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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INVESTIGATION OF F
IN PLATO'S DRAMAS OF DEFINITION

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draft: 17 October 1999
I Introduction

I.i The Formality of The Investigation of $F$ in Plato's Dramas of Definition

Several Platonic texts share a similar structure: at some point in the discussion a question is posed of the form, What is $F$?, where $F$ is, in the broadest sense, an ἀρετή.\(^1\) The remainder of the discussion is devoted to determining the identity of this entity. These texts include Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, and Hippias Major. Investigations of $F$ also occur in Meno and Republic I, but to a more limited extent. After the What-is-$F$? question is posed, only a portion of the remaining discussion is devoted to answering it. At some point other questions arise and pursuit of the What-is-$F$? question is suspended. Sections of Protagoras are also devoted to the pursuit of the identity of ἀρεται. In Lysis a What-is-$F$? question is never posed. However, there are grounds for maintaining that the majority of the discussion attempts to determine what ὁ φίλος or φιλία is.\(^2\) In each case, the text ends with the investigation of $F$ unresolved. I refer to these four and related four texts as dramas of definition.\(^3\)

While the investigations in the dramas of definition are similar in the sense described as well as in other conspicuous ways, each investigation is also conspicuously idiosyncratic. Types of idiosyncrasy include the way Socrates poses questions, the kind of responses his interlocutors give, and the way Socrates criticizes his interlocutors' responses. There must be numerous reasons for these idiosyncrasies; but perhaps the most obvious is this: in each text the identity of a different ἀρετή is investigated. To some extent then the form of the investigations is ἀρετή-specific. That is to say, the form of a given investigation depends to some extent on the specific ἀρετή investigated.

\(^1\) In all these texts, but one some human ἀρετή investigated. In Meno it is human ἀρετή itself. But in Hippias Major it is broader, since Socrates and Hippias consider the κάλλος of humans as well as non-human entities. LSJ correctly give "excellence" as the primary definition of ἀρετή. Herodotus writes of the ἀρετή of land (4.198). Plato writes of the ἀρετή of equipment (601d). In Republic I human ἀρετή is distinguished from the ἀρετή of dogs and horses.

\(^2\) Though see David Sedley's "Is the Lysis a Dialogue of Definition?", Phronesis 34 (1989).

\(^3\) Protagoras really should not be called a "drama of definition", aside from convenience in terms of its role in this paper. Also, in this paper I do not discuss Lysis.
Aside from ἀρετή-specificity, a given investigation may be composed in certain idiosyncratic ways for any number of other reasons. These I refer to under the broad category of drama-specificity.\textsuperscript{4} I will speak then of ἀρετή- or drama-specific characteristics and structures of a text. I use the words "characteristic" and "structure" informally, under the assumption that pre-analytic intuitions are clear enough to serve the needs of the paper. Whatever the precise identity-conditions for a characteristic are, "structure" is used to designate a complex of interrelated characteristics.\textsuperscript{5}

The existence of ἀρετή- and drama-specific elements (i.e., characteristics and structures) in a text presumes the existence of ἀρετή- and drama-specific characteristic and structural principles. Characteristic and structure are descriptive categories; principle is an explanatory one. So, an ἀρετή-specific or drama-specific characteristic or structural principle is a proposition or set of propositions that explains the occurrence of an ἀρετή-specific or drama-specific characteristic or structure in the text. For instance, where C is an ἀρετή-specific characteristic of text T, and P is the pertinent ἀρετή-specific characteristic principle, C occurs in T because of P.\textsuperscript{6}

Assuming some influence of ἀρετή-specificity and drama-specificity on the formation of the investigations, it is a question to what extent, if any, formal elements relating to the investigation of F characterize the texts as well. By formal elements I mean both characteristics and structures of the investigation of F whose occurrence is due to formal characteristic and structural principles. These formal principles are propositions about the investigation of F generally, such as that F is an entity of a certain kind. For instance, both ἀνδρεῖα investigated in Laches and σωφροσύνη investigated in Charmides are ἀρεται. If Socrates appealed to F being an ἀρετή in order to refute a definition of his

\textsuperscript{4}For instance, the epistemological discussion in Meno does not seem to be due to ἀρετή-specific reasons.

\textsuperscript{5}For instance, an investigation may be regarded as having the following structure: Socrates asks his interlocutor a question of the form, What is F?; the interlocutor offers an account of F; Socrates rejects this account; the interlocutor offers a second account; Socrates rejects this account; and so on, until, after a number of rejected accounts, Socrates' initial interlocutor desists from the investigation, and a second interlocutor takes his place.

\textsuperscript{6}For instance, the characteristic principle explaining the characteristic that an investigation ends in aporia might be the fact that the author did not know the answer to the question Socrates poses. Similarly, the structural principle explaining the structure described in footnote four might be that Plato wished initially to canvass a range of popular beliefs about the moral entity under investigation and to impress upon his intended audience the inadequacies of these popular beliefs.
interlocutor, this characteristic of the investigation would be formal; and the principle
explaining its existence would be formal. 7

Many scholars believe the investigations in Plato's dramas of definition are to
some extent governed by certain formal principles. For example, those who believe $F$ is
an $είδος$ might consent that, from whatever point the investigation begins, Socrates (as
Platonic pedagogue) encourages the investigation toward a view of $F$ as an $είδος$.
Similarly, those who believe the $αρεταί$ are identical or, if not identical, mutually
entailing, e.g., types of $σοφία$, might consent that Socrates encourages the investigation
toward an intellectualist view of $αρετή$.

In this paper I consider which formal characteristics, if any, occur in the
investigations. In addition, I am interested in whether there is a transformation of formal
characteristics among the dramas of definition.

Methodologically, the paper focuses on what I call the surface claims and
arguments of the text. By that I mean the explicit claims and arguments Socrates and his
interlocutors make about the identity of $F$. This aspect of the texts is distinguished from
their literary or dramatic aspects as well as any indirect claims and arguments about $F$;
however these might occur. The neglect of the literary and dramatic dimensions of the
texts seems to me irresponsible as a general hermeneutic principle, but I do not see that it
jeopardizes this particular project.

In addition, I make some reference to the inconspicuous discursive conditions of
early fourth century Athens and the Greek world at large. Plato assumes much in his
writings that would have been familiar to his intended audience of fourth century Greeks.
Especially in considering $αρετή$-specificity in the dramas of definition, it is advisable to
be sensitive to these discursive conditions.

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7 The following is a negative example. It is possible, though highly unlikely, that ending in aporia is not a
formal characteristic of all the investigations. It could be a drama-specific one, i.e., one that occurs in all
the texts, but in each case for reasons particular to that text and unrelated to the reasons for aporia in other
texts. In such cases we would speak of drama-specific characteristics or structures and drama-specific
characteristic or structural principles.
The Argument of the Paper

The paper suggests that certain formal characteristics of the investigations of $F$ in the dramas of definition transform between one set of texts and another. I refer to these two sets as A and B. Set A consists of *Republic I, Charmides, Laches*, and *Protagoras*. Set B consists of *Euthyphro, Hippias Major*, and *Meno*.

Among A $F$ is an ἀρετή. $F$ is characterized as a psychic δύναμις, and more specifically as a certain σοφία. $F$ is never characterized as an ἐλελογίδεα or as an ὄνοσια. The range of $f$ entities is limited to people and their actions. $F$ is characterized as dynamically related to $f$ action. By this is meant that $f$ action (or action performed $f$-ly) is the ἐργον of $F$, which is its δύναμις. The relation of $F$ to $f$ people is vague. The relation has been described as constitutive, but the metaphysics of constitution do not seem to me simple or obvious. So, I prefer to refer to this relation as psychic, and I analyze it in the following vague way: if $F$ is in the ψυχή of $S$, then $S$ is $f$.

Among B $F$ is characterized as an ἐλελογίδεα and an ὄνοσια; never in *Euthyphro* or *Hippias Major* as a psychic entity, an epistemic state, or a δύναμις; and only in the later stages of *Meno* as an epistemic state. Attending the transformation in A and B is a transformation in the characterization of the relation between $F$ and $f$ entities. In *Hippias Major*, the range of $f$ entities is broader than people and their actions; it includes artifacts and inanimate natural kinds. Since some $f$ entities are not actions and some are inanimate, the relation between them and $F$ cannot be described as dynamic or psychic. Moreover, since $F$ is not explicitly conceived as a psychic-entity or a δύναμις, a psychic or dynamic explanation of the relation is unwarranted.

In both *Euthyphro* and *Hippias Major*, the following phrase-type occurs: all $f$

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8 A word on the genesis of the paper—the argument of the paper develops from my experience with the interpretation of *Euthyphro*. I found the investigation of $F$ in *Euthyphro* puzzling in comparison with those in *Republic I, Charmides, and Laches*. Having failed to explain the relative idiosyncrasies of *Euthyphro* on ἀρετή-specific grounds, I developed an alternative hypothesis. I found that my hypothesis for the distinctiveness of the investigation of $F$ in *Euthyphro* explains aspects of the investigations in *Hippias Major* and *Meno*.

9 In *Protagoras* and *Charmides* $F$ is recognized as having an ὄνοσια; however, the investigation of $F$ is not conceived as the pursuit of an ὄνοσια.

10 Throughout the paper I use the symbol $f$ for the adjective corresponding to $F$. 
entities are \( f \) because of \( F \). This phrase-type seems to suggest that the relation between \( F \) and \( f \) entities is the same in the case of every \( f \) entity. But this can only be true if this relation is understood as different from the dynamic and psychic relation. It is suggested that \( F \) is related to \( f \) entities by an ousiac relation. The nature of the ousiac relation is vague; and it is suggested that it may rest on a confusion of logical, constitutive, and causal relations.

