Parmenides on Naming by Mortal Men: fr. B8.53ff. VS

Leonard Woodbury

University of Toronto

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp

Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation

https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/116

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Concerning the text and syntax of the passage there appears to be a wide, though not a universal, agreement. But in regard to interpretation it is agreed only that severe problems proliferate and defy clear solutions. Of line 54 Professor U. Hölscher writes that the eliciting of its meaning belongs "zu den schwierigsten Fragen der Interpretation."

δύο is taken to modify μορφάς, leaping back over the metrical caesura of the verse and away from the next following ξύσμας, which would otherwise invite its agreement. By a similar movement κατεθέντο is made to vault both the caesura and the intervening δύο to embrace ξύσμας. ονομάζειν at the end of the line is then construed as a supplementary infinitive, depending on κατεθέντο...ξύσμας and thus brings to an end the arched suspension of μορφάς. The sense thus achieved is as follows: "they made up their minds to name two forms."

Τῶν μίαν in 54 must then refer to μορφάς...δύο, with which it is contrasted, and the infinitive ονομάζειν is supplied in order to complete οὐ χρεών ἄστιν. "Of which it is not right to name one; that is where they have erred."

The two sensible "forms" thus instituted are seen to be Light and Night, the two principles of the Way of Mortal Men. But opinions differ concerning the error that is exposed here. The second half of 54 is certainly the judgment of the goddess, from whose speech
of revelation the passage is taken; but is the first half of the line also her own judgment or does she merely report what is said by mortal men? Does she denounce utterly the naming of the opposites, or do men forbid that one of their opposites be named without the other?

The meaning of μίαν now comes under scrutiny. If it means, as it appears to mean, simply "one", either the goddess is implicitly approving the naming of the other of the two forms or men are insisting that the two are inseparable. But many have been reluctant to accept the implication, in the former case, that "fire has any claim to reality," and in the latter reading the indirect discourse is most obscurely indicated and liable to misinterpretation because of the claim that follows: the reader expects, but does not find, an explicit contrast between the error denounced by mortal men and that other one disapproved by the goddess. Doubts have also been raised, though ineffectively, about the use of μίαν, rather than έτέραν, in the sense, "one (of two)", and the plain sense has been expanded to mean "(so much as) one", "only one", or, most improbably, "a unified form".

Our manuscripts of Simplicius, whose quotations preserve the passage for us, in fact give almost equal support in line 53 to the accusative γνώμας and to the dative γνώμαις. Editors and commentators have generally preferred the former, rightly I believe, but recently Professor D.J. Furley has defended γνώμαις. He objects to the severance of μορφας from the following verb and renders, "they set up two forms in their minds for naming."

The difficulty with this reading is: that, while Greek verse speaks often of "laying something up" in the φρένες or in the θυμός, it speaks very seldom of laying them up in the γνώμη. The best parallel is probably Pindar, Nem. 10.89: οὗ γνώμης διμλόω θέτο θεός. But there γνώμη exhibits its proper sense of "will", "judgment", or "deliberate purpose", and what is, or is not, laid up there is a "counsel" or "decision", not an external, physical object, as in our passage of Parmenides. I believe that the proposed reading is not congenial in archaic verse, but I judge that, if it were to be admitted here, the sense would be, "they established in their purposes two forms for naming." What would then be signified would be an intention or a decision rather than a committal to
memory or a fixing of attention, which are the usual senses conveyed by the idiom of "laying up" in the mind. But, if the idiom can develop this new sense, it remains unsatisfactory to suppose that Parmenides' meaning is that the two physical forms are "decided". Nor does the interpretation give any help with the difficulties, already outlined, in line 54.

