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3-22-1984

### Theophrastus on Emotion

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#### Recommended Citation

Fortenbaugh, William W., "Theophrastus on Emotion" (1984). *The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter*. 188.

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## THEOPHRASTUS ON EMOTION

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March 22, 1984 PAC

While Aristotle's treatment of emotion has in recent years received considerable attention, Theophrastus' work on the same subject has been mostly ignored. The reason for this neglect is that the relevant material has not been readily accessible, but with the publication of my Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts<sup>1</sup> that obstacle has been largely removed. Texts whose primary focus is emotional response have been brought together under the heading "Affekte" (L1-L11), and other relevant texts are included elsewhere in the volume (e.g., L12, L30, L88, L117 and L118). My purpose here is to call attention to this material and to use it, in order to advance our understanding of Peripatetic work on emotion. We shall see that Theophrastus' treatment of emotion is Aristotelian (Section I) and yet of especial interest, for it involves analyzing closely related emotions in terms of the more and less (Section II). We shall look closely at the emotion of fault-finding (Sections III-V), observe parallels with Theophrastus' classification of plants (Sections II-III, VI) and in the end have a better understanding of why the Greek commentator Aspasius found no definition of emotion or better, pathos among the older Peripatetics (Section VI).

### I

Theophrastus followed Aristotle in holding that anger, fear and other similar emotions are complex phenomena involving belief, desire and sensation (pain or pleasure). In regard to Aristotle, the point has already been argued in the literature,<sup>2</sup> so I limit myself to a single example: namely, anger. This emotion is discussed at length in the Rhetoric and said to be a desire for revenge which is accompanied by pain and caused by apparent insult to oneself or one's own (2.2 1378a30-1). Aristotle speaks of apparent insult, because it is not necessary for an insult to have actually occurred. To become angry one need only believe that it has. In Aristotelian terms, this belief is the efficient cause of anger, and it is properly mentioned together with pain and desire for revenge in a complete definition of anger.

The evidence for Theophrastus is contained in several different texts, but taken together these texts are adequate to support the claim that

Theophrastus followed Aristotle and adopted a complex view of emotional response. Staying with the example of anger, we may begin with an excerpt preserved by Stobaeus (Anthology 3.19.12 = L88).

Theophrastus: Nor indeed should men of practical wisdom do anything at all in anger, for rage is most unreasonable and will never do anything with forethought, but drunken with contentiousness, as may happen, it is subject to impulses. Consequently you ought not to take immediate revenge for misdeeds either from slaves or from anyone else, in order that you may always do what (seems) best to reason, not what is dear to rage, and that you may extract a penalty from your enemies, as a result of which you are going to harm them without causing yourself pain. For taking revenge on someone while injuring oneself is no less to pay a penalty than to extract one. Consequently one ought to seek to defend oneself over a period of time rather than quickly to chasten the enemy in a way not beneficial to oneself.

Theophrastus' primary concern in this passage is to discourage angry men from hasty action. In doing this, he makes quite clear that anger involves both a desire for revenge and a belief that injustice has occurred. It is the desire for revenge which makes a man "drunken with contentiousness" and "subject to impulses", and it is the belief that wrong has been done which causes a man to want "revenge for misdeeds". This belief can be erroneous, but it can also be quite correct and justify anger. The man of practical wisdom avoids uncontrolled, impetuous action, but he does on occasion become angry. A remark attributed to Theophrastus by Seneca makes the point in a straightforward manner: "Good men are angered on account of wrongs done to their own" close friends and relatives (On Anger 1.12.3 = L10).

The Stobaeus passage quoted above urges us to seek a revenge which causes harm to our enemies without causing pain to ourselves. What is not said is that anger itself is painful, so that impetuous individuals are likely to end up with a double pain: one directly attributable to the emotion and the other resulting from imprudent action. I know of no Theophrastean text which speaks explicitly of a double pain, but that is of little matter, for Theophrastus certainly recognized the fact that anger is in itself a painful emotion. A selection from the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (2.10 = L4) provides clear evidence:

In comparing mistakes, as one generally compares such things, Theophrastus states philosophically that miscues due to appetite are more serious than those due to rage. For when a man becomes enraged, then in conjunction with a certain pain and internal contraction, he manifestly abandons reason. But when a man makes a mistake on account of appetite, then being inferior to pleasure he is in a way manifestly more undisciplined and more effeminate in his mistakes. Therefore, he (Theophrastus) stated correctly and worthily of philosophy that the mistake accompanied by pleasure invites greater reproach than that accompanied by pain. On the whole the one (who is in a rage) seems more like a person who has suffered an initial wrong and been compelled by pain to become enraged. The other has on his own initiative rushed to do wrong, swept into some action by appetite.