Finally, an appendix discusses the use of the \( \tau \)-\( f \) phrase for \( F \) (in particular, in *Euthyphro*). The \( \tau \)-\( f \) phrase is ambiguous and can be used as a referring expression or as a quantifier-phrase. Its use as a referring expression, specifically to denote \( F \), occurs in A in *Protagoras* and *Republic I*, but not in *Laches* and *Charmides*. Moreover, in *Protagoras* the form "\( \tau \) \( \sigma \)ι\( λ \)ον" does not occur, only "\( \sigma \)ι\( λ \)οτ\( η \)ς". It is hypothesized that the \( \tau \)-\( f \) phrase is introduced as a Form-designation in the later dramas, in particular in *Euthyphro*, in order to distinguish the novel metaphysical conceptualization of \( F \) from popular conceptions of \( F \) evoked by common grammatical forms of \( F \).

The argument for distinctiveness between A and B raises the question whether the transformation of certain formal characteristics in the investigation of \( F \) reflects a development in Plato's thought or rather the pedagogical order in which the writings were intended to be read. If the paper were arguing that the two characterizations are exclusive, it would be appropriate to argue for developmentalism. Since the paper does not argue this, but only that the characterizations are distinct, it would be necessary to add another dimension to the paper in order to resolve the question. Since the paper is already quite long, this question is not addressed here; and the argument remains compatible with both developmentalism and unitarianism.
II A

II.i  The ἄρετή-Σοφία Thesis in A

In this section of the paper I suggest that the investigations of F in A (i.e., Republic I, Charmides, Laches, and Protagoras) share several formal characteristics. These include the characterization of F as psychic, an epistemic state, and a δύναμις. These claims are generally accepted;11 but it is important that I defend them because in the following third section of the paper I suggest that the investigations of F in other dramas of definition, B (i.e, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, and Meno) do not exhibit these formal characteristics. Scholars who argue for the first claim do not argue for the second; and, as far as I know, to argue for both claims is novel.

It is also important how I argue for the first claim. I want to show that the texts of A share certain formal characteristics despite the various forms of the investigation of F in the individual texts. In order to reconcile diversity of form with what may be called a certain conceptual unity, I introduce the concept of ἄρετή-specificity and make arguments on ἄρετή-specific grounds.

To begin—I suggest that in the investigations in A the persona Socrates is committed to the belief that ἄρετή (or at least the specific ἄρετή under investigation) is a psychic entity and more specifically an epistemic state. In Laches and Republic I he says and argues that ἄρετή is a certain σοφία. In Protagoras he argues that all the ἄρεται are a form (or forms) of σοφία. In Charmides Socrates does not explicitly say or argue that σοφροσύνη is a kind of σοφία. But he does suggest that σοφροσύνη is a psychic entity, that it is beneficial, and that one who does good, cannot be σώφρων without knowing what he is doing. These claims suggest that σοφροσύνη at least requires σοφία; and the central section of the investigation discusses definitions of σοφροσύνη as ἐπιστήμη. I believe the ἄρετή-σοφία thesis is a structural principle of A. That is to say, I believe that

in A Plato intends to encourage consideration of the thesis that ἀρετή is a certain σοφία; and he organizes the investigations in accordance with this thesis.

I have said that in A Socrates believes F is psychic entity or an epistemic state. I have not said that Socrates believes F is a psychic-type or a type of epistemic state. I want the distinction to be clear. The former might suggest the latter to contemporary philosophers. But the type-token distinction or something akin to it is simply not articulated or discussed in A.

Consider, for instance, the sentence "ἀρετή is in the ψυχή". In this sentence, what exactly is the relation between ἀρετή and the ψυχή? In order to answer the question we must consider whether "ψυχή" and "ἀνδρεία" are recognized as general as opposed to singular terms. Clearly in A ψυχαί are regarded as individuated. But it is not clear whether ἀνδρείαι are, like tropes or simply like particulars, individuated as well; or whether ἀνδρεία is, like a universal, a unity somehow present in multiple ψυχαί. In almost all dramas of definition the moral entity under investigation is suggested to be a single δύν or πράγμα. Taking "δύντα" and "πράγματα" as synonyms, we may translate these terms as "entities".12 Though, it is unclear exactly how broad a range of entities were considered πράγματα and δύντα.13

In Laches it is said that all ἀνδρείαι men possess ἀνδρεία. But there is no indication that thought is given to the question whether each ἀνδρείος has his own ἀνδρεία; or whether there is just one; or how this is related to the unity of the πράγμα. In considering such questions ourselves we are consciously approaching familiar metaphysical problems relating to the identity of properties and their relation to particulars. But, these questions are not raised in A. Consequently, I do not describe Socrates as seeking types or Forms in A.

Instead, Socrates' interest in the ἀρεταί seems to be principally in two claims about these entities. We have already mentioned the one: the ἀρεταί are psychic entities; i.e., they exist in the ψυχαί of humans. More specifically, they are a certain σοφία. The

12 This point is discussed further in section three.
13 Some insight into this question may be gained from considering passages 292c9-d3 and 294b1 from Hippias Major in conjunction. In the former Socrates lists a wide variety of καλά entities, including acts, processes, humans, gods, and natural kinds; in the latter he says that all καλά πράγματα are καλά on account of τό καλόν. If "πράγματα" in this latter passage is understood to include the range of entities listed in the former passage, then "πράγμα" may be an all-purpose word for any entity.
Socratic belief about the psychic nature of the ἀρεταί contrasts with the belief, initially expressed by all of Socrates' interlocutors, that the ἀρεταί are actions. The second claim is that the ἀρεταί endow their possessors with the capacity (δύναμις) to perform acts f-ly and make their possessors f. Note the distinction in these two claims between the relation of F and an f action and F and an f person. In the former case the relation appears to be causal; in the latter constitutive. It is controversial how Plato understands these relations; and, more broadly, how he distinguishes causal, constitutive, and logical relations. These problems are discussed both in this section and the following third section.

In sum, in A F is understood to have the following characteristics. Though, again, note that an ontological distinction between substance and attribute cannot be assumed and is not explicitly recognized. F is a positive moral entity; accordingly, it is conceived as possessing positive moral characteristics such as being-ἀγαθόν, being-καλόν, being-ὠφέλιμόν, etc., as well as being f (i.e., self-predicable). It is a psychic entity; that is to say, something that exists in the φνχή. It is a certain epistemic state; that is, a certain σοφία (also described as ἐπιστήμη and φρονήσις, and sometimes, more specifically, as the knowledge of good and evil). F is also a δύναμις. Finally, I stress that in A F is not described as a universal or Form.

II.ii  The First Definitions in Republic I and Charmides

The first definition of δικαιοσύνη in Republic I is an action, telling the truth and returning what one takes. Socrates refutes this definition by suggesting that it is occasionally harmful to tell people the truth and to return to them what one takes. It is assumed that if one harms others in certain such cases one does injustice. I suggest the argument has the following form (A):

\[ F \text{ is in every case } f \]
\[ x \text{ is occasionally } f \text{ and occasionally not-}f. \]
\[ \text{therefore, } x \text{ is not } F \]

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14 Again, we do not want to say: "they are not act-types".
15 In this paper I do not discuss the difficult problem of self-predication.
16 I use the phrase "a certain..." throughout this section to preserve a lack of recognition of the type-token distinction.
17 That is to say, an act-type.
In *Charmides* Socrates uses a similar argument to reject Charmides' first definition of \( \sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) (B):

\[
F \text{ is in every case } \kappa\alpha\lambda\nu
\]
\[
x \text{ is occasionally } \kappa\alpha\lambda\nu \text{ and occasionally not-} \kappa\alpha\lambda\nu
\]
therefore, \( x \) is not \( F \).

Just before Socrates poses the What-is-\( F \)? question in *Charmides* he suggests that \( \sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) is a psychic entity. He describes his alleged Thracian charm with these words:

The soul (\( \psi\upsilon\chi\eta \)) my dear friend is cured by means of certain charms, and these charms consist of beautiful words. It is a result of such words that \( \sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) arises in the soul. And when the soul acquires and possesses \( \sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) it is easy to provide health both for the head and for the rest of the body.\(^{18}\)

Shortly after he says:

Now it is clear that if \( \sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) is present in you, you are able to form an opinion about it. For it is necessary, I suppose, that if it resides in you, it provides a sense of its presence, by means of which you would form an opinion both that it exists and of what sort of thing it is... Well, in order to guess whether it resides in you or not say what in your opinion \( \sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) is.\(^{19}\)

The immediate contexts of the first definition of \( F \) in *Charmides* and *Republic I* differ in this respect. Socrates does not give Cephalus any indication that \( \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) is a psychic entity. The investigations in *Republic I* and *Charmides* also differ in that in *Republic I* Socrates does not initially pose a What-is-\( F \)? question. Rather, he draws attention to what he perceives is a definition of \( \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) in Cephalus' remarks.

It might be remarked that Socrates does not suggest that \( \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) is a psychic entity before the first definition of \( \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \), because the initiation of the investigation of \( F \) in *Republic I* differs from that in *Charmides*. But granting this point does not satisfactorily explain Socrates' silence about \( \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) being a psychic entity. Moreover, after the rejection of Cephalus' definition, Polemarchus offers a definition that introduces a series of clarifications and modifications and finally results in another definition, aiding one's friends and harming one's enemies. Polemarchus persists, throughout his exchange with Socrates, to define \( \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) as an action. At no point in their exchange does Socrates suggest that \( \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\eta \) is a psychic entity.

\(^{18}\) 157a3-b1.
In contrast, in *Charmides*, after Socrates rejects Charmides' first definition, he encourages Charmides to reconsider what σωφροσύνη is, and he does this in such a way so as to suggest again that σωφροσύνη is a psychic entity.

