4-27-1984

Plato on Virtue, Knowledge, and the Unity of Good

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I suppose that everyone who has tried to impose some systematic order on the jumble of paradoxes and arguments that together comprise Plato's ethics would admit to a certain degree of dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, there is I believe more systematic unity among the ethical doctrines that is generally allowed today. Diffidence about systematic unity seems to lead to certain unnecessary confusions. In this paper I shall attempt to display some of the results of trying to fit some of the pieces together; an experiment, if you will, in taking Plato literally. This will necessitate traversing some very familiar ground which I shall try to do as economically as possible. It will also involve a certain amount of dogmatism in the assertion of interpretations of texts at various stages of the argument. The reader is invited to treat these as hypothetical and tentative and in need of extensive independent confirmation. I shall also require as a working hypothesis a certain limited unitarianism in the treatment of the development of Plato's doctrines. The justification for this is of course only to be found in the outcome.

I shall begin with the doctrine of the unity of the virtues in the Protagoras and some of the reasons that have been advanced for not taking this doctrine in its strongest form (1). If the virtues are a unity then not only will the possession of one entail the possession of the rest, but also, for example, courage will actually be temperance. And this it is held is false. For there are courageous persons who are not temperate and the practice of courage just is not identical with the practice of temperance.

It is not too difficult to see that Plato's intention is not likely, to be correctly represented by an interpretation which holds the virtues to be merely extensionally equivalent (2). For if the possession of any one virtue entails the possession of any other, that is, if there is a necessary connection between them, then one of the following alternatives must be true. Either they are actually identical and mutual implication is a result of that fact that the different names of the virtues stand for one "thing," or there is some "link" in virtue of the possession of which all the virtues are possessed. Thus, if the possession of x entails the possession of y and vice versa, the explanation of this is that x is possessed in virtue of possessing A and y is possessed in virtue of possessing A. But then we would obviously need to ask why the possession of A necessitates the possession of x and y. And the answer would be either that being x and y just means being A, in which case we have identity, or we would need another "link" between A and x and A and y. So, either we accept an infinite regress of "links" or we accept identity straightaway.

In fact, the apparent difference amongst the virtues, which seems to cause the trouble, and the claim that they are a unity look very much like an argument for their reductive identity. For example, we might say that mental events are reductively identical with brain activity or that macroscopic phenomena are reductively identical with microscopic processes. A somewhat more illuminating example, but also very contentious, is Aristotle's reductive identification of being to substance and substance to form. The clearest evidence that the unity of virtues is a reductive identification of the virtues is in the notoriously troublesome argument for the identity of courage and wisdom or knowledge (3). There it is argued that daring without knowledge is folly and daring with knowledge is courage, the point being that the presence of knowledge ensures the presence of courage just because courage really is knowledge. So, daring with knowledge must be courage and daring without knowledge must not be courage. Of course this argument begs the question. But to leave it at that is to miss the point. The only way to avoid begging the question is to begin with different definitions of the virtues. If, however, the virtues are a unity there could not be correct and
different definitions of the virtues. A reductive identity argument, since it does not aim to eliminate the real difference between the apparent and the real, must in effect point to their apparent difference and their real identity at the same time, which is precisely what the hypothetical, dialectical method of Plato is made to do.

The recognition of Plato's reductive identification of the virtues with knowledge is naturally coupled with Plato's frequent claim that this knowledge is knowledge of good and evil or of goods and evils (4). As it stands, this claim is so obviously unsatisfactory that one can easily surmise that Plato meant nothing definite by it. For the claim that virtue is nothing but the knowledge of what is good and evil in matters of courage does not explain how that knowledge is identical with the knowledge of what is good and evil in matters of temperance, nor why the possession of one should entail the possession of the other.