Marcus is not quoting Theophrastus directly. He is reporting a comparison made by Theophrastus: namely, the greater seriousness of wrongs due to appetite in comparison with those attributable to extreme anger or rage. Moreover, Marcus' own Stoicism intrudes itself, at the very outset: he feels obliged to say "as one generally compares such things", because as a Stoic he thinks that all wrongs are equally bad. But if the passage must be read with some caution, there is no reason to think that Marcus is misrepresenting Theophrastus, when he speaks of rage being accompanied by "a certain pain and internal contraction". Marcus' word for contraction (systolē) is a terminus technicus among the Stoics (SVF 3.386,391,394), but Theophrastus may well have anticipated Stoic usage. And questions of vocabulary aside, Theophrastus certainly thought that emotions involve bodily movements or changes (Simplicius, CIAG vol. 10 p. 964.31-965.1 = L2) and that these changes manifest themselves as painful or pleasant sensations: painful in the case of an emotion like anger and pleasant in the case of, say, finding something funny and responding with laughter.

The bodily movements involved in emotional response also manifest themselves through changes in voice and facial features. These are tell-tale marks, which are not private in the way sensations are and which are of high practical value when people interact. That Theophrastus took notice of such external signs of emotion is certain. We have the evidence of Barlaamus, a 14th century monk, whose remarks concerning Theophrastus are highly polemical and even unfair, but who does Theophrastus no injustice when he attributes to him the view that the signs (signa) of emotion "appear now and again even on the mouth, in the countenance and in the eyes" (Ethics

according to the Stoics 2.13 = L11). Moreover, in his work on rhetorical delivery, Theophrastus will have given special attention to signs, for as Athenasius reports, Theophrastus referred delivery not only to emotional response but also to the movement of the body and the pitch of the voice (RhGr vol. 14 p. 177.3-8). We shall have occasion to return to rhetorical delivery in Section VI. Here I want to underline that when Barlaamus speaks of signs which occur "now and again" (interdum), he is on target, for changes in gesture, face and voice are not regular features of an emotion like anger in the way that belief, desire and sensation are. The man who becomes angry thinks himself insulted, desires revenge and feels pain, but he may or may not raise his fist, turn red and speak loudly. This may be deliberate as when a man controls his anger, or it may be due to a special physiological condition, but either way gestures, facial expressions and changes in voice are only signs of emotional response.

## II

We have been looking at texts which strongly suggest that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in holding a complex view of emotional response. I now want to focus on a different text, for which no Aristotelian equivalent survives. It is found in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories (CIAG vol. 8 p. 235.3-13) and runs as follows:

Suppose some people object to the classification which does not make the one many, as (they say) is necessary, but brings together many into one and makes one class of habit and disposition on the grounds that the former is intensified and the latter slackened, while maintaining the same specific character. And suppose they should say that it is possible that nothing prevents even some things<sup>3</sup> which differ in kind from differing in respect to the more and less. And suppose they should adduce as examples fault-finding and anger and rage, which Theophrastus in his work On Emotions says differ in respect to the more and less and are not identical in kind. Similarly, too, friendship and goodwill are intensified and relaxed and each is different in kind; savagery and bestiality in relation to anger, and appetite and lust are distinguished in the same way, and in general the more shameful of the emotions, when intensified, change into another kind.

This passage is not a statement of Simplicius' own view. It is rather an objection which Simplicius raises, in order that he may argue against it.

For our purposes the important point is that Theophrastus is said to have analyzed fault-finding, anger and rage (mempsis, orgē and thymos) in terms of the more and less (to mallon kai hētton). Unfortunately it is not entirely clear whether the immediately following examples: friendship and goodwill, savagery, bestiality and anger, appetite and lust, generally the more shameful passions, are drawn from Theophrastus. Nor is it immediately clear whether Simplicius is saying that Theophrastus thought of difference in degree as merely compatible with difference in kind or actually determinant of difference in kind. On the whole I am inclined to believe that Theophrastus used the more and less to distinguish between species, and for this I have three reasons. The first is the general drift of the passage. Simplicius signals no break between the mention of Theophrastus and his following remarks including the generalization concerning shameful emotions. This generalization does treat difference in degree as determinant of difference in kind ("the more shameful of the emotions, when intensified, change into another kind") and so suggests that Theophrastus did the same.

The second reason is that Stobaeus attributes to Theophrastus a definition of lust (erōs) which fits well with our Simplicius passage. The definition runs as follows: "Lust is an excess of an unreasoning appetite, whose coming is swift and parting slow (Stobaeus, Anthology 4.20.64, vol. 4 p. 468.4-7 Hense = L117). The definition is not entirely perfect, for the cause is not specified (see Section VI), but it does make clear that (moderate) appetite becomes lust when the appetite intensifies. And since this is the sort of change or contrast which Simplicius has in mind when he writes, "appetite and lust are distinguished in the same way" (i.e., by the more and less), I am inclined to think that Simplicius is drawing on Theophrastus both here and throughout the list of examples.

The third reason is that such an analysis would not be without well known precedents. Aristotle had made important use of the more and less in various contexts including zoology, while Theophrastus regarded it as basic to the classification of plants.<sup>4</sup> Especially clear is the introduction to the Historia plantarum (1.1.6), where Theophrastus offers programmatic remarks concerning differentiation by reference to parts.