Once again now... Charmides, concentrate hard and look inside yourself. Consider what sort of person (ὅποιόν τινά) σωφροσύνη makes (ποιεῖ) you, if it is present, and what sort of thing (ποία. τίς) it would have to be in order to affect (ἀπεργάζοιτο) you in that way.\(^{20}\)

I suggest that Socrates does not suggest to Polemarchus (or to Cephalus) that δικαιοσύνη is a psychic entity, because Plato wants the personae to investigate the popular view of δικαιοσύνη as the action, aiding one's friends and harming one's enemies. Plato regards the rejection of this popular view as a discursive act of considerable importance. He does not want to complicate the discussion by suggesting that δικαιοσύνη is a psychic entity. Nor does he need to assert that claim in order to undermine the popular view. He has other means to do so. In short, to assert or argue that δικαιοσύνη is a psychic entity, before the popular view has been developed and investigated, would be premature and counter-productive.

There is also this to consider—Socrates could simply insist that σωφροσύνη is a psychic entity, as he does in *Charmides* and *Laches*. In the cases of temperance and courage—to offer particularly suggestive translations of "σωφροσύνη" and "ἀνδρεία"—the *prima facie* plausibility of his claim might be strong enough so as not to compel a defense. However, in the case of δικαιοσύνη, which might strongly suggest a type of conduct to Plato's readers—as I believe the English word "justice" does—he might have to develop an argument and therefore again risk complicating the issue.\(^{21}\)

I suggest then that the reason the treatment of the initial stage of the investigation in *Republic* lacks Socrates' expressed condition that F is a psychic entity is largely ἀρετή-specific. That is to say, it is largely due to issues specifically pertinent to δικαιοσύνη (as opposed to the other ἀρεταί).

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\(^{19}\) 158e7-159a3.

\(^{20}\) 160d5-8.
II.iii Socrates' Criticism of Charmides' Second Definition

The progress of the investigation in *Charmides* seems ἀρετή-specific to a large extent as well. For instance, Charmides' two definitions, ἡσυχίότης and αἰδώς, were popular views of σωφροσύνη specifically associated with the conduct of aristocratic youths like Charmides. Critias' first definition, τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, had specific political connotations related to the quietism and anti-democratic sentiment of aristocratically- and oligarchically-minded individuals such as the historical Critias and his hetairoi.22

However, unlike Cephalus' and Polemarchus' definitions in *Republic I*, Charmides' definitions and Critias' first definition are not all actions. Charmides' second definition is a psychic entity. This may not obvious, and it may even be controversial; for, αἰδώς could be understood as modest behavior as well as a disposition to such behavior. The following is Charmides' second definition:

Well, it seems to me...that σωφροσύνη makes (ποιεῖν) one feel ashamed (αισχύνεσθαι), that it makes23 a person modest (αισχυντηλὸν), and that σωφροσύνη is modesty (αἰδώς).24

The verb "αισχύνεσθαι" suggests that σωφροσύνη causes one to have a certain affect, the feeling of shame. Accordingly, σωφροσύνη would be a disposition to feel shame. The adjective "αισχυντηλὸν" might mean to act modestly or to have a modest character (the former signifying a causal relationship, the latter a constitutive one), or both. The ambiguity cannot be resolved just from Charmides' response. However, the way Socrates responds to Charmides' second definition lends some support to the idea that Charmides means to act modestly.

In the last clause of Charmides' second definition, we can rule out the meanings of

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21 I think "ὁσιότης" is rather like this as well, i.e., in view of Ancient Greek religion, more suggestive of a type of conduct than a psychic state of faith, devotion, or love.
22 Both claims about the socio-historical significance of the terms are discussed in my dissertation, "Aporia in Plato's *Charmides*, *Laches*, and *Lysis*", University of Chicago, 1997, 65ff.
23 The verb for "makes" is the "ποιεῖν" from the previous clause.
24 160e3-5.
feel ashamed and act modestly for the word "αιδώς", since, in view of the first clause, obviously neither feeling ashamed nor acting modestly can cause one to feel shame. Consequently, it seems we should understand αἰδώς as a disposition.²⁵

This interpretation finds some support in the fact that αἰδώς would then be psychic, and so the second definition would accord with Socrates' insistence that Charmides look inside himself for the answer to the What-is-F? question. The interpretation is also supported by the way Socrates responds to it. Socrates gains Charmides' assent to the view that σωφρονείς men are ἀγαθοί, and that something that makes (ἀπέργαζεται) a man ἀγαθόν must itself be ἀγαθὸν. Both of these claims are ambiguous with respect to the causal versus the constitutive relation between σωφροσύνη and the goodness of the man who possesses σωφροσύνη. But the line Socrates cites from Homer encourages the conclusion that by "a good man" Socrates means one who acts in a certain way:

It is not a good thing for modesty to be present to a man in need.²⁶

The Homeric verse suggests that modesty should not hinder a person from acting so as to satisfy his needs;²⁷ and that suggests that a man who possesses αἰδώς does not act so as to satisfy his needs.

In sum, the evidence for favoring the view that Charmides defines σωφροσύνη for the second time as a psychic entity, as opposed to an act-type, is more equivocal than one wishes; but it is most reasonable to interpret him as defining a psychic entity.

Socrates uses basically the same argument to refute Charmides' second definition that he uses to refute Charmides' first definition. The argument has the following form (C):

\[ F \text{ is in every case } \gammaαθόν. \]
\[ x \text{ is occasionally } \gammaαθόν \text{ and occasionally not } \gammaαθόν \]
\[ \text{therefore, } x \text{ is not } F \]

²⁵ Translators are of little help with this passage. Lamb combines the first two clauses into one: "temperance makes men ashamed and bashful" (Plato XII, Harvard University Press, 1927, 33); Jowett does the same: "temperance makes a man ashamed or modest" (reprinted in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Princeton University Press, 1961, 106)

²⁶ 161a4.

²⁷ It is questionable whether the context of these lines would be apparent to Charmides. Though, if they would be, the context makes my point more strongly. They are spoken by Telemachus to the swineherd as he asks the swineherd to give bread and wine to Odysseus who is disguised as a beggar. The beggar is being reprimanded for not attempting to acquire food more aggressively.
This is remarkable, because in refuting Charmides' second definition, Socrates does not acknowledge that this definition is, in any respect, of the right kind, that is, a psychic entity rather than an action. This should be contrasted with Laches' second definition in *Laches*. Once Laches identifies *àvôpeia* as a psychic entity, *ή καρτέρία τῆς ψυχῆς*, Socrates says that he has answered his question as he intended it to be answered.

Socrates' silence on this point in *Charmides* appears to disserve Charmides. Charmides should receive encouragement for having satisfied at least one of Socrates' category conditions. Instead, Socrates' refutation of Charmides' second definition seems to compound Charmides' puzzlement—at least as far as his comprehension of the identity conditions of the entity under investigation.28

This is not to say that Socrates' pedagogical effect on Charmides is entirely negative. Charmides at least seems excited by Socrates' dialectical ability; he asks for Socrates' estimation of a view of *σωφροσύνη* he has recently heard. However, the third definition, *τὸ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν*, is an action; and this seems to confirm the supposition that Socrates' *elenchoi*, in particular the second one, fail to impress upon Charmides that *σωφροσύνη* is a psychic entity.

It has already been mentioned that Plato has an ἀρετή-specific interest in the definition, *τὸ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν*. This compels him to entertain the definition. Also, given the political significance of the phrase and the linguistic discussion that follows from its ambiguities, it is appropriately attributed to Critias, the σοφός, as opposed to Charmides. Furthermore, it is analyzed so as to serve as a segue to the consideration of *σωφροσύνη* as a psychic entity, specifically, an epistemic state. All this is to say, the placement of the third definition in the discussion, following Charmides' two definitions and preceding the investigation of *σωφροσύνη* as a certain ἐπιστήμη, is purposeful.

At the same time this suggests that in composing argument (C) in response to

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28 A further related problem concerns how Socrates can expect Charmides to determine a psychic entity without considering the action of a σώφρων man. In contrast, in response to Laches' first definition of *àvôpeia*, Socrates acknowledges that such a man is *àvôpēios*; and thereby gives Laches a basis from which to consider a related psychic entity. But Socrates rejects *ήσυχιότης* as an instance of *σωφροσύνη*. This should leave Charmides questioning what action may be considered *σώφρον* in light of which to consider related psychic states.
Charmides' second definition Plato sacrifices the integrity of the investigation, because he wishes to introduce Critias' first definition as it is. The second elenchos should emphasize that Charmides is right to define σωφροσύνη as a psychic entity, only that αἰδὼς is not the right one. But if Plato had composed an elenchos of that sort, it would have jeopardized his treatment of the third definition; and it would not be reasonable for Critias to revert to an action.

II.iv  F as a Psychic Entity

Nowhere in the dramas of definition does Plato introduce an argument that F is a psychic entity. Socrates occasionally merely asserts that it is. This may be contrasted with the fact that Plato introduces three distinct arguments for F being an epistemic state. In Charmides Plato introduces an argument that F cannot be an action, but the argument suggests that F must be a certain epistemic state, not, more broadly, a certain psychic entity. This argument comes in response to Critias' first definition, τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει. After initial discussion of the meaning of the phrase it is agreed that "τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει" means doing good. This is a remarkable definition in that it cannot be refuted by elenchoi of forms (A), (B), and (C). Doing good is good, beautiful, and—given that σωφροσύνη is good in every case where it occurs—σώφρον. In short, unless he is to accept this as a satisfactory definition of σωφροσύνη Socrates must resort to a novel elenchos; precisely, one suggesting that σωφροσύνη is not an action. He does this by raising the question whether, if a man does good, but only by accident, he is σώφρων. Critias' intuition strongly compels him to reject this possibility. He stresses that a man must know what he is doing in order to be σώφρων, and he goes so far as to claim that σωφροσύνη is self-knowledge. The argument devolving from Socrates' question may be expressed as follows (D):

If one is f, one knows what one is doing
If one acts well, but one does not know what one is doing, one is not f.
Therefore, if one acts well, one is not f.

