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1977

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THINKING BEING AND LANGUAGE IN
THE WORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

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N55
no. 211

TEACHING WITH THE LANGUAGE OF
THE WORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

KENNETH A. STEINER

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of the University of Maryland
at Baltimore
1976

THINKING BEING AND LANGUAGE IN
THE WORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

BY

KENNETH M. STEINER

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in State University of New York
at Binghamton
1976

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I would like to thank Martin C. Dillon for all his help
and encouragement, my friends for being some of the best teachers I
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ancestors, the grandparents I never met, but whose story taught me

Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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I would like to thank Martin C. Dillon for all his help and encouragement, my friends for being some of the best teachers I ever had, my parents for having enough faith to let me find my own path, and a special thanks to Sherry, artist, woman and wife, for bearing with me. But this work is specifically dedicated to the Jucovicis, the grandparents I never met, but whose story taught me that the truth is only known when heard with the heart as well as the mind.

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Introduction

Language is in its essence not utterance of an organism nor is it expression of an animal. Thus it is never thought of with exactness in its symbolical or semantic character. Language is the clearing-and-concealing advent of Being itself.¹

Re is a question?

All of Heidegger's work has been concerned with one question: the Seinsfrage. He approaches the question from many directions, but one direction seems to predominate: a phenomenological analysis of language. The quote above, along with the now famous characterization of language as "the house of Being," evidence the significance Heidegger places on language in his quest of Being. What is the meaning of these claims? Why did Heidegger focus on language? Is it merely an application of his ontology, or perhaps just a means to an end? Or is there a more significant relation between language and Being? These are the questions that the following work is designed to answer.

Heidegger has said: ". . . reflection on language, and on Being, has determined my path of thinking from early on . . ."² Though I will not touch upon the works prior to Being and Time, I have tried to incorporate everything he published from that work on. After Being and Time his work can be seen in two broad categories - a rethinking of past philosophy and being underway on a new path of thinking.

¹Heidegger "Letter on Humanism" trans. by Edgar Lohner in Phenomenology and Existentialism ed. Richard Zaner and Don Ihde (New York: Capricorn Books, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973) pp. 155-6.

²Heidegger On the Way to Language trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 7.

These are not totally separate tasks for, as he says, ". . . we can learn thinking only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally."¹ With these considerations in mind, I have divided this work into five sections: the first deals with the importance of language to the question of Being as approached in Being and Time; the second with the relation of language and Being in Heidegger's rethinking of the roots of the history of Western philosophy; the third with the meaning of Being as it was finally worked out in the late works; the fourth with the meaning of language in these late works and how it relates to the meaning of Being; and finally in the fifth I step back to ask for the significance of Heidegger's work on Being and language to our quest for wisdom in general.

The first four sections necessarily stay as close to Heidegger's thinking as possible. My main goal has been to understand Heidegger, and in order to do this I have attempted to give an interpretation that presents Heidegger's way as consistent and insightful, for to find fault prior to this attempt is not really to find fault. In short, my prime concern is to find Heidegger, and only in the last section do I give some hints as to where we can go beyond him. Despite this, I do not intend to merely repeat what Heidegger said, rather my hope is to give an interpretation that helps open up his enigmatic and often misunderstood writings. For this reason I chose neither to give a book to book summary of Heidegger's work (as, for example, Richardson did in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought)

¹Heidegger What is Called Thinking? trans. by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row 1968) p. 8.

nor a purely problematic approach that raises the questions of Being and language in general. Rather, I tried to trace a continuous development through various broad stages of Heidegger's career to find how he approached and worked out the relation of Being and language.

To see how this is done we must start with a preliminary indication of how the issues are viewed by him. As the opening quote indicates, he is concerned with language in what he calls its ontological dimension rather than its ontic. He is not after facts and information about language, but rather the Being of language and how this Being is related to Being in general. To understand this distinction (i.e., between the two different approaches to language) we must give a preliminary sketch of the question of Being itself, for this distinction springs from the so called 'ontological difference', the difference between Being (Sein) and beings (seienden; things, entities). Objects that can stand before us as things with properties that can be defined and analyzed have traditionally been the primary concern of philosophy and science. However, the happening of the standing before us of the object is a completely different issue; this is the thing's Being, and cannot be viewed as a thing itself. A concern with information about things is an ontic study, while a concern with the standing before (i.e., Being) is an ontological one, and its methodology must be as different as that which it is studying.

We can infer only that 'Being' cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its

foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a justifiable way of characterizing "entities." The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look the question in the face.¹

Thus when we ask for the Being of language we are searching for how language occurs as what it is, and this is not merely a definition or a list of features about language. In traditional terminology it would be said that we are looking for the essence of language, but we must be careful to note that an essence has been historically considered as an abstractable form or definition that is separate from the concern of existence, and this is not how Heidegger views it. For him the distinction between essence and existence is a prejudice of the development of metaphysics, and the question of Being really lies at the source of this distinction.

If the questions raised are thought through even roughly, the illusion of being a matter of course, in which the distinction of essentia and existentia stands for all metaphysics disappears.²

Therefore, when Heidegger raises the question of Being, he is not raising the same issues as traditional metaphysics. He is neither searching for a substance that whatever is actual (i.e., exists) possesses such as a substratum, the will to power, or unity, nor is

¹Heidegger Being and Time trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) p. 23.

²Heidegger The End of Philosophy trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) p. 3.

he attempting to give an eternal definition of what is "truly real" about something. Being for Heidegger is the process of standing before (presencing) of the entities which are present, and this process of presencing must be thought on its own terms and not merely as the dichotomized essence or existence of an object.

As we shall see it is a different task to ask for the Being of something, like language, and the meaning of Being itself.¹ To ask for the meaning of Being is to ask how it is that there is anything at all, i.e., why is there something rather than nothing? To question the Being of language is to ask how language occurs as language, and as such is closer to the questions of traditional metaphysics. However, if we insist on the terms of metaphysics, the Being of language addresses itself to both existence and essence, for as we noted Being lies at the source of this distinction. However, it is misleading to insist on questions of essence and existence, despite the ability to do so, for this is still not thinking the Being of language in the way it is meant to be thought. As Heidegger summarized what he is questioning when he asks for the Being of something:

But what really are we asking? Why the essent (Seiendes) as such is. We are asking for the ground of the essent: that it is and is what it is, and that there is not rather nothing. Fundamentally we are asking about being. We are asking about the being of the essent. We are questioning the essent in regard to its being.²

¹Though we shall see that language can not be considered as an entity among the others of the world, our first approach to it sees it that way, and though the Being of language will eventually lead us to Being qua Being, they are clearly not the same.

²Heidegger Introduction to Metaphysics trans. by Ralph Manheim (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1961) p. 26. Essent is Manheim's translation of Seiendes (i.e., entity, thing, existant etc.)

Thus whether questioning the Being of an entity or Being itself a new type of thinking is needed. We must learn a type of thinking that lets the mysterious dynamics of Being come forth, and not a thinking that encapsulates everything in the clear and distinct categories of "Logical Reasoning." To explain and understand Being was the goal of traditional metaphysics.¹ Because this means placing the meaning of Being within the limits that the medium of human reason constitutes, Heidegger sees that its mode of thought is one of re-presentation, and thus regardless of its assertions is basically subjectivistic in nature. This is why he sees the history culminating in Nietzsche whose Will to Power is the essence of all metaphysical thinking of control, adaptation, and manipulation, and why he considers his quest for Being to be a needed radical new beginning rather than a developed continuation of the tradition.

His attempt is to return to the Presocratics, the source of Western thought, and show how the development of metaphysics is only one direction that thought could have taken. Heidegger is not in a real competition with this tradition since he is trying to follow out a different branch of thought, and not perfect or add to the old one. Metaphysics is suited for understanding and explaining universal structures and essences of things, but it is not suited for the thinking of Being as the presencing of whatever is present. Heidegger's attempt at overcoming metaphysics is, therefore, not a nihilistic

¹Bergson was among the first to be bothered by the alienating distance of this traditional view, and his method of empathy as an alternative to understanding contains many of the seeds of Heidegger's thought.

destruction, but an Aufhebung; a return to Being itself that exposes metaphysics for what it is - an epoch of Being that is characterized by the submission of the world to the logic and categories of rationality, and thereby a forgetting of Being itself. As he develops his own thinking he is not illogical or irrational, but claims that for the thinking of Being a different kind of thought from what is commonly known as logic and reason is needed. As he summarizes it:

Calculative thought places itself under compulsion to master everything in the logical terms of its procedure. It has no notion that in calculation everything calculable is already a whole before it starts working out its sums and products, a whole whose unity naturally belongs to the incalculable which, with its mystery, ever eludes the clutches of calculation. That which, however, is always and everywhere closed at the outset to the demands of calculation and, despite that, is always closer to man in its enigmatic unknowableness than anything that "is," than anything he may arrange and plan, this can sometimes put the essential man in touch with a thinking whose truth no "logic" can grasp.¹

The clarity and development of this paragraph makes it obvious that Heidegger is overstating his position when he claims that there is no logic to his thought. But what is important is that he is after a new mode of thinking, one that cannot be reduced to traditional

¹Heidegger "What is Metaphysics" trans. by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick in Existence and Being ed. Werner Brock. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949) p. 357.

thinking. This new mode of thought will first allow us to approach Being in the way proper to it, and thereby first enable us to ask for the Being of language in a manner suited to finding the relation of Being and language. However, a difficulty arises for, as we shall examine later,¹ our thinking is not independent from our language, and thus until we know the Being of language we cannot know the Being of thought, and until we know the Being of thought we cannot properly think Being. As we saw above, to ask about the Being of language or of thought is not to formalize a unique essence of them, but rather to ask how they stand with Being itself. That is, to ask for the Being of language or thought is already to ask for the relation of Being, language, and thought. Until we do this we cannot know what the proper mode of thinking is, but it must also be noted that we cannot find Being, language, and thought until we are thinking properly. We are thus caught in a circle of interrelations between our three major issues, which unexpectedly has given us a preliminary answer to why language is important to our quest of Being.

Though this circle makes us wonder whether we can ever start, let alone succeed, in the project we intend, we must view it as a methodological difficulty that forbids any traditional logical structure (e.g., deductive, inductive, transcendental, or dialectical) but does not make it completely impossible. We must recognize that though we discuss thinking, language, and Being individually, the truth of each one can

¹See for example the relation of legein, noein and logos in the chapter on the early Greeks.

only emerge in light of the others for they are not really independent. Thus the full significance of our thesis emerges in the unfolding development which occurs rather than being stated or asserted. What is said at each stage along the way is not an isolated explanation that later will be related to other isolated explanations. Nor is any one section any type of logical consequence of another section. Each part is an inextricable component of the developing interplay of interrelations which is the only possible methodology for thinking how Being, language, and thought stand with one another. If we understand how to approach the work in this way we have once again unexpectedly found ourselves in the midst of the issues rather than merely introducing them, for we are already thinking in the "non-logical" way, that is, we are already underway to thinking Being by thinking the belonging together of language, thought, and Being.

With these introductory remarks we hope to have given a preliminary sketch of the issues by showing how they are dealt with. The circle of interrelations we discussed and the resulting concern with the development as crucial to understanding the individual statements is in line with the way Heidegger sees the parts of his own career:

" . . . only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if contained in Heidegger II."¹ As

¹Heidegger's forward to Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought by W. J. Richardson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) p. xxii. Though 'Heidegger I and II' refers specifically to early and late Heidegger the same point holds for any one part to any other.

we mentioned in the beginning, we do not want to merely repeat what Heidegger stated, and we now see that this would be a mistaken approach for it would be reducing his significance to a collection of independent statements and ignore the importance of the active process and development. Therefore, our own methodology will hopefully be true to him by thinking along the path with him. Our interpretation is not, of course, a final and complete word on Heidegger, but we hope it will be successful in disclosing the Being of Heidegger's concern with Being and language.

One thing is necessary, though, for a face-to-face converse with the thinkers: Clarity about the manner in which we encounter them. Basically, there are only two possibilities: either to go to their encounter, or to go counter to them. If we want to go to the encounter of a thinker's thought, we must magnify still further what is great in him. Then we will enter into what is unthought in his thought.¹

Everything here is the path of a responding that examines as it listens.²

¹What is Called Thinking? p. 77.

²Heidegger Poetry, Language, Thought trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 186.

I. Being and Time: Discourse as the Language of Being.

Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.¹

On the first page of Being and Time Heidegger tells us his task, but unfortunately this task was never completed. The book opens with a preliminary analysis of Dasein, and ends with the temporality of Dasein, never reaching the concrete analysis of time and Being which was scheduled for the third division of part one.² Posterity is plagued by the question of why the work was never completed, and what the significance of the unfinished sections really is.

The fact of the matter is that in a sense Heidegger's goal was completed, and the third division could only have repeated what was already said. Dasein can only be understood in terms of the question of Being, for otherwise Being and Time must be viewed only as philosophic anthropology, a possibly interesting and rewarding path, but one that Heidegger repeatedly repudiates. Therefore, the question of Being is really an issue every step of the way, and in that sense the task of Being and Time was achieved.

Why then did Heidegger simply not print the original division outline and have a short concluding final chapter indicating how the question of the meaning of Being has been dealt with already? An

¹Being and Time p. 19.

²"In thus interpreting Dasein as temporality, however, we shall not give the answer to our leading question as to the meaning of Being in general." Ibid. p. 38.

interesting possibility he might have chosen not to do this is because he realized that though in one sense the book was complete, in a more significant sense one book could never sufficiently deal with the question of Being. In other words, Being and Time is both complete as it stands and also could never be complete, no matter how much was added to it. It is one way to Being, and Heidegger's mistake was that at first he thought it was the definitive route. Later he realized that though the general content of the book was valid, important, and in a sense complete, at the same time it was only a beginning and therefore had to be understood as such. Being and Time, we now realize, is an introduction to the later works, and not a completely self-standing enterprise. As an introduction it works in the mysterious way of setting the concerns of that which follows, but the significance and truth of these concerns can only be understood if seen in the light of that which follows. These reasons might explain why Heidegger was willing to publish the book with its open ended quality, and it is with these ideas in mind that we approach it.

Our concern is with language and we therefore make no pretense of giving a complete account of Being and Time. We intend to deal only with those sections most directly related to understanding the role of language in understanding Dasein, Being, and their relationship. Our first step must be to try and make clear what Heidegger means by Dasein. Taking heed of our previous warning, we must be guided by the question of Being from the very beginning.

'Dasein' is often translated as 'man' or 'human being,' and there certainly are grounds for doing so. However, this translation can be very misleading, and tends to misguide the reader in the direction of erroneously interpreting Being and Time as primarily a study of man. But if 'Dasein' is not a direct equivalent for 'man' what is it? Let us first look what a few commentators have said.

In direct or literal translation into English, this word means 'to-be-there.' Such a literal translation does not adequately express the meaning of the word which it has in the German language or in which it is used in Heidegger's philosophy....In German, Dasein means 'existence,' 'life,' and 'presence.' Generally it expresses the concreteness of here and now. In Heidegger's philosophy the word 'Dasein' retains all these shades of meaning in contemporary German but in a deepened and unified way. Primarily, Dasein for Heidegger is the presence of Being in concrete life and situations. Man is the only being who has an understanding of Being, therefore, only for man can Being be present. Man is the place of the presence of Being; he is this presence. Man is Dasein. Dasein is not identical with empirical man, but rather his essence.¹

In other words, the ego, the subject, is not the Da-sein. Dasein is rather the understanding (Lichtung) where Being 'opens' itself and therefore 'understanding' occurs.²

¹Vincent Vycinas Earth and Gods (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961) pp. 24-5.

²Egon Vietta "Being, World and Understanding" Review of Metaphysics #5 1951/52 page 166.

Though in traditional German philosophy it may be used quite generally to stand for almost any kind of Being or 'existence' which we can say that something has (the 'existence' of God for example), in everyday usage it tends to be used more narrowly to stand for the kind of Being that belongs to persons. Heidegger follows the everyday usage in this respect, but goes somewhat further in that he often uses it to stand for any person who has such Being and who is thus an 'entity' himself.¹

Though I find this last quote misleading because the final sentence suggests 'Dasein' is concerned with an entity rather than Being, it indicates why there arose so much confusion over the meaning of Dasein and Being and Time as a whole. It shows that Heidegger often uses the term for an entity, i.e., as an ontic term, while the other quotes show that it also stands for the Being of this entity, i.e., an ontological term. As we saw in the introduction this is the ontological difference, and we must ask whether these two uses result from carelessness on Heidegger's part, or whether something significant about Dasein and Being itself is revealed by it?

We first note that all three quotes make reference to man, or traditional philosophical understandings of man as ego or subject, but distinguish Dasein from this. They recognize that Dasein is an ontological concern, and not simply an ontic or empirical one. The justifications for this move come from both the dictionary definition of 'Dasein,' and from its etymology. For someone as concerned with

¹ John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translators footnote Being and Time p. 27.

language and etymology as Heidegger, these clues are not to be ignored for the sake of a neat and clear word substitution for 'Dasein.' Let us turn to Being and Time itself for textual support for some understanding of Dasein in line with these etymological hints.

And because we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a "what" of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter, and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own, we have chose to designate this entity as "Dasein," a term which is purely an expression of its Being.¹ (p. 33)

So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein,' we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being. (p. 67)

Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. (p. 68)

One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an "I" or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. (p. 72)

Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of equipment would. . . (p. 419)

What emerges from these quotes is that the word 'Dasein' does refer

¹Note the last three words in German are "als reiner Seinsausdruck" and should be translated "as pure Being expression" leaving out the possessive "its" which indicates the reified substantiality which is presently in question.

to man, but in terms of his unique Being and not in terms of any ontic properties. Unfortunately, as we shall see, Heidegger waivers in his recognition of Dasein as an ontological concern. Often he calls Dasein an entity, which makes it an ontic rather than an ontological term. Further, as the history of interpretations of Being and Time testify, the entity he is concerned with is man. Thus he falls in the trap of having his fundamental concept (Dasein) speak about man himself rather than of Being-in-the-world. However, we will attempt to maintain the ontological interpretation of Dasein as strictly as possible for it seems clear that the reason Heidegger used the term 'Dasein' rather than more common terms for man or man's Being was that he wants to reach a new conception of man's Being in its relation to Being in general. In order to gain further insight into how Heidegger views this unique way of Being we again turn to Being and Time.

Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being. (p. 39)

"Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state. (p. 80)

Dasein is its disclosedness.¹ (p. 171)

...only as long as Dasein is, 'is there' (gibt es) Being.... As we have noted Being is dependent upon the understanding of Being...(p. 255)

¹Disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) can signify either a laying open or the state of being laid open.

If no Dasein exists, no world is 'there' either. (p. 417)

These quotes indicate that Heidegger is interested in the Being of man insofar as man allows for, or enables, the emergence of whatever is. He is not interested in man's Being as body, soul, rationality, will, as a social, cultural or political entity, or any combination of these. Of course much of what he says is pertinent to the understanding of man in these respects, but that is secondary. His prime concern is to reach Being itself, and his concern with man is to show him in relation to the question of how anything can first be present. "...the analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of Being."¹

Dasein is not a blank screen that records or reflects the world, rather it enables the world to be there altogether, in itself, not in a mind, soul or realm of mere appearance. Nor should Dasein be viewed in the sense of a transcendental subjectivism whereby it constitutes entities, for Dasein is not a subject, but man in his fundamental unity with the world, and because Dasein does not constitute the "What" or content of entities, only their ability to occur as entities. Dasein constitutes or enables the appearance of whatever is, and as such without Dasein entities could not be there, i.e., there could not be anything.

In this way we seem to have identified Being and appearing, and since this connection is of crucial importance to Heidegger, it needs

¹Being and Time p. 38.

some further clarification. Though he spends a great deal of effort distinguishing his phenomenological concern with one of appearances, he does conclude: "And finally one can use 'appearing' as a term for genuine sense of 'phenomenon' as showing itself."¹ To use it in this correct way we must be careful to note that he does not mean appearing in the sense of mere appearance as opposed to the "really real," nor appearing in the Berkeleyan sense that only when something is sensually experienced (i.e., appears) does it exist; he does not need to resort to a God to grant Being to the tree alone in the forest. For what he means by Being is that which allows something to occur as what it is,² and this is not dependent on a continuing subjective reception. In order to understand in what way appearing and Being are then brought together for Heidegger we must first see how the question of Being is understood. The question of Being is raised in the light of the question "why are there entities rather than nothing?" Heidegger devotes a great deal of energy in Introduction to Metaphysics, and elsewhere, to just raising this question. Merely to utter it is not enough. For this question to be truly asked we must hold ourselves in the sway of Nothingness, over the abyss that is not the negation of something positive, but nonbeing itself. Only then do we not take it for granted that there already are entities and merely ask for their original cause. Only

¹Ibid. p. 53.

²Ibid. pp. 25-26.

in the face of Nothingness can the meaning of Being itself be asked.

Instead this essent, through questioning, is held out into the possibility of non-being. Thereby the why (i.e., "why are there essents rather than nothing?") takes on a very different power and penetration. Why is the essent torn away from the possibility of non-being? Why does it not simply keep falling back into nonbeing? Now the essent is no longer that which just happens to be present, it begins to waiver and oscillate,¹

What is it to Be? What is the meaning of Being?

Asked about in this light Being is no longer questioned as a first cause, nor as a property or quality of things, for in both these cases it too would be something among all the things of the world, and we would have to ask about its Being. Being cannot be a something, entity, or anything that is, for it is the is itself. Why are there entities rather than nothing? Because Being. What does it mean to Be? It means to be there, to have abiding presence, to be held up over and against the void but not disappear in it. It is in this sense that we say Being means appearing. Appearing not taken as appearance, i.e., perceptual manifestation or semblance, but as first coming on the scene, being there, existing.

Thus we must keep in mind that the expression 'phenomenon' signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest....When 'phenomenon' signifies 'semblance,' the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded.²

¹Introduction to Metaphysics p. 23.

²Being and Time p. 51.

It is in this sense of phenomenon as showing itself that we have interpreted appearance and Being, and why in his quest for Being Heidegger feels he is continuing the essential path of phenomenology.

Clearly, we have not in the least answered what it means to appear, what the meaning of Being is, or why there are entities rather than nothing. All that we have done is establish the path of the question. We have only first begun to lay out that about which we are questioning, i.e. Being as presencing, appearing, being there. But, though just a beginning, that is a big step for it is the beginning.

The project of Being and Time is to show the role Dasein plays in the meaning of Being. As the etymology of Dasein indicates, it is strongly relevant to the question of Being (Sein) itself. Dasein is man, but man in his Being as that which allows whatever is to Be.