Differences in parts, to take a general view, are of three kinds: either (1) some parts are possessed and other not,<sup>5</sup> as for example leaves and fruit, or (2) the parts are dissimilar and unequal, or (3) they are arranged differently. Of these, dissimilarity is determined by shape, color, density, rarity, roughness, smoothness and the other qualities, and further the several differences in flavor. Inequality is determined by excess and defect in number or size, and to speak in general terms, all of those too (i.e., dissimilarities in shape, color etc.) fall under excess and defect. For the more and less is excess and defect.

The idea that (1) the possession or lack of a part makes a difference is important and will occupy our attention in the following section of this paper. For the present our focus is on (2) and on the more and less, which Theophrastus mentions, in order to explain the fact that dissimilarity can be included under excess and defect. This is familiar Aristotelian doctrine (e.g. Cat. 8 10b26-11a19, HA 1.1 486a26-617), so that Theophrastus does not labor the point. Instead he takes it as common ground that qualities can be possessed unequally, and then in the detailed discussion which follows he makes frequent reference to differences in degree. Since the matter has received some attention in the scholarly literature<sup>6</sup> and in any case is well known, I limit myself to a single example: namely, the date palm (phoinix). Theophrastus states explicitly that there are several kinds of date palm (2.6.6), and he makes special mention of those which grow in Babylon, Cyprus, Syria, Egypt, Crete and Ethiopia (2.6.6-11). The doum-palm which grows abundantly in Ethiopia is said to be distinguished by various characteristics including leaf-stalks which are smooth and not long, a leaf which is broad and fruit which is rounder, larger and more palatable, yet less sweet (2.6.10). In the case of Cyprus Theophrastus is careful to distinguish between three different kinds of date palm. One is said to have fruit which is very pleasant and sweet when unripe. Another kind is characterized as shorter and more fruitful, while still a third is marked off by broader leaves and much larger fruit (2.6.7-8). There is, of course, more to this analysis, and in the next section I shall return to it. For now the important point is that Theophrastus uses degree of difference to distinguish between different kinds of date palm. This is typical of his approach to botany, and if our Simplicius passage is a good guide, it is also important to his analysis of closely related emotions like

fault-finding, anger and rage.

This may seem like an advance over (or departure from) Aristotle, for in the Rhetoric little use is made of the more and less. The account of anger in 2.2 is typical. Aristotle spells out the condition of men prone to anger (1379a10-29), the persons toward whom one feels anger and the grounds or reasons why one is angry (1379a30-b37). He does recognize that anger admits of degree (e.g. 1379a38, 63, 11, 14, 27), and he does treat calmness (praun̄sis) as the opposite of anger (1380a6-b34), but he never makes use of difference in degree to mark off anger from other closely related emotions.<sup>7</sup>

A complete survey of all the emotions discussed by Aristotle is neither possible here nor necessary, but a word concerning friendship or friendly feeling (philia) seems in order, for our Simplicius-passage mentions this emotion together with goodwill (eunoia) immediately after fault-finding, anger and rage. In the introduction to Rhetoric 2 Aristotle actually pairs friendship with goodwill and states that the two are to be discussed within the account of emotions (1378a18-19). However, the discussion of friendship in 2.4 proceeds without any mention of goodwill. Aristotle devotes himself almost exclusively to describing the person who is the object of friendship (i.e., the friend), and while he does acknowledge the existence of different kinds of friendship: comradery, closeness, kinship and the like (1381b34), the acknowledgement is a mere footnote lacking any reference to difference in degree. Here we must be careful. Failure to develop a footnote does not mean that Aristotle was unable to analyze comradery, closeness and kinship in terms of "the more and less", and certain remarks in the EN suggest that he could have done so. Friendship between child and parent is characterized as more pleasant and useful than friendship between persons who are unrelated (1162a7-8); friendship between brothers is said to contain elements found in friendship between comrades, and more so when the brothers are good and in general when they are alike, inasmuch as they are closer and have loved one another since birth (1162a9-11). For our purposes the important point is that Aristotle focuses on difference in degree not only in zoology but in other areas as well. In ethics he characterizes vice in terms of excess and defect (EN 2.6 1106b33-4) and in the case of two closely related virtues such as generosity and magnificence,



he sees a difference in scale (EN 4.2 1122a22). My guess is that Aristotle found difference in degree equally useful for distinguishing between closely related emotions. We should not forget that Diogenes Laertius lists two Aristotelian works on emotion: Peri pathōn orgēs (5.23) and Pathē (5.24). The former title is suspicious, but Rose has suggested referring the plural pathōn to various species of anger.<sup>8</sup> My own inclination is to follow those scholars who emend the title to Peri pathōn ē peri orgēs, On emotions or On anger -- a double title in which the second member indicates the emotion treated first by Aristotle and perhaps most fully.<sup>9</sup> But whether we keep the title as transmitted or opt for the emendation just mentioned;<sup>10</sup> we can easily imagine Aristotle focusing on difference in degree in order to distinguish between anger and closely related emotions such as fault-finding and rage.

