Aristotle on Civic Friendship

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Aristotle offers us no sustained account of civic friendship (πολιτικῆς φιλίας), only remarks scattered throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. In this paper I hope to make clear what his views on civic friendship are.

Before I get to his remarks on civic friendship themselves, I want to look briefly at two discussions in Aristotle that I believe contribute to uncovering his views on civic friendship, and I want to indicate briefly those interpretations of Aristotle's civic friendship that I reject.

I

First, let us take a quick look at two related issues: (1) Aristotle's criticism of the communism of women and children in Plato's Republic, and (2) Aristotle's claim that one cannot properly be a friend--i.e., a character friend--to many people.

According to Plato, nearly every citizen in the best city of the Republic will actually feel close familial friendship or affection towards one another: A citizen will regard all younger citizens as children, and all older ones as parents and grandparents, and all those of the same age as siblings. And they will really feel this; these are not simply words (Rep. 463c-d). This, it was claimed, will result in the highest unity possible. (See Rep. 462b-464d.) Aristotle levels several criticisms against this 'communism of women and children,' as it is sometimes called. (See Pol. II 3-4.) For example:

What is common to the most people gets the least care, since they are concerned (φροντίζουσι) most of all with their own things, but less with the common things, or [only with] as much as falls to each [individually] (1261b33-35).

And:

There comes to be a thousand sons to each of the citizens, and these not as [sons] of each [individually], but any chance man is equally the son of any chance man [given that they are in the proper age groups], such that all [the "fathers"] will equally neglect them [i.e., the "sons"] (1261b38-1262a1).

The main thrust of Aristotle's complaint is that where women and children are held in common (or more accurately, where all regard themselves as part of one common family), people will not be able
to care for one another, and will not be able to feel close affection—at least not for everyone in the city. (See Pol. 1261b32-1262a14.) Under such a system, friendship becomes fragmented or diluted, because fellow-citizens cannot spread themselves so thin without the affection becoming diluted or fragmented, and thus destroyed. (Pol. 1262b14-22)

In a similar spirit, Aristotle claims that one cannot be a character friend to many people at the same time (NE 1158a10-11, 1171a1-11). Why?

1. The formation of character friendships is not consistent with having many such friends. Character friendship 'will not arise among many people, because it is difficult to put many people to the test; for it would be necessary to live with each one' (EE 1237b34-36). (See also NE 1156b24-32, 1158a10-15, 1157a20-25, 1161b24-27, EE 1237b10-12.)

2. Likewise, the activity of character friendship is not possible in relation to many people at the same time (EE 1238a8-10). 'One cannot live with many people and distribute (διανέμειν) oneself among them' (NE 1171a2-4), i.e. one cannot engage in the activities appropriate to character friendship with many people.

It is impossible to know many people intimately, and it is impossible to act as a close friend towards many people. The knowledge, and the ability to act, involved in such a close relationship can be focused only on a very few people.

II

I think it is clear from what has been said that civic friendship cannot be equated with, nor is it a type of, character friendship. It is true that the Greek polis is much smaller than the modern state (and the modern city, for that matter); but no matter how small the population of the polis is, it will be a much larger number than the few character friendships that are possible. (As we shall see, Aristotle says as much.)

Terry Irwin, in 'Aristotle on the Good of Political Activity', recognizes that civic friendship is in some sense a form of friendship of utility, but he argues that because this does not show what is intrinsically good about political activity—and he thinks there are good reasons for believing that Aristotle thinks political activity has some intrinsic value—we must turn to character friendship in describing the relationship between fellow-citizens. This is hopeless, Irwin notes (recognizing that one cannot have many friends in the manner of character friendship), but not a waste of time. He thus extends civic friendship to include aspects of character friendship (e.g. we will regard fellow-citizens as other selves). But this is highly speculative, and quite dubious in light of Aristotle's criticism of Plato in Pol. II 3-4.
Similarly, it seems equally clear that Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, as well as his account of character friendship, rule out any position that sees civic friendship in Aristotle as a relatively intimate relationship involving a close sharing or merging of the lives and ends of the individual citizens. The stronger and more intimate civic friendship is, the more open it is to Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato—i.e., attempting to make the affection that is felt between citizens as close as character friends would lead to neglect instead of affection, and such affection would end up fragmented and diluted. So civic friendship must be a weaker form of friendship than character friendship.