The plausibility of the claim that virtue is the knowledge of good and evil is not enhanced by the interpretation of this knowledge principally as "knowledge how" rather than "knowledge that" (5). In fact, it is diminished. For skills or examples of "knowledge how" are usually not mutually implicatory. They must be learned one at a time. If the putative skill that is virtue is something like knowing how to bring about the good and how to avoid evil, we shall more than likely be moved to reject once again the unity of virtue, since it seems perfectly possible that someone should know how to bring about the good and evil in one area without knowing how to do it in another. Even if, as is held on one interpretation of the Protagoras, the knowledge of good and evil is just the craft of pleasure and pain management, it seems possible that someone should have this knowledge in one area but not in another (6). Further, if virtue is identical with knowledge and if, as Socrates argues, one cannot have this knowledge and fail to act on it, it seems clear that the knowledge must be more properly characterized as that in virtue of which one has "knowledge how" rather than "knowledge how" itself. I suspect that the claim that the knowledge that is virtue is "knowledge how" has been falsely inferred from the argument that knowledge is sufficient for virtue just in the sense that if the knowledge is possessed one cannot fail to act upon it. But the doctrine about human action and motivation upon which this argument is based does not require that one who knows what his good is knows how to achieve it, but rather that if he knows what his good is he cannot but aim to achieve it. Another reason for the claim that virtue is "knowledge how" is that insofar as virtue is characterized as a dunamis it is easy to assimilate it to a case of "knowledge how" which is naturally so characterized. That there is a certain amount of truth in this claim I do not care to dispute. That it cannot be the whole truth seems to me to be evident from the fact that a person may be virtuous and yet not have the faintest idea of how to bring about the good and avoid evil in a particular situation. This becomes even more clear if we reflect on the extreme generality that must infect the knowledge that is identical with all the virtues. For if the knowledge is explicated as, say, a list of specific precepts, it will be extremely difficult to show how it is not possible to possess some and not others.

At the risk of making matters worse I would like to elicit assistance from another fundamental Platonic ethical doctrine, one to which Plato adheres consistently throughout the dialogues. The doctrine is that no one does wrong willingly (7). If we isolate and reconstruct an argument for this doctrine its basic form is as follows. Every man acts in order to bring about that which he believes is good for him. In order to reach the conclusion that no one does wrong (the bad) willingly, we need a premise which states that one's own good and the good are in fact identical, or otherwise related by mutual implication, so that insofar as one acts to achieve one's own true good, one cannot but act to achieve the good simpliciter. That the doctrine is not merely the psychological claim made in the first premise is clear from an argument such as that in Gorgias 468c-472d where Socrates tries to show that the greatest of evils is to do wrong (8). It is clear from the argument that "the greatest of evils" is to be completed by "for a man," in which case "do wrong" must be construed according
to an objective standard, for Socrates is not here arguing that the worst thing for a man is to do whatever is the worst thing for him, but that in fact failing to adhere to a certain standard is actually the worst thing for him, whatever he thinks. Again, if it is better to suffer than to do evil, two standards are here being employed, that according to which suffering evil is better for me than doing it and that according to which what is done to me is determined to be evil. But in fact Plato seems to believe that there is a coincidence in these two standards: failing or succeeding according to one means failing or succeeding according to the other.

I believe it is clear that the doctrine that no one does wrong willingly is not merely a psychological doctrine about human action and motivation, but that the doctrine goes further in supposing an identity in these two standards or what I have called the unity of goodness. There are powerful metaphysical reasons why Plato should be committed to such a view. First, Plato is committed to the univocity of 'good' as a consequence of his "one-over-many" argument for Forms in general. In the language of the Phaedo it must be held that x is good because there is goodness in it, just as it is held that Helen is beautiful because there is beauty in her and that something is tall because there is tallness in it (9). Thus even if it is held that 'x is good' is systematically incomplete, in the statements 'x is good for y' and 'w is good for z' 'good' must be used univocally.

The supposed incompleteness of the predicate 'is good' makes it easy to confuse it with a relative predicate like 'is tall.' Just as we can say that y is tall in relation to x and short in relation to z, so it might be thought that we can say that y is good for x and bad for z. And in a sense this is true. For the medicine that is good for x may be bad for y and so the same medicine may be good and bad. But we cannot stop the expansion of 'is good' here. For we must add that if x is good for y it cannot be bad for z that x is good for y. Denying this is no more warranted on Platonic principles than is the claim that if x is taller than y and shorter than z that x is both taller than and shorter than y. Similarly mistaken is the claim that if x is taller than y and shorter than z then x is neither tall nor short.