Securing the validity of (D) depends upon the disambiguation of the conclusion.

The premises do not rule out the possibility that if one acts well and knows what one is doing, one is f. A more acceptable conclusion would be the following: if one merely acts
well, then one is not f. In other words, acting well is an insufficient condition for being f. Nevertheless, Plato uses Critias' strong response to push the investigation toward consideration of an intellectualist position; rather than suggest that ἀρετή is a combination of a certain epistemic state and a certain action that somehow relates to it.  

V.v Laches' First Definition of 'Anthony'.

The initial progress of the investigation in Laches seems to have greater formal integrity and to depend less on the idiosyncrasies of the specific ἀρετή under investigation than the investigations in Charmides and Republic I. Socrates asks Laches what ἀνδρεία is, and he receives the answer that a man who remains in position, fights against the enemy, and does not flee is ἀνδρείος. We may infer from (E), a man who stands in position, defends himself against the enemy and does not flee is ἀνδρείος, that (F), standing in position, defending oneself against the enemy and not fleeing is ἀνδρεία. This inference is encouraged by the fact that Socrates himself makes a similar type of inference elsewhere in the investigation: Nicias advances the view that a man is ἀνδρείος insofar as he is σοφός; and Socrates infers that Nicias is defining ἀνδρεία as a sort of σοφία. However, if here we infer (F) from (E), we seem to run into a problem. Consider Socrates' response:

You speak well Laches [in claiming that the man who remains in formation, defends against the enemy, and does not flee is ἀνδρείος], but perhaps I am at fault here for not speaking clearly; you did not answer me as I intended you to when I asked, but differently. 

Socrates agrees that a man engaging in paradigmatic hoplite conduct is ἀνδρείος. That is to say, he assents to (E). If he infers (F) from (E), he needn't assent to (F);

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29 Perhaps this owes to the Socratic idea that one who knows what is good cannot fail to act upon that knowledge.
30 There is a further complication with Laches' response. Laches' exact definition is: "a man who is willing (ἐθέλειν) to remain in formation,..." Strictly speaking Laches is defining a psychological state, not an act-type. However, I suggest that the verb ἐθέλειν is used here rhetorically or idiomatically and that Laches does not intend to convey a definition of ἀνδρεία as a psychological state. This suggestion is confirmed by the fact that Socrates responds to Laches' definition with these words: "This man, I understand, is ἀνδρείος who, as you say, remains in position and fights against the enemy." And Laches and then Socrates respond as follows: "I, at any rate, think so.—Yes, and I do too." (191a).
31 τὸ σέ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ἐλεγήμενος ἡρόμην, ἀλλ' ἔτερον. (190e8-9)
however, he should at least recognize Laches' answer as satisfying some category condition of his question. Yet, Socrates claims that Laches has answered a *different* question from the one he had asked. But if Laches has defined *άνδρεία* as paradigmatic hoplite conduct, then surely he has answered the question Socrates asked.

I suggest that Socrates may regard a man who engages in paradigmatic hoplite conduct as *άνδρείος*; he may interpret Laches' response as (F); but he may still maintain that (F) does not answer his question—even though (F) is of the form: *άνδρεία* = *x*. In order to see how this may be so, we must distinguish two senses of "an *άνδρείος* person". A person may be (1) because he has a certain psychological disposition,32 or (2) because he acts in a certain way. Socrates can accept (E) and reject (F), because he accepts (1) and rejects (2). Laches is committed to both (E) and (F), because he is committed to (2). In other words, Socrates recognizes *άνδρεία* as characteristic of men who engage in paradigmatic hoplite conduct. But he does not think such men possess this characteristic because they engage in this type of conduct. If that were the case, it would not be possible to call other men *άνδρείοι*, though they did not engage in paradigmatic hoplite conduct. Yet, as Socrates proceeds to show, we do call other men *άνδρείοι*. Therefore, the men Laches describes must possess *άνδρεία* and engage in paradigmatic hoplite conduct, but not possess *άνδρεία* because they engage in paradigmatic hoplite conduct.

Socrates criticizes Laches' first definition because Socrates believes *άνδρεία* is not an action but a psychic entity. That this psychic entity causes various sorts of action, including the one Laches describes, Socrates would presumably admit as well. In short, Socrates regards Laches' failure to recognize this category condition of his question, being-psychic, as the reason for Laches' misjudging it.

Socrates attempts to explain why Laches' answer does not respond to his question. He describes numerous actors engaged in a variety of actions, whom Laches agrees are all *άνδρείοι*. In doing so Socrates attempts to impress on Laches that it is not because

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32 This is the first of many times I use the word "because" with reference to a passage in one of the dramas of definition in order to describe relations that may be logical, causal, or constitutive. I am compelled to do so without attempting to clarify the nature of the relation at the given instance, because I believe Plato himself is confused about the distinctions between these various types of relations. The problem is discussed below in this section and in the third section.
they engage in a certain action that these men are ἄνδρείοι. The actions are several, but Socrates stresses that the various agents all possess some thing.

Then all these men are ἄνδρείοι, only, some possess ἄνδρείαν in situations of pleasure, some of pain, some of desire, some fear; while others possess δειλίαν in these same situations. What each of these things [ἀνδρεία and δειλία] is, this is what I wanted to know.33

Laches misunderstands Socrates' question because he views ἄνδρεία as an action, rather than a psychic entity possessed by agents. Socrates' explanation attempts to shift Laches' focus from the character of action to the character of agency. It is important to recognize this, for otherwise one might mistakenly regard the failure of Laches' response as due to its lack of generality. This is not to say that Laches responds with a particular, when a universal is expected. But the failure of his response is not a result of its not being general enough.34 If that were the case, Laches could proceed in a subsequent definition to generalize the action he defines as ἄνδρεία so as to encompass the numerous acts Socrates describes in his response. For instance, Laches could define ἄνδρεία as a very general action such as resisting danger. However, since Socrates believes ἄνδρεία is psychic, no description of an action would satisfactorily answer his question.

Consideration of Socrates' response to Critias' first definition corroborates this claim.

Consider Socrates' response to Laches:

...So then this is what I was saying just now, that I was at fault for your unsatisfactory answer because I was inquiring unsatisfactorily. I wanted to learn from you not only about ἄνδρείους hoplites, but cavalrymen, and soldiers in general; but not only ἄνδρείους· men in battle, also at sea and in illness and poverty...All these men are ἄνδρείοι, only some have acquired ἄνδρείαν in situations of pleasure, some of pain, some of desire, and some of fear...35

So try now, Laches, and tell me, what kind of power or capacity (δύναμις) ἄνδρείαν is, which is the same in situations of pleasure and pain and in all situations where we said it existed...36

33191e4-9.
34Though at least one scholar has made precisely this claim: "His definition is, of course, not general enough." (Alexander Nehamas, "Confusing Universals and Particulars in Plato's Early Dialogues", Review of Metaphysics 1972, 295)
35191c7-e6.
36192b5-8.
It is clear that being-psychic is a category condition of Socrates' question, not only from this criticism of Laches' first definition, but also from the way Socrates introduces the investigation of ἄνδρεία. Socrates says that ἀρετή is to be joined to the ψυχαί of Lysimachus' and Melesias' sons in order to make them better people. Subsequently, Laches and Socrates agree to inquire into a part, rather than the whole, of ἄνδρεία; Socrates says:

Then, Laches, let us first try to say what ἄνδρεία is; then after that we will investigate just how our young men may acquire it...38

Clearly then when he poses his What-is-Φ? question Socrates has some grounds for assuming Laches will regard being-psychic as a category condition he needs to satisfy, and therefore as failing to satisfy any category conditions he had in mind.

There is more to Socrates response than I have so far discussed. Laches needs additional assistance before rendering the kind of answer Socrates is seeking. After Socrates describes the various agents and asks Laches what they all have in common, he asks Laches: "Do you still not grasp what I am saying?"; and Laches responds: "Not exactly."39 At this point Socrates offers the example of quickness:

I mean this. It is as if I were asking what quickness is, which we experience in running and harp-playing, in speaking and learning, and in many other activities. Yes, I would say we possess this (αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα) in almost any situation you care to mention—whether it be in activities involving the hands or legs or the mouth or voice or thought...So if someone were to ask me, "Socrates, what is this quickness, which you say exists in all these situations?", I would say to him that I call quickness the power to accomplish a lot in a short time (τῇ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ διαπραττομένην δύναμιν), whether in respect of the voice or in running or anything else...So now, Laches, you try and tell me what power (δύναμις) it is that is the same in situations of pleasure and pain and everything else we mentioned and which is called ἄνδρεία.40

Vlastos contends that "δύναμις" in this passage means quality, not power or capacity.41 There are several reasons why his interpretation is unacceptable. By defining

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37190bf.
38190d7-e1.
39191e11-12.
40192a1-b8.
"δύναμις" as quality, Vlastos identifies quickness as a characteristic of action. If Socrates were saying this, it would undermine his previous explanation to Laches that ἄνδρεία is not in principle a characteristic of action, but of people. We may call a certain action ἄνδρεῖον, but it is so only derivatively in the following sense: if actions are F because they are performed by agents who possess F.

Socrates clearly states that the quickness under discussion is a possession of agents: "αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα"; and this expression is clearly intended to reflect his previous claim that various agents possess ἄνδρεία ("τὴν ἄνδρειαν κέκτησαν"). Power, force, and capacity are the most common meanings of the word "δύναμις". Accordingly, we may infer that Socrates views ἄνδρεία as a certain power of the ψυχή.