When Dasein does not exist, 'independence'
'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself.'
In such a case this sort of thing can be
neither understood nor not understood.
In such a case even entities within-the-
world can neither be discovered nor lie
hidden. In such a case it cannot be said
that entities are,¹ nor can it be said
that they are not.

We are now in a position to return to a question we raised earlier. We have seen that Dasein refers to man's Being in a very special way, and yet we have noted that 'Dasein' is often used to stand for the entity man itself. The significance of this double usage is summarized in one sentence: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence."² To clarify what this means we turn briefly to

¹Being and Time p. 255

²Ibid. p. 67.

"Letter on Humanism." In this work the Being of man is defined as "standing in the clearing of Being."¹ Heidegger goes on to say "Ex-sistence can only be said of the essence of man, i.e., only of the human way 'to be,'"² and "All that man is, i.e., in the traditional language of metaphysics the "essence" of man, rests in his ex-sistence."³ It should be noted that Heidegger writes existence in this work as 'Ex-sistenz' (rather than 'Existenz' as in Being and Time) in order to emphasize man's transcending himself, and standing in the light (truth) of Being. From this we see that for Heidegger man is man only insofar as he stands in this relation to Being, i.e., insofar as he ex-sists, insofar as he is Dasein. Thus Dasein is understood as both man and the emergence of whatever is, because man in his essential Being is this emergence. If he were not this emergence he would not be man and the world would not be "there." Man as Dasein constitutes the "there" (da-sein), so that there can be something rather than nothing. "This entity Dasein carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off, in the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness this entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is 'there' for itself."⁴

We now have explained why 'Dasein' can be used as an equivalent of 'man,' and yet preserved the full significance of this word. It

¹"Letter on Humanism" p. 154.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Being and Time p. 171.

is only with this effort that sense can be made of Heidegger's claim that his late work is not a reversal of Being and Time.¹ We must make a constant attempt to understand Dasein in respect to the emergence of whatever is, and not as man understood in some subjectivistic sense. As Heidegger summarizes it:

But to lay bare the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible, is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all - an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the entity called Dasein.²

With the understanding of Dasein that we have reached it is not surprising to see Being-in-the-World declared as Dasein's basic state. The analysis of Dasein is therefore an attempt to unravel the structures (existentialia) of Dasein as Being-in-the-World. Heidegger is careful to point out that Being-in-the-World is a unitary phenomenon, it is not the glueing together of two separate objects. "Subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the World."³ Thus the task is not to bring together two sides

¹"The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But (the thought of) Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II." Heidegger's preface to Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought p. xxii.

²Being and Time p. 274.

³Ibid. p. 87.

of a dualism, but rather to show how and in what way Dasein is Being-in-the-World. Chapter V of Being and Time, in which language (Discourse) is discussed, focuses on just this issue. It is entitled "Being-in as Such" and is meant to "set forth the ontological Constitution of inhood itself."¹ Therefore, as a preliminary to an examination of the role of Discourse it is necessary to examine the chapter as a whole in order to understand what is meant by the "inhoodness" of Dasein.

We start with a quote that further elucidates how Being-in is to be approached:

Being-in is distinct from the present-at-hand insideness of something present-at-hand 'in' something else that is present-at-hand; Being-in is not a characteristic that is effected, or even just elicited, in a present-at-hand subject by the 'world's' Being-present-at-hand; Being-in is rather an essential kind of Being of this entity itself. But in that case, what else is presented with this phenomenon than the commercium which is present-at-hand between a subject present-at-hand and an Object present-at-hand. Such an interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if we were to say that Dasein is the Being of this 'between.' Yet to take our orientation from this 'between' would still be misleading. For with such an orientation we would also be covertly assuming the entities between which this 'between,' as such, 'is', and we would be doing so in a way which is ontologically vague. The 'between' is

¹Ibid. p. 79.

already conceived as the result of the convenientia of two things that are present-at-hand. But to assume these beforehand always splits the phenomenon assunder, and there is no prospect of putting it together again from the fragments.¹

This quote is crucial for understanding Heidegger's project, and it leads us to an understanding of Being-in as an existentiale of Dasein that constitutes Dasein in its very special mode of Being. We have understood the Being of Dasein as its Disclosedness, Disclosedness not as a property or accidental attribute of Dasein, but as its fundamental Being. We now must see that this Disclosedness constitutes the 'inhood' of Being-in. The key to unraveling the structures of this phenomenon lies in the "there" (da) of Dasein:

When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the lumen naturale in man we have in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structures of this entity, that it is in such a way as to be its "there."²

This "there" is the root of Dasein's having a world, i.e. Being-in-a-world. It is through its Disclosedness that Dasein is its "there": "...disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its "there".³ In other words, Dasein, Disclosedness, 'There,' and Being-in are ontologically the same- Dasein is Being-in because it is its Disclosedness, by which it is its 'there'

¹Ibid. p. 170.

²Ibid. p. 171.

³Ibid. p. 263.

(i.e., Disclosing Being-in-the-World). Thus, the structures of disclosure not only constitute the 'there' of Dasein, but, since Dasein is Being-in-the-World, these structures also constitute the 'there' of the world. This is a difficult point to grasp without reducing ourselves to an idealism, but we must recognize that there is an inherent connection between disclosing and constituting which emerges from the primordial interrelation of Dasein and the world, and not from a subjectivity. Constitution is not to be understood as one side molding or constructing the other, but rather as "make-up" or structure which allows both Dasein and the world to first be what they are. In short, because there is Dasein, because Dasein is "there" as the disclosing of Being which it is, a world can emerge as something that Dasein is already alongside (present-at-hand) or within (ready-to-hand). "To say that in existing, Dasein is its "there," is equivalent to saying the world is "there;" its Being-there is Being-in."¹

The "there" is not to be understood in the sense of geometrical space of the present-at-hand. Rather than referring to a specific location, it is that which makes possible all ideas of location, whether spatial or temporal location of the objectified present-at-hand or the lived involvement of the ready-to-hand (e.g., the nearness of Athens and the distance of my glasses when reading Plato). To speak metaphorically, the structures of the "there" constitute

¹Ibid. p. 182.

the stage which gives the entities of the world a place to unfold, and without which, therefore, nothing could Be. And as the constitution of a stage affects the Being of a play that takes place within its region, the constitution of the "there" creates a region that inherently affects the Being of the world. Not as a molding of a world that already is, for just as a play is not (a play) unless it has some type of stage within which to 'come to life', nothing is unless it has a place to be, i.e., unless the "there" of Disclosure provides the open space for it to emerge.¹ Thus Disclosedness, as that which constitutes the "there" of Dasein and thus the "there" of the world, is what constitutes the possibility of the being there of whatever is. There are four basic structures of Disclosedness: State-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), Understanding (Verstehen), Discourse (Reden), and Falling (Verfallen). An analysis of these will thus give us how, whatever is, can be.

State-of-mind is an existentiale of Dasein that is known to us as mood. Moods reveal something special:

Phenomenally we would wholly fail to
recognize both what mood discloses and

¹Though the metaphor of a stage is misleading because the "there" is not a pre-existing spatial 'container' as a stage seems to be, we chose it because of the sense of independence of a play yet the influence the stage has on the structure of its Being. The 'there' is what Heidegger later calls the free or open space, and though this does not exist apart from the things which appear within it, we felt the idea of a stage conveys its significance.

how it discloses, if that which is disclosed were to be compared with what Dasein is acquainted with, knows and believes 'at the same time' when it has such a mood. . . . for the mood brings Dasein before the "that-it-is" of its "there", which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma.¹

Thus, the facticity of the being there of something is revealed in mood, and not a specific whatness of that which is there. This determination of the "there" of Dasein constitutes it as already alongside something, i.e., as confronted with a given, and is characterized by Heidegger as "throwness" (Geworfenheit). In other words, the "there" of Dasein is revealed as a being 'delivered over' to something, i.e., it is not an isolated pure ego but is cast into a place where it can be affected. At the same time the world is revealed as "there" as something that matters.

The fact that this sort of thing (i.e., something within the world) can 'matter' to it (i.e., Dasein) is grounded in ones state-of-mind; and as state-of-mind it has already disclosed the world-as something by which it can be threatened for instance....Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind.²

State-of-mind is one way in which the "there" is constituted: Dasein is "there" as something thrown and as attuned to its thrownness, and the world is "there" as something which is in such a way

¹Ibid. p. 175.

²Ibid. p. 176.

as to matter. State-of-mind both reveals and constitutes the "there." In short, insofar as whatever is, is "there," and the "there" is revealed and constituted by Dasein, which is characterized by state-of-mind, whatever is "there" must be disclosed and constituted as something that matters in one way or another.

Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself (sich schon angewiesen) to having entities within-the-world "matter" to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance.¹

State-of-mind is one existential structure whereby the "there" is disclosed in its Being; Understanding is a second. It is equiprimordial with State-of-mind, which means that though we can consider them separately they in fact are always together in the revelation and constitution of the "there." Heidegger defines Understanding as "the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of."² Another way of saying this is that Understanding is characterized by "projection" (Entwurf), which means that it places Dasein 'ahead of itself' and as 'more than it already is.' Understanding thus reveals the world in accordance with future possibilities, and not as factual here and now given as State-of-mind does.

¹Ibid. p. 177.

²Ibid. p. 184.

Understanding is not the thematic, conscious grasping of something present-at-hand, rather it is the ground of this insofar as the "there" of whatever can be known is constituted by its possibilities. I can comprehend that this item in front of me is a hammer because its possibility of driving in a nail is available to me. The existentielle Understanding is what makes possible my ability to reach ahead and be aware (at some level of consciousness) of possibilities. Understanding does not reveal specific possibilities, but just as State-of-mind makes possible specific moods by disclosing and constituting the world as something that matters, understanding makes possible the derivative modes of comprehending, knowing, recognizing, seeing, etc. which do make use of specific possibilities. What Understanding does is to reveal possibility as possibility, by projecting ahead.

Furthermore, the character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects - that is to say possibilities. Grasping it in such a manner would take away from what is projected its very character as possibility, and would reduce it to the given contents which we have in mind; whereas projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it be as such.¹

Thus Understanding is an existentielle of Dasein that constitutes it as more than it immediately is, and lets it reach ahead to that which is not actually present. Remembering that Dasein is its

¹Ibid. p. 185.

Disclosedness and the interconnection of disclosure and constitution, we can conclude that whatever is disclosed is constituted in its Being by its possibilities. In other words, whatever is "there" is so as it is because Understanding is open to its possibilities. Understanding does not primarily have the role of delimiting something in advance of its becoming (being) present, rather Understanding's role is to disclose and constitute what is present here and now by reaching (projecting) ahead of the here and now and opening up the possibilities which enable that which is present to be "there" as it is. "In the projection of Understanding, entities are disclosed in their possibility."¹

As was noted, Understanding does not explicitly work out the possibilities, but this can be done by what Heidegger calls Interpretation (Auslegung).²

The projecting of the Understanding has its own possibility - that of developing itself. This development of the Understanding we call "interpretation"....In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.³

¹Ibid. p. 192.

²We break with the Macquarrie and Robinson convention and capitalize 'Interpretation' since it is a primary existentiale.

³Ibid. pp. 188-189.

Another way of putting this is that Interpretation is the elaboration of the 'fore-structures' of Understanding. That is, in Interpretation something gets explicitly disclosed as what it is. This 'as' is not a tacking on of additional qualifications to a true or naked entity; rather, since the "there" is revealed and constituted by Understanding in accordance with its possibilities, the as-structure is inherent to the Being of whatever there is.

It seems that this leaves us with a circle in which all our unfolding knowledge of the world is an interpretation which is "pre-ordained" by the fore structures of Dasein's possibilities, i.e., by Understanding.

But if interpretation must in any case already operate in that which is understood, and if it must draw its nurture from this, how is it to bring any scientific results to maturity without moving in a circle, especially if, moreover, the understanding which is presupposed still operates within our common information about man and the world?¹

But this circle is not to be thought as a vicious circle of subjectivity because Understanding provides the structure that simply determines the fact that whatever is is (at least partially) constituted by its future, i.e., its possibilities, while the unfolding of these possibilities is grounded in the thing, and in no way is dictated by a subject. Dasein provides the structures in accordance with which something may Be something at all, the things themselves provide what is known and understood. This point is seen in Heidegger's

¹Ibid. p. 194.

discussion of meaning. He states: "Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'."¹ This does not mean that the meaning of an entity is tacked on by a subjectivity, rather it says that whatever is "there" is disclosed and thereby constituted by the structures of Dasein, which includes Understanding and its resulting meaningfulness.² Thus meaning belongs to entities in their very Being, and not as something tacked on. Therefore, though we say that meaning and knowledge are rooted in Dasein we are asserting anything but a subjectivism.

To further clarify these notions Heidegger turns to an analysis of a derivative mode of interpretation: Assertion (Aussage). "... we may define "assertion" as a "pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates"."³ In other words, an assertion communicates to someone a definite character of something by means of predication, and thereby that something is pointed out, i.e., shown to be there. It is different from Interpretation in general because Interpretation does not have to be carried out in

¹Ibid. p. 193.

²Though "meaning" will be discussed later, we note: "...meaning" must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to Understanding." Ibid.

³Ibid. p. 199. It is interesting to note that both the German 'Mitteilen' and the English 'communicate' etymologically speak of taking part together, or sharing, and this is just the sense Heidegger intends - a sharing in the thing and not the imposition of one person's thoughts on another.

words or a statement. The placing into words is not an irrelevant difference, for assertion has a very definite structure of its own that discloses and constitutes the world in its own way. Assertion entails a specific judgment about the thing and thus changes the relation of Dasein to the thing. The thing is taken out of its originary involvement with the world and possibilities, and is placed on a pedestal, as it were, to be viewed in a detached way and in a specific manner. This mode of relating to the object is what we have been calling the present-at-hand. Presence-at-hand, however, is only one mode of Being, and according to Heidegger not a primordial one.

Interpretation in general does not necessarily formulate the possibilities in a thematic statement: in picking up the item in front of me and driving in a nail with it I am Interpreting it. In so doing Interpretation is operating in the ready-to-hand; rather than the present-to-hand. Assertion, on the other hand, takes the entity out of this originary "there" of the ready-to-hand, and constitutes and reveals a new and different "there" - that of an isolated and delimited factum.¹

We hasten to point out that not everything put into language does what assertion does - poetry being the most striking counter example. Assertion is one aspect of language, and one that can provide access only to a limited and derivative mode of Being. It is in this light that Heidegger's critique of traditional philosophy finds

¹In the later works this mode is called Framed (Ge-stell) thinking.

its directive. Heidegger says that because of the fetters the history of philosophy has placed upon itself with logic it has forgotten Being; and the importance logic has been given arises out of an interpretation of logos as assertion. "...by knowing that logos has been interpreted in a way which is ontologically inadequate, we have gained a sharper insight into the fact that the methodological basis on which ancient ontology arose was not a primordial one. The logos gets experienced as something present-at-hand and interpreted as such..."¹ We hasten to point out that Heidegger is not refuting logic, but merely exposing its limitedness. As he says elsewhere: "The very idea of "logic" disintegrates in the vortex of a more original questioning"² and "'Logic" is only one exposition of the nature of thinking."³

In short, logic's predominance in the history of philosophy arose from considering logos strictly as predicative judgment, and thus limiting the scope of the world to the present-at-hand. Therefore, it is not the significance of logos that is to be diminished, but we need to reinterpret it in a more fundamental manner which recognizes that the interpretation of logos has degenerated from a fundamental understanding of language, to language as assertion or judgment.

¹Being and Time p. 203.

²"What is Metaphysics" p. 342.

³Ibid. p. 365.

In his attempt to rethink logos he introduces the term Discourse (Rede) which he considers a translation that can help recover the full significance of logos. "...the basic signification of logos is "discourse"..."¹ As he points out this does not help us any until we work out what is meant by Discourse itself, but the direction this will take is clear for he says "...the function of the logos lies in merely letting something be seen, in letting entities be perceived..."² We have thus been led from an analysis of Understanding to Interpretation and then to Assertion, which finally led to Discourse itself.

The basic stock of 'categories of signification', which passed over into the subsequent science of language, and which in principle is still accepted as the standard today, is oriented towards discourse as assertion...The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existentiale.³

We now move on to a discussion of Discourse itself, in order to bring out how Heidegger views language and to see how it fits together with the project of Being and Time as a whole. We start with a group of excerpted quotes that give a basic characterization of Discourse.

¹Being and Time p. 55. Though not elaborated in Being and Time this conception of logos is grounded in the connection of logos to legein (originally 'to lay forth' now 'to say' or 'to tell'). This will be dealt with explicitly in the next chapter.

²Ibid. p. 58. See note 1.

³Ibid. p. 209.

The existential-ontological foundation
of language is discourse...

Discourse is the articulation of
intelligibility (Verstandlichkeit)...

That which can be articulated in inter-
pretation and thus even more primordially
in discourse is what we call "meaning"...

The way in which discourse gets expressed
is language...

Hearing and keeping silent are possibilities
belonging to discursive speech.¹

From these quotes two major points emerge: first, we see that what Heidegger has in mind with Discourse is the ground of language and not identical to it; and second, Discourse, as an existentials of Dasein's disclosedness reveals in some way something that is somehow prior to it. What this means is that Discourse cannot simply be considered as an entity present-at-hand that is an attribute of man,² it must be viewed in its Being, and this Being lies in its revelation and constitution of the "there," i.e. in its making something present.

Heidegger states that there are four items that make Discourse what it is: what is said in the Discourse, what is talked about, the manifesting (Bekundung) and communication. However, we cannot assume to have a full understanding of the Being of Discourse by

¹Ibid. pp. 203-204.

²"Were language not ontological, it could not disclose anything pertaining to the world...Language cannot be just another thing (have ontic, that is, psychological status) for then it would not be a discloser, but itself be in need of being disclosed." Loy Vail Heidegger and the Ontological Difference (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1972) p. 163.

merely putting together explanations of these four components. Discourse must be seen in its own light, and viewing it in terms of its components is only a step in that direction. What these aspects do tell us is that Discourse is primarily concerned not with itself but with a manifesting communication of the world.

This concern of Discourse with the world is further evidenced when we remember that "hearing" and "keeping silent" are ways of Discourse. They are not merely derivative modes, they are essential to it. In so far as Discourse is primarily an opening up of the world, and not necessarily a delimiting judgment about it, "hearing" and "keeping silent" are necessary. When words are spoken the words themselves are not as important as what they let be heard. True Discourse is not mere words, as is exemplified in the cry of a desperate man who pleads "Can you hear what I am saying?," or the angry parent who threatens "You did not hear a word I said" and is not really satisfied by the child's ability to re-call the words. Words are not enough for Discourse, for Discourse is primarily a communicative opening-up to the world, and words in themselves do not always do this.

At this point we are led to two crucial questions: exactly what is that to which Discourse opens up, and in what way does Discourse have input into the constitution of that which is opened up.

Heidegger states:

Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility (Verstandlichkeit)....That which

can be articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning." That which gets articulated as such in discursive articulation, we call the "Totality-of-significations."¹

We have made brief note of meaning in the discussion of Interpretation, but in order to deal adequately with the questions we have now raised it is necessary to return to this point.

The first thing we must note is that by 'meaning' Heidegger does not have in mind 'a definition'. He uses the word Sinn, which like the French sens, has the connotations of sense and tendency, so that we can talk of the meaning (Sinn) of a painting, a play, or any object in general, as well as of a sentence or a word.² To clarify meaning we must see it in relation to significance (Bedeutung), which as that which is Articulated (specifically laid-out or opened up) must be similar to meaning but not identical - meaning being that which can be Articulated. Since it is through Discourse that significations first are, and since Discourse is more fundamental than spoken language, Heidegger can say "To significations, words accrue. But word-Things do not get supplied with significations."³ By this

¹Being and Time p. 204. The connection between intelligibility (Verstandlichkeit) and Understanding (Verstehen) is, as we shall see, a crucial one, and is unfortunately lost in translation.

²This is why Heidegger can speak of the meaning of Being and not just the meaning of 'Being.' See Manfred Stassen's Heideggers Philosophie Der Sprache in Sein und Zeit.

³Being and Time p. 204.

Heidegger is saying that though our access to significations may be through words, the words get their guidance from significations. To find the right words we must first listen to the significations (significance) of a situation - i.e. Discourse must occur.¹ It is in this same sense of significance being prior to words that meaning is prior to significance: - though it is through significations that meaning gets expressed (articulated), significations get their guidance from meaning. As human speech must listen to Discourse, Discourse must listen to meanings. But how can meanings be listened to if they are by definition unarticulated?

We take as a clue for the answer to this question the fact that meaning is introduced and discussed in connection with Understanding. It is in the structure of Understanding that our answer lies. "...Meaning" must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to Understanding."² Now, since the disclosedness of Understanding is characterized by projection, we can see that meaning is constituted by the 'fore-structures'. These fore-structures constitute the interconnection of the world, in so far as they reach ahead of the 'here and now' in order to constitute that which is 'here and now' as what it is. I understand that someone is Just, because I have a fore-conception, though not necessarily explicit or specific, of a range of possibilities of behavior of this person. This fore-conception of possibilities

¹"We never come to thoughts. They come to us. That is the proper hour of discourse" Poetry, Language, Thought p. 6.

²Being and Time p. 193.

is in accordance with having a fore-conception of the meaning of Just; and the fact that philosophers can try for thousands of years to articulate what it means to be Just, shows that though we in some sense understand the Just (i.e. have a fore-conception of the meaning of it) the meaning is not explicit or articulated (though it is that which can be articulated).

We are now in a position to return to our question, and show how Discourse can be guided by the unarticulated meaning. Though the meaning is not presently explicitly before us (and because of the complexity of things probably never completely can be) it does implicitly constitute our understanding of that which is presently before us, and thus is in some sense available to us. Listening to meaning is a matter of unravelling the meaning from what is given to us, i.e., articulating those characteristics of the fore-structures that make that which is before us what it is. "Both discoursing (Reden) and hearing are based upon Understanding."¹

Discourse, therefore, does not mold the world according to its own design, rather it is the coming forth of a meaningful world, announcing itself in some articulated fashion, - and this is why hearing is constitutive of Discourse. Discourse is thus not the making meaningful of what originally was not so (i.e. sense data or pure sensation), but rather direct attunement to meaning itself. It is in this way that we understand Discourse to reveal and constitute the "there" of the world, and thus recognize that it is not merely an

¹Ibid. p. 208.

entity for scientific study, but more fundamentally an existentiale of Dasein's disclosedness.