That 'x is good' is incomplete does not mean that 'x is good' is a relative in the sense in which 'is tall' is a relative. For if x is taller than y then necessarily y is shorter than x. But if it is good for x that he do something to y then it is not necessary that it is bad for y. In fact, if, as Plato holds, 'good for x' is at least extensionally equivalent with 'good,' then if it is good for x that he do something to y then necessarily it is good for y that it be done to him. For if 'good for x' means at least that good has been realized here and now then good has been so realized for y. The spuriousness of a distinction between 'good' and 'good for x' may be compared with the spuriousness of a distinction between 'true' and 'true for x.' There may be truths about x which are not truths about y, but whatever is true about x is true for y just because it is true. A similar point drawn from the first book of the Republic may be made for justice. Although a type of action may be just or unjust, a token of this type is either just or unjust but not both at once. And when an action is just, to add 'just for x' is superfluous.

Typically, many ethical problems are framed in terms of conflicts of goods. Thus a good for x is thought to be realizable only at the expense of a good for y. The doctrine of the unity and universality of good means that a real conflict of goods is impossible; the conflict can only be apparent. For the same action or event or property cannot be good and bad at once any more than a proposition can be true and false at once. If x gains by y's loss then x's gain cannot be good for x unless it is also good for y. And since characteristically much that is accounted gain is at the expense of others, it will follow that such things are not good. Or at least they are only apparently good. For example, the first argument against the identity of pleasure and goodness in the Gorgias seems to turn upon the oddity of a pleasure and a pain being simultaneously present in the same person (10). But the same argument can be extended to make the point more clearly. Consider the case of someone who
derives pleasure from someone else's pain. But if pleasure is good and pain bad, then
the same action will be both good and bad. The argument holds only if good and bad are
taken in the non-relative sense I have indicated. There is no contradiction in saying
that the pleasure is good for one and the pain bad for the other unless 'good for one'
means 'good' and 'bad for the other' means 'not-good.'

The misunderstanding of Plato's doctrine on the unity of goodness is evident in
Aristotle's massive attack on it in the Nicomachean Ethics (11). Aristotle offers six
arguments against the doctrine: (1) Goodness is found in substances, qualities, and so
on. But the goodness in substances is prior to goodness in other categories. The
Platonists, however, do not wish to posit Ideas of that which is prior and posterior.
(2) The term 'good' has as many senses as the term 'being.' Being is not univocal;
therefore, neither is 'good.' (3) If there is one Idea of good there would be a single
science of it. But there are many sciences of good even in one category. (4) A form
of good "itself" is supposed to be different from something good. But the goodness in
the Form of the good is identical with the goodness in good things in which case we do
not need to posit a Form of the good "itself." (5) An eternal "good itself" is no more
good than a particular good. (6) There are many things, like thinking, seeing, and
certain pleasures and honors which are good unqualifiedly as opposed to being instru­
mental goods. But if the Form of the good is the only thing that is good unqualifiedly
the rest will not be so. But if they are, goodness should be the same thing in all of
them. This is not the case. For the definitions of them are distinct and they differ
in their goodness. That is, the goodness of thinking has to be understood as being
defined by what thinking is, and the goodness of seeing by what it is, and these differ.

Objections (4) and (5) are really special cases of the general case against the
theory of Forms and may be put aside. Objections (1), (2), (3), and (6) represent
from different perspectives the view that 'good' is equivocal and not univocal. There
is, however, nothing in the notion of the univocity of good that prevents us from saying,
for example, that the science of how goodness is brought about in medicine is different
from the science of how goodness is brought about in military matters or that goodness
is manifested in thinking in a way different from the way it is manifested in certain
pleasures. Nor, for that matter, does the univocal attribution of a Form-instance f
to a and b preclude priority and posteriority in a and b (12). Aristotle, however,
seems to want to insist that the science of the good must be medicine, strategy, etc.,
which cannot be one science. But even if the science of good entails knowing how to
bring about the good in all these areas, it does not follow that this science is a
composite of medicine, strategy, etc. For knowing how to bring about the good in these
areas may consist in knowing who are the experts and when and how to put into their
hands the realization of the good in these areas. Thus it seems correct to distinguish
a claim about the unity of goodness from the false claim that goodness is always brought
about in one way. More important, if we distinguish these two claims we cannot identify
the knowledge that goodness is a unity with the knowledge of how to bring goodness
about in any area.