Vlastos finds this problematic because the analogy of quickness, qua δύναμις, with ἄνδρεία makes little sense. The consequences are admittedly strange. However, Greek physical science teems with ideas that appear far-fetched in view of modern beliefs. Therefore, it seems anachronistic to expect that ancient thinkers held ideas about physical and psychological entities and processes that we regard as commonsensical. In Republic Socrates describes the δύναμις of sight (δόξα), and how the possession of this δύναμις may yield various results or products (ἔργα). It is said that the individual’s power of sight (δύναμις ὃσεως) depends upon the organ (ὁργανὸν) of the eye (ὁμμα), the color (χρῆμα) or shape (σχῆμα) of the visible object, as well as light (φῶς). The

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42This obviously results from rendering "δύναμις" as "quality"; but Vlastos explicitly states the result: "Quaint though it may seem to the modern reader, 'going through much in a little time' is not a bad shot at what constitutes 'quickness': it would fit nicely in all contexts in which a Greek speaker would use the word to designate the property of actions he wants to mark off as 'quick' from a contrasting class he reckons 'slow." (ibid. 414; my italics)

43The expression occurs at 191ε6.

44For example, in Homer it is used of bodily strength (Od. 2.62), in Herodotus of a contingent of soldiers in battle (5.100). It can also be used of the potency of medicines (Galen, peri tes...dunameos, 1.672), or of magical powers (PMag.Leid. 5.8.12). Cf. Souilhé, J., Étude sur le terme ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ dans les dialogues de Platon, Paris, 1919.

45“If Socrates called quickness a dunamis because he thought of it as the power which causes a given action to be quick, he would be making the extraordinary assumption that the cause of everything done quickly by anyone anywhere is the same, e.g., that the very same thing which caused a man to run quickly would also cause him to learn and think quickly. Is it at all plausible that Socrates would be tempted to entertain such a fantastic notion which would fly in the face of the most common experience—say, that of a superlatively fast runner who is a hopeless learner and sluggish thinker?” (op. cit. 413-14)

46 Of course we must begin with commonsense, but adjust where evidence contradicts.

47 Cf. Bury, R. G., "Δύναμις and Φύσις in Plato", Classical Review 8 (1894) 298. Cf. also the discussion of δύναμις in Republic: Ψήφομεν δύναμις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὀντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δύναμια ἐν δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πάν ὁ τί περ ἐν δύνηται, ὅν λέγω ὅφειν καὶ ἄκοι χαὶ τῶν
dependence of the δύναμις of sight for its efficacy upon theses additional elements suggests that the δύναμις of quickness might be conceived in the same way. Discrepancies in the body and ψυχή of the agent, as well as other factors, might explain why one person who possessed quickness could run quickly, but not multiply integers so fast. If Socrates' physiological views are, from a modern perspective, far-fetched, his analogy of quickness and ἀνδρεία is, from a modern perspective, infelicitous. But it seems even less satisfactory to interpret him as explaining ἀνδρεία, qua δύναμις, as a characteristic of agents, while defining quickness, qua δύναμις, as a characteristic of actions.

Further support for this view comes from a passage in Protagoras where Socrates and Protagoras are discussing the unity of the ἀρετέα. Socrates gains Protagoras' assent to claims of the following form: people conduct themselves ἐν οὐδὲν because of F. For instance, Socrates says:

Things done foolishly (ἄφρόνως) are done so because of foolishness (ἄφροσύνη); and things done temperately (σωφρόνως) are done so because of temperance (σωφροσύνη).

He continues:

And if something is done with quickness (μετὰ τάχους), then it is done quickly (ταχέως).

Clearly the phrase "μετὰ τάχους" and the word "ταχέως" are not both being...
used to describe the quality of actions; for then the apodosis would be tautological. Rather, as the preceding examples indicate, and as the preceding discussion in Protagoras makes clear,\textsuperscript{52} entities like \textit{άφροσύνη}, \textit{σωφροσύνη}, and \textit{τά χως} have particular \textit{δύναμεις} that in distinct ways affect the actions of those that possess them.

Following Socrates' criticism of his first definition, Laches succeeds in satisfying the condition that \( F \) is a psychic \textit{δύναμις}:

Well then it seems to me to be \textit{καρτερία, της ψυχής} (a certain toughness of the soul), if it is necessary to speak of the common element in all cases relating to \textit{άνδρειας} (\( τό \ γε \ διά \ πάντων \ περί \ αύρειας \ πεφυκός \)).\textsuperscript{53}

Note that in his response to Laches' definition, specifically in response to the protasis, Socrates says:

But of course it is necessary, that is, if we are going to give each other answers to the questions asked (\( τό \ ερωτώμενου \)).\textsuperscript{54}

Socrates' response indicates that Laches has now given Socrates the sort of response he desires.

\textbf{II.vi \( F \) as a \textit{Δύναμις}}

In \textit{Laches} Socrates describes \textit{άνδρεια} as a \textit{δύναμις}. In \textit{Republic I} \textit{δικαιοσύνη} is said to have a \textit{δύναμις}. There may be more than a semantic distinction between having and being a \textit{δύναμις}, but I will not dwell on that here. In \textit{Protagoras} Socrates also suggests the \textit{άρεταί} have \textit{δύναμεις}. In \textit{Charmides} Socrates never says that \textit{σωφροσύνη} is or has a \textit{δύναμις}; but he uses dynamic-language to discuss \textit{σωφροσύνη} throughout the text.\textsuperscript{55} I suggest that the dramas of A are unified on this point: \textit{άρετή} is (or has) a \textit{δύναμις}.

\textsuperscript{52} Previously Socrates asks Protagoras whether the names of the \textit{άρεταί} refer to a single entity or whether they refer to distinct entities that each possess a distinct \textit{δύναμις}: "\`Η καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ἴδιαν ἔχει;" (330a4)
\textsuperscript{53} 192b9-c1. \( τό \ γε \ διά \ πάντων \ περί \ αύρειας \ πεφυκός \) is a difficulty phrase. By "common element" I mean to convey \textit{that element that naturally occurs in such situations}, and by "naturally" I mean \textit{normally}, as things go.
\textsuperscript{54} 192c2-3.
\textsuperscript{55} Some of this will be discussed below.
In discussing Socrates' response to Laches' second definition it was suggested that Socrates regards δύναμις as a power or capacity; and specifically in the case of the ἀρεταί as a psychic disposition. To some extent, it has been suggested that Socrates regards the ἀρεταί as what we would call causally related to activity; what ἀρεταί cause are certain actions. 

In Republic I the actions that the ἀρεταί cause are described as their, that is, the ἀρεταί's, "έργα". For instance, Socrates asks Thrasymachus:

Consider. Would the eyes produce their ἔργα well if they lacked their particular ἀρετή...?

Socrates does not say what the specific ἔργα and ἀρετή of the eyes are, but answers can be derived from pertinent remarks in the text. In response to Socrates' question, Thrasymachus assumes that the ἀρετή of the eyes is vision (ὁψίς). Earlier in the discussion Socrates confirms with Polemarchus that it is the ἔργα of heat (θερμότης) to make things hot, and the ἔργα of dryness to make things dry. He also confirms that it is the ἔργα of τὸ ἀγαθὸν to benefit. These examples suggest that an ἔργον is an action. So, by analogy, it is the ἔργα of the eyes to see visible objects.

On the other hand, the ἀρετή of these entities appears to be their capacity for an ἔργον. This hypothesis is strengthened by Socrates' claim toward the end of the text that the ψυχή has an ἔργον or number of ἔργα, namely, to manage, rule, and deliberate, and he defines the ἀρετή of the ψυχή as δικαίωσύνη.

In continuing his preceding discussion with Thrasymachus regarding the ἔργα of ἀρεταί Socrates asks whether one city will have the δύναμις to enslave another if it lacks δικαίωσύνη. It might be assumed that the ἔργον of δικαίωσύνη is understood as enslaving another city. But this surely cannot be a satisfactory characterization, since it has been denied that the ἔργον of δικαίωσύνη can be to harm others. It seems more

56 In this case, the relation between these δύναμες and their ἔργα seems causal. But I am hesitant to describe δύναμες as causal agents generally. As mentioned previously, this is due to the fact that I believe Plato was unclear about differences between causal, constitutive, and logical relations. This point is developed in section three.

57 353b14-c1.
58 Οὐ γάρ θερμότητος ὡμισὶ ἔργων ψυχεὶν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐναντίου.—Ναὶ.—Οἶδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐναντίου.—Πάντα γε: (335d3-6)
59 Οἶδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐναντίου.—Φαίνεται. (335d7-8)
60 353d3-6.
61 353e1-9.
accurate to say that the ἔργον of δικαιοσύνη is to act cooperatively. Socrates suggests that a city whose members lack δικαιοσύνη will be incapable of organizing a successful military campaign. This is because the ἔργον of ἀδικία, which is understood to be present in the absence of δικαιοσύνη, is to breed hatred among the citizens of the enslaving city.63 He then speaks of ἀδικία as having a δύναμις, and suggests that if ἀδικία is present among at least some members of a group, it will disable the group from cooperatively carrying out its enterprises.

[If, in the case of two people, ἀδικία is present in one,] will it lose its δύναμις or retain it?—Let it have it just the same, he said.—Then is it not apparent that it has a certain kind of δύναμις such that wherever it is present,64 be it in a city, family, army camp, or anywhere else, it first causes the thing to be incapable of acting within itself on account of faction and division, and then it renders the thing an enemy to itself?65

I conclude that in Republic I, Socrates regards ἔργα as the manifestations, qua perceptible acts, of ἀρεταί, which are themselves (or have) δύναμεις.66 From this a more general conclusion may be drawn regarding Socrates’ understanding of action in Republic I, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras. An agent may possess in his ψυχή an ἀρετή, which, insofar as it is (or has) a δύναμις, produces ("ἀπεργάζεσθαι" is the most common verb used to describe the workings of the δύναμις) an ἔργον, which is a certain action. The ἀρετή itself is imperceptible, but its effects are perceptible. I will refer to this explanation of human action as model M.