Does this mean that civic friendship must be construed in an extremely narrow way? Julia Annas thinks so. She rejects the view that there is ‘a special sort of interest, which is a friendly interest on the part of each citizen in every other....’ Instead she believes that

A civic or political friendship...is a friendship between two or a few more people whose shared activities are those of civic involvement, rather than those of religious, family or other involvement. They become friendships, presumably, because they are trying to support the same public measure, ostracize the same politician, and so on.

I believe three passages count strongly against Annas’s view.

First, at NE 1167a22-b3, Aristotle equates civic friendship with concord and says a city possesses concord when its citizens agree. Second, at EE 1242a6-9, he ties civic friendship to people coming together to form cities due to a lack of self-sufficiency and a desire to be in the company of other humans. Finally, at NE 1163b32-1164a2, civic friendship is said in part to involve the economic relations between, for example, shoemakers and weavers. These passages show that Aristotle’s conception of civic friendship is broader than Annas claims, and broader in two ways: First, civic friendship involves many more people than the two or a few that Annas maintains it involves; and second, it does not simply rise out of an ad hoc political partnership with very narrow political aims. Civic friendship, I hope to show, involves many (ideally all) fellow-citizens, with an aim as broad as the good of the city and the citizens in it.

III

A person, Aristotle says, can be a friend to many people in a fellow-citizen’s way. Those who have many friends and treat them all as close to them seem to be friends to no one, except in the manner of fellow-citizens, and these people are called obsequious. Now it is possible to be a friend to many people in the manner of fellow-citizens and not to be obsequious, but a truly decent person. But it is not possible to be a friend to many due to their virtue and for their own sake, and we should be content to find even a few such friends. (NE 1171a13-20)
Furthermore, civic friendship seems to be a genuine type of friendship. Specifically, it is a type of friendship of utility. 'Civic friendship is constituted according to utility' (τὸ κατὰ χρήσιμον) (EE 1242a6-8). 'Concord appears to be civic friendship, just as it is said to be. For it is concerned with advantage (περί τὰ συμφέροντα) and with what affects our life' (NE 1167b2-4). (See EE 1242a5-b26, and cf. EE 1236a33-34 and MM 1209b17-19.) This should settle the debate over whether civic friendship is a form of character friendship or friendship of utility, although it certainly does not erase all the problems involved in discovering the exact nature of civic friendship.

So at the very least, civic friendship involves the feeling of goodwill by each citizen for every other (this is qualified somewhat below), where all are aware of this good will, and where the source of (and the motivation for) this feeling is the expectation or recognition of the benefits they are receiving or will receive as a result of the relationship they have with their fellow-citizens. This does not mean they are indifferent as to whether or not their fellow-citizens also receive benefits. The goodwill they feel is genuine, and thus they wish their fellow-citizens well.

In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle writes that civic friendship is not based on superiority, but on equality (1242a9-11, b22, 30-31). This is not to say that there will not be a ruling and a ruled element among the citizens who feel civic friendship for one another. But what is important is that this ruling factor is not natural (ψυχικὸν, like the rule of a master over a slave) or kingly (βασιλικὸν), but based on equal rule in turn. So even if we are considering only the correct constitutions, we must set aside as special cases those not based on equality, i.e. on ruling and being ruled in turn. (This would include kingship and most forms of aristocracy). The important point here is that in most cases what fellow-citizens feel for one another (qua fellow-citizens) will be the same.

The most important characteristic of civic friendship is unanimity or concord (όμόνοια). Not only is concord a feature of civic friendship, Aristotle says it actually appears to be civic friendship (NE 1167b2-3, EE 1241a32-33). It also seems to be that which is most responsible for holding the city together (NE 1155a23-26). In addition:

Concord also appears to be a mark of friendship. Thus it is not merely identity of opinion (οὐδοξία), for this might occur even among people who do not know each other. Nor do we say that people are in concord when they agree about just anything, e.g. those who agree about the heavens (since concord about these things is not a mark of friendship), but we say a city is in concord when [its citizens] agree about what is advantageous, choose the same actions, and act on what they have resolved to do in common. Thus, it is about things to be done that people are in concord, and among these, about important matters in which it is possible for
both parties or everyone to get what they want (NE 1167a22-30)

