Translation And Conflict: Arab-Spring Uprisings and Their Impact on Translation from Arabic into English

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Translation And Conflict:

Arab-Spring Uprisings and Their Impact on Translation from Arabic into English

ARABS’ POST ARAB-SPRING DILEMMAS

Abstract

The present dissertation intends to provide a detailed account of the main issues of translation from Arabic into English and to highlight the roles that translators and translations can play in terms of elaborating, subverting, or undermining narratives circulated about certain communities and events. To do so, the present dissertation uses narrative theory in translation studies as developed by Mona Baker as a theoretical framework to describe the translation scene from Arabic into English in the wake of the Arab-Spring uprisings.

The dissertation provides a brief introduction to the narrative theory in translation followed by a discussion of the main disciplinary narratives that take the field of Arabic into English translation as their field of inquiry. This discussion is significant as a way of explaining the increase in the number of titles translated from Arabic into English after 2010. Another important element that is discussed as part of this dissertation is the analysis of paratextual practices and shifts that a translated book undergoes. The
expanded analysis can uncover the subtle framing practices that cannot be understood through analysis of translated texts alone.

The section that follows engages with translating from Arabic into English. I take the translation of the Arabic word *al-irhab* (terror) as an example of the concepts that I translated in the course of translating the book: الأرَبَعُ مُعَضَّلَاتُ ما بَعْدِ الربيع (al-Arab: Mu’dilat Ma Ba’d Arrabie, *Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas*), whose translation makes up the last section of this dissertation.
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Translation And Conflict: Arab-Spring Uprisings And Their Impact On Translation From Arabic

Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas

Introduction

The translations of public narratives, that provide various accounts of the causes, actors, and possible solutions of the Arab-Spring uprisings and the dilemmas that resulted from these uprisings, have proliferated after 2010. While the narratives elaborated about these politically sensitive conditions come from different resources such as newspaper articles, news bulletins, and literary and non-literary books, few of them are developed by intellectuals or political scientists who are in a better position to theorize these situations—hence my selection of Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas for translation from Arabic into English. Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas is edited by Marwan Muasher¹, a Jordanian politician and diplomat, and includes contributions by politicians and intellectuals from different Arab countries.

Since these “narratives do not travel across linguistic and cultural boundaries and do not develop into global meta narratives without the direct

¹ He is currently the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He oversees research on the Middle East.
involvement of translators” (Baker 2010, 27), the present project is an attempt to make these alternative conceptual narratives available to English readers to “challenge the oppressive public and meta narratives” (27) of the mainstream media and international channels. This highlights the importance of the text/book selected for translation.

Book selection has been a central issue for studies that are concerned with the reception of translations of Arabic titles into English. For example, Baker (2010), maintains that intervention in narratives that are produced through translation does not necessarily involve linguistic inaccuracy for these translations to be misleading. Intervention yields more results, according to Baker (2010, 347), “by intervening in the space around the text (footnotes, prefaces, addition of visual material) and by the very selection of texts to be translated”.

Therefore, book selection and paratextual strategies may be a useful indication of the ideology that drives translation from Arabic. To set the scene for the current project and to situate it within the larger framework of translation from Arabic into English, it is important to survey the disciplinary narratives/competing arguments i.e. the ethnographic/Orientalist frame vs. world literature frame, concerning the driving forces behind the higher translation rates after 2010. Paratextual strategies that come into play in the
space around the translated text will be discussed as a possible framework that might be used to comment on which frame has more currency.

First, let me provide a conceptual narrative of the current political situation in the Arab world. To set the stage for this narrative, this dissertation will begin with a theoretical section which consists of 5 chapters followed by the translation of *Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas*.

Chapter One, A Narrative Account of the Arab-Spring Uprisings, situates the current project within the larger framework of narrative theory in translation. It also highlights my understanding of the role of the activist Arab translator as an intellectual whose mission is to oppose the manipulation of translation in the service of suspicious agendas. The chapter explores how Baker herself is an example of an activist Arab translation scholar and intellectual whose work involves deconstructing “Narratives of terrorism and security” to expose their “suspicious frames”. The chapter then moves on to survey the main concepts of the narrative theory and how they can be used to describe translation from Arabic into English.

Chapter Two, Disciplinary Narratives of Translating from Arabic into English, discusses the disciplinary narratives that take the field of translation from Arabic into English as their field of inquiry. These disciplinary narratives have significant impact in terms of developing a better
understanding of the high translation rates from Arabic into English after 2010. However, the chapter concludes that these narratives which dismiss Orientalism as a viable framework for explaining the high translation rates fail to make the right conclusions from the increasing number of translations.

Chapter Three, Paratexts in Translation, highlights how the analysis of paratextual practices and shifts that a translated book undergoes can uncover subtle framing practices that cannot be discovered through narrowly textual analysis of translated texts. The chapter gives some examples of paratextual shifts that books translated from Arabic into English after 2010 underwent. The chapter concludes that the same paratextual practices that prevailed before 2010 are still practiced which undermines disciplinary narratives that speak of change in the way we read narratives or political change in the Arab world.

Chapter Four, Translating Terror: Terrorism and the Sins of Translation, discusses the translation of the Arabic word الإرهاب (al-irhab, terrorism) into English. The idea behind this chapter is to respond to Osama Alghazaly Harb, in his chapter entitled “Revolution Phenomenon in the Twenty-First Century,” questioning of the use of the Arabic term al-irhab, to refer to acts of violence and killing. He states that the word was originally used in the discourse on both the French and Chinese revolutions in a positive sense. After discussing this issue from a translation studies perspective, the chapter concludes that the
concept of *al-irhab* and all forms of opposition and violence, legitimate or illegitimate, are labeled as acts of terror to justify the American foreign policy after 9/11. I decided to translate *al-irhab* as terror and to italicize it to draw the attention of readers to the fact that this translation is contested or problematic for some Arabs/Muslims.

Chapter Five, *Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas*, is an introduction to the book that I translated from Arabic into English. The chapter opens up by introducing the Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation; an initiative from the Arab Bank in Jordan. The chapter sheds light on the educational and political activities of the foundation and how sponsoring the publication of this book explains the political stance that the Foundation has always promoted. The chapter goes on to describe the book in some detail and highlights some translational choices and issues that were tackled during the translation of the book.
Chapter One: A Narrative Account of the Arab Spring Uprisings

I set out in my current translation project from my belief in and understanding of the role of the activist translator. A translator must assume an oppositional stance to the manipulation of translation in the service of suspicious agendas that narrate only a part of the story; the part that supports the ideology of one party over the other. An activist translator must refuse to be complacent in relation to authoritative academic institutions or publishers’ translation practices that dehumanize and criminalize certain communities, even when these parties commission him or her to perform a translation. As Lawrence Venuti (2010) put it:

This translator will be constantly alert to the differences that comprise foreign languages, texts, and cultures, constantly engaged in signaling those differences to constituencies and institutions in the receiving situation, and constantly inventive in finding the linguistic and cultural means to make a productive difference in that situation. (Venuti 2010, 80)

This translator has to play the role of an activist and intellectual, to use Edward Said’s term (Said 1994, 21). A translator needs to be an activist because his or her translation activity is performed in a politically charged atmosphere. There is no way a translator, or any other intellectual for that matter, can perform his or her work without being part of a political circle in a way or another because:
Politics is everywhere; there can be no escape into the realms of pure art or thought or, for that matter, into the realm of disinterested objectivity or transcendental theory. Intellectuals are of their time, herded along by the mass politics of representations embodied by the information or media industry, capable of resisting those only by disputing the images, official narratives, justifications of power circulated by the increasingly powerful media.

(Said 1994, 21-22)

Of course, translation is one resource of information that feeds in the ‘information and media industry’ (Baker 2010). An activist translator can work on two levels. First, he or she can either produce translations of texts that have already been translated with the aim of ‘signaling out differences’, as stated above by Venuti, and ‘disputing the images, [and] official narratives’ as stated by Said, or expose these differences or images through publishing articles or even books that highlight these blatant translation activities. A good example of such a translator is Mona Baker who dedicated a series of her articles (e.g. “Narratives of terrorism and security: ‘accurate’ translation, suspicious frames”, 2010 among other articles) to exposing the translational practices of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI): “how MEMRI’s entire translation programme participates in constructing Arab and Muslim communities as terrorist and extremist.” (Baker 2010, 349)
Baker focuses particularly on exposing MEMRI’s practices because it is the “most influential with politicians and the media, especially in the United States” (349). Moreover, Baker dedicated a series of her earlier articles (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) to show the different ways translation can be manipulated to serve political purposes.

Second, an activist translator can work on translation projects that would not otherwise be chosen for translation by dominant institutions or publishers. The selection of texts to be translated is another way an activist translator can counter the knowledge constructed about certain communities by giving voice, in the target language and culture, to texts that provide other worldviews from communities that have been represented as a security threat. My selection of *Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas* for translation into English is in line with this second task of the activist translator. The book presents the views of a group of contemporary Arab intellectuals on the current social and political upheavals in the Arab world. These intellectuals, coming from different Arab countries, not only provide an alternative representation of their societies, other than the “dehumanising narratives” (Baker 2010, 347), but also reflect on the causes of the status quo and the possible solutions out of these dilemmas.
Contributors in this book challenge the public narratives “circulating among social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family, religious or educational institutions, a political or activist group, the media, and the nation” (Baker 2010, 25) in their respective countries and provide their own conceptual narratives and stories of the events surrounding them with the hope that their narratives can have an effect on their societies or even the whole world (26). Most of the public narratives that these contributors challenge are narratives circulating/circulated in the media about the social/political disorders in the Arab countries which undermine narratives that do not fit within the stereotypical image of the Arab societies. Margret Somers and Gloria Gibson (1994, 62) state that “[t]he mainstream media arrange and connect events to create a “mainstream plot” about the origin of social disorders.”

Because of the importance of the translators’ role in the transmission of narratives across languages and cultures where they can acquire the status of meta narratives, (Baker 2010, 27), the present project is an attempt to make these alternative conceptual narratives available to English readers to “challenge the oppressive public and meta narratives” (27) of the mainstream media and international channels.
I use public and conceptual narratives as described by Mona Baker (Baker 2010). Baker provides an outline of a narrative framework that might be used to explain and critique the work of translators and interpreters whose translation and interpretation activity is socially or politically motivated. Drawing on the work of social theorists like Margaret Somers and Walter Fisher, Baker defines narratives as “public and personal stories that we subscribe to and that guide our behavior.” (Baker 2010, 25)

Following Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson (1994) Baker distinguishes between four types of narratives namely: ontological, public, conceptual, and meta narratives. She defines ontological narratives as “personal stories we tell ourselves about our place in the world and about our own personal history” (25). Although ontological narratives are interpersonal and social in nature, their main focus is one’s self and his or her surroundings. Public narratives for her are “stories elaborated by and circulating among social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family, religious or educational institutions, a political or activist group, the media, and the nation.” (Baker 2010, 25)

As for the conceptual narratives, they refer to concepts and explanations elaborated by social researchers. Baker finds it reasonable and productive to add “disciplinary narratives in any field of study” to the definition originally
put forward by Somers and Gibson. As such, she defines conceptual narratives as “stories and explanations that scholars in any field elaborate for themselves (and others) about their objects of inquiry.” (ibid. 26). While some of these stories might have substantial impact worldwide, others impact their community or filed only.

For meta narratives, Baker cites Somers and Gibson’s definition as “narratives in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history” (Somers and Gibson 1994: 63 qtd in Baker 2010: 26-27). Meta narratives, or master or super narratives as Somers and Gibson, and Baker call them respectively, as opposed to the three first types transcend geographical and national borderlines and spaces and affect the “lives of the entire world population.” (27).

I find Baker’s addition of disciplinary narratives above as part of conceptual narratives helpful in understanding the importance and impact of the disciplinary narratives elaborated by researchers in the field of translation from Arabic into English. The significance of these narratives stems from their ability to explain the real factors that led to the increase of the Arabic titles into English.

While the impact of these narratives may be restricted to the field of Arabic translation, they might have more significant political impact in terms
of revealing whether or not we are witnessing a new era of cultural and political interaction between the Arab world and the West as suggested by some narratives below. At the disciplinary level, these narratives can have a considerable impact of the field of Arabic translation in terms of developing this field as “[e]very discipline, including translation studies, elaborates and thrives on its own set of conceptual narratives” (Baker 2010, 26). In the following section, conceptual narratives that tell various, even conflicting, stories about translation activity from Arabic into English will be compared because of their significant framing effects on the field of Arabic translation studies and Arab readers at large.
Chapter Two: Disciplinary Narratives of Translating from Arabic into English

Statistics from the Three Percent database show a noteworthy increase in the titles translated from Arabic into English in the years following the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings (Three Percent). The website reported that 18 titles were translated from Arabic into English in 2011, 24 in 2012, 16 in 2013, 30 in 2014, 26 in 2015, and 23 in 2017. With these numbers, Arabic ranked 8th, 5th, and 6th in the list of the 43 languages translated into English for the years from 2011 -2017. According to some translation studies researchers (Shamma 2016; Alkharashi 2016; and Van Leeuwen 2016, among others), this increase suggests a change in the attitudes, practices, and/or intentions of the actors involved in the processes of selecting, translating, and circulating the translated Arabic works. Some of these researchers even started questioning the validity of the discourse on Orientalism and cultural hegemony for the interpretation of the factors behind the higher translation rates from Arabic. Drawing on the narrative theory, this dissertation represents ontological and disciplinary narratives elaborated on the field of Arabic translation. These narratives are important because of their potential
contribution to the advancement of this field and because of their potential impact in shaping public narratives.

Translation from Arabic into English, as well as other Western languages, is burdened by a long colonial and imperial history of political and ideological confrontations between the Arab world and the West. From a translation studies lens, Arabic literature is seen as suffering from many problems ranging from being “embargoed” (Said 1990), to “incompatibility or low prestige” (Lefevere 1992), to untranslatable (Kilito 2002), and to being considered potential financial burdens. and commercial risks associated with promoting it (Lefevere 1992, and Clark 2000).

Edward Said famously described Arabic literature as an “embargoed literature” (Said 1990). In this example of influential disciplinary narrative, which was based on ontological and public narratives, Said was recounting his own experience with a ‘major New York commercial publisher known for his liberal and unprovincial views” (278). Upon the publisher’s request, Said suggested a list of the so-called “Third World” novels to be translated and published including two or three novels by Naguib Mahfouz. None of Mahfouz’s works were chosen because, according to the publisher, “Arabic is a controversial language” (278).
The situation got worse for Arabic due to political events such as the 9/11 attacks. Arabic, among other non-Anglophone languages, is “treated as unequal to an American standard, they are ranked low in a decisive political hierarchy” (Venuti 2012, 395). Arabic is at the top of the list of the so-called critical languages that are considered a threat to the American national security (Rafael 2009).

The rising interest in translating Mahfouz’s works into English after winning the Noble Prize in 1988 leads Said to stress that translating Arabic works into English does not guarantee good reception of these works in the receiving culture. The problem was no longer, according to Said, one of unavailability of Arabic literature in translation, but rather the problem has been that works translated from the Arabic language remain largely “overlooked or deliberately ignored by editors and book reviewers” (278) and that the translations of these works do not receive any attention simply because they do not repeat the “usual clichés about ‘Islam’, violence, sensuality, and so forth” (278). Moreover, Said adds that this shows a kind of deliberate policy of reductionism against Arabs and Islam. It is the kind of Orientalist discourse that “distances and dehumanizes” others, let alone their language and their culture.
However, Said does not only blame Westerners and Western academy for the low status associated with Arabic literature in English translation, he blames “Arab writers themselves (as well as their publishing houses, ministers of culture, embassies in Western capitals)” (280) because they have rarely done anything to promote their works in the West. The issues pointed out by Said were later echoed by Andre Lefevere (1992) in his discussion of the translation of the Arabic qasidah (poem).

Lefevere states that “[o]f all great literatures of the world, the literature produced in the Islamic system is arguably the least available to readers in Europe and the Americas” (1992, 73) and even when works are translated from Arabic they face one of two problems. First, their circulation is hindered because of different factors like their high cost. Second, the “incompatibility of the poetics of the European and the Islamic systems” in the sense that translators, or ‘rewriters’ in Lefevere’s terms, apparently fail to ‘naturalize’ the qasidah in the Euro-American system.

Furthermore, Lefevere adds that there is another reason for the failure to naturalize the qasidah other than incompatibility which is the “low prestige of Islamic culture in Europe and the Americas” (75). This low prestige instigates two reactions on the side of Euro-American readers the most radical of which is that readers explicitly refuse being exposed to this culture while
the other reaction tolerates exposure to the Islamic culture but based on the very Eurocentric notion of ‘dominant/dominated’ relationship. Because of the prevalence of such a relationship, another problem arises here as to what to be chosen for translation must meet ‘popular taste’ in the translating culture. Peter Clark elaborates on this issue from his personal experience.

Peter Clark in his book *Arabic Literature Unveiled: Challenges of Translation* (2000) describes an incident that he experienced when he went to work in Syria in the 1990s. Clark wanted to translate a contemporary Syrian literary work into English. He was interested in the work of ‘Abd al-Salam al-‘Ujaili who wrote novels, short stories, poetry, and criticism. When Clark proposed to his British publisher a volume of translation of ‘Ujali’s short stories, the editor’s reply was that “[t]here are three things wrong with the idea. He’s male. He’s old. And he writes short stories. Can you find a young female novelist?” (Clark, 2000: 3). Clark considers the publisher’s comment as a reflection of the policy of the publishing house. It is a risk, from the publishing house’s point of view, to publish Ujali’s works who was unknown to the Anglo-Saxon reading public.

According to Clark, the availability of excellent Arabic literature is less significant than the “tastes of the Anglophone reading public as perceived by the publisher” (Clark 2000, 4). Obviously, these tastes, or at least perceptions
of those tastes, favor women’s literature over men’s literature because women’s literature has a “built-in advantage” (Clark 2000, 4). Clark questions this advantageous status of women’s literature by raising the following question: “Is this because of lingering orientalist fantasies of the harem, or due to a liberal wish to offset prevailing gender imbalances and inequities?” (4). Clark’s own answer to his question best summarizes the problem of Arabic literature in translation where he states that: “[c]ommercial calculation gets in the way of the dissemination in English of the best Arabic literature” (Clark 2000, 4).

Clark summarizes the problems of translation from Arabic as related to orientalism and the resulting prejudice associated with it as well as the financial risk that publishers fear. He suggests two solutions to these problems. First, Arabs must become proficient literary translators by learning foreign languages. Second, the risk that publishers fear must be removed. The issue of financing translation projects that Clark suggest as one of the main hindrances of the translation activity confirms Richard Jacquemond’s view of translation as set “within the general framework of the political economy of intercultural exchange, whose tendencies follow the global trends of international trade” (1992:139).
Jacquemond, who examines the situation of French-Arabic translation activity between France and Egypt from postcolonial lens, explains that the direction of translation activity is mainly “North-North, while South-South translation is almost non-existent and North-South translation is unequal: cultural hegemony, confirms to a great extent, economic hegemony” (139). Jacquemond’s fine description of translation directionality and hegemony applies to the relationship between almost all hegemonic and counter-hegemonic language. Lawrence Venuti (1998: 160) describes the same North-South translational relations as asymmetrical and the statistics he provides, in this regard, confirm, to a great extent, Jacquemond’s description cited above. This asymmetry or inequality can be explained as follows: 1) while only 1 or 2 percent of the book market in the South is translated from Northern languages, 98 or 99 of the book market in the South are translations from the North (Jacquemond 1992, 139). 2) Even when works from the South are translated in the Northern languages, they are consumed within almost closed circles of specialized people while works written in North are widely circulated among the Southern readerships whether in their original languages or in translation. 3) This kind of disproportionate translation relationship reinforces the colonial notion of cultural hegemony where the former colonizers’ intellectual production continues to greatly influence the cultures
and languages of the formerly colonized while the influence in the opposite direction is nil. The problem of Arabic literature translated into English, in light of Jacquemond’s essay, is that it is governed by political, social, and historical determinants of power differentials between the Arab world and the West.

Another obstacle that hinders the translation and circulation of contemporary Arabic literature in the West is the translation of earlier works like *Arabian Nights* and other similar works such the translation of the *Ruba’yat* by Omar al-Khyyaam. Hartmut Fahndrich (2016) in his essay “Translating Contemporary Arabic Literature: a pleasure with many obstacles” traces the development of a European image about the ‘Orient’ and its literature which turned into a ‘cliché’ that is difficult for the modern Arabic literature to challenge because it does not match this cliché. Fahndrich explains that Galland’s translation of the *Arabian Nights* “contributed to, or helped to create, the image of a magical, an enigmatic, a fairy-tale orient” (2016, 18). This long reception of the *Arabian Nights* has become part of the European cultural heritage during the 18th and 19th centuries which in turn “has built an insurmountable obstacle to progressive translation and publication of Middle Eastern literature” (Fahndrich 2016, 20). Modern Arabic literature is deprived of the chance of being ‘read and treated’ on the
basis of their own merit without having to match presupposed expectations based on the translation of works like the *Arabian Nights* and *Ruba’yat*.

The disciplinary narratives elaborated above by Said, Lefevere, Clark, and Jacquemond all tell the story of translation from Arabic into English from their personal experience and based on the public narratives circulating among social, educational, political institutions, and the media.

However, recent research on the translation from Arabic into English has seen other disciplinary narratives that started questioning the “validity of existing interpretive frames” (Shamma, 2016: 7) when discussing the translations done from Arabic into English because of the recent political events in the Arab world.

It is not uncommon to link translation from one language into another to social, political, or economic events that may not seem directly related to translation/language. This might explain the increase in the number of Arabic titles translated into English as a way of learning about Arabs and about what is currently going on in the Arab world. In the same vein, Tarek Shamma (2016), in the introduction of his edited volume: *Arabic Literature in Translation: Politics and Poetics*, maintains that Arabic literature continues to be viewed by most publishers and readers as a means of gathering information about the Arab culture (7). The role that translation is expected to
perform in this regard is to “complement the exponential growth in studies on the social, religious, and especially political, life of the Arab world, which was coupled by a boom in academic offerings in these areas” (7-8). Shamma (2016) stresses that the current political events taking place in the Arab world make up an important criterion in the selection of works to be translated; political milestones, whether we like it or not, seem to be more important than literary merits of the Arabic works selected for translation. Focus on Arabic literature stems from its “socially representative value” (8) rather than its own literary value. Shamma supports this idea by referring to the list of winners of the International Prize of Arabic Fiction (IPAF) where he states that a combination of “grand causes … and intercultural experience seem to be more decisive factors, above and beyond literary merits” (8).

Richard Van Leeuwen (2016) discusses the reception of the European translations of One Thousand and One Nights. In his discussion, he juxtaposes two approaches: one that stresses contextual aspects of the process of translation in terms of appropriating the text and as such conforms to the “model of orientalism as developed by Edward Said;” (Van Leeuwen, 2016: 31) while the other approach places more emphasis on the textual aspects in the process of translation and as such conforms to the “model of world literature” (31). He argues that the “theoretical framework of orientalism as a
mechanism governing cultural exchange” (2016:29), as put forward by Edward Said, is ‘insufficient’ to explain how the *Thousand and One Nights* was incorporated into European literature and later in world literature. Van Leeuwen criticizes orientalism ‘as a methodological instrument’ for the analysis of the translation process of the *Thousand and One Nights*. The problem with Orientalism, according to him, is its emphasis on highlighting exotic elements of the *Thousand and One Nights* as part of the process of ‘translation and transfer’. Scholars who adopt orientalism as an approach to discuss the translation of the *Thousand and One Nights* highlight ideological aspects and overlook ‘textual mechanisms’ that are involved in the transition of texts from one culture to another. Van Leeuwen is calling for a framework that highlights these textual over ideological aspects, a framework that derives from world literature. However, I do not think that seeing the translation process from a world literature lens justifies the exoticizing practices and other shifts that texts undergo as part of the translation process.

