The Argument for Immortality in Plato's Phaedrus

Thomas M. Robinson

University of Toronto

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp

Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation

https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/235

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARGUMENT FOR IMMORTALITY IN THE PHAEDRUS

One of the most condensed and abstruse arguments for soul's immortality is to be found at Phaedrus 245c-246a. It is not even clear whether 'soul' here is meant to refer to soul collectively or to individual souls; perhaps it refers to neither, but simply to 'soul in all its forms'. Certainly the very general form of the argument which follows would lead one to the latter conclusion, though 'soul' must still be understood as 'rational soul' or perhaps rational part of soul if one is to abide by the limiting characteristics outlined at 245c2-4: 'our first step ... is to discern the nature of soul, divine and human, its experiences and its activities.' If this description has any meaning at all, the phrase \( \tau\iota\iota\varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\varepsilon \) can hardly refer to World Soul (as Posidonius seems to have thought) nor can it include the souls of flies (as Harpocration seemed to think). It must be the noetic soul, as Hermias saw, the \( \theta\iota\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \) common to gods and men.

Until recent times this argument for soul's immortality seemed to stem from an assertion that it was 'eternally moving' (\( \varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \)). The discovery of an Oxyrhynchus papyrus, however, which read 'self-moving' (\( \varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \)) convinced Robin that this reading made much more sense of the argument, and he duly incorporated it into the Bude text. The move has found a number of champions, notably Vollgraff, Bignone, Pasquali, Müller, Ross and more recently J. L. Ackrill. It is certainly true that with this reading one can reduce a complicated argument to the neater lines of an Aristotelian first-figure syllogism, but this in itself ought perhaps to be grounds for suspicion. As Diano has pointed out, \( \varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \) is a word found nowhere else in Plato; the first incontrovertible instance of its usage is at Aristotle, Phys. VIII, 5, 258a2. Plato tends rather to use phrases like 'that which moves itself' (\( \tau\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \\varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \)). So it is at least possible that \( \varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \) is the gloss of some commentator interested in reducing Plato's looser arguments to a more terse and respectable logical format. Be this as it may, the original reading \( \varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \) ought, I think, to be defended. The diffuse series of arguments will then run as follows:

**Introd. (= the argument in a nutshell)**
All soul is immortal, because it is \( \varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \), and anything \( \varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \) is immortal (245c5).

The meaning and implications of the word \( \varepsilon\iota\iota\kappa\iota\iota\nu\tau\iota \) are then brought out in two arguments:
1. (i) To call anything ἱερεῖν τον is to call it a ἀνείπων κίνουν (c5-8)
(ii) For (a) if it were not a ἀνείπων κίνουν there would be a cessation
of life and movement (c6-7)
(b) if it is a ἀνείπων κίνουν there will never be any cessation
from movement, since a ἀνείπων κίνουν never 'breaks contact'
(c8) with itself (c7-8)
(iii) Unstated conclusion: ὁποτέ κινούν and ἱερεῖν τον are one, and
presumably immortal.
cf. the phrase 'it never ceases from being moved' (or: 'from
moving itself')(c7-8)

2. (i) The ἱερεῖν τον never had a beginning, for it is a 'source of
motion' (κρύσταλλος κίνησις)(d1)
(d2-3: explanation of why the notion of an ἱερεῖν τον should imply this.)
(ii) Qua ἱερεῖν τον it is also indestructible (d3-4)
(d4-6: explanation of why the notion of an ἱερεῖν τον should also imply
this.)

A final argument links together the results of (1) and (2), corroborating
them with a per impossible consideration for good measure. It runs as
follows:

3. (i) The upshot (οὐτω)(d6) is that ἄρχοντες κίνησις and ἀνείπων κίνουν
are one and the same (since both are identical with what is
eternally in motion)(d6-7)
(ii) This entails (a) no cessation from being
(b) no coming into being
(iii) Consider the odd results if it did not entail this! (d7-8) cf. d4-6 above.