So civic friendship requires that citizens agree on what the proper conception of justice is, the arrangements concerning the rulers and the ruled, what offices should be elective, with whom the city should make an alliance, etc. (See Pol. 1301a35-39, NE 1167a30-b2.)16 Citizens should in general agree on the most basic and most important questions concerning the nature and activities of their constitution. (See Pol. 1295b13-33.) Also, citizens must be satisfied that there is justice in the city, not only politically, but economically (i.e. justice in the marketplace). For instance, a shoemaker will have to know that he can deal with weavers, doctors, etc. and get a fair price for his goods, paying a fair price for their goods and services. (See NE 1163b32-1164a2, EE 1242b21-27.) This requires a monetary system, a system of justice, no significant institutional fraud or corruption, etc. In addition, concord most likely requires that citizens be supportive of the constitution, that is, they must want it to exist, and they should feel benevolence towards it. (Pol. 1270b21-22, 1320a14-17)

Although Aristotle sometimes speaks of all citizens agreeing (e.g. Pol. 1320a14-17)— which seems quite unrealistic—he more likely means that all the parts of the city (especially rich, poor, and middle class) agree on fundamental constitutional issues (see Pol. 1270b20-22, cf. 1294b34-40 and 1295b19-25)—i.e., e.g., that the rich, for the most part, tend to agree with the middle-class. Even so, I imagine there are different degrees of concord a city could possess and still meet with Aristotle’s approval, with the very unlikely total unanimity among citizens being at one end of the spectrum. More likely, there will be at least some locking of horns on fundamental political issues.

Moving on: Justice and friendship, Aristotle says, are either the same or not very far apart. (See NE 1159b25-1160a8, EE 1234b18-31.) All friendships of utility—and thus civic friendship—are most of all based on justice (EE 1242a11-13). But not all friendships of utility are the same.17 With respect to justice, there are two kinds of friendship of utility: legal and moral (νομική and ήθική). The former is based on an agreement (καθ’ ομολογίαν) (e.g. on a contract), the latter is left up to trust, in a way that resembles character friendship. (He says this type tends to lead to accusations, and is contrary to nature.) (See EE 1242b21-1243b14, cf. NE 1162b21-1163a23.)

Civic friendship, like the friendships found among cities in an alliance, are legal friendships of utility (EE 1242b22-25). (This is, I think, yet another reason why we should not regard civic friendship as a form of character friendship.) But even within this category, there are differences in degree. As we shall see, the friendship that exists among cities is an example of a stricter form of legal friendship. There are good reasons to think that civic friendship involves more than, or in some sense goes beyond, strict justice. Citizens should not
simply be motivated by contracts or law, but also by a concern for moral character.

Pol. III 9 contains information crucial to understanding the nature of civic friendship. The city exists not only for the sake of living, but for the sake of living well (1280a31-32). To put it another way, the city does not exist for the same reasons an alliance does, simply to prevent injustice, establish trade agreements, and make military treaties (1280a34-40, cf. NE 1157a27-28). It is necessary for a city to arrange for these things, but not sufficient (1280b29-35).

Aristotle describes the major difference between a city and an alliance in the following way:
The city does not exist for the sake of an alliance, so that no one suffers injustice, nor for exchange and [commercial] dealings. Those in one city are not concerned that those in another ought to be of a certain quality, or that none of those coming under the treaty [or compact, τας συνθηκας] should be unjust or wicked in any way, but only that they should not act unjustly toward one another. But whoever is concerned about good government keeps an eye on political virtue and vice. It is therefore evident that virtue ought to be a care for every city that is truly (i.e. not just nominally) called a city. Otherwise the community becomes an alliance which differs from others (i.e. from alliances whose members are remote allies) only by location. And law becomes a treaty and, as the sophist Lycophron says, a guarantor among one another of the just things, but not that which makes the citizens good and just. (1280a34-b12)

Citizens (at any rate, some of them) must take thought for, or be concerned about, the moral character of other citizens. (In Pol. VII 4, Aristotle writes that citizens must be acquainted with [γνωρίζεΐν] one another’s qualities or worth [1326b14-16]...) This makes a city one city (see Pol. 1280b13-15), and thus it may be a part of concord (which most of all holds a city together). In fact, concord requires at the very least the following concern for a fellow-citizen’s moral character: One’s beliefs about justice and the virtues generally will affect how one views the nature and activity of the city, and it is just such opinions that determine whether a city possesses concord. In addition, Aristotle says concord requires that citizens know each other, and he may very well have had in mind (at least in part) a knowledge of moral character, and thus it may very well be the case that Aristotle included this concern for the moral character of one’s fellow-citizens in his conception of civic friendship.