Van Leeuwen, however, confirms that the reception of the translations of the *Thousand and One Nights* has been “marred by prejudice and stereotypes” (Shamma, 2016: 9) when he discusses the context of power relations, cultural hegemony, and colonial expansion in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The translations of the *Nights* were undertaken by
Galland, Lane, Burton, and Mardrus, all of whom explicitly link “their translations [of the Nights] to an external, exotic reality” (Van Leeuwen, 2016: 32). Van Leeuwen concludes that these translations were more of an anthropological work, based on the accompanying footnotes and the amount of appropriation practiced, rather than a work of translation.

Despite his confirmation of the strong arguments for examining the translations of the Thousand and One Nights within the framework of Orientalism on the basis that the work was “appropriated by the translators to be reshaped according to their tastes, political interests, ideological outlooks, and to fit in the broader colonial discourse shaping Europe’s relations with its Other” (Van Leeuwen, 2016: 33), Van Leeuwen dismisses the Orientalist paradigm as a viable framework for examining the translation of the Nights, in favor of the world literature paradigm, because the former has some shortcomings, according to Van Leeuwen. These shortcomings include that 1) the Orientalist paradigm is based on an “ideological perspective” (33), 2) Eurocentrism cannot be avoided because the main actors were European in the absence of the role of Arab intellectuals, and that 3) the nature of the translation process is responsible for some of the characteristics of these translations.
Van Leeuwen’s call for a world literature model as a framework for the examination of the translation of the *Thousand and One Nights* is based on the argument that within the world literature paradigm the “ideological aspect of the migration of texts is not neglected, but some of the premises mitigate its significance and shift the focus from contextual to textual mechanisms” (Van Leeuwen: 2016: 34). Although Van Leeuwen advocates shifting the focus from the contextual to the textual aspects of translation, he does not engage with close analysis of the textual or paratextual elements of the translations of the *Nights* to support his argument. Van Leeuwen based his narrative on evaluation criteria; a process known as selective appropriation in narrative theory. However, in his conclusion, Van Leeuwen ignores the framing role of the footnotes and appropriation that characterized the translations that he discussed. His conclusion, instead, focused only on listing the shortcomings or Orientalism. These shortcomings are among the direct results of colonialism. Orientalism itself is a direct result of colonialism. Moreover, the “muteness [was] imposed upon the Orient as object” (Said 1985, 93) as part of the process through which it was “constituted and then introduced into Europe.” This leads to the conclusion that “[t]he Orient was therefore not Europe’s interlocutor, but its silent Other” (Said 1985, 93).
A similar disciplinary narrative is elaborated by Norah Alkharashi (2016). In her article “Modern Arabic Fiction in English: The Yacoubian Building; a Case in Point,” she questions Edward Said’s description of Arabic literature as an embargoed literature. In particular, she raises the question of whether Said’s observations still remain relevant today (Alkharashi, 2016: 44). Her answer to this question is that Said’s observations are no longer relevant to the situation of Arabic and Arabic literature these days. She bases her answer on some “encouraging signs of change” coming from statistical data for the numbers of Arabic literary titles translated into English in 2014 when 30 Arabic titles were translated into English both in the UK and the USA. According to these statistics which Alkharashi got from Three Percent, Arabic literature was the fourth in popularity after French, Spanish, and German.

Alkharashi’s is basically a case study of the translation of Alaa Al Aswany’s novel *Imarat Yaqubyan* (2002) into English as *The Yacoubian Building* (2004). To set the scene for her discussion of the case study, Alkharashi surveys the major issues and trends in Arabic literature in translation from 1988 – 2014. She bases this periodization on a quote from Buchler et al. (2011) which suggests that literary and political events attract attention to the Arab world. In this regard, she mentions Naguib Mahfouz
winning of Nobel Prize in 1988, September 11th events in the USA, and the ‘Arab Spring’ of early 2010. She provides a brief description of the translation movement of Arabic literature from Arabic into English during these three periods from 1988 – 2014. The first period starts after Naguib Mahfouz was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1988. Alkharashi describes the winning of the Nobel Prize by Naguib Mahfouz as the end of the times when Arabic literature was viewed as a ‘controversial’ one and when it was read by experts’ circles only to serve political agendas. In view of this analysis, Alkharashi states that “while Said’s postcolonial analytical framework has its merits, it may not be the best methodology to study transnational literary exchange between Arabic and English” (Alkharashi, 2016: 50).

Alkharashi thinks that recent developments in the field of translation studies, such as the introduction of Itamar Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory and the incorporation of sociological concepts into translation studies, would be a viable alternative to examine the case of Arabic literature translated in English. She uses both polysystem theory and the sociology of translation as informed by Bourdieu’s literary fields and social agents in her analysis of the function of the English translation Yacoubian Building into English. In her concluding remarks, she presents the translation Yacoubian Building as a success story of an Arabic literature into English translation. However, she
also mentions that “no review mentions the literary value of the novel” (Alkharashi, 2016: 56). Furthermore, she quotes Buchler et al. (2011:45) as saying “reviews of Arabic literature, when they occur, are almost always fairly superficial”. The results of Alkharashi’s study are far from being generalizable to the field of translating Arabic literature into English. First, she only analyzes the translation of one literary work. Second, the translation, as shown by the reviews cited by Alkharashi, was not celebrated for its own literary merit but for the controversial themes of the original novel which was dismissed by some Egyptian critics as belonging to low literature.

These two points show that the field of Arabic literature translated into English is still governed by the same old Orientalism paradigm as can be shown by an analysis of textual and paratextual elements of this novel i.e. Aswany’s novel *Imarat Yaqubyan* (2002), as well as other Arabic works translated into English. Third, in the section (one page) that Alkharashi, dedicates for discussion of the effects of the ‘Arab Spring (2010)’ on the translation of Arabic works into English, she very briefly discusses the role of two Arab initiatives namely: Kalima project in the UAE and Qatar Foundation to translate and promote Arabic literature in English. She includes statistics from Three Percent, for the Arabic works translated into English during the years 2012, 2013, and 2014. Most important, the work that she analyses in her
study was written and translated before the time frame set for the current study. Like Van Leeuwen above, Alkharashi argues for dismissing Orientalism as a frame to explain the high translation from Arabic into English.

This argument misses the point because these researchers are drawing the wrong conclusions from the increasing translation rates from Arabic into English. Since the ideological and political realities that have nurtured Orientalism are still in effect, we cannot speak of better images, new lenses, or positive narratives about Arabs in the West or as Edward Said puts it:

Many of these disadvantaged post-colonial states and their loyalist intellectuals have, in my opinion, drawn the wrong set of conclusions, which in practice is that one must either attempt to impose control upon the production of knowledge at the source, or, in the worldwide media economy, to attempt to improve, enhance, and ameliorate the images currently in circulation without doing anything to change the political situation from which they emanate and on which to a certain extent they are based. (Said 1985, 100)

The last narrative in this review confirms that the ethnographic and Orientalist frameworks are still valid for telling the story of Arabic titles while making their way to a second life in English. Susan Pickford (2016) examines difficulties facing Maghrebi Arabic language writers who seek international visibility. To do so, she uses a corpus of works translated into English written by Maghrebi authors writing both in Arabic and French. She studies how these works get translated into English and in a bid to find out what the status that
works translated from Arabic and French have in the target “literary and publishing polysystems” (Pickford 2016: 77). The obstacles that Pickford cites as hindering into-translation of Maghrebi works written in Arabic are the “weakly structured nature of the source publishing sphere and the ethnographic frame that dominates their reception” (77).

Pickford also challenges the idea that Naguib Mahfouz’s 1988 winning of Noble Prize was a turning point for Arabic into English translation of Maghrebi works. She instead attributes English translations of Arabic Maghrebi works to the enfranchisement of Maghrebi works written in the “French literary and publishing polysystems” (77). The driving forces to which Pickford attributes the translation of Arabic Maghrebi works into English are: “Tahar Ben Jelloun’s 1987 Prix Goncourt win, the rise of Francophone Studies within the Anglo-American academy, and the ethnographic frame that saw a cluster of terrorism memoirs translated in reaction to events in Algeria in the 1990s” (77-78).

Pickford’s analysis of the quantitative data regarding Maghrebi works translated into English reveals that foregrounding both Naguib Mahfouz’s 1988 Nobel Prize win and post-9/11 events as turning points for the increase of Arabic works translated into English set by Altoma (1996) and Khalifa and Elgindy (2014) respectively does not apply to Maghreb context. Pickford
states that the results of this analysis should remind us that the Arab literary field should not be treated as a “singular cultural monolith” (Toler 2001: 48 cited in Pickford 2016:84) because each national cultural field and its publishing polysystem has certain characteristics that impact the international circulation of works produced in each field.

In concluding her narrative, Susan Pickford states that the “hypothesis of the significance of the feminist ethnographic frame as a driving force for translation … is supported by a study of the paratext of the translations” (Pickford 2016, 90). The following chapter will shed more light on how paratexts are used for framing Arabic titles translated into English.

In conclusion, while I agree with Yasir Suleiman (2014) that there are considerations, other than Orientalism, to be taken into account, I think Orientalism remains the biggest consideration and that it drives the other, more minor, factors. According to Suleiman:

Publishing is a commercial enterprise; publishers are looking for books that will sell with their target audience. They need to take into account the horizontal expectations of their own readers in English. Orientalism may be one of those expectations, but there are other factors. (Suleiman 2014)

It would be productive if other considerations are taken into account. Publishing policies and reader expectations in the receiving culture certainly have a role to play. However, reader expectations have, in the first place, been
shaped by the Eurocentric/Orientalist discourse. Both publishing policies and reader expectations affect the way translated books are framed to fit the existing stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims. These existing stereotypes are of course one of the products of Orientalism. At this point, the heavy weight of Orientalism on translation can be easily traced since “we can see the influence of orientalism coming into the paratextual features of the text in a particular way” (Suleiman 2014). As an example of this, Suleiman mentions Nawal Al Saadawi’s book’s title (The Naked Face of Eve, translation in Suleiman 2014) which was translated into The Hidden Face of Eve in the translation. The book cover features a picture of a veiled woman although the woman in the original Arabic version does not have any cover which is also indicated in the original Arabic title. The following chapter will shed more light on the manipulation of paratexts in translation for framing purposes.
Chapter Three: Paratexts in Translation

The last narrative in the previous chapter confirms that the ethnographic and Orientalist frames are still relevant for narrating the story of Arabic titles while making their way to a second life in English. Pickford states that the manipulation of paratexts in translation is an indication of the relevance and significance of the ethnographic frame as a way of explaining the increasing translation rates (Pickford 2016, 90). The importance of these paratextual elements stems from the fact that “paratexts are an important site of framing in book translation: they include cover images and blurb, introductions, prefaces and footnotes” (Baker 2007, 160). This chapter will discuss how paratexts are used as framing devices in translation and how they shape and influence readers’ reception of translated books.

As indicated by Yasir Suleiman, publishing and book production is one of the important sites where paratexts come into play. Anglo-American publishers have resorted to paratexts as an avenue to frame the reception of Arabic literature translated into English. In this regard, Lawrence Venuti (1992) states that:
It can be said that Anglo-American publishing has been instrumental in producing readers who are aggressively monolingual and culturally parochial while reaping the economic benefits of successfully imposing Anglo-American cultural values on a sizable foreign readership. (Venuti 1992: 6)

Publishers use both textual and paratextual elements in the framing processes. However, since translation is “a textual activity that is closely scrutinized and generally treated with suspicion,” (Baker 2010, 347) these translations do not necessarily need “to be linguistically ‘inaccurate’ in relation to their source to mystify and mislead” (347). In this case, paratextual strategies provide a significant site for uncovering shifts that translations undergo and consequently the ideologies of translators/publishers.

The study of the paratextual elements of the Arabic titles translated into English uncovers the shifts undertaken by the translators and publishers of these works. In this regard, Mohja Kahf (2000) in her article “Packaging ‘Huda’: Sha’rawi’s Memoires in the United States Reception Environment” discusses the translation of Sha’rawi’s (Mudhakkirati, My Diaries 1981) into Harem Years: the Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist (1986) by Margot Badran. She states that the translator used a different title on the cover for the translated book to cater for the expectations of the reception environment in terms of presenting the Arab woman as seeking rescue “from her narrow straits as an Eastern woman through a European ‘window’ of rescue” (Kahf 2000, 148). The Arabic word Mudhakkirati was translated into English as
Harem Years. This issue is not uncommon in the translation of Arabic literary works into English. In this regard, Amal Amireh and Lisa Suhair Majaj (2000), invoking Edward Said’s “Travelling Theory,” remind us that “texts do not ‘travel’ by accident. Unless originally written in English, they must be translated and then published; they must be distributed.” (Amireh and Majaj 2000, 5). The processes of selection, translation, and circulation bring market forces into play; hence a publisher is the one who makes decisions to “foreground certain texts and repackage or silence others.” (Amireh and Majaj 2000, 6). However, even if works by Arab novelists were written originally in English, they will still be subject to the choices and decisions of Anglo-American publishers. For example, Fadia Faqir’s novel *My Name is Salma* (originally written in English) was published under the title *The Cry of the Dove* in the United States which is different from the title under which the novel was published in the 15 other countries.

Fadia Faqir, who writes mainly in English, elaborates on the title change in her interview with Rachel Bower (2010). The main topic of the interview is Faqir’s novel *My Name is Salma* (2007). The novel was translated into 13 languages and was published in 16 countries. In the United States, the novel was published as *The Cry of the Dove*. Faqir explains that she resisted the title change in the beginning and that she had very little authority over the
appearance of the book which varied between countries where it was published. She maintains that her British and American publishers could not come to an agreement as to which title to be given to the novel. She says that she agreed to publish the novel under a different title in the United States to work with prestigious publishers. She regrets that she agreed to this because it complicated her life and her website. One of the main ideas discussed in the article is that the “marketing and sale of Anglophone Arab fiction often relies on the circulation of stereotypical images.” (Bower 2010, 4).

In this regard, Faqir states that “[t]here is certainly a discrepancy between the content of my novel and its covers. On the cover of most editions Salma has a veil, except in Indonesia, France and Italy, even though in the book she takes it off.” (Bower 7). The interview points to a lack within postcolonial studies in “criticism which combines important questions about material texts with rigorous narrative analysis” in terms comparing paratextual shifts that a translated work undergo to the content of the work. Moreover, the marketing of Arabic literature is dominated by “images of veils, deserts and forlorn individual females” (4). Faqir voices out the need to challenge these representations and refers to the marketing of her novel as “totally Orientalist”. This interview shows the dearth of critical studies that
combine both the analysis of paratexts and texts themselves when it comes to works translated specifically from Arabic.

Gerard Genette (1997) engaged with the study of paratexts of literary texts in his article “Introduction to the Paratext” (1991) and in his book *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation* (1997). Genette (1997) defines the paratexts as the “accompanying productions” (1) that are associated with a text. Genette distinguishes between two types of paratexts namely: peritext and epitext. Peritext refers to all types of paratexual elements that appear on or inside the body of the book itself, such as the book cover, introduction, and preface. Epitext, however, refers to all types of paratexual elements that can be found outside the book including: reviews, interviews, and advertisements. The main function of paratexts is that they surround the text to “present it, in the usual sense of the verb, but also in its strongest meaning: to make it present, to assure its presence in the world, its ‘reception’ and it consumption” (Gérard Genette and Marie Maclean 1991, 261-272). This function of paratexts shows the importance and the potential benefits of the examination of paratexts in translation.

Another important scholar whose work is concerned with paratexts is Michael Saenger whose book, *The Commodification of Textual Engagements in the English Renaissance* (2006) explains that aspects of Renaissance books
that were designed to advertise and present texts seem strange to modern readers. Saenger calls these aspects title pages and front matter paratexts. Saenger’s book examines the paratexts of Renaissance books published in London between 1580 and 1620. His focus is on how paratexts structured the way in which readers approached, engaged, and understood texts. Saenger explains that these paratexts served as tools of advertising, framing, and explaining texts. The framing function of paratexts involves influencing the readers’ understanding of a text. Front matter/paratexts mark out a liminal space where texts and readers can interact and “blurs the lines between other elements, such as authors and publishers, art and commerce, truth and fiction.” (Morrow 298).

Saenger examines how title pages, dedicatory epistles, epistles to readers, commendatory verse, titles, subtitles, engraved frontispieces, frontispiece explication poems, and prefatory narratives mediate between the reader and the book and how they develop, complement, and challenge techniques used in other areas of paratexts (14-15). He demonstrates that paratexts often borrow thoughts from inside the main text to frame the book. In light of this, I think that paratexts is a good resource of data for the study of the ideology behind the paratextual shifts of translated books. Although the works mentioned above do not concern themselves with the study of
translated works, they provide an important framework for the analysis of book production of translated works.

The last work in this discussion is concerned with uncovering Arabic language ideology by analyzing the paratexts of books published on the topic of Arabic language. Yasir Suleiman’s *Arabic in the Fray: Language Ideology and Cultural Politics* (2014) provides a chapter-long examination of the role of paratexts in ‘framing’ and ‘presenting’ Arabic language works. He maintains that while each paratextual device has its own function, they collectively present the text and mediate the interaction between these books and their potential readers. The ability of paratexts to convey ideological content in a telegraphic manner is a great advantage that paratexts enjoy over extended textual material. Paratexts engage the public who may read the whole text or even a substantial part of it. The public in this case is one of the channels through which texts circulate in a certain society (95).

Paratexts stand on the fringes of a text and act as “thresholds of interpretation” (Genette 1997, 1) in the sense that they occupy a liminal space. They are not completely inside or outside the text. Because of this liminal position, most readers rarely pay attention to them, hence the ideological loading of these paratexts does not receive due attention. An example of this is Ahlem Mosteghanemi’s dedication of her novel *Dhakirta al-Jasad* (1985)
which was translated into English as *Memory in the Flesh* (2000, 2003) and *The Bridges of Constantine* (2013). The novel is dedicated to the memory of Malik Haddad who decided to give up writing in French after Algeria got its independence from the French colonization. At the same time, Haddad did not have the ability to write in Arabic, hence “he died by the might of his silence to become the martyr of the Arabic language.” (Mosteghanemi and Sreih 2000, 1). This dedication is of great importance for the understanding of the whole novel as being part of Algerian postcolonial writing. The deletion of the dedication in the English translation reframes the novels as romantic outside of the politics of language which is in line with the expectations readers have for works coming from this part of the world.

Suleiman suggests that “the recurrence of the same meanings justifies treating some paratextual frames or devices as tropes of language ideology” (Suleiman 2014, 118). In discussions about Arabic, Suleiman investigates the recurrence of terms like ‘crisis, attack, and defense’ as tropes. Suleiman defines a language ideology trope as a “figurative use of an expression that has currency in talk about a given language” (120). According to Suleiman, Arabic language ideology is encoded in these tropes that act as headings that combine ideas and metaphors about language ideology. These tropes have special importance because of their value in “designation and
taxonomy” (119). These tropes form a network because they overlap with each other. This network of tropes helps in mapping and consequently understanding the perspectives that motivate language ideology. By the same token, tropes can be identified and explored in translations to uncover translation ideology. Uncovering translation ideology would, in turn, uncover cultural politics that govern the selection, translation, and circulation of Arabic literature in the West. For example, one of the most recurrent tropes in the translation of Arabic literature into English is the oppressed Arab/Muslim woman.

A quick survey of jacket copies of English translations of Arabic novels can establish the “frequency and currency” (Suleiman 2014, 125) of ‘woman’ as a trope. In other cases, the word woman is added in the title of the translation although it is not part of the title of the source novel. For example, the title of Samar Yazbek’s novel’s title in Arabic is Tqata’ Niran: Min Yawmiyat al-Intifadhah al-Suriyah (2011) (literally Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution), the published English translation of the title starts with word ‘woman’ i.e. A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution. Other cases, like that of the translation of Ahlem Mosteghanmi’s Memory in the Flesh, includes the addition of a picture of a woman on the
jacket copy of the translation while the original novel does not have a similar image.

**Paratexts in translation studies**

In the field of Translation Studies, many studies have used paratexts to examine different translational phenomena. Those studies have shown that paratexts are not just supplementary materials that surround the text. The following are some Translation Studies works that have examined the use of paratexts to reveal translation norms that control the translation from one language into another.

In his article entitled “Translations, Paratextual Mediation, and Ideological Closure.” (1996), Urpo Kovala studies the ideological role that paratexts play in the translation of American literature in Finland from 1890 to 1939. He explains that the paratexts of the works he analyzed were designed to impact the mode of reading. This resonates with Saenger’s argument above on how paratexts structure and mediate the reader’s approach and engagement with the book.

Aysenaz Koş (2008) examines the ideological attitudes towards women as expressed in the Turkish translations of Simone de Beauvoir’s works. After an analysis of paratextual materials associated with de Beauvoir’s works, Koş
concludes that the use of paratextual materials reflects a shift in the attitudes towards women’s issues and feminism in Turkey during the 1980. Here again, Koş like other researchers above explains that publishers used paratextual materials to guide the readers of the translated works.

Şehnaz Tahir-Gürçağlar (2002) claims that paratexual materials can be studied to uncover ideas that were not expressed explicitly in the text itself and to provide extra information about the text that may help the translator to understand the text in question and to translate it adequately. She adds that paratexts “can be used in order to reveal translational phenomena that are either absent or only implicit in translated texts themselves” (1). By the same token, I think paratexts can be studied to reveal the translator’s or publisher’s agency and attitude towards the translated work and its original culture.

Thomas Spittaël (2014) in his article “The Peritextual paratextual? Framework of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s First Discourse in Eighteenth-Century English Translations (1751–1779)”, examines the use of paratexts for the investigation of the reception of translations. His investigation covers certain types of paratexts including translators’ prefaces and title pages. His article is concerned with the study of the reception of some of Rousseau’s works in Britain. His main argument is that the changes and the shifts performed on the translator’s prefaces and title pages were used to promote
the visibility of the author by adding elaborations to show that the authors works won certain prizes.

**Paratextual Strategies and the English Translation of Arabic Titles**

Paratexts have received little or no attention in relation to studying English translations of Arabic works. Since most encounters with these translations are mediated through these paratexts, attention must be paid to these thresholds because of the information they provide about translation ideology. In what follows, I will discuss the roles played by publishers and translators in the book production of the English translations of the two Arabic titles.

*Dhakirat al-Jasad (Memory in the Flesh, 1993)* is the first novel by the Algerian novelist Ahlem Mosteghanemi. This novel has had the unique experience of being translated into English three times over a relatively short period of time. Peter Clark who undertook the second translation states that “[n]ot even Naguib Mahfouz has had three translations of any of his novels... three translations in fifteen years is remarkable.” (Peter Clark 2013)

The first translation of *Dhakirat al-Jasad* into English, under a literal rendering of the title, *Memory in the Flesh*, was initiated by the American University in Cairo Press following its winning of Naguib Mahfouz Prize for
Literature in 1998. The American University in Cairo Press undertook to sponsor the translation and publication of all novels that win the Naguib Mahfouz Prize for Literature which is organized by the American University in Cairo Press. The novel was awarded the prize based on its aesthetic and literary values in Arabic and this can be taken as the reason behind selecting this novel for translation. The American University in Cairo Press released the English translation in 2000. The translation was undertaken by Baria Ahmar, a Lebanese Journalist, translator and author.

The sales of the English translation of Memory in the Flesh did not match or reflect the wide readership that Mosteghanemi’s works have in Arabic. Mosteghanemi was not satisfied with Baria Ahmar’s translation of her novel for the American University in Cairo Press. In an interview with Nuha Baaqeel (2015) concerning the translation of her works, she openly criticized the translation saying that: “The American University in Cairo was in a hurry to publish the translation after it [the novel] won Naguib Mahfouz Award in 1998” (Baaqeel 146).