### III

In the preceding section I have focused generally on the more and less and its apparent use in the analysis of emotion. What I have not done is tackle the particular case of fault-finding, anger and rage. This may seem like an unimportant omission, for in Section I we have pinned down several features which are typically involved in emotional response and which can vary in degree. Anger is a desire for revenge, accompanied by pain and occasioned by (apparent) insult. Rage, it would seem, is just these same features to a greater degree and fault-finding to a lesser degree. There are several problems here, but let me begin with what I take to be the most obvious difficulty. It is the connection between fault-finding and pain. For while painful feelings are prominent in anger and rage and therefore encourage analysis in terms of the more and less (cf. EE 3.3 1231b13-15), such feelings do not seem central to fault-finding. The fault-finder is primarily a complainer (he does something) and not a sufferer. Theophrastus' sketch of fault-finding (or more accurately "faulting one's lot": mempsimoiria) illustrates the point. The initial definition mentions an action: namely, criticism of one's portion (Char. 17.1), and the subsequent description of the fault-finder sets forth a string of humorous complaints (17.2-9). There is no explicit mention of painful

sensation, nor even any hint that pain is involved in fault-finding.

Theophrastus' sketch is, of course, funny and not intended as a carefully formulated answer to the question, whether fault-finding involves painful sensations. Were the work On Emotions extant, we would look there for Theophrastus' considered answer, but since that work is lost and there is no other Theophrastean text which explicitly addresses the question, I want to suggest three different possibilities. The first is that Theophrastus did not deny a connection between fault-finding and pain. He recognized that pain is not prominent but nevertheless held that fault-finding is always painful. He could then cite degrees of pain when distinguishing between fault-finding, anger and rage: the fault-finder experiences very little pain, the angry individual experiences more and the enraged person still more. This is the simplest possibility, and it may well be Theophrastus' answer. But there is a second possibility, which is like the first in that it recognizes a connection between fault-finding and pain, but also different in that it makes room for exceptions. Theophrastus will have held both that the unpleasant sensations felt by the fault-finder are quite weak and that on occasion they may even be absent. By recognizing the presence of weak sensations Theophrastus would be able to offer an analysis in terms of the more and less, and by allowing for absences he could also take account of the fact that sometimes fault-finders do not seem to feel anything. Here a passage in the Eudemian Ethics is relevant. It runs: "I call emotions such things as rage, fright, shame, appetite and generally things which are in themselves accompanied for the most part by sensory pleasure and pain" (2.2 1220b12-14). On one interpretation of this passage - I shall soon consider a second - Aristotle is saying that while sensations follow upon emotion as such (i.e., they follow directly upon emotion and are not due to some additional factor), the connection is nonetheless defeasible. There are occasions when an individual is emotional and yet feels nothing that can be called a painful (or pleasant) sensation.<sup>11</sup> We know that Theophrastus paid especial attention to the EE,<sup>12</sup> and given the preceding interpretation of EE 1220b12-14, we can easily imagine him arguing that fault-finding as such is accompanied by painful sensations, but only for the most part. Further, we can imagine Theophrastus following the EE and generalizing the point, so that it applies

not just to fault-finding but to many different emotions including anger and rage. For while painful sensations are prominent in anger and rage, their prominence does not rule out exceptions: e.g., confronted with a sudden, unexpected insult a man may respond immediately and violently without feeling anything.

Here it might be objected that while there are cases in which a man responds without experiencing painful or pleasant sensations, such cases do not count as emotional responses. Emotions are by definition painful or pleasant, so that anytime a man responds emotionally, he necessarily feels pleasure or pain.<sup>13</sup> The qualifier "for the most part" (EE 1220b13) is not to be pressed but rather taken as a "throw-in" whose only role is to affect a tentative manner.<sup>14</sup> This objection has an initial plausibility, for Aristotle's definitions of emotion in Rhetoric 2.1 1378a19-22 and EN 2.5 1105b21-3 mention pleasure and pain without the addition of a qualifying phrase. On reflection, however, the objection fails, for there is no contradiction involved in holding both that pain belongs to anger as such and that occasionally anger occurs without feelings of pain. In fact nature is full of examples which make the point ever so clearly. Quadrupeds as such have four legs, yet occasionally one meets a quadruped with three. There is, of course, always an explanation (e.g. a birth defect or an accident), but the explanation does not lead one to deny that the creature under consideration is a quadruped. Its nature is that of a quadruped and its behavior or life style is (as far as possible) quadrupedal.

Not surprisingly Theophrastus addresses this issue at the beginning of his *History of Plants*. He first tells us that a part which belongs to the nature of a plant seems to be permanent either absolutely or once it has come into existence. Then he adds the important qualifier: "unless it is lost because of disease or old age or mutilation" (1.1.2). These causes can be further explained: e.g., age and decay occur when a plants' natural moisture and heat fall short (1.2.4), but for our purposes the important point is that Theophrastus may have offered a similar analysis of emotions like fault-finding, anger and rage: their nature is to be painful, but exceptions, which admit explanation, do occur. The kind of explanation which Theophrastus would have offered is, I think, clear enough. Emotions involve bodily movements (see Section I), and while these movements most

often manifest themselves as painful (or pleasant) sensations, there are exceptions. Sometimes the movements are too weak to be noticed (e.g., when someone voices a complaint, but his blood never really boils), or they are blocked by intense mental activity (e.g., when one's entire attention is absorbed by a sudden situation), or they are obscured by some competing sense experience (e.g., when an outraged person suffers a serious wound<sup>15</sup>). In these cases there is bodily movement, but it does not result in painful sensation.