A.W. Price claims that when Aristotle says a person wishes his fellow-citizens well and wants them to be good, this cannot mean that the person wants them to be good because it in some way benefits him. That, Price argues, would make the city no different from an alliance, where we are concerned that the other parties of the alliance are just only to the extent that it benefits us (or because it benefits us). Therefore, Price claims,
Aristotle must mean that we wish fellow-citizens well for their own sake, which, Price infers, makes civic friendship a variety of character friendship: My goals—my happiness—merge or 'overlap' with the happiness of my fellow-citizens. Their happiness in some sense is a constituent of my happiness, as is true of character friendships.

But what Price is offering us is a false alternative: Either the city is like an alliance in the way described, or fellow-citizens are intimately connected to a high degree, merging their goals and lives together. But a distinct position between these two is possible (and much more plausible): A citizen is interested in the moral character of others not simply because he wants others to fulfill their contracts (though that is part of it). He also wants his fellow-citizens to be good (and happy) because he spends a great deal of time with these people, and engages in activities with them—in the marketplace and at the Assembly, for example. But the source of this interest—and of civic friendship and the goodwill that that entails—is still utility, i.e. the fact that such a situation benefits me.

IV

So far we know that civic friendship involves citizens feeling mutual good will, a high degree of concord, a certain connection to legal justice, and (most likely) citizens taking thought for the moral character of their fellow-citizens. But we do not yet know how close this friendship is (if it can be called close at all). Discovering this, however, at first glance seems problematic. For on the one hand, we know from what was said earlier that civic friendship cannot depend on every citizen having a close relationship with each of his fellow-citizens (or even having knowledge of each particular fellow-citizen). On the other hand, we know that a citizen (in order to be a 'civic friend') must know the political views of his fellow-citizens (NE 1167a23) and probably their moral character as well. Is there some way of resolving this apparent contradiction?

As far as I can tell, it can be avoided only if Aristotle maintains that a 'civic friend' knows in general the moral character of the citizen body (i.e., e.g., he knows his fellow-citizens tend to be just) as well as the general political views of the citizen body (i.e., e.g., he knows his fellow-citizens tend to be democratic, and for the most part believe the city should join in an alliance with Athens). If one concludes that one's fellow-citizens tend to be moral, and observes that they tend to be in agreement politically, then the relationship one has with a fellow-citizen can be described as civic friendship. (No such relationship holds, of course, where one knows that a particular fellow-citizen is corrupt, say, and/or against the present constitution in some fundamental way.) A citizen need only discover the character and political views of his fellow-citizens generally; a more intimate knowledge is not required.
How will citizens come to have the knowledge requisite for civic friendship? Because of friendship, human beings desire to live together (Pol. 1280b38-39, and NE 1155a19-21). This leads them to inhabit one location, intermarry, and partake in such institutions and activities as 'clans, festivals, and the pastimes of living together' (Pol. 1280b35-38). I believe Cooper is correct in writing that these clans, festivals, etc. in turn...provide the specific sort of connectedness that, in Greek cities, grounds the interest in and concern by each citizen for the qualities of mind and character of his fellow-citizens generally that he has been insisting distinguishes citizenly ties from those provided by contractual agreements for mutual economic advantage. These institutions and activities (in part) provide a citizen with both the knowledge of, and concern for, the ethical qualities of his fellow-citizens. In addition to these, political institutions and activities (e.g. meetings in the Assembly) also provide us with this same knowledge and concern, as well as a general knowledge of the (hopefully highly uniform) basic political views of the citizen body.