Peter Clark reviewed Baria Ahmar’s translation for the seventh issue of Banipal in 2000. Although Clark praised the book, he pointed out certain “defects in the translation, which did a disservice to the original” (Clark 2013). He argued for a comprehensive revision of the English translation. Hence, the
American University Press asked Clark to undertake the task himself. Clark’s revised translation was published in 2003. This time the translation was distributed in the United Kingdom by Arabia Books in 2008.

Thirteen years later, Bloomsbury UK re-released a new translation of Dhakirat al-Jasad under the title The Bridges of Constantine in 2013. This time the translation was undertaken by Raphael Cohen who had earlier in 2011 translated Mostaghanemi’s The Art of Forgetting and he showed, according to Susannah Tarbush (2014), “an affinity with the tone, style and humour of her [Mostaghanemi] writing.” Tarbush adds that the language in The Bridges of Constantine is lyrical and meditative and that the narrative is complex and vivid. A discussion of the paratextual shifts that each publisher i.e. the American University in Cairo Press and Bloomsbury UK engaged with highlights the importance attributed to paratexts in translation.

While Memory in the Flesh (2000, 2003) kept the same cover of the original novel Dhakirat al-Jasad; a colorful blanket and a candle, The Bridges of Constantine got a new cover that features a stereotypical image of the Middle Eastern women as held by people in the West. M Lynx Qualey (2014) describes the image of the woman on the cover of The Bridges of Constantine as “a woman with kohl-rimmed eyes wearing a full veil — a siren call to the English-language reader, an echo of the jackets used for the popular “saving
Muslim women” subgenre.” The addition of this image is an indication of the publisher’s promoting Arabic literary works translated into English as exotic. This image cannot easily be connected to theme of the novel which is an allegory of the social and political life in the decolonized contemporary Algeria.

The front cover of *The Bridges of Constantine* also features a quotation from the Independent on Sunday that reads as “One of the richest and most evocative books that I have read all year.” Another edition of *The Bridges of Constantine* has a different Quotation at the top of the front cover that reads as “The Million-copy International Best Seller”. These two quotations replace “Winner of the Naguib Mahfouz Medal for Literature” that was used in the same place on the cover of *Memory in the Flesh*. This space is empty in the original novel. This shows how important these paratextual practices from the publishers’ perspective.

Both translations got rid of the famous Arab poet Nizar Qabbani’s blurb to the original novel which appears on the back cover. The back cover of *Memory in the Flesh* features the logo of Naguib Mafouz Medal followed by a blurb from Naguib Mahfouz, “I thoroughly enjoyed this beautifully written book”. The back cover also features a quote from a major Egyptian newspaper i.e. Egypt Today which reads as follows:
With a sublime emotional intensity, Mosteghanemi injects the reader into the mind, heart, and soul of her characters, shedding new light on the meaning of yearning, nostalgia and the pain of a disembodied spirit.” – (2003)

The back cover of *The Bridges of Constantine* features some quotations from the Independent on Sunday, The Times, and the Daily Mail. The quotations chosen for *The Bridges of Constantine* differ in their content from those chosen for *Memory in the Flesh*. While the quotations printed on the back cover of *Memory in the Flesh* stress that the novel is a winner of Nuguib Mahfouz Medal for Literature, the quotations on the back cover of *The Bridges of Constantine* all refer to the themes of the novel itself. These quotations stress the idea that the novel addresses both love and politics. For example, the quotation from the Daily Mail states that: “Love affairs, like politics are both complex and quixotic. This novel explores both, a window into a different world.” The quotation from The Times reads as: “Framed by a powerful love story … No emotion is small here; the writing is lush and stately.” It is easy to recognize the departure from the kind of quotations which accompanied the publication of the first translation of the novel. This can be partly interpreted by the fact that the novel was retranslated and republished at the time of uprisings in the Arab world. Making references to politics and to the themes of the novel which addresses the Algerian war of independence may increase interest in a novel which describes in detail the Algerian
revolution and its aftermath on the political and social levels. However, these references are made on the back cover and are mixed with explicit reference to ‘love’ which is not a central theme in the novel.

**Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution**

The paratextual shifts that Samar Yazbek’s novel *Tqata’ Niran: Min Yawmiyat al-Intifadhah al-Suriyah* (2011) underwent as part of the translation process are strikingly obvious. The novel was translated by Max Weiss and published by Haus Publishing. The novel was translated under the title *A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution* (2012).

As is the case with many Arabic novels translated into English, the English translation features some paratextual changes introduced by both the translator and publisher. These changes affected the cover of the novel, the title, and adding a foreword. These changes, especially the addition of the word ‘woman’ to the title of the novel, would change the reception of the novel among its potential English readers. This is one of the main functions of the paratexts in terms of ‘framing’, to use Mona Baker’s term, the public’s understanding of a book. In this regard, Baker states that “Apart from images, captions, and the manipulation of titles, paratexts are an important site of
framing in book translation: they include cover images and blurb, introductions, prefaces and footnotes” (Baker 2007, 160).

Whereas the cover image of the original novel features crossing lines that symbolizes crossfires covering the title of the novel on a blank white background, the cover of the English translation is crowded with details. The front cover of the English translation is a picture of a group of demonstrators raising the flag of the Syrian revolution. Another large flag of the Syrian revolution appears on the right-hand side of the picture. A comparison between the covers of the original and the translation shows how paratexts are accurately designed to serve the publishers’ ideologies. The publisher of the original, Dar al-Adab in Lebanon, used a book cover that may appeal to readers of different political attitudes. The cover does not indicate whether the contents of the book support the Syrian regime or opposes it. This cover reflects a fact that no one can object to; a crossfire. In this case, different people regardless of their political alignments may engage with the book either as public or as readers, in Suleiman’s terms above. It is obvious that the publisher does not seek to complicate the situation of the book circulation in a country whose population are divided into either opponents or supporters of the Syrian regime.
The title of the English translation is the most striking example of how Arabic literature is treated in the English translation. An image of a woman or even the word woman, as I mentioned in the discussion of Suleiman’s work, is usually added on the cover of the translated work regardless of whether this image or word is relevant to the theme or not. This is true in the case of the translation of Yazbek’s novel. The word ‘woman’ is added to the title although the word does not appear in the Arabic title. This addition shifts the focus from the main theme of the novel which is ‘crossfire’ to ‘woman’. The novel is about the crossfire in Syria and how innocent people; males and females, young and old are affected by this crossfire. The first page of the text of the novel is dedicated to the definition of crossfire as “where an individual or a political or military group is within range of two or more lines of fire, from both enemy and friend” (Yazbek and Weiss 5). The addition of the word ‘woman’ in the title, as well as the other examples discussed above, suggests to what extent the translated works depend on paratexts in presenting Arab women, and their societies by extension, as oppressed, exotic and different to tap into readers’ expectations.
Chapter Four

Translating Terror:

Terrorism and the Sins of Translation

This chapter is motivated by my translation of one of the chapters in Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas. Osama Alghazaly Harb, in his chapter entitled “Revolution Phenomenon in the Twenty-First Century”, questions the use of the Arabic term الإرهاب (al-irhab, terrorism) to refer to acts of violence and killing. He states that the word was originally used in the discourse on revolutions in a positive sense (Harb 2016, 60). Moreover, Mohamed Jumeh (2010) in his article, “Terrorism and the Sin of Translation” blames translation from English into Arabic for the intralingual translation that the word underwent in its original language. According to Jumeh, al-irhab was meant as a way of military deterrence to avoid violence and wars in the Arab Peninsula.

The common denominator between Harb (2016) and Jumeh (2010) is that they both argue that these two words i.e. al-irhab and terrorism are not the ‘right equivalents’ for each other. Such arguments that describe
translations as simply right/wrong assume what Lawrence Venuti (2010) refers to as an “instrumental model of translation as the reproduction or transfer of an invariant contained in or caused by the source text” (74). Venuti maintains that most translation practice, translation research, and translator training are guided by instrumentalism which is the common understanding of translation these days.

Venuti suggests replacing instrumentalism by hermeneutic thinking to advance the understanding of translation. A hermeneutic model is based on the understanding of language as “creation thickly mediated by linguistic and cultural determinants” (74). According to this hermeneutic model, translation is viewed as an “interpretation of the source text” (74). Furthermore, the form, meaning, and effect of the source text are viewed as variable as opposed to invariant in the instrumental model. As a result, the source text, its form, meaning and effect are all subject to “inevitable transformation during the translation process” (74). This understanding of translation as an interpretation points out to the important role of the receiving language and culture in reproducing the text. This understanding is also important to account for the appearance of different translations of the same source text as each translation reflects the understanding and interpretation of the source
text. To Venuti, a source text is altered during the process of translating it into the target language and culture:

Translating never gives back the source text unaltered. It can only inscribe an interpretation, one among many possibilities, through lexical and syntactic choices that can alter source-textual features like meter and tone, point of view and characterization, narrative and genre, terminology and argument. (Venuti, 2010: 74)

This understanding is important because it explains that there are other ways of describing translations than either “right” or “wrong”. A translation is just another interpretation or possibility that can coexist alongside other interpretations of possibilities without having to exclude or eliminate the others as valid choices or possibilities. In light of this, one could speak of other options instead of having to say a translation is right or wrong.

Another translation scholar who takes issue with the instrumental view of translation is Andre Lefevere in his 1982/2004 article “Mother Courage’s Cucumbers”. Lefevere’s take on Romanticism is that it is based on the assumptions of the “originality of the author” (204) and on the assumption of “recovering the author’s true intentions”. Lefevere dismisses these assumptions in favor of a “systemic approach [that] tends not to suffer from such assumptions” (2004, 204). Lefevere defines translations produced under this systemic approach as “texts produced on the borderline between systems” (204). Moreover, “Lefevere treated translation, criticism, editing, and history as forms of “refraction: or “rewriting.” (Venuti 2004, 187). Lefevere defines
refractions as “the adaptation of a work of literature to a different audience, with the intention of influencing the way in which the audience reads the work” (205).

Refractions/rewriting, according to Lefevere (2004), are determined by factors such as: patronage, poetics, and ideology (206). Lefevere focuses on the examination of these factors in his 1992 book: *Translation, Rewriting, and the Manipulation of Literary Fame*.

Andre Lefevere was the first scholar to use the term “rewriting” for translation. Theo Hermans (2004) states that Lefevere views translation as a “particular mode of a broader practice” (Hermans 2004: 125). In the beginning, Lefevere used the term ‘refraction’ to refer to this mode, but he later adopted the term ‘rewriting’. Lefevere also had his own ideas about systems and the position of rewritings (translations) in these systems.

Lefevere is concerned with the examination of factors that control the reception, acceptance, or rejection when it comes to translations of literary texts. These factors encompass “issues such as power, ideology, institution and manipulation (Lefevere 1992: 2).” For Lefevere, people who occupy positions of power are the ones who rewrite literature and control the consumption of such rewritten literature among the public readers. Rewritings are motivated and constrained by ideological or poetological factors.
Although rewriting influences translation among other fields of study like histiography and criticism, he only focuses on translation (Lefevere 2004: 9).

Lefevere’s focus is particularly on literary translation. For him, two factors control the field of literary translation namely ‘professionals’ working within the literary system and who decide in part the prevalent poetics. These professionals include translators, academics, critics, and reviewers who, in addition to influencing the poetics, sometimes influence the ideology that controls the translated text. The second factor is ‘patronage’ from outside the literary system, which decides the ideology. Patrons can motivate/constrain the dissemination of literature, whether original or translated. Patrons can be powerful individuals, groups of people, and institutions. (Munday 2008: 194-5).

Patronage, according to Lefevere, has three elements and these elements can interact in different combinations. However, Lefevere (1992: 16-17) distinguishes these elements as follows:

1) The ideological component which constrains the selection of the subject and how it is presented. Lefevere’s definition of ideological is not synonymous with political.

2) The economic component which refers to payments made to writers and rewriters. These payments are typically made by patrons.
3) The status component which takes many forms. For example, the acceptance of patronage involves the membership in certain groups and accepting ‘their lifestyles’.

Moreover, patronage controlling a literary system can be either differentiated or undifferentiated. If the three components mentioned above i.e. the ideological, the economic, and the status components are provided by the same patron, then the patronage is undifferentiated. Patronage is differentiated, however, when economic success is divorced from ideological influences and does not necessarily involve status (17).

The examination of how poetics, ideology, and translation interact with each other make Lefevere conclude that, during the translation process, if linguistic considerations conflict with ideological ones, it is the ideological considerations that win:

On every level of the translation process, it can be shown that, if linguistic considerations enter into conflict with considerations of an ideological and/or poetological nature, the latter tend to win out (1992, 39).

Ideology here, according to Lefevere, refers to either the translator’s ideology or the one imposed on him by his/her patron. Poetics refer to the poetics prevalent in the target culture. It is obvious then that the combination of ideology and poetics determine the translation policy for any translation
project and what solutions are deemed suitable for certain problems (Munday 2008: 197).

Drawing on Charles Peirce’s semiotics, Venuti describes the resulting interpretation translations produced under the hermeneutic model as a “third category” that the translator inscribes. This third category serves as a mediator between the source language and culture and the target language and culture. It is a method of transforming the source text into the translation (Venuti 2010, 75) Drawing on Charles Peirce, Venuti refers to this third category as an ‘interprétant’ which mediates between the signified and the signifier.

A similar view of translation comes from Marilyn Gaddis Rose (1997) who views a translation as a reflection of the translator’s understanding of a text at the time when the translator completed the translation. She adds that this understanding is “time-bound and ideology-cued” (1997: 7). This understanding of translation implies that there might be other possible translations when the same text is translated at different times and/or motivated by a different ideology.

Furthermore, Gaddis Rose sees a source text as “a resilient axis in a circle or a globe with a circumference that wavers and shifts” (7). The circumference might expand or tighten, all that is within the circumference is related to the axis and is “part of a work’s potential” (7) This is idea is
important when evaluating translations in the sense that a translation might be
judge based on the area of its circumference in terms of being wide enough or
being too tight which enables us to avoid instrumental comments such as right
or wrong.

Gaddis Rose states that using the “strategies of stereoscopic reading” (2) is productive when it comes to interpretation of texts. Stereoscopic reading involves juxtaposing a text and the “translations it elicits” (7), which results in gaining gifts that would otherwise be lost. This juxtaposition creates an interliminal space of bridges and thresholds rather than boundaries. Gaddis Rose’s approach views translating as participating in and adding to the text.

Similarly, interprétants in translation make up a principle of mediation, according to Venuti. This principle is formal and thematic:

Formal interprétants include a concept of equivalence, such as a semantic correspondence based on current dictionary definitions, or a concept of style, a distinctive lexicon and syntax related to a genre. Thematic interprétants are codes: they may be specific values, beliefs, and representations; a discourse in the sense of a relatively coherent body of concepts, problems, and arguments; or a particular interpretation of the source text that has been articulated independently in commentary. (Venuti, 2010: 75)

The interprétant is thematic in the sense that it relates the signifier to the signified. The formal element in an interprétant lies in its demonstration of the structure of the relation between the signifier and the signified.
Interprétants belong to the translating language and culture and they are used by translators to recontextualize the source text:

Interprétants are fundamentally intertextual and interdiscursive, rooted primarily in the receiving situation even if they incorporate source-cultural materials to some extent. The translator's application of interprétants recontextualizes the source text, replacing intertextual and interdiscursive relations in the source language culture with relations in the translating language and culture that are built into the translation. (Venuti, 2010: 75-76)

The fact that interprétants are intertextual and interdiscursive and that they belong to the translating language and culture show the importance of considering the receiving situation when evaluating a translation. The comparison of the source and target texts is not enough for the evaluation of the translation. The cultural and social circumstances, under which the translation was performed, have to be taken into consideration because of the role these circumstances play in affecting the translator’s interpretation:

Because translating always submits the source text to a transformation, a translation cannot be evaluated merely through a comparison to that text without taking into account the cultural and social conditions of the translator's interpretation. (Venuti, 2010: 79)

Instead of comparing the source text and its translation in a bid to measure the equivalence at word level, Venuti (2010) rightly suggests shifting the evaluation of translation to higher level that not only takes the cultural and social circumstances into consideration, but also highlights any ideological
practices at play during the translation process to give way to one of multiple ‘competing interpretations’ over the others:

The evaluation must be shifted to a different level, a level that seems to me properly ethical: in inscribing an interpretation in the source text, a translation can stake out an ethical position and thereby perform an ideological function in relation to competing interpretations.

(Venuti, 2010: 79)

A similar comment comes from Susan Bassnett in her (1980/2014) book *Translation Studies*. Bassnett reminds us that translation is more complicated than replacing a group of lexical items from one language with a group of lexical items from another. She states that:

Translation involves far more than replacement of lexical and grammatical items between languages … Once the translator moves away from close linguistic equivalence, the problems of determining the exact nature of the level of equivalence aimed for begin to emerge. (Bassnett 2014: 35)

The question then becomes less of a search for sameness or equivalence in translation because “sameness cannot exist between two TL versions of the same text, let alone the SL and the TL version” (Bassnett 2014: 39). The question then becomes more of how to evaluate a translation and how to benefit of the hermeneutic approach to translation? The answer would be that:

A translation in the human sciences, then, might be evaluated according to its impact, potential or real, on academic disciplines in the translating culture; according to whether it challenges the styles, genres, and discourses that have gained disciplinary authority; according to whether it stimulates innovative thinking, research, and writing and alters the course of the institution. (Venuti 2010, 79)
A translation can then be evaluated based on how successful it is in subverting existing narratives, practices, and providing alternative conceptual narratives rather than on the semantic equivalence between single lexical items.

Back to the translation of the concept in question, Jumeh (2010) argues that setting up the English term *terrorism* as an equivalent of the Arabic term *al-irhab*, is not merely an unintended act of mistranslation. It is rather an interpretation that inscribes the Arabic term with negative connotations for ideological purposes. This mistranslation is ideologically motivated, and it results in an intralingual translation of the Arabic word *al-irhab*. In his 1959/2004 article “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation”, Roman Jakobson lists three kinds of translation as follows:

1. Intralingual translation or *rewording* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.
2. Interlingual translation or translation proper is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.
3. Intersemiotic translation or transmutation is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign system. (Jakobson 2004, 127)

This description might be helpful in explaining the change that the Arabic concept underwent in terms of acquiring new significations that were excluded earlier or that were among other competing interpretations. Intralingual translation occurs when a text is rewritten in the same language. In the case of the concept in question, it might be said the interlingual
translation between English and Arabic gave way to an intralingual translation of this concept within Arabic.

Harb discusses this term in his chapter entitled the “Revolution Phenomena in the Twenty-First Century”. He discusses the term al-irhab as part of his analysis of the Arab-Spring uprisings. He states that there are many elements in a revolution: revolutionary terror, guerrilla wars, traditional wars, mass uprisings, and etc. Harb stresses that the term terror was originally related to revolutions before it came to be related to violence as it is practiced by illegal organizations these days:

It is important to mention that terror was originally related to revolutions before it was connected to violence exercised by some illegal organizations these days. (Harb, 2016: 60).

Hans Wehr’s Arabic-English dictionary: A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic lists the English words: intimidation, frightening, threatening and terror as English meanings of the Arabic noun ارهاب (irhab). The translation of the word irhab is usually discussed because the word invokes the use of this word in a Quranic verse i.e. verse sixty of Chapter Eight of the Quran (Surat al-anfal, the spoils of war):

وأعَدُواْ لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِن قُوَّةٍ وَمِن رِّبَاطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَهُ بِهِ عَذَّوَّالله وَعذَّوَّكُمْ وَآخَرِينَ مِن ذُوّتهمْ لاَ تَعْلَمُونَهُمْ الله

{وَعَلِيمُهُمْ وَمَا يَتَّبَعُونَ مِن شَيْءٍ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ يَوْفِيُهُمْ إِلَىّكُمْ أَنَّهُمْ لا تَعْلَمُونَهُمْ[الأنفال:60]}}
The famous English translations of the meanings of the Quran: Sahih International, Pickthall, Yusuf Ali, Shakir, Muhammad Sarwar, Mohsin Khan, and Arberry translate the word تُرْهِبُونَ into English as: terrify, dismay, strike terror, frighten, frighten, threaten, and terrify respectively. These translations are based on intralingual Arabic interpretations of the Quran. The interpretations of the Quran appeared at different times throughout the Islamic history. The different translations of the word indicate that the word was interpreted differently in Arabic. However, none of these translations coincides with the meaning that the word terror conveys these days.

In English, Meriam Webster’s online dictionary lists four definitions of the word terror. The first definition is: a state of intense fear. The second definition is divided into four sub-definitions: one that inspires fear, a frightening aspect, a cause of anxiety, and an appalling person of thing. The third definition is: reign of terror. The fourth definition is: violent or destructive acts (such as bombing committed by groups in order to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands. The origin and etymology section for the word terror states that the word is “Middle English, from Anglo-French terrour, from Latin terror, from terrere to frighten”.

The third definition sheds light on the origin of the word terror. The reign of terror is a state or a period of time, of the French Revolution from
March 1793 to July 1794, marked by violence often committed by those in power that produces widespread terror. Walter Laqueur (2016) states that the “terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” are of relatively recent date” (6). He states the meaning of “terrorism was given in 1798 supplement of the Dictionnaire of the Academie Francaise as systeme, regime de la terreure.” Furthermore, he adds that according to a French dictionary that was published in 1796, the Jacobins sometimes used the term terrorists while “speaking or writing about themselves in a positive sense” (6). Laqueur concludes that “more recently, the term “terrorism” (like “Guerrilla”) has been used in so many different senses as to become almost meaningless” (6).

According to Harb, Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Revolution, was the first to theorize the connection between terror and revolution. Mao Tse-tung describes how rebels carried out operations against feudal leaders who governed small villages, in order to frighten these feudal heads. Harb stresses the use of frightening and not killing. As such, the term الإرهاب was used to signify terrifying/scaring/frightening, but not killing. In fact, Harb states that at an advanced stage of his research he decided to provide a definition of the word terror in the contexts of the Chinese and Russian revolutions and found that there are 110 definitions of the word. All of the definitions refer to terror as revolutionary act.
Mohammed Jumeh (2010) in his article “Terror and the Sins of Translation” published in Arabic under the title (الإرهاب وخطيئة الترجمة) describes how dangerous this mistranslation of the English word terrorism is. He states that many Muslim preachers in congregational prayers proudly describe themselves as "إرهابيين" ("irhabi-yeen, terrorists"). They use a verse from the Quran to show that the Quran promotes al-irhab. For Jumeh, what these preachers do is a result of mistranslation, if unintended, or even a sin, if intended.

To explain this, Jumeh cites Walter Laqueur’s definition of terrorism as “the use of covert violence by a group for political ends, [which] is directed against a government, less frequently against another group, class or party.” (2016: 79). He also cites the definition put forward by the British government as well as the definition included in the USA Patriot Act and concludes terrorism is defined as the use of violence against civilians for political, economic, religious, cultural, or philosophical ends. These definitions of terrorism do not correspond to the actions commanded by the Quranic verse, cited above, based on which Islam is said to promote “terrorism.”

