that Hierocles shares some of the credulity so endemic to the ancients about animal behaviour. Are there really spitting snakes which do not bite? Do beavers really castrate themselves to escape pursuers (3.9-19)? Any argument which relies on ancient standards of observation of animal behaviour is offering a hostage to fortune and future critics. This potential weakness too is less of a threat to the first argument.

The final observation to be made here is that the second argument supports the claim not just that animals have a perception of themselves, but also of themselves in relation to other animals. We shall return to this later.

So much for Hierocles' arguments for his first claim. Next Hierocles argues that self-perception is continuous and uninterrupted throughout the animal's life. There is a series of proofs. The first is a complex technical argument employing traditional Stoic doctrines on the nature and relation of body and soul (3.56-4.53). The argument runs as follows:

Step 1 (3.56-4.3) Both are corporeal.
Step 2 (4.3-4.22) They are mixed in a total krasis di' holôn and therefore interact.
Step 3 (4.22-4.27) The soul is (or has, to be precise) a dunamis aisthetike.
Step 4 (4.27-4.38) The nature of the soul's perceptive interaction with the body is described (the text is very bad here, but Hierocles gave an account of the tonike kinesis).
Step 5 (4.38-4.53) The conclusion draws together these premisses and claims that it follows that the soul must be in a constant state of perceiving the body. The interaction of body and soul is an antilepsis; such interaction is simply equivalent to what is meant by an animal perceiving itself.

This argument is noteworthy, not just because it offers us new details of Stoic theory (as von Arnim says, p. xxii). It also gives every sign of being an original one. (Again, von Arnim's interest is solely in traditional elements used in the argument. His overly critical attitude to Hierocles' own contribution is obvious.) It accurately employs traditional Stoic psychology in an apparently new way in order to argue for a traditional doctrine. The conclusion is a strong one (4.52-3): the psychic functions he describes are shown to be equivalent to the fact of self-perception. Thus the acceptance of the physical analysis of the soul's operation commits one to the claim Hierocles wishes to defend. The physical theory is taken as scientific fact (and we may well wonder about the adequacy of contemporary alternatives to this theory, at least from a materialist perspective); in this way an important part of the foundations of ethics is given an allegedly independent and objective demonstration. It is characteristic of the Stoics to move from the uncertainties of ethics to the solid ground of physics when supporting their theories. Here too a useful contrast to other schools may be discerned. As one could show from a more detailed examination of Stoic psychology, their 'naturalism' in ethics had a special flavour lacking in Aristotelian and Platonic theories (although perhaps not in Epicurean): the claims about human and animal
psychology used to ground ethical doctrines are detailed, exact and technical. They did not rely on generalities which were as precise as the inaccurate subject matter of ethics demanded (NB Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102a23-27). Aristotle's difficulties in reconciling his treatment of akrasia (NE 1.13, 7.3) with his scientific conception of psychic powers not divided into Platonic parts (DA 3.9), which culminates in the obscurities of DA 3.11, were not shared by the Stoics, largely because of their rather different views about the relationship between physics and a naturalistic ethics. Hierocles retained and advanced this philosophical method in his own work.

This long argument gives us an insight into what Hierocles meant by the 'self'. Problems of what constitutes the self are not at the centre of Hierocles' interest, as he is primarily concerned with perception of the self. But the issue is of intrinsic interest and is suggested by Hierocles' arguments. The first two focussed on a limited aspect of the self—the animal's capacities, limbs, organs and instinctive behaviour patterns. He made no pretense that this was the whole story about 'self'. These partial aspects merely provided a basis for suggestive arguments (see 1.39-40: pros hupomnesin toutou). But still it is noteworthy that no distinction was drawn in the earlier arguments between bodily parts and capacities or behaviour patterns. This suggests that the self is seen as a unity, a compound of soul and body; it also suggests that a Stoic would be out of sympathy with a Platonic view which identified the true self with the soul alone. This is confirmed by letter 121.10 of Seneca, where the 'constitution' of the animal (arguably meant to be equivalent to the self—see Alexander De Anima Mantissa p. 150) is defined as a relational disposition: the mind in a certain condition relative to the body: principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus.

The major argument just considered points in the same direction. For it depends upon the premiss that the body and soul are both material substances inextricably blended in a perfect mixture which explains their intimate interactions (4.3-22). Although the discussion of the soul's tonike kinesis is lacunose, it is clear that the fact that the blend of body and soul is perfect explains why the perceptual power of the soul is not directed just at the body as a distinct entity. The body could not be sensed without the soul being sensed as well. No gap could arise between perception of the body and perception of the soul which would need to be bridged by further theory or argument. Thus his conclusion (4.51-53): "a grasp occurs of all the parts both of the body and of the soul, and this is equivalent to the animal perceiving itself".

The conclusion of this argument carefully recapitulates its key steps; again we see Hierocles' rhetorical skill and his deliberate concern to present his audience with a clear case. The same commendable interest in clarity is apparent in the next argument, which consists of a series of examples (4.53-5.35): after all, examples may persuade where logoi to not (marturia ... pista tôn logon ta sumbainonta—4.53-54). He alleges that our behaviour in sleep shows that self-perception occurs even then, when conscious awareness is not present. In sleep we rearrange the blankets to stay warm, we gingerly avoid lying on sore spots, we even keep track of time so as to awake at the appointed hour next morning (a trick some people, I fear, are better at than others). Further, one's waking concerns manifest themselves in sleep: the miser grasps his purse, the drunkard
his bottle, the modest girl keeps her dress decorously arranged (as Polyxena did even in death) and Herakles slumbers with a firm grip on his club. If one's character is manifested in sleep, there must be some kind of self-awareness governing this behaviour. The argument is then generalized to include animals too, as the thesis requires, and this move is supported by argument, though not by further examples (5.23 ff.). Behind all of this, though not in express terms, (11) is a good, a fortiori argument. If we are aware of ourselves even in sleep, then surely also while awake. Therefore always.