While I incline toward the preceding interpretation, there is still a third possibility which I want to discuss and which is suggested by a different reading of EE 1220b12-14: Aristotle is not recognizing exceptions among the particular responses of individual men; rather he is allowing for exceptional kinds of emotion.<sup>16</sup> An example would be hate (misos), which in the Rhetoric Aristotle contrasts with anger: "The one (anger) is accompanied by pain, the other (hate) is not accompanied by pain. For the man who is angry feels pain, but the man who hates does not" (2.4 1382a12-13). Here Aristotle is thinking in terms of necessary features which are invariably present (or absent), whenever a given emotion occurs. Anger is always painful, and this explains why we do not become angry at people who act in anger: no one who acts in anger slights others, for slights are painless, but anger is accompanied by pain (Rhet. 2.3 1380a34-b1; cf. EN 7.6 1149b20-3). In contrast, hate is always painless, and this enables Aristotle to explain why hate is more reasonable than anger. At least in his Politics he argues that hate makes greater use of calculation, "for anger is accompanied by pain, so that it is not easy to calculate, while hate is free from pain" (5.10 1312b32-4).

In much the same way Theophrastus may have distinguished between fault-finding, anger and rage. He may have argued that while anger and rage are painful, fault-finding is not; angry and enraged individuals always feel pain, while a fault-finder never does. What especially interests me about this third possibility is that it - like the second - invites comparison with Theophrastus' method in botanical studies. We may recall HP 1.1.6 (quoted above in Section II), where we are told that parts may (1) be possessed by one plant and not by another, (2) differ in degree and (3) be arranged differently. Our Simplicius passage refers to the more and less, and for this reason we have been focusing on difference in degree.

But Theophrastus is clear that this is only one of three ways in which closely related kinds differ from one another. And when different kinds of date-palm are distinguished in HP 2.6.6-11, the analysis is not restricted to the more and less. In fact, Theophrastus gives pride of place to the possession and absence of a part: "There are several kinds of date-palm. First and as it were the greatest difference, one kind bears fruit and another does not" (2.6.6). Whether Theophrastus ever offered a similar analysis of fault-finding, anger and rage, cannot be decided with any certainty. But given the Aristotelian analysis of hate and his own interest in the possession and absence of attributes, we should take the possibility seriously. He may well have argued that fault-finding is like hate in that it lacks the painful sensations which accompany anger and rage.

## IV

At the beginning of Section III, I suggested that analyzing fault-finding, anger and rage in terms of the more and less involves several problems. Having discussed one of these problems: the connection between pain and fault-finding, it is now time to look at a different problem: the cause of fault-finding and its relationship to the causes of anger and rage. Is the cause of fault-finding like the causes of anger and rage in being an apparent insult or injustice done to oneself or to one's own by some other person? And is it always trivial in comparison with the causes of anger and rage? Here Theophrastus' sketch of the fault-finder (Char. 17) is of immediate interest, for it lists a variety of typical complaints, some of which are directed toward an individual who is thought to have done something wrong: e.g., when a friend sends food to his house, the fault-finder complains that he has not been invited to dinner (17.2), and after winning in court by a unanimous decision, he faults his speech writer for omitting many arguments (17.8). The first case is easily seen as a response to apparent insult, and the second, while less clear, can also be construed as a response to some imagined wrong. In both cases the offenses are comparatively minor and so invite analysis in terms of the more and less: fault-finders, angry persons and enraged individuals all take offense at some wrong done to them, but the offenses which occasion fault-finding are trivial in comparison with those which arouse anger and rage.

The preceding is not altogether wrong, but it does need significant qualification, for while fault-finding (or better, mempsis) is often and perhaps most often a response to unjust treatment by some other person(s),<sup>17</sup> it may also be a complaint concerning circumstances and bad luck. This is clear in the Characters: e.g., when the fault-finder comes upon a purse in the street, he remarks that he has never found a treasure (17.5), and when he receives the news that a son has been born, he speaks of losing half his property (17.6). In neither case is the fault-finder criticizing someone who has done him an injustice. He is rather complaining about his luck. Here it might be objected that these examples are atypical and intended to be funny - the humor depending upon the fact that the complaints are quite absurd. But even if the Characters is primarily a collection of humorous sketches, it does not follow that Theophrastus is making a (deliberate) conceptual mistake, when he depicts the fault-finder as one who complains about other things than personal insult. We may compare Herodotus 1.77, where Croesus is said to have been dissatisfied (memphtheis) with the size of his army and so to have returned to Sardis. Fault-finding is always a matter of dissatisfaction, but it may or may not be in response to some insult or other kind of unjust action.<sup>18</sup>