The same argument is echoed in Jack Draper (2002 cited in Mona Baker, 2006). Translation as a metaphor is used by Draper as a way of explaining the framing of political violence after 9/11. In other words, many
forms of social action that are violent in some sense or another are labeled or named “violent” by the US State department and US mass media] Draper calls that act of indiscriminate naming “translation.” Draper thinks that the US metaphorically translated the various forms of legitimate and/or illegitimate violence that it does not support into the target language of terrorism to justify all its actions after 9/11. This type of translation, for Draper, involves “a transmission of the pure instance of violence into the discourse of terrorism” (in Baker 2006, 107) which entails forgetting the “historical context of violence in order to evacuate it of all meaning” (107). Similarly, Walter Laqueur (1999) states that “terrorism is violence, but not every form of violence is terrorism” (8). This usage of translation as a metaphor can explain what happened to the concept of al-irhab during the process of translation in its literal meaning in the sense that:

Translating a violent act as terrorism thus reifies the act as a commodity which can then be inscribed with whatever moral or political or political connotations the translator deems expedient. (Draper 2002, in Baker 2006, 107).

Once this translation is performed, it can be promoted nationally and internationally. Therefore, discourse on terror sells globally as evident from the popularity of terrorism as a label. As an example of this popularity, Draper describes how Osama bin Laden labeled “Americans [as] proponents of ‘bad terror’ while putting himself on the side of ‘good terror’”. (107)
Therefore, I do not think that the problem both Harb and Jumeh are describing above is a result of the translation of one word from one language into another. The problem is that although terrorism is one of the most-discussed concepts these days, there is no precise definition of what can be referred to as terrorism. When translating the Arabic word *al-irhab* in the body of *Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas*, I used the English word terrorism as a counterpart. However, I write terrorism in italics as a way of signaling that these two concepts are not commensurate in the sense that what actions that are referred to as *terror* in English do not have a lot in common with what the word *al-irhab* originally refers to in the Quranic context.
Chapter Five

*Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas*

**Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation**

The Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation\(^2\) (henceforth Shoman’s Foundation) was founded in 1978 as a non-profit initiative by the Arab Bank in Jordan by allocating a portion of the Bank’s annual profits to help lay the ground for the development of Arab communities through supporting the national economy. Promoting scientific research, cultural enlightenment, and innovation have also been central to the Foundation’s mission.

The Foundation was named after the late Abdul Hameed Shoman (1888-1974), the founder of the Arab Bank. Shoman believed in the importance of promoting knowledge, sponsoring scholars, and promoting Arab individuals’ creativity. The establishment of Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation in 1978 was an embodiment of his vision.

As part of the Foundation’s efforts to promote leadership through encouraging scientific research in different fields, the Abdul Hameed Shoman Award for Arab Researchers was launched in 1982. The Abdul Hameed Shoman Cultural

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\(^2\) The information about Abdul Hameed Shoman’s Foundation are from the Foundation’s official website: [https://www.shoman.org/ar/](https://www.shoman.org/ar/).
Forum was founded in 1986. The Abdul Hameed Shoman Fund for Scientific Research was founded in 1999.

According to the Shoman’s Foundation website, the Abdul Hameed Shoman Cultural Forum, which sponsored the publication of *Arabs’ Dilemmas Post Arab-Spring*, aims at providing the opportunity for a wide audience to meet and interact with Arab intellectuals and politicians.

Considering the time and the participants in the forum, it can be said that Shoman’s Foundation is elaborating its own narrative of the Arab-Spring. All the book contributors promote peaceful solutions and pluralism as a way out of the current dilemmas and blame social injustices as the main reason behind the eruption of the protests.

**Why Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas?**

*Arabs’ Dilemmas: Post Arab-Spring Uprisings* is a timely book that provides expert analysis of the causes of the protests that flooded the streets of some Arab countries after 2010. Translating this book into English will provide Western readers with a conceptual narrative that undermines most of the public narratives that are circulating in the media. The narratives elaborated in the book foreground authoritarianism, monopoly of power, lack
of social justice, sectarianism, and the lack of equal citizenship as the main causes of protests as opposed to the narratives of conspiracy and insurgency.

This important analytical book was published in April 2017 by the Arab Institute for Research and Publishing in Amman, Jordan sponsored by the Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation. It was edited by Marwan Muasher. The book is divided into fourteen chapters written by intellectuals from different Arab countries including Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Tunisia.

Marwan Muasher, the editor of this book, is a prominent Jordanian diplomat and politician. He served as Jordan’s foreign minister from 2002 – 2004. He also served as a deputy prime minister during 2004-2005. Muasher served as senior vice president of external affairs at the World Bank from 2007 – 2010. Muasher is currently the vice president at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He oversees research on the Middle East. Muasher is the author of *The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation* (Yale University Press, 2008) and *The Second Arab Awakening and the Battle for Pluralism* (Yale University Press, 2014).

Muasher describes his 2014 book as an extension of his 2008 book:

> This book is a natural extension of my 2008 volume, *The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation*. Little did I know that, three years later, the unsustainable status quo I wrote about would translate into an Arab Awakening that has swept the whole region. (Muasher 2014, xiii)
Obviously, the current volume i.e. *Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas*, is an extension of the first two volumes. While Muasher chose Arab Awakening to refer to the status quo in his 2014 volume, he uses Arab Spring/Arab Spring Revolutions/Revolutions to refer to the same status in his introduction to the current book. Muasher states that contrary to what the title of the book implies, the causes of the “so-called Arab Spring”, (Muasher 2017, 1) have doubled rather than diminished. Muasher uses *spring* here ironically since the root causes of the protest have expanded and the expectations of democratic transformation faded away. The name given to these protests is important in understanding/shaping the attitude of the major Western powers that are called upon for help.

Although achieving the final results of the protests are in the hands of the people of the countries concerned, major Western powers, also have their own saying in supporting these protests or not. For the major Western powers to be able to help these protesters constructively, they need to have a clear understanding of the causes of these protests. In this regard, Muasher states that “much Western thinking about the Awakening is mistaken - with the resulting danger that Western action may be misguided” (2014, 2). For the first years after the start of the Arab-Spring uprisings, the West turned from calling these protests Arab Spring to viewing it currently as “some kind of
Arab inferno” (ibid.) as a result of the rise of Islamic parties that are seen as a threat to liberal and democratic progress.

As such, other possibilities can be considered for the translation of the Arabic word الفراح (Arrabi’, spring) into English other than the word spring based on Muasher’s explanation of how the causes of the protests have doubled and based on the fact that he uses the phrase “so-called” to describe the Arab-Spring. These possibilities include words like fall/decay as opposed to growth and prosperity implied by the use of the word spring. However, the use of one of these words would remove the connotations suggested by the use of the word in the source text. It would deprive the target text from portraying a scene of fall/decay with a background painted with the alternative spring that could have offered a new life. So, I decided to keep the word spring in italics to draw the readers’ attention to the fact that these protests were supposed to lead to an Arab-Spring, but this spring turned into anything but spring.

Khairy Mansour, one of the contributors, states at the beginning of his chapter “Explosion of the Arab Oppression”, that it is a catastrophe to refer to the protest that swept some Arab countries by the name Arab-Spring. The problem according to Mansour is that the name spring is an Orientalist term which Orientalists used to describe the protests in the Arab world as compared
to what happened in Europe in 1848 at the time of the famous European movements and again when Waterloo Barrack when the Soviet Union attacked Budapest with its tanks to return the country to the Communist Party. Mansour refuses the use of the word *spring* to describe the movements taking place in some Arab countries as this name is misleading to him. He also refuses “Arab Fall” as an alternative and suggests that there is a fifth season which he describes as the season of nothingness and emptiness.

Gouda Abdel-Khalek, in his chapter “Arab Spring and Social Justice: the Case of Egypt” takes a different approach to the discussion of the expression Arab-*Spring*. He states that the expression Arab-*Spring* evokes many emotions and concerns in light of the current Arab situation. He discusses this expression in terms of social justice in light of the experience that he acquired from the Egyptian case which he was a direct part of when he was appointed several times as a minister in four subsequent governments after the January 25th revolution. Abdel-Khalek concludes that the divide is still widening socially and economically speaking, in Egypt as well as in the other Arab countries, between the working and upper classes. This widening divide is a major hindrance of social justice and of any spring by extension.

Hamada Faraneh, in his chapter “Five Years of the Arab-*Spring*” refers to the protests by the expression Arab-*Spring* revolutions. The same thing
applies the word الثورة (ath-thawrah, revolution) which Muasher uses in some instances to refer to the protests. Since Muasher does not seem to stick to one name for the protests and since he uses both Arab-Spring and Arab Revolutions in this volume interchangeably, I decided to translate الثورة here as revolution, and to italicize it as well to attract the readers’ attention to the fact that these names are not definitive since events are still unfolding.

The problem here is two-fold. One the one hand, there is no agreement on whether these protests qualify as revolutions. The concept revolution is not easy to define as illustrated by Osama Al-Ghazali Harb. Harb refers to these protests as twenty-first century revolutions or Arab revolutions as opposed to the twentieth century revolutions that happened in Russia, Egypt, Cuba, and Algeria.

Linguistically speaking, Harb explains that the word refers to the idea of revolving and that it was originally used in astronomy to describe the movement of the planets in their orbits (60). The word was later taken up by political scientists to describe the change of a political regime from autocracy to democracy. Later, the word started to be used to describe radical, comprehensive and instant change of a political regime. In this sense, Harb distinguishes between two definitions of revolution. While functionalism in political science views revolutionary change as deviation from the normal
track and refers to revolution as a stereotypical phenomenon which reflects a kind of disorder in the system, Marxism, however, defines revolution as a fact resulting from development and claims that it does not happen arbitrarily, but as a result of circumstances or because of a shift from one social or economic form to another.

According to these definitions, Harb lists three conditions that must be met for the revolution to start. However, he concludes that these conditions do not apply to both developed and underdeveloped countries alike. Harb concludes that what happened in Egypt, his country, and by extension the other Arab countries that witnessed protests after 2010, are not revolutions. He prefers to refer to what happened in Egypt as an intifada (uprising) rather than a revolution because no radical changes happened in the societies of these countries.
Conclusion

The current project engaged with the main issues that a work translated from Arabic into English faces in terms of what motivates the translation of certain works but not others, presuppositions concerning the content of the work to be translated, paratextual shifts that translated works undergo, and decisions that a translator makes during the translating process. In particular, the discussion in this dissertation concerned itself with the role that activist Arab translators can play to serve the interests of their communities.

The narrative theory in translation studies provided the theoretical apparatus necessary to situate the current translation project and shows how this project functions as a conceptual narrative that provides an alternative perspective on the Arab-Spring Uprisings. However, the discussion of the disciplinary narratives concerning the higher translation rates from Arabic into English after 2010 show that the narratives which attribute this increase to a change in attitudes miss the point as evident from the discussion of the paratextual shifts that the translated works undergo.

The investigation of the paratextual shifts that accompany the production of the translated works show how stereotypes still dominate the
presentation of works translated from Arabic into English. Regardless of the content of these works, the same book covers bearing the images of veiled women and the like are still common.

The translation of the Arabic word *al-irhab*, which is used as an example of the considerations and decisions that a translator has to deal with, into English as terrorism cannot be evaluated as simply incorrect or inaccurate. This translation is an interpretation that has gained more currency and publicity over other choices such as violence and/or acts of violence. Whereas the use of the word terrorism as a translation of *al-irhab* reflects the translator’s position in terms of promoting or undermining a certain narrative, the use of words such as violence/acts of violence reflects that other narratives are possible for the interpretation of a certain event or events. At least, the discussion above serves to point out that the translation of *al-irhab* into terrorism is just an interpretation and that it reflects a certain ideology on the side of translators who have used it.

Finally, the current translation project confirmed my understanding of the importance and centrality of the roles that translator and translations can play in the context of the Arab-Spring Uprisings, Middle East conflicts, and the war on terror because most of the interactions within/with the region are mediated through translation. It also confirms the need for translators to
function as part of larger networks that encompass other influential actors who can provide translators with the resources they need for their work to be successful.
Arabs’ Post Arab-Spring Dilemmas

Introduction

Marwan Mmuasher

The title of this important book implies that the so-called Arab Spring is over and that it has become part of the past. It also implies that Arabs these days are concerned with facing the dilemmas that ensued after this Spring. However, the content of the book does not mean this meaning, because the causes that have led to the outbreak of the revolutions over the last six years are still existent. In fact, these causes have doubled on the ground. Many of the contributors in this book state that these causes include: authoritarianism, monopoly of power, absence of social justice, and the absence of a modern concept of equal citizenship.

The most accurate description of the current stage might be the end of the first stage of what I prefer to call Arab revolutions, which were characterized by the denial of the status quo. As a result, people took to the streets collectively and individually to protest the absence of governance with all its political, economic, and social dimensions. These protests have not
translated into action to produce effective political, economic and social systems that would lead to the establishment of pluralistic communities that are flourishing and stable.

Expectations of instantly moving into democratic communities may have been merely romantic dreams since no movement for change in history has been able to move from protests to the stage of building a modern state in a few years or even decades. This is especially true in the absence of intellectual frameworks backed by large popular bases that can determine what they want for the future, not just those protesters shouting out what they do not want and against the absence of mechanisms needed for building institutions that can incubate and protect pluralistic communities.

This lack of immediate change highlights the importance of such intellectual contributions, which should not suffice to diagnose problems or demolish the old frameworks. They also have to try to set up modern intellectual frameworks to develop the Arab societies. It is feared that merely demonstrating will drag these societies into more authoritarianism, instability, or economic stagnation.

What is crystal-clear in the Arab world is that it is not the end of the Arab revolutions. It is rather the decay of the common social contract in many countries in the region. These contracts were established between authorities
and societies forcefully rather than through negotiations or consensus. These contracts were namely made up of two major items: first, the state is committed to providing its citizens with basic services such as health care services, education, job opportunities, and supporting quality basic goods with subsidies. In return, the people are committed to the second item of the contract which implies their political underrepresentation in running the affairs of their countries or their acceptance of weak or symbolic representation.

These contracts, albeit coercive, remained effective as long as the citizens’ basic needs were available in one way or another. When governments expanded in rentier rather than productive ways, states were no longer capable of maintaining the same level of services provided to the public. At the same time, governments insisted on depriving people from their right to pronounce their self-determination. Arab revolutions were the direct consequence of this disorder.

In addition, many Arab countries collapsed quickly because of the absence of well-established institutions since these countries could not resist the waves of protests. They collapsed because of the absence of these institutions while the security forces tightened their grip through the same old authoritarian methods. Only Tunisia understood the major lesson of the Arab
revolutions, which is the need to develop new social contracts based on agreement among the different elements of society.

The Arab region is currently facing a new dilemma represented by the impending end of the oil era. With the declining oil prices and the international expectations for these prices to remain low in the foreseeable future, the oil exporting countries—as well as countries benefiting from oil revenues, either through financial assistance or through transfers from their citizens working in the oil exporting countries— are no longer capable of funding rentier systems that do not prioritize productivity over rentier. They also cannot face the challenge of providing real job opportunities to young societies that introduce millions of young people to the job market annually.

This analysis leads us to foresee how to move on to a safe and prosperous future. If authoritarianism is a major cause behind the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, the need for governance systems and incorporation is palpable. Moreover, if the rentier systems are not sustainable, gradual and smooth movement to productive systems is spontaneous and inevitable.

However, these two movements seem unattainable because most Arab regimes do not agree to give up a part of their authorities for the purposes of fostering both the legislative and judicial authorities despite their obvious failure in developing their societies. In addition, economic reforms that had
been approved earlier were separate from political reforms necessary to develop a system of separation and balance to ensure monitoring and prosecuting the procedures of the executive authority. Corruption aggravated greatly as a result of implementing these reforms. There is also a need to enable low-income people and to equip them with the qualifications necessary to make them competitive in the job market. This highlights the importance and the necessity of combining the tracks of political and economic reform to achieve the desired stability and prosperity and to ensure effective monitoring and prosecution.

In light of the destructive sectarian conflicts that the region is witnessing, the need for adopting the equal citizenship principle in Arab countries’ constitutions is paramount, as well as in application, as a deeply-rooted basis for building societies. The citizen equality principle alone, regardless of race, religion, belief, gender, or number is the only warranty to all categories of society that ensures all their individual and collective rights are maintained. This warranty will motivate them to fulfill their responsibilities towards the state and the society honestly and willingly and encourages them to highlight the national identity over other minor identities.

The distinguished contributions in this book represent intellectual, political, and economic highlights to help readers understand the experiences
of the past and to foresee future possibilities for the region. We, more than ever, need more of these spotlights which design the intellectual frameworks as well as the roadmaps required to put the above-mentioned principles into action. These roadmaps should be constructed in a way that helps us understand lessons from the past and promote a new start towards more open-minded, far-reaching, incorporating, and welcoming societies for all their constituents and use the intellectual and religious pluralism as a weapon for development and prosperity rather than destruction and demolition.

Marwan Almuasher
Explosion of the Arab Oppression

Khairy Mansour*

In the beginning, I have to explain what the title of the lecture means because it seems vague somehow. Two days after I suggested the title, I read a book whose title is *Titles: A Theological Study of Titles*. This applies to titles whether they were titles of articles, books, or other titles. The author of the book maintains that there are three families of titles. There are titles that are like a hat that perfectly fits the head. These include the titles of books, article and the like. Other titles are like umbrellas that cover a wider area. The third and most dangerous type of titles is the one that is like a key that is turned in a rusty lock and it is mostly broken there.

My title belongs to the third family where the rusty lock is the Arab condition and, in particular, the five mean years we are experiencing currently. They are the years during which many keys have been broken by all approaches whether psychological or political. What is left are only approaches whose advocates apologize sometimes for putting them forward because they are unusual like the atheological approach; because what happened and what is still happening now, can never be understood based on

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- This lecture was delivered on Aug. 1st 2016
- A Jordanian journalist, intellectual, and poet.
traditional political approaches. What is more catastrophic is the name that has been given to the Arab conditions during these five years. Here, I am referring to ‘Spring’ as Spring is an Orientalist term that Orientalists used based on what happened in Europe at a historical moment. The first stage was in 1848; the time of the famous European movement towards the middle of the nineteenth century and the second time was in Waterloo Barrack when the Soviet Union attacked Budapest with its tanks to return the country to the Communist Party; the year of Marx’s second rise against Marxism.

However, in order to show how dangerous names are, I will refer to a trend in the West known as ‘naming strategy’ which means re-reading the human history as a whole through names. For example, we kept reading Ernest Hemingway’s novel The Old Man and the Sea the same way over the last forty years until an American critic explained that the novel has to be read through the name ‘Santiago’ which means Prophet Jacob. He also explained that the fishing was not in Cuba, but rather in Galilee Lake where the story of Jesus and Palestine ended. Hence, the novel was rethought completely through the name. Also, I have recently read an article written by an Irish Priest about Albert Camus’s novel The Plague which we used to think was written as a way to strike out against the French occupation. However, through the French
names mentioned in the novel, it has been concluded that Albert Camus, according to this Priest, was expressing his Frenchness as a colonizer.

I have personally benefited from this approach. In a novel written by Nagib Mahfouz called *The Way* (translated into English as *The Search*) which was also played as a popular movie, I found that the protagonist of the novel represents Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. I arrived at this conclusion by collecting all the available clues. I was in Cairo when I finished this project and it created heated discussions.

We have to not underestimate naming since when we say ‘spring’, all that comes to our minds are the color green, birds, and all the enjoyable aspects of the spring. When ‘spring’ is misleading, the name fall does not also apply to it. Some people may refer to the current condition as ‘Arab Fall’, but I do not see it this way either. It is a fifth season. The compass is not broken also. It is pointing to a fifth direction; the direction of nothingness that we are experiencing now.

The truth is that they have always cheated us by naming. When Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, they only changed one word in the sixth-grade grammar book i.e. in the sentence: “the Arab returned as a triumphant”, they replaced the word “triumphant” with the word visitor. We also waited for ten years to name the former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s going to Israel
a visit with all the connotations of intimacy and warmth that the word visit expresses. As per the former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir’s suggestion the definite article i.e. the was deleted from the words heights, peninsula, Bank, and Strip. So, please do not ever underestimate names because they are a new approach to reading history.

So, what happened, in my estimation, was not a spring. It was rather a simultaneous explosion of four oppressions. I will describe these oppressions one by one:

The first oppression is the class economic oppression which means exploiting chaos to loot banks and museums and the robbery of state institutions which are not accomplishments of the regimes. They are the accomplishments of the state instead. In some countries like Iraq, we witnessed people who reminded us of the revolution that happened in Soviet Union after Stalin when people went out to destroy the railways under the pretext that Stalin is the one who built them. By the same token, some extremist Iraqis suggested demolishing all institutions and statues that Saddam Hussein built as a way of disobeying him.

Then, the first oppression that exploded five years ago is the class economic oppression where there were not parties to represent the working class nor there was real political activism nor were there real left. It was
economic oppression suffered by the poor and the deprived people that mobilized those who were awaiting the absence of the police from the streets and the collapse of the state to settle down issues and pay back for tyrannies that they have suffered for long at the hands of the state authorities.

The second and more dangerous oppression is the ethnic oppression i.e. sectarian oppression. The Arab world used to experience to a certain extent what is called the spectrum era where all colors harmonized as if they were in a rainbow. In Egypt, for example, there are Muslims and Christians. In Iraq, there are seven ethnicities. Why has this explosion happened so bloodily? I brought with me an encyclopedia that was published in America in 1994 immediately after the end of the cold war. The title of the encyclopedia is *Two-Hundred and Thirty Endangered Minorities*. It was a preparation to fill the gap after the end of the Cold War. It was practically the World War III. They were preparing for a war to be fought regionally i.e. not between armies. You can see the preparations inside each intended country. For example, in Iraq, they found Sunni and Shiite so they ignited the conflict between the two sects. They started working on this since 1991 by injecting and charging so that they benefit from the deconstruction theory which was Condoleezza Rice’s PhD dissertation’s topic when she was George Bush’s secretary in the CIA before he became president. She specialized in the Soviet Union. They
found that ethnic oppression between its Muslim and non-Muslim and Christian republics was the basic reason that accelerated its collapse. I remember that I went to Moscow in 1989 when churches were still practicing their rituals but under ideological caution. In that year, in my journey from Uzbekistan to Samarkand I knew that something was going to happen. I visited the Writer’s Union whose Muslim president told me: we wish that one day we will be able to destroy Lenin’s Statue and to replace it with a statue of a Muslim from Uzbekistan. I was escorted by a female Russian attendant who accompanied me to a popular market. There was an old Uzbekistani woman who asked me: are you a Muslim? I said yes. Then then started throwing raisins at me, but when she saw the attendant with me, she closed the door. I then realized that the winds of change and collapse started blowing on the Soviet Union. I experienced the same scenario in Egypt. About seven years ago, I was living in a four-storey apartment building. The owners of the building were living in the top floor. Their father was an elderly man, so they started building an elevator. This brought about much noise. A Christian family was living in the first floor. This family asked the owners to work at certain times and not while they are sleeping. The owners insisted and continued working. I travelled after that and when I came back, I saw pieces of furniture in the street. I asked the doorman about this furniture and he told
me that it belongs to the Christian family because they sold their apartment for half its price. When I asked about the reason, he replied that the owners installed the elevator and set the Azan as the ringing tone for its answer machine. I went to the owner and told him: “This is against the teachings of Islam. Azan is five times a day only. It is not appropriate to make them hear it whenever you press the answer machine.” I went out to Abu Rish Café to meet some friends of mine including Mohamed Hasnain Haikal and Dr. yahya Aljamal and I told them: “I think Egypt is heading to a catastrophe; there is an ethnic explosion approaching, but the government is not paying attention.”

What happened in Menya in Egypt in terms of displacing Christian families from their homes was a result of the ethnic oppression that I witnessed a few years ago. There are endless examples of this in Jordan and other countries. Moreover, this meeting is strangely coincident with five centennials i.e. the centennial of Sykes-Picot agreement, the centennial of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the centennial of the World War I, and a few months later will be the centennial of Belfour Declaration 1917. The concurrence and overlapping between centennials is like what Francis Fukuyama calls the end of history. It is as if history is placed in a coffin and buried whereas this is not the case. The classic end of history is the end of the
conceptual systems which we use for interaction after they were replaced by new concepts and vocabulary that we use to deal with the world.