To conclude our analysis of the role of language in Being and Time we must turn to Discourse as it is manifested most often, that is in its 'fallen everydayness'. Heidegger calls this form of Discourse "Idle Chatter" (Gerede). He characterizes it as a closing off of that which is talked about, i.e., a lot of words that end up burying what they want to say.

We do not so much understand the entities which are talked about; we already are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially.¹

This is significant for it points out that Discourse in its authentic state is characterized not by what is said as such, but by what it lets speak. The ground of Discourse is the world, and Discourse is an existentiale that lets the world speak; but idle chatter, on the other hand, gets its direction from what people want or expect to hear, or from a role or image that the speaker wants to project, and thus cuts itself off from its true ground.

Discourse, which belongs to the essential state of Dasein's Being and has a share in constituting Dasein's disclosedness has the possibility of becoming idle talk and when it does so, it serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-World open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, and cover up the entities within-the-world.²

¹Ibid. p. 212.

²Ibid. p. 213.

The danger of idle chatter is aggravated by the fact that it does not recognize itself for what it is. We believe we reach an understanding of what is talked about, even though this is just what it lacks. "Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own."¹ A prime example of this phenomenon takes place in museums, where in front of a great masterpiece, we hear so much chatter about "colorful," "pretty," "Oh, I know this painting" and other such conversation that does anything but let the painting speak.

Idle chatter is the form of Discourse in fallen Dasein. This is not a rare state of Being, for Falling is an existentiale of Dasein - a way of constituting the "there." It is a way of Being-in-the-world that is as real as any other, and one that we all spend most of our time in. "Falling reveals an essential ontological structure of Dasein itself. Far from determining its nocturnal side, it constitutes all Dasein's days in everydayness."² However, it is important to recognize it for what it is, and to recognize its consequences. As a cutting off from the world, idle chatter, and falling in general, is the ontological root of alienation:

Ontologically this means that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is - as Being-in-the-world - cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in. Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached...³

¹Ibid. p. 213.

²Ibid. p. 224.

³Ibid. p. 214.

Heidegger has therefore laid the groundwork for much social and anthropological philosophy, but that is not his primary concern; he merely wants to lay bare the way Dasein constitutes the fundamental relation between man and the world. Discourse is an existentiale of disclosedness, of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, and as a form of Discourse Idle Chatter reveals and constitutes Dasein and the world as being cut off from each other. But such a cutting off from the world is only possible for a Being who is in a fundamental relation with it.

To be uprooted in this manner is a possibility of Being only for an entity whose disclosedness is constituted by discourse as characterized by understanding and states-of-mind - that is to say, for an entity whose disclosedness, in such an ontologically constitutive state, is its "there," its 'in-the-world'.¹

At this point we conclude our interpretation of Being and Time. Before going on we must bring together the ground we have covered. We have attempted an analysis that shows Dasein as not merely an entity among others, but rather the Being of man in his fundamental relation (unity) with the world. The Being of Dasein is the revelation and constitution of the world, and the Being of the world is its emerging and its being "there" as it is. Thus the constitution of Dasein is at the same time the constitution of the emergence (the "there") of the world. This "there" that we spent so much time

¹Ibid. p. 214.

trying to expose is the place of something that allows it to be. The "there" of Dasein is its Disclosedness, its being in a position to be open to the world and allow the world to emerge. Thus because of the existentialia of Disclosedness, Dasein is "there"; that is, its "there" is constituted by State-of-mind, Understanding, Discourse and Falling. The "there" of the world is also constituted by these existentialia, but seen in a different 'direction'. The world's "there" is constituted by State-of-mind as something that matters, has facticity, and, though we did not examine temporality, has a past. By Understanding the world's "there" is constituted with possibilities, more than what is actually (concretely) or factually present, that is, a future. Discourse constitutes the "there" of the world as something that can announce itself, be articulated. And from Falling the "there" receives a constitution as cut off, alien, something to be manipulated and controlled. It is in this way that whatever is ("there") is "there" as it is because of the Disclosedness of Dasein, and why we can say that Dasein simultaneously reveals and constitutes the "there" of the world.

What has traditionally been considered as two separate realms, i.e., subjectivity and objectivity, we express as a unity by saying that the structures we have examined are constitutive of (the "there" of) Being-in-the-world. Working out the structures (existentialia) of Dasein, is thus undertaking the task of working out the structures of the possibilities of Being-in-the-world in general, i.e. of Being itself. We have not undertaken the task of discussing all the

structures, nor have we expressed them in their temporality, a project necessary in order to show Dasein in its essential completeness. Instead, we simply gave an exergesis of the four basic existentialia that constitute Being-in as such, and in so doing the role of language, as Discourse, became a topic of obvious concern. We saw that Discourse is constitutive of Being-in because in its authentic mode it is essentially a coming forth of the world, an articulation of the meaning of entities of the world. Without Discourse the structures constituted by Understanding, and also State-of-mind, since every Understanding always has a State-of-mind, would remain unarticulated, and thus the "there" would be revealed and constituted in a quite different way. In fact, to be exact, since State-of-mind, Understanding and Discourse are equiprimordial in the constitution of the "there",¹ we would not have anything "there" at all. Discourse gets its direction from Understanding, but without the articulation of the world there would be nothing "there" for Understanding to understand. Understanding gives us possibilities as possibilities and thus without Discourse there would be nothing actual, which is impossible since possibilities are always possibilities of something actual. Discourse, as articulation of an intelligibility (understandability) which goes with a State-of-mind, is a gathering of facticity (thrownness, past) and possibility (projection, future) into a self manifesting presence that is not otherwise "there."² Thus a concern with Discourse

¹Being and Time p. 203.

²The threefold significance of logos (Discourse) as gathering, Saying, and Being-present will be of continuing concern.

is imperative for the question of Being, for without it there would be nothing (nothing would be "there").

In this section we have raised many points that will continue to concern Heidegger in his analysis of Being. The relationship between Discourse and that which is (can be) articulated, as well as between man, Being, language, listening and silence have all been introduced. In the mere seven pages on Discourse Heidegger raises all these issues in an almost staccato form. It therefore seems that he was only beginning to realize the significance of these questions to the quest for Being. Thus I do not consider any of these issues to have been fully worked out, but they have been exposed, and Heidegger's views on them as presented in Being and Time have been given. In the later works we shall see a clarification and elaboration of these projects, goals and views of Being and Time, rather than an abandonment of them, as many interpreters of the 'Heidegger reversal' maintain. This is not to say that Heidegger considers his first work to be perfect, or that the later works make no attempts to overcome mistakes, but the crucial issue of the relation of man, language, and Being is developed and not reversed as the categorical viewing in terms of subjectivity and objectivity might claim. In order to see this issue we attempt to make a brief comparison of the Heidegger of Being and Time to the transcendental idealism of Kant.

It is an obvious concern to the consideration of Heidegger as an ontologist to ask whether or not he has gone beyond Kant. Heidegger holds the First Critique (up to the Dialectic) in high esteem,

though he has a fairly unique interpretation of it. However, the value of Heidegger's contribution to the development of ontology would be questionable if he gave us nothing other than a new version of transcendental idealism. We therefore must make a comparison of Dasein's disclosedness to the Kantian categories of intuition and understanding - in order to see whether they are serving the same function.

The most obvious difference between them is that Kant is after a justification of science and therefore finds the limits of experiencability of an object in terms of traditional logic, while Heidegger is after the meaning of Being in general, and therefore considers a concern with the possibility of objects of science, i.e., concerns of the present-at-hand, of limited scope. Secondly, Kant's categories and forms of intuition are clearly understood as properties of man's finite rationality, and thus we are inescapably left with the unreachable thing-in-itself. On the other hand, the existentialia for Heidegger are not merely properties of finite man, but rather the constitutive structures of man and Being in their fundamental unity of Being-in-the-world. Another way of saying this is that Kant starts with the Cartesian dualism between man and the world, and then tries to bring them together on the grounds of a transcendental functioning of man, while Heidegger starts with a fundamental unity - man and world need each other, neither is primary - and thus his task is to unravel the components or structures of the unity, rather than to piece together two divided realms. It is for

this reason that Heidegger is never plagued by the division between phenomenon and thing-in-itself - for him phenomenon cannot mean mere appearance, it must be understood as the thing manifesting itself, in itself.

It should be noted that these two differences between the thinkers are rooted on a common ground. Kant tries to analyze the conditions of objectivity because he understands the world as object (present-at-hand) - an understanding that necessarily separates it from subjectivity which is understood as the unique thinking object. Heidegger, on the other hand, tries to unravel the meaning of Being in general, for rather than seeing the world strictly in terms of the objectivity of the present-at-hand, he recognizes another, more primary, mode - the ready-to-hand - in which the awareness of the world is no further removed than that of my own subjectivity.¹ In the ready-to-hand the world's meaning and my meaning are intrinsically united - a primordial unity and not two separate realms affecting each other.² Thus Heidegger must be concerned with the ground of whatever is, the meaning of Being itself, and not with the subjective constitution of objectivity.

However, notwithstanding these differences and our understanding of Dasein in light of Heidegger's warning to escape subjectivist thinking (interpretation), there seems to be an inescapable link between Kant and Heidegger. Dasein, though not equivalent to subjectivity,

¹Note that this idea is the root of the transformation of the Cartesian starting point of "I think" to an "I can" by thinkers like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

²See Being and Time p. 170; quoted p. (23ff) of this work.

is certainly 'tied' to man (i.e. constituted by human possibilities), and thus it seems as though Heidegger has merely made Being itself grounded in transcendental constitution. Even though constitution is understood as 'structure' or 'make-up' and not 'molding' or 'constructing' (the traditional understanding of Kant's transcendentalism), Dasein's equation with being human leaves the ground of Being in the being of (finite) man. Certainly because of the fundamental unity of man and world, and because Being is designated (opened up) by a term of man's language, the question of Being cannot be asked apart from the question of man, but must Being be reached through a study of the being of man as in Being and Time? The answer is no, and Heidegger himself recognized this. That is why in the later works Dasein becomes understood more in the sense of existing or being-there in general, and not strictly as man's essence,¹ and why the later works emphasize that when in Being and Time he said "Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist ... "gibt es" Sein," (Surely, only as long as Dasein is ... is there Being (is Being given)) the "it gives" was consciously and carefully considered and the "it" which gives, is Being itself, the ground of man, Dasein and the giving.

We reiterate that the analytic of Dasein in Being and Time is not thereby invalidated by these considerations. The fundamental structures of the "there" revealed by the unravelling of Dasein's existentialia are intrinsic to and constitutive of the meaning of

¹As early as Introduction to Metaphysics when concerned with man's being he always speaks of 'human Dasein' and not merely 'Dasein'.

Being, and this can never be forgotten. However, Being and Time itself occasionally fell into traditional subjective traps because it first defined Dasein in the sense of the essence of man, and was thus guided by traditional understandings of man. What has to be done is first understand Dasein as the occurring unity of man and the world (Ereignis) and then understand man within the guidance of this understanding of Dasein. This is the route followed by the later works. Thus Dasein is essential to the question of Being, and the later works maintain this, but Dasein as Ereignis, not strictly as the essence or being of man, and certainly not as the entity man. Dasein is not an entity, and as we have shown Being and Time itself tried to move in this direction, but could not fully carry it out.

Since Heidegger himself was led into the problems of 'subjectivist thinking' while explicitly trying to lay out a new direction, the tendency of the reader to do so is certainly an understandable danger. Heidegger recognized this, and has said one of the problems with Being and Time was that the terminology was too strongly rooted in traditional metaphysics (subjectivist thinking) for what he was saying to be really heard. This exposes another reason why a concern for language is important to him. If the initial attempt to reach Being was failing because of language difficulties, he must expose the being of language so that these difficulties can be understood and thereby avoided. When we learn that authentic language listens as much as it speaks, is guided by and gains its Being from what is

talked about, is not always an assertion or judgment, and is not primarily a property belonging to man, we learn how to read Heidegger himself. Tied to this is a second consideration which indicates the importance of language. On the first page of Being and Time we have seen Heidegger proclaim "Our aim is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely." We have also seen that the questions of meaning and the concrete working out of meaning are ontological problems solvable only in the ontology of language. From what we have done we realize that meaning is not linguistic definition, not a subjective formula for a mere word. Meaning is rooted in that which is "there" itself, it is its Sinn. Therefore, we know that when Heidegger asks "what is the meaning of Being," he is not asking simply how man uses the word 'Being,' rather he is calling for a thinking encounter with Being itself. Thus by asking for the meaning of Being he is avoiding the circularity of asking what is Being, i.e., of asking for the Being of Being. He is not, however, abandoning Being itself for a mere linguistic concern. Thus, only by having worked out Heidegger's ontology of language and meaning were we able to understand his project in the quest for Being.

Thus Heidegger's concern with language is anything but an incidental interest or even an example used as a trial application of the power of his ontology. Rather, Being and language are intricately tied, not in the domain of one or the other, but in a unity more fundamental than either individual concern.

Not the spoken word - itself a thing -
but the Saying, as the chime of still-
ness of which the spoken word is but
an echo, bestows world and hence also
that which we call by the little word
'is'. Word and thing, Saying and Being,
are bound together in a unity.¹

The task before Heidegger in 1927, and the one before us now, is to
unravel how language and Being can be reached only in each others
light.

¹J. L. Mehta The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York:
Harper & Row, 1971) p. 226.

II. Language and the origins of philosophy

In our first section we have seen that in Being and Time Heidegger interprets logos as Discourse, and sees it as the essence of Dasein.¹ In this section we plan to elaborate the concept of logos as he developed it after Being and Time, where logos comes to mean Being itself, but as still tied to a concern with language. In this way we shall be developing an understanding of how language tied into his basic concern with the meaning of Being. We have seen how logos as Discourse has to do primordially with Being-there, and not with human utterance. However, the human element can not be ignored, and one of the functions of this section will be to explore the relation of man as a thinker and speaker to logos understood as Being. As this relation is discussed we will be touching on many areas that can only be fully elaborated in later sections, but we will have at least seen what issues are of concern in Heidegger's work with language, and how these are always directed to the basic question of Being.

The concept of logos is developed by Heidegger in his work on the early Greek philosophers. Heidegger's analyses of the history of philosophy are notoriously unique, and we must therefore understand how he views his approach to other thinkers. He states:

Only when we turn thoughtfully toward
what has already been thought, will
we be turned to use for what must
still be thought.²

¹Being and Time p. 47.

²Heidegger Identity and Difference trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) p. 41.

In various works Heidegger did perform this thoughtful return to various thinkers, especially with the Greeks, Kant, Nietzsche, and Hegel. These works fulfill the promise of the never published second part of Being and Time, which called for a "phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology," and in order to understand what Heidegger was doing we must become clear on how he means 'destruction'. He does not intend a nihilistic annihilation of everything the great philosophers have done, rather he views his task as the exposing of what is unthought or what underlies what they have said. Thus when he calls for a 'destruction of the history of ontology' or says "every interpretation must do violence," he is neither calling for a reevaluation of their greatness nor for an unjustified misconstrual of what they said, rather he is calling for a violent shaking up of what they said, in order to expose their roots. Heidegger admits that much of the thoughts he draws out of the historical thinkers they themselves were never aware of: "The more original the thinking, the richer will be what is unthought in it. The unthought is the greatest gift that thinking can bestow."¹

Thus Heidegger approaches past philosophers as a philosopher himself, and not as an historian. As he says: "That which really is, Being, which from the start calls and determines all beings, can never be made out, however, by ascertaining facts, by appealing to particulars."² He is not using the Greek thinkers as support

¹What is Called Thinking p. 76.

²Ibid. p. 66.

for his own position, but rather he is attempting to bring us into a new and thoughtful relation with them that at the same time is bringing us into a thoughtful relation with Being itself as Heidegger is trying to approach it. Further, since he is after the unarticulated relation to Being that underlies these thinkers and not a factual determination of their specific intentions, any argument against Heidegger's interpretations, on the basis of an alternate interpretation of the writings, can not belittle the philosophical import of Heidegger's endeavor. Heidegger's goal in the return to earlier thinkers is the same as everywhere else: to disclose Being. He must ask about the Being of these thinkers, that is how they stand with Being:

Destruction does not mean destroying,
but dismantling, liquidating, putting
to one side the merely historical asser-
tions about the history of philosophy.
Destruction means - to open our ears,
to make ourselves free for what speaks
to us in tradition as the Being of beings.¹

As we have stated we will be concerned solely with the work Heidegger has done on the Presocratics, and more specifically on Heraclitus and Parmenides. Though he is concerned with various aspects of these thinkers, his attention focuses on a retrieving of the significance and meaning of logos. In this endeavor he must be concerned with two other terms, legein and noein, and show how the current interpretations of these miss their true meaning, and how this affects our understanding of logos.

¹Heidegger What is Philosophy trans. by Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1955) p. 73.

We must merely free ourselves from the notion that originally and fundamentally logos and legein signified thought, understanding and reason. As long as we cling to this opinion and even go so far as to interpret logos in the light of logic as it later developed, our attempt to rediscover the beginning of Greek philosophy can lead to nothing but absurdities.¹

The retrieve of the Greek meaning of logos begins with the claim that rather than originally having the significance of reason, word, or judgment, it meant to gather or collect. "Originally logos meant, according to Heidegger, gathering or collection, having the sense of both collecting and collectedness; it was the primal gathering principle."² The support for this interpretation comes from an analysis of the etymology, a technique Heidegger repeatedly uses. H. G. Liddell states³ that logos is a verbal noun of legein which in addition to meaning to say or speak, originally meant to pick up or pick out for oneself, and also to be counted among (e.g. the members of a group). The sense of gathering is also present in logeia which means a collection of money for taxes or charity.

And Charles Kahn states:

The term logos is a verbal noun, whose primitive meaning is inseparable from that of the verb legein to which it corresponds ... In its earliest usage (for example, in Homer) legein means either 1) to pick or gather, or 2) to count or enumerate. The underlying idea, reflected in both senses, seems to be

¹Introduction to Metaphysics p. 104.

²J. L. Mehta The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger p. 144.

³H. G. Liddell A Greek-English Lexicon Clarendon Press Oxford 1843.

"to group or gather, passing from one thing to another."¹

The notion of logos as counting or enumerating is a common one (even as late as Plato's Theatetus), and what Heidegger is emphasizing is not the mere listing but the fact that in counting or enumerating we bring things into a grouping which gathers or holds together the individual things that are listed or counted. Thus the connections of logos and legein through the sense of gathering is scholastically supported, and as we continue this idea must be kept in mind.

The sense of logos as a gathering which we have gained can now be used to interpret (i.e., enter a thinking relation with) Heraclitus in a way that is more valuable to us than some more common translations. Rather than understanding logos merely as The Word (as for instance John Burnet does in Early Greek Philosophy), we now see it as that which gathers together, and holds in a balanced tension, the warring opposites that for Heraclitus make up whatever is.

"Logos is the steady gathering, the intrinsic togetherness of the essent (Seiendes); i.e. Being (Sein)."² In other words, logos is the binding force that runs through the world of becoming or flux and grants it the abiding permanence of Being in a similar manner to the way counting binds together the isolated entities which are enumerated. We can therefore, view Heraclitus not merely as a relativist, that results from a theory of pure process and flux of isolated

¹Charles Kahn "A New Look at Heraclitus" American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 11 No. 3 July 1964 pp. 191-2.

²Introduction to Metaphysics p. 110

opposites, as Plato seems to understand him, but rather as a thinker of Being, one who recognizes the diversity, change and tension of the world of things which we encounter, yet constantly has an eye on that which grants it an abiding presence, i.e. Being. "Being is the gathering of this conflict and unrest."¹

Thus, though it cannot be denied that logos has a meaning tied to language as the usual translations indicate, it, as our analysis of Discourse indicated earlier, is concerned with a more fundamental notion than 'language' ordinarily indicates.

There can be true speaking and hearing only if they are directed in advance toward Being, the logos. Only where the logos discloses itself does the phonetic sound become a word. Only where the Being of the essent (Seiendes) is heard does a mere casual listening become a hearing.²

In short, as a gathering, logos holds together warring fragments of transitory becoming, and grants them Being. But we have understood Being (and therefore logos since the above quotes show the identification of Being and logos) as a presencing, coming-forth, or disclosure, and we must now see how gathering and presencing belong together. It is for the purpose of developing this connection that a discussion of legein and noein becomes necessary.

¹Ibid. p. 113. Just as fire is the tying together the two distinct states of that which is burned.

²Ibid. p. 111.

The usual translations of legein and noein as saying and thinking are tied to the usual conception of logos, but we must now retrieve a more fundamental notion of these terms that coordinates with, and thus clarify, the new understanding of logos. The first step is to see how legein is viewed in a way which brings together the ideas of saying, gathering and Being. In the first section we saw that there are four aspects to any saying: "what-is-said," "what-is-talked-about," "communication," and "manifesting." In Being and Time Heidegger emphasized the notion of "what-is-talked-about" by distinguishing authentic Discourse as that which does not lose sight of "what-is-talked-about" by becoming too narrowly concerned with "what-is-said." Now Heidegger focuses on the companion aspect "manifesting," for insofar as we are to be concerned with "what-is-talked-about" we must see how a saying lets this come forth.

The saying and discoursing of mortals occurs from the earliest times on as legein, laying. Saying and discoursing occur essentially as the letting-lie-together-before of everything which, laid in unconcealment, comes to presence.¹

In this quote legein is seen as talking of both gathering and letting-lie (manifesting). We have seen the etymological support for interpreting it as gathering, and Liddell also confirms the interpretation of laying-out, or manifesting, but as a separate listing, and the question facing us is how the two senses of legein work together as a characterization of authentic saying.

¹Early Greek Thinking p. 63. Das Sagen und Reden der Sterblichen ereignet sich von früh an als legein, als legen. Sagen und Reden wesen als das beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen alles dessen, was, in der Unverborgenheit gelegen, anwest.

In order to find the foothold for an answer we need to reflect on what actually lies in legein as laying. To lay means to bring to lie. Thus to lay is at the same time to place one thing beside another, to lay them together. To lay is to gather.¹

This quote certainly can not serve as a completely satisfactory solution to our question. However, it can not be ignored, for it points in the direction of the gathering a letting-lie actually does entail. As we shall see, letting something lie means to place it in a context, i.e., within a world, and thus there is a gathering of the thing with its context (world).