A further worry is whether the cause of fault-finding is always comparatively trivial in comparison with the cause of anger and rage. This is, of course, a matter of how one sees the situation and not what is in fact the case. People find fault when they think themselves treated unfairly, and they may find fault, instead of becoming angry or enraged, when they mistakenly perceive some quite outrageous deed as a trivial offense. But can a man clearly see that an outrage has occurred and yet react by merely voicing a complaint? Theophrastus' sketch of the fault-finder does not encourage a positive answer. It is restricted to comparatively minor offenses and so offers no reason for recognizing exceptional cases. Still, there are two considerations which do encourage me to think that Theophrastus would have recognized exceptions. The first is philological. If Croesus can be said to complain (memphetai) about the oracle which was given him at Delphi (Herodotus 1.91), and if the Athenians can be said to send envoys to fault (mempsomenous) the Spartans for allowing the Persians to invade Attica (9.6), ordinary language does not restrict fault-finding

to the trivial, for in both cases the complaint concerns the fate of an entire city. The second consideration is physiological. Anger and rage require a certain bodily condition, and when this is not present, even quite a strong and clear (cf. Arist., De an. 1.1 403a19) offense may fail to arouse anger. In such a case, the situation is seen and appreciated, but there is no intense pain or strong desire for revenge. The man either does nothing or alternatively he responds to the situation by stating a complaint or finding fault with what has occurred.

## V

There is still another problem concerning fault-finding which deserves at least brief notice. It is whether fault-finding is like anger and rage in being, among other things, a desire for revenge. In the case of anger Aristotle makes clear that this desire is never an idle wish. He defines anger as a desire for revenge (Rhet. 1378a30), and he tells us that no one becomes angry when there is no prospect of revenge (1370b13, 1378b3-4). That Aristotle and Theophrastus, too, adopted a similar view of rage seems to me probable, but no surviving text makes the point explicitly. In regard to fault-finding, we are better off, for we have the evidence of Theophrastus' Characters. Eight typical complaints are sketched, and in several a desire to cause pain is easily imagined. When the fault-finder criticizes his speech writer for omitting arguments (17.8) and when he complains that he was not invited to dinner (17.2), he seems to be uttering a rebuke. And when the fault-finder wonders aloud whether his mistress really loves him (17.3), his remark is intended to be heard and, we may suppose, to hurt the woman who hears it. Some complaints, however, seem to have little or no connection with causing someone else pain. For example, complaining about the weather is normally idle and not directed toward some other person - though the Theophrastean fault-finder may be foolish enough to think his complaint painful to Zeus (17.4). But when the fault-finder comes upon a purse and complains that he has never found a treasure (17.5), his remark is not directed against anyone. It is simply an expression of personal dissatisfaction.

The above is not meant to suggest that there are occasions when the

fault-finder does nothing at all. He always does at least one thing: he voices his complaint (or puts it in writing). Still, this action need not be motivated by a desire to cause pain, and when such a desire is in fact present, voicing complaints may be counter-productive. This is why angry men occasionally appear to do nothing, although they are silently plotting revenge. For as Theophrastus observes: the man who betrays his intentions does not know how to inflict harm (Burlaeus, De vita et moribus philosophorum 68 and codices Parisini 2772, 4718, 4887 = L106). Theophrastus, then, could have marked off fault-finding from anger on two related grounds: first, while the fault-finder always states a complaint, the angry man does not, and second, fault-finding does not presuppose a desire to inflict harm in the way that anger does.

The second of these differences: namely, the absence of a motivating desire, seems to me especially important, for it might be thought that desiring some object is an essential ingredient in emotional response. In the case of practical emotions like anger and fear, this may be true, but in the case of other emotions, it is not.<sup>19</sup> Fault-finding gives us pause, for in certain respects it is similar to anger, and fault-finders do on occasion intend to hurt other people. But when a man finds, say, a joke or verbal play funny and responds with laughter, his response has no obvious tie to desire. That Theophrastus recognized this seems to me quite likely, for he spent considerable time on the laughable. He wrote monographs On The Ludicrous (D.L. 5.46) and On Comedy (D.L. 5.47), and a report by Athenaeus documents his interest in word play (The Sophists at Dinner 8.40 348A). According to Plutarch, Theophrastus himself could raise a laugh. At least he caused no offense when he said to a snub-nosed friend of Cassander, "I am amazed at your eyes, for they do not sing, though your nose gives them the pitch" (Table Talk 2.1.9 633B). The play here is on the verb endidonai, which is used ambiguously: the nose "gives in", since it is snub; it also "gives the pitch", in order that the eyes may sing. Such wit is, of course, a staple of comedy, and both on and off the stage it evokes laughter. Cassander's friend is said to have taken no offense, and we can imagine him smiling, if not laughing. But that he and any bystanders wanted more of the same is neither stated nor implied.

One caveat is in order. Theophrastus did not think that finding



something funny is a single emotion. We can be certain that he recognized different causes of laughter and was prepared to draw distinctions on this basis. Unfortunately neither of Theophrastus' monographs on humor nor Book 2 of Aristotle's Poetics has survived. But in the Rhetoric, Aristotle does recognize three sources of humor: men, words and deeds (1.11 1372a1), and the Tractatus Coislinianus - whether its source be Aristotle, Theophrastus or some third Peripatetic<sup>20</sup> - does make clear that early Peripatetics drew a distinction between laughter caused by diction and laughter caused by actions, and that within each of these major categories they recognized various subdivisions. With the details of these divisions we need not concern ourselves. The important point is that Theophrastus studied laughter in detail and almost certainly recognized that finding something funny - in many of its forms, if not in all - is not a practical emotion like anger and fear.