It is worth while to pause here and consider Hierocles' use of examples, which is so extensive and striking in the treatise. For such ample use of what are taken to be mere illustrations tends, some have thought, to mark him as a mere elaborator of school dogma. But as the methodological remark at 4.53-54 suggests, these examples are not mere illustrations (at least not all of them). The presentation of carefully chosen and often startling examples of human and animal behaviour is part of a respectable philosophical technique. The strategy is to find instances of behaviour which only make sense if we postulate psychological traits of the desired character. One takes the observable behaviour as a sign (seneion or marturion) of the unobservable facts. This reasoning from effect to cause may be seen as a form of inference to the best explanation. As always in such a procedure, the most enlightening examples are those which are surprising—because they can only be explained in light of a particular theory. Thus the appeal of the puzzling and unusual—such as the apparently self-destructive behaviour of the beaver (3.9 ff.; note eti de thaumasioteron). The case of soldiers who fraternize with the enemy (11.19 ff. note de thaumasiotatton) is a similar example used to prove a different point: it only makes sense if men are endowed with strong social instincts. In the same way, the hypothesis that the beaver has self-perception relative to his predators explains why it maims itself in its drive for self-preservation. If it did not have such a self-perception the behaviour would be incomprehensible. One might also compare the effectiveness of the examples designed to prove the instinct to self-love and self-preservation itself from the behaviour of people who are in painful or distasteful physical states (12) (7.16 ff.; note de thaumasiotatton at 7.24). Such determined attachment to oneself even in an unnatural state makes best sense, Hierocles claims, if the Stoic theory is right and one's primary orientation is to oneself.

This mode of argument from examples, especially from well-chosen cases of otherwise inexplicable behaviour, is interesting and certainly intellectually respectable; and Hierocles shows that he is aware of it as a distinct mode of argument. Of course, such a form of argument is only effective if one accepts the premiss that nature operates in a reasonable, relatively uniform and goal-directed manner; but this was widely accepted by the Stoics and their opponents. Hierocles' exploitation of what may be called the argumentum ex mirabilibus is, to be sure, developed rhetorically; but underlying it is an appreciation of the vital role of crucial examples in any attempt to infer causes from effects. That the wide range of examples chosen is also rhetorically attractive should not blind us to the effective use of non-deductive argument.

Yet, as the argument at 3.56-4.53 shows, deductive argument was also employed. So was a more dialectical style, in the argument to show that continuous self-perception starts at birth (5.15-5.52): even birth is part of our lifetime (and so the body-soul argument discussed above applies); moreover, his opponents are challenged to state which moment of life except the first could be defended as the starting point of self-perception. If the second, why not the first,
which is relevantly similar? A form of sorites, now wielded by a Stoic rather than an Academic, seems to lurk.

Again, examples of animal behaviour (5.52-5.60) reinforce the case. The pattern of Hierocles' argumentative technique is now clear: an effective alternation of philosophical technicalities and lively examples, of deduction, inference and dialectic. Before moving on, Hierocles summarizes the main point: all grasp of external objects of perception entails self-perception. And he supports this with another argument adapted from the Cyrenaics (cf. Sextus M 7.191:(13) perceiving something white entails perceiving that we are 'whitened', perceiving something hot that we are 'heated', perceiving something sweet that we are 'sweetened' (5.60-6.10). We can see how the conception of the self as an intimate union of the body and the corporeal yet percipient soul underlies this point. For if it were just the bodily sense organ which was 'whitened', as in Aristotle's theory, then this would only show that the soul perceived the body when it perceived an external object. But the corporeal soul is mixed into the aistheterion. It too is 'whitened', so the soul is aware of itself as well as the body and the external object. Any tendency to psycho-physical dualism or to belief in the incorporeality of the soul would vitiate this argument.

Hierocles' final argument is a general metaphysical one (6.10-6.22): all dominant faculties (hegemonikai dunameis) apply first to themselves; this is supported by references to other faculties, hexis and phusis; then it is argued that perception is such a faculty; therefore perception perceives itself before it perceives others. The argument may be flawed by selection of perception alone as the dominant power in the soul,(14) but this emphasis is characteristic of Hierocles and suggests that this too may well be an original argument. The series of arguments concludes with a summary of the thesis which Hierocles regards as established (6.22-24): "as soon as it is born the animal perceives itself".

I have not exhaustively discussed Hierocles' various arguments for self-perception. This is a topic for further study. But they are varied and acute, and some seem to be original. They show a detailed familiarity with the technicalities of Stoic psychology, which are handled with independence and tempered by Hierocles' sensitivity to his audience's need for clarity and diversion, and a sharp realization that the ethically significant account of animal behaviour must be grounded in a detailed psychological theory. Much of the raw material is traditional, but the handling of it is intelligent. Even his reliance on earlier theory for the premisses of his arguments is not to his discredit, since much of the detailed psychology still stood out as the best and most detailed materialist theory of its day (though the physiology had been challenged by medical research). As far as we know, the essential basis of the psychological theory had not yet been seriously impugned by the critics of the Stoa.

Let us now return to our original puzzle. Hierocles devotes an extraordinary amount of care to the demonstration that self-perception is a fact. We have seen that he is determined to refute certain opponents who deny this Stoic thesis. Who were they? Why did they deny it?