Note also the relation between model M and the following type of claim that, as we saw, occurs in Protagoras: things are done ἴδια because of F. This claim describes why acts have certain characteristics; they have them because the agents who perform these acts possess particular δύναμεις, whose ἔργα these actions are. I will assume that the claim, things are done ἴδια because of F, is equivalent to the claim, ἴδια actions are ἴδια because of F.

62 351b1-9.
63 351d9-e1.
64 The "it" refers to ἀδικία itself, not the δύναμις of ἀδικία. Though this does not seem a substantial point.
65 351e6-352a3.
66 This might well suggest that δύναμεις themselves in general are imperceptible. But this is separate problem.
III B

III.i Orientation

In this section I describe the distinct formal characteristics of the investigation of F in B. These include: the absence of psychic and epistemic conditions for F; the absence of a δύναμις condition for F; the characterization of F as an είδος or ιδέα; and the characterization of F as an οὐσία.

The organization of the discussion in this section differs from that of the preceding section. In discussing formal characteristics of F in A I advance through the dramas introducing topics that cumulatively yield a description of the distinct unity of the investigations discussed. But in doing this I examine problems of ἀρετή-specificity in order to reconcile the diversity of the forms of the investigation of F in A with the unity of the investigations. In this section I do not make ἀρετή-specificity so central a feature of my interpretation. To some extent, this is because the investigations in B have a greater diversity of philosophical foci, and so of forms, that cannot simply be explained on ἀρετή-specific grounds. But mainly it is due to the difficulty of the philosophical problems the distinct formal characteristics in B raise, both per se and in relation to the characterization of F in A. These problems include: the range of f entities and the relationship between f entities and F. Given propriety of length for the paper and desire for clarity and simplicity, I avoid discussing ἀρετή-specific influences on the form of the dramas of B. In short, instead of describing why the investigations in Euthyphro, Hippias Major, and Meno have distinct forms from one another while still being unified in their formal characteristics, I simply discuss the formal characteristics of F they share, some of the philosophical problems of these characteristics, and their relation to the formal characteristics of F in A.

III.ii The Absence of Psychic- or Epistemic-Conditions in B

In the initial stages of the investigation in Euthyphro Socrates does not suggest that F is a psychic entity (or an epistemic state). Nor does he in the initial stages of the
investigations in *Meno* or *Hippias Major*. This occurs in *Republic I* too; and I have suggested ἀρετή-specific reasons for this fact. As in *Republic I*, so in *Euthyphro*, it may be that some ἀρετή-specific or drama-specific reason explains the fact that Socrates does not describe τὸ ὦσιον as a psychic entity early in the investigation. For instance, before Socrates poses the What-is-F? question the personae are preparing to evaluate allegedly sacrilegious activity for legal proceedings. Socrates is on trial for his conduct and Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for his conduct. Generally speaking, the ἀσεβείας γραφή was an accusation of sacrilegious activity, not beliefs or intentions. So, when Socrates asks Euthyphro what τὸ ὦσιον is, Euthyphro understands that he is being asked what sort of activity is appropriate with respect to the divine. This in part explains the kind of response Euthyphro gives to the What-is-F? question: prosecuting those who commit sacrilege is ὦσιον.

On the other hand, Socrates does not request an act. He says he wants to know what form acts of murder or anything else (περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων) have such that they are either ὦσιον or ἄνόσιον, and he believes that every act (πάση πράξει) that is ὦσιον has one form (μίαν ἱδέαν). Moreover, after Euthyphro gives his second definition, τὸ θεοφιλές, Socrates expresses enthusiasm that Euthyphro has answered his question as he intended it to be answered:

Very good, Euthyphro, now you have answered just as I wanted you to.67

Socrates' approval of Euthyphro's second definition may be contrasted with his approval of Laches' definition. Once Laches defines ἄνδρεία as a psychic entity, ἤ τῆς ψυχῆς καρτερία, Socrates regards him as having answered the question he asked. However, τὸ θεοφιλές is not a psychic entity.

In fact, nowhere in *Euthyphro* does Socrates suggest that τὸ ὦσιον is a psychic entity or an epistemic state. This is especially remarkable in view of *Protagoras* where ὦσιότης is discussed among the other cardinal human ἀρετή. Protagoras agrees almost immediately that ὦσιότης, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, and σοφία are alike, if not identical; and the discussion proceeds to define ἀρετή as a kind of σοφία.

The fact that Socrates does not describe τὸ ὦσιον in *Euthyphro* as a psychic entity (or epistemic state) does not imply that he disbelieves it is a psychic entity, but he does
characterize τὸ ὀσίον in Euthyphro differently from the way he characterizes ὀσιότης in Protagoras and the other ἀρεταί in Protagoras and the dramas of A.

III.iii  F as an Eἴδος and Ἰδέα.

A conspicuous distinct characteristic of the investigation in Euthyphro is Socrates’ claim, before both Euthyphro’s first and second definitions, that F is an εἴδος and ἱδέα.68 In A F is nowhere described as an εἴδος or ἱδέα. It is possible that Socrates’ silence about τὸ ὀσίον being a psychic entity is due to his belief that τὸ ὀσίον is an εἴδος. Or rather, if Plato is for the first time in writing introducing the idea that F is an εἴδος, possibly he is interested in focusing on the εἴδος condition, as opposed to the psychic condition. In Hippias Major and Meno F is described as a εἴδος. In Hippias Major Socrates never describes τὸ καλὸν as a psychic entity or epistemic state. In Meno, Socrates discusses Meno’s definition of ἀρετή as a desire for and a capability for procuring goods. Both the desire and the capability suggest a psychic entity; and although Socrates does not say that ἀρετή is something psychic, he does not reject Meno’s definition because it is a psychic entity. Much later in Meno Socrates and Meno discuss definitions of ἀρετή as wisdom. So, the treatment of ἀρετή in Meno encourages the hypothesis that being an εἴδος and being psychic need not be exclusive conditions.

III.iv  F and the Range of f Entities

In Hippias Major just before Socrates poses the What-is-F? question, he elicits Hippias’ assent to four claims:

(1) δίκαιοι men are δίκαιοι because of δικαιοσύνη
(2) σοφοὶ men are σοφοὶ because of σοφία
(3) all ἀγαθά things are ἀγαθά because of τὸ ἀγαθόν
(4) all καλά things are καλά because of τὸ καλόν

67 7a2-3.
68 I understand these words as synonymous.
69 287c2.
70 287c5.
71 287c6-6.
72 287c8-9.
These claims exhibit a distinction in range between entities. In (1) and (2) the entities are humans. Given the psychic condition for the identity of ἀρετή, it could be that the entities are limited to those with ψυχαί. Socrates could, and often does in A, focus discussion on the goodness and beauty (or fineness) of humans, such that goodness and beauty could be viewed as psychic characteristics of humans. But as (3) and (4) stand, the range of entities is broader. This broader range may be emphasized by the adjective "πάντα", which appears in both (3) and (4), and which could appear in (1) and (2), but doesn't.

The claim that in Hippias Major Socrates is seeking the beauty because of which all beautiful things are beautiful, not just human-beings (or their actions), is supported by the following remark of his, which occurs later in the investigation:

Are you not able to recall that I was asking what τὸ καλὸν is, by which to whatever it is added it befalls that thing to be καλὸν, whether it is a stone or a stick or a human or a god or any act or any study?73

In contrast, the only reason it seems Socrates limits the discussion to human ἀρεταί in A is Plato's interest in human ἀρεταί, as opposed to any other kind of ἀρετή. But given the meaning of the term, the investigation could be much broader.74

In Euthyphro Socrates says he is interested in that single Form because of which all ὂσια entities are ὂσια. I will refer to this as:

(5) all ὂσια are ὂσια because of τὸ ὂσιον.

(5) has the same form as (3) and (4) from Hippias Major. This encourages consideration of how broad a range of ὂσια entities he has in mind. Given the discussion of ὂσιότης in Protagoras it might be assumed that the range of ὂσια entities in Euthyphro is limited to humans and their actions. I am reluctant to allow the treatment of ὂσιότης in Protagoras to influence the interpretation of τὸ ὂσιον in Euthyphro. But, on the other hand, in Meno ὂσιότης is enumerated among the cardinal ἀρεταί, as it is in Protagoras.75 This paper's hypothesis of characteristic affinities between Meno and Euthyphro might lend support to the claim of a broader characteristic unity about this particular aspect of ὂσιότης: in all dramas of definition Plato regards ὂσιότης as a

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73 292c9-d3.
74 See footnote 1.
75 78d7-e1.
characteristic primarily of humans and derivatively of their actions. If that were so, then the similarity of form between (5) and (3) and (4) would be misleading, as far as judging the range of ὅσια entities.

In considering the breadth of range in (5) it is useful to consider Socrates' response to Euthyphro's second definition. Euthyphro defines τὸ ὅσιον for the second time with the following words: τὸ θεοφιλὲς is ὅσιον. It is questionable exactly how to interpret this statement as a definition of the Form τὸ ὅσιον. But, without broaching that problem here, we can work from the idea that that which is god-beloved is ὅσιον. The problem lies in defining the conceived range of god-beloved entities. Euthyphro initially defines τὸ ὅσιον as an action. So the question is whether Euthyphro is defining that which is god-beloved more restrictively as action that is god-beloved, or whether he is defining it more broadly as whatever is god-beloved. Socrates confirms that, at least for him, the discussion and the definition encompass more than just holy action:

So then, let us consider what we are saying. Both that which is loved by the gods (τὸ θεοφιλὲς) and the person who is loved by the loved (ὁ θεοφιλὲς ἄνθρωπος) is holy (ὅσιος).76

Clearly Socrates is thinking about people as well as actions. But it is still unclear whether τὸ θεοφιλὲς is conceived as encompassing inanimate objects as well as actions. Again, what speaks most in favor of interpreting τὸ θεοφιλὲς as all-encompassing is Socrates' insistence that Euthyphro define the Form common to all holy things (πάντα τὰ ὅσια). However, to argue on that basis would be circular.