These results are now applied to the notion of soul itself, and the argument
runs as follows:

1. It has already been seen that the ἀνείπων κίνουν is immortal (i.e. by
implication at the end of the argument (1) above)(e2-3)
2. This will mean that soul, too, is immortal (e3-4)
   For (a) body, whose movement is from without, is as such 'soulless'
   (ψυχή)(e4-5)
   (b) soul has as its nature movement which is from within (e5-6)
3. One must therefore conclude that ἀνείπων κίνουν and soul are one and the
same, and also (from dl-4 and d7-8) that soul will thereby be necessarily without beginning and immortal (e6-246a2)

While Hackforth defends the original reading \(2\varepsilon\varepsilon\kappa\iota\nu\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma\), he can hardly be right in assuming that it is an \(\epsilon\nu\delta\omicron\varsigma\),\(^13\) serving as a major premiss, since the greater part of the argument is spent in elucidating it and outlining its implications. In Ackrill's words, 'it (i.e. the major premiss) can perfectly well express a proposition required for the main proof though itself needing to be established by a subordinate proof.'\(^14\) This 'subordinate proof' in fact follows several stages:

1. The \(\varepsilon\kappa\iota\nu\eta\tau\omicron\) is a \(\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma\) (c5-8).
2. A \(\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma\) is immortal. (c5-e2).
3. Soul is a \(\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma\), and thereby immortal. (e5 ff.).

In the argument as I have outlined it, the first two proofs are apodeictic, and each one sufficient of itself to show the immortality of \(\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma\) and \(\varepsilon\kappa\iota\nu\eta\tau\omicron\). But Plato chooses to stress their cumulative rather than their individual plausibility (argument (3)), adding what Hermias calls an argument per impossibile for good measure ((3)iii).\(^15\)

The argument, as many have pointed out, has much in common with the final argument for immortality in the Phaedo.\(^16\) But whereas that of the Phaedo sprang from a metaphysic of Plato's own creation, the Phaedrus argument is of a more empirical cast, and has its roots deep in the pre-Socratic tradition.\(^17\) It also goes a long way towards solving difficulties presented by the psychology of the Phaedo. There the soul had been assimilated to the Ideas, and the hiatus between the unmoving Intelligible World and that of sensible things subject to motion had meant an inadequate explanation of the soul as we experience it in the world of movement. In the Phaedo he had found himself compelled to run in the face of all philosophic tradition, as part of his defence of his new-born metaphysic; the elementary attribute of all living things, movement, was quietly shelved, and the static, homogeneous, unchanging entity whose immortality he was left to prove was recognizable only to himself. Now soul is seen as the source of motion or activity, and a more balanced appreciation of its true nature is possible. This is not to argue, of course, that the notion of movement appears like a bolt from the blue in the Phaedrus. It was there by implication in both Phaedo and Republic when soul was seen as a principle of Life, or bound up with the Idea of Life;\(^18\) unfortu-
nately this notion was allowed to stand on equal terms with others barely compatible with it - such as that of soul's likeness to the static Ideas - and one is led to conclude that Plato was not then fully aware of the implications of what he was asserting.