It can help us to look at the German word that Heidegger uses for gathering: Lesen, which in addition to gathering means to read. The connection between reading and gathering points the way to the connection of laying-out and gathering in general, for reading is a gathering of letters, words and sentences that lets a nexus of meaning come forth. Reading is a gathering that lets an explicit understanding take place; it gathers the various parts so that something may be there for us to listen to and think about. The parts which a reading gathers are easy to point out, but this is not the case with legein. We have seen Discourse as a gathering-laying-out of Understanding, and logos as a gathering-letting-Be of whatever is, but this takes us only part of the way toward an understanding of how Heidegger views the fundamental gathering of an authentic saying. As we shall see, a saying gathers ourselves into a fulfilling unity with Being, but a full elaboration of this must wait until a later

¹Ibid. p. 61.

point. The idea will finally come to culmination only in the thinking of the Fourfold (gods, mortals, sky, and earth), so for now we must be satisfied with the recognition that the two roots of legein can work together to characterize a fundamental notion of a saying: a gathering lets something lie before us and be manifest. "Legein in the sense of "saying" and "discoursing" is intelligible only if it is thought in its most proper sense - as "laying" and "gathering."¹

We must now turn to another notion, noein. As evidenced by Parmenides' famous fragments "It is necessary to speak (legein) and think (noein) what is; for Being is, but nothing is not" and "For thought (noein) and Being are the same,"² noein plays a crucial role for the Greeks in understanding Being. In line with this Heidegger attempts to rethink noein in a way free from the prejudices of subjectivism which links it to the traditional conception of legein and logos by understanding it in the Cartesian sense of representational thought. This traditional approach focuses on thinking as a non-material process of the soul which in some way re-produces the objective world, and as such is dependent on God or transcendental categories for a claim to knowledge. In short, this view of thinking cuts it off from any real belonging to the world and presents us with an eternal dualism. Parmenides' statement thus becomes that of a naive thinker who dogmatically overlooked the complexities of this dualism. It is Heidegger's claim that this criticism of Parmenides

¹Early Greek Thinking p. 73.

²J.M. Robinson translations in An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968).

is based on a distinction which is not coherent with the Greek conception of Being. His attempt is thus to reinterpret noein with specific emphasis on Being rather than man. In line with this it is important to note that even in the subjective developments of metaphysics the connection of Being, logos, and thinking remains strong. But as the understanding of thinking develops more and more into an individual subjective process of the soul logos is understood as rules of thought (logic), and thus as metaphysics culminates in the idealism of nineteenth century Germany, Being becomes pure Idea. To overcome this Heidegger states that just as the source of logos and legein was found in Being as presencing, and not in subjectivity, so too must the original sense of noein be retrieved.

Noein - translated for short as thinking - is thinking only to the extent to which it remains dependent and focused on the einai, Being. Noein is not "thinking" simply by virtue of occurring as a non-material activity of the soul and spirit. Noein qua noein belongs together with einai; and thus belongs to einai itself.¹

In What is Called Thinking Heidegger undertakes the rethinking of noein in terms of a receptivity or receiving, rather than as a grasping or prehending. The latter view sees the direction of noein going from the subject outward, and thus considers it as a manipulating or forcing into categories on the part of subjectivity of that which is by itself passive and unreachable in its true Being. Heidegger on the other hand states:

¹What is Called Thinking p. 240.

In noein, what is perceived concerns us in such a way that we take it up specifically, and do something with it. But where do we take what is perceived? How do we take it up? We take it to heart. What is taken to heart, however, is left to be exactly as it is. This taking-to-heart does not make over what it takes. Taking to heart is: to keep at heart.¹

Heidegger justifies this interpretation by again returning to the etymology, and again Liddell confirms his claims. One of the early meanings of noein is "to see so as to remark or discern, distinguished from merely seeing," and therefore Heidegger's claim of taking to heart as a special receptive or retaining perception is insightfully accurate. Further, by noting the connection of noein to nous, or noos, we again see his interpretation confirmed. Usual translations see the connection of noein as thinking to noos as mind or reason, but there is a more fundamental interpretation of noos that goes along with our findings on noein. The early meaning of noos is "the mood or temper of man," and in such sayings as ek pontos no on, "with all his heart," and chaire no oi, "he is glad at heart," we see the connection to, and thus the justification of, Heidegger's understanding of noein.

Noein implies a perceiving which never was nor is a mere receiving of something. The noein perceives beforehand by taking to mind and heart. The heart is the wardship guarding what lies before us, though

¹Ibid. p. 203.

this wardship itself needs that guarding which is accomplished in the legein as gathering.¹

Thus noein as a taking to heart is dependent on legein, which as the gathering-letting-lie-forth provides noein with something to take up. Therefore it seems that the original naming of legein is prior to thinking, or, in terms of another phase of Heidegger's work, the poet is prior to the thinker. However, this is not completely correct, for as Heidegger states: "Legein and noein are coordinated not only in series, first legein and then noein, but each enters into the other."² Further, Heidegger sees thinking, and as we shall see later also saying, as a mergence of these two terms. One can not be viewed as independent of the other, and thus thinking involves both letting-lie and taking to heart. "The conjunction of legein and noein is the fundamental characteristic of thinking which here moves into its essential nature."³

This conjunction is not the glueing together of two separate processes; rather we must see that each essentially entails or includes the other. In legein, gathering-letting-lie, we must be already taking to heart, for, as we saw, taking to heart is a holding of the Being of that which manifests itself, and thus we could not let something lie before us, i.e., be there, if we did not take it to heart. In other words, the gathering which lies at the source of authentic saying as

¹Ibid. p. 207.

²Ibid. p. 208.

³Ibid. p. 211.

a letting lie can only take place insofar as there is a taking to heart. It is noein as taking to heart which lets authentic saying (legein, gathering-letting-lie) occur. But at the same time we must remember that noein can not occur except as a legein, for until there is a gathered something lying before us, only Nothing can be taken to heart, i.e., nothing can be taken to heart. Thus though they may be considered separately, on the ontological level a letting-lie is a taking to heart and a taking to heart is a letting-lie, and this conjunction is what is called thinking.

We can now return to logos. Heidegger has stated: "... for thinking is the legein of the logos,"¹ and elsewhere "in thought Being is taken up in language."² This relation of thinking (legein and noein) to Being (logos) thus rises to the foreground in our attempt to rethink language and Being for the Greeks. Let us briefly recap what we have accomplished so far. We started with a discussion of logos, which, though never losing overtones pointing towards language, has a primary meaning of Being; but Being understood in two ways: as gathering and as presencing. Thus by examining logos we are led to a thinking of the coming together of language, Being, presencing, and gathering, and the task is then to further progress our thinking towards this belonging together. To do this we moved to the etymological source of logos, i.e., legein. Legein started us

¹Ibid. p. 162. We, of course, must at this point understand this as "...the legein and noein of the logos."

²"Letter of Humanism" p. 148.

at a thinking of saying, but led to a notion of gathering-letting-lie. And thereby we once again reached a belonging together of such notions as saying, gathering, and lying. To further clarify this we then examined Parmenides' statements which led us to another term, i.e., noein. A thinking of noein starts at an understanding of it as thinking, but leads to a more fundamental notion of taking to heart. Taking as our clue Parmenides' statement that legein and noein are the same, we were then led to a thinking of how these two entail each other and belong together. In other words, Heidegger interprets Parmenides' TO AUTO ("The Same") as a belonging together of a mutual dependency and entailment. This point is elaborated in Identity and Difference as well as the essay "Moirai," and, as should be evident, this notion is becoming increasingly significant, and it shall continue to be of concern to us.

What this led us to was the mutual entailment of legein and noein insofar as a gathering-letting-lie occurs as a taking to heart and visa versa. It is not as if they were one and the same, but they belong together, each requires the other. Thus thinking is no longer merely the equivalent of noein, nor is it understood as a process of representational ideas by a subjectivity. Thinking becomes the combination (which results from the mutual entailment) of legein and noein. Thinking is a taking to heart which gathers and lets lie. Though we did not emphasize the point, the same holds for saying (language) as for thinking. Language and thinking are obviously closely tied for Heidegger,¹ but saying is no longer understood merely

¹Note for example: "Thinking of Being is the original poetizing. Language first comes to language, i.e., into its essence, in thinking.... Thinking is primordial poetry." Early Greek Thinking p. 19.

as a translation of legein, nor essentially as human utterance. Saying is a gathering-letting-lie which takes to heart. In this way we have come quite far in thinking the belonging together of thinking and saying through an examination of the Greeks, and we are now in a position to return to the question about the two senses of logos (Being) as gathering and as presencing.

Logos as presencing is the thinking-saying (i.e., legein and noein) that lets whatever is Be what it is by a laying out which takes to heart. We indicated that the letting-lie of legein is a gathering, and we saw for Heraclitus logos can be understood as a gathering of the transitory flux of opposites into an enduring tension of Being. However, for Heidegger the notion of logos as a gathering is something different - it is the gathering of thinking and Being (and the other relations that belong together) in a mutual dependency. This gathered relatedness Heidegger later calls Ereignis (Appropriation) and we shall discuss it in depth in the next chapter. For now it is important to note that as paradoxical as it seems the relation of thinking and Being is Being (logos) itself. The clearest evidence that Heidegger considers Being as the relation of itself to something appears in "Letter of Humanism" where in discussing man's essence as ex-sistence he states:

What relation has Being to ex-sistence?
Being itself is the relationship, insofar
as it retains and reunites ex-sistence
in its existential (i.e., ecstatic)
essence - as the place of the truth of

Being amidst the beings... man as an existing one comes to stand in this relationship which Being itself professes to be.¹

In other words, as Dasein was the meeting of man and world in Being and Time, logos as gathering is, for Heidegger, the meeting of thinking and Being. Logos (Being) as the gathering belonging together of thinking and Being tells us that Being as presencing needs thinking (and visa versa), and thus when Heidegger says "es gibt Sein" the it (es) which gives Being (presencing) is Being itself in the sense of gathering.

But since the dawn of thinking "Being" names the presencing of what is present, in the sense of the gathering which clears and shelters, which in turn is thought and designated as the logos.²

Presencing, the emergence of whatever is, can only be understood in the light of the primordial gathered unity of thinking and Being (man and world). We can see that it is out of this unity that presencing is possible. Further, we must note that the way or manner that this unity historically occurs determines what can Be present in that age. For example, contradictions can not occur (Be, present themselves) in a logically dominated era and gods can not be present

¹"Letter on Humanism" p. 159. Note also: "But in what else could the exceptional character of gods and men consist if not in the fact that precisely they in their relation to the lighting can never remain concealed? Why is it that they can not? Because their relation to the lighting is nothing other than the lighting itself, in that this relation gathers men and gods into the lighting and keeps them there." Early Greek Thinking p. 119-120.

²Early Greek Thinking p. 39.

in a technological one. Finally, looking from the other direction, it is as presencing that the gathered unity is manifested or occurs, i.e., Being as presencing is the legein of Being as the relation. In other words, it is through the presencing of what is present that the togetherness of thinking and Being can show itself. Thus the two senses of logos (Being) actually need each other and rather than ambiguously shifting its meaning, as it might first seem, these different ways of viewing it actually work together in widening our grasp of its meaning. As Heidegger states in a discussion of Parmenides' fragment "For thought and Being are the same":

But what is to be thought is named in the enigmatic key word to auto, the Same. What is so named expresses the relation of thinking to Being. Specifically, it (the Same) reigns as the unfolding of the twofold - an unfolding in the sense of disclosure. That which unfolds, and in unfolding reveals the twofold, allows taking-heed-of to get underway toward the gathering perception of the presencing of what is present.¹

With this we draw to a close the discussion of Heidegger's rethinking of the early Greek philosophy. It has been an extremely important endeavor, for as the birth of Western philosophy Heraclitus and Parmenides set the course for what followed. Therefore, in uncovering their roots we gain sight of Being as it first stood. These Greeks take a crucial place, for they laid the groundwork that determined the course of Western philosophy. We can see how as noein

¹Ibid. p. 94-5.

came to mean a subjective process of the soul, legein statement or assertion, and logos logic, they lost the sense of their original significances, and Being qua Being, as Heidegger views it, was covered over. By going back to the Greeks Heidegger was able to contrast his quest for the meaning of Being from the metaphysical and logical tradition, and let Being (logos) come forth in its originary significance.

The role language played in these developments is not what might have been expected. Legein and logos do not have a meaning of language in the sense of uttering, referring or symbolizing. Only when we understand the fundamental nature of language as a gathering letting-lie does a concern with it become relevant to the quest for the meaning of Being. As Heidegger says, "We have to learn to think the essence of language from the saying, and to think saying as letting-lie-before and as bringing-forward-into-view."¹ This is why Heidegger says that when we are concerned with the nature of language we must enter into an experience of it, and not analyze it as an object among other objects. In a metalinguistic analysis of language one language is used to examine the properties of another language, and thus the manifesting nature of language itself can never come forth. On the other hand, in an experience of language the attempt is to let the nature of language announce itself. "In experiences which we undergo with language, language itself brings itself to language."²

¹Ibid. p. 91.

²On the Way to Language p. 59.

In this section we have seen the nature of language as a gatherer which lets lie. It is in this sense that Heidegger says "... for words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are."¹ This is not the claim of a subjectivist, saying that Being is in the hands of our will, rather it is saying that language in its fundamental nature of a gathering letting-lie is necessary for things to stand there and manifest themselves. Human thinking and language do not create Being, but as we move closer to grasping the meaning of Being we recognize that it can not be considered apart from humans.

Finally, an important point for Heidegger has emerged in this section without our really noticing it. We have seen how his approach to Being and the corresponding unorthodox interpretations of the Greeks are consistent with the etymology. Thus, though the key terms of the early Greeks have come to speak metaphysically of subjectivity, objectivity and ratiocination, they historically find their roots in a speaking of Being as the gathered laying out that is manifested and maintained by a taking to heart. Thus what seems to have emerged is Heidegger's famous claim (which will be discussed later) that we do not use language, but rather language uses us. We, in our tradition of metaphysical language, can not help but see the Greeks as the proponents of a metaphysical understanding of the world, i.e.,

¹Introduction to Metaphysics p. 11.

speaking of thinking and saying as processes of subjectivity and Being as objectivity. And language also used the Greeks, for regardless of what they were trying to say, through the history of their language they spoke of the fundamental belonging together of gathering, letting-lie, taking to heart, manifesting and presencing. Could it be mere coincidence that the etymologies of the key terms of the great Presocratics at least allow a thinking of Being as Heidegger has attempted to think it? Or has Heidegger successfully retrieved Being as it underlay the birth, and thus the history, of philosophy?

The question is: Is Being a mere word and its meaning a vapor, or does what is designated by the word "Being" hold within it the historical destiny of the West.¹

¹Introduction to Metaphysics p. 35.

III. The Fourfold and Appropriation

We now turn our attention to Heidegger's last phase, in which he becomes directly involved with Being and language. In our previous sections language and Being seemed to collapse into an identity. Logos (Discourse) was seen as one of the primary existentials of Dasein, and further elaborated into the primordial gathering associated with Being itself. Further, language as legein (and the entailed noein) is understood as "gathering-letting-lie" and Being as presence is understood as a gathered lying there. However, we must be careful to understand identity when we say that Being and language are identical. In Identity and Difference Heidegger explains that identity means "belonging-together," and not collapsing into a unitary sameness. Belonging together is a mutual dependency, in which each of the two can only first arise out of the relation. As Joan Stambaugh says in the introduction to Identity and Difference: "It is perhaps difficult for us to think of a relation as being more original than what is related, but this is what Heidegger requires of us."¹ The notion of 'relation' has traditionally meant the tying of two separate and independent entities. This is obviously not the notion Heidegger is after since the gathered togetherness is more fundamental than the independent "components." This is why Heidegger attempts to use the term 'identity' rather than 'relation' to refer to the belonging together (though he too uses the word 'relation' at times). However, since the "components" do have separate integrities

¹Identity and Difference p.12.

and can be focused upon separately we permit ourselves the use of the word 'relation' to facilitate our explication, but it is imperative to understand it as a primordial belonging together and not a subsequent holding together of two separate entities. As we shall see in this chapter, this belonging together is known as Appropriation.

The relation between language and Being is expressed in the famous quote "Language is the house of Being." With this quote Heidegger tries to express the sense of identity of belonging together and needing each other. Being dwells in its house: it lives there, i.e., Being has a place to Be thanks to language. At the same time language is dependent upon Being. Language is a mere empty shell if it does not constantly keep Being present within its domain. Being, when housed in language, keeps it strong, meaningful and significant. If language loses its contact with Being, it crumbles into idle chatter, impotency and finally non-sense (and, therefore, non-existence).

However, we are getting ahead of ourselves, and in order to understand the relation of Being and language we must turn to an examination of Heidegger's development of the topics. This phase of Heidegger's philosophy is usually called the "late works." However, it is important to realize that many of the ideas that get worked out in the writings of the fifties and sixties began with such works as "Origin of a Work of Art" and "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry" both originally composed in the thirties. Thus though the writings

we will be concerned with have a common bond in both subject matter and style, they do not represent merely a short phase of Heidegger's thinking.

These works have also been characterized as the poetical phase of his work. Though this is a true characterization, it does not mean that their value lies solely in aesthetic concerns. As we shall see the relation of thinking and poetry is a very close one, in fact Heidegger will argue that authentic thinking has to be poetical. Therefore, when his philosophy is poetic, it does not reduce philosophy to unguided and non-accurate discipline. Rather, he is elevating poetical writing to a methodology that first lets serious and accurate philosophy take place.

There has been a latent tension in the meaning of Being throughout Heidegger's writing. On the one hand Being has been the act of presencing of that which is present: appearing, *da-sein*, or legein or noein. On the other hand, it is the condition of this presencing: the gathered unity of man and world known as Being-in-the-world, *Dasein*, or logos. In this chapter these two senses of Being become explicit, and the meaning of each is worked out. We start by asking how it is that things presence, that is, for the Being of things.

In two short essays written in the early fifties ("The Thing" and "Building Dwelling Thinking")¹ Heidegger explores what it means to Be a thing. It is not the case that whatever is is a thing; for example man, works of art and equipment are but they do not presence as things.

¹Both in Poetry, Language, Thought.

However, things are what we are surrounded with every day; they include physical and nonphysical, real and nonreal, abstract and concrete entities. Thus examining their Being provides us with the best access to the question of Being itself. Once we have gained an understanding of the Being of things we turn to the second sense of Being which, as we noted above, is at this stage called Appropriation. After unravelling the meaning of Being as Appropriation we will return to Being as presencing by examining the Being of entities other than things, and in so doing we will bring to light how the two senses of Being work together.

Heidegger discusses the Being of things in terms of the unified oneness of what he calls the fourfold: earth and sky, divinities and mortals. The unity of these four, which consists in the mirroring entailment of all of them in each individual one, is what grants the Being of things, i.e., is what enables things to be present. As he states it:

This manifold-simple gathering is the jug's presencing. Our language denotes what a gathering is by an ancient word. That word is: thing. The jug's presencing is the pure, giving gathering of the one-fold fourfold into a single time-space, a single stay. The jug presences as a thing. The jug is the jug as a thing. But how does the thing presence? The thing things. Thinging gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the fourfold's stay, its while, into something that stays for a while: into this thing, that thing.¹

¹Poetry, Language, Thought p. 174.

We notice right away the carry over of the notion of gathering that first emerged in the rethinking of the Greeks. The task must therefore be understood as an elaboration of the thinking of Being as a gathering, and that is where we will eventually be led.

Heidegger describes the four of the fourfold as follows:

Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal.

The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year's seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of the day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depths of the ether.

The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment.

The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth¹ under the sky, before the divinities.

Though Being is understood as the gathered unity of all four which is given in the mirroring interplay of the four in each one, it is valuable to examine them individually. At first appearance it seems as if Heidegger has abandoned an attempt to speak philosophically about Being, and resorted to a mythical explanation in terms of random components. However, when we thoughtfully approach the four, we realize that though poetic, there is nothing magical nor random about them.

¹Ibid. p. 149.

Since the beginning of philosophy there has been an attempt to define Being in terms of formed matter. From the peras and boundless of Pythagoras to the formal and material causes of Aristotle to the Categories and sense manifold of Kant, Being has been seen as the placing of outlines upon an undifferentiated continuum. It is as a development of this tradition that Heidegger introduces the fourfold, for he believes the concept of formed matter speaks of a very limited conception of Being. As he states:

The metaphysics of the modern period rests on the form-matter structure devised in the medieval period, which itself merely recalls in its words the buried nature of eidos and hyle. Thus the interpretation of "thing" by means of matter and form, whether it remains medieval or becomes Kantian-transcendental, has become current and self-evident. But for that reason...it is an encroachment upon the thing-being of the thing.¹

In short, the notion of Being as formed-matter limits us to viewing only concrete physical things which are clearly demarcated or framed as things, and this blocks us from thinking the Being of things in its fullness.

But why the fourfold? How do these four speak of Being?

Examining them separately we first look at earth.

¹Ibid. p. 30.

(1) Earth

Earth can be associated with the notion of matter, but it is broader than the traditional concept. In addition to physical matter, earth also means the sphere of life opposed to the spiritual, and it is also the planet which is our home (to some cultures it was even associated with a mother). Thus when Heidegger speaks of earth as a component of Being, in addition to speaking of the physical aspects of solidity and spatiality he is also speaking of the characteristics that pervade the things in touch with nature: the fact that all living things survive from the nourishment and protection the earth provides. However, over and above even this presence of earth we often describe something as "earthy" when it has characteristics such as warmth, openness, and an appropriate belongingness. It is this notion of "earthy" that arises from the earth being our home and that Heidegger sees as a "component" of Being.

It is not something that can specifically be explained, for it speaks of many things and the "earthiness" that all these things hint at is not a specific thing itself. Earth is not only being made of matter, being alive and feeding from the earth's fruits, or having something in common with these characteristics; it is also having roots, being fertile, welcoming and caring, yet it is more than any of these or even the sum of them. To further understand it, it is important to note that with all we have mentioned as characterizing earthiness, the opposites of these also involve earth. Something can appear as "unearthy" only in reference to earthy categories: just

as it is only because we are seeing creatures that we can be blind, it is only because the categories of earthiness are relevant to all things can they be homeless, arid, eerie or however else we characterize "unearthly."