## VI

We have already seen that an emotion such as hate is not accompanied by painful sensation (Section III), and that an emotion like finding something funny lacks an immediate tie to desire (Section V). We should now take note of the fact that some emotions (or better, pathē) are not caused by a particular kind of belief in the way that, say, anger is caused by the thought of outrage. An obvious example is appetite (epithymia). Hunger, thirst and sexual desire are typical appetites, and all three are caused by bodily conditions. They are common to men and animals, and they are not open to persuasion in the way that an emotion like anger is. Indeed, appetites are not normally called "emotions", and in the rest of this paper I shall use the Greek term pathos. For both appetite and anger can be grouped together as pathē (Arist., EN 2.5 1106a21-2, EE 2.2 1220b12-13), but only anger is necessarily tied to a particular belief.

Hunger, thirst and sexual desire have already been discussed in the scholarly literature.<sup>21</sup> I would only add two points. The first has to do with Barlaamus. As already mentioned in Section I, his criticism of Theophrastus is polemical and unfair, but what he says about hunger and thirst does make clear that Theophrastus looked upon these pathē as natural and involuntary (PG vol. 151 col. 1362B, 1363B = L11). This is not to say that Theophrastus thought men quite powerless to control their eating and drinking, but it is to say that he thought appetite a bodily

phenomenon, whose occurrence does not presuppose certain kinds of belief. My second point is that hunger, thirst and sexual desire are not the only pathē which lack an immediate tie to belief, and that Theophrastus' work on delivery will have helped him see this. For like Aristotle (Rhet. 3.1 1403b28, cf. 3.12 1413b9-10), Theophrastus connected rhetorical delivery with pathos (Athanasius, RhGr vol. 14 p. 177.3-8), and in his work On Delivery he almost certainly discussed individual kinds of pathos. This work is lost, but if we look at Cicero's On the Orator 3.217-19, we see that such discussions might focus on, e.g., energy (vis) as well as anger (iracundia) and fear (metus). In other words, a manner not tied to belief could be brought under the label motus animi (= pathos) and treated together with other pathē whose occurrence presupposes certain beliefs.<sup>22</sup>

Here we may recall a point already touched upon in Section III. It is that Theophrastus' interest in classifying plants made him sensitive not only to features which are shared by two or more kinds and differentiated by the more and less, but also to features which are present in some kinds and absent in others. The point was illustrated by reference to the date-palm, and its possible application to fault-finding was discussed. What we did not comment on earlier is that the absence of characteristic features has an effect at the highest level. In the case of plants, Theophrastus picks out root, stem, branch and twig as the primary and greatest parts, and then adds that these are only "common to most" plants (HP 1.1.9), and that this makes the plant something difficult to describe in general terms (1.1.10). Similarly in the case of pathē, Theophrastus recognizes several important features including sensation, desire and belief, but he does not think that each of these features is found in every pathos. He may, of course, have recognized certain standard or paradigmatic cases which have them all. He does this with trees (1.1.9-11) and may well have done something similar with pathē such as anger and fear. But picking out central cases is not the same as offering a general description or definition applicable to all pathē.

In conclusion I want to suggest that the Greek commentator Aspasius is not confessing laziness when he tells us that he has been unable to find a definition of pathos among the older Peripatetics (CIAG vol. 19.1 p.44.20-1). His words are to be taken seriously, and they are to be explained by the

fact that neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus offered what Aspasius hoped to find. It is, of course, true that in the Rhetoric Aristotle says that "pathē are all those (feelings) account of which men differ in regard to judgements and which are followed by pain and pleasure" (2.1 1378a19-21), but this is not a general statement of what it is to be a pathos. Rather it is an attempt to describe that group of pathē which are aroused and allayed by the speeches of orators (1.2 1356a14-16).<sup>23</sup> Similarly, in the Ethics Aristotle does not offer a general account of pathos. Instead he gives an illustrative list and then makes mention of pleasure and pain (EN 2.5 1105b21-3), for in ethics and politics pleasure and pain are of especial importance (EN 2.3 1105a5-6,10-12; cf. Plato, Laws 636D5-7). That Theophrastus offered similar statements not only in rhetoric and ethics but also in poetics and other fields of particular interest seems to me quite certain. But that either he or Aristotle offered a general description or definition covering all pathē is unlikely. For they had investigated many different kinds of pathē: hate and laughter and appetite as well as anger and fear, and as a result they had come to realize that there is no one set of features which are shared by all pathē and together constitute a general definition of pathos.