I wish to suggest that the threads of doctrine I have been discussing are brought
together in the Republic. There is in fact a much great continuity in the Republic
with the doctrines of the Protagoras and Gorgias than is usually realized.

II

It has been held that because of the tripartition of the soul in the Republic
and the consequent recognition of the possibility of akrasia Plato has come to reject
the Socratic doctrine that knowledge is sufficient for virtue and the doctrine that
virtue is a unity. It is also said that as a result of this new conception of virtue,
complete virtue is reserved for the guardian-philosopher and is no longer the sort of
thing to which the ordinary man can aspire (13). I believe that in the light of what
has been said we can see that this picture of the Republic's doctrine is mistaken.
Let us address first the claim that only the guardian-philosopher can be completely virtuous. The location of the virtues in the ideal state is beyond dispute. Wisdom is found in the guardians (428c11-429a3); courage in the auxiliaries (429a8-c2); temperance in all three classes when these are content that the guardians should rule (430d6); justice in the three classes when each is functioning properly (433a1-b5). But it is held that one cannot infer from this that individuals in the lower classes of the ideal state can have courage or wisdom, although they may have temperance (431e4-6) and justice (433e6-10).

That this view is mistaken can be seen if we turn to the deduction of the virtues in the individual soul following the tripartition of the soul (441c-445b). Wisdom in the individual is defined as knowledge of what is beneficial for each part of the soul and for the whole soul (442c6-8); courage is defined as the preservation by the thumoeides of the proclamations made about what is fearful and what is not (442b11-c3); temperance is defined as friendship and harmony of the parts of the soul when they agree that reason should rule (442c10-d1); and justice is defined as each part of the soul doing its own job (441d12-e2).

The view that individuals in the ideal state other than the guardians cannot be virtuous must show either that virtues are attributed to the ideal state and individuals equivocally or that the only individuals who could have these virtues are the guardians. First, unless the virtues are attributed univocally to the idea state and to the individual the argument of Book IV falls apart (14). The search for virtue "writ large" in the ideal state must presume that what is found there is identical in meaning to what is found in the individual, just as, for example, in the Symposium there must be univocity in the attribution of beauty to bodies, souls, and institutions. If, for example, wisdom in the idea state is not an instance of the same Form as is wisdom in the individual, then the analogy employed is without point. For it could be said that even though the individual has three parts in his soul roughly corresponding to the three parts of the idea state, it does not follow that the discovery of wisdom in the state can be assumed to be at the same time the discovery of wisdom in the individual. The central difficulty with the view that perfect virtue is to be found only in the philosophers is in an incorrect application of the analogy. The state viewed organically has its wisdom in its rulers and its courage in its auxiliaries. But it does not follow from this that the only individuals in a state who can be wise are the philosophers. This would follow only if being wise meant doing something or being something that only philosophers could do or be. It would be as if one argued that institutions could not be beautiful because beauty required having flesh and bones.

The alternative that wisdom in the individual is the same as wisdom in the state but that the only individuals who can have it are the guardian-philosophers is equally mistaken (15). Nothing in the text suggests that the knowledge of what is beneficial for the parts of the soul and the whole soul is just philosophical knowledge or something that only the guardian-philosophers can have (16). It is generally assumed that the way wisdom is described in the ideal state is so exalted that only guardian-philosophers could possess it. And so it is assumed that when wisdom is described in the individual as knowing what is good for the parts of the soul and the whole soul, then either this wisdom is not the same sort of thing as the wisdom of the ideal state or the knowledge here identified with wisdom could only be some sort of philosophical knowledge that only a guardian-philosopher could have.