Difficulties of interpretation apart, the line, as commonly read and construed, exhibits a structure of quite extraordinary complexity. Its form is certainly without parallel in our surviving verses of Parmenides, and it has not been shown to have parallels elsewhere. This must seem even more astonishing, if we reflect on the philosopher's customary awkwardness in the composition of verse. No one is likely, given the existing evidence, to acclaim him as an accomplished or elaborate versifier. Yet verse 53, as it is usually read, assumes an aspect of intricate interlacing, somewhat as follows:

\[
\text{μορφάς χόρ κατέβηντο // ὁ ἐν χώμας ἀνομάζειν.}
\]

It seems desirable to seek a construction that is nearer to the practice of contemporary poetry and more appropriate to Parmenides' modest merits as a poet.

To meet this wish, I propose the following scheme:

\[
\text{μορφάς χόρ κατέβηντο // ὁ ἐν χώμας ἀνομάζειν.}
\]

This arrangement groups the main syntactical clause on either side of the caesura, while μορφάς at the beginning of the line has its governance suspended until its end is reached. The meaning is then: "for, as to forms, they came to two decisions (put themselves into two minds) concerning their naming."

Though the idiom is not common, it seems agreed that κατέβηντο...χώμας means "they decided." It is true that an undoubted parallel for ἔχωμαι καταθέσθαι in this sense is lacking, but the idiom is known with the simple form of the verb, as in Sophocles (Phil. 1447): ἱκάρι χώμας τάκτην τίθεσαι, and Herodotus (7.82): Ἄρτανθείου τοῦ χώμας Θεσέου and in An- docides (3.21): τίνα χώμαν ἔθεντο. Closest is Πηγής (717): ἀλλὰ χρή πώλτας χώμην καταθέσθαι. The compound verb, when used with ἔχωμαι, signifies the "laying up" in the heart (Semon. fr. 8.4 IEB), "to
record" in memory or in writing (LSJ s.v. II.6), and it is used by Parmenides (fr. 88.39, 19.3) of the institution of names by mortal men. The infinitive that follows may be compared with that used to complete the sense of ἐγγώμαι (Hdt. 1.74, 6.85, Isocr. 17.6, in the sense, "hand down a judgment"). Herodotus (3.80) has τίβεμαι...ἐγώμην, "I declare my view", followed by a future infinitive and Thucydides (2.2.4) has ἐγώμην...ἀποκούντο with the aorist infinitive.

It is relevant to notice that Greek appears to use the singular ἐγώμη even when the verb’s subject is plural, if the ἐγώμη is the same for all; in these circumstances its idiom might be rendered, "they made up their mind". The rule is supported by the usage of Theognis, Sophocles, Andocides, and Thucydides, as quoted here. If this is a valid rule, the received translation requires the singular ἐγώμην, since all take the same decision. But our manuscripts give the plural ἐγώμας, which invites the attachment of δύο, certifying the use of the plural as signifying two different decisions.

Duality of mind is often represented in poetry, usually with δίχα or διώνοιχα and a noun such as θυμός, βουλή, νοῦς or νόμα, and the like (LSJ s.v. δίχα I.2), signifying doubt and variance, as (e.g.) at Homer (Od. 16.73): δίχα θυμός ἐγώμαι ἔφεσι μερισθείην, in Theognis (910): δίχα θυμόν ἐγώμαι, and in Euripides (Andr. 480): διώμα προμίθεα ἐγώμα. The adverbs occur also in expressions of variance between different speakers, as in Homer (Od. 3.127): διχῶς ἐξακούομεν, or of variance between different spoken opinions, as in Herodotus (6.109): τετείχεν ἀθώνων ἐπιστημονίας ἐγώμουσα δίχα ἐγώμαι. In addition, duality may be found in character, as in Achilles' outburst (Il. 9.312-313) concerning the hatefulness of the man who conceals one thing in his heart while speaking another (from the same source) and in Theognis (91): δεις μὴ χλώψῃ δίχως ἐχει νόον, or in temperament, as in the woman whose disposition Semonides (fr. 7.27 IEG) compares with the inconstant sea: she δύο ἐν φρεσάν νοεῖ.