With this characterization of earth we now turn to things and see in what way earth is present in their Being. Clearly in all material things, whether organic or inorganic, earth is present in so far as all matter consists of the physical elements found on the table of elements. But earthiness is a substantiality and depth of which the substantiality and depth of physical things are only a part. Non-physical things such as aesthetic and emotional experiences and feelings, mythical beings, and even numbers are also earthy. The fact that some music (or other art) can envelope us, or be warm and refreshing, or alternatively be threatening, annoying, flat, and removed are a result of there being an earthy element to the aesthetic experience. The earthiness of the bass is most predominant and evident, but when we pay attention to the clear depths of experiencing the fragile violin runs we recognize earth there too. Even the sounds of words apart from their meaning have an earth element, as poets as well as advertising agents have discovered in manipulating the phonemes to present a desired atmosphere.¹

Perhaps the hardest place to find earthiness is in the realms of geometry and mathematics. Do shapes and numbers have the type of

¹Note for example a current lipstick commercial where the rich sounds of luscious, delicious, shimmering, and moisturizing are effectively incorporated with the strong and colorful visual presentation.

significance that we are speaking of? As for shapes I believe that the clearest evidence that they do comes from modern painting. Kandinsky once wrote that the effect of the meeting of an acute angle with a circle is the same as that of God's finger reaching out to Adam's in Michaelangelo's Sistine Chapel depiction. Though I can not expect the reader to agree with this equation, I do believe it is visually possible to question and test it, and this testing in itself shows the ability to see 'abstract shapes' in respect to an earthiness. Perhaps there is security in the narrowness of the corners of angles, cleanliness and order in the strength of a square, completeness and enveloping in the perfection of a circle. Questions like these are being explored by many modern artists, and when we are concerned with shapes in this way their earthiness emerges (whether or not we can verbalize a specific meaning of a shape). As for numbers, we must remember that the Pythagoreans were able to draw an association between them and things, which shows that they are not purely abstract, but rather belong to the earth in some way. Further, the fact that some numbers welcome us as lucky and comfortable and that certain numbers feel different than others are a result of their earthiness.

We have now shown how, when properly understood, earth is seen as a "component" in the Being of things. Besides referring to physical attributes, earth has a more fundamental sense of belonging, of having a substantiality of some kind that gives it more than a cut and dry abstract existence. The earthiness of things is what ties them to our world; no matter how abstract, new, or ethereal anything is,

it can not be so rarefied that it loses all reference to and grounding in earthy qualities.

It may be argued that all the earthy qualities of which we spoke are mere subjective feelings or fantasies tacked on to the true thing, and thus nothing more than mythical nonsense in the question of Being. To this criticism we respond that it is true that there is a human element in all we said about earth, but that is because we have seen that to speak of Being apart from man is impossible. The earthy elements seem to be felt by man in the heart and gut, but why should this be any less real (i.e., any less a part of the true Being of things) than the scientific or abstract thoughts of an analytic brain? Just because there is a human element does not mean that it is mere subjective input upon the true thing. A mental effort of abstraction (i.e., an effort to ignore certain aspects) is needed to view things apart from their earthy qualities - to hear 'pure sound' inputs rather than a meaningful significant sound that speaks to us with its earthy elements. Therefore, to constitute these characteristics as mere subjective inputs is to take a derived state (that of the abstractly viewed thing) as the starting point.¹ Only if the mistaken prejudice of this view of reality, which is a carry over from Descartes and the rationalists, is overcome can the full Being of things be seen. The devastating consequences of this mistaken pre-judgement of what the Being of things consists in must not be underestimated if philosophy is to make any progress. It is for this

¹It is interesting to note that while Heidegger is accused of being too subjective for including characteristics such as this in his analysis of Being, an active and difficult process of reduction performed by a subject is needed to reach the Being of any analytic metaphysician.

reason that Heidegger calls on us to discover earth in our quest for the meaning of Being.

We of course can not go through every thing in order to see how earth is present, any more than Kant could have gone through every thing to see how the categories were present. However, now that we have given a general idea of how earth is understood, and how it is present in the Being of all things, we can move on to the second of the four which is sky.

(2) Sky

Though each of the four mirrors the other three, sky is best seen as the complement of earth, as is evidenced by the way Heidegger writes the four: "earth and sky, divinities and mortals." Earth speaks of the silent unchanging security that the substantiality of a home and roots provide. Sky, on the other hand, speaks of temporality as the course of the sun, moon and planets divide our world into segments, and also of the infinite wonder and beyond that all things point to ("the blue depth of the ether"). To a scientific outlook sky might be understood as a "component" of Being insofar as space-time is needed as a container in which things can Be, and because light is needed for things to appear. However, this is only a limited way of seeing how sky enters Being. Space-time is not a container for things, rather things are spatial and temporal because sky is part of their Being. Light is not merely added to the Being of things so they may appear, for to Be means to stand forth into the open, into the light.

Sky is the ethereal element of things, it is the heady wonder that is most obvious when staring at the boundless heavens on a summer night.

But it is also the light softness of the drifting clouds of a lazy afternoon, and the crystal clarity of the winter air, and the vastness of open spaces, and the light fragrances that go fleeting by, and the continual motion of the heaven's orbit, and varying weather and phases of the moon. Sky is all these things - change and motion yet continuance and the same, transparency and clearness yet infinite wonder. None of these fully or exactly describe it, but that which is seen by viewing them all there together despite their differences is what Heidegger means by sky. We may call it a heady aspect rather than a heart or gut felt aspect of earth, but it is basically the mysterious wonder that arises in a combination of the passing of time (motion) and yet the infinite endurance that come together in the sky.

The ethereal quality of sky is evident in the Being of non-physical things, but what of the most mundane physical beings - a rock or a pile of manure? Even in these things, if they are seen in their Being, sky must be present (though of course we can be concerned with them in ways that ignore this aspect). The sky is present in these solid and mundane things in several ways. First, as gestalt theory in psychology and relativity theory in physics have shown, the rock has the qualities it does only within the horizon of its environment. The open space of the sky is interrupted by the massiveness of the rock, and it is this interruption of the open space that gives the rock its massive, solid, earthy Being. Further, sky is present when we behold the rock in its awe inspiring age. The countless risings and settings of the sun that the rock silently beheld, the countless rains that helped mold its shape, the stars that will still be there to watch this rock

long after all else is gone. In all these ways the sky is gathered in the very Being of the rock.

When approaching any thing in a thoughtful way as we have done with the rock, we can find sky present in its Being. And again to assume that this is a mere subjective or poetic input is to prejudice our understanding of Being by a narrow analytic approach, rather than letting the thing in its entirety come forth.

(3) The Divinities

Third of the four are the divinities. The divinities play an important role in Being, as attested by the emphasis God has received in traditional philosophy. Divinities speak of the infinite, the eternal, the unknowable powers, the inexplicable creation and beginning, and the transcendent meaning of all things. Heidegger speaks of the divinities as messengers of the godhead which sometimes shows itself and sometimes remains hidden. If we understand the godhead as the All or the Whole, the divinities speak toward it in the Being of every thing. Just as in every action I perform, the "whole me" is somehow present (though sometimes in a hidden fashion but other times showing itself with a flash of startling brightness) the divinities are the aspect of the Being of things that allows Being itself (the All) to be present.¹

Further, the divinities remind us of Plato's Ideas, and in a way they have the same meaning. However, because of the problems of thinking the Ideas as separate existences we must be careful to distinguish

¹By 'the All' and 'the whole me' I do not mean the sum of everything, but rather an encompassing or predominant significance.

divinities from them. As we have noted earlier, the four are not separate existences themselves; strictly speaking they are not, for Being itself only occurs as the gathered mirroring interplay of them. Thus something is because it speaks of meanings and significances beyond itself (divinities) but divinities are not things themselves, not the Forms of individual things participating in them. In the analogy of myself and my actions, there are not two separate entities of whom I am and what I do, for I am my actions, behaviors and intentions. But though I am not other than my actions, I am more than any particular one of them, or even the sum of them. I am the style or harmony that permeates and ties together everything I do, and thus my action can tell of who I am only by speaking beyond itself, announcing that it comes from some context of a set of motivations, desires, view of things and interpretations. In short, we can say that my actions have the Being they do specifically because they are able to transcend their own (immediate) Being. It is in this way that divinities are to be understood - they are beyond the immediate and concrete Being of things, yet not completely other than them. The divinities are transcendent, but insofar as they are gathered in whatever is, they are not separate or outside that in which they are present. However, the divinities remain greater than that in which they are gathered. As a pantheist says God is in everything yet does not reduce God to any individual thing in which It is, the divinities for Heidegger are in everything yet remain greater than that which they are in. In this paradoxical way of being present in things (i.e., being present as transcendent) divinities contribute in making the Being of things what it is. In its

Being a thing is always more than what it is, and there is always a meaning and significance over and beyond the immediate nominalist definition because the divinities are gathered in the Being of all things.

(4) Mortals

Finally we turn to the last of the four: mortals. By mortals Heidegger is obviously referring to man, and his special role in Being. Being mortal does not simply mean that man will die, it means he is aware of his own death as an inescapable occurrence. The awareness of death is an important contribution to Being for several reasons. First the awareness of death means being ahead of oneself: I am not yet dead, but since I am aware of it my current Being is what it is by virtue of its future. In this manner of being ahead of oneself mortals are able to preserve the future in the present, which is necessary for the abiding presence of Being. If the future were not so foreshadowed in the present, the world would be disconnected moments, we could not even say a series of moments for there would be absolutely no connection between them. Thus nothing could stand forth in an abiding presence, i.e., nothing could be.

Mortality plays a further and more direct role in the Being of things in so far as it speaks of finitude and its opposite, infinitude. In the awareness of my death I am at the same time aware of what is beyond my limits, and as Heidegger says:

Death is the shrine of Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. As the shrine of Nothing death harbors within itself the presencing of Being. As the shrine

of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being.¹

In other words, it is in the face of Nothingness, or within the horizon of Nothingness, that whatever is can emerge or be present. As we saw in the first chapter, Nothing plays an important role in the questioning of Being. There we raised the question "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" in order to gain a sense of the meaning of Being by holding the things of the world over the abyss of non Being.

"Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible for our human existence."² It is an undefinable realm, beyond whatever is, that Nothing can serve to first bring Being to light. "Man's Da-sein can only relate to what-is by projecting into Nothing. Going beyond what-is is the essence of Da-sein."³ By being aware of death man transcends what-is, including himself, and confronts non being, and therefore through man's mortality things stand forth against the horizon of Nothingness and into the abiding light of Being.

In Being and Time Heidegger entered a discussion of death in an attempt to understand Dasein in its completeness. Being capable of death means being limited, and insofar as all things have limits, i.e., can be discriminated in some way, mortals (and the horizon of negation and Nothingness) are present. Nothingness is the withdrawal of the

¹Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 178-9. Since Nothing can presence we must paradoxically say that it is. However, we must understand that its mode of presencing is not that of a thing's, but rather one, as we shall see, that first makes the presencing of things possible.

²"What is Metaphysics?" p. 340.

³Ibid., p. 348.

slipping away of whatever is, it is the gap or void that remains when all the meaning and significance of the presencing of Being withdraws. In the face of our death, when we truly confront ("our own") non being, the meaningless of Nothing stands before us. Only in this way can the world then stand in the light of its Being and have the solidity of meaning and significance and abiding presence. In the face of God and the Kingdom of Heaven this world is imperfect, fleeting, meaningless, and mere appearance (Maya), but in the face of Nothing this world can once again come forth with the full strength and reality of Being.

Nothing ceases to be the vague opposite of what-is: it now reveals itself as integral to the Being of what-is.

"Pure Being and pure Nothing are thus one and the same." This proposition of Hegel's ("The Science of Logic," I WWII p. 74) is correct: Being and Nothing hang together, but not because the two things - from the point of view of the Hegelian concept of thought - are one in their indefiniteness and immediateness, but because Being itself is finite in essence and is only revealed in the Transcendence of Da-sein as projected into Nothing.¹

It is in mortals' awareness of their finitude that they are aware of the unlimited and undifferentiated void of Nothing, and it is this gathered tension of finite and infinite, limit and continuity, and Being and Nothing that Heidegger has in mind when he speaks of mortals.

(5) Being as the gathered Fourfold

We therefore see that rather than precluding certain areas of Being with his notion of the fourfold, Heidegger has attempted to give a broad enough understanding of the meaning of Being that (for the first time) does not limit our conception of what it is to Be to certain

¹Ibid., p. 346.

areas of things or ways of viewing things. Previous conceptions of Being (eternal Idea, formed matter, extension, individual or monad, spatio-temporal entity) are all too narrow in a double sense. First they refuse to grant Being to various realms of things we encounter or might encounter, and second they are a subjective limitation of individual things insofar as they limit them in their Being. What allows something to Be is that it is both unique and yet common to its surroundings: if not unique it would "blend" into something else and thus not Be, and if it had nothing in common it would not be in an horizon or context, which is impossible.

Further, traditional theories explained Being in terms of a thing itself - what it was to Be was to possess a certain existing trait. This is to be ignorant of Heidegger's ontological difference: the difference between Being and beings. In a quest for Being to give an explanation in terms of another being (Idea, matter, extension, etc.) is really just avoiding the question of what it means to Be. We have merely given ourselves another being and we still do not know what it means to say that this being is, and is not nothing.

Has Heidegger himself fallen into the trap of reducing Being to a being? We have tried to indicate that each of the four are not things, they are merely moments of the interplay which first grants Being to things. Even by mortals we are not designating a thing, for as we noted, we are referring to the gathered tension between Being and Nothing that is present in the awareness of death, but which is really a part of the Being of all things. Further, it must be remembered that by the fourfold Heidegger means the unity of the mirrored interplay of

the four, which is something different from any one of them, or the sum of them. "By a primal oneness the four-earth and sky, divinities and mortals - belong together in one."¹ It is this gathered interplay of four-in-one that Heidegger understands as the meaning of Being, and this is not a thing. Thus though we discussed the four separately, and showed how each one is in some way present in the Being of things, the truth about Being is not the presence of one or the other of them, but rather the fact of the occurring process of the interplay of the four into a gathered unity, "This manifold-simple gathering is the jug's presencing."²

With this notion of the unified Fourfold, Heidegger's quest for the meaning of Being as presencing or Being-there has reached a culmination. Thus rather than an attempt at fanciful poetry, the elaboration of the fourfold is a serious attempt to rise out of the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics, and give a viable understanding of what the Being of things means. To the charge of arbitrariness, and a demand for justification, Heidegger responds:

But it never occurs to anyone to ask whence Plato had a directive to think of Being as idea, or whence Kant had the directive to think of Being as the transcendental character of objectness, as position (being posited).... I can provide no credentials for what I have said.... Everything here is the path of a responding that examines as it listens. Any path always risks going astray, leading astray.³

¹Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 149.

²Ibid., p. 174.

³Ibid., p. 185-6.

It is important to note that the notion of the fourfold addresses itself to Being both as essence and as existence. A thing is because the fourfold is present, and it is what it is because the four are gathered in the specific way in which they are. Thus when Heidegger says the task of thinking is to think Being, he is not calling for a mystical transcendence, or an instantaneous beholding of a mere 'that-it-is'. To think that-it-is means to think Being, which means to preserve the four as they are gathered. Heidegger calls this preserving a dwelling:

To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving.¹

Thus thinking Being is a dwelling, which is a difficult process of contemplation and meditation. Thinking is the taking to heart which we have discussed in the second chapter. It is not something tacked on to Being, but is rather necessary to Being itself. As he says at this stage:

Staying with things is the only way in which the fourfold stay within the fourfold is accomplished at any time in simple unity. Dwelling preserves the fourfold by bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things. But things themselves secure the fourfold only when they themselves as things are let be in their presencing.²

To clarify this we must modify something we have been saying up until this point. Rather than calling the fourfold Being, Heidegger

¹Ibid., p. 149.

²Ibid., p. 151.

calls it world: "This appropriateing mirror-play of the simple one-fold of earth and sky divinities and mortals we call world."¹ However, Heidegger goes on to say: "Whatever becomes a thing occurs out of the ringing of the world's mirror play."² In other words, the unity of the fourfold is called world because it refers specifically to the Being of things, it is what allows things to Be things. But, as we saw earlier, Being is Being-in-the-world, and thus the fourfold, or world, needs thinking man to preserve it, to let it Be. In thinking man dwells, and dwelling is a preserving of the fourfold (including himself as mortal) and thus a preserving of Being. "Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things."³

Dwelling does not mean merely living in a close proximity, it means belonging to, being part of, being involved with. It is thus the Being of dwelling that now becomes crucial for Heidegger in his quest for the meaning of Being, for the fourfold gave us world, but world needs dwelling man to realize itself and Be. At times Heidegger speaks of being involved with a topology of Being, because he is concerned with the area of meeting between man and world, i.e., where and how they dwell together. This meeting is called Appropriation (Ereignis), and our task now becomes an understanding of Being as Appropriation.

¹Ibid., p. 179.

²Ibid., p. 183.

³Ibid., p. 151.

(6) Appropriation

The thinking of Being as Appropriation is the culmination of the ideas of Dasein and logos that took form earlier in his career. It is an attempt to get away from the thinking of Being of beings (presencing) and think Being qua Being (that which enables presencing). Because of the connotations 'Being' has from some of his earlier concerns and from the works of other philosophers, he tries to avoid the word - sometimes writing it with crosses through it, sometimes writing it as the old English 'Beon', but most often by referring to it simply as Appropriation. As he summarizes it in answer to a question from Joan Stambaugh and J. Glenn Gray:

"Being itself" means: The Appropriation can no longer be thought as "Being" in terms of presence. "Appropriation" no longer names another manner and epoch of "Being". "Being" thought without regard to beings (i.e., always only in terms of, and with respect to, them) means at the same time: no longer thought as "Being" (presence).¹

This concern with Appropriation rather than Being as presencing is one way of viewing the celebrated reversal which metaphysical interpreters consider to be a turn from subjectivity to objectivity. The turn is from a questioning of Beings of beings (i.e., da-sein, being-there, presencing) to a questioning of Being qua Being (Appropriation). We must note that though these two concerns are different they can not be fully separated:

But Appropriation is different in nature because it is richer than any conceivable definition of Being. Being, however, in respect of its essential origin can be thought in terms of Appropriation.²

¹The End of Philosophy, p. xiii.

²On the Way to Language, footnote, p. 129.

And as he says elsewhere: "Being comes to language as the Being of beings."¹ Therefore, Heidegger is not abandoning the notion of Being as presencing, he is merely refocusing his attention. For as he said: "As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws"² and now it is time to recall Being itself, i.e., that which grants Being as presencing and thereby grants all that is.

"Appropriation" is a translation of the German word "Ereignis" the dictionary translation of which is "event or occurrence." But Heidegger uses it in a special sense arising out of its etymological roots. Er-eignen speaks of eigen, own, and the sense of Ereignis is an unfolding into one's own, a coming to where one belongs. This is the sense that is attempted to be conveyed by "Appropriation", and it is now our task to show that coming into one's own for man and Being means belonging-together (or dwelling as we called it above) with each other - man as a preserver and Being as the presencing of what is present. Though this will be the ultimate significance that Appropriation will have for us the path to this point must meander for a while. The basic meaning of Appropriation is the identity of belonging together that first gives rise to "independent things" which are dependent on each other to Be what they are. Heidegger points out that in order to think this belonging together we must recognize both identity and difference: identity at their mutual source of meeting and yet difference in each coming into its own as what it is. Our task is to understand

¹Early Greek Thinking, p. 22. Note that this was written in 1946 before the terminology of Appropriation was formulated, but the first "Being" must be understood as Appropriation and the second one as presencing.

²Ibid., p. 26.

this sense of belonging together, and to do that we start with the Appropriation of time and Being and then turn to Appropriation of man and Being (where the significance of thinking and language will become crucial).

In On Time and Being the path that leads to a thinking of Appropriation arises from the questioning of Being as presencing. Being in this sense means a coming into the open, an unconcealing. But, as we saw in Being and Time, this requires a free space or stage, i.e., the "there", in which to occur. In so far as in the second half of Being and Time temporality was shown to be the Being of Dasein,¹ temporality is shown to lie at the root of this free space. As developed in On Time and Being, temporality is revealed as the unified realm of past, present and future which provides the arena that first allows things to have an enduring presence:

Time-space now is the name for the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and primarily provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold.²

To clarify this idea we must note that the metaphor of a stage or arena is not really accurate for time is not a thing like a container. Neither time nor Being are things, and thus we can not view one as containing, or even causing, the other. Being is the presencing of what is present, and time is the interplay of the three ecstases that

¹Being and Time, p. 277. "But the primordial ontological basis for Dasein's existentiality is temporality."

²On Time and Being, p. 14.

turns a momentary now in which nothing could have the abiding presence of Being, into an extended open realm which first enables things to Be.

From this point it must be asked how it is that time and Being belong together if time is neither a container for Being nor a cause of it. How is it that time arises as a unified extending that enables things to presence? The answer to this lies in Appropriation:

In the sending of the destiny of Being, in the extending of time, there becomes manifest a dedication, a delivering over into what is their own, namely of Being as presence and of time as the realm of the open. What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together, we shall call: Ereignis, the event of Appropriation.¹

Though it sounds strange to talk of allowing or enabling Being, this is just the way Heidegger views the situation. Appropriation as the belonging together of time and Being first makes possible the coming to pass of the presencing of what is. Appropriation itself is understood as a possibility: the possibility of belonging together, and without this gift of belonging together none of the "components" could come into their own. We, therefore, say that it is Appropriation which appropriates time and Being to each other and in so doing allows or enables things to Be.

However, insofar as Appropriation grants Being and not the other way around, it is difficult to know how to approach it. We can not even call an "it" for "it" is not something that is.

Appropriation neither is, nor is Appropriation there. To say one or to say the other is equally a distortion of the matter, just as

¹Ibid., p. 19.

if we wanted to derive the source from the river.¹

Therefore, whatever is said about Appropriation in the mode of an assertive statement can not be accepted as completely accurate. However, we can give ideas of how to think Appropriation, though this can never be a representational thought that specifically answers the question What is Appropriation? (A question that Heidegger considers misguided and inappropriate.)

In Identity and Difference the path to Appropriation is through the belonging together of thinking and Being:

Now it becomes clear that Being belongs with thinking to an identity whose active essence stems from that letting belong together which we call the Appropriation. The essence of identity is a property of the event of Appropriation.²

In other words, Appropriation can be seen through the ability of thinking and Being to belong to each other. As such it is the mutual vibrating of thinking and Being, and this belonging together must be understood on its own terms as more primary than the independent Being of either of the components:

We stubbornly misunderstood this prevailing belonging together of man and Being as long as we represent everything only in categories and mediations, be it with or without dialectic. Then we always find only connections that are established either in terms of Being or in terms of man, and that present the belonging together of man and Being as an intertwining.³

¹Ibid., p. 24.

²Identity and Difference, p. 39.

³Ibid. p. 32.

Why must Appropriation be more fundamental than the "components" it holds together? The answer to this lies in the fact that neither one can Be apart from the other, and thus the source of their belonging together must be prior to the Being of any one of them. That which grants their belonging together, i.e., that which enables consciousness to reach out to an object and an object to come forth and be present for a consciousness, must be more fundamental than either one. In Heidegger's terms:

Thought is, more simply, thought of Being. The genitive has two meanings. Thought is of Being, insofar as thought, eventuated by Being, belongs to Being. Thought is at the same time thought of Being insofar as thought listens to, heeds, Being.¹

In other words, Being, as presencing, can only occur if that which is present is maintained in its Being by a taking to heart which lets lie; and thinking, as a taking to heart which lets lie, must (as we saw earlier) be understood as a unique kind of perception or receptivity that preserves but certainly does not create. Thus each needs the other, and the possibility of this mutual belonging together must be the most fundamental.