## Footnotes

I am indebted to many people for various kinds of help. My collaborators on Project Theophrastus: Pamela Huby, John Keaney and Robert Sharples have been most generous with their knowledge. The same is true of Allan Gotthelf and Jim Lennox, who discussed with me problems concerning "the more and less". Stephen Leighton is to be thanked for sending me one of his articles prior to publication. A different kind of assistance but no less appreciated has been generously provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

1. Studien zur antiken Philosophie Bd. 12, 1983.
2. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (London 1975) 12-16.
3. Or "it is possible and that nothing prevents some things".
4. For "the more and less" in zoology see PA 1.4 644a6-18: "groups which differ in respect to excess, i.e. by the more and less, are brought together in one group" and HA 1.1 486a21-23, b16-17: "others are the same but differ in respect to excess and deficiency; this applies to those belonging to the same group ... one may consider the more and less (to be the same as) excess and deficiency." HA 1.1 486a25-487a1 relates closely to Theophrastus' remarks in HP 1.1.6-7. Of the literature on "the more and less" the following is a selection: D.M. Balme, "Genos and Eidos in Aristotle's Biology," Classical Quarterly 56 (1962) 87-89 and Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I (Oxford 1972) 103, 120; H.J. Krämer, "Grundbegriffe akademischer Dialektik in den biologischen Schriften von Aristoteles und Theophrast," Rheinisches Museum 111 (1968) 293-333; J.G. Lennox, "Aristotle on Genera, Species, and 'the More and the Less,'" Journal of the History of Biology 13 (1980) 321-46.
5. My translation here is intended to convey the sense of the Greek text in the most economical way. It is not literal: the active verb echein is rendered with a passive form, and it obscures the question whether ta men ... ta de refer to parts (merē) as I believe or to plants (phyta) which is certainly possible. Either way one must understand something.

6. See Krämer (above, note 4) 303-10.
7. The difference between anger and hate is not one of degree. See Section III.
8. V. Rose, Aristoteles pseudepigraphus (Leipzig 1863) 111.
9. V. Rose, Aristoteles Fragmenta (Leipzig 1886) 4; R.D. Hicks, Diogenes Laertius, Loeb ed. (London 1950) 1.466; H. Long, Diogenis Laertii Vitae philosophorum, OCT (Oxford 1964) 1.206.
10. A third possibility is suggested by A. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford 1978) 42, who changes orgēs to hormēs, translates the title with "On the influence of the passions" and identifies the work as EE 6 (EN 7).
11. Michael Woods, Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics (Oxford 1982) 109-10 and W. Fortenbaugh, "Arius, Theophrastus and the Eudemian Ethics," Rutgers University Studies in Cl. Hum. 1 (1983) 211.
12. Fortenbaugh (above, note 11) 203-23.
13. The objection is made by Stephen Leighton, "Eudemian Ethics 1220b11-13," Classical Quarterly
14. Aristotle does occasionally throw-in a qualifier which should not be pressed: e.g. Phys. 226b27-8, where "or as little as possible" is not seriously meant, for continuous change cannot admit a break. For further discussion see my Ar. on Emotion (above, note 2) 47 n.2. Leighton (above, note 13) XXX thinks the qualifier is to be taken seriously, but he goes on to argue for exceptional kinds of emotion as against exceptional instances of a given kind. The idea will be developed later in this section.

15. In this case anger is accompanied by pain, but the connection is accidental and not per se. Of course, pain caused by a deep cut and generally any wound may help to stimulate anger, but it remains distinct from the pain which accompanies anger per se. Hence I disagree with Leighton (above, note 13) XXX n.8, and much prefer his remarks in an earlier piece "Aristotle and the Emotions", Phronesis 27 (1982) 156-7. For in this piece he carefully distinguishes between the pain of emotion and any chance pain which happens to occur at the same time. If I have any worry, it concerns Leighton's claim that different kinds of emotion are marked by pains (and pleasures) which differ not only in number and intensity but also in kind. This may be true for say anger and fear, but whether there is a (discernable) difference in kind between the pains of closely related emotions like fault-finding, anger and rage is doubtful. Theophrastus might well say that the only difference is one of degree.
16. This reading is advocated by Leighton (above, note 13) XXX
17. For an Aristotelian example, see EN 8.13 1162b5-6, 16-21. In friendships based on utility, accusations and complaints (egklēmata and mempseis) arise, when one party thinks he has not received his due from the other party.
18. An individual case of fault-finding may resist simple classification. See, for example, Thucydides 1.84.1 where Archidamus warns the Spartans against being ashamed of the slowness and dilatoriness of which their allies complain (memphontai). The complaint to which Archidamus refers has two aspects. On the one hand, it is concerned with a general character trait, which Archidamus defends by citing the benefits it has brought (1.84.1-4, cf. 71.1-3). On the other hand, it concerns Sparta's present inaction, which the allies construe as unjust neglect (1.71.4-5).

19. Here I have benefited from the remarks of A. Gotthelf, "Comments on Professor Fortenbaugh's Paper with Special Attention to Pathos" Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities 1 (1983) 230. On practical emotions see my Ar. on Emotion (above, note 2) 79-83.
20. See now R. Janko, Tractatus Coislinianus London 1984.
21. E.g., Fortenbaugh (above, note 2) 33-5 and Leighton, "Aristotle and the Emotions" (above, note 15) 161-5.
22. For further discussion see my "Theophrastus on Delivery", Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities II.
23. The description needs tightening up, for it lets in pathē like hunger and thirst. These pathe do affect judgement, but since they are caused by bodily changes and not by beliefs, they are not of primary concern to the orator.