If individuals other than the guardians can be temperate then their individual temperance (not the temperance of the state) must consist in the agreement of all the parts of the soul that the rational faculty in the soul rule. So, one who concedes that individuals in the ideal state other than the guardians can be temperate but not wise, must hold that reason can rule in these individuals without their having the knowledge that is wisdom. It might be held, for example, that reason rules in those who follow the orders of the guardians about how they ought to act. And certainly this is all that temperance in the state requires. But there are several considerations
that weight against this view, apart from the fact that Plato does seem to identify the rule of reason and the knowledge that is wisdom in the definition of wisdom in the individual (442c5-8).

In describing the actions of the just individual (443c9-444a2) Plato says that the just man will use his justice in engaging in everyday practices, such as making money, looking after his physical health, and political involvement. In all of these the just man thinks and names wisdom the knowledge which directs these practices. The philosopher's knowledge is not yet a part of the argument at this stage. Still, an individual in the state might engage in everyday practices under the direction of the knowledge of the guardian-philosopher. So, it might be thought that there are two possibilities: either one has the relevant knowledge in which case one is a philosopher or else one receives the knowledge in the form of proclamations, laws, instruction, etc., from the philosophers. The principal difficulty with this is in the passage in which Plato asserts that the just man, presumably because he is just (in Plato's sense), will not likely commit the deeds ordinarily thought to be unjust (442e4ff) (17).

If individuals in the ideal state other than the guardian-philosophers can be just in Plato's sense then they too will not do the things ordinarily accounted unjust such as lying, embezzling, sacrilege, theft, adultery, etc. And they will not do them because there is justice in their souls. And if they are just then reason rules in them. The rule of reason in them seems to be sufficient to direct their ordinary practices, at least insofar as these provide occasions for just or unjust deeds. They do not need the proclamations of the guardian-philosophers. Therefore the rule of reason in the just individual seems to be at least closely related to the knowledge which is wisdom and which directs their everyday lives.

We need to ask of course why Plato thinks that his just man in whom reason rules will not do the things ordinarily accounted unjust. To begin with, we can say that if he knows that goodness is a unity, that is, that his good could never possibly be achieved at the expense of another, then, in pursuing his own good, he will not be disposed to do those things ordinarily recognized as involving wrong to others (18). Still, one wants to ask why is it that a man in whom reason rules could not believe that his good is achievable at the expense of others. Why, in other words, could not the Platonically just man be ignorant of the truth that goodness is a unity? Further, why would not true belief in the unity of goodness not be sufficient? For example, it might be said that it is possible for a man in whom reason rules to think that it is good for him to maximize his pleasures by satisfying his appetites on every occasion they arise. The answer to these questions requires a more penetrating look at exactly what the rule of reason is supposed to be.

When the case of Leontius is adduced to demonstrate the existence of the thumoeides (439e6ff) the obvious question is: is Leontius to be identified with (1) one part of his soul only, or (2) with none, or (3) with all? I take it that (2) answers nothing and that even if we say (3) we are faced with the question of why thumos is the natural ally of reason which is, at least grammatically in this passage, identified with Leontius (19). What perhaps makes us hesitate to say (1) is that Leontius' appetites and emotions are after all not those of another person. I think that in order to appreciate what Plato says we are not at all being anachronistic in attributing to Plato a distinction here between something like an ideal and a real self, between a man as he is, divided in his desires, and a man as he ought to be, unified or constricted into a rational self. This comes out in many places, most strongly at 589a7-bl where Plato speaks of "the man within the man" obviously referring to the rational faculty of the soul and at 443el where he speaks of the "becoming one out of many" in the acquisition of virtue. Leontius, who is not a virtuous man but an acratic, is not in doubt that he desires his own good, or that in some sense he desires both to look at the corpse and not to look. He struggles with his desire to look and loses because he is in doubt about who he is and therefore which good he should seek, his own or another's. He identifies himself in the first instance with the alien force within
his breast and also with his rational faculty that enjoins against his breach of piety. He is disunited in himself. He does not know that his good is exclusively a rational good because in part he identifies himself with that whose aim is idiosyncratic and arational and often achieved at the expense of others. Even to speak about the aims of the appetites as goods is misleading for it is strictly a determination of reason that their satisfaction is good or not. A rational faculty operating in a subordinate role endorses as good whatever the appetites desire; when it operates in a superordinate capacity it adjudicates the claims of appetite independently, roughly similar to the way one would adjudicate the appetitive claims of children over whom one has charge.