We now see: what lets the two matters belong together, what brings the two into their own and even more, maintains and holds them in their belonging together ... is Appropriation. The matter at stake is not a relation retroactively superimposed on Being and time. The matter at stake first appropriates Being and time into their own in virtue of their relation....²

¹"Letter on Humanism", p. 149.

²On Time and Being, p. 19.

To elaborate further this identity of thinking and Being we turn to "Letter on Humanism".

The standing in the clearing of Being I call the ex-sistence of man. Only man has this way to be. Ex-sistence, so understood, is not only the basis of the possibility of reason, ratio, but ex-sistence is that, wherein the essence of man preserves the source that determines him.¹

And he goes on to say:

Being clears itself for man in ecstatic projection. But this projection does not create Being. Moreover, the projection is essentially a matter of being cast. What projects in the project is not man, but Being itself, which determines man to the ex-sistence which is the essence of Dasein. This destiny is realized in the clearing of Being.²

What emerges here is that Being needs man to be preserved, but it itself is what enables man to be a preserver (i.e., ex-sist). Man is the being whose Being entails an involvement with Being itself - man's Being is to stand in the clearing of Being.

Thus what makes man unique is that he is ecstatic, in the ordinary sense of being beyond himself. It is as a thinking being, thought in the sense of taking to heart and letting what is stand in its Being rather than in logical or re-presenting thinking,³ that man ex-sists. Heidegger states that as such (i.e., ex-sisting) man stands in the

¹"Letter on Humanism", p. 154.

²Ibid., p. 163.

³We hyphenate 're-presenting' to emphasize the traditional mode of thought which is conceived as somehow mirroring or re-producing the external world and being closed upon its own presenting of the world.

clearing of Being, and this clearing of Being must be seen as the open or free-space in which Being as presencing can occur. As such man is not an entity outside this realm, that somehow leaps into it; rather in his Being man belongs to it for it is what grants him the Being which he is. The clearing of Being is the meeting of man and Being, and without it nothing could ever manifest itself. Further, since man is merely a "component" of this clearing and does not create it, we must see something else, namely Appropriation, as that which grants it, and thereby provides for the belonging together of man and Being. In so doing Appropriation first makes possible man as ex-sistent and Being as presence.

It may be asked why we must speak of Appropriation as granting the belonging together of man and Being, when it seems that they belong together by their own nature. To answer this we must see that both man and Being are historical, and thus the nature of their belonging together varies historically. But no matter how it varies they must be Appropriated to each other in some way. Appropriation is this atemporal possibility of being appropriated to each other. It is the granting that somehow has enabled the "things" which need each other to belong together. It is not only the granting of the belonging together of thinking and Being, but also of time and Being, and even the four of the fourfold. In each case we can see and analyze the components separately, but they can come into their own only as a result of a fundamental belonging together. Since this belonging together is prior to the components it can not find its source in either one of them, and we must understand its occurrence strictly on its own terms. Time, the

staying presence of Being gathered earth and sky, divinities and mortals, and man all arise as a gift of being appropriated to each other; and the historical unfolding of their interrelated destinies could not occur without the original Appropriation which first allows them to belong together and thus come into their own.

Thus Being as Appropriation becomes an Absolute outside the temporality that was originally exposed as the fundamental ground, and outside the presencing disclosure of Being. But the notion of an Absolute seems so contrary to the development of historicity and hermeneutics for which Heidegger is so well known that we must examine it further.

We must first note that this Absolute (Appropriation) is not something that can be known or represented in thought. Nor is it a God's viewpoint on what is, that our thinking might hold above it as an ideal. In short, it is neither a thing (such as a Platonic Idea), a viewpoint on things or underlying (or rather overriding) Truth of things (as Hegel's Absolute), nor an eternal and necessary structure of things (as the categories of Kant or eidetic laws of Husserl). It is simply the awe-inspiring, yet undeniable fact, that man, time and Being have been given to each other. Appropriation is not only the answer to why there are beings rather than Nothing, but the giving of the possibility that we can raise the question altogether. It takes various forms throughout history, but its fundamental truth, its originary granting of the possibility of an historical unfolding, always remains. We may speak of broad epochs of Being, such as the Greeks, the Middle Ages, the

Renaissance, the scientific and the technological,¹ in which the presencing of things, i.e., the way the fourfold is stayed or gathered, takes a predominant style or form. However, it is only because of Appropriation that the fourfold can gather itself in things at all, and, therefore, that anything can Be.

As the epochs of Being vary, and with them the forms of Appropriation, so too within a single epoch can Being vary when we are concerned with different sorts of beings. We have elaborated the Being of things as the gathered fourfold, and thus man is appropriated to things as a preserver of the fourfold. However, this is only the relatedness for authentic or thoughtful man, and, as we have seen inauthenticity is more predominant and just as "natural" as authenticity. Thus for the most part man is not appropriated to things as a preserver of their fourfold Being - he takes their Being for granted and is concerned solely with the place of things within his projects. However, this too is only possible because of an original Appropriation, for insofar as we take the Being of things for granted, that Being must present itself, and thus be preserved. Further, since the entities are suited to take a place within man's projects, though they do not present themselves with the thoughtful Being of the gathered fourfold, they do manifest themselves in their own way, i.e., with the practical Being of usefulness. Things are only a part of whatever is, and preserving the fourfold is only one way man is appropriated to Being. As Heidegger says

¹I distinguish the cosmic view of early scientific exploration, from the human centered view of domination, control and manipulation of today's technological age.

at the close of the essay "The Thing":

But things are also compliant and modest
in number, compared with countless objects
everywhere of equal value, compared with
the measureless mass of men as living
beings.¹

Entities other than things include people, equipment, and works of art. The Being of these entities is different from that of things, and thus man must be appropriated to them differently. The notions of man as a thoughtful preserver, of Being as the presencing of that which is present, and the mutual need of one for the other, do not vary, but what it means to preserve and to Be does. Just as in Being and Time Care took various forms such as concern with the ready-to-hand and solicitude with other humans, the preserving function of man and the Being of entities takes various forms. To understand this further we turn to the other types of entities, and see how Appropriation lets them belong together with man.

Though Heidegger does not speak much of the belonging together of man to the Being of other humans, he does speak of the belonging to our own Being. This of course was the specific task of Being and Time, but it is also an issue in all his other works. We have seen the Being of man as mortal, transcending himself, and ex-sisting in Being, and Caring. Man's relatedness to his Being is his awareness and acknowledgement of his death and finitude, and his taking to heart the world that affects him in his own Being. In short, man is appropriated to his own Being by being aware of, and thus preserving, his role in the

¹Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 182.

presencing of whatever is. Thus man is appropriated to other humans insofar as he can recognize them as special entities, who like himself are not mere things or tools, but rather stand in the light of Being. To preserve the Being of another person is not to stay the fourfold in him, but to preserve him in his own way of Being. However, it is again Appropriation itself that grants the possibility of man Being in a way that he can preserve and let what-is Be what it is in its Being, in this case let another human Be human.

As for equipment, the most notable characteristic of the Being is its usefulness. That is, equipment presents itself specifically as an aid to accomplish a task. This usefulness can be further expressed as reliability, insofar as the equipment silently serves its task (i.e., is equipment) as long as it functions well. When it breaks, or in some other way no longer performs as it is supposed to, it loses its Being as equipment and becomes a mere thing in our way. This reliability of equipment can be seen as giving equipment a Being characterized totally in the service of something else; the equipment itself remains invisible as it is transcended to the end in whose service it gains its Being. "The more handy a piece of equipment is, the more inconspicuous it remains,..."¹

Man is appropriated to the Being of equipment by being a project oriented being, and being able to use that which is given to him to serve in bringing about the future. In other words, because man is a being who is ahead of himself and has possibilities (which are

¹Ibid., p. 65.

possibilities of the world), he can have equipment to serve as a bridge from the present to the future state of affairs. However, man could not be project oriented nor have equipment if Being did not lend itself to man in the way it does. Being's future possibilities are foreshadowed in its present, but certain conditions or changes have to be met for the possibilities to be actualized. Because man in his Being stands in the light of Being he is open to these possibilities and the conditions needed to be satisfied. It is for this reason that he can be goal directed and manipulate present things strictly in satisfaction of conditions needed for the actualization of possibilities. Man does not force the world into the mode of equipment, but rather because man and world are appropriated to each other there is equipment and project oriented man. Once again we see that from Appropriation man and Being are cast into each other's domain; man as a preserver of Being and Being as a maker of man in his ex-sistence. Arising out of Appropriation each comes into its own thanks to the other.

Finally, we look at the Being of a work of art. A work of art's Being consists in its presenting or bringing forth something else. Work enables something to emerge in its Being in a way which would not otherwise occur.

The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this deconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the art work, the truth of what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work.¹

¹Ibid., p. 39.

Unlike equipment, however, work does not disappear in the service of something else. A work is not meant as a mere tool that serves to merely re-present something other than itself. Rather that which is brought forth in a work can only emerge in its Being through or in the work, and to do this the work must continually present itself as work. An art work about an object is not the same as the object presenting itself in and by itself; the work opens it up in a way that the object does not do by itself. Thus the work must continually and explicitly announce itself as work in order not to turn into a mere thing isolated from the world it is meant to open to us or a mere tool that brings something about but does not open it up in its Being, i.e., let truth happen. Further, as we shall see with language, the way something is opened up affects what is opened up, i.e., the Being of what is opened up stands forth in a way unique to the Being of the opening. Thus to understand what is opened up we must maintain an awareness of the way it is set forth.

In a work, by contrast, this fact, that it is as a work, is just what is unusual.... The more essentially the work opens itself, the more luminous becomes the uniqueness of the fact that it is rather than is not.¹

In order to preserve the Being of the work, man must be capable of transcending the work's thingly character to stand in the truth it is opening up. To do this he must maintain the announcement of the work as work, and this consists in maintaining the fact that it has been created. "But in contrast to all other modes of production, the

¹Ibid., p. 65.

work is distinguished by being created so that its createdness is part of the created work."¹ This is not a matter of recognizing who the artist is, or what his reputation is, it is rather recognizing that this is an opening up of the world, i.e., a created work. Equipment is of course also created or produced, but its createdness is not part of its Being, because its Being consists in withdrawing itself and not in announcing itself.

We can therefore say that man is related to the Being of work in a twofold sense: in recalling its Being as created he thereby transcends the thingly character of the work into the openness of man and Being of work, work can first Be as a bringing into nearness that which is or has been distant, and man can first Be as a dweller and unfold of that which is or has been distant. Neither the Being of the work nor man is primary, they need each other, and they can both Be because they are appropriated to each other, i.e., Appropriation granted them the possibility to dwell together.

At this point we draw to a close our analysis of how Heidegger views Being in his last phase. We have taken a round about route going from the Being of things to Being as Appropriation and then back to the Being of entities other than things. In this way we hoped to expose the meaning of Being, both in terms of the Being of what-is (presencing) and in terms of that which first grants this Being. Though they can be looked at separately they really belong together:

¹Ibid., p. 64.

Appropriation can only be understood as a granting of the possibility of Being (presencing) and Being (presencing) can only be understood with regard to the original gift of the belonging together of time, Being and man.

We must now return to language, for in the light of Appropriation the Being of man emerged as a preserver, and we have earlier seen language's crucial role in this. In Being and Time we saw Dasein's Being characterized essentially by Discourse. In "Letter on Humanism" we saw language called the house of Being, and a house must be understood as something that shelters and preserves. In the works on the Greeks we saw the Being of legein and noein as a gathering which preserves the primordial gathering of logos. Therefore, language emerges as essential to the notion of preservation, and thereby to the notion of Being (presencing) and thus, in short, to Appropriation. Our task now is to examine the work on language Heidegger did in his last phase, and see how it stands with what has been put forth in this section.

IV. The Being of Language: The Language of Being

We do not wish to assault language in order to force it into the grip of ideas already fixed beforehand. We do not wish to reduce the nature of language to a concept, so that this concept may provide a generally useful view of language that will lay to rest all further notions about it. To discuss language, to place it, means to bring to its place of being not so much language as ourselves: our own gathering into the appropriation.¹

We are concerned with language strictly in terms of its Being. It cannot be an object among others for us to analyze in terms of properties, uses, and underlying structures. "...the point is to think of the essence of language in its correspondence to Being, and, what is more, as this very correspondence, i.e., the dwelling of man's essence."² Therefore, we cannot take language as something already given, i.e., present-at-hand, we must first let it come to us in its own unique Being. This means that rather than trying to step back from language in order to examine it, we must enter into an experience with it. "To undergo an experience with language, then, means to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering into and submitting to it."³

To enter into an experience with language means to let language announce itself in its Being. "In experiences which we undergo with

¹Poetry, Language, Thought p. 190.

²"Letter on Humanism" p. 160.

³Heidegger On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 57.

language, language itself brings itself to language."¹ This is quite different from the scientific information gathering about language with which the current discipline of linguistics is concerned. For language itself to come forth we do not want to explain it in terms of something else: "Instead of explaining language in terms of one thing or another, and thus running away from it, the way to language intends to let language be experienced as language."²

The first step in letting language be experienced is to put aside our preconceived notions about it. There are three common understandings of language that we must avoid: 1) language is primarily an activity or tool of man, 2) it is an externalization of an internal feeling or idea, and 3) it serves to re-present objects of the world. These notions about language presuppose that it has the Being of equipment, that it is used by man in order to represent or stand for something other than itself. Though in a sense this view is correct, and is certainly useful for various disciplines, it does not permit a complete understanding of language in its Being.

We still give too little consideration, however, to the singular role of these correct ideas about language. They hold sway, as if unshakable, over the whole field of the varied scientific perspectives on language. They have their roots in an ancient tradition. Yet they ignore completely the oldest natural cast of language. Thus, despite their antiquity and despite their comprehensibility, they never bring us to language as language.³

¹Ibid. p. 59.

²Ibid. p. 119.

³Ibid. p. 193.

But how are we to enter into this experience with language? Until we can actually demonstrate a new approach to language, and show what is learned from this, our claim of the limitations of other studies of language is empty rhetoric. We constantly use language as a tool, and it becomes difficult to still this use of it, but, unless we do, no new understanding of language can be reached. When we try to describe language we use language itself, and are thereby using language as a tool, the very presupposition about the Being of language that we are trying to overcome. How can we quiet the attack of language as a tool so that we can openly experience the Being of language? At the very point when language fails us.

But when does language speak itself as language? Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we have in mind and, without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being.¹

When words fail us a curious thing is revealed, and by examining what happens, or rather what does not happen, the nature of language can stand out for the first time. Entering into an experience with language can only take place when we do not take it for granted and merely use it. The place where this can occur is just where our language fails us. At this limit of language we experience a demand

¹Ibid. p. 59.

to be named, a desired announcement, but the failure of the naming or announcing to occur. There is no announcement, no telling, merely a beckoning. But what beckons, and what happens when the beckoning is reversed into a speaking? In this mystery lies the Being of language.

The beckoning is fleeting and unclear; we cannot quite put a finger on it. Its nature might be made clearer by a comparison to the horizon in a theme-horizon configuration. The Being of an horizon is to stand back as a theme comes forth. However, when we scan a field and cannot find a theme we do not have an horizon either since theme and horizon are bound together in their Being. Rather than an horizon we have an undelineated lack. This is the sense we get when we cannot find the right words: we get a sense of a gap or a lack which we want to stabilize, in the same way as finding a theme stabilizes the withdrawing field into an horizon. We attempt to speak in a way that will hold down this beckoning mystery before it frustratingly slips away. We try to find words that let it echo through and come to stand - we know when words are inadequate to the beckoning but we of course cannot point out why, for then we would have found the adequate words.

Thus by going to where words fail us we see that the failure to find words is not an inability to match or correspond words to a pre-established (thematized) thought, for it is only in the words that the thought comes to ring through and become established and stabilized. It is a struggling to be born, to come out into the world, not the mere tacking on of a sign or label to something already there. There

are no items merely waiting around to be represented by the right word, rather language is what first allows things to come into their own and stand in their place. This coming into one's own and standing forth in the world is how we have understood the meaning of Being, and thus we must conclude that "It is in words and language that things first come into being and are,"¹ or as Heidegger puts it at this stage of his writings "...the word is what first brings that given thing, as the being that is, into this 'is'; ... the word is what holds the thing there and relates it and so to speak provides its maintenance with which to be a thing."²

No matter how we build up to this claim of the relation of language and Being, when it comes it still shocks us, and we are hard pressed to understand how Heidegger can seriously claim that it is in language that things first come to Be. Three questions immediately come to mind that Heidegger's approach to language seems to ignore: 1) certainly there was a beckoning prior to the words, how then can he say there is no Being of things prior to the words? 2) how could words, as things themselves, possibly bring things to Being, i.e., how can something that is be the source of the is itself? 3) if words are the source of Being, are we not back to a subjective grounding of Being in a human function?

¹Introduction to Metaphysics p. 11. Since this chapter is a quest for the fullness of language's Being, we will be concerned solely with authentic language.

²On the Way to Language p. 82.

There are answers to these objections, and though it will take some development to answer them in a way that is completely satisfactory, we briefly mention how Heidegger will approach them.

To the first we must remember that here Being means the presence of what is present, and that which is not (which beckons for announcement) is not mere nothingness - as we have seen the encounter with Nothing is as significant as the encounter with things which are. Words let things Be, but Heidegger does not have to maintain that words create ex nihilo; they are simply what let things presence, i.e., Be things.

As for the second objection, a word is not a thing among other things; considering it as such leaves us with the expression theory of language. In its Being a word is quite different from a thing: it is a being whose Being transcends its own presencing and grants presence to that which it announces. "If our thinking does justice to the matter, then we may never say of the word that it is, but rather that it gives ..."¹ Thus it is only insofar as it brings things to Be, and we cannot say that it is simply a thing itself which after the fact causes the Being of things.

Finally, to the charge of subjectivism we must come to an understanding of Heidegger's notion that it is not man but language which speaks. The relation of language, speaking, and human utterance is a complicated one, but at this point we can summarize it as follows:

¹Ibid. p. 88.

"Language needs human speaking, and yet it is not merely of the making or at the command of our speech activity."¹

To elaborate these points fully and thereby understand the relation of language to Being, we return to our original attempt to experience language, and examine what happens when the unsaid comes into language. "...language alone brings what is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time."² We experience language as an announcing, it goes beyond itself to show something other than itself. The announcing is guided and directed by the original beckoning, but in the announcement of language the withdrawing lack of beckoning suddenly halts and for the first time finds a place within the world. "This naming does not hand out titles, it does not apply terms, but it calls into the word. The naming calls. Calling brings closer what it calls."³ When the words are provided, that which is named is brought into the Open (the Nearness or Neighborhood) of the Appropriated belonging together of man and Being, and in so doing first allows things to Be.

Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming nominates being to their being from out of their being. Such saying is a projecting of the clearing, in which announcement is made of what it is⁴ that beings come into the Open as.

¹Ibid. p. 125.

²Poetry, Language, Thought p. 73.

³On the Way to Language p. 198.

⁴Poetry, Language, Thought p. 73.

In the second sentence of this quote an extremely important point is revealed. When Heidegger says "...naming nominates beings to their being from out of their being ..." he is referring to the process of coming into one's own which we previously saw to be the grant of Appropriation. Since this coming into one's own of a thing is now revealed as the gift of naming we are led to understand naming in the light of Appropriation. "The way to language belongs to Saying determined by Appropriation."¹ In this way we see that what escapes language is not mere nothingness, it is a being which has not come into its own, i.e., into its appropriated belonging together with man. Language does not create things, it provides the opportunity for them to presence as things. When the unsaid comes to language it comes from out of its own, it beckons language, and language provides the vehicle whereby it can first stay in the light of abiding presence. "Being, clearing itself, comes into language."² But we must once again attempt to focus on the nature of language to understand how we can say things first come to Be in language, yet Being comes to language itself.

One thing should have been made clear by now, and that is that the Being of language is an announcing, a letting something Be what it is. This Being of language Heidegger names Saying, as used in the quotes above and as etymologically derived from the Old Norse Saga

¹On the Way to Language p. 129.

²"Letter on Humanism" p. 179.

which means to show or make appear.¹ "The essential being of language is Saying as Showing."² Only when language Says something is it authentic language, otherwise it is mere chatter. Further, we must remember that Saying is not something tacked on to words or sentences; words and sentences can only be what they are if they Say something. Finally, we note that as uttered sounds may decay into mere chatter and no longer Say anything, silence, when properly employed, can Say a great deal (e.g., the silent stare of an angry parent) and thus must be considered as language.

The Being of language, rather than being understood merely in terms of sounds and sentence structures, may now be seen as lying in the ability to show, reveal, or bring forth something other than itself. This is why Heidegger says that language speaks (Says) rather than man. It is not man directly who can call forth the unsaid (though he is of course needed) but the power of language itself. This is evidenced in the everyday experience of when we are asked "Do you realize what you are saying?" and reflect upon all the consequences, shades of meaning, and implicit judgments that are entailed in what we just uttered. This ontic evidence indicates that ontologically the nature of language is to Say something, and that it is not our vocal cords, sentence structure, or any other human facet that is in complete control of this essential power of language. The power to Say belongs to language itself, and not exclusively to man.

¹On the Way to Language p. 93.

²Ibid. p. 123.

We must now examine how language brings forth things, i.e., Speaks. As we indicated, it does this by enabling the thing to stand in the light of Appropriation, i.e., by bringing it into the Open of the belonging together with man. The physicalist may stand before his class in a search for Being and ask "Does an animal the size of a skyscraper and able to fly faster than light have Being?" and expect an obvious "no" answer. But the correct answer is "now it does, though, of course, not physically." Through language this imaginary creature has been called forth and placed within a world before us. Even without being able to represent the thought of flying faster than light, the magical powers and strengths of this creature shine forth in their mysterious wonder. The significance of this power of naming will become clearer when we discuss poetry, but for now we have seen how language has granted Being to a thing by placing it in the light of Appropriation of which man is a part.

This Saying granting of Being may be understood in the case above, but it seems more difficult to understand for objects which actually do have physical existence, for they certainly seem to Be prior to language. However, we must remember that prior to language things do not disappear into a sheer void, but neither are they "there" standing forth in their own, in their Being. "Where there is no language, as in the being of stone, plant, and animal, there is also no openness of what is, and consequently no openness either of that which is not and of the empty."¹

¹Poetry, Language, Thought p. 73.