For a clue to who the opponents are I suggest that we look to some of the other theories of oikeiosis in antiquity, which are not properly Stoic but which were inspired by the Stoic theory and which we may call 'para-Stoic', and also to criticisms of the Stoic view. For some para-Stoic theories differ markedly over the role played by self-perception and some criticisms turn on the role of perception in their theory. Here we may hope to find a basis for plausible conjectures about Hierocles' opponents and their concerns.
Let us begin with the account in Arius Didymus which is probably that of Eudorus of Alexandria. This Academic shows very little divergence from the Stoics on the vital role played by self-perception, making it a key component in the affiliation to oneself which all animals have, although he is not particularly clear about its exact relationship to the oikeiosis. What he says is that the subordinate goal (hypotelis) is the primary oikeion from the moment at which the animal begins to perceive its own constitution. He explains: "For upon being born the animal was certainly oriented to something from the beginning"; and then Eudorus proceeds to outline in Carneadean fashion the three possible objects of this affiliation: the prota kata phusin, pleasure or freedom from pain. His choice is obviously for the first of these, which distinguishes his theory as non-Stoic and as dependent possibly on Antiochus' anti-Stoic critique, certainly on that of Carneades. But the essential point is that self-perception has a vital role from the moment of birth. We find no clue to the inspiration of Hierocles' anti-Stoic opponents here.

Later in Stobaeus, however, there is another para-Stoic account of oikeiosis, again probably compiled by Arius Didymus but attributed by him (or by Stobaeus) to the Peripatetic school. It has long been recognized that this account owes much to Antiochus' theory; like the account in De Finibus 5 it is said to be Peripatetic in origin. Here, though, at Ecl. 2.118-9, there is no reference to self-perception. Indeed perception plays virtually no role at all in the Antiochean/Peripatetic theory as Arius reports it.

The same is true of the more genuinely Peripatetic theories of the proton oikeion which are reported by Alexander. This short discussion is a good example of how Aristotle's treatises, which do not deal explicitly with this topic, could be interpreted, sensitively or otherwise, by later Peripatetics in an effort to develop the 'true' Aristotelian view on an issue which first arose after the master's death. Xenarchus, Boethus, Verginius Rufus, Sosicrates and Alexander himself all had their theories. In none of them is self-perception of any importance. The commitment of the animal, whether it be to pleasure, itself, perfection, energeia or life, is not made dependent on any explicit requirement for self-awareness. In this the later Peripatetics are faithfully reflecting the content of the Aristotelian texts which they used to develop their own theories.

The situation with the Antiochean material in Cicero is slightly more complex. All the accounts of neo-natal self-love are bereft of references to self-perception which exists from the moment of birth and is the necessary condition for oikeiosis. But there are several references to an analogous phenomenon in human beings. As they grow up they gradually acquire self-knowledge—not perception but knowledge (2.33, 5.24 ff., 5.41 ff.). This is clearest at 5.24:

Omne animal se ipsum diligit, ac simul ortum est id agit ut se conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantummodo se tueatur qualecumque sit; sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intelligit. cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quidque se attingat ad sequentem perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progredi seseque agnoscre et intellegere quam ob causam habeat eum quem diximus animal appetitum, coepitque et ea quae naturae sentit apta appetere et propulsare contraria. ergo omni animali illud quod appetit positum est in eo quod naturae est accommodatum. ita finis bonorum existit, secundum
There are several features about this Stoically inspired account which are worth noting. First, there is a strong emphasis on *horme*, but it is clearly thought of as being independent of any cognitive or perceptual activities. Moreover, the acquisition of self-knowledge is clearly meant to be subsequent, temporally and logically, to the love of self which all animals are born with and to the appetitus which this love causes. (Contrast the account *De Finibus* 3, where self-perception is a necessary condition for self-love and the corresponding desires.) Nevertheless, the presence of this growing self-knowledge in the animal's later life does enable Antiochus to stay close to the Stoic account of the later stages of moral evolution, according to which we gradually realize our affiliation to reason and virtue as we come to see that our true selves are centred on these concepts, and it also enables him to retain the Stoic account of the telos as life according to nature. But the important point for contrast to the Stoics is with respect to their view of the new-born animal. Self-perception is not the basis for self-love and impulse; nor is it the root of the subsequent rational self-knowledge.

The difference between the Stoics and Antiochus emerges clearly from the fact that even plants, according to Antiochus, have natural drives to self-preservation. For Antiochus this basic drive of nature is quite independent of perception or even of conscious participation by the agent. Self-perception or self-knowledge, of which the Stoics made so much use, has a role only in the further evolution of the commitment to oneself. As we learn what our nature really calls for, our motivations evolve accordingly. But self-perception is not given as a necessary condition of self-love by Antiochus—any more than it was by Aristotle.

We can trace this kind of para-Stoic theory down to Hierocles' own day. For the same Platonist Calvenus Taurus who refers to Hierocles' anti-Epicurean slogans with approval also gives us a para-Stoic account of *oikeiosis* (*Noctes Atticae* 12.15) which, as Dillon notes, is on other points noticeably Antiochean in character. In this version too self-perception plays no foundational role.

We may conjecture that those whose own theories of *oikeiosis* omitted self-perception, like the Academics and Peripatetics, engaged in criticism of the Stoic theory, though the Academy would be the more likely home for vigorous polemic. Archedemus and Posidonius, Seneca's sources in Letter 121, must have had opponents who argued an anti-Stoic line. Antiochus himself had an argument, although relatively feeble, against their position (*De Finibus* 5.41 ff. see below). I would like to suggest that Hierocles' opponents were in the same tradition. Some contemporary Academic, possibly Taurus himself, had been challenging the role of self-perception in *oikeiosis* recently enough and vigorously enough to provoke Hierocles into response. He saw the continuation of this criticism as a major threat to the orthodox Stoic theory; accordingly he set out to respond to their arguments, somewhat ill-naturedly, even at the cost of distorting the scale and scope of the general treatise he was writing.