Finally, in Bacchylides (3.78-84), Apollo advises Admetus, son of Pheres, that it is right for a mortal man to foster (in his mind) two distinct determinations, (θρῶν εὖνα γρη διώμους ἐξῆυ ἐγώμα), viz., that the light of tomorrow's sun will be the last that he will see and that his life will endure for fifty years of ample prosperity. The most profitable
course is then to combine piety of action with gladness of heart (ἓνια ὅμων εὐφραίνει θυμόν). The man’s γνώμα, are not only paired but opposed and the opposition is recognised as the condition of human life. A similar sentiment is attributed to Epicharmus (fr. B24 V8) by Clement of Alexandria in a different construction: ώς πολύν ζήτων χρόνον χῶς ὀλίγον, οὕτως ἐνεπούλη.

Though a precise parallel is lacking, the phrase κοτέσσεντο ὁ διὸ γνώμα is sufficiently close to known Greek to be quite acceptable. Its meaning is more surprising, although there is a good, general, semantic analogy with Pindar (Nem.) 10.89): οὖ γνώμα διπλόων θέτει βουλών. The idiom signifies, it is plain, a mental irregularity, or even an aberration, viz., the process of decision whereby one comes to be of two minds at the same time.

This observation invites comparison with fr. B6, in which the goddess warns her devotee, first against the way of not-being, and then against that other way which mortal men, in their ignorance, follow aimlessly:

Mortal men are described as indeed aberrant, in possessing double heads and wandering minds, directed only by a failure to cope, without power of judgment. Their path is said to wander and to return upon itself, for it takes being to be the same as not-being, and yet not the same. The description fits very well a state characterised by duality of mind.

In fr. B8.11-16 the goddess presents her devotee with the necessity of a choice (κρίσις) between being and not-being. But the choice, she insists, has been made in accordance with necessity (κέκριται ὅ ὁμον, ὅσπερ ἀνάγκη). The implication is that Parmenides must make up his mind on the question, although, for one who has an insight into necessity, the decision is already made. In another passage (fr. B7.5) her advice is the same, though more brisk and pointed: κρίναι ὅ ὅς ἐλημω, she commands.
Similarly at fr. B8.38-41, where the goddess insists that all names instituted by mortal men can refer only to that-which-is. These are cited in pairs, tightly bound together by τοι and καί. Being and not-being are evidently the paradigmatic pair, and they recall the account of their identity and difference at B6.8-9 (just quoted); for not-being, though distinguished from being, is nevertheless permitted to be and not excluded from existence. From this confusion flows a dichotomy of physical forms, as we see in fr. B8.53-59, represented by light and night, which are taken to be causes of the world's creation at fr. B9.

If then B8.53 speaks of two decisions in regard to naming forms, τοι μίαι in 54 can refer only to one of those. It is true that it has sometimes been objected that Greek prefers ἄρπα to εἰς when the total number is two. Generally speaking, the rule holds, but it is evident that there is no semantic need of the comparative form, if the whole upon which the one depends is specified as a two. So in English we may say "one of the two" as well as "either of the two". The readiest rendering of Parmenides' Greek is just "one of which"; it is Procrustean to twist this genitive into something other than a partitive.

But if τοι μίαι refers to γυμας, and not to the more distant μορφίς, then we must understand καταθεο-θαι, not -δι/αμαξβΛί/with ου Χρεωι/ àcrrii/. There is one of these two decisions that it is wrong to take.

The two decisions are surely those that lead men to begin in the two ways that are described in fr. B2. The one way takes the form that "it is" (Ἀ μὲν ὀμως ἐστιν) and constitutes, I have argued, the proper use of the true name, which is εἶναι, as we learn from Cornford's fragment (Plato, Theaetetus 180e):

οἶον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ πῶντ' ὀνομ' εἶναι.  
"sole and unmoved is the name of the all, (which is) being".  

οἶον codd. μόνον Simplicius.
fr. B8.38, which it closely resembles. Plato, it was noticed, is not always precise in his quotations and it was supposed that Simplicius, who also quotes it twice, simply copied it from Plato.