 Citizens will feel affection for one another due to the mutual benefit they receive from living together in a city. They agree about what is advantageous for the city: who should rule, how the city should be run, etc.; and to the extent that they care about the common good, they all have one aim. In addition, the affection a citizen feels for his fellow-citizens most likely involves a concern for their moral character (and its improvement). For how well one is able to support the city and the constitution, is likely to be loyal and not a traitor, is willing openly, honestly, and intelligently to discuss issues in the Assembly and the Council, is likely to be fair in the marketplace, etc. depends on moral character. It is the awareness of a common aim and the awareness that everyone accepts it and is working to achieve it—each thereby benefiting himself—manifested in and encouraged by their 'living together,' that most of all holds a city together.
Notes

1. Depending on how one reads Pol. 1295b21-25, Aristotle mentions civic friendship once or never in the Politics. (See John Cooper, 'Political Animals and Civic Friendship,' in G. Patziger, ed. Aristoteles' "Politik" [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1990], 233-34n16, and [in the same volume] Julia Annas, 'Comments on J. Cooper,' 246.) Though it is unclear to me why Aristotle has no discussion of civic friendship in the Politics, it is clear that what he says there is important for discovering his views on civic friendship. (On why there is little or no mention of civic friendship in the Politics, see Cooper, 234n16, Annas, 243 & 248, and Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship [Albany: SUNY Press, 1995], 204n7.)

2. I shall be presenting a paper entitled 'Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Communism of Women and Children' at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Chicago, April 27, 1996) which will provide a more detailed look at my views on these two issues.

3. It seems that in this particular passage Plato has in mind the guardians alone, not all citizens. It also seems that Aristotle is aware of this (see Pol. 1262a40-b1). But on the question of whether Platonic communism is in general intended for all citizens or only the guardians, Aristotle thinks Plato is unclear, and there is something to what he says. (See my article, 'Aristotle on the Extent of the Communism in Plato's Republic,' Ancient Philosophy 13 [1993], 313-21.) In any case, Aristotle proceeds as if this close familial affection were intended for all the citizens of the Republic.

4. All translations from the Greek are my own.

5. In Nicomachean Ethics VIII 2, Aristotle says that three kinds of things are likable: what is good, what is pleasant, and what is useful (NE 1155b18-19). Friendship is not only goodwill (εύνους, i.e. wishing goods to others for their own sake), it is reciprocal good will, of which both parties are aware (NE 1155b31-1156a5). (I take this, and not the list at the beginning of IX 4, as more of a description of the characteristics that every kind of friendship would possess. But cf. Annas, 'Comments on Cooper,' 235n18.) There are three kinds of friendship, he says, based on the three likable things (NE VIII 3, 1156a6-8). The first two are friendships based on utility, and friendships based on pleasure. These are the imperfect, or incomplete, types of friendship. They are coincidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός, NE 1156a16-17): What is liked is not so much the friend’s character, but the pleasure or
usefulness one receives from a friend. This is not to say Aristotle looks down on these types of friendship. They are classified as friendships because they resemble complete friendship. They are, however, easily dissolved, and they can exist among bad people. (NE 1156a10-b6)

The third type of friendship, complete or perfect (**τελεία**) friendship (what I shall be calling character friendship),

is the friendship of people who are good, and alike in virtue; for they wish goods to each other in the same way qua good, and they are good in themselves. And those who wish goods to their friends for the friends’ sake are most of all friends; for they are this way [i.e. friends] because of the friends themselves, and not coincidentally. (NE 1156b7-11)

6. Cf. Theophrastus, frgs. 538a-f, where he says a person should make friends with people only after testing or judging them.

7. Living together involves shared activity. Aristotle writes:

For each person, whatever existence [or being, τὸ εἶναι] or that for that sake of which he chooses to live (τὸ ζῆν) is, that is what he wishes to do with his friends. Hence some friends drink together and some play dice, while others do gymnastics and go hunting, or study philosophy, each [set of friends] spending their days together engaged in whatever they love most in life. For since they wish to live with their friends, they do those actions and share in those things which they suppose make for living together. (NE 1172a1-8)

And perhaps most importantly, living together involves shared conversation and thought (κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοεῖται, NE 1170b10-14). By spending time together, a good man perceives his friend and thereby perceives his own being, and this is pleasant and good (NE 1170a13-b12, 1171b34-35). Such friends also cultivate virtue by living together (NE 1155a14-16, 1170a11-13, 1172a10-13).