Several questions arise at this point. Why was this such a major issue for Hierocles? Why did the opponents disagree with the Stoic emphasis on self-perception? What philosophical point hangs on the issue?
Plutarch may provide our next clue. In that polemical ragbag entitled On Stoic Self-Contradictions there is a chapter (12) dealing with oikeiosis. He begins by quoting Chrysippus to the effect that for the non-sage nothing is useful, oikeion or appropriate and that to the sage nothing is allotriion. He then confronts him with references to the oikeiosis doctrine according to which from birth on (men and all animals) do have an oikeiosis to themselves inter alia. He then concludes: "But neither is there perception for those to whom nothing is perceptible nor oikeiosis for those to whom nothing is oikeion; for oikeiosis seems to be a perception and grasp of what is oikeion."(24)

The reference to perception comes as a bit of a surprise to this point, since it is not mentioned in the opening of the chapter which set Chrysippus up for the contradiction. But the point about oikeiosis is clear. Chrysippus used the term both normatively, to refer to the ideal affinities to ultimate values which only a fully mature sage has, and descriptively, to refer to the basis of this in the natural endowments of the new-born animal. Letter 121 of Seneca explains how the Stoics linked the two by means of a complex theory of moral evolution, but Plutarch's polemic leaves no room for such a deep and fair account of Stoic principles. Glib demonstration of prima facie self-contradiction is his game.

But what of the intrusive perception here? Surely an analogous point is being made. The Stoics, I suggest, defined perception in the same dual way in which oikeiosis was characterized. Ideally it is an assent to a cataleptic presentation.(25) Descriptively, of course, all animals perceive. Indeed, aisthesis and horme are the faculties which characterize animals in contrast to plants and lower entities. To the non-sage, then, nothing is fully perceptible, just as nothing is oikeion—in the ideal sense. So, Plutarch is hinting, the aisthesis which is the foundation of oikeiosis is impossible and Chrysippus again contradicts himself.

Plutarch's narrow polemic builds on the assumption that oikeiosis is a perception and grasp of the oikeion. This assumption is approximately correct (for properly aisthesis is a necessary condition of oikeiosis, not identical to it) and is confirmed by Porphyry (of all people) in his De Abstinentia (3.19 = SVF 1.197): kai gar oikeioseos pases kai allotrioseos arche to aisthanesthai. As Kerferd says (op. cit. p. 186), "the process of oikeiosis is a process of self-recognition". All oikeiosis is a process of recognition of naturally established affinities. The affinities could not be meaningful for the agent unless they were perceived, brought into the cognitive world of that agent. Mere existence of a natural affinity is powerless to create that relationship of self to self (or self to other—see below) known as oikeiosis.

Why would anyone want to deny this? Antiochus' account of an animal's early development provides a clue. Their activities are thought of as being quite automatic, independent of any response to perception of their environment let alone themselves (above on De Finibus 5.24 ff.). He argues (at 5.41) that self-knowledge does not begin at birth. For if it did, an agent "would immediately see what we are looking for, the end and limit of our objects of desire, and he would be unable to go wrong in any point. But as it is at first our nature is hidden in a remarkable fashion and cannot be known; however, as we gradually mature, little by little, or rather quite slowly, we get to know ourselves, as it were". Antiochus insists that self-love and the corresponding hormai to self-preservation precede any meaningful grasp of our own nature and how it differs from other animal natures. Then only do we "begin to pursue those things which we are born to pursue".
The movements of the newborn are instinctive and almost plantlike: *parvi primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint* (5.42); it is only later that they gain strength and begin to use their souls and senses to deal with the external world. This view of infant psychology is in marked contrast to the Stoic, which insists that birth marks a decisive break with the embryonic existence. As Hierocles establishes at the beginning of his treatise, at birth the previously plantlike foetus suddenly acquires a soul with the characteristic powers of *horme* and *aisthesis* and immediately exercises them. This sharp transition bears comparison with the two later crises in life: the acquisition of reason and the sudden elevation to the status of sage, if it is ever achieved. Stoic psychology leaned heavily on such sharp developmental 'passages' and exploited them in ethics. The Academic-Peripatetic psychology which we see in Antiochus is more realistic and biological, giving what we think of as due consideration to gradual and uninterrupted growth and change, an imperceptible and continuous unfolding of natural potentials. (26) The Stoics overlaid this biological viewpoint with their own and very different emphasis on rigidly defined stages of life.

Antiochus' critique of the role of self-perception raises an objection to the Stoic claim that it is the necessary condition for self-love and the resultant actions. A man would, it is claimed, have to have a clear grasp of his ultimate nature from the moment of birth. To a degree this is unfair. The Stoics did not mean to thrust infallible knowledge of human nature onto babes in arms, but only a form of perception which is plausibly rudimentary. The serious objection, though, is that a neonatal perception of one's nature is not possible, since that nature is still incoherent at best. And this kind of objection was taken seriously by Stoics, for it would seem that Seneca's sources for Letter 121 (Archedemus and Posidonius) clarified the orthodox theory of *oikeiosis* accordingly (121.14ff). At birth the animal is aware of and loves his current constitution. As this constitution evolves and changes so does the awareness of it. At each stage of development only the existing nature of the animal is known and loved. Man does not perceive and strive to preserve his rational nature until he in fact becomes rational (at age 7 or 14).