Cornford's argument, though it has often been rejected or neglected, appears to me to be very strong. Why should Simplicius, who is often able to quote the text of Parmenides, have had recourse to Plato instead on this occasion? Even if he did so, he cannot have taken his text for fr. B8.38, for he is able in two places to quote that verse in its context with greater exactness than he does here, on the old assumption.

It is incredible, Cornford continues, "that he produced a verse meaning "it is sole, immovable. The All has the name 'Being'" out of the end and the beginning of two sentences meaning "Since Destiny has fettered it so as to be whole and immovable; therefore all those things will be a (mere) name that mortals have agreed upon, etc."

It is worthwhile to cite these arguments once more, because, though they seem to me compelling, they remain generally unacknowledged. It is as bizarre to suppose that Plato could mutilate the text of Parmenides by quoting this tattered line as if it were independent and integral as it is to believe that he could find a meaning appropriate to his purpose in it or to imagine why this suffered such inexplicable damage in the corruption of the final ἐπιστα, by which it is reduced to nonsense. Simplicius' procedure, on this assumption, is not less irrational. For, when he took the text from the Theaetetus, he must then have supposed that it was fr. B8.38, but for all that, he diverged from the version of the line that he quotes, evidently from Parmenides' own book, on other occasions. It is beyond understanding, in that case, what he could have made of his text either in the Parmenidean, or in the Platonic, context.

Cornford himself felt doubts about τελέως, which is not known to be used elsewhere by Parmenides and is not found in other Pre-Socratics in the sense "is". When this verb and ἕκτελέως are used by Empedocles (fr. B65.1 and 17.10), they give the sense "grow"—"an association", writes Cornford, "that Parmenides would avoid in speaking of the changeless Being." But Parmenides himself is unlikely to have felt this scruple, for he is willing to use τέλεως, which also connotes
becoming and change (fr. B6.8, 8.11, and 18.45) in place of his characteristic ειναι. The name "being" is evidently not, for him, a lexical element and may appear in different words. Nor is it possible to evade this argument by noting that πέλω as early as Homer has the meaning "to be," for just the same observation might be truly made of τελέθω (cf. L&J s.v.). If Homer's use makes πέλειν acceptable in Parmenides in the sense "to be", that ancient authority can serve equally to justify the use of τελέθειν in the later poet. The occurrence of τελέθειν in Parmenides is unobjectionable and the verb is attested for him, apparently independently, by Plato and Simplicius. That Parmenides does not, in general, exclude verbs of motion from descriptions of that-which-is is shown by his ἰε ον ἰοντι πελαζει ("being draws near to being") in fr. B8.25 (cf. 46-47). No more can the argument be admitted that "since Parmenides denotes by the word ὑνωμα and its cognates the falsity of human convention it is unlikely that he would have referred to his doctrine of truth with the characterization of ὑνωμα." For the objection begs the question at issue, which is whether Parmenides recognised the real name, which is being, in addition to the false names given by mortal men.

It has been noticed also that "Parmenides, who uses πων often enough in apposition to the subject of the verb "is", does not elsewhere use το πον." But το, which is in origin a demonstrative pronoun, is in Parmenides assimilating itself to a function as the article with a neuter adjective or participle, a construction that will become common later in prose. Because the word is in this transitional phase, Parmenides' usage vacillates, as between ἵναι and το ἵναι, between "what-is" or "(it)-as-being" and "that-which-is". On general grounds it seems likely that there was a similar variation between πον and το πον. It is justifiable, therefore, to read το ποντ either as an articular function ("the all") or as the use of the adjective in apposition with the pronoun ("it as a whole"). Whichever way we read the phrase, there seems no good ground for qualms about το ποντ.