Only when we have a name for a thing can it be called forth in its uniqueness, and thereby stand out in its Being. A whole world of a new discipline opens up as we learn its language, be it the language of a philosopher or a scientist, and without the language the things of that world remain closed to us. Without any language there would not be any world. Yet there is a circularity in which we must see that only in the opening of the world does the full significance of the new language reveal itself. In this circular relation lies the Saying of language which by bringing together a world and a particular thing allows each to come into its own and Be for the first time. In other words, the Saying of language brings a world to stay in a thing, and only in this way can a thing Be a thing and a language Be a language. "In the naming, the things named are called into their thinging. Thinging, they unfold world, in which things abide and so are the abiding ones."¹

As we saw in the previous chapter, the bringing together of world in a thing is the gathering fourfold that grants a thing Being. Thus, the Saying of language which brings world and thing together must be the staying of the fourfold in a thing.

There arises the possibility of seeing how Saying, as the being of language, swings back into the presence of nearness. Quiet consideration makes possible an insight into how nearness and Saying, being of the persisting nature of language are the Same. Language, then, is

¹On the Way to Language p. 199.

not a mere human faculty. Its character belongs to the very character of the movement of the face-to-face encounter of the world's four regions.¹

Language lets the fourfold ring together in unity by staying it in a thing, and lets a thing be a thing by letting a world (the fourfold) shine through it. The Saying of language does not create this bridge between thing and world by its own whim. Language, as it were, stands in the rift (dif-ference, Unter-schieden) between thing and world where they come together, and thereby lets their belonging together stand forth into the open; not merely as a gap, but for the first time as a mutual harmony that lets each one Be by virtue of its harmonizing with the other. "Language speaks. Its speaking bids the dif-ference to come which expropriates world and things into the simple onefold of their intimacy."²

In other words, we can understand 'world' as a context or horizon and 'thing' as a theme, and language unites the two insofar as a word delineates a particular thing but arises out of the specific cultural context of the language we are speaking. Whether it is a scientific word that gathers the scientific world into the thing, named, or a poetic word that gathers the fourfold world into the thing, in each case language lets two "things" which need each other (i.e., world and thing) come into their own through their belonging together.

¹Ibid. p. 107.

²Ibid. p. 210.

When we deal with things in a thoughtful or poetic manner language gathers the fourfold into the thing, since a thoughtful or poetic language arises out of a world where the fourfold is still preserved. When we approach things in other ways, language is still an appropriating of thing and world, but instead of "world" explicitly referring to the four regions it more generally is seen as the context or field constituted by the discipline or way of approach. For example, naming a green leafy plant with a latin designation of genus and species gathers (appropriates) the plant with the world of the botanist. The plant can thereby first show its Being as a scientifically distinguished yet interrelated and placed form of vegetation with certain previously overlooked but now self evident characteristics (e.g., uses, best conditions for survival, reproductive capabilities, and its uniqueness from similar species). "Saying is the gathering that joins all appearance of the in itself manifold showing which everywhere lets all that is shown abide within itself."¹

Saying does not create the harmonizing unity of what is brought together, it merely lets this unity be manifest. It is Appropriation itself that first grants the belonging-together, and Saying moves this to its fruition.

The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning. It is what brings all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind. This owning which brings them there, and which moves Saying as Showing in its showing

¹Ibid. p. 127.

we call Appropriation. It yields the opening of the clearing in which present beings can persist and from which absent beings can depart while keeping their persistence in the withdrawal... That Appropriation, seen as it is shown by Saying, cannot be represented either as an occurrence or a happening - it can only be experienced as the abiding gift yielded by Saying.¹

As Showing, Saying, which consists in Appropriation, is the most proper mode of Appropriating. Appropriation is by way of Saying.²

In short then, to Be means to presence or show itself in some way or another, including the presence of withdrawal. As we have seen earlier for a thing to appear it must be both unique and yet common with respect to its context. The way this happens is for a thing to come forth in its own individuality, but within the gathered presence of a world. It is the primordial Saying which allows the belonging together of thing and world granted by Appropriation to come forth and announce itself. Until there is, for example, a poetic language nothing poetic can come forth and Be. It withdraws into the haze of Nothingness where one might get a fleeting call from it, but until the Saying which gathers the thing into the poetic world is possible it cannot stand in the light of Being.

So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.³

¹Ibid. p. 127.

²Ibid. p. 131.

³Stefen George "The Word" Quoted and studied by Heidegger in many places in On the Way to Language.

But what of man in all this? We have seen the Being of language as the Saying which arises out of Appropriation. We have seen that man plays an important role in Appropriation's grant of Being. Now we must ask specifically how man's speech is related to Appropriation's Saying.

As could be expected man's speaking is needed for the showing Saying of language, but man must be understood as a fulfiller and not as a creator or ground.

For language, after all, remains unmistakably bound up with human speaking. Certainly. But what kind of bond is it? On what grounds and in what way is it binding? Language needs human speaking, and yet it is not merely of the making or at the command of our speech activity.¹

As Saying gathers thing and world and thereby lets the thing come forth in its Being, man's speech must preserve this Saying. As we saw, Being as presence and man as preserver arise in a mutual belonging together from Appropriation. Therefore, Saying as the presencing of appropriated thing and world, must also be the binding together of Being ("worlded thing") and man (the needed preserver of world and thing). Man is capable of speaking insofar as he belongs to the primordial Saying, i.e., insofar as he is Appropriated to Being.

Saying that shows makes the way for language to reach human speaking. Saying is in need of being voiced in the word. But man is capable of speaking only insofar as he, belonging to Saying listens to Saying, so that in resaying it he may be able to say a word.²

¹On the Way to Language p. 125.

²Ibid. p. 134.

Thus man's language must be seen as a listening response to the primordial Saying of Appropriation, but one which is needed for the thing which is shown in the Saying to Be, and thus for Saying itself to Be. Already in Being and Time silence and listening were seen as essential parts of Discourse, and now we must reaffirm the essentiality of these to human speaking. But to what do we listen? If Saying itself needs human language to be fulfilled we cannot demand a direct listening to it, it cannot be heard apart from our speaking. What we must therefore listen to is our own language. Not to the mere words but to a silent Saying of our language. Only then can we ask whether our speaking has satisfied the beckoning of silent Being. Perhaps Merleau-Ponty explains this best:

Speech does not choose only one sign for one already defined signification, the way one searches for a hammer to drive in a nail or pincer to pull one out. It gropes around an intention to signify which has at its disposal no text to guide it, for it is just being written. And if we want to grasp speech in its most authentic operation in order to do it full justice, we must evoke all those words that could have come in its place that have been omitted; to feel the different way they would have impinged on and rattled the chain of language, to know at what point this particular speech was the only one possible if this signification was to come into the world...In brief, we should consider speech before it has been pronounced, against the ground of the silence which precedes it, which never ceases to accompany it, and without which it would say nothing.¹

¹M. Merleau-Ponty Prose of the World trans. by John O'Neill (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Press, 1973) p. 46.

In other words, it is only through some silent aspect of our own language that the silent primordial Saying, which beckons our speech, can be heard. After we listen to our speech we can ask whether it satisfies what was needed, and at times even recognize a lack in it, but apart from our own listening speaking there is nothing that we can hold up that allows us to merely reach into our aviary of words and find the corresponding one. It is therefore this silent aspect of our language that maintains the Saying of Appropriation, and we must examine it closer.

Everything depends upon bringing into language the truth of Being and letting thought penetrate this language. Perhaps then language requires far less precipitate utterance than correct silence.¹

Every language presences (gathers) the world differently. Language speaks, but in a way unique to itself. This is most obvious when we consider the different things that poetic and scientific languages can Say, but, as every translator painfully encounters, there is even a difficulty in making two languages as close as German and English (for example) Say the same thing. Every language has a history, both immediate in respect to current usages and overtones, and long range in terms of etymological developments and the spirit of the people who gave rise to and maintained the language. These histories are one of the factors that influence the silent Saying of our language, and since the language we speak Speaks in

¹"Letter on Humanism" p. 167.

a way unique to itself, every word and sentence of that language must be viewed in a similar way.

Projective saying is saying which, in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world. In such saying, the concepts of an historical people's nature, i.e., of its belonging to world history, are formed for that folk, before it.¹

A language establishes a world or context in which everything we say in that language is ordered or "controlled;" yet we must, of course, understand that a language is not something prior to or independent of the words and sentences of that language. Thus our history (i.e., the history of our language) is somehow contained in everything we say, and what we say is therefore in the service of our language rather than language being in our service.

An example of the way current usage affects the way a language speaks can be seen in the word "freak" of the American counter culture. Originally "freak" designated an abnormal or deformed person. When a natural conservatism developed a fear and revulsion of anything different or deformed, "freak" received a pejorative connotation. When the counter culture emerged with shocking hair styles and dress fashion they were called freaks by middle America, which naturally carried the pejorative sense of what they wanted to say about this new phenomenon. Then a curious thing occurred; the counter culture adopted the term themselves and used it to refer to their comrades. It no longer spoke negatively for those who were a part of the sub-

¹Poetry, Language, Thought p. 74.

culture. "A real freak" became an authentic person, one the marginal members of the culture admired and awed at. "Freaky" movies, songs, and experiences were all recommendations and not condemnations. The counter culture favored change and uniqueness, and thus it could readily adopt the word as one of praise.¹ In this transformation of the word the language speaks differently, Says something else, and it is not at our control to use the word the way we want. The language itself speaks, and we must listen to what it Says before we can use language to say what we want.

If we may talk here of playing games at all, it is not we who play with words, but the nature of language plays with us...It is as though man had to make an effort to live properly with language.²

Further, etymological connections to current uses of other words play an important role in what a language Says. For example, "astro-naut" is etymologically derived from "star-sailor" but because of the scientific usages of "astro" in such words as "astronomy," "astrophysics," "astrosphere," and even "astrology," the term "astro-naut" Speaks in a much more scientific way than the more adventurous "star-sailor." Therefore, what man Says, i.e., gathers and discloses, when uttering "astronaut" has a specific Being that is granted by the silent speaking of our own language, and which can therefore only be fully revealed when we listen to how language speaks.

¹It is interesting to note that this final transformation of the word ties it to the original etymology of the middle English "freking" which means whim or capricious conduct.

²"Letter on Humanism" p. 118.

The way in which the long range history of a language affects what it Says are harder for us to see since it has become so ingrained in the language. Yet it is important for us to see this in order to understand how human speech can only Speak by listening to the Saying of language. A prime example comes from Heidegger's work itself. We saw that one of the reasons he did not publish the complete version of Being and Time was the difficulty of making a new approach to Being understandable in the language available to him, i.e., the language of traditional metaphysics. Only by returning to etymologies could he show what the language was trying to Say, and contrast that to what it actually was Saying through its metaphysical history. The transformation of what a word Says from its original etymological source to its current sense reveals the historical Being of a language, and the variations of the world it gathers and opens up. The significance of what a language Says can only be seen in contrast with the way it originally Spoke, as is clearly evidenced by the analysis of Logos, legein, and noein in contrast to Logic, speaking, and thinking as commonly conceived.

The current language reflects its source and historical development the same way as anything present contains its past; not necessarily as something it still specifically is, but as the context in which what it now is must be seen as arising out of. An ex-convict is not the same as someone who was never arrested, and the significance of Logos as rational is much clearer when we consider the historical development of that word. We cannot ignore the etymology just because

the word no longer speaks as its etymology intended, rather it is for this very reason that we must consider it.

There is no such thing as a natural language of a human nature occurring of itself, without a destiny. All language is historical, even where man does not know history in the modern European sense.¹

In all these ways language speaks, and to understand this means to experience the nature of language or Saying as the bringing forth of things in their Being. Every utterance we make can only result from the listening to the Being of things that our language allows to come forth.

Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we are speaking ... We do not merely speak the language - we speak by way of it.... Language speaks by Saying, this is, by showing, What it says wells up from the formerly spoken and so far still unspoken Saying which pervades the design of language ... We accordingly listen to language in this way, that we let it say its Saying to us.²

In short then we have seen that Saying, as the fulfillment of Appropriation, lies at the source of the relation of language and Being. First we saw Saying gathering world and thing in their tension and letting them come forth. Then we came to understand

¹On the Way to Language p. 133.

²Ibid. p. 124.

Saying as the essence of language to which man has somehow been granted access. Man belongs to the Saying, he is able to listen to it, and respond to it in a fulfilling utterance of his own.

"This way-making (i.e., Appropriation) puts language (the essence of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the sounded word)."¹ In this way Saying has brought together man and things into the resulting light of Being. Things are because the Saying of language announces them in their gathered presence.

Saying is in no way the linguistic expression added to the phenomena after they have appeared - rather, all radiant appearance and all fading² away is grounded in the showing Saying.

Thus it is language that brings us to Appropriation, the source of Being as well as man. This is why Heidegger considers language the Being of man and the house of Being. In his Being man is Dasein, that is, he is ex-sistent, and this means belonging to Saying which gives him the gift of speaking.

Appropriation, in beholding human nature, makes mortals appropriate for that which avows itself from everywhere to man in Saying, which points toward the concealed. Man's the listener's, being made appropriate for Saying, has this distinguishing character, that it releases human nature into its own, but only in order that man as he who speaks, that is, he who says, may encounter and answer Saying, in virtue of what is his property.³

¹Ibid. p. 130.

²Ibid. p. 126.

³Ibid. p. 129.

This relation of man's speaking to the primordial Saying is one that must now be elaborated. We have seen that man's speaking first requires a listening and then a response. Human speech must arise out of the primordial Saying and let it speak. Since the primordial Saying has not yet reached voice it is silent, and we must clarify how the voiced speaking can be true to the silent call.

The encountering saying of mortals is answering. Every spoken word is already an answer: counter-saying, coming to the encounter, listening Saying. When mortals are made appropriate for Saying, human nature is released into that needfulness out of which man is used for bringing soundless Saying to the sound of language.¹

What is the nature of human speaking that it is needed for the fulfillment of Saying as Showing, yet is meant to maintain the Saying in itself?

As has been indicated, we must view our speech as more than just a sounding utterance. "What is spoken is never, and in no language, what is said."² Nor can it be viewed merely as a sounding utterance and a silent sense coupled together. The voiced sounding must in itself be determined by, and thus be a unity with, the silent aspects. "What is sayable receives its determination from what is not sayable."³ In other words, only by virtue of the unsaid can the said say what it says, and we therefore cannot consider them as two distinct components. In addition to the history of a language that

¹Ibid. p. 129.

²Poetry, Language, Thought p. 11.

³The End of Philosophy p. 78.

we discussed above, such things as context and the Being of the speaker affect the silence of our speech, and certainly these considerations cannot be seen as disjointed additions to what is said.

In "A Dialogue on Language" Heidegger tries to make this relation clear by calling the word a hint, which he distinguishes from a mere sign. A sign points to something other than itself, or represents that other by itself. Viewing language as a sign leads us back to the expression theory of language in which we think of the said and unsaid as two rather than one. A hint, on the other hand, is compared to a gesture, of which Heidegger says:

J: Thus you call hearing or gesture:
the gathering which originally unites
within itself what we bear to it and
what it bears to us.

I: However, with this formulation we
still run the risk that we understand
the gathering as a subsequent union..

J: ...instead of experiencing that
all bearing, in giving and encounter,
springs first and only from the
gathering.¹

Perhaps this difficult point can be made clearer by an analogy. The grandeur and excitement of an iceberg results from the fact that despite how big it is on top, we know that most of it remains unseen. Yet we can see its immensity in the visible part above the surface. Despite the fact that the major portion is not visible because it is below the surface, once we learn to understand icebergs, we can see the unseen portion overwhelmingly present (as an absence) in

¹ On the Way to Language p. 19.

the visible section. In fact, the foreboding grandeur of the iceberg is a result of the very fact that most of it is present as an absence. If the whole thing were above the surface it would certainly appear huge, but the fearful awesomeness that results from the mystery of its being mostly hidden would not be the same. Thus the experience of the full grandeur, fascination, and excitement (as well as the danger of deceiving us) can only be understood if we recognize that the invisible part is immediately present in the small section above the surface.

In the same way a word has the power it does because of a ringing silence sounded in the voiced word. "Only as man belongs within the peal of stillness are mortals able to speak in their own way in sounds."¹ Thus, human speaking must be seen as arising out of the silent primordial gathering Saying, and yet is needed for this Saying to show itself, just as the hidden part of an iceberg needs the top to make its hidden awesomeness visible. The only way this relation can occur is if human language continues to let the still depths of the thing's gathered Being resound through the word.

When we understand our language in this way we see that words are not isolated things which somehow cause things to Be. Words and the Being of things are not really separate, they both arise out of Saying, and are only maintained as long as they join together as Saying. The thing first rings forth in Being through the gathering

¹Ibid. p. 208.

Saying that lets it¹ presence as a thing, and the human word as a listening response to this Saying maintains the Saying and thereby maintains the Being of the thing as thing.

Language has been called "the house of Being." It is the keeper of being present, in that its coming to light remains entrusted to the appropriating show of Saying. Language is the house of Being because language, as Saying, is the mode of Appropriation.¹

We have now presented an ontological account of the Being of language as the Saying which grants both Being and man (as ex-sisting). We saw that an authentic speaking of man must also contain the silent reverberation of a listening. It is clear that for the most part our language is not, and cannot be, this language of Being. When concerned with information and calculation we are concerned with getting everything as explicitly delineated as possible. Further, through constant use our language necessarily becomes matter of fact, we take it for granted, and it can no longer speak towards-and-from Being.² However, when concerned with things in a thoughtful way, when we are concerned with things in their Being, then we have to avoid information language and "used up" expressions. In short, we

¹"The Way to Language" p. 135.

²This is not to deny that our everyday language has its own silent history that gathers its own world and is thus still tied to Being, but it remains oblivious to the world it gathers and is characterized in its Being as a forgetfulness of Being.

have to be what Heidegger calls poetical. This does not mean that all thinking must be reduced to poetry, but it does mean that all thinking must proceed within the poetical. "Poetry and thinking meet each other in one and the same only when, and only as long as, they remain distinctly in the distinctness of their nature."¹ To understand this, and thereby further elucidate the Being of language, we now seek out an understanding of the relation of poetry, language, and thinking.

By poetry Heidegger does not mean rhyming couplet or any other categorization by verse structure, but rather a specific mode of language. We can understand the different modes of language as a scale ranging from formal logic at one end to poetry at the other. While logic is precise and accurate, the poetic is rich yet vague, and therefore not suited for certain areas of information transference. But what is the nature of poetic language, and for what is it suited? The answer is of course for thinking Being, and this is what we must now explore.

"Poetry's spoken words shelter the poetic statement as that which by its essential nature remains unspoken."² In this way poetry characterizes authentic language in that its speaking is what it is by virtue of guarding the unspoken. Only insofar as the unspoken remains unspoken, yet is listened to as such, can the speaking

¹Poetry, Language, Thought p. 218.

²On the Way to Language p. 188.

of poetry take place. However, thinking too must take place with authentic language, and in order not to reduce thinking to poetry we must, as Heidegger indicated in the quote above, find their sameness (authentic language) in their differences.

But since like is only like insofar as difference allows, and since poetry and thinking are most purely alike in their care of the word, the two things are at the same time at opposite poles in their essence. The thinker utters Being. The poet names the holy.¹

The poet names the holy. But what is the holy? "The element of this ether, that within which even the godhead itself is still present, is the holy."² Thus in naming the holy the poet calls forth what was previously shown to be one of the fourfold - the gods or divinities. But, in the naming the gods themselves must remain unspoken, for they are brought to us in their absence. "... the god who remains unknown, must by showing himself as the one he is, appear as the one who remains unknown."³ Thus the poet's task is not to give us any answers, but merely to bring us into the presence of the mystery of the unknowable. The poet calls forth the silent mysteries that are gathered in all Being, and lets them stand, but stand as a beyond that we can never fully know. This is why Heidegger says poets stand between men and the gods, and what is ordinarily referred to as poetic wonder.

¹"What is Metaphysics" p. 360.

²Poetry, Language, Thought p. 94.

³Ibid. p. 223.

But insofar as the gods are brought to stand as unknowable, man is able to dwell in his proper place. When we experience a poem with the awe filled attentiveness that good poetry calls for, we get a glimpse of the silent mysteries. We experience how foreign and delicate a thing that which the poet is trying to Say really is. We hear the words and they propel us over an abyss that our cognitive faculties cannot fully grasp, that even the poet's words cannot completely contain. In naming the holy (the gods, the abyss) the poet brings to the fore a realm that was totally ignored simply because it could not be conceptualized. In this way as the divinities are held before us, we simultaneously bring ourselves forth in our finitude. We see ourselves dwelling as mortals, before divinities, on earth, and under the sky.

The poet himself stands between the former-the gods, and the latter-the people. He is one who has been cast out- out into that Between, between gods and men. But only and for the first time in this Between is it decided who man is and where he is settling his existence. "Poetically, dwells man on this earth."¹

Poetry is a primordial naming, it lets the gods be present (in their absence) in words. To turn the gods into knowable and explainable entities is the tendency of popularized religion, to ignore the gods is the tendency of scientific thinking. Both over-estimate man's place - the former claiming we can know the infinite, and the latter saying that what we cannot know can have no place. Only when the gods are named in their mystery by the poets can language become language, i.e., a Saying which says what it does

¹"Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry" in Existence and Being, p. 288.

because what is unsaid resides in the said; and only then can man's Being dwell in its place. "Hence poetry never takes language as a raw material ready to hand, rather it is poetry which first makes language possible."¹ Thus poetry does not use authentic language but makes it authentic in its responding to the gods.

In the naming of the gods poetry is true to the understanding of language we reached earlier as the bringing of things to Being. However, that which poetry is concerned with is our place before the holy, a necessary step towards thinking Being, but not equivalent. Thinking, like poetry, always proceeds with language, and while poetry now is clear as the naming of the holy, we must see how thinking utters Being.

Thinking's saying would be stilled in
its being only by becoming unable to
say that which must remain unspoken.

Such inability would bring thinking face
to face with its matter.

What is spoken is never, and in no
language, what is said.²

This quote reiterates what Heidegger said in the quote above from "What is Metaphysics?": "poetry and thinking are most purely alike in their care of the word." Both poetry and thinking must let language speak towards-and-from the unsayable silence. But in

¹Ibid. p. 283.