A much-discussed question is the relationship of this doctrine of soul as source of motion to the problem of the pre-cosmic chaos at *Tim.* 49a ff., and a number of scholars in recent years have used the one to explain the other. For at 53a2 in particular we read how the Receptacle, itself in motion, moves the four 'kinds' (\( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \gamma \)) which it has received into itself, thus separating the 'unlike' sorts farthest from one another, and bringing 'like' kinds close together; so that even in this pre-cosmic world there is some sort of organisation, some region to which each 'kind' gravitates. Before that they are 'without plan' (or 'without pattern', or 'without proportion', \( \chi \lambda \gamma \nu \zeta \) \( ^{\text{21}} \)) and 'without measure' (\( \chi \lambda \iota \tau \rho \nu \) \( ^{\text{22}} \)). It is the action of the Receptacle itself, apparently, which gives them some sort of primitive organisation. It is when they are in this latter state - a state qualified as 'what one would expect from a thing when \( \theta \varepsilon \zeta \) is absent from it' \( ^{\text{23}} \) - that the Demiurge intervenes. The point at issue is whether the power of motion here expressly attributed to the Receptacle indicates the presence of soul or not. One can begin by saying that in the *Phaedrus* and *Laws* the argumentation is very generalized and schematic; no reference is made to pre-cosmic states, and understandably so, since the context does not demand them. \( ^{\text{24}} \) In addition, the reader coming new to the text can be forgiven for assuming that in these two dialogues the movement referred to is that which he sees operating in the world around him, and that the 'bodies' in question are those with which he is acquainted in the world of everyday experience; in a word the movement which is to be found in an (already) organized universe. How far it would apply, if at all, to a pre-cosmos is hard to see. It was argued by Plutarch that it definitely does apply to the pre-cosmos; \( ^{\text{25}} \) by most modern scholars, following Proclus, that it applies to that element in the cosmos which talk of a pre-cosmos is meant to symbolize; \( ^{\text{26}} \) by Herter that it ought logically to have applied to the pre-cosmos (real or metaphorical) but that it does not appear to do so. \( ^{\text{27}} \) Certainly the passage 52e-53c (like 30a3-5) offers no hint of the presence of Soul, rational or irrational. While it must be admitted that the *argumentum e silentio* is often a foundation on quicksands, in this particular instance it seems to have more cogency than usual. If the pre-cosmic chaos did possess soul, that soul is part of what the Demiurge 'took over'; he did not
create it. It will also be an irrational soul, since it does not possess the exclusively rational circular motions with which (rational) World Soul is endowed. These conclusions combined lead one to doubt any thesis that such an irrational soul is to be included within World Soul as outlined in the Timaeus, since it is apparently both distinct from it and different in kind from it. If, however, one still accepts the notion of soul as the motive force of the pre-cosmic chaos, though not as 'part' of World Soul, one is left with the conclusion that there are or were two distinct psychic forces in the universe, one rational, one irrational. But in the Politicus myth Plato rejects the notion of two opposing divinities in the universe, and one could argue that the notion of two opposing 'psychic agents' would be open to the same objection. (On the other hand, there is no particular reason why Plato should not have changed his mind; the problem is sufficiently puzzling to give pause to the most confident). The most basic objection to the theory, however, seems to be as follows: the notion of a soul other than that created by the Demiurge is so crucial in its implications that it seems incredible that Plato should not have given clear indication of its presence. To say that one can 'infer' its presence from the evidence of the Phaedrus and Laws is not enough. For, if Owen and others are right, both Phaedrus and Laws may well have been written after the Timaeus, and if this is the case one would be engaged in the dubious task of interpreting an earlier dialogue in the light of later ones. But even if, for the sake of argument, one granted that the Phaedrus pre-dates the Timaeus, it is still far from evident that both are talking about the same thing. In the Phaedrus, for example, it is natural to assume that the movement in question is that which obtains among bodies in the fairly organized cosmos known to us by sense experience; to infer that it also applies to the pre-cosmic world where duration is not Time and the bodily (i.e. organized bodies which we can recognize) is as yet non-existent, is less easy. The Phaedrus seems to be saying that soul is the cause of all movement in an organized world, a world measurable by Time. In a non-organized world not measurable by Time one can wonder whether the movement in question has anything to do with this. At this stage words start to break down under the strain. Plato is compelled to give some description of the pre-cosmic chaos, and talk of movement in such a world is no more and no less intelligible than phrases like 'before this' (προ του του) (53a8) in the same passage, when Time has been admitted to be absent. So Herter seems right in saying that the doctrine of Phaedrus and Laws is not to be applied to the Timaeus, but perhaps unjust in saying that logically it ought to
have been. Plato, as far as I can see, is dealing in two instances with two completely different types of motion, the one accepted and universally admitted, and operating in an organized world of temporal succession, the other a pis aller trying to describe a reality in every sense different. If this analysis is correct, there seems no reason to reproach Plato here with lack of logic, though on points of clarity he may leave a lot to be desired.

University of Calgary. Thomas M. Robinson.
NOTES


5. ibid.

6. ibid.

7. Tim. 41c7, 69c3.

8. 245c5.


10. See note 11.

11. For the references and comment (both on these and L. Robin) see C. Diano, Parola del Passato 2, 1947, pp. 189-92. For J. L. Ackrill's comment see Mind LXII, 1953, p. 278.

12. Diano, loc.cit. pp. 190 ff. For a number of recent comments on the subject see H. Cherniss, Plato (1950-7), Lustrum 4-5, 1959 (Band 4) - 1960, p. 137. The most telling criticism of Robin's arguments for ωτητηνήτος is that of Diano, followed by W. J. Verdenius, Notes on Plato's Phaedrus, Mnemosyne IV, 8, 1955, p. 276. Robin has made the opening lines into an Aristotelian syllogism, taking ἄτι at c6 as adversative, and ἄτι at c7 as consecutive (see his translation ad loc., Bude edition). Diano points out how ἄτι can equally well be progressive, and ἄτι emphatic, thereby changing the character of the argument considerably. At c5 the words Τὸ γὰρ ζεισμενήτων ςαμεωτόν are really a definition, as Diano sees (p. 191). As such, it is the argument's conclusion, rather than its starting-point. It gains by being placed startlingly at the beginning, in the manner of a textbook definition; what follows is an explicatio and probatio of what it contained succinctly.