What happened in 2011 was designed completely in 1979. This year is seen as the most dangerous year in the twentieth century. It is even more dangerous than 1914 the time of the World War I and 1945 the time of World War II. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran, and Camp David Agreement was signed. The American theory of dual containment, or the theory which Henry Kissinger called playing on the Accordion which they tried to apply for the first time in Iraq in 1973. However, it was not possible to end the engagement after the 1973 war. Kissinger says “we militarized the Kurds in the North to keep fighting and the regime agreed to this. So, I discovered that the best policy to be used in the Middle East is the Accordion policy i.e. you play on both sides by creating two parties that are eager to fight each other. We threaten each party with the other. In Egypt, we threaten the Muslim brotherhood with the military. In the Middle East, we threaten the Arabs and Israel with each other”. There is a popular proverb that says, “like a saw; it cuts both ways”. This is the new theory that they started applying and prepared for everything, but we do not read. For example, there are reports by the deputy assistant secretary of state for defense in the late seventies on the Middle East in which he suggested taking down two basic countries: Iraq and
Egypt. However, his theory was impossible according to strategic analysts. Iraq cannot collapse from inside; it used to be called a country with a helmet which means that it was a military country. There were four million people in the army whether as regular soldiers or voluntary soldiers. So, Iraq can be destroyed by external invasion rather than from within. Egypt also cannot be invaded. So, they benefited from the evacuation reports of 1936 and from the reports of 1919 revolution. They concluded that Egypt can only be destroyed by a strategy that they called ‘biting the intestines policy’ which means instead of an army attacking from outside, the destruction comes from the inside. First, “we play on the Muslim-Christian cord and then we play on the economic cord”. The World Bank now gives Egypt loans and imposes conditions. The exchange rate of the USD reached 16 Egyptian Pounds as an introduction for flotation. Egypt agreed and increased the prices of electricity, bread, and they lift support from many goods. We hope Egypt will be able to overcome the consequences of the coming revolution because it maybe a hunger revolution with the slogan “we do not want the regime to step down, but we want to take Egypt down”.

We said that happened in 1979. There are also maps that Bernard Lewis provided through the article, in which he responded to Edward Said. He questions the position of Arab political activists including partisans,
intellectuals, and academics from Bernard-Henri Lévy who was the coordinator of the Libyan rebels. The answer to his question comes from Another Jewish French namely Alain Gresh in a book that he published recently under the title *Levy is not Like KuKo*. He said “Four years ago I wrote an article about Bernard-Henri Lévy and I was astonished the following day by news on local news websites saying that I received money from Gaddafi. I was obliged to issue a statement about it and I explained right away that the reason behind this news is that I wrote about Bernard-Henri Lévy”.

It is said “The reason is known the surprise is blown”. The reason here is crystal-clear from the reports of the deputy assistant of the state secretary for defense that we discussed earlier. Voice was rewarded the same way McNmara was rewarded in the Vietnamese war when he became the president of the World Bank. Force also became a president of the same Bank. I attended a lecture that was delivered by Condoleezza Rice in The American University in Cairo in 2005. She talked exactly about what is happening now as a consequence of the deconstruction theory that she used in the Soviet Union when she was working with George Bush Senior. Arabs did not listen to what she said although she said that the aliens are coming. I wish that Arabs responded to her lecture the way they respond to weather forecasts. For example, when the Jordan TV broadcasts a weather forecast saying
“tomorrow will be windy so do not get out. Snow will be one meter high”, we will make all the necessary arrangements. Then what about a forecast whose result is all this blood that has been shed!

There are simple statistics saying that the number of Arabs killed by other Arabs during five years’ time is a hundred times the number of Arabs killed by their enemies. If we compare the number of Arabs killed by the Israelis in the 1967 and 1973 wars and in Beirut invasion in 1982 with the numbers of Iraqis, Lebanese, and Palestinians killed by each other, we will find out that the latter number is a hundred times more. This is what I call national suicide.

Before this movement, many books were published under similar titles. The Lebanese writer Mahmud Haider published a book entitled About the Dissolution of the State. In Egypt, a book was published by Dr. Jalal Amin under the title The Soft State in Egypt. In Jordan, a book was authored by a young man under the title of The Suicide of a State. This means that some intellectuals provided introductions to what was going to happen, but people do not read. They merely depend on satellite channels and rumors as their source of information.

Concerning all that has been written about the Arab-Spring or what has been called so, I remember that I said, in this hall three years ago in a lecture
entitled “Militarizing Orientalism”, “geography teachers are no longer important in the elementary schools in the Arab world; NATO fighters can do the job on their behalf. They strike the Arab villages in Libya, Syria, and Northern Iraq. This the first time we hear of these villages. NATO fighters are teaching us the Arabic geography. They are teaching us the names of our villages and towns”. I also talked about militarizing the American diplomacy which practically started with Colin Paul when he was the secretary of state for foreign affairs. There was a scene that none of the Arabs paid attention to. That was when Rice arrived in Baghdad. When she disembarked from the plane, she took a helmet off the head of a soldier and placed it on her head. She had a souvenir photograph as a folklore. However, for me this photograph represents the moment when the American diplomacy was militarized the same way Orientalism was militarized. In the past, Orientalism was conducted by orientalist riding camels. Now, however, orientalists have become generals on planes. They head directly to the urban scene they would like to destroy.

I do not apologize for what I said three years ago. I do not also apologize for what I said five years ago. By the way, three days after I arrived in Amman from Cairo, I met in my friend Amin Mahmoud’s house with a group of other friends. I told them my opinion of what is going on. They all opposed what I said. This incident happened at least three times. I was coming from Cairo at
that time of the 25th of January Revolution. I also expressed my opinion in Addustour daily. I told the same thing to King Abdullah II. Every time, I was swimming up current.

The only writer who wrote about this spring, or what I called the fifth season, is not an Arab. He is the Spanish writer Juan Goytisolo who in the course of his study to analyze the psychology and oppression behind this movement said: “there is only one approach to understand what happened in the Arab world. It is Ibn Khaldun’s approach when he said that when the state impoverishes and weakens, it turns into a tax collector and the social contract terminates. At this point, chaos spreads in the absence of the state leading to its destruction”.

Generally speaking, what happened can be explained as a misconception of the difference between the state and the regime. The elements of modern Arab state have not matured yet. We were comparing ourselves with the post-state stage while we were in the pre-state and pre-modern stage. I read publications for writers in our Arab world who wrote about post-nationalism and we have names like: doctors without borders, lawyers without borders, and everything without borders. This in fact stresses the lie that appeared in the sixties against the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser under the name of globalization.
I have recently reviewed a speech by the American President Roosevelt in which he said: “It is our destiny in America to globalize the world”. The truth is that he meant much more than the positive meaning of the term globalization as put forward by Macdohan about the war time in Vietnam. At that time, a photograph of a little naked female child running from the American airstrikes was published and gained popularity to the extent of globalization in the positive sense. However, when it was shown in the Arab world, it took another turn that was lost in history the same way Arabs are lost now between identity wars and between ethnic minorities that have been there since 6 thousand years. Those who have the oldest identity that is engraved in history, their identity is now in the auction. There are Arabs standing in long queues waiting to change their Arab passports with other passports of foreign countries. The number of Palestinians in front of the Western embassies is tens of times the number of the Jewish people who are willing to return to Palestine. What is happening now is that you are committing suicide while your enemies do not need you to do this one their behalf.

I can summarize the whole thing in a joke. I was reading about the revolution of Paris (La Commune de Paris). There was a movement like our movements and there was a famous French poet who was pampered and long-haired. When the revolution started in Paris, his neighbors saw him carrying
a rifle and running. So, they asked him: “where are you going, Charles?” He replied: “I am looking for the general who married my mother to kill him”.

Each has his own purpose when chaos is all over the place.

Ultimately, we need to make a calculation. So, let us calculate the debts. Each Arab child is born to find him/herself indebted for about seventy to one hundred thousand Dollars. This means that this child is a hostage the same way we used to foreclose a ring when we wanted to purchase some goods. Now, states foreclose the future of their children to get money to overcome their daily problems like electricity, water, and others.

I may be pessimistic, but the issue is more than pessimism, optimism, and employment. Arabs have to wake up from their coma that has lasted for five years because the conspiracy is complicated. It is not movements or revolutions that were kidnapped; I am afraid that the causes of these revolutions were kidnapped so that they are not repeated; that they become phobias. Some people now regret the loss of the leaders they ousted. By the way, this is an Arabic literary genre which is called the ruins genre. There are always people crying ruins whether they are the ruins of buildings or concepts. You can now go to any Arab country to find out that there are people crying for ousted leaders as if they are convinced that the coming ones are worse.
I wonder if you noticed that there are new terms that appeared after the Arab movement. I have lived in Egypt as a student and as a writer, but I have never heard of the word harassment except after the Arab-Spring. Harassment did not exist in Egypt and the word was not frequently heard. However, today there are discussions on TV concerning the harassment and rape of many children during the last three years. These children are five or six years old. In most cases, they are killed. This is the explosion of the third oppression i.e. the sexual oppression because it was not treated educationally. Arabs are like all the other peoples of the world; they have instincts. There are two options for these instincts. They are either oppressed and turned into temporary meanness or, as Freud puts it, they are aggravated until they find human expressions. These expressions include attending a good school to start getting along with the other party.

What happened to us was because of the prevalence of the traditional system socially and politically. Politics has also been subject to sociology. The problem is that leaders, instead of being proactive and collaborate with the future, became hypocrites to the social base because they are only concerned with continuing in power.
The strange thing is that the social base is moving backward. In the sixties, we were more advanced than these days and there was co-education at universities.

The question is, where have these countries been? A study had been published in the West, it had better been published in Cairo or Amman, by a French young man on the increase of crime percentage in the Arab world after signing peace agreements. I told an Egyptian friend about this study and he shouted saying: “I will surprise you with one more thing; during the first five days of October war, no crimes were reported to any of the police stations in Egypt. When there was a war and when there was news about victory, thieves were ashamed of stealing even a pen or other items.”

The French young man attributes, in his study, the high percentage of crimes after signing peace treaty to the fact that this people is dynamic because most of its constituents are young. This people has been taught for sixty years that Israel is their enemy, but suddenly they were told that this enemy is in fact a friend. How are they going to vent all the power they have?

The West turned us into white lab mice. They examine our conditions. However, how is a patient supposed to get better when he/she hides the symptoms from the doctor. We are sick and we are ashamed of the symptoms of this sickness. We have half-educated people whose solutions to major
problems is like treating cancer with cold water bandages. Their solutions are also like treating AIDs, whether political or sexual, with a pain-killer. They are half-educated and ignorant although they are part of the outcomes of ignorance.

The truth is that enough blood had been shed and enough pain had been suffered and it is time now to call things with their true names.
Arab-Spring and Social Justice:
the Case of Egypt

Dr. Gouda Abdel-Khalek

The expression Arab-Spring evokes many emotions and concerns in the current Arab situation which makes it important to consider all its aspects. Within this framework, I will discuss this expression in terms of social justice in light of the experience I gained from the Egyptian case since I was a direct part of it. I was appointed several times as a minister in four subsequent governments after January 25th Revolution.

My first appointment was on February 22nd, 2011. I was appointed as the minister of Solidarity and Social Equality. At that time, I was careful to include the term justice in the name of the ministry which used to be called the ministry of social solidarity to stress the meaning of this term as one of the slogans that protesters chanted not only in Tahrir Square, but throughout the Egyptian squares simultaneously with the revolution.

In the beginning, I would like to highlight two points concerning my educational and social upbringing because of their significant impact on how I view social justice.

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- This lecture was delivered on April 28th, 2016
- A former minister in many Egyptian governments and an academic specialized in economics
First, although I got specialized academic degrees from both local and foreign universities, I think that my study at one of the Quranic schools in the Delta area in Al-Ahliya governorate had the most significant impact on my intellectual experience. There, I learned both Arabic and Quran in a way that significantly affected my personality later.

Second, this point is related to growing up in a poor community. I experienced closely what it means to be poor. This later point encouraged me to compensate the poor for part of the deprivation they suffered from through firmly establishing sustainable social development in their communities, and through raising awareness among the public of the importance of this development in different regions. The January 25th Revolution provided me with the chance to achieve this goal. I was looking forward to an acceptable level of social justice which remained absent from the Egyptian scene until recently.

**Social Justice and the Arab Masses**

Since the beginning of the second decade of the current century, Arab masses, in many Arab countries like: Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, took to the streets demanding change in the first place and looking forward to achieving social justice afterwards. At about the same time of this
movement, prior to it, or after it, there was public actions in other countries such as Jordan and Morocco to achieve a kind of peaceful change through consecutive stages instead of waiting for a popular movement to take place and lead to the outbreak of disorder or to an explosion in terms of internal security.

At that time, the Arab masses demanded the ousting of rulers and changing the existing systems. The masses shouted, and they still do, “bread, freedom, and social justice.”

**Introducing the concept (Social Justice)**

In essence, social justice is a basic human value, prior to considering it as a requirement for the poor and the marginalized all over the world. It has initially been connected to different religions which insisted on achieving and establishing it among all.

Throughout history, philosophers and sociologists provided many definitions, explanations, and interpretations of “social justice”. In this context, Plato, in the fourth century A.C. indicated in his book *The Republic* that it is necessary to combine justice and wisdom. He linked justice to equality and listed a group of needs that he believed the state must provide to its citizens. Justice was one of them, of course. Aristotle, in his book *Ethics*,
linked justice with equality and described them as the basis for what he called ‘distributive justice’ through the equal distribution of wealth, political and moral positions as well as anything that can be distributed among people.

However, the clearer vision of social justice and its necessity on both the individual and state levels came from the Tunisian sociologist and historian Abdelrahman Ibn Khaldun who stated, in the introduction to his book *Kitāb al-ʻIbar* (Book of Lessons), that human development can only be achieved through social justice. This link is very important because, as he mentioned in the *Muqaddimah* (Introduction), tyranny leads people to unemployment, lack of earnings, as well as the recession of markets. This is something that can be easily seen on the ground. Tyranny does not deprive people from employment and from earning only, but it also leads them to take positions to end social tyranny as is the case in many Arab countries.

Modern political thought linked the two concepts of citizenship and equality organically with the concept of justice. It set citizenship and equality as the basis for social justice through equality among citizens regardless of their place of residence or their religions.

This thought concluded that social justice is based on the idea of equality among citizens. In this case, a home country is introduced as a major
identity whereas all the minor identities withdraw to the backline. Then the standard citizenship will be linked to the main identity. Equality among citizens will be based on their belonging to this main identity.

Consequently, we cannot achieve social justice without achieving equality among all citizens based on their citizenship rather than any other consideration.

Therefore, the role of social justice is to achieve: equality, solidarity, and protecting citizens’ rights and dignity. Social justice is a comprehensive concept that includes two contexts namely: economic and social. It also encompasses the cultural context.

At the policy-making level, the International Labor Organization’s constitution, that was published in the beginning of the Twentieth Century immediately after the First World War, stresses the importance of social justice. This constitution sates that a comprehensive and sustainable peace in the world can only be achieved on the basis of social justice. Without establishing social justice, comprehensive and sustainable peace, nation wise in the first place and worldwide subsequently, can never be achieved because this justice requires the establishment of equality, solidarity, and protecting human rights and dignity.
As far as the application on the ground is concerned, social justice includes equality in job opportunities, equality in income distribution and wealth distribution. Generally, political controversy on social justice centers around justice in income distribution. However, equality in job opportunities is equally important and is even a priority over income justice because it encompasses equality in education opportunities, health care opportunities, training opportunities, and employment opportunities. This is compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights issued by the United Nations in 1948.

At the procedural level, social justice includes three dimensions namely: the horizontal dimension, the vertical dimension, and the spatial dimension.

The first dimension refers to equality among individuals and categories which live together at the same period. This dimension is usually stressed to discuss if there was equality or inequality in income distribution and the equality or inequality in wealth distribution.

The second dimension refers to equality between generations. The lives of communities exceed the life of any specific generation. Opportunities are created by former generations for the benefit of later generations. Generally,
gas, oil, and water are all wealth elements that are closely related to vertical dimension of justice which refers to the equality among generations in benefiting from these opportunities.

The third dimension; the spatial dimension, refers to the equality among residents of different areas like: countryside as opposed to urban areas, coastal areas as opposed to inner areas, and other dichotomies according to the social contexts found in each individual country.

**Social Justice and Economic Reform**

Undoubtedly, economic reform was the decisive factor at the level of introducing a lot of important changes in the world throughout history. This shows the importance of arriving at an accurate understanding of what came to be called economic reform in the context in which it is used.

During the Eighties and Nineties of the last century, many countries like: Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen carried out economic reform programs either voluntarily or in response to recommendations from the World Bank and the Global Fund. The procedures of these programs included decreasing state roles by means of privatization, price liberalization, trade liberalization, decreasing support to citizens, and
decreasing public expenditures. These procedures resulted in significant harm to social justice and many other levels.

**The Egyptian Model**

Before the January 25\(^{th}\) Revolution, the political scene in Egypt was problematic and suffered from many problems and crises including: distribution crisis represented in the absence of social justice: horizontally and vertically, participation crisis because of the absence of democracy, and legitimacy crisis that led to excessive use of power by security forces to maintain the stability of the regime at that time.

These crises strongly stressed both the state and the society alike and paved the way for the January 25\(^{th}\) Revolution and the events that accompanied and followed it.

At social tyranny level in Egypt, we start with the phenomena of poverty. Numbers show that between 20\% - 25\% of Egyptians were way below the national poverty line in 2010. This percentage increased to 26\% in 2013. This does not mean that the January 25\(^{th}\) Revolution was behind this increase because there is a host of economic and political factors that accumulated over the decades and led to this increase.
As for the international poverty line which the World Bank set at $1.25 per day, 40% of Egyptians are currently way below this line according to official resources. This percentage may be up to 45%.

Concerning unemployment phenomena, it is less acute in Egypt than in other Arab countries. It can be described as less than the general average on the Arab level.

Official figures concerning the percentage of income distribution among the Egyptian society categories are close to 30% according to Gini coefficient (attributed to the Italian scientist Corrado Gini) which represents the justice of national income distribution. The closer this percentage to zero percent; the closer the society is to the equal distribution of income among its categories. A higher percentage of this indicator represents a lack of justice of course. In the Egyptian case, the percentage is moderate in comparison to the other countries of the region.

As an example of the absence of social justice in Egypt, in terms of the third spatial dimension, we notice that two-thirds of the poor live in the tribal countryside (Sai’d, Upper Egypt) where the percentage of the poor is way higher than the average percentage of the country. If poverty percentage
in Cairo was 26%, it is 68% in Asyut, one of Upper Egypt’s governorates. This percentage is dangerously high and must be addressed.

Within the same dimension, we notice that poverty levels in border governorates are higher than the levels in inner governorates. Moreover, the opportunities available for citizens of these governorates are very few and limited in comparison with the opportunities available for people from other governorates. For example, only 20% of border governorates residents have access to clean drinking water which makes them highly susceptible to diseases. About 25% of children in these governorates are stunted (dwarfs) which negatively affects their future socially and economically.

**Economic Indicators of Social Development**

Economic indicators show that economic growth rate in Egypt ranged from 5% -6% between 2005 – 2010; the years preceding the January 25th Revolution. These indicators also show that the economic growth rate in the country for the fiscal year 2010 – 2011 decreased to 1,8%. In the following year it increased to 2,2. It decrease again to 1,8%. It later increased to 2,8%. This growth rate is lower than the population growth rate in the country which means that the per capita national income will decrease. On the ground, this
will be reflected as an expansion of poverty pockets throughout the country in addition to the decline of social justice.

There are overall indicators pertaining to debt and budget and exchange rate of the Egyptian Pound that generally indicate that the country is currently facing difficult economic circumstances.

A reduction in the foreign investment rates in the country can be noticed. It has decreased by 90% during the first four months since the January 25th, 2011 Revolution. This percentage is still low until now in addition to the recession of the economic activity in other sectors like tourism and industry in general.

Economic growth indicators in Egypt are generally negative after the revolution when compared to the pre-revolution period. In addition, political corruption, which was deeply rooted in the overall structure of the country, exacerbated and had negative reflections on the social make-up of the country.

In light of the above, it is important to consider social justice indicators from a somehow different perspective. This means that the current discussion of social justice, in the Arab countries in general, focuses on a conflict between two classes namely: employees and employers on the one hand, and junior and senior staff, on the other, in terms of the re-distribution of gains
among them. It is a reduction that compromised the concept of social justice in light of what the Arab area is witnessing at the level of its political structure because these gains, based on the earlier indicators, are decreasing. Therefore, social justice cannot be reduced to merely the re-distribution of the declining gains between two classes. First, we must work to maintain these gains and then to maximize them before we equitably re-distribute these gains among the different classes of the society.

This way, social justice remained lacking in the Egyptian society because of the political structure that Mubarak’s regime was based on initially as an inheritor of Sadat’s regime. This structure that is still existent until now and it prevents achieving effective radical solutions through which social justice can be achieved among all Egyptians.
Five Years of the Arab Spring

Hamada Faraneh* 

Five years after the explosion of the Arab-Spring revolutions, there seems to be a dearth need to stop and evaluate. The aim is to contribute to providing answers that aspire to get close to reality and to essential questions concerning change and revolution. These questions include: is change a narrow self-interest or a collective result imposed by objective realities dictated by factors that are beyond our control? Regardless of the reason, has the revolution succeeded or failed? Where has it succeeded? Why has it failed?

At all levels, this revolution constituted a quality transition in the course of the Arab liberation movement which started around the middle of the last century after the World War II in order to achieve three due objectives namely: 1. Independence; 2. Social justice; and 3. Democracy. Based on the existing and tangible realities, after more than half a century of continued

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This lecture was delivered on February 29, 2016
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struggle, sacrifices, and pain, Arab liberation movement failed in fulfilling its duties in the three topics or in some of them.

For example, foreign occupation, as represented by the Israeli expansionist colonialist project, continues on the Palestinian land, the Syrian Golan Heights, and Southern Lebanon. It is actually goes too far by striking deep in the Syrian and Lebanese lands the same way it targeted Iraq, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and even Emirates was not immune to its strikes. Tel Aviv still occupies the strongest position compared to most Arab countries in accordance with American project and slogan which seeks ‘to keep Israel strong and superior’. It is working tirelessly to apply this project depending on Washington’s options that support the Zionist project and to provide it with the needed cover and means of protection for its aggressive expansionist policies.

Americans and Europeans intervened militarily and overthrew the regimes in Iraq and Libya, let alone their blatant and open interference in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia. The six Arab Gulf states are protected by American and European military bases and intelligence agencies. Egypt and Jordan are shackled by the unfair Camp David and Wadi Araba agreements.
The Iranian interference in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, through the imposition of the Iranian interests and clerical ruler’s (velayat-el-faqih, guardianship of Islamic jurist) policies, constitutes an instrument that hampers the development of these countries in an independent and democratic manner. Iran still occupies the three United Arab Emirates’ Islands namely: Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa. Moreover, it refuses international arbitration to solve this problem. There is also provocative Turkish interference in Syria and Iraq that reflects Turkey’s plans to expand its influence. Moreover, Egypt and Sudan are threatened by drought and the recession of irrigated areas because of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Addis Ababa’s continued incitement in the Horn of Africa making the area insecure and unstable.

At the economic level, most Arab countries are facing difficult conditions because they suffer from the weakness of economic, productive, and financial resources which forces them to remain constrained by the budget deficiency and bound by the heavy debts and their consequences and conditions to cover their needs. This is manifested in the poor and low level basic services including education, health, housing, and jobs.