²Poetry, Language, Thought p. 11

what ways are their concerns different? Heidegger is never clear on this issue, but we can take as a clue something he said in

"Remembrance of the Poet":

The vocation of the poet is homecoming
by which the homeland is first made
ready as the land of proximity to
the source.¹

As we saw above, the poet allows man to dwell in his place by giving him a language that allows the gods to be present. This allowing of man to dwell in his proper place is the homecoming. But this is only the preparation, for now that man dwells and has a language that allows the quiet stillness to ring through its words, he can begin to think, i.e., to explore himself and his world in the fullness of their Being. "And only when man speaks, does he think."² And it is poetry that lets man's words speak.

Only insofar as we dwell or belong can we explore the nature of things (including ourselves) in their Being, and not merely in a subjective re-presentation. Poetry gives us dwelling, thinking is the exploring. Poetry is the language that first brings things into Being, thinking is the preserving elaboration of the Being of these things. As J. Glenn Gray describes thinking in the introduction to What is Called Thinking:

Thinking is not so much an act as a
way of living or dwelling...It is

¹"Remembrance of the Poet" in Existence and Being p. 266.

²What is Called Thinking p. 16.

a remembering who we are as human beings and where we belong. It is a gathering and focusing of our whole selves on what lies before us and a taking to heart and mind these particular things before us in order to discover in them their essential nature and truth.¹

In naming the holy poetry gives us a language that lets us speak of things in their Being, and that means it first lets thinking utter Being. It is not that thinking must wait for poetry to give it specific words with specific meanings, rather, thinking is dependent on poetry to make the nature of language rich and powerful, to reverberate with the still depths of the unsaid. Though both poetry and thinking stem from the primordial call of Appropriation (Saying), and thus good poetry must be thoughtful and true thinking must be poetical, their tasks are different. Poetry gives mortals their place and language; thinking proceeds with this language to explore Being, i.e., the place of himself and the things he encounters. Without poetry a language becomes flat and sterile, and thinking can be nothing more than information. Thus, we see poetry is to thinking as language is to Being. Neither half of the analogy is a relation of equivalency, but they need each other and spring from a common source - the gathering Saying of Appropriation. Neither side is primary, for though poetry gives thinking the language it needs and language lets things Be, poetry must start as a thoughtful listening to the holy, and language does not create by fiat, but rather is a

¹What is Called Thinking p. xi.

responding to the primordial gatheredness of Being. In short, "The being of language: the language of Being."¹

Everything depends upon bringing into language the truth of Being and letting thought penetrate this language. Perhaps then language requires far less precipitate utterance than correct silence. Yet who amongst us today would like to imagine that his attempts at thought were at home on the path of silence?²

As a tourist can never understand the Being of a foreign land as long as he merely observes from the outside, a thinker can never achieve his goal until he dwells and learns to hear the silent world that is gathered in making the manifest manifest. Perhaps an example can show how a thinking which pays heed to the silence of language proceeds as opposed to other approaches. We choose the topic of friendship, more or less at random, but also because it is an important phenomenon to all of us and one that Aristotle thought worthy of two books of his ethics yet has since been ignored as an area worthy of philosophy. We as thinkers ask for the Being of friendship. Aristotle in his scientific style, describes different types of friendship, situations conducive to it, important characteristics of it, and a guide of proper behavior between friends. As interesting as many of the points he makes are, they tend to be a

¹"The Nature of Language" p. 94.

²"Letter on Humanism" p. 167.

list of facts that may describe certain properties of friendship, but fail to capture the significance and life of that which he himself indicates is the most important good there is.

This approach of Aristotle is carried out today in various scientific studies. There are anthropological approaches¹ which study friendship patterns among a variety of cultures (including animals) and attempt to find biological, psychological, and social causes of friendship. There are also psychological approaches² which study the causes of friendships by isolating variables of a test group of people some of whom become friends and some who do not. In these studies we again gain possibly interesting and useful information about friendship, but over and above the assumed understanding we must have had in the beginning in order to study its causes, conditions, and behavioral manifestations, we gain little or no insight into what friendship is.

An alternative to these studies is to turn to art, and view how friendship has been portrayed in books, poems, and paintings. As Samuel McChord Crothers says in his introduction to The Book of Friendship:

¹See for example: Elliot Leyton editor, The Compact, Selected Dimensions of Friendship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

²See for example: Steven W. Duck Personal Relationships and Personal Constructs. A Study of Friendship Formation (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1973).

"No abstract or philosophical description can satisfy us in regard to an intimate personal experience which we all have felt."¹ Through these art forms the beauty, intensity, and struggles of friendship are brought before us, and in this way we are brought to dwell before the divine bonds of friendship. It is here that thinking of the Being of friendship can begin. To help our thinking we may turn to famous quotes and aphorisms about friendship, not to collect more information and facts, but to silently reflect and meditate on the richness of these sayings and how they light up with greater and greater clarity the dimensions of friendship which we now hold before us. By listening to our own statements and thoughts, as well as those of others, their truth and richness grows² - even clichés can sometimes regain their original strength of insight.

No one statement serves as a definitive formularization of the essence of friendship, but they all help hold it before us in the richness of its actual Being. We do not want to cover up friendship itself with words, theories, causes, and explanations; we want it to reveal itself. Though we can not here attempt a full philosophy of friendship it may help to suggest a fourfold: the divinities are the godlike bonds of friendship which are invisible yet can be stronger

¹Samuel McChord Crothers editor The Book of Friendship (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1910) p. 5.

²Or of course the opposite can happen, the statement reveals itself more and more as shallow or misdirected. But this can only happen insofar as the truth of friendship shines clearer in the light, and thus by a reverse method reflection on the statement still brought out the Being of Friendship.

than any physical test of them. "Two friends, two bodies with one soul inspired." (Homer, The Illiad Bk xvi¹). Mortal is the reality of the hardships, questions, and limitations of true friendship. "O my friends, there is no friend." (Chilo). Sky is the ethereal beauty of a good friend - the loneliness of when you are apart or the pleasure in sharing a treasured moment. "In love one has need of being believed, in friendship of being understood." (Abel Bonnard The Art of Friendship). Earth is the arm around arm comradeship of an adventure together. "All for one and one for all!" (Dumas, The Three Muskateers). However, if these four are approached merely as a list, a combination of properties, they will not bring to light the Being of friendship. Only if we listen to the silence of the unity of their interplay, letting that to which and from which they speak reveal itself, are we properly underway to thinking.

But there would be, and there is, the sole necessity, by thinking our way soberly into what (his) poetry says, to come to learn what is unspoken. That is the course of the history of Being.²

The thought of Being guards the Word and fulfills its function in such guardianship, namely care for the use of language. Out of long guarded speechlessness and the careful clarification of the field thus cleared, comes the utterance of the thinker.³

¹All of the quotations used in connection with this discussion of the fourfold are from The Home Book of Quotations edited by Burton Stevenson (N.Y.: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1964).

²Poetry, Language, Thought p. 96.

³"What is Metaphysics?" p. 360.

V. Conclusion. Being, Language and Philosophy

At this point we have come to an end of the examination of Heidegger's published work on Being and language. By unravelling the key concepts we have attempted to show the important place the thinking of language has in Heidegger's quest for the meaning of Being. We must now recapitulate what we have accomplished, and then raise the question of where it has left us and where we are to go from here.

Though not an explicit task of this work one of its major significances was to show a continuous development from Being and Time to the late works. An easy attack on Heidegger could have been made by juxtaposing apparent subjectivist or idealist statements against objective or realist ones, and thereby rejecting Heidegger as a confused and contradictory thinker. For example, comparing the claim in Introduction to Metaphysics that "It is in words and language that things first come into being and are." (p. 11) and the one in On the Way to Language that states "But man is capable of speaking only insofar as he, belonging to Saying, listens to Saying, so that in resaying it he may be able to say a word," (p. 134) we might find an excuse either to reject Heidegger completely, or at least to consider him to have made a complete reversal regarding the relation of words and Being.

However, it is necessary to see these two statements not as contradictions, nor even as two opposing directions on the same issue,

but rather as a developed saying of one and the same thing. If we fail to do this, we continue to view Heidegger within the context of subjectivity and objectivity, the very categories of Being that his life's work was intended to overcome. A critique of Heidegger based on subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of various quotes immediately places the issues in polar tension rather than letting them speak together on their own terms. To ask for a solution to dualism, yet insist on dualistic structures of every approach to Being, will leave philosophy entangled in its own net. To evaluate Heidegger we must first understand what he says, and to do this we must learn his language and meaning, and not persist in translating it into a form he rejects.

For this reason the first chapter of this work started with an interpretation of Dasein that attempts to show Being and Time as raising the question of Being from the meeting point of man and the world, and not from the idealistic standpoint of man qua immanence. In line with this, the discussion of Discourse, as an existentielle of Dasein, was primordially concerned with it as the announcement of Being, and not as expression, statement or communication.

Unfortunately, at this stage of his career Heidegger considered Understanding and its corresponding temporal dimension of the future to be primordial ("The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.")¹ and, he therefore explored Discourse

¹Being and Time p. 378.

as the announcement of the silent structures of Understanding ("Both discoursing and hearing are based upon Understanding.")¹ His concern with language as an announcement of Being was of course never abandoned, but as his understanding of the meaning of Being developed, he realized that the grounding of meaning (the silent source of Discourse) strictly in Understanding and the future was short-sighted. He even recognizes this at various points in Being and Time:

When the "there" has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by understanding, state-of-mind, and falling; and this disclosedness becomes articulated by discourse. Thus discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in any definite ecstasis.²

This is the direction the rest of Heidegger's works moved in, and the next stage of his development led him to a study of the meaning of Being through the source of Western thinking. By exploring logos as a gathering-which-lets-presence, his path towards Being is disclosed, and the significance of language to this path is also indicated. Being of things is understood as original presencing, and the Being of language as the primordial synthesis which first enables things to come forth and Be. The crucial belonging together of language and Being is thereby exposed by their common root in one of the most crucial words of Western philosophy.

¹Being and Time p. 208.

²Ibid. p. 400.

The meaning of the belonging together of Being and language lies in the gathering, but this relation cannot be fully seen until we advance our understanding of both Being and language beyond their initial roots in logos. Thus, our third section attempted to explore the meaning of Being, and our fourth the meaning of language. We traced Being through the various ways entities may be present, to that which enables anything to be present, i.e., Appropriation. We saw Appropriation as that primordial mystery that is prior to Being itself, insofar as it grants the belonging together that is needed for things to Be. Since a theme needs an horizon and an horizon needs a theme, their belonging together must be prior to either one, and in the same way the granting of the belonging together of thing and world, Being and time, and Being and man cannot arise out of one or the other 'component'. Appropriation is nothing specific in itself, but insofar as whatever is arises out of its primordial gift of Nearness and Neighborhood, whatever can be revealed about anything comes from, and thus must point to, Appropriation itself. It is in this context that Heidegger considers thinking a thanking¹ - when thinking of things in the fullness of their Being we pay homage to that which makes things and their availability to us possible. In not losing sight of Appropriation by being overly concerned with facts and uses of things we preserve it and thereby pay it its due.

¹See What is Called Thinking part II lecture III.

Finally, we saw in the fourth section that it is through a careful relation to language that Appropriation is acknowledged, for when we pay thoughtful heed to the silence of our language we are fulfilling the silent Saying of Appropriation that first grants things their Being. "Accordingly, what prevails in and bears up the relation of human nature to the two-fold is language."¹ This is the meaning of the phrase "language is the house of Being," and why language becomes an intricate part in Heidegger's quest for the meaning of Being. Only through man's ability to fulfill the gathering-showing of Saying can entities stand forth in the light of Being.

However, as the Being of language is revealed as the Saying which gathers thing and world and thereby lets things come forth in their Being, we must ask why Heidegger considered spoken language (and its alternative of silence) as the primary mode. One of the limitations of most approaches to language is that they look for the essence of language in what is unique to spoken language (e.g., semantic and syntactic structure) and thereby treat it in a way that overlooks its primary philosophical Being as an opening of (to) the world. They treat language as an isolated thing whose unique essence can be found by the traditional metaphysical analysis of form (structural analysis) and matter (phonology and morphology). However

¹On the Way to Language p. 30. The two-fold refers to the unified difference of things and Being, i.e., things in their Being.

useful these studies can be they typically start from a recognition that in its Being our speech is just one of many ways that we are open to the world. Understanding our spoken language's unique essence is an important project, but its commonness within the context of Being as a whole must also be considered.

Heidegger's thinking apparently falls into a parallel trap. Though he examines the Being of language in the context of Being as a whole, he then unjustifiably assumes that only our spoken language has this Being, and thereby erroneously acknowledges linguistic analysis as the primary study of the opening of the world (Saying). In discussing various modes of art, which have similar modes of Being to language, he states: "All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry."¹ In itself this claim is not threatening because we could interpret it as expanding the notion of poetry to its Being as an opening of the world, rather than reducing art to our presently narrower conception of poetry. However, this attempted interpretation fails to be maintained for Heidegger goes on to say:

Language itself is poetry in the essential sense. But since language is the happening in which for man beings first disclose themselves to him each time as beings, poesy - or poetry in the narrower sense - is the most original (ursprünglichste) form of poetry in the essential sense....

¹Poetry, Language, Thought p. 72.

Building and plastic creation, on the other hand, always happen already, and happen only, in the Open of saying and naming....They are an ever special poetizing within the clearing of what is, which has already happened unnoticed in language.¹

What is troublesome is not the claim that spoken language (poesy) must temporally come before any other art form, this very well may be true, but that all other art forms lie within the domain of its Saying. In this way language seems to be defined by its traditional ontic conception rather than the ontological examination of Saying. Music, painting, dance, and all the other arts Say something that emerges within the world of the speaking of their own languages, and not within that of poesy and the spoken word. We have seen that the spoken word is not a representation of a pre-given, and thus there is no ground on which to claim that its language has a special priority in the emergence of Being. Every art form gathers and opens Being in a way unique to itself, and to limit Being beforehand to the world of spoken language is not to let the other art forms Speak, but (to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty) to verbalize in paint or music.²

When learning a foreign language we initially translate what we learn into our native tongue, and even describe the new language (both syntactically and semantically) in the one we are more familiar

¹Ibid. p. 74.

²In discussing the English "the man I love" and the French "l'homme que j'aime" Merleau-Ponty states: "Thus we must disabuse ourselves of the habit of understanding the relative pronoun in English. That is speaking French in English, it is not speaking English." Prose of the World p. 29.

with. But eventually we hope to reach a place where the inability to discuss something of our now second language in terms of our first is no longer a sign of non-understanding, but rather one of true understanding. In the same way as we learn to listen to the language of various art forms we resort to spoken language for explanations, but eventually we must make a leap to let the art form Speak (i.e., gather and announce) on its own terms. This is not to say that words will no longer have any place in the realms of the other art forms, but the words must enter into a true dialogue with the piece and, further, be in constant service to the speaking of the piece and not an explicit alternative to it. In short, words can tell us how to look or listen, but not what we see or hear. Only the art work itself can do that, and words can at best lead us to this non-verbal presencing.

Thus one of the first tasks left open to philosophy is an examination of similarities and differences of the various ways in which Being is opened. This was the attempt of Sartre's What is Literature and Merleau Ponty's "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," but much more work is needed in this line. If it is to do this philosophy will of course have to proceed with words, but its speaking can never replace the other art forms, but simply give us access to them and thus a broadened openness to Being. Spatiality, colors, textures, tones, harmony, etc. all gather a world and thereby open Being in ways we must learn to preserve. As our spoken language can decay into idle chatter, it seems probable that the

other art forms can do the same. Though it would be up to the artist to rejuvenate their medium, philosophy can help by showing what certain epochs of art can and cannot say. In discussing the relation of poetry and thinking Heidegger says that we must learn how to have these two enter into a dialogue with each other. When we recognize that all art forms are in their Being an opening of Being,¹ we see that from the ontological definition of language as a gathering-opening Saying, all art forms can be called languages. This of course is not to say that all art forms are expressive or representational, for that is not the fundamental Being of language. Nor is it to say that all art forms are reducible to a common form, since they are alike only in that they are all openings to and from Being - as we saw this means that they all gather a world and thing in their belonging together, but each art form silently speaks from and gathers a different world. In short, we see that all art forms (including poesis) "dwell near to one another on mountains farthest apart," and thus one of the great tasks Heidegger has left us with is an examination of the unique Being of each.

If Heidegger has left us with these questions we must ask what he has given us that will aid us in this and other directions of philosophy. The first thing we must conclude is that his final achievement of the thinking of Being qua Being will not serve any

¹ See section on the Being of a work of art in chapter III.

use in the development of philosophy. Heidegger himself accepts this for he distinguishes his thinking of Being from philosophy, and goes on to say that asking for a use of the thinking of Being is to miss its point. To clarify this we must remember that the thinking of Being has two dimensions: the thinking of entities in their Being and the thinking of that which makes this possible, i.e., the beholding of Appropriation. This latter, however, when considered in and by itself is simply a meditation on the unchanging, unknowable, unexplainable giver of Being and our ability to think Being. There is no doubt that this granting of the belonging together of man and world is a primordial occurrence that is awe inspiring and powerful. We should not ignore the non-productive value of meditation on Appropriation, but unless we think Appropriation in its specific forms of the belonging together of entities in their Being, we achieve something closed upon itself. In the quest to understand ourselves and our world the beholding of Appropriation is too broad to give us anything but the horizon in which all our answers must rest. Appropriation is the horizon which lets us ask questions and give answers, but in itself gives no answers to our never ending explorations. That is not a fault of the thinking of Appropriation, merely its limitation. Thus, though the value of beholding Appropriation should never be underestimated, unless we are foolishly content with just that, we must look for help from Heidegger elsewhere than this final achievement.

This does not mean that Appropriation has no place in our exploring thinking, but it must be approached as the appropriated Being of entities and not as the abstract Absolute which is "thought without regard to beings."¹ In fact, perhaps the most important notion Heidegger has given us is the belonging together of man and Being. As an outgrowth of Husserl's intentionality and the life-world in his later works, Heidegger developed the concept of Being-in-the-world that finally led him to Appropriation. The consequences of this exposed interrelation affects the theoretical foundations of every discipline. Once we know that in each case the Being of the examiner is always an intricate part of that which is disclosed, every discipline must examine itself in order to understand its subject matter fully. Connected with this is the historical dimensions of Being, and the resulting problems of hermeneutics that is beginning to influence a large variety of disciplines. Further, heightened by his devastating critique of a correspondence notion of truth (which we did not discuss in this work) and replacing it with an understanding of truth as disclosure, the growth of perspectival approaches to a subject matter has gained respect; perspectives are not just subjective limitations but the truth of Being itself. Finally, Husserl's characterization of phenomenology in the proclamation "to the things themselves!" is carried out in

¹The End of Philosophy p. xiii.

Heidegger's meditative thinking. As we saw, Heidegger opposes his thinking to a subjective will dominated thinking that forces the things into predetermined categories. Thus Heidegger's methodological call is "let things be," and by bringing us along the path of his thinking he has clarified and developed the basic methodological tenet of phenomenology.

In all these ways Heidegger has made important contributions to the general intellectual endeavor. But given the concerns of this work, the most important developments Heidegger has made lie in his work on language. Ontologically revealed as the house of Being language is forever at work in whatever we do. Thus the work Heidegger has done on how our language speaks, and the consequences of our language on what we can say, are of critical importance to everything we do. The revelation of the intricate belonging together of silence and the voiced, and the decay of the silence in a fallen language, first teaches us what we are saying in everything we say. When we learn this we recognize that language speaks, and thus we learn that only by listening can we speak. Thus in any endeavor of communication or statement our relation to language is of extreme importance, and Heidegger has given us the first adequate examination of this relation.

Though some of these issues are beginning to have an input in various areas, Heidegger's greatest effect is still in philosophy. The hermeneutic work of Ricoeur and Gadamer, and all the work spun off from these figures, finds its source in Heidegger. Perhaps

most significant is the connection of Merleau-Ponty's work on language, and all the issues that arise out of it, to Heidegger's work. Already in Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty had a chapter on language, and throughout his career the thinking of language played an important role. His reflections on language centered around two of the same issues that Heidegger found important: the role of the silent (or invisible) in all language ("...language lives only from silence.")¹ and the connected point that thought can only come to fruition in language and thus language cannot be viewed as the translation or re-presentation of a ready made thought ("thus speech, in the speaker, does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it.")² In examining these points Merleau-Ponty expands the phenomenology of language in important ways, but his prime concern is showing the significance of the analysis of language in psychology and social philosophy.

Language certainly has an inner content, but this is not self-subsistent and self conscious thought. What then does language express, if it does not express thoughts? It presents or rather it is the subject's taking up of a position in the world of his meanings. The term 'world' here is not a manner of speaking: it means that the 'mental' or cultural life borrows its structures from natural life and that the thinking subject must have its basis in the subject incarnate.³

¹Merleau-Ponty Visible and the Invisible trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968) p. 126.

²Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) p. 178.

³Ibid. p. 193.

We therefore see that Heidegger's work has paved the way for many areas of study. An examination of language was necessary to reach a thinking of Being. The thinking of Being results in a rejuvenation of language into its original power, which at the same time rekindles our ability to think and not merely juggle the world around in worn out categories.

But the emptiness of the word "being," the total disappearance of its appellative force, is not merely a particular instance of the general exhaustion of language; rather, the destroyed relation to being as such is the actual reason for the general misrelation to language.¹

Thus Heidegger is right when he says that while it is true that we cannot do anything with the thinking of Being qua Being, we should not consider the project valueless, because the thinking of Being does something with us.² Most of our studies are concerned with increasing the horizontal breadth of our knowledge, Heidegger's thinking has hopefully led to an improved vertical depth of knowledge wherever it is applied. Thus, rather than putting an end to the philosophical endeavor, Heidegger has actually laid the groundwork for a new beginning, a new era of thinking. Thinking and poetry dwell near to each other in their service to language, and now that our approach to Being has helped rejuvenate language, or at least shown the path towards rejuvenation, the arts and

¹Introduction to Metaphysics p. 42.

²Ibid. p. 10.

thought can enter a new dialogue with each coming into its own,
and thus a new era of both has gotten Underway.

No transformation comes without an anticipatory escort. But how does an escort draw near unless Appropriation opens out which calling, needing, envisions human being, that is, sees and in this seeing brings mortals to the path of thinking, poetizing, building.¹

Whether we take up the path of thinking is the question now facing us. Heidegger has given us the way, he has once again brought us before the power of Being; if we follow it, rather than exclusively and blindly staying on our path of information, manipulation, and technology is the most important choice we must make.

Most thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking - not even yet, although the state of the world is becoming constantly more thought-provoking.²

¹The End of Philosophy p. 110.

²What is Called Thinking p. 4.

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In order of original German publication.

2

This is a collection of essays from a variety of sources so a chronological location is somewhat arbitrary.

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