I doubt that this is a substantial change to the Chrysippian theory. It is more like a clarification designed to get around this Academic criticism, which may in fact not have been original with Antiochus. There is an interesting consequence of the Stoic theory as thus clarified. Since the *oikeiosis* to self and the impulse to self-preservation follow upon a perception of self, and this follows upon the evolution of one's nature as one matures, the drive to self-preservation is not also a drive to personal development as it is in Antiochus' and Alexander's versions; it is not a voluntary drive to proceed to the next state of life, to actualize the potential of one's species, only to perfect the state one is in. In this connection it is worth noting that Nicholas White (27) has recently stressed that Antiochus' theory puts far more emphasis on 'self-realization' than the Stoics did. There are aspects of White's discussion of the Stoic theory with which I cannot agree, but to this extent his study fits in with the different ways in which the two schools look at the relation between perception and *oikeiosis*.

This argument also points to a rather different conception of self in Antiochus' work. The self he is concerned with is the fully mature state of the animal, and this is a bipartite entity: body and soul considered as distinct entities. Of these the developed rational soul is by far the more important and is, indeed, the dominant element. It is love for this fully developed compound
nature which draws human beings on and grounds their characteristic behavior. Thus even when discussing children Antiochus makes use of their innate love for knowledge and virtue—characteristics of reason—(De Finibus 5.42-43, 48, 61). Hierocles and other Stoics do not argue in this way for the simple reason that it would contradict their own theories: children do not have reason; self-love is directed to oneself as one is; the self is an intimate blend of body and soul, not a compound of two distinct entities.

Is there another psychological basis for the Academic-Stoic debate on self-perception? For the Stoics, the oikeiosis is a set of dispositions to act in certain self-preservatory ways. But, as the synopsis of Chrysippus' theory at D.L. 7.85 and many other Stoic sources make clear, action is always preceded and caused by a horme, which itself is always a response to a perceptual stimulus (aisthesis or phantasia). In the context of the Stoic psychology of action, no action could be performed without the stimulus of a prior perception. In contrast to the Antiochean model of infant psychology, the Stoic theory employed a strict stimulus-response model. Action never just happens, it never flows from within the animal all on its own as a result of unprompted instinct. Perceptual stimulation is always necessary. There are, of course, instinctual predispositions to respond to stimuli in set ways, but no instinctive drives (like the Platonic eros) which emerge on their own steam, as it were.

There may be more to the disagreement over the role of self-perception. Another general difference between Stoicism and Platonism may be relevant here. Antiochus' main criticism of Stoic ethics in De Finibus 4 and 5 depends on his version of a body-soul dualism. Although soul is material for this Stoically inclined Academic, it is still viewed as one of the two distinct component parts of the human being. The goal of life will only be achieved when both parts are functioning properly. The Stoic view of man is, as we have seen, more unified. The constitutio or sustasis, which is equivalent to the animal itself as the object of self-love, is defined by the Stoics as a relation of soul to body. The self, as one of Hierocles' arguments (3.56-4.53) for self-perception makes clear, is a physical unity. It is the excellent condition of this compound entity, the soul-in-relation-to-body, which constitutes the goal of life. This highly unified organism, the soul-body compound mixed in a krasis di' holou, is aware of itself as a whole if it is aware of anything. For the soul, if it exists at all, is by definition capable of perceiving. But the more dualistic model of soul which Antiochus held as a Platonist makes self-perception (as opposed to perception of one's own body) more problematic and not the sort of state which follows automatically from the essential characteristics of soul and body. Self-perception—or self-knowledge, I should say, since Antiochus prefers more intellectual language on this point—is a complex and sophisticated task. It is certainly not one which could be performed from the very moment of birth, even before external objects could be perceived.

I suggest, then, that anyone with an inclination to psycho-physical dualism will naturally tend to resist the Stoic notion of primitive self-perception. The Stoics, whose materialism is a powerful extension of Aristotle's unified and hylomorphic view of soul and body, just as naturally embraced self-perception. The Academic disapproval of the Stoic theory, then, is rooted at least partially in fundamental disagreement over the body-soul relationship and in a corresponding disagreement about the nature of the self.

Another of the contrasts between Antiochus and the Stoics has a similar
significance. As was noted above, for Antiochus nature seemed to operate on newborn animals without their awareness or conscious collaboration. Nature and man are quite distinct. Man begins later on to reflect on nature's activity, discovering after the fact what his nature is. For the Stoics, nature operates through the animal's psychological faculties at each stage. It is the awareness of its own self which leads the way in each animal's pursuit of its natural behaviour patterns. Thus in D.L. 7.85 the teleological efforts of nature are carried out through nature's endowment of animals with certain dispositions. Nature does not do things for animals; she gives them the dispositions which enable them to do things for themselves. The preference for regarding nature as immanent in the members of each species, rather than as some outside power, is also part of the Stoic's genuinely Aristotelian heritage.

But let us return to Hierocles for more specifics. Why self-perception? This, after all, is Hierocles' main point. The actions of all animals are fundamentally self-preservation. It does little good to perceive the external world if you cannot distinguish the beneficial from the harmful. All of the goal-directed actions of the animal depend on having some notion of the self which is to be preserved. At the heart of the Stoic position is the sensible realization that all purposive action is relational, based on a view however incohate of the agent's relation to the world. In his preface to the edition of Hierocles, von Arnim complains that Hierocles' examples of animal response to external threats are beside the point, which is to establish self-perception as a fact (pp. xxi-xxii). But this is a misguided criticism. A baby chick's automatic flight from a hawk or a cat shows not just that it perceives the hawk or cat, but that it also perceives something about itself (cf. Seneca Letter 121.19-21), as does its failure to flee those animals which are not natural predators. The behaviour can only be explained if the chick perceives its own nature as well as that of the predator.