When a friendship is a close one, as in the case of character friendship, then one friend actually feels the sorrow and joy of the other (at least to the extent that that is possible [EE 1240a33-b2]). And only in such a close relationship is a friend able to help another in bad times. 'For a friend comforts us by the sight of him and by his words, if he is dexterous (ἐπιδέξιος), since he knows (οἶδε) our character and what pleases and pains us' (NE 1171b2-4). What makes this possible is the knowledge one character friend has of another—a knowledge gained through shared activity.

9. Again, I have in mind Irwin, Price, and Schollmeier. Certain elements of Cooper’s view of civic friendship might arguably be included here as well.

As will become clear, I am in agreement with much of what Cooper says about civic friendship. Nevertheless, there are some points I am not sure about. For example, his view that civic friendship is an extension of familial friendship (236), his claim that the common advantage is greater than the advantage of the individual citizens (236), and most importantly, his claim that a non-virtuous citizen in a sense leads a virtuous life ‘by having his life merged in the life of the whole city which itself is a virtuous one...’ (240n22). (On what Fred Miller has called Cooper’s mix of holism and individualism, see his Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 202-203.


11. This suggests that the deviant regimes (i.e. tyranny, oligarchy and democracy) will not be characterized by civic friendship in any essential or complete way. Certainly, there will exist no kind of friendship between the rulers and the ruled. For in these regimes the rulers do not care about the common good; they are only concerned about their own advantage. Rulers neither care about, nor act to benefit, the ruled. See Pol. III 7. Cf. Pol. 1309a33-35 and NE 1161a32-34. But there may exist civic friendship among the ruled.

12. Though I cannot get into the issue here, I should at least point out that I agree with Cooper’s argument for the view that in friendships of utility and pleasure as well as in character friendships, one wishes one’s friend well for the friend’s sake. See John Cooper, 'Aristotle on Friendship,' in Amelie Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 308-315.

13. See EE 1242b27-30. I think it is clear that Aristotle is not referring to proportional equality, in the sense that, for example, a proportion may be found in the relationship between the king and his subjects that equalizes their relationship. See the next two notes.
14. See NE VIII 10-11. Consider the following example: In a kingship, there will be the normal civic friendship among the ruled, but what they feel for their king, and what their king feels for them, cannot be called civic friendship, for it is an unequal friendship, namely, paternal friendship (NE 1160b24-27, 1161a10-15).

15. Even where equal citizens are ruled and rule in turn, there will be some differences in how the ruled treat the rulers. But these differences are minor. See Pol. 1259b7-8.

16. Perhaps the most important aspect of concord is agreement about the system of rule. 'There is concord when the same choice [has been made] concerning who is to rule and who is to be ruled.... Concord is civic friendship.' (EE 1241a30-33)

17. There are different types or degrees of friendship of utility. For example, the affection you feel for the doctor you have gone to for the past ten years will be greater than the affection you feel for your average fellow-citizen, though both are friendships of utility. And as we shall see, civic friendship will be greater than the friendship characteristic of alliances. Etc.


21. Cf. Cooper, 'Political Animals,' 233-234n16, 235n18. Aristotle speaks of a citizen's goodwill for the city, and of cities in an alliance being friends (Pol. 1320a14-17 and NE 1157a25-28), so it is not implausible that he thought civic friendship involved a person feeling friendship for the citizen body as a whole.

22. Disagreements among citizens are of course bound to occur. (See Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 118-127.) Such disagreements may be what the author of the Magna Moralia has in mind when he writes that the friendship between a citizen and a foreigner is more solid than that between fellow-citizens (1211a6-16).

23. This is not civic friendship, but a more general form of friendship that arises among people of the same race or among human beings generally.

25. The primary benefit is political stability—the city being held together. This best enables one to pursue one's own goals. There are other benefits of civic friendship, e.g. moral education. See Cooper, 'Political Animals and Civic Friends,' 239n21.

26. I would like to thank Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Henry Richardson, and Gerry Mara for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Anthony Preus for his valuable suggestions for this version. I would also like to thank the Social Philosophy and Policy Center (Bowling Green State University) for a research fellowship that gave me the time to work on, among other things, an earlier draft of this paper.