It may be that objections such as these, however ineffectual they may be, have been maintained in order to support another argument, which has appeared more substantial. If this is the case, that argument is likely to be Plato's purpose in the passage from Theaetetus.
It is certain that Plato cites the verse as a summary description of the Eleatic philosophy, as expressed by Parmenides and Melissus, of static unity (συν τε πάντω ἄλλω καὶ ἐχθρίκον αὐτό). He took his cue, then, from the two epithets (ἀλλων ἐκτού) with which the line begins. There is no other verse in our surviving texts that would have served this purpose so well. But it must be added that neither Parmenides nor Melissus, as we have their writings, ever states simply that all things are one. It is Plato who presents to us the Eleatic being in the focus of unity. It is important to notice that, if this statement is true, as I believe it to be, Plato could not have found in Parmenides a verse, or indeed a passage, formulating the Eleatic doctrine just as he conceived it. It might be objected, it is true, that great boldness must be attributed to Plato, if he is to be supposed to have cited this isolated line to illustrate his own interpretation of the Eleatic philosophy. But the rejoinder is ready to hand that, in acting in this way, Plato was quite evidently less bold than he had been in his interpretation, offered immediately before (Theaet. 180d), by which he had discovered the philosophy of flux in the poets' tales of Ocean and Tethys.

This being the case, it is in no way surprising that the verse has also something to say that is beside his point, which has, indeed, nothing to do with names. But "name" is, beyond all doubt, present in his text, and we have reason to believe that it was impossible for him to find another Parmenidean verse that gave expression to the desired doctrine without irrelevancies. It is to be presumed that he was content to find the relevant doctrine implied in the text, for the uniqueness and immovability of the name, which is being, might be taken to imply the presence of the same characteristics in the object (τὸ) that it names. It is precisely the logic of the act of naming by means of being that reveals to us the immovability of its nominee. It is the way of being that conducts us into the presence of the goddess.

If Plato intended that this implication be found in the paradigmatic verse, he could rely upon his readers' familiarity with a habit of Greek that is as old as Homer. Language is often said, by the epic, to be characterised in just the same way as the sense conveyed by that language and the effect produced upon the listener is similar in kind. Thus, gentle words convey gentleness and induce it in others, shameful
words convey and induce shame, and foolish words behave similarly with folly. It is not a long step from this ancient practice to see that a name characterised in a certain way must reveal, by the meaning that it conveys, an object of reference similarly characterised. If so, a name that is unique and immovable must imply an object possessing the same characteristics. Parmenides' ὅνομα that is ὀλοι οὐκύκνητοι implies a nominee, viz. τὸ ἐὖν, that is described in the same terms. The real name entails the real object, which could not be, nor be said to be, without it: there can be no reality, apart from the name itself, that is not named nor can the name indicate any object but that particular one that is its own. The logic of Parmenides is the logic of naming and it applies only to its nominee. The name is real, because it is a physical object, and its nominee is true, because it is what is named by the real name's meaning. The attributes of being inhere in the object as a consequence of its being named, whereas the same attributes inhere in the name because that is being.

But, if the logic of being, which is imposed by the use of the real name, has implications for its object, it is equally true that it also excludes the possibility of its own negation. In consequence, the way of being not only affirms that it is, but also necessarily excludes not-being (καὶ ὃς ἔρεων ἄρτι μὴ ζήω). It is the error of mortal men to fail to observe this exclusion, with the result that they both affirm and deny that it is, thus using and abusing the true name, which is being. Because of this failure of logic they found it possible to use the true name both positively and negatively. Their decision to use it positively is correct, whereas they are mistaken in deciding to use it also negatively. The goddess is therefore justified in describing their way of thinking as the ἔγνωμη (fr. BB.61), a deliberate, though mistaken, policy of their judgment about naming.