Leontius' growth in virtue would be a gradual identification of himself - in the sense in which we say a man identifies with a cause - with his rational faculty until such time as he could look upon his appetites almost as if they were those of another. We must say "almost" of course because the incarnate individual cannot perfectly identify himself with his rational faculty. To the extent that a man identifies himself with his rational faculty he identifies his good exclusively as a rational good. And since the activity of reason in a superordinate capacity is strictly universal, he must identify his good with the good itself. Further, it is unlikely or even impossible that he should engage in those activities ordinarily thought unjust because these are the result of the subordination of the rational faculty or pleonexia (20). Identifying himself with his rational faculty would mean that his appetites would not play a decisive role in action; they would not be an arche of action, as they are in the vicious man or in the acratic. A virtuous man would judge the demands of the appetites on the grounds of whether or not they were instrumental to his good, not constitutive of it.

Accordingly, the rule of reason cannot be reduced to deliberative activity. The Platonically just man will not do ordinary unjust things because reason rules in him. The rule of reason is sufficient to prevent him from doing these things only if it is understood as the rule of the man himself in the complex soul. And this is a kind of self-knowledge. The answer to the question of why a Platonically just man could not be ignorant of the truth that goodness is a unity is that if he identifies himself with his rational faculty, the determination of his own good would be equivalent to the determination of what is good simpliciter. The answer to the question of why true belief is not adequate is that a man could not believe that his good was identical with the good simpliciter unless in fact he knew who he was, that is, a rational self (21). The proclamations of the guardian-philosophers to the lower classes are certainly not equivalent to this knowledge. A temperate state would be one in which everyone obeyed these proclamations, but a temperate individual would not need them. Therefore it is not necessary for a temperate state to have only temperate individuals. But it is also not true that temperate individuals other than the guardian-philosophers could not be found in such a state.

Certainly, the guardian-philosopher has knowledge that no one else has. Specifically, he has knowledge of the Form of the good and therefore knowledge of the proper ordering of things in the state so that they may achieve the good insofar as they are able (22). This knowledge, however, is over and above the knowledge that is virtue, the knowledge that is identified with wisdom. Perhaps Socrates himself is the best example of one who does not have the knowledge possessed by the guardian-philosophers but does have the knowledge that is virtue.

The knowledge that is virtue is to be distinguished from the spurious virtue of the Phaedo or the demotic virtue mentioned in the Republic (23). I take it that these need amount to nothing more than the sum of practices that persons not genuinely virtuous engage in for prudential reasons. It is quite besides the point if Plato held that the vast majority of non-philosophers are capable only of this, even in the ideal state. The knowledge that is virtue is a specific kind of knowledge, in a way quite simple, but difficult to attain because it requires the askesis of detachment from the
idiosyncratic self. It is also quite irrelevant if in fact Plato believed that the appropriate form of askēsis or even the only one was embodied in his theory of philosophical education.

If the knowledge that is virtue is self-knowledge it is perhaps a bit easier to see how knowledge can be identical with a hexis (24). The existence of akrasia does not gainsay this claim at all. Still, the claim allows for greater or lesser, continuous or intermittent, stages of self-knowledge and so of moral growth and decline. The acratic is closer to being virtuous than the vicious man who in the worst case identifies himself entirely with his appetites. But the acratic still has a divided self and so is not virtuous. The virtuous man is distinguished also from the man who has correct opinions about what he ought to do.