Insight into this question can be gained by considering the use of the adjective "ὁσιον" among the Attic orators, dramatists, and prose authors. The overwhelming majority of uses of the adjective "ὁσιον" modify the names of actions and people. Occasionally, laws are described as ὅσια, but presumably that is because they prescribe ὅσιον action.77 On the few occasions that inanimate objects are described as ὅσιον this seems clearly connected with their relation to ὅσιον activity; for instance, hands are ὅσια (because not defiled by ἄνόσιον activity) and homes are ὅσια (because occupied by ὅσιοι people).78 In Aristophanes' Lysistrata a pregnant woman on the Acropolis prays that she

767a8.
77 Thuc. 2.52.3; Ant. 5.14, 6.2.
78 Soph. Oed. Col. 470; Aesch. Ag. 778.
will not go into labor until she comes to a ἀγαθὸν χώριον (place). The scholiast explains that it would have been sacrilegious to give birth on the Acropolis. So, a ἀγαθὸν place is one appropriate for a certain kind of activity.

The evidence seems to suggest that, despite the similarity of (5) with (3) and (4), Euthyphro and Socrates conceive the range of ὁσια entities as including only people and their actions.

III.v The Relation of F and f Entities

I have spent some time analyzing the range of f entities in preparation for the analysis of the relation between F and f entities. In considering the dramas of A two kinds of claims regarding the relation of F and f entities occur. The following claim is derived from Socrates' model of action M:

(G) f actions are f because of F

In Charmides' second definition, we also encounter the following type of claim:

(H) f people are f because of F

I describe the relation in (G) as dynamic, noting that F is a δύναμις and that f action (or action done f-ly) is the ἔργον of F. This kind of dynamic relation may be causal. In the preceding section I spoke of it as causal. However, I do not want to assert that all relations Socrates describes as dynamic are causal. The reason is, as we will see in this subsection, Plato does not seem to appreciate certain differences between logical, constitutive, and causal relations.

In considering the relation in (H) the following complications arise. The phrase, "an f person", is ambiguous. It can mean either a person who has F, qua psychological disposition; or a person who acts f-ly. In Charmides' second definition I interpreted the phrase "an f person" as a person who acts f-ly. According to this interpretation, there is no substantial difference between (G) and (H), and in both cases the relationship of F to the f entity is dynamic.

But, there are other descriptions of f people in A that do not seem to allow this interpretation. For instance, in Charmides Critias regards as σώφρων that man who has a certain kind of knowledge. In such cases, the relation of the f person and F seems to be
constitutive. Consider also, and more broadly, that if ἀρετή is a kind of σοφία, a man who has σοφία must be σοφός. Consequently, we might conclude that, although in (G) the relation between f actions and F is dynamic; in (H) the relation between f people and F is not dynamic, but constitutive. However, I am reluctant to use the word "constitutive" as well. This is both because there is no analysis of the relation between F and f people in A, and because I do not regard the nature of the relation of constitution as simple or unambiguous.79 If F is a part (μέρος) of a person—in some vague sense of part—all we can say is that a person is f if that person has F in his ψυχή. For want of a better expression, I refer to this as a psychic relation.

We see now that f actions are f for a different reason than f people are f. In view of this, cases such as (3) and (4) become troublesome and success in determining the scope of ὅσια entities in Euthyphro assumes a particular importance. In (3), (4), and (5), all entities, including actions, people, and any other f thing, are described as f because of F. This seems to suggest that F relates to all f things in the same way. But if this is so, how can it be reconciled with the fact that f people and f actions are not related to F in the same way?

I note and discuss three possible options here without resolving the issue. In the following subsection I introduce a further distinct characteristic of F in B, οὐσία, which introduces further complications into the problem at hand. The options are these. One is to claim that what we might consider a constitutive relation Socrates views as dynamic. In other words, Socrates views the dynamic relation much more broadly than we do.

A passage in Charmides suggests that Socrates understands δύναμις very broadly. Critias proposes a definition of σωφροσύνη as the knowledge of knowledge and lack of knowledge. Socrates doubts whether such a thing is possible; and he argues by analogy that it is unlikely to exist. He claims:

Whatever has the capacity to effect (δύναμις) an object which is itself will not have the nature (οὐσία) on which its effect can work.80

For instance, in the case of vision, a vision of vision is only possible if the object of vision, in this case vision, is of such a nature that it can be viewed, i.e., has

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79 Particularly since we are dealing with properties here.
80 168d1-3.
characteristics such as form and color. The range of examples introduced to strengthen Socrates' claim reveals how broadly he understands δύναμις. In addition to modes of perception and other intentional states, such as fearing, loving, and opining, he refers to relations and relational quantities, such as exceeding (μείζον) and double (διπλάσιον). For instance, in the case of double-ness, that which is double does not have the οὐσία upon which its δύναμις can achieve its effect, for then it would be double itself and half itself. Similarly, in the case of exceeding-ness, that which exceeds does not have the οὐσία upon which its δύναμις can achieve its effect, for then it would exceed itself and be less than itself.

In these cases Socrates seems to regard relations that we might consider logical or constitutive as dynamic. This might suggest that he regards the relation of F and f people as dynamic as well; and in that case there would be no disunity between earlier and later dramas on this point. The main difficulty with this solution is that nowhere is an f person's or f entity's simply being f described as the ἔργον of the δύναμις. Unless we assume it is, we cannot speak of the relation as dynamic.

A second option is to claim that in A Socrates views the relation between f actions and F and f people and F as different, and in A he never says all f things are f because of F. So, Socrates does not contradict himself, in A. On the other hand, since he does use such phrases as (3), (4), and (5) in B, his characterization of the relation between f entities and F in B is different from and disunified with his characterization of this relation in A.

In contrast to the first option, this second one with claims disunity between A and B favors a developmentalist interpretation. In this regard one developmentalist interpretation might run as follows. When Plato first started thinking and writing about F, it was qua ἀρετή, specifically qua psychic δύναμις. He thought of the relation of ἀρεταί to certain f entities, namely, actions, dynamically. When he broadened his consideration of F to include non-psychic entities and began to conceptualize F as a Form, the conceptualization of the dynamic relation became difficult to maintain, either because of his reluctance to conceive of all Forms as δύναμεις, or of all f entities, qua f, as the ἔργα of those δύναμεις.

Note that the term "ἔργον" does not appear in this discussion.
Finally, a third option, like the first, preserves unity by reinterpreting phrases such as (3), (4), and (5). For instance, in *Euthyphro* it is said that all *f* entities are *f* because of *F*. The range of *f* entities includes at least people and actions. Perhaps both people and actions are *f* because of *F*, but the relations between *f* actions and *F* and *f* people and *F* are not the same. The instrumental dative, by which the relation of *f* entities and *F* is expressed, describes a relation vaguely. Therefore, phrases such as (5) may indicate simply that anything *f* must be related to *F* in some way; but it does not indicate that every *f* entity is related to *F* in the same way. *f* people and *f* actions are both related to *F* in some way, but the former may be related *psychically*, while the latter is related *dynamically*. Furthermore, as in the case of *Hippias Major*, those *f* entities that are neither actions nor people may be related to *F* in yet some other way. Of course it is inadequate to say that an *f* entity is related to *F* in *some* way; since all entities are related to *F* is *some* way.

IIII.vi  *F* as an *Oūσία.*

In continuing to examine the relation of *F* and *f* entities, in this subsection I consider one further distinctive formal characteristic of the investigations in B. In B, *F* is described as an *oūσία*. The word "*oūσίαa" occurs in *Charmides* and *Protagoras*, as well as in the texts of B; however, only in *Euthyphro* and *Meno* is the pursuit of the identity of *F* described as the pursuit of an *oūσία.* The passages in *Euthyphro* and *Hippias Major* in which the word "*oūσίαa" occurs are particularly complex; and it would be inappropriate to examine them here. In contrast, the passage from *Meno* is relatively uncomplicated and provides evidence needed to make my point. My point is that the relation between *F*, *qua* *oūσίαa*, and *f* entities cannot be identical to the *dynamic* or *psychic* relation, at least insofar as the latter two have been described above.

In *Meno*, Socrates discusses the *oūσία* of bees. The *oūσία* of bees is understood as that entity because of which all bees are bees.

...Now, *Meno*,...if I were asking about the *oūσία* of the bee, what it is; and you said that there are many and various ones, what would you say if I asked you this:

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82 *Charm.* 168d2; *Meno* 72b1; *Hip. Maj.* 301b6, 8, 301e4, 302c5; *Prot.* 349b4.
Do you agree that there are many and various bees and that they differ from one another insofar as they are bees? Or do they not differ in this regard, but in some other respect, such as in their beauty, or size, or something else of that sort?83

In this example it does not seem reasonable to interpret the relation between the οὐσία of bees and the bees themselves as psychic, because it does not seem reasonable to think that what makes all bees bees is something present in the ψυχή of bees. It also does not seem reasonable to interpret the relation as dynamic, insofar as we consider the dynamic relation as causal. The οὐσία of bees does not cause bees to be bees. On the other hand, we have seen in the Charmides passage of the preceding subsection that Socrates may interpret the dynamic relation more broadly or differently than the causal relation. Even if this is so, the οὐσία of bees is not described here as a δύναμις and the bees are not described as ἔργα of that οὐσία. Furthermore, nowhere in Euthyphro or Hippias Major is F, qua οὐσία, described as a δύναμις, or f entities as ἔργα of F, qua οὐσία.