Again we can see that a general philosophical principle underlies the school polemic. The insistence on self-perception as the necessary condition of goal-directed behaviour reflects an advance on earlier theories of action (Aristotle's and Epicurus', for example). It is in fact a better explanation of goal-directed behaviour. If Academic critics were reluctant to accept this point, then perhaps Hierocles' contempt for them is not so difficult to understand.

To summarize. We may make one or two general remarks about Hierocles' philosophical stature based on this debate. His acuity is shown not in his new doctrine but in his perception of where the crux of the debate lay and in his elaboration of new arguments from older material. He saw, correctly, that the battle over oikeiosis was to be fought on the grounds of the detailed theory which could be offered about the psychology of self-perception. Unlike some other later Stoics, he knew what was central, where the principal issues lay, and he went at these points clearly, directly and thoroughly. He set up a challenge to the braduteroi, those Academics who, perhaps, had attacked the conclusions drawn from the Stoic theory without properly refuting the premisses. It is the mark of a keen philosophical mind to see the issue, to focus on the strong points in one's own position and to force one's opponents to debate on your ground not theirs. Whether any contemporary Academic was up to this challenge we shall probably never know.

When we turn to the second problem which I mentioned at the outset, Hierocles and his Stoic predecessors come off less well. For there is a problem in the Stoic use of oikeiosis as a foundational principle of ethics which, I would argue,
goes back to Chrysippus himself and is never properly resolved, even in Hierocles' day. Academics seem to have zeroed in on this point too, and there is no sign that he or his predecessors ever fully appreciated the force of their attack or developed a response that would be defensible in debate. I refer to the problem of the relationship between the two forms of oikeiosis and the resulting tension between the themes of egoism and altruism in Stoic ethics.

In Stoic theory, oikeiosis served two distinct purposes. The primal commitment to self-preservation formed the basis of the theory of the telos, since the commitment of the adult to living the life of reason was supposed to be derived by a process of natural (though not inevitable) moral evolution from the self-preservatory urges of the new-born animal. The commitment to the self remained constant, but as the self changed the focus of that commitment shifted from the preservation of mere animal existence to the maintenance of the characteristically human nature, reason. But as our sources also tell us, a form of oikeiosis was also used to ground our commitment to others, as a foundation for justice and the other-regarding virtues generally. The best evidence we have (and it does leave something to be desired) suggests that this form of oikeiosis was rooted in our instinctive love for our own off-spring, which is then generalized to all fellow creatures (see St. Rep. 12 for instance). But in fact it is open to question whether the Stoics ever found a satisfactory way of accounting for the relationship between these two potentially conflicting orientations of human nature.

Epictetus is typical on this point; he asserts flatly (Diss. 1.19.13) that the nature of a rational animal has been set up in such a way as to ensure that this altruistic orientation is a component part of our essentially egoistic approach to ethics. But it is far from clear whether this optimistic assertion about human rationality can be sustained either in argument or in the face of practical decisions in real life. Seneca, who clearly formulates the egoistic approach to ethics of the Stoa (Letter 121.17: si omnia propter curam mei facio, ante omnia est mei cura), elsewhere emphasizes our basic commitment to others. No doubt he believed that egoism properly interpreted and altruism were compatible—but how? When a situation comes up where these two principles appear to conflict, how is one to adjudicate the competing claims on human nature, if both forms of oikeiosis are held to be fundamental?

The general problem, of course, was hardly new in Greek thought. Plato's Republic attempted to resolve it by arguing that other-regarding actions 'pay off' for the agent because they flow from and reinforce the optimal state of the agent's soul. But we lack a comparable Stoic account, where the need of it is more acute since they quite deliberately derived the goal of life, i.e. virtuous action, including social virtues, from a natural drive to self-preservation.

In both of his works Hierocles touches on the issue at hand and so he raises the expectation that a resolution be given. In the Stoicheiosis (col. 9) he lists three kinds of oikeiosis: the egoistic eunoetike (which is pros heauto), the social sterketike based on family affection (sungenike) and a third hairtike, directed at ta ektos chremata. His discussion of these is lost, and with it we have lost whatever attempt he made to reconcile the former two. By column 11 he is firmly in the midst of an account of social oikeiosis alone. Was there room in columns 9 and 10 to solve the problem? Doubts we may have on this point are hardly allayed by the other relevant text, this one from a long passage on oikeiosis preserved by Stobaeus (Fior. 84.23–). This is the famous 'concentric circle' passage, of which the following is the key portion (p. 61.10–26, 62.4–7 in von Arnim's edition of Hierocles):
In general each of us is, as it were, circumscribed by many circles, some smaller, some bigger and some enclosing and other enclosed according to the different and unequal relationships towards one another. The first and most intimate circle is that which someone has himself drawn as though around a centre point, his own mind. In this circle are enclosed both the body and those things adopted for the sake of the body. For this circle is, more or less, the smallest and practically in contact with the centre. Second after this and more removed from the centre and enclosing the first is that in which parents, siblings, wife and children are placed. The third is that in which are placed uncles and aunts, both grandfathers and grandmothers, the children of one's siblings and cousins too. Next is the circle which contains the rest of one's relations. Next to this is the circle of one's demesmen, and next the circle of one's tribesmen, then that of one's fellow citizens and moreover in the same way that of one's fellow townsmen and those of the same race. The outermost and greatest circle, which encloses all the circles is that of the entire human race. These things being established, it is the duty of a serious man concerning the proper treatment of each of these groups to draw together somehow the circles towards the centre and to be serious about constantly moving those from the enclosing circles towards the enclosed ones. For the remoteness of blood relationship, being quite large, will detract somewhat from one's good will. But still we must be serious about the task of equating them. For it would be a reasonable accomplishment if through our treatment of them we reduced the distance of our relationship to each category of relationship.