At the democratic level, most Arab countries lack the pre-requisites of democracy and its tools such: elected parliaments and influential parties. They
also do not respect human rights, they refuse the principle of power rotation. They refuse the results of elections because of the power of the inspired leader, far reaching chief, and genius individual, and the single-family rule. The ruling sect prevails at the expense of pluralism and constitutional citizenship.

All this led to the explosion of the spring revolutions at the national level in more than one Arab country. By carefully analyzing the economic, political, and security conditions of the Arab countries, we notice that they can be divided into three groups as follows:

First, the group of Arab countries which need economic and financial assistance from donor countries like the United States and Europe. This group includes: Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Djibouti, Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon. Because of their needs for assistance, these countries listen, in a way or another, to the Euro-American recommendations. In other words, they respond to these recommendations and obey them.

Second, the six Gulf States which does not need financial assistance, but they need the American and European security and military protection, so they also respond to recommendations and act according to their guidelines.

Third, the third group includes Arab countries that do not receive financial assistance and do not seek security and military protection. Their
policies are characterized by rebellious nature. They faced pressures and
different kinds of sieges before the Arab-Spring revolutions. These countries
are: Algeria, Sudan, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Some of them sought to improve
their relations with Washington and the European capitals. These countries
did what it takes to remove their names from demonizing lists and from the
list of state sponsors of terrorism. They presented their credentials to remove
or mitigate the siege, but they did not find the required acceptance from the
Euro-American West.

For more influence, the assistance provided by donor countries to each
Arab country is divided between three parties within the same country with
the aim of keeping the influence of the donor countries strong in terms of
directing the course of events in a way that protects the interests of the donor
countries. These interests include: oil, Israel, fighting terrorism, and Arab
market and money.

Regardless of the observers’ disagreement on a certain criterion in
terms of priority, there is an agreement that these are the five topics of the
American and European interests in our Arab world. As for the three parties
that receive assistance within the same country, they are as follows:
**First**, government budget i.e. civil state institutions whether in the form of financial grants, loans, coverage of different projects.

**Second**, the military and security institution in isolation from the official civil institution through training projects, weapons, or the costs of security and military projects.

**Third**, civil society institutions in isolation from governmental civil and military institutions.

Therefore, the leverage, influence, and tools of American and European dealing with the Arab countries can be interpreted in accordance with these aids and their importance to understanding the course of events which exploded alongside the Arab- *Spring revolutions* and their consequences. The *revolutions* started with the beginning of 2011 based on objective grounds and dictated by the absence of the three criteria namely: 1. The absence of political and economic independence, 2. The absence of social justice, and 3. The absence of democracy.

The tools that started the *revolution* are three equal parties. Each of these parties performed its role according to the available capabilities, possible opportunities, and each according to their abilities and influence on the course of events and their outcomes. These parties are:
First: mass protests performed by civil society institutions. These are the institutions that can use the internet. They call for democracy and modernization. They have international relationships to protect them and they have financial abilities and media. Civil society institutions took the initiative because of the weakness of the leftist and national parties, the absence of liberal parties, and the silence of Islamic parties because of their prior agreements with the Americans. They restored the understanding that prevailed during the cold war era (1950 – 1990). They reconnected after the events of September 2001 in the United States and the American occupation of Iraq in 2013. Washington cooperated with Islamic current parties to overthrow the national regime in Iraq and to hand over power mainly to two parties by Bremer’s government the first of which is the alliance of Shiite parties and the second of which is the Muslim Brotherhood Branch in Iraq.

Second, the military which played consecutive roles, especially in Egypt and Tunisia, in terms of protecting demonstrators from suppression, on the one hand, and protected state institutions from collapse, on the other, to avoid the repetition of the Iraqi experience. At the end, the military fired the president and ousted him in the two countries.

Third, the international, American, and European decision. Without the international de-legitimizing of the regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi would not have been able to implement the demands of the demonstrators. By the same token, Rachid Ammar said to his Tunisian President “go home” and the president stepped down.

The question here is: why was the international decision directed towards the America friendly countries and why these countries responded to this decision?

First, because these countries provided their services throughout the cold war period and therefore they ran out of the needed supplies. They bred four terms that affect and harm the American interests. These terms are: fundamentalism, extremism, terrorism, and hostility towards the West. These terms have become the most outstanding political topic of influential events and powers. Of course, this is mainly because of the absence of democracy, prevalence of poverty, poor services, and the absence of social justice. The Euro-American West supported Arab dictators and stood by them all along the cold war period. However, later they no longer deserved to be taken care of and they were no longer able to bear the responsibility. As a result, the United States introduced the theory of Creative Chaos to change the Arab regimes who lack elections legitimacy and who became a burden,
provocation, and harmful to the interests of the Americans and the Europeans through the four terms especially after 9/11 attacks and what followed them.

Second, these countries abide by the American recommendations because they need financial and security assistance from Washington. Therefore, change happened in response to the demands of demonstrations, protests, and sit-ins which were led by civil society institutions in a way that does not run counter to the American interests represented in the following: 1. Continuity of oil flow 2. Israel’s security 3. Fighting terrorism 4. Arab money and market.

The American agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood Movement prevailed throughout the cold war to confront communism, socialism, the Soviet Union, and their allies in the Arab world. This alliance ended in the early Nineties in the wake of the cold war. This agreement reappeared obviously between them in the heat of the Arab-Spring. Khairat el-Shater, Deputy Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Essam el-Erian played an important role in this regard in their capacity as the officials in charge of the American and international relations in the international guidance office of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement. The same way the agreement was signed with the Iranians which led to signing Iran nuclear deal in July 2015 and other security, economic, and political agreements. The
understanding between Washington and Iran was preceded by agreements with Afghanistan and Iraq. They overthrew Taliban’s Jahadi regime and the national Ba’ath Party regime before handing power to the Shiite religious parties.

Therefore, it can be concluded that Arab-Spring revolutions was started because of the first objective criterion which is the interruption of economic and political liberalization process, the absence of social justice, and the absence of democracy. However, the failure of the Arab-Spring revolutions is a result of the immaturity of the second subjective criterion because it is the operating tool of the revolution which directed its activities and program. This criterion was immature because of the results of the cold war and because of the consequences of the devastating Gulf crisis. These two led to the regression and weakness and even to the total absence of the influence of the leftist, national, and liberal parties from managing and directing events.

Therefore, the activity of the subjective criterion that run the revolution was restricted to the role of civil society institutions with their modern concepts of democracy and pluralism, their call for women’s participation in decision making institutions, the relations these institutions with the European and American institutions that provide them with the required immunity and
support. It is necessary to note here that the burning of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and torturing Khaled Said in Egypt are the two incidents that lit the fuse which expanded to the streets after the two incidents were employed by the civil society institutions which led the revolutions not only in Tunisia and Egypt, but also in all the Arab countries.

It has to be objectively noted here that the absence of the role of the leftist, national, and liberal parties prompted the Muslim mainstream parties, which invested in the absence of the other mainstreams, to benefit from the outcomes and consequences of the Arab-Spring so as to become the decision-maker either through 1. Agreements with the Americans or by 2. Obtaining the parliamentary majority like what happened in Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco or 3. Acquiring fighting skills as a result of their role in Afghanistan and their willingness to make essential revolutionary change. So, they resorted to the use of violence and weapons in the face of the American occupation of Iraq or to overthrow the existing regimes in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The outcome of these criteria was the failure of the Arab-Spring revolution so far despite the availability of the first objective criterion for the revolutions to improve the reality politically, economically, and socially. However, the obvious failure is due to the immaturity of the subjective criterion and its many deficiencies, its incompleteness on the basis that it is
the tool and operator of the *revolutions*. Therefore, the availability of the first objective criterion alone is not enough for the success of the *revolutions*. The availability of the second criterion is necessarily required as experiences clearly show. It is the subjective and operating criterion that leads and directs *revolutions*. The subjective criterion was not available in the Arab-Spring countries. It was lacking, and the phases of its maturity were never completed. This was reflected in the form of weakness in their performance and on the results of their actions. The absence of the three mainstreams i.e. leftist, national, and liberal parties and their weakness left the situation to the power of the Muslim mainstream parties which do not believe in pluralism or democracy and do not have the efficient economic or social programs to provide the them as tools for the public or as an objective for them to be part of the *revolution*. The former regimes with all their evils were to be considered better than what happened later. They were considered to be better than the control, power, and influence of Muslim parties and their leadership of political action and revolutionary change backed by support from regional capitals. Turkey and Qatar are the incubators of the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran is the incubator of the Shiite parties. This created a situation of direct regional and international conflict in our area, on our ground, and at the expense of the blood of our people and its wealth.
Arab Solidarity: the first step to Arab Unity

Dr. Ali Mahafzah*6

Undoubtedly, the first Arab movement to seek Arab Unity in Asia is the Great Arab Revolt led by sharif Hussein bin Ali and his sons in 1916. This Revolt freed Hijaz and the inner parts of Greater Syria from Aqaba to Aleppo under the leadership of Prince Faisal I. However, the conspiracy of the superpowers which promised Hussein and Arab political leaders of recognizing the freedom, independence, and unity of the Arab countries in Asia, deprived this Revolt from achieving its objectives. Instead, Britain and France forcibly imposed their mandate on the Levant and divided it into small political entities; Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan. The colonial European countries controlled the Arab world from Morocco in the West to Bahrain in the East and from the Pacific Ocean and the African Sahara in the South to Taurus Mountains and the Mediterranean Sea in the North.

The first call for the unity and solidarity of the Arabs after that was during the Arab National Conference that was held in Jerusalem on 12/13/1931. This call was repeated in the founding meeting for the League for National Action which was held in Qarnayel in Lebanon on 08/24/1933. It

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* This lecture was delivered in August 2016
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was also repeated in the Arab Nation Convention which was written by the Arab Unity Assembly in 1936. Another call appeared in Nuri al-Said’s, the Iraqi Prime Minister, project dubbed as the “Blue Book” in 1943. This call was later officially devoted in the Charter of the League of Arab States on 03/22/1045. It also appeared in the Mutual Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty among the member of countries of the Arab League and its military appendix dated 04/13/1950 in Cairo. The same call has always been repeated in Arab-summit meetings since 1946 -1990.

In fact, the establishment of the Arab League as a regional Arab system that focused on the Arab national security was a response to mitigate the appearance of the regional nation states that appeared after the world war II. The regional Arab system was established among states which in total make up one nation namely the Arab nation. The states making up this system were mostly newly established and were created to serve colonial interests and international power relations. Therefore, these nation states have had different perspectives on country (national) security and the national security which encompasses the Arab world from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to Basra Gulf in the East and from the Mediterranean Sea and Taurus Mountains in the North to the African Sahara, the Ethiopian heights, and the Pacific Ocean in the South.
Undoubtedly, national Arab security differs from regional security because the relations among the Arab countries and the challenges facing them as well as their mutual interests make the Arab national security different from regional security based on geographical proximity. Arab national security is that of a nation that has one language, a common culture, an uninterrupted geographical landscape, a long common history, and common interests and expectations. This nation seeks unity and aspires to protect itself against the internal, regional, and international dangers which have threatened the Arab nation for more than a century.

Nakba (catastrophe) that overwhelmed the Palestinian people in 1948 and the establishment of that so-called Israel made Arabs realize the dangers and the threats around them. This also made them feel the need for solidarity and for military cooperation among them to protect their collective security. Therefore, Council of the League of Arab States on 04/13/1950 approved of a mutual defense and economic cooperation agreement to make up for the lack and gaps found in the Charter of the League of Arab States.

Due to conflicts and disputes between Arab regimes and due to the absence of Arab political will, the organs of the League of Arab States, which was established in accordance with the agreement, were discontinued. Three meetings of the mutual defense council were held since the signing of the
agreement between 1950 -1967. After June war, the council held seven meetings without reaching any results.

The first violation of the Arab Solidarity Agreement was the Turkish – Iraqi Charter dubbed as Baghdad Alliance of 02/24/1955 because it contradicts Article 10 of the Arab Solidarity Agreement. When the Tripartite Aggression on Egypt took place in the Fall of 1956, Arab states did not apply the terms of the Arab Solidarity Agreement.

It is true that Arab solidarity was demonstrated by the establishment of a common Arab military force in 1961 to replace the British forces in Kuwait with the aim of protecting its fresh independence against the Iraqi Abd al-Karim Qasim’s threats. It is also true that it took a practical nature in the Arab Summit which was held in Cairo on 01/13/1964 by establishing a unified Arab military leadership headed by Lieutenant General Ali Amer. However, Political and ideological conflicts between Arab regimes and the absence of a unified Arab administration prevented the fulfilment of the objectives set for this leadership.

The Arab solidarity was also demonstrated in the Arab Summit in Khartoum in 1967 in the wake of June 1967 defeat. It was also proudly
demonstrated in October (Ramadan) war in 1973. However, the Arab political moves that followed this war renewed Arab conflicts.

Two years later, the civil war started in Lebanon and lasted for fifteen years. President Sadat went on his ominous visit to Jerusalem in 1977 in a challenge to all Arab leaders as well as all Arab charters and agreements. Then, the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations started and led to Camp David Accords in 1978 and Egypt – Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. This treaty was a strike in the heart of Arab solidarity. The Iraqi – Iranian war followed only to widen the gap of Arab division after Egypt left the League of Arab States. The following stage was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 which was the knockout of Arab solidarity. It allowed any Arab country to seek support from foreign forces to protect its independence and sovereignty. It also encouraged opposition movements and parties in each Arab country to seek support from foreign forces to intervene and strike the existing Arab regimes as was the case in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Arab regimes failed to do their duties and they lost the ability to face internal Arab crises. The security of all Arab countries was open to external dangers and threats and the three forbidden actions were committed: Arab countries fighting one another, seeking support of foreign armed forces to fight other Arab countries, and establishing national security by foreign forces.
Things got worse by the negative positions taken by Arab countries regarding the Arab embargo that was imposed on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait and how Arab countries were committed to this embargo. Moreover, Arab regimes had different positions concerning the American – British aggression on Iraq in the spring of 2003. Some regimes supported this aggression and provided logistics while others were watching silently.

These Arab positions were repeated during the Israeli aggression on Lebanon in the Summer of 2006. These positions were not very different from the response after Israel’s criminal aggressions against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the first Intifada in 1987 until today.

Among the consequences of the Iraqi – Iranian war and the development of the Iraqi political opposition to Ba’ath regime and the American – British occupation of Iraq between 2003 – 2011, is a mixture of the Iraqi identity issue. It gradually changed into sectarian and ethnic identities after the social national identity that the Ba’ath Party, which ruled in the name national Arabism, established was dropped. A political regime was established during and after the occupation based on sectarianism after the Shi’ite and the Kurds felt that the Iraqi national and regional identity gave preference to Arab Sunnis over them.
Undoubtedly, the collapse of the institutions of the Iraqi state in 2003 and establishing a regime based on sectarianism exacerbated identity conflict and destroyed the Iraqi state. It also led to the establishment of the al-Qaeda organization in Iraq, which later became Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (Daesh) as a response to the sectarian regime’s practices in Iraq and its military organizations (Shiite militias). Iraq was dragged into a swamp of sectarian war and it is still struggling there. Arab Gulf states contributed to the outbreak of this war which spilled over to Syria since 2011. Popular Intifadas in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya quickly became civil wars to add to the suffering of the people of these countries after the appearance of Salafi Jihad groups in there which destroyed everything.

The Arab-Spring revolutions failed, and the dreams of millions of Arabs vanished. These young people were looking forward to freedom, dignity, social justice, fighting corruption, unemployment, and poverty. The Arab Gulf states promptly spent billions of Dollars to purchase their citizens’ loyalty. They also invested their money in Egypt, Oman, Bahrain, Yemen, Morocco, and Jordan to prevent the success of the required change by the popular Intifadas in these Arab countries. The United States of America and the European Union intervened to support the constructive chaos in the Arab region in an attempt to create more division and destruction and to create new
political entities loyal to them to secure protection for their interests in the region and to secure the continuity of the Zionist entity and its control.

Internal crises and external subordination continued. Bloody wars continued on ethnic, religious or sectarian, and tribal grounds in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Terrorism became active in Egypt, Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Jordan.

After the League of Arab States approved of the foreign intervention in Libya, Iran, Russia, the United States of America, Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, and Israel rushed to intervene in Iraq and Syria. Generally, Arab countries were either falling or disintegrating. Societies were losing their internal harmony. They were divided geographically and historically. Hundreds of people are killed daily as blood was shed and nobody was held accountable for it. The civil wars continued. The economies were destroyed, and armies were depleted in internal wars with armed militias whose duty is killing and destruction.

The question which must be raised here is: Why have we got to this hopeless destiny, division, and disintegration?

Undoubtedly, the Arab regimes are responsible for what has happened. Political authoritarianism, power monopoly, autocracy, denial of public and
individual freedoms, abusing people’s dignity and continually insulting them, oppression and suppression by security forces against people in general and against peaceful political opposition in particular, failure of economic and social development, low living levels, high unemployment rates, the prevalence of poverty in addition to the different kinds of corruption have all contributed to the rebellion of the young people. These young people have become easy targets for the Salafi Jihad movements and international terrorism organizations which ravaged the Arab countries after they had been trained by the international super powers with funds from Arab oil-producing countries.

The Arab regimes have, ever since they got political independence, exercised policies that weakened the Arab solidarity and caused conflicts and hatred between Arabs. These policies were based on the following:

1. Prioritizing country interests over the Arab national interests.
2. Prioritizing regimes’ interests over country and Arab national interests.
3. Prioritizing country security over Arab national security.
4. Inability of the Arab regimes to build modern states in which citizens are: equal before the law, enjoy security and feel safe for their lives, money, and honor, have job opportunities and a decent life, participate in political life, participate in decision-making concerning their lives
and the future of their children, feel that their rights as humans are protected, and do their duties as citizens without any obstacles or restrictions except for the restrictions of laws that regulate their lives. These regimes continuously feared any serious collaboration with other Arab countries. The feared the effects of such collaboration on their legitimacy.

5. Lack of trust between Arab regimes because of differences between them in terms of their backgrounds, how they came to power, as well as conflicts that appeared between them and corrupted their relations.

6. Priority of political and economic subordination to foreign powers over mutual Arab action.

7. Ideological disagreement between Arab regimes which ranged from explicit adherence to Islamic Sharia law, to Marxist ideology, and Western liberal ideology. In fact, they adhered to the forms and appearances of these ideologies but not their true essences.

8. Absence of science, wisdom, and objectivity in addressing country and Arab national issues as well as internal and external challenges that faced the Arab regimes.

9. The colonial burden inherited by these regimes in terms of border and water problems among others.
10. The multiplicity and contradiction of challenges and threats that hinder Arab solidarity whether past, present, or future.

11. Wealth disparity between Arab regimes which appeared clearly after October (Ramadan) war in 1973. High oil prices resulted in drastic wealth discrepancy between oil-exporting Arab countries and the rest of the Arab countries. Leaders of oil-producing countries felt that Arab solidarity and mutual Arab action mean sharing their wealth with non-oil-producing countries. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf states did not hesitate to seek support from foreign powers and establishing military bases for these powers on their land.

Political development in the Arab world as well as regional and international events since the end of the World War II and the establishment of the League of Arab States until today proved that nation states with their security and interests are realities that cannot be ignored or overcome. It also proved that these countries or their regimes are unable to protect their national security on their own. So, they signed protection agreements with the major powers who have ambitions and interests in the Arab region. Based on these two facts, any future planning for the Arab national security has to take into account the national security of each Arab country.
Generally, in light of the current Arab situation and the dangers it encompasses, it is not acceptable for anyone to be indifferent towards the destruction that is devastating the fraternal Arab countries because it is threatening the other countries. Therefore, the role of the League for Arab States must be reactivated, its institutions must be restored, and its charter must be reviewed to reinvigorate Arab solidarity again.

Undoubtedly, establishing a supreme Arab court of justice to investigate Arab conflicts and disputes and to determine peaceful solutions for them will contribute to promoting confidence in the League for Arab States and its institutions. Action must be taken so that Egypt regains its effective role in the Arab regional system. Arab countries must abide by Arab agreements and conventions as well as resolutions issued by the League for Arab States and its different institutions. This requires holding an extraordinary Arab League summit to discuss the nation’s status quo and to reach decisions that adopt the aforementioned suggestions and other expedited issues. This will help in finding the way out of the current suffocating crisis and in restoring the Arab solidarity which paves the way for joint projects to achieve economic integration among the Arab countries. It will also help reconstruct what was destroyed in many Arab countries by giving up illusions, hatred, and resentments.
What is currently happening in the Arab countries requires a fair amount of maturity and wisdom to rescue the nation.

We desperately need hope, optimism, courage, and the ability to do what it takes to achieve the desirable future, and to make up for our earlier mistakes because our future can only be secured through our solidarity and collaboration.
The Revolution Phenomenon in the Twenty-First Century

Dr. Osama Al-Ghazali Harb

Before I start my lecture, I would like to say that in the early morning I sent my daily article to al-Ahram Daily in Cairo. The article has the title “Jordan is rising” in reference to what I witnessed in this country. I came to Amman more than once and this has been my feeling since I arrived in Queen Alia International Airport.

My feeling was confirmed when I watched King Abdullah II’s speech on an American TV channel. I was attracted to his speech when he said that Jordan’s success is a result of investing in the ‘human capital’. We have heard this profound statement earlier from leaders of countries that have made real progress in recent decades. Undoubtedly, investing in the human is the secret behind Jordan’s superiority these days. It is not a coincidence that the Jordanian athlete Ahmed Abu Ghoush wins a golden medal in the recent Olympics. We should not underestimate this event because it does not merely mean that a young man won a sports medal. Excellence in sports is closely

7 - This lecture was delivered on August 22nd 2016
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linked to the overall performance of the state and its success. When the society and the state are highly skillful, this will be reflected in all activities and of course sports activities will take the lead. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the societies which now win the best Olympic medals are the same societies which make progress in all aspects of life. Actually, I expect Jordan to make further similar achievements.

The title of my lecture is “the revolution phenomenon in the twenty-first century”. I will try, as much as possible, to point out to some important topics especially that I have been interested in the topic of revolution for a very long period of time. I would like to tell you a funny story that happened to me after I got my degree in political science in 1969. Three or four years later, I was doing my M.A. My supervisor was Boutros Ghali and I asked him if I can write my thesis on the topic of “Why Revolution in Egypt?” He replied with his elegant style “You are crazy, revolution in Egypt!” I asked him again “What is the problem?” He replied, “You are still young and do not realize the consequences of what you do.” Then, I said “I can talk about the Palestinian revolution.” He said “Nor this, stay away from the Arab region so that you do not get yourself into trouble.” Thus, my M.A. thesis was about the Vietnamese revolution. It was a chance to study the revolution as a
phenomenon in the first place. I still have the manuscript not printed, but it enriched my knowledge of the topic of revolution.

I use the expression twenty-first century *revolutions* to refer to the Arab *revolutions* because the great revolts that we know are the twentieth century revolutions which broke out in Russia, Egypt, Cuba, and Algeria and we are in another century now. We might also remember that the most important revolutions in history were the English Revolution, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution which happened in the seventeenth century. However, the twenty-first century remains, so far, the century of Arab *revolutions*.

It is not easy to analyze the revolution phenomenon because there are hundreds of books, research projects, and studies on the analysis of revolution. Moreover, there are more minor topics under revolution studies than we imagine. For example, in one study, I focused on revolution methods in revolution literature like that of the Chinese and Russian revolutions which discuss guerilla warfare and *terror* and the like. I remember that at an advanced stage I wanted to provide a definition of the term *terror* since we do not use the term *terror* in the common context, but it is used, in fact, as one of the tools for the revolution acts especially in the Chinese Revolution literature. I found out that there are a hundred and definitions of the word *terror*. 
These issues and all their details received more attention than we can imagine from students and researchers in political and social sciences.