The human acts of naming and misnaming have necessarily, as their object, that-which-is, since it alone exists as named and it is just that of which εἶναι is the true name. This is, I believe, the fundamental insight; upon it Parmenides erects the structure of his whole philosophy. Here I shall outline it briefly, without argument, in order to indicate the consequences, as I conceive them, of the interpretation advanced here and in HSCP (1958).
The result is that men take the result of their actions for a play of light and dark, conceiving of a whole world that is made up of these "forms". The transition is conceivable, if the true name, which must in Parmenides have some physical reality, is identified with light. The man's vacillation in the act of naming then takes the form of a light that is turned, first on and then off. Pluralism is the acceptance that mortal men give to this effect of their own erratic behaviour. At any rate, the creation of light and night is explicitly said to be the result of naming:

\[ \text{αὐτὸς ἐπειδὴ πάντα φῶς καὶ νῦν ὄνομαται,} \]
\[ \text{πάν πλέον ἔστιν ὅμοι φῶς καὶ μυκτὸς ὀφάντου.} \]

For the filling of "all" with light and night is presented as the result of the act of naming things accordingly. Light and night are called into being by the confused actions of naming. They are not "forms" to begin with, to which appropriate games are then given. They are the creatures of naming.

In the flickering of light and darkness that men recognise in what is the effect of their own actions there is discovered a kind of being, but one divided and turned against itself in contradiction. This is being in the mode of doxa, which is the acceptance of men themselves. It is that ὁκίμῳς εἶναι that the goddess had promised her initiate (fr. B1.32) to show to be the condition of the all-pervading ὁκούντα. She had promised also to demonstrate the necessity (ἱρὴν) from which that condition arises. She makes good her promise by deriving it from the use and abuse of the true name.

That-which-is (τὸ ἄόν) is the object (τὸ), illuminated by the light of the meaning (νοεῖν) of the true name (ἄμοι), which is being (εἶναι). But in the acceptance (ἀποκαλοῦμαι) of mortal men, light is mutually
implicated with its negation, which is the denial of light, as light-and-night and being-and-not-being. Aristotle is, then, quite correct in identifying Parmenides’ being with light. The sensible world is a misconception by men of their perception of the object; it is the task of the philosopher to purify that misconception of its contradictions by showing that these rest upon an error of decision in regard to the use of the true name.

The proper choice is the one figured in the proem, the entrance upon a road that passes beyond the paths of Night and Day into light, under the guidance of the Daughters of the Sun, who quit the House of Night for this purpose, throwing back thereat the veils that cover their faces. The journey is one that is directed by Justice and has the effect of persuading the Necessity that controls the goings of mortal men under the direction of a bad dispensation. The choice of the road, it is plain, entails the choice of the guidance of light.

1. The following studies of Parmenides are those that have been found particularly relevant to this enquiry; they may be cited below by author’s name only.


2. But K. Deichgräber, Parmenides' Auffahrt zur Göttin des Rechts, Abh. d. Akad. Mainz, geistes- u. sozialwiss. Kl. (1958) no. 11, page 54, note 1 wishes to cause कृतेवन्तो to govern both μορφάς and चन्द्रयोς. He translates accordingly: "Gestalten setzen sie nämlich, zwei, sie als Erkenntnissen zu benennen." Construction and meaning seem impossible and are properly rejected by Tarán 216, note 57 and by Mourelatos 229, note 22. No more likely is the version of R. Falus in AA 8 (1960) 287: he takes μορφάς to be governed by कृतेवन्तो and चन्द्रयोς by ένθωμεν.

3. The quotation is from Cornford 46.

4. Cornford 46, Untersteiner CLXX ff., Stokes 146. As Long points out (98), the attribution of this sense to μίαν is supported by Aristoph. Thesm. 549 and Xen. Anab. 5.6.12.

5. After Simplicius, Zafiropulo 120, note 291 and 140,
(1968) 107, Mourelatos 89-87. Earlier opinions are surveyed by Zeller-Nestle, 703, note 2.


8. The expression anticipates the later, technical formulation, that names exist οόροι, as in Democritus (fr. B26 VS, from Proclus). For an intermediate stage of phrasing, see Eur. Phoen. 12: καλούμενον μετὰ τοῦτο χρόνο ποτήρ ἔθεσο κακεῖν. Within the general sophist ambience the antithesis of οόρος/φύρια produced another alternative to the old view, viz., that names exist νόμως, see, e.g., Thuc. 4.60.1 and Hippocr. De arte 2 sub fin. The existence of the sense "pay" for θεώμεθαμαι (LSJ s.v. II.7; cf. English "pay down") may suggest that Parmenides' phrase signifies the ratification of a decision by the public presentation of it before witnesses, whether in oral or in written form. If so, the words do not signify the taking of a decision, but its establishment by public ratification.