Our various relationships to self and others are seen as a set of concentric circles, with our own intelligence egocentrically at the middle. The problem of how the self is to be related to others is dealt with by prescribing an attempt to draw the outer circles, representing others, in towards the middle, representing oneself and one's own self-interest. If complete success were ever to be achieved, one's feeling of concern and love for all mankind would be rendered equal in intensity with one's concern and love for one's own self. (Although not with one's attachment to one's own reason. Hierocles says nothing about making any of the circles touch the centre, one's dianoia, only the innermost of the circles which is the body and associated material advantages. At De Finibus 3.70 the problem is posed in these terms.) But while this sheds light on the factual situation of man—our self-love is more powerful than our love for others—it does nothing to resolve the question at hand. In the ideal case of the successful moral practitioner, the sage, how are we to deal with a situation of conflict between self-interest and regard for others? Ideally both should be equal.

There are three problems. First, is this ideal state possible? Second, how is it grounded in human nature? And third, if it is achieved, how could conflicts be resolved? Sadly, Hierocles answers none of these, though (at least) he avoids simple-minded optimism about the answer to the first question.

Should we expect Hierocles to have addressed these problems, even solved them? Undoubtedly yes. The conflict of self-interest and altruism is obvious enough and was dealt with at length by Hecaton (De Officiis 3.89) and many others, notably Antipater and Diogenes (De Officiis 3.49 ff). Moreover, the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus, who may have been roughly contemporary with Hierocles,(35) raised the issue explicitly in the context of oikeiosis.

Among his criticisms is an ideal test case which goes back at least to Hecaton: two men, presumably sages, are left after a shipwreck, clinging to a
scrap of wood which will support only one. Is it possible to love your neigh-
bour as yourself now? If so, how should you act?(36) Hecaton's answers (in
his version it is stated explicitly that the two survivors are sages) are
facile,(37) and the later text suggests that the debate went on into Hierocles'
own day. Without a solution, how could a Stoic blithely assume the compatibi-
licity of personal and social oikeiosis?

The commentator clearly thinks that the equipollence of the two oikeioseis
is impossible and so he finds the Stoic attempt to ground justice in the social
version untenable. Plato did better in his decision to base justice on homoiotes
pros ton theon (7.14-20). The debate was clearly a pointed one: the commentator
cleverly argues (6.29 ff) that the Stoic theory of justice is no better than
the reductionist and utilitarian Epicurean theory! Touche!

On the question of possibility the commentator hits home. He argues on a
variety of grounds (5.24-6.20) that the selfish drive of personal oikeiosis
does and must override a concern for others. In this attack he exploits the
Stoics against themselves, in the best Carneadean tradition.

That the Stoics did not have answers for these problems seems very likely.
That Hierocles ignored this persistent challenge is probable, though not prov-
able. We have seen him take up one contemporary criticism and solidly turn it
back on the critic. Now he dodges another. What are we to say of his dialecti-
cal skills and philosophical merits?

I suspect that Hierocles is about average in philosophical acumen among
Stoics of the first two generations after Chrysippus. No later Stoic could approach
the subtlety and power of the second founder. But neither is Hierocles a mere
Musonius or a simple popularizer of the inherited theories. If we seek a com-
parison, we might look to the scholars of the second century B.C., Diogenes
and Antipater:(38) serious, capable, debaters; strong in defending the
school's strengths, weak in defending its weaknesses; eager for debate, but
reluctant to abandon the doctrines of Chrysippus even if unable to rebut the
critics adequately.

The Stoicism of the second century A.D. was not at its acme, but neither
was it philosophically negligible. Between the moralists of the fringe, whose
works are well preserved, and the dialectical giants of the good old days, now
all but lost, there was a wide range of philosophical activity. Hierocles gives
us a glimpse of the middle ground during this period. We might properly feel
as much regret for the loss of his and other works of his day as we do for the
loss of so much else of Hellenistic debate.
NOTES


2 P. 118.

3 Praechter p. 107

4 Or possibly only one: the question whether the Stobaeus extracts are from the same work as the Stoicheiosis was debated by von Arnim, Praechter (in Hermes 51 1916 p. 519) and Philippson.

5 The addition of a third form of oikeiosis may well be a late development. Reference to the oikeiosis towards external objects is also found in the anonymous commentary on Plato's Theaetetus. Compare Posidonius' more radical change to the traditional doctrine: he posited a distinct oikeiosis in each of the three parts of a Platonically divided soul (frr. 160, 169 E-K).

6 NB appetitus = horme at De Officiis 1.11, representing Panaetius' adaptation of the theory.

7 Compare also Tertullian's remarks, probably of Stoic inspiration, at SVF 2.845.

8 His references to other discussions of the theme are, perhaps, part of an epistolary fiction. No trace of such discussions has come down to us.

9 Or perhaps 'Outlines of Ethics'. The only other work of this title I know of is by Eudromus (D.L. 7.39). The interpretation of stoicheiosis affects the question whether the Stobaeus fragments are from the same work. They might belong to an 'Outlines', but would be less appropriate in a 'Foundations'. My own preference for 'Foundations' is based on the content of what survives of the papyrus.

10 At 1.37-40 they are called 'rather slow-witted'; at 1.42-44 it is 'slow-witted and bereft of sense'; in 4.22-24 and 6.43 ff. he says that no one, not even Margites (a proverbially stupid man), would take the position his opponents want to take. In column 5 (45-47, 52-53) Hierocles rudely challenges his opponents to disagree with him. The overall effect is to suggest that he feels considerable contempt for these misguided critics.