To discuss the definition of revolution, we have to point out that linguistically speaking the word refers to the idea of revolving. The word revolution was originally used in astronomy to refer to the movement of planets in their orbits. It was first used in old political science to refer to the change of a political regime from autocracy to democracy. With the passage of time, revolution came to be used to refer to radical, comprehensive, and instant change of a political regime. This is what the concept of the revolution refers to. Many categories and analyses appeared within this framework.

To avoid getting carried away in this topic, I give an example for a definition of revolution. The two most important schools in this field are functionalism in political science and Marxism.

Functionalism views revolutionary change as a deviation from the normal track and refers to revolution as a stereotypical phenomenon which reflects a kind of disorder in the system. Marxism, on the contrary, views revolution as a fact resulting from development and that it does not happen arbitrarily but because of circumstances or because of shift from one social and economic form to another.
When we analyze revolution, like any other phenomenon, we discuss its formation, components, and forms. By the formation of the revolution I mean how it appears in a society or, why it happens in a certain society. It is listed under the revolutionary situation because there is a specific situation that is illustrated in a specific society and makes up the motivation for the start of the revolution.

The revolutionary situation refers to all objective components in a certain society and leads to the start of the revolution. In fact, political thought knew and addressed this idea since Plato and Aristotle.

**Why do Societies Revolt?**

Plato and Aristotle explained that revolutions happen due to differences in interests and differences between social forces. Later, we remember the well-known American writer Crane Brinton as well as another important political writer who discussed the description and accurate scientific analysis of revolutions. He is the representative of the Western Thought in the face of Marxism which analyzes revolution based on a class concept. It views revolution as a result of irresistible objective historical forces.
If we agreed on this definition of the revolution, what are the general conditions for the outbreak of revolutions? Why does a revolution happen in any society? What leads to the start of revolutions?

In fact, Egypt and Tunisia experienced revolutions and they were preceded by America, France, and Iran, but not all societies witnessed revolutions. Then, why do revolutions happen in specific societies, but not in others? This is part of what is known as the revolutionary situation i.e. circumstances that prevail in a society and lead to the forming and leading this very important phenomenon which affects the society track.

Generally, the components of the revolutionary situation can be summarized in three basic factors as follows:

The First factor: the accumulation of pressure on the working classes which means that the first condition for the start of revolutions is that the people is put under pressure to the point that they is forced to move unconventionally and to gather and revolt. This is the first condition that makes it possible to talk about the possibilities of the of a revolution. It is the condition that all revolution researchers and analysts agree on. You may know how Marx brilliantly analyzed the conditions that led to the outbreak of the 1848 revolution in France. One of these conditions was that pressures
devastated the working classes to unacceptable levels. Moreover, many European intellectuals discussed this condition. There are many details in this regard, but it may be said that one of the most interesting points is the relationship between economic disadvantage and revolution. However, it is important to point out that it is necessarily the case that strong pressures on people that affect their living conditions lead to revolution. This means that if the conditions of the society in question are bad to the extent that it is crushed by extreme poverty and complete deprivation, this may prevent the start of the revolution as these two factors may leave societies unable to unite against the ruling class. This explains why many poor African societies do not revolt. It is true that these societies experience turmoil, disturbance, and crimes, but they do not revolt because they are exhausted to the point that they cannot revolt.

Therefore, there must be a certain degree of progress or welfare in a society for the revolution to take place. Thus, when we study Marxism, we notice that when Marx traced the revolution, he did not start from Russia at all. He, instead, traced it in Europe i.e. in France and Britain societies have a degree of progress and welfare.
Then, the first condition for the revolution in a specific society is that the people feel aggrieved with the condition that they enjoy a degree of welfare that enables them to express themselves by means of a revolution.

The second condition: the disintegration of the ruling class and its inability to rule the homogenously. This means that there might be rebellion and resentment, but the ruling classes themselves are strong and consistent in handling the aspects of rebellion and resentment successfully from the beginning. However, if these ruling classes were paralyzed and unable to deal with the revolution, resentment, rebellion, and public demonstrations, a real revolution would be in effect. This strongly applies, for example, to most of the modern revolutions like the Iranian Revolution which happened when the Shah’s regime was unable to keep its tight grip as opposed to earlier stages when the Shah could control public demonstrations firmly. There are myths and tales about the amount of violence the Shah exercised against the rebellion popular forces. However, as soon as this regime was exhausted and confused, taking it down was an easy mission. In fact, there are many publications which support this idea. The failure of the ruling classes to respond to pressures is a decisive element for the of the revolution.

The third condition: it has been noticed that wars play an important role in preventing revolutions. Moreover, most of the important revolutions were
related to the wars that preceded or accompanied them. For example, the
Communist revolution in Russia cannot be separated from the failure of the
Russian Army and the Russian regime in World War I. We cannot also
separate the July 23\textsuperscript{rd} Revolution in Egypt from the Palestine war. There is
much more evidence that wars contribute to the maturity of the revolutionary
situation. They also contribute to the maturity of the circumstances that lead
to the appearance of the revolution by affecting the two previous elements.
On the one hand, they show the inability of the ruling classes, and they show
the resentment of the ruled classes as a result of the consequences of losing a
war, on the other.

These are, very briefly, the basic elements of the revolutionary
situation or the ones that explain the appearance of the revolution in any
society.

Now, the question is: do these conditions apply to both the developed
and underdeveloped societies in the same way? The answer is no, of course.
The question here is: why?

Because in our countries, as well as in other countries, there are
different circumstances that may affect the revolutionary situation differently.
However, there are, absolutely, Third World revolutions experience different
conditions, or other elements are added to them the most important of which is that most of the Third World revolutions are related to colonialism. In other words, many of these revolutions came to fight colonialism and not in response to the conditions mentioned above. Colonialism led to the development of the revolutionary situation. Therefore, colonialism represents a unique factor in the case of the Third World revolutions. There are also the social and economic conditions of the Third World which are different in the way they prepare for the revolution from those in the developed countries. Those who studied Marxism know that Marx’s idea is a result of his analysis of the production pattern in the different societies which is radically different from its counterpart in the developed societies.

Mao Tse-tung is one of the most important people who theorized revolution in the underdeveloped societies. His analysis of the revolutionary situation in China is different in many ways from the traditional Marxist analysis. Mao Tse-tung focused basically on peasants away from Marxism. The Chinese Revolution was indeed a real short revolution, but it did not of course relate to the conditions that were described by Marx. It was related to the special nature of the Chinese people and the situation of the peasants.

Now, we move to talk about the elements of revolution which can be summarized as follows:
First: organization; a revolution cannot start without a certain organization as revolution is not arbitrary. When people take down to streets spontaneously, this is not a revolution. It can be an intifada or a demonstration whereas a revolution assumes a kind of organization that is different from one case to another. However, eventually organization is a basic element to have a revolution according to scientific definitions.

The concept of organization, in our normal study, is related to management sciences. However, in political science, organization means revolution especially through political organization which can be partisan. Therefore, if we speak of a revolution and organization, we largely mean political parties and their role which is an issue that requires a lengthy discussion. However, absolutely no modern revolution happened without organization or in other words without a political party.

The second part of the elements of a revolution is ideology since any revolution must have a certain idea which may be national, social, or democratic. The question here is: what is ideology? What is the idea that stands behind this spirit and that makes people go out to revolt?

The truth is that ideology is among the most difficult terms to analyze, interpret, or explain because there are so many definitions for it. However, I
prefer a definition that we received in Cairo University from one of the best political science professors namely Professor Hamid Rabie. He is a very distinguished person who used to live in Italy. He received nine PhD degrees in Europe from France and Italy. Ideology is a kind of comparison between the present reality and the ideal reality that we aspire to achieve and to decide on the way to move from the first to the second.

Then, the simplest content of ideology is that it shows us the following three elements: analyzing the current reality, envisaging the aspired reality or future, and deciding on the methods to move from the current reality to the ideal one. If we take the communist ideology, for example, we find that communism mimics the current reality i.e. class conflicts; the conflict between the higher and the ruling classes, one the one hand, and the working classes, on the other. It talks about the ideal reality which is the communist society which is free from class conflict. It also describes the ways to move from the current reality through struggle or class conflict. Therefore, communist ideology is a live and pure model of the ideology as a concept. This way we can describe any other dominant ideology. Thus, if we talk about a revolution, we must discover, whether implicitly or explicitly, the characteristics of this revolution’s ideology.
There is another important element that the study of the revolution proves to be essential for the success of the revolution, which is the external support for the revolution financially or in terms of recognition. This issue is very important and very interesting. Perhaps the presence of the revolutionary model motivates other societies to do the same.

The French Revolution is, of course, considered the most comprehensive and the biggest example in history. When that revolution happened, it was considered the beginning for other revolutions in Europe. Based on a very recent model that we experienced, it can be said that the Tunisian Revolution had a substantial effect on the Egyptian Revolution. When the revolution happened in Tunisia, it undoubtedly mobilized the Egyptian masses. This is very interesting because I was personally in the heart of the Egyptian Revolution and many of the slogans of the Egyptian Revolution were repetitions of the Tunisian Revolution slogans including “the people wants to overthrow the regime”.

The other element in revolution analysis is revolution methods. Revolutions can take many different forms. What synonyms do we know for the term revolution? There are names like revolutionary terror, gang wars, normal wars, traditional wars, and mass intifadas. All of these are different forms of revolution. It is important to mention here that terror was basically
related to revolutions before it became connected to violence exercised these days by some illegal groups. Mao Tse-tung was the first to theorize this connection in his capacity as the leader of the Chinese revolution. If we review his writings, we will find that he spoke abundantly about terror as a means for the Chinese Revolution. During the revolution, the rebels went to the villages governed by feudalist to target them and carry out operations to frighten them rather than killing them. For example, the rebels would go to some villages and capture officials. At night, they would put these officials on donkey backs or other animals and start applauding them as a way of frightening and scaring them.

Terror is then one of the tools of the revolution. It is also known that contemporary revolutions included gang wars. The Chinese Revolution included large guerrilla wars during some of its stages. Mao Tse-tung is considered one of the world’s most important guerrilla war theorists. The Vietnamese experience, Malay Revolution against the British colonialism, Suez Canal revolution against the British colonialism, as well as many Palestinian organizations exercise guerilla war as part of their resistance. In other words, it is neither a terror style nor a normal war style. It is rather guerilla war. This is one of the basic revolution tactics in addition to the
normal war which takes place at a certain stage like what happened in the case of the Chinese Revolution.

The last aspect is peaceful intifadas which may be one of the basic forms of revolutionary intifadas. I believe that this is one of the major characteristics of the recent Egyptian Revolution. It was peaceful and was based on the idea of popular intifada rather than on any other method.

**How did information revolution affect the Twenty-First Century revolutions?**

When we reflect on the Arab-Spring revolutions, especially in Egypt and Tunisia and later in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, we find out the following:

First: there is a central role of the young people in these revolutions, but which young people are we speaking about? They are the young people who master the use modern social networking. We all know how the young people who organized the January 25th Revolution in Egypt could communicate through Facebook and social networking media to mobilize the masses. There are a lot of details concerning what happened in terms of organizing the revolution and how these young people could mobilize other young people who never had any prior agreement with them. No one mentioned the word
revolution since it was a demonstration on police day. Because police were a problem for the revolutionary young people because of the predation of the state security investigation department, young people hated them a lot and thought that their basic battle was with the police. So, they decided to organize a large protest against the police on police day. The protest turned into a revolution when people insisted on staying in Tahrir Square until the regime falls. This is the central idea which escalated the situation and showed the determination of the sit-in protesters who continued their sit-in protest. It was very interesting for me, scientifically speaking, to see a revolution developing and escalating in front of me. It was interesting and strange for me to watch its mechanism and the forces that affect its formation. Most of what happened is hard to measure in the future. I remember how the first day ended and how around ten thousand people remained in the Square. Staying in the Square became the basic challenge. The situation continued this way for more than ten days. On February 11th was the big event when President Mubarak declared his abdication.

The most important question is: was the revolution the beginning or the end? Was the reaction to what happened correct? Did the revolution succeed or fail in achieving its goals? The answer to these question is a different topic. I believe that the revolution failed on the ground or at least
relapsed undoubtedly. Why? How? Why am I saying this? I am not going into this now. However, the Egyptian Revolution did not achieve its aspired objectives. Therefore, after this long talk, considering what happened and the results we reached, we have the right to ask the following question: has Egypt witnessed a revolution?

The answer is no. What Egypt witnessed was a mass intifada but not a revolution. I can only say it was a revolution if radical changes happened in the Egyptian society, but these did not happen.

I would like to add a note. I was personally within the close circle of Jamal Mubarak and I do not think that Hosni Mubarak was a complete evil at all. He had his advantages, but the catastrophe happened when the Egyptians knew of his intention to pass power to his son. It was completely unacceptable to inherit Egypt by the President’s son. It was the last straw (the straw that broke the camel’s back).
Where is Iraq heading? A Future Vision

Dr. Khaireldine Hasib 8

In order to understand the current situation in Iraq and to propose a plan for solution, I would like to explain some points:

My opinion from the beginning, concerning the regime that preceded the occupation, was that it is the right of any people to use all the possible legal ways to change their country’s regime if they were not satisfied with this regime. However, no people has the right to seek support from foreigners to change the regime. When America occupied Iraq, it did not do so pursuant to any international resolutions. On the contrary, the Secretary General of the United Nations announced that America’s occupation of Iraq is illegal.

As for the American allegations that Iraq had mass destruction weapons and that there was al-Qaeda organization in Iraq, they had been proven nonsense. The evidence was that the Congress formed a committee to investigate this issue. The committee announced in a report that it published that “there were no mass destruction weapons in Iraq and there was no al-

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Qaeda organization before the occupation, but it i.e. al-Qaeda appeared after the occupation”.

American circles like the neo-conservatives among others raised the issue of democracy and that America went on to occupy Iraq to establish democracy.

However, the questions we raise here are:

- Was Iraq the only non-democratic country in the Arab world? I believe that all regimes are non-democratic to different degrees.
- Was Iraq the only country whose people was not satisfied with his regime?
- Was Iraq the only country whose people were unable to change the regime?

Therefore, establishing democracy as a justification is not convincing.

We also have the right to ask the following question: what did the American occupation do to Iraq?

We can sum up the answer as follows:

**First:** the most important thing that the occupation did was disbanding the Iraqi Army as well as all the other security agencies.
Second: Bremer ordered to form a temporary governing council based on sectarian and ethnic distribution. The council was made up of Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen, and others. This way the American occupation was the first to officially introduce sectarian division.

Third: the occupation no longer spoke about the people of Iraq, but instead it spoke of Shiite, Sunni, Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen etc. until the term Iraqi people disappeared from the American discourse.

Fourth: the military governor in Iraq enacted a law called “Provisional Government Act” which adopted the same sectarian and ethic principle. It is the act that was later approved as a basis for the constitution that was legislated while the constitution itself was drafted in America.

Fifth: the occupation legislated what was called “De-Ba’athification Law” although this regime had been in Iraq for Forty years. It was not possible for anyone to assume a leading position such as a general director, under-secretary etc. unless he was registered nominally at least, in the Ba’ath Party. This led to the exclusion of large numbers of Iraqi expertise from Iraqi ministries, institutions, and military. These positions were filled by other people based on affiliation and sect and the like. With the passage of time, the American occupation and its
governments succeeded not only in changing the regime only, but in taking the Iraqi state itself down.

Also, we have the right to ask: what are the achievements of governments that were appointed by the occupation?

In fact, these achievements can be summarized in the following points:

First: occupation governments enjoyed favorable conditions including the rising oil prices and its increased revenues.

Second: The basic expertise of the state was excluded for different reasons and lame excuses. State institutions were re-built, and their responsibilities were distributed on sectarianism, nepotism, and kinship. This resulted in the collapse of expertise and the spread of bribery and nepotism.

Third: because of insecurity during the occupation and after its nominal withdrawal in the late 2011, a militia army called the Iraqi Army was established. It is an army made up of militias with affiliations to different sects and forces. The army members were chosen on sectarian and ethnic bases and it quickly failed in the basic missions assigned to it.
Fourth: the prevalence of corruption, looting, and waste which aggravated by the rising oil prices. No evidence is needed to prove this after the frightening confessions of the occupation governments’ officials. Among these is the American ambassador in Baghdad who sent a secret report to the American Department of State entitled: “The Iraqi Government’s Corruption”. The report was published in the Arab Future Magazine.

Fifth: The Iraqi oil production was increased against the world export potential. New oil drilling costs were paid, and their maintenance followed without any possibility for using them because oil production capacity was predetermined to decrease.

Sixth: The prevalence of hopelessness, countless assassinations, arbitrary detentions without trials. Recently, ten thousand detainees were released in one week either because of the lack of evidence or because there was no investigation. Daesh has occupied Mosel and the neighboring areas since June 2014. It is worth noting that America is the one who brought Daesh, but when the latter reached Europe and other areas, they started fighting it.
Seventh: the intervention of most of the neighboring countries, especially Iran, in Iraq’s internal affairs in ways that violate international conventions and norms.

Eighth: Iraq currently experiences a crisis resulting from the failure of the occupation and its governments at the political, economic, security, and community levels. The country has become threatened with bankruptcy because the occupation governments could not pay for state expenses, salaries, and pensions.

Ninth: dividing Iraq is no longer limited to sectarianism or ethnicity although some external as well as internal powers desire this division. It has become threatened with partitioning. If it is divided into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish, Sunnis will fight each other, and the Shiite and the Kurds will do the same because the disputes among the three components are sharp and impartial enough to lead to wars on land within each component following any sectarian or ethnic division. This will lead to the disintegration of Iraq.
The question now is: what is the solution, is there any way to rescue?

Based on what was mentioned and because of the impossibility of finding internal solutions to the multidimensional crisis which Iraq experiences currently and because the occupying force, without exception, which participates in the political process lacks any national horizon, it is inevitable to resort to Arab and international solutions to rescue Iraq. Iraq is not the first country to do so. This happened in many similar cases in Europe. It is also happening currently in Syria and Yemen, and maybe others, through the Security Council.

These solutions may not come from foreign countries like American, Iran, or Turkey because they are the source of the problem albeit in different degrees. Thus, they cannot provide solutions.

This plan was preceded by different attempts. On December 9\textsuperscript{th}, 2005, I personally launched an initiative concerning Iraq to consult with the active political powers which oppose the occupation. The initiative was broadcast on Al-Jazeera satellite channel and was also published in an annex to the second edition of the book *Iraq’s Future after the End of Occupation*. 
A national Iraqi meeting was held in Beirut for two days during the period from November 29-30, 2008 under the title: The Iraqi Meeting for Liberation and Democracy. It issued the political methodology in a specified appendix. It largely overlaps with the initiative I mentioned earlier.

The Proposed Plan

Based on item three of this paper concerning occupation governments’ outcomes in Iraq and to benefit from all the previous initiatives to rescue, I decided to propose the following initiative in the form of an action plan. Invitations will be directed to all Iraqi nationalists who may be concerned, excluding those participating in the current political process, to participate in a meeting that will be held in Tunisia on March 19th for one day to discuss the draft of this initiative. The proposed plan includes the following:

First: to call for a meeting of the Security Council based on a recommendation and endorsement from the coming Arab Summit which is to be held by the end of the coming March in Morocco because of the failure of the different occupation governments in Iraq, including the current government, to maintain security and order in Iraq, to
protect its borders, and to secure the minimum basic needs for its citizens.

We will urge the Security Council to immediately intervene in Iraq through the formation of a transitional national government for a limited period of time that does not exceed two years. The government is to be made up of individuals who have experience, integrity, impartial, and non-partisan. The prime minister must pledge not to run for office in any forthcoming elections. The prime minister has the power, upon non-binding consultation with the UN representative, to remove any minister from his/her post and to add new ministers according to the needs and circumstances. During the transitional period, this government has the necessary legislative, representational, and financial power to fulfill its duties. It also has the right to reconsider the revocation or amending of laws, regulations, and orders issued since the beginning of the occupation until the formation of this transitional government as well as any laws, regulations, and instructions issued earlier.

**Second:** the protection of Iraq is assigned to an Arab military force from Arab countries that did not encourage or facilitate its occupation.
The Security Council, in consultation with the transitional government, is responsible for deciding the size, tasks, and countries participating in this force and its duration. This force is responsible, under the supervision of the transitional government, reforming the Iraqi military according to the principles mentioned later in this initiative.

**Third:** The Security Council must be committed to maintain Iraq’s independence and sovereignty on its land and objects any military intervention from foreign and neighboring countries in its internal affairs.

**Fourth:** The government starts right away, in consultation with the main national powers opposing the occupation, reforming the Iraqi military and the other security forces according to the principles and standards it deems fit. The military and other security forces are to be equipped with the latest weapons they need from resources it deems fit. All the militias currently active in Iraq must be dissolved in the way the government decides.

**Fifth:** The military and other new security forces must not be allowed to intervene in politics or the practice of partisan activities, and they must remain under the political leadership of new government. All parties and other
political powers in Iraq are strictly prohibited from practicing partisan and political activities inside the military and the other security forces.

**Sixth:** in addition to what was mentioned above, the new government selects an advisory board that is made up of a hundred to a hundred and fifty people from the Iraqi political powers, figures, and expertise who did not collaborate politically with the occupation. The meetings and deliberations of this board must be closed, and its discussions must not be announced.

**Seventh:** that so-called constitution, was prepared under the occupation, and its referendum was falsified so it is considered cancelled.

**Eighth:** within a period of no more than a year after this agreement, the government must draft a new electoral and party laws. The elections of the two houses must be held in accordance with temporary draft constitution that was prepared in Beirut meeting on Iraq’s future in July 2005.

After the American occupation, over a hundred Iraqis participated in a meeting to discuss the consequences of the occupation at the Arab and regional levels. Later, in 2005, the Center for Arab Unity Studies called for a symposium and many committees were formed to prepare a program for the post-occupation Iraq. This included drafting a temporary constitution,
electoral law, party law, reconstruction law, oil project law, media law, military, the Kurdish issue, and compensations.

The book that was published concerning the proceedings of the meeting is available on the Center for Arab Unity Studies website. Its first edition was published in 2005.

Ninth: the elections must be held during the second year of the transitional period under the supervision of the UN, the Arab League, the European Union, Arab Organization for Human Rights, Amnesty International, and other international and Arab organizations to ensure the freedom, integrity, and transparency of the elections which must be held based on proportional lists that is mentioned in paragraph 9/j of the project.

Tenth: the new government must be committed, during the transitional period, to the oil policy which was agreed on in Beirut meeting. All oil agreements that were signed during the occupation period are subject to amendment or cancellation because they violate Security Council resolutions 1483 and 1536. All the agreements signed by Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party during the period extending from 1991 to 2003 as well as agreements they signed during the occupation period with foreign companies for oil exploration or oil production development in the
governorates of Suleimaniyah, Erbil, and Dohuk are considered illegal and are therefore cancelled. These companies will be asked to stop any operations in these governorates. They will be subject to litigation inside and outside Iraq because they signed contracts with illegal Iraqi bodies to invest in the oil sector.

Eleventh: the Security Council, based on an initiative from the United States, lifts all the remaining sanctions that were imposed on Iraq after Iraq invaded Kuwait including deductions from exported oil revenues for unlimited period of time and releases any Iraqi balances.

Twelfth: the United States and the United Kingdom, the two countries that participated in the occupation of Iraq, have to provide financial assistance in the form of grants of no less than fifty billion US dollars and twenty billion US dollars respectively. These amounts must be made available for the new Iraqi government within a six-month period from the date of the agreement. These amounts are for the purposes of the reconstruction of Iraq, compensations for losses and damages to the state and people of Iraq as a consequence of the illegal American occupation. The American and British governments have to urge the Arab countries that have claims against Iraq to write-off these debts as well as waiving reparations required from Iraq pursuant to earlier Security Council resolutions. Reparations that these
governments received, as well as individuals and institutions, from Iraqi oil revenues through the United Nations in accordance with oil-for-food agreement must be returned.