9. It should be noted, however, that B.A. van Groningen, Théognis. Le premier Livre in Verhandel.d.kon.nederl.Akad.v.Wetensch.afd.Letterk., Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 72, no. 1 (Amsterdam 1966) 277-278 prefers, quite unconvincingly, the sense "abandon". Van Groningen appears to overlook the parallel of Parm. fr. B8.39, where θέματο has the sense "established" and governs οόρος, and there is no supplementary έτι, but οόρος or the like, which van Groningen, like some translators, desiderates. There can be little doubt, I think, that Théognis uses the verb with the same sense. If there is an irony in "Théognis" tone, I find that no reason for rejecting this meaning.

10. For more Greek instances of duality of mind, see Mourelatos 229, note 23.

11. Mourelatos 228 finds in the line a deliberate ambiguity, embracing both ξυώμοι κατέθεμα ("they decided") and κατέθεμα δύο οόρος ("they did not decide").

12. As by Tarán 218. In addition to the argument
given in the text above, it is relevant to notice that, in a parallel construction, Parmenides (fr. B6.37) has ἵππος (not ἤπατον) πόρες τοῦ ἕοντος.

13. Taran 218 holds that οὐ χρεε ἦσσεν "does not imply a positive obligation but the absence of an obligation." The argument evidently neglects the familiar use by Greek of what grammarians call "adhaerescens οὐ": see (e.g.) H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar rev. G.M. Messing (Cambridge, Mass. 1956) §2691 ff. Smyth says: "in such cases οὐ goes closely with the leading verb, forming a quasi-compound: whereas it belongs in sense to a following infinitive..." Among his examples Smyth cites (in addition to the common οὐ φημί, in the sense "I deny that..." or "I say that...not...") Thuc. 1.126: οὐκ ἔστιν φεύγοντα τιμωρεῖσθαι, "he said that it was not right..." Cf. also R. Kühner and B. Gertt, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache 1.2 (Hanover and Leipzig 1904) 180, and E. Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik hrsg.v. A. Debrunner (Munich 1959) 593-594.

14. Taran 134, 135 states first that the line "contains the doctrine that all things are one", and then that "the last part of the line contains the assertion that being is the name of all." He does not show how the line can be construed as a unit in such a way as to yield both translations. But if, as Taran's translations appear to imply, the text is made up of two independent fragments, what is to be made of Plato's purpose in quoting two discrete texts?

15. The line is accepted by a number of scholars as a separate fragment: see J.H.M.M. Loenen, Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias: A Reinterpretation of Eleatic Philosophy (Assen 1959) 75-76, W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy 2 (Cambridge 1965) 40, Mourelatos 185-187, Nussbaum 73ff., Gallop 90, 91. Mourelatos, however, finds the most plausible translation to be "such, immovable is that for which as a whole the name is: 'to be'". This construction is harsher grammatically in extruding the subject and verb of the main clause, in the displacement of πῶς, and in requiring that έστι be supplied in the subordinate clause, whereas the version printed in the text above seems the readiest rendering of the Greek words. The meaning proposed by Mourelatos would be more naturally expressed in a conjectural οὖν ἀκίνητον τελέθει πῶς. τῷ ἐξ ἕνας ἐίναι or, indeed, in the evidently broken form given by our manuscripts,
In sum, Mourelatos’ version makes explicit a sense that remains implicit in my text (that the nominee of the name "being" is immovable); for, on my interpretation, the immobility of the object is revealed by the logical rigour of "being", by which it is named.