11 At 4.54-56 he says that it is reasonable that self-perception occur especially in sleep if it is a general and constant feature of animal life.

12 This is a traditional point; cf. Antiochus on Philoctetes at De Finibus 5.32.

13 See Pembroke p. 118 and n. 20. This is also a point which follows from the Stoic theory itself (see SVF 2.63).

14 Hierocles here places aisthesis alone as a 'dominant power' where we might expect him to refer to the set of all characteristic powers of the soul (see
von Arnim pp. xxix-xxx). But throughout Hierocles has simplified his account by concentrating on perception alone as the power of the soul which is most important for his argument. This seems to be deliberate and I doubt that it seriously affects the value of his argument.

15 Preserved in Stobaeus Eclogae 2.47. H. Tarrant has recently suggested that the material on oikeiosis in the Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus is also by Eudorus ('The Date of the Anon. In Theaetetus' Classical Quarterly 33 (1983) p. 186). While most of his argument is based on other points of doctrine, which I am not competent to evaluate, Tarrant does seem to exaggerate the similarity of Eudorus' account of oikeiosis in Ecl. 2.47-8 to the material in the commentary. The commentary is concerned primarily with social oikeiosis, Eudorus with personal oikeiosis and self-perception. In fact Eudorus' greater sympathy for the Stoic theory is hard to reconcile with the attitude of the commentator and this may weaken the suggestion that Eudorus is the same man. Moreover, the elaboration of three kinds of oikeioseis instead of two, which the commentator is aware of, is unknown in the Stoae before Hierocles.


17 De Anima Mantissa pp. 150-153. All portions of the Mantissa may not be by Alexander himself, but questions of authenticity are not relevant here.

18 5.24 ff.; 5.41 ff.; 2.33; 4.16 ff.

19 Seneca, unlike other Stoics, uses similar intellectual language (Letter 121.10-13) in addition to the perceptual language. This is no doubt due to the influence of the opponents in the debate and their language. Hierocles and Cicero are more scrupulous. The occurrence of suneidesis in D.L. 7.85 (which is often and correctly, in my view, emended to sunaisthesis) may be a result of a Platonizing influence.

20 See esp. Letter 121 of Seneca. Antiochus speaks of awareness or knowledge (which progresses with age) of mature human nature. This should be contrasted with the Stoic point that the perception an animal has of its constitution at each stage can be of greater or lesser clarity. This is Hierocles' subject at 7.50 ff. and Seneca's at 121.10-13. Antiochus is concerned with how well one knows the completed and perfected nature of one's species at various stages of life; self-perception of this order is impossible for a new-born infant (see De Finibus 5.41 ff.). The Stoics postulate a perception (which may be more or less clear) of the current constitution at every stage of life.

21 5.33, apparently followed only by Philo Judaeus De Animalibus 94-5.

22 It is likely that Seneca's letter on self-perception reflects a response to much earlier critics (late second century and early first century B.C.), since he mentions Archedemus and Posidonius as sources. The criticism of Academics like Carneades inevitably comes to mind.

23 The Middle Platonists (London 1977) pp. 240-1. Taurus presents his account as a version of what a Stoic would say, but the omission of self-perception suggests that he is adapting it in an Academic direction.
24 'Grasp' represents the Greek antilepsis; cf. Hierocles 1.45-6, 5.47 for the term.

25 D.L. 7.52: he di' autôn (i.e. the senses) katelepésis. This ideal or normative use of aísthesis would make it the equivalent of episteme. My only support for this speculative suggestion is the claim at SVF 2.78 that aístheseis are all true (in contrast to phantasiai which may be true or false).

26 This is also suggested in the Peripatetic discussion, Mantissa pp. 150-153.


28 Cicero does at De Finibus 3.17-18. But this is unique in a Stoic account and is one more reason to challenge the appropriateness of that otherwise puzzling section. It is probably Cicero's own ill-considered interpolation into his source material. The reference to children's pleasure in learning contradicts the anti-hedonistic tendency of what precedes. The attribution of reason to children contradicts Stoic doctrine. Note also that the rest of section 18 fits badly into its context.

29 I have discussed this at length in Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism forthcoming from OUP.

30 In the Academica Antiochus stays closer to the Stoic theory; he is there concerned with epistemology rather than ethics.

31 Note that the same word, antilepsis, is used by Hierocles of self-perception (n. 24) and of perception of others relative to oneself (3.21).

32 See my discussion 'The Two Forms of Oikeiôsis in Arius and the Stoa', pp. 190-201 in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics (n. 16 above). The disagreement among Stoics over the relative value of one's own reason and that of a friend (De Finibus 3.70) brings this tension into the open.

33 Kerferd (above n. 1, pp. 195-6) supplements this with the suggestion that our commitment to our rational nature is generalized to a commitment to all reason and so to all other men as rational creatures. But there is no direct evidence for this.

34 Just actions are a result of justice in the soul: 442d4-443b6; just actions reinforce justice in the soul: 444c5-e6.

35 Dillon op. cit. pp. 270-271 suggested that he was Albinus or a close associate. If Tarrant op. cit. is right in his redating of the commentary to the Augustan period, some of the immediacy of the challenge to Hierocles may be lost, but none of its importance.

36 Theaetetus commentary 6.20 ff.; De Officiis 3.90.

37 The sage who is of less use to himself or the state will yield the life-preserving plank to the other; if they are equal on these counts, as one would expect, they will decide by lot. Note the evasion of the issue: cuius magis intersit vel sua vel rei publicae causae vivere.

38 Discussions of kathêkonta similar to Hierocles' are preserved for Antipater too.