14. art.cit., p. 278.

15. Hermias, loc.cit., p. 103, 3 ff.

16. (continued)  

pp. 435-8). Festugière, however, has argued that he took it from 'la découverte purement grecque de la régularité des mouvements célestes' (art. cit., p. 21). In this he is followed by V. Martin, Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des Lois, Studia Philosophaica XI, 1951, p. 116, who also allows some cogency to the accepted explanation, p. 117. If this guess is correct, the line of reasoning seems to be as follows:

(a) the circular motion of the heavenly bodies manifests the operation of intelligence ( νοῦς ) (Tim., passim).

(b) intelligence cannot arise apart from soul (Tim. 30b3, Sophist 249a4-8).

(c) soul, with intelligence, is consequently responsible for the movement of heavenly bodies.

(d) by analogy, the same reasoning will be applicable to all noetic souls, celestial or otherwise.

The strength of this argument, if it genuinely represents Plato's thought, is that it accounts for the motive power of the noetic soul (see notes 6 and 7 of this paper) - i.e. the only soul apparently in question in the Phaedrus argument. In the Laws, however, the soul which is the source of movement is something much wider than the noetic soul: it is in itself neutral, only taking on ethical color when seen as νοῦς προς λαοις οτι μεγιστος or ους νους της νεομλημη. This seems to lay stress on the nature of soul as a vital principle, the sine qua non of all activity, good or bad (V. Martin, art. cit., p. 120), rather than soul as essentially characterized by intelligence and 'care' (*τιμή* των) (the Phaedrus position), and here Festugière's explanation hardly fits.

17. For a study of the doctrine of movement in Empedocles, Alcmaeon and the Pythagoreans see J. B. Skemp, op. cit. (His views on Alcmaeon are criticized by Festugière, Revue des Etudes Grecques 1945, Vol. 58, pp. 59-65). H. C. Baldry, (Embryological Analogies in pre-Socratic Cosmogony, CQ XXVI, 1932, pp. 27-34) has shown, I think convincingly, that Anaximander saw the world as a living creature, in many ways like a foetus. For an account of soul as source of motion in Alcmaeon, Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia see A. Diès, Autour de Platon, Paris, 1927, p. 536. For Aristotle's views on soul as a principle of motion among pre-Socratic thinkers see de an. 403b24 ff., and compare Phys. VIII, 9, 264b17-266a5.

18. Cherniss seems to me to go beyond the evidence when, in seeing a connection between the final proof of the Phaedo and that in the Phaedrus, he identifies the 'idea of life' with the 'idea of motion' (op. cit., pp. 435-8). Compare H. Cherniss, Ononon 22, 1950, p. 208, where he makes the point that the notion of self-motion is to be found as early as Charmides 168e. To have a notion, however, is not necessarily to see its implications. If, at the time when he wrote the Phaedo, Plato really did see all the implications of the notion of the 'idea of life', it is hard to think that he would have painted the very static portrait of *ψυχή* that he did. For a different viewpoint see G. Müller, Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi, München, 1951, pp. 79-80.
Phaedo 80bl ff.

Skemp, op.cit., pp. 77-78 and Cherniss, art.cit., p. 25. Both use the same notions of 'first order' (πρωτοτυποῦ ὑδάτος) and 'second order' (ἐπιτυποῦ ὑδάτος) movement at Laws 897a4-5 to prove rather different things. For Skemp the 'second order' movements are the 'necessary conditions' (σύνηκες) of Timaeus and Phaedo: that is, they are the purely mechanical sine quibus non of the (psychic) actions of intelligence and Necessity. In this way the Laws are used to bolster a view of soul, rational or irrational, as the direct (πρωτοτυποῦ ὑδάτος) cause of all movement. For Cherniss (rational) soul is the indirect (though ultimate) cause of all movement: this is based on his assumption that the 'first order' and 'second order' movements of Laws 897a4-5 stand for 'primary' and 'secondary' causation respectively and that they find their exact parallel at Tim. 46e in the causes:

(a) 'which work with intelligence to produce what is good and desirable,' and

(b) 'which being destitute of reason, produce their sundry effects at random and without order.'