16. The quotations are from Tarán 135-136.
19. Thus, e.g., J.H. Lesher writes in *Phronesis* 26 (1981) 16: "Homer often speaks of the word as being itself an instance of the quality it designates. Where one’s words convey wisdom, shame, harshness, and foolishness, one’s words are themselves, or are endowed with, the property of wisdom, shame, harshness, gentleness, or foolishness (πυκινός, άιτχρός, πικρός, μαλακός, νήπιος)."

20. At *Soph.* 244c, d Plato, in a discussion of the Eleatic philosophy, contemplates the possibility that the name and its object constitute two things, and concludes that such a condition is incompatible with the unity that he posits for Parmenides (above, page 9). See the interpretation of the passage offered by A.E. Taylor in his *Plato: The Sophist and the Statesman* (London 1961) 139, 140. For another indication of Plato’s acquaintance with ideas of the kind here attributed to Parmenides, see J.M. Rist, "The Theory and Practice of Plato’s Cratylus" in Greek Poetry and Philosophy Ed. D.E. Gerber (Chico, California 1984) 209-218, especially 212 ff. Rist argues that Plato wishes to deny the use of names in “investigative enquiry”. The view attacked by Plato appears to be the same as that discovered above in Parmenides.

21. The restoration to the text of ὄνοματι, in place of the universally-accepted ἄνωματι ἔσται, was proposed, with argument, in 1958 and 1971 (above, note 1). The objections offered to the reading and interpretation by Tarán 129 ff. and by W.J. Verdenius in *Philologus* 11 (1966) 81-98; 12 (1967) 99-117 are answered in the notes of the revised version. Since 1958 the restored text has been accepted by many scholars, including M. Ostwald, A.A. Long, A.P.D. Mourelatos, G. Vlastos, U. Hölscher, J. Jantzen, S. Weizk, D.J. Furley, M.C. Nussbaum, V. Songe-Möller, and D. Gallop and it has most recently been received into the standard text of G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1983) 252, who
print it without comment or defence, as if none were any longer required, and without indication of the source of the restoration. Contrast, however, the rejection of J. Barnes, 615, note 11. An objection often repeated is that the case argued in 1958 lacked a precise parallel for the use of ὄνομακεν with the dative, but without ὄνομα or ἐμι. See, e.g., G.E.L. Owen in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy ed. R.E. Allen and D.J. Furley 2 (London 1975) 69, note 1. M.F. Burnyeat in PhilosRev 91 (1982) 19, note 22 seeks to meet this objection by taking τοῦ as "therefore" and τὸ ἐνόμιαν as subject, translating "wherefore it (the one being) is named all the names". The grammatical objection is evaded and the general sense saved by this device, but at the cost of muffling the principal point (the reference of the names), by requiring that this be understood rather than expressed. In any case, the grammatical point can be met directly by citing Plato, Crat. 418b: ταύτην ὄνομακεν ὑέρον, which is translated by H.N. Fowler in the Loeb edition (Cambridge, Mass. 1926), "they called it (sc. ἴμερον) ἴμερον".

22. The point is well made by J. Owens, "Naming in Parmenides" in Kephalaion: Studies...C.J. de Vogel (Assen 1975) 16-25, who writes (17), "Establishing the name would somehow mean giving the thing its specific character and individuality." Owen goes on to conceive of physical things as metaphorical names of the one, immobile being. With this view in mind, Owen inclines to the reading ὄνομα τοῦ ὄνωμα in fr. B8.38.

23. Arist. Met. 1.5: 986b27 ff.: 28A24 VS. Though rejected (e.g.) by Tarán 289, the Aristotelian relation between fire and being has been espoused by others, as by Vlastos 74 and most recently by Owens 20-21. It should be indicative for modern interpreters that Aristotle, in spite of the evidence of Cornford’s fragment (which he must have known, presumably from Parmenides’ book, certainly from the Theaetetus) that Parmenides held that being is the name, was not hesitant to recognise being as light in that philosopher, though he himself held that names are conventional (De interpr. 2).