On the above interpretation there are no grounds for holding that Plato rejected the doctrine of the unity of virtue in the Republic. This unity is organic and dynamic. The analogy of virtue and physical health in Book IV is particularly apt. Virtue is a psychological state in which a man identifies himself with his rational faculty thereby knowing who he is. The notion that it is possible to have one virtue and not another cannot arise unless one confuses the actions that spring from the hexis with the hexis itself (25). The virtuous man is disposed to do good and avoid evil even when he is not clear about how this is to be done. But since his virtue does not consist in doing good and avoiding evil, it cannot consist in knowing how to do these things. Nevertheless, since virtuous deeds are named so insofar as they protect and support the functioning of a virtuous soul, and since the virtuous soul is disposed to perform just such deeds, the connection between being virtuous and doing virtuous deeds can hardly be termed accidental.

The conclusion of Book IV of the Republic that perfect virtue is intrinsically valuable does not, as I have argued, rest on a conception of virtue reserved for the guardian-philosopher. Nothing in what I have said, however, denies the claim of Book IX that the philosophical life is most pleasurable of all the lives considered. One may compare the examples of the theologian and the virtuous peasant. It may be agreed that both may have the saving knowledge that is virtue, without denying that speculative activity is more pleasurable than manual labor or that the theologian undoubtedly possesses intellectual abilities completely beyond those of the peasant (26).
Notes

1. Socrates announces the question of the unity of virtue at 329c6-330b6. The range of interpretations of Socrates' thesis and the grounds for not taking it literally are well discussed in T. Penner, "The Unity of Virtue," Philosophical Review 82 (1973), 35-68.


4. See, for example, Charmides 174b; Euthydemus 280-1; Protagoras 352c2; Laches 199c; Alcibiades I 110c; Republic 438e2.


7. See Meno 77b-78b; Gorgias 466e, 467b, 509e; Apology 25d-26a; Protagoras 358d; Laws 731c1-5, 734b, 860d5; Timaeus 86d.


9. Phaedo 100c9-102al. Gorgias 506d1-2 makes the same point concerning goodness.

10. Gorgias 495e2-497d8.

11. Nicomachean Ethics I, 6, 1096a11-1097a1.

12. At Republic 443e5-6 just actions are subordinate to justice in the primary sense, justice in the soul. In this case it is perhaps possible to infer priority and posteriority and univocity. Cp. 433e12-434a1.

13. See, for example, Irwin, ch. 7, sec. 8.

14. Note how this is stressed at 441c5,10,d2,6; 442a6,e5. Vlastos "Justice and Happiness in the Republic," 111-139, in Platonic Studies, recognizes the stress, but believes nevertheless that there is equivocity in the attribution of justice to state and individual.

15. Note particularly the reference to the interlocutors at 441d12-13. Holding this view would require that the description of the philosopher in Bks. V and VI which has not yet been introduced must be understood in Bk. IV.

16. At 428b1 cff Plato speaks of the pollai epistêmai in the city, referring to a wide class of skills. The guardian-philosopher's knowledge, called euboulia, is one form of epistêma, albeit the rarest (429a1-3).


18. At 433e6-8 ordinary justice is described approximately in this way.
19. 440b4-7. Note particularly throughout the entire passage the extensive use of metaphors of war. Leontius identifies himself hama with his appetites and his reason; the appetites overcome Leontius insofar as he is identified with his reason.

20. See the contrast at Gorgias 507c7-508c4 between ἕπονεξία and ἰσοτεὶς γεωμετρικῆ.

21. The "political courage" at 430c3 is true belief about what should be done.

22. 505a2-4, 500c9-d2. The philosopher is even called "divine" at 500d1. But the "perfect man" at 499b2-3 is not identified with the philosopher.

23. Phaedo 68c-69d; 82ab; Republic 500d8, 619d1.

24. Virtue is described as εὐεχία at 444e1. Justice is a ἕξις at 443e6. It is called a δύναμις at 443b5.

25. Plato makes a point of distinguishing them at 443e5-6.

26. My thanks to my colleagues B. Inwood, J. Rist, and F. Sparshott who read an earlier draft of this paper and made many helpful suggestions.