**Thirteenth**: the Iraqi parliament, which will be elected during the second year of the transitional period, will draft a constitution benefiting from the draft constitution of Beirut meeting. The constitution is then put to public referendum. The new government approves of the draft constitution of Beirut meeting as a temporary constitution which expires once the new constitution is approved.

**Fourteenth**: the elected Iraqi parliament selects a president according to the constitution that will be approved through a public referendum.

**Fifteenth**: the new government handles the Kurdish issue in accordance with the draft constitution of Beirut symposium.

**Sixteenth**: the transitional Iraqi government commits itself to peaceful means and not to resort to the use of force in any conflicts with other Arab states and other neighboring non-Arab countries. The same applies to countries which encouraged or participated in the occupation of Iraq in one way or another, except for self-defense purposes, and in accordance with the limits of the United Nations Charter and Arab League Charter.
Seventeenth: the new Iraqi government forms an independent Arab judiciary committee from Iraqi, Arab, and international legal expertise to investigate all war-crime complaints, human rights violations in Iraq, collusion with the occupation and looting the state, and sectarian kidnapping and killing, and extortion as well as other crimes since the July 14th 1958 Revolution until the formation of the Iraqi government.

The investigation committee gathers information about these crimes while the elected parliament decides on the way to handle them in light of the international experience in similar situations.

Eighteenth: benefiting from the general principles of the Iraqi National Meeting and Democracy initiative, which was mentioned earlier, based on the selection of transitional government to consult with the advisory board.

Nineteenth: this offer is integral and devoid of selectivity.

This initiative, after approval of its final format, will be submitted in the suggested meeting. Invitations for the meeting will be sent out during the week after the Security Council and Arab Summit Conference which will be held in Morocco during the last week of this month. All the concerned bodies and entities which may support adopting and facilitating it will be invited.
International Monetary Fund

And the Available Alternatives

Dr. Ahmad Al-Sayed Al-Najjar

First: a critical reading of the Fund’s program for developing economies reform

Social/economic policy basket, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and creditor countries recommend for the debtor and stumbling states, which need to reschedule their debts, or to get loans to face financial imbalances which they suffer from, constitute a program that aims to basically serve the interests of the creditor countries and their partners and address the imbalances of the debtor countries regardless of who bears the expenses. Generally, the poor and the middle class are the ones who are burdened with these solutions according to the traditional program of the Fund. In addition to addressing economic crises at the expense of the poor and the middle class, these solutions are based on floating economy and public finance through loans that burden the generations and governments to come. These “solutions”

- This lecture was delivered on May 27th 2013.
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may fix imbalances on the short run, but they will worsen social tensions, on the one hand, and will worsen imbalance factors again when the loans are due to paid back, on the other. The result is a deficiency in active demand that motivates economy because of the bad income distribution resulting from economic policy basket that the IMF usually recommends.

The traditional “commandments” that the IMF suggest that any financially troubled countries are based on free capitalism and that they believe that economic take-off can be achieved by providing the private sector with more money to start establishing new investments to create job opportunities, promote growth, and increase production. This prescription does not care about the fact that this model, the accumulations of imbalance factors, and the social injustice it involves were a major factor in the biggest and the most complicated financial and economic crises in the world in general. These include: the Great Depression Crisis of October 1929, which continued devastating some advanced and developing capitalist countries until after the mid-thirties of the 20th century and the Second Great Depression of 2008 whose consequences are still in effect until now. In addition, there was the depression crisis in the advanced countries in the years 1982 and 1983, the global financial crisis of the year 1987, the partial crises in Mexico in 1995, in South and South-East Asia in 1997 and 1998, in Russia
and the former Soviet Union republics throughout the Nineties of the last century, and in Turkey during the period from 1999 until 2002.

The programs or “prescriptions” of the IMF for addressing crises in countries suffering from internal and external imbalances are also characterized by the fact that they are almost fixed and do not change regardless of the circumstances of the economy or its growth level. This makes them more rigid and ideological than can be absorbed by the situation which requires flexibility and practical solutions which takes into account the social dimensions and are characterized by efficiency and justice at the same time.

The elements of the IMF program for the stumbling countries focus on ending the direct role of the state in industry, agriculture, and trade and to restrict its role to defense, security, ensuring individuals’ commitment to their contracts, and investing in the infrastructure necessary to facilitate life and economic activity; which is called (the welfare state model).

The program also includes privatizing the public sector to end any direct role of the state in economy, which is a repeated requirement, although practical experience proved that privatization processes turned, in all the countries of the world, into gigantic corruption operations which resulted in
looting what previous generations and governments built in the debtor countries for the benefit of a handful of local and foreign capitalists. This requirement, generally, turns its back to the fact that the state in advanced capitalist countries played a direct central role in economy, industry, agriculture, and investments, and services sector from the thirties to the late seventies of the twentieth century.

These countries, through their direct and vast involvement in economy, were capable of getting themselves out of the first Great Depression, bearing the expenses of the World War II and its requirements. They rebuilt what was damaged during the war. They rebuilt their economies and built new powerful companies that could control their local markets and expanded throughout the world either through their goods or service exports or through their direct or indirect investments all over the world.

After that, some capitalist countries, specifically Britain during Thatcher’s time and the United States during Reagan time, followed by all the capitalist countries, started thinking of privatizing the public sector with transformations in capitalism towards the free economy model which has no direct role for the state in the economy. These are the transformations whose accumulative consequences led to the second Great Depression Crisis in 2008 which was followed by large-scale interventions by the governments to save
the falling capitalist economies including governmental bailout programs and total or partial nationalization of some affected companies to prevent them from collapse.

In fact, what is allowed in these countries, since the thirties and after the Great Depression Crisis, cannot be accepted to be forbidden in our countries which currently need an active state role in economy. In addition, they need to allow total freedom to the small, medium, cooperative, and large private sector to engage in all economic sectors so that the economy can grow based on a partnership between the public sector and the private sector which will eventually lead to the mobilization of all community and state energies to actively participate in the economy.

The IMF program usually includes austerity measures like: reducing public spending especially subsidizing basic goods necessary for the life of the poor, reducing wages which make up the income for those who work for the state and its public sector, and improving public revenues through tax increases on the middle class specifically.

It is necessary to point out that moving the economy in depression situations may require an expanding policy rather than an austerity policy
similar to what the United States itself did when it doubled the public spending after overcoming the second Great Depression Crisis in September 2008.

The program also includes, freeing goods and services industry within the economy and it is external relations, freeing capital market, opening unrestricted direct and indirect investment market for foreign capitals, and reducing labor protection measurements in general especially protecting them against termination. This will give capitalists more freedom in terms of labor retention or layoffs without any deterrent expenses.

In addition, the IMF program always includes the requirement to free the local currency exchange rate and to float and decrease it under the claim that this measure is effective in increasing the competitive ability of local exports regardless of the extent of economy movement and its ability to export in the first place.

This measurement, usually, results in countries with low-growth economies which depend on exporting basic materials like oil, gas, minerals, and agricultural goods to affect the prices of imports in terms of raising them when they float the local currency. This launches a wave of inflation which negatively affects employees with semi-fixed incomes, workers who work for daily wages, and people who live on pensions. However, it positively affects
landlords and property owners because their property values and revenues increase at the time of inflation.

However, the IMF program for the debtor countries has some advantages in terms of agreeing, in principle, on the taxation of capital benefits represented in the dividends and stock-exchange profits, bank deposits profits, and real estate trade. Parasitic or monstrous Governments in some developing countries either reserve or reject these requirements.

Moreover, the IMF program for the debtor and troubled countries is negotiable. If the debtor countries propose a strong, coherent, and practical program to restore its financial balance internally and externally through mechanisms different in certain aspects from what the Fund proposes or requires, the Fund may approve of the proposed program, which means that efficiency and flexibility of the social biases of the economic management in the troubled countries have an important role in determining the aspects of the program to be applied on the ground and the social biases it expresses.

**The Egyptian Model: Imbalances and the Necessity of Addressing them**

The realistic and more beneficial option for Egypt is the deep integration in the international economy on just and equal bases whether in
terms of bilateral relations or multilateral relations in the different areas of international economic relations, commitment to international agreements, collaboration with state international economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and World Trade Organization.

This integration should be combined with constant endeavors to make these institutions more equitable and more democratic while taking into account the special nature of the economic situation of each country. It has to be more considerate of the priority of the national program to redress economic imbalances and distributing the burdens of this reform equally.

This logic is the basis for the position towards the loan that former President Dr. Mohamed Morsi’s government requested from the IMF and loan obsession that accompanied this government, which portrayed Egypt as a beggar country in all the places that Morsi or his prime minister visited requesting loans or grants. The characteristics of this realistic and practical choice, which may serve Egypt’s interests, within a framework of balance with the other countries and the international financial institutions in the following:
1. Reforming any economy’s imbalances resulting from a crisis should start with realistic and practical internal measures based on knowledge and justice some of which may lead to immediate positive results while others may be difficult on the short run. What eases this difficulty is the equal distribution of its burdens, its effectiveness, and its positive effects on the medium and long terms if it was properly applied. These measures, with their bittersweet results, should have positive effects for the poor, middle class workers, small project owners, cooperative project owners, and large capitalist project owners. At the same time, they have to provide the community with strong solutions for problems and economic differences which will make the community accept these measures.

2. Stopping loan obsession of Dr. Morsi and his government has become a necessity for Egypt’s best interest, which is being dragged to excessive debts and to create major burdens for the generations and governments to come, simply because of floating everything by the failure of the current government which lacks efficiency and flexibility. Since Dr. Morsi came to office, he had constantly sought to get loans from inside and outside to make up for the deficiency in external operations of the state and generally to fill the state budget deficit which
was estimated, at the time of setting the budget for the fiscal year of 2012-2013, at about 135 billion Egyptian Pounds. Then the estimate was recently raised to 185 billion Pounds without him or his government thinking of redressing this deficit and reducing the need for loans. On the contrary, the annual state draft budget for the fiscal year 2013-2014 indicates that the deficit reached 197.5 billion Pounds in addition to the amounts needed to pay for the old loans of 114.5 billion Pounds. The amounts that Dr. Morsi’s government will borrow will be about 321 billion Pound in the next year. If we deduct from public revenues 6 billion Pounds as a result of wrong calculations in the state budget, the amount of loans will rise to 318 billion Pounds in the fiscal year 2013-2014.

During the first three months of his rule, Dr. Morsi borrowed about 140 billion Pounds from inside Egypt raising the amount of the internal debts to 1378 billion Pounds at the end of the last year compared to about 1238 when he came to office and to about 962 billion Pounds on January the 1st 2011; a month before Mubarak was removed.

Dr. Morsi also borrowed 4 billion dollars from outside from a small Gulf Emirate. There is an agreement to borrow another 3 billion dollars from that Emirate by buying bonds and treasury bills for that
value. In addition, there are 2.5 billion dollars from Islamic Development Bank. One billion of this amount had already been withdrawn. There is an agreement to borrow 2 billion dollars without profits from Libya for five years. This is a humiliating deal for the Egyptian state because it was completed in return of handing over some Libyan refugees to the Libyan authorities at a time when Egyptians in Libya are subject to all kinds of targeting, oppression, humiliation, and torture.

In short, Dr. Morsi borrowed about 11 billion dollars in ten months which raised Egypt’s external debts from 34.4, when he came to office, to 45.4 billion dollars in April 2013. There are negotiations with the IMF to get 4.8 billion dollars in addition to borrowing through what is called instruments since the government wants to borrow about 10 billion dollars annually through this system. Assets and public revenues will be mortgaged for these loans (public instruments). If the coming governments could not pay these debts when they are due, assets will be conveyed to those who have the instruments whether they were citizens or foreigners or even the International Muslim Brotherhood Organization which can then own Egypt even if they fail to continue governing it. This means that if Morsi continues along these
lines, his loans in four years will exceed the internal and external loans of Mubarak and Sadat in forty years.

3. Requesting loans from the IMF or any other country must be made in absolute necessity circumstances under financially affordable terms. The IMF and crediting entities must take into account the national plan for the Egyptian economy reform, and rebalancing the Egyptian economy and its internal and external exchanges. It has also to be conditioned with avoiding any measures that would add more burden on the poor and the middle class who have suffered for a long period of time before and after the revolution as evident from poverty and unemployment. Let alone unjust wage and tax systems that direct support to the rich and the capitalists. It is not logical, economic, moral, or politically possible to make them suffer more. Requesting loans must also be conditioned with the principle that Egypt has the freedom as to how to use these loans as they will be listed under the public revenues of the state budget to be used in financing the establishment of direct productive projects whether through financing small and collaborative projects for the unemployed to restore their jobs or to create a generation of young employers whose businesses are based on hard work, knowledge, and innovation. Alternatively, they can be used to
finance establishing public, co-owned, or private industrial or agricultural projects in areas that the community needs and ones that can pay off loans and their profits from their revenues.

4. Although economic logic requires treating exchange rate as a mechanism to achieve economic goals and not as a goal in itself, proportional stability of exchange rate is a necessity for the efficiency of future account of investors and to control inflation rates. Dr. Morsi’s government and in response to the IMF requirements, floated the Egyptian Pound allowing its exchange rate to decrease against the dollar and the other main free currencies with 15% so far in the official market and more than 25% in the black market which finances all kinds of illegal trade on top of which are weapons and drugs. Any exchange rate decline against the American dollar means an increase in the costs of Egyptian imports including basic and food commodities for the same percentage.

Since the value of the Egyptian goods imports, according to the Central Bank of Egypt, was about 352.8 in the year 2011-2012, the increase in the imports costs that the people will suffer after the decline of the Pound against the American dollar for 15% in the official market will be about 52 billion Pounds if we suppose that the size of the
imports is constant. This amount is more than the value of the IMF loan which is less than 33 billion Pounds. The fact is that the timing of floating the Egyptian Pound is anything but correct because it came at the time of the collapse of the reserve which reached a critical situation according to the Central Bank description as enough to cover less than three months of imports which creates bad spirits that promote speculations. Currency exchange companies, most of which are owned by prosperous right currents under Muslim names, drain the market out of these currencies to pile up these currencies and then raise their prices to make exceptional profits in an opportunistic manner at the expense of the interests of the nation.

It also comes at a time of large trade deficit which reached 31.7 billion dollars in the fiscal year 2011-2012. Trade account balance deficit reached about 7.9 billion dollars in the same year. It could have reached more than 25 billion dollars without the transfers of expatriates which was 18 billion dollars in the same fiscal year comparing to 12.8 billion dollars in 2011-2012 and 9.8 billion dollars in 2009-2010. It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that an important part of these transfers was transfers to the radical Islamist groups and as such they
are not a building force for the economy as much as a power to finance the dominance of these groups.

The corrupt people are smuggling their wealth abroad after changing it into free currencies and because the Egyptian stock market continues without controls. This enables parasitic speculators to transfer their profit to the outside after changing them into dollars or free currencies without any limits which will deplete Egypt’s reserve of free currencies.

The same thing applies to foreign companies which makes large monopolistic profits especially in the two areas of fertilizers and cement which transfer all their monopolistic profits after changing them into free currencies without limits.

The time is inappropriate because of the increase of the illegal imports of weapons by those in conflict with the law and religious extremist groups from Libya and other neighboring countries in addition to the illegal importation of drugs which depletes Egypt’s reserve of free currencies in criminal trade and partakes in declining the Pound’s exchange rates.
Third: Egypt’s Available Borrowing Alternatives

A number of alternatives is available to Egypt to balance the public budget deficit and to develop important renewable local revenues resources while maintaining an open and positive relation with the IMF. Also, borrowing and the using loans from the IMF or any international party has to be conditioned with the terms we mentioned earlier.

Regardless of the loans, elements of monetary and financial reform that Egypt needs can be summarized as follows:

a. Reforming subsidies system to remove the subsidies provided to the wealthy people and to the large capitalist tourist resorts whether local or foreign. They sell their products for prices higher than the international prices in cement, fertilizers, iron, ceramics, and aluminum. Moreover, bakeries, brick furnaces, transportation vehicles must be changed to be powered by gas through affordable loans to finance this change. This will save a large number of subsidies which is 75 billion Pounds out of 100 billion Pounds allocated for petroleum products.

It is noted that electricity subsidies were about additional 5 billion pounds last year 2012-2013 and it is estimated to rise to 13.3
billion pounds in the fiscal year 2013-2014. Most of these go to the rich and large capitalist companies whether local or foreign. To do so without allowing these companies to raise the prices of their products, the legislative authority must amend competition protection and antitrust law to impose severe penalties on companies that exercise harmful monopolistic practices. The state must exercise pressure on companies that raise the prices of their products by importing products similar in quality and cheaper. A wave of initial public offerings must be started by the government to establish private projects owned by stakeholders in the fields in which Egypt suffers from monopolistic practices that are harmful to consumers. This will increase the amounts of local production and will place pressure of the monopolistic companies and will force them to sell their products for moderate prices.

Within the same context, bread subsidies must be fixed by purchasing the final product i.e. the bread from the market in free prices and selling it for the subsidized prices for those who deserve subsidies instead of wasting its allocated amounts in subsidizing other goods like wheat which is smuggled and sold to candy factories. This way, some bakery owners with the complicity and
participation of some supervision and control officials in the Ministry of Supply and police take over large amounts of bread subsidies which is allocated for the poor and low-income people who consume this subsidized bread.

b. Changing mineral wealth management law and royalty fees which is next to zero. For example, royalty fees are two cents per ton of limestone and twenty cents for granite. These fees were set in 1956 when the state used to monopoly their use. Then the private sector, local and foreign, started using them. The low fees continued which is considered a waste of public natural resources.

Any new law can raise the fees for exploiting this wealth to economic levels by adding from 7 to 25 billion Pounds annually to Egypt depending on the rates of excavating and preparing mineral and quarry resources, according to the estimates of the public authority for mineral wealth.

c. Reforming government interest rates for new bonds and treasury bills and settling the accumulated old profits. Interest rate increases must not be more than one percentage point higher than the interest rate given to deposit owners in the banking system. It is not acceptable for the interest rates on treasury bills to range from 13%
to 17% whereas the interest rate on the deposits is 9%. This action, which is similar to what public sector banks do with stumbling businessmen, can decrease about one fourth of gigantic payments on the accumulated debts i.e. about 33 billion pounds of profit amounts which was about 133 billion pounds in the current budget of 2012 - 2013.

d. Making real and essential reform to the tax system towards and multi-tiered and bottom-up system with rates similar to those used in developing countries. These promote local and foreign investments as used in countries such as: Thailand, China, and Turkey where the top tier for individual income is 37%, 45%, and 35% in the three countries respectively. Moderate taxes must be created for stock exchange transactions to mitigate the severity of speculations and make revenues for the public treasury. Taxes must also be created on capital profits in the stock exchange on the speculator and foreign company transfers of their profits abroad, on real estate transactions, and bank deposit profits with a commitment to waive profits which is less than the income tax waiver level. The annually renewable outcome of this change to the tax system may
exceed in one year the amount of the loan under negotiations with the IMF.

e. Making critical changes to the prices of Egyptian gas exported to Turkey, Spain, and Jordan to equal the international prices, and to change accordingly on the basis that the corrupt contracts that provide the Egyptian gas to these countries at fixed extremely low prices are illegal contracts. They were signed by a corrupt regime that does not represent the interests of the Egyptian people.

This action has a recent international precedent which is the cancellation, by the United States after its criminal occupation of Iraq, of all oil contracts signed by the late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein on the grounds that he did not represent the Iraqi people. If this change to gas prices takes place, Egypt will add up about 15 billion pounds as public revenues annually.

f. Imposing non-renewable resource tax on all Egyptian and foreign companies working in the oil and gas sectors to restore the Egyptian people’s rights from them because most of the co-production contracts were signed when oil prices were at 17 dollars per barrel in the Nineties of the last century. These prices are still the same although oil prices exceeded 100 dollars per barrel. This made tons
of profits to the foreign companies working in the oil and gas sector. Egypt must restore its rights from this increase through this tax similar to what happened in other countries such as Algeria.

Since the total of oil and gas production was 222.4 billion pounds in 2011-2012, it added a non-renewable resource tax of 15% which makes a revenue of 33.4 billion pounds to the state. About 15 billion pounds of this comes from foreign oil companies. These revenues must be deposited in the coming generations’ fund to compensate them for depleting Egypt’s reserve of oil and gas by the current generation. The money in this fund can be used to finance the establishment of productive and profitable public projects for the benefit of the current generation and the generations to come. These projects can be developed continuously to inherit them to the generations to come as highly efficient and productive assets.

g. Rethinking exports subsidies for 3.1 billion pounds in the last budget on the basis of corruption discovered in its distribution over the last years. This money can be used to support health care, education, and wage systems. Alternatively, it can be used to mitigate the burdens of the public budget to avoid external loans or to use loans for establishing productive projects instead of filling budget deficit.
h. Reinvigorating tourism sector and promoting domestic, regional, and international tourism in Egypt to restore the levels of tourist revenues to the pre-revolution levels. This will increase the annually renewable Egyptian balance of foreign currencies and will contribute to balancing the current account. It will also end or reduce the need for external borrowing. Tourism reinvigoration can be achieved by removing obstacles that resulted in the decline in the numbers of tourists. Egypt’s tourism revenues decreased from about 11.6 billion dollars in 2009-2010 to 10.6 billion dollars in 2010-2011, and to 9.4 billion dollars in 2011-2012 according to official data.

Removing these obstacles which hinder the recovery of the tourism sector, requires the police to do their role in protecting security in Egypt effectively and restoring the rule of law in without abusing human rights. Otherwise, the police need immediate and fundamental reform to achieve this goal if they fail to achieve it. Personal freedoms must be strictly maintained, and the law must be respected by stopping the chaos and barbarism that were spread by the extremist religious groups when the law encouraged them.
Adding exit fees on all tourists for 50 dollars which adds about 500 million dollars annually to the public revenues.

i. Changing customs fees on selected goods without a breach to Egypt’s commitments towards International Trade Organization and GATT agreements. This will increase the public revenues from customs and will protect local products to strengthen its capacity for competition in the local market.

j. Temporarily limiting luxury imports (two years) in consultation with the chamber of commerce in a friendly and binding manner and through administrative decisions. This will provide the government in one year with the amount of the loan which it is currently negotiating the IMF. It will also contribute to decreasing trade deficit and inflation to rebalance the current account.

These actions are completely possible to carry out on the condition that they are carried out in a social environment characterized by security and respect for personal freedoms. These conditions deteriorated a lot under security levels that are much worse than the levels that the Egyptian people is used to in light of increasing attacks on personal freedom by right extremist groups which hide behind religious names.
These actions must be applied effectively in a politically stable environment which Egypt lost since Dr. Mohamed Morsi’s non-constitutional declarations through which he took over the legislative authority. He then granted it to the advisory council which was elected by 7% of the voters only. Moreover, it was elected as an advisory council rather than a legislative council. In other words,

These procedures should be applied in a highly efficient and flexible manner as a part of a full reform parcel with direct and precautionary procedures, which guarantees the efficiency and success of application. It can guarantee the achievement of real development as a result of self-dependence and independent national choices for development by focusing on transformative industries, agriculture, fishing, and services on top of which are health, educational, scientific, and tourism services. All this guarantee observing social justice in distributing production revenues by enabling people to earn their living with dignity through providing them with real job opportunities. This will also enable them to participate in the economy in terms of production and distribution through fair wage and support systems. The ultimate
results are social transformations and public services on top of which are health and educational services.
Works Cited