Consequently, I will describe the relation between F, qua οὐσία, and f entities as ousiac. This is of course merely a label for a relation whose nature is as yet undetermined. But, as a provisional device, it does not seem to me unwarranted. The suggestion that the relation between F and f entities is to be described as ousiac means that f entities are f because they stand in some, as yet undefined relation to an οὐσία F. Whether distinct f entities are f because they stand in various types of relation to a single οὐσία F is unclear. Since the word "οὐσία" does not occur in A as a condition for the identity of F, the characterization of the relation between F and f entities in A and B appears distinct. But the possibility that distinct f entities stand in various relations to the οὐσία F accommodates an interpretation of distinction, rather than disunity on this point between A and B. In other words, the ousiac relation may be a relation-type superordinate to others such as dynamic and psychic relations, in addition to still others.

Finally, I want to say that this seems to me a very charitable interpretation of the relation of F and f entities. We have only begun to question whether Plato really appreciates the difference between logical, causal, and constitutive relations. I believe that an examination of the Euthyphro passage in which "οὐσία" occurs would reveal that

8372b1-6.
he does not. If we could conclude that this was the case, it would help clarify our present question at least by showing that Plato himself may not have had a sound understanding of the relation between $F$ and $f$ entities.

III.vii Conclusion

In conclusion, in this paper I have suggested that Socrates investigates the identity of $F$ by attributing one set of characteristics to $F$ in one subset of the dramas of definition (A) and another set of characteristics to $F$ in another subset of the dramas of definition (B). In A $F$ is characterized as psychic, epistemic, and a δύναμις. In A two types of entities are described as $f$, people and actions. The relationship of $F$ to people differs from the relationship of $F$ to actions. In the first case the relationship appears to be constitutive. I have preferred to describe it as psychic. That is to say, $F$ exists in the ψυχή of individual people. Whether there are multiple $Fs$, one for each person, like tropes, or whether $F$ is single, like a universal, is indeterminate. The question is simply not raised in A. In the latter case the relationship appears to be causal. I have preferred to describe it as dynamic. That is to say, action is the ἔργον of $F$, where $F$ is a δύναμις. In this case $F$ is apparently a psychic capacity or disposition. In Short, $F$ is related to $f$ people and $f$ action differently.

In two texts of B, Euthyphro and Hippias Major, $F$ is never explicitly characterized as psychic, epistemic, or dynamic. Instead $F$ is characterized as a single Form (είδος/ίδεα) possessed by all $f$ entities. In this sense the characterization of $F$ in A and B differs, but again this does not imply inconsistency. For instance, in Meno $F$ is considered to be a psychic entity. Furthermore, since it is unclear in A whether $F$ is a unity or plurality, the characterization of $F$ in B as a Form is distinct from, but not necessarily inconsistent with the characterization of $F$ in A.

In Hippias Major, though not in Euthyphro, the range of $f$ entities is broader than people and actions. It includes inanimate and animate non-human natural kinds as well as artifacts. In these cases $F$ is neither in the ψυχή of the $f$ entity, nor are $f$ entities described as ἔργα of $F$, qua δύναμις. The nature of the relationship between $F$ and this broader range of $f$ entities is treated to a limited extent. In particular, in B $F$ is characterized as an
attributed to Hippias Major and Euthyphro the phrase-type appears: f entities are f because of F. Accordingly, I refer to the relation here as ousiac. Given F's characterization as an ousia, consistency between A and B regarding the relation between F and f entities can be preserved only if the ousiac relation is understood as of a superordinate type to the types of psychic, dynamic, and other indeterminate relations.84

Lastly, in arguing for the distinct characterizations of F in A and B I have avoided describing A and B in terms of priority and posteriority, whether that be of a chronological or pedagogical kind. According to the current dominant developmentalist paradigm at least two of the texts of B, Meno and Hippias Major, are regarded as chronologically posterior to those of A. To my knowledge no developmentalists have argued that Euthyphro succeeds Republic I, Laches, and Charmides. Moreover, to my knowledge none have argued for the division between A and B I have described. As for developmentalists, to my knowledge none have argued that the texts of B succeed those of A.85 Besides Kahn, in fact none have recently attempted to order the dramas of definition at all.

84 It may also be noted that the problem of the relation between Forms and non-Forms is notoriously problematic. So, the fact that it is found problematic here at least suggests why this may be so in other Platonic writings.
Appendix F and the $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrase

For most of the discussion in *Euthyphro* and *Hippias Major* Socrates refers to $\mathcal{F}$ using a phrase compounded of the neuter singular definite article and an attributive neuter adjective, $\tau\mathit{o}$-$\mathit{f}$. In this appendix I refer to this phrase-type simply as the $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrase. The $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrase does not occur in *Meno* and it does occur in *Republic I*; so, it cannot be argued that a complete shift occurs. However, the use of the $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrase in *Euthyphro* is particularly remarkable, because in *Protagoras* the word "όσω της" is used exclusively. I suggest that Plato introduces the $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrase in *Euthyphro* in conjunction with the other formal characteristic distinctions of B to distinguish his novel conceptualization, the Form.

$\tau\mathit{o}$-phrases in the Platonic corpus are commonly understood to operate as singular terms designating the Forms of Platonic metaphysics. The Platonic use of $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrases is idiosyncratic insofar as Plato's theory of Forms is idiosyncratic. But the formation of singular terms by compounding the definite neuter article and adjective is common enough among Greek writers. We might think to refer to this use of the $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrase as property-designating. However, that would be anachronistic. It would assume that what Plato understood by a Form is what we understand by a property. This is dubious both because debate persists over how Plato understood the Forms and whether the treatment of Forms throughout the corpus is consistent; as well as because there is no widely accepted contemporary view of the metaphysics of properties. Consequently, it seems most prudent to refer to this use of the $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrase as Form-designating (and instances as Form-designations); where a Form is understood merely and vaguely as a *sui generis* ontological kind.

There are in fact several additional uses of the $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrase; but the following ones, which I will call quantificational or quantifier-phrases, warrant our special attention. $\tau\mathit{o}$-phrases are used as quantifiers where the universe of discourse is defined by the set of $f$ entities. Which quantifier depends on the given sentence. For instance, "$\tau\mathit{o}$ καλόν ἑστιν ἀγαθόν" may be expressed as the schema $\forall x (Kx \supset Ax)$ and translated as "Everything that is beautiful is good"; while "$\tau\mathit{o}$ ἀνδρεῖον πρᾶττει" may be expressed as the schema

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In both such cases, we can translate the τό-phrase as "that which is" or "what is" followed by the adjective, and thereby preserve the indeterminacy of the quantification. Accordingly, the preceding Greek sentences may be rendered as "That which is beautiful is good" and "He is doing what is courageous".

The investigation of F in Euthyphro is distinct from those in A, except, to some extent, Republic I, in that the grammatical form of F is distinct from the common feminine nouns ending in -εία, -της, or -σύη that appear in the four other texts. In Euthyphro Socrates uses a τό-phrase ("τό ὀσίον"). But in Protagoras, where ὀσιότης is discussed among the five cardinal human ἀρεταί, Socrates uses the conventional form "ὁσιότης" and never the phrase "τό ὀσίον". In what are commonly referred to as middle and late writings Plato uses the τό-phrase as a Form-designation. Grammatical distinctiveness in Euthyphro alone obviously does not compel us to interpret a transformation in the development of Plato's metaphysics; nevertheless, it is a question why Plato uses the τό-phrase for F in Euthyphro and not in Protagoras.

I suggest Plato's introduction of the τό-phrase, or rather his adaptation and application of the τό-phrase may conform with the transformation between A and B I have been describing in this paper. As he makes Socrates characterize F as an ἔίδος and an ὀνόμα, he wishes to distinguish this characterization terminologically. So, in B, as in the so-called middle and late writings, Plato refers to the ἰδέαι and ἔιδη using a distinct locution.

In both Euthyphro and Hippias Major Socrates uses the words "ὁσιότης" and "κάλλος" for F as well. Though he does so only in the later stages of the investigations. The reasons for this are too complex to discuss here. But, it is important to recognize that he regards "ὁσιότης" and "τό ὀσίον" as well as "τό καλόν" and "κάλλος"—where the τό-phrases are understood as Form-designations—as referring to the same two entities respectively. However, he also seems to recognize that the use of the common words as

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opposed to the ῥό-phrases provoke different thoughts in the audience, both the intended reading audience of the texts and Socrates' interlocutors.
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Aristotle on the Philosophical and the Political Life

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Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*, usually translated as happiness, sometimes as human flourishing, has generated an enormous amount of literature and continues to do so. Writers on *eudaimonia* have usually limited their efforts to the *Nicomachean Ethics* and have often ignored the political doctrines in that work. Both the *NE*¹ and the *Politics* deal with a pursuit called *politeia*, politics. Both deal with "the philosophy of human affairs". In both the *NE* and the *Politics* Aristotle is concerned not just with the *eudaimonia* of the individual (man),² but also with the *eudaimonia* of the larger community (*polis*) in which the individual lives.

In this paper I should like to present my reading of one aspect of Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*: what is the role that contemplation and morally virtuous behavior or, as I prefer to call it, character-excellent behavior, play in the happy life? In Book X Aristotle calls both these two activities happiness, with contemplation being primary happiness and character-excellent behavior secondary happiness. This question is usually phrased in a

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¹ Chapters 1-3 of book I clearly indicate that what Aristotle is doing in *N.E.* is political science, as he calls it. One can look at the relation between the *N.E.* and the *Politics* in the following way: the *N.E.* is in the first place concerned with establishing what is good for the individual making abstraction in some important respects of his natural community, the *polis*. The *Politics* will then look at ways how to legislate in such a way that the good of the individual and of the *polis* is achieved or, at least, strived after. The *Politics* 'completes' the philosophy of human affairs (cf. *N.E.* X 9 1181b12-15, where the transition is made from the *N.E.* to the *Politics*).

² Aristotle is in the first place interested in the *eudaimonia* of men, and not just of all men, only to a lesser degree in the *eudaimonia* of women, who will in any case not qualify as candidates for the life of the highest *eudaimonia*. 