(b), on his analysis, are the side-effects of (a), and, while serving no directly rational end, find their fons et origo in rational soul all the same. The point to notice is that soul is taken to be rational; Cherniss will not concede that there is an irrational World Soul (Skemp) or part of World Soul (F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, London, 1937, p. 208) represented by Necessity (Skemp) or by the Different (Cornford). See also H. Herter, Bewegung der Materie bei Platon, Rh. Museum, N.F. 100, 1957, p. 332.

53a8.

ibid.

53b3-4.

See G. Vlastos, The disorderly Motion in the Timaeus, CQ XXXIII, 1939, p. 78.

de an. procreât, in Tim. 1016c-d.


H. Herter, op.cit., pp. 343, n. 55, and 346.

Several scholars have taken it for granted that the Circle of the Different in World Soul is or represents irrationality. See L. Robin, Platon, Paris, 1935, p. 328; F. M. Cornford, op.cit., pp. 76, 96, 118-119, 144 n. 2 and 208; A. D. Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought, New York, 1956, p. 332, and G. Morrow, Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's Timaeus, Philos. Review 59, 1950, pp. 162-163. But there is no indication in the first that the composition of the one is in any way different from that of the other. True, both have different
provinces, different spheres of influence. The Same has to do with the eternally stable world of the Ideas, a world only penetrated by pure intelligence, while the Different deals with the sub-rational world of sense-experience. But it still approaches the world of sense in the most rational manner compatible with that exiguous amount of reality which such a world enjoys, and compatible with such a world's inherent inability to be fully comprehended by rational analysis. Given the nature of the subject-matter, the Different will never come to conclusions other than \( \delta \delta \xi \lambda \) and \( \pi \iota \tau \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \); but its rational activity is made clear by the way it can guarantee that any such \( \delta \delta \xi \lambda \) and \( \pi \iota \tau \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) will be factually correct. See J. B. Skemp, op.cit., pp. 208-9, n. 5, and J. Gould, The Development of Plato's Ethics, Cambridge, 1955, p. 199.

29. No doubt this is one reason why Aristotle (Met. A, 1072a 1) says that Plato's "eternal elements" is only \( \varepsilon \iota \nu \iota \tau \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) as he goes on to say (a2), \( \nu \iota \tau \varepsilon \iota \nu \varepsilon \kappa \lambda \tau \chi \kappa \tau \iota \tau \nu \iota \tau \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) \( \chi \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \). See Herter, art.cit., p. 329, n. 6, and A. Rivaud, Le problème du devenir et la notion de la matière dans la philosophie grecque depuis les origines jusqu'à Théonhraste, Thèse, Paris, 1906, p. 337. T. Gould (Platonic Love, London, 1963, p. 29) suggests that the pre-cosmos is described as in chaotic motion to make the most complete contrast with the static permanence of the Ideas, where Intelligence is supremely manifest.

30. 270a1-2.


32. Cornford (op.cit., p. 205) finds 'bodily changes' in the pre-cosmic chaos, and so argues (from the Phaedrus and Laws X) to the presence in it of an (irrational) soul. In this he seems to stress the wrong alternatives in the two ambiguous terms 'change' and 'bodily' which Plato is using. It is true that the Demiurge is said to 'take over' all that was visible (30a3-4), but one need hardly conclude, with Proclus, that the bodily must therefore be present in the pre-cosmic chaos, if only in some minimal way. (See Cornford, op.cit., p. 205). Plato himself only talks about \( \chi \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) and \( \chi \iota \tau \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \), and there is no reason to think they necessarily obey the same rules as organized bodies. The word 'visible' is probably used loosely for 'non-spiritual' or 'non-psychic', in much the same way as in the Phaedo soul is called
(v)

32. (continued)

'invisible' where one might have said 'non-material'. See Phaedo 79a6 ff., where reality is divided into 'the visible' and 'the invisible', the objects of 'opinion' and 'knowledge' respectively, and 79b12 ff., where soul is said to be more of the class of things 'invisible' than 'visible'. 