Aristotle on the Nature of Logos

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I. Synopsis
Attention has been frequently drawn to the problems attending attempts "to trace a long progression of meanings in the history of the word *logos*" (Kerferd). Especially difficult proved the assigning to Aristotle a place in this long progression. One of the reasons is that we have yet to reconstruct his theory of *logos*. The difficulty is not so much with the complexity of the uses of the term in his works as it is with the widely recognized fact that he left no special treatise on the subject of a doctrine of *logos*, not to be confused with the instrumentalities found in the so-called logical works that comprise the *Organon*. The doctrine is not to be found in the *Metaphysics* any more than it is treated in the biological works. Yet it exists, presumably with the pieces dispersed in the various texts, waiting for the investigators to find and fit the parts into a coherent whole. So far no such systematic opus has been produced, despite the number of interpretive attempts made in recent times to identify what may conceivably count for a doctrine of *logos*. The importance of such a doctrine or theory can hardly be denied, since it could, *inter alia*, provide the basis for a full explanation of the intriguing connection between the two definitions of *anthropos* as *logical and political animal*. In pursuing such a goal, certain interpreters found it tempting to reduce *logos* to language, broadly understood (Randall, Mesthene, and Wedin).

The central issue this paper explores is the possibility of detecting a way, supported with what the texts afford, to answer the question "What is *logos*", but do so not in the obvious sense of discussing the outcomes of its operations, e.g. discourse, account, demonstration or definition, nor by stringing together textual references to reconstruct the mechanics of articulating and communicating, but seeking to understand *logos* qua *ousia*, though not as *logos* of an *ousia*. The paper sets forth the parameters for an inquiry in hope to identify the components of this elusive doctrine.

II. The Problem of a Theory of *logos*.
An initial condition must be met to solve the problem regarding the building of a theory of *logos*, and it consists of two parts: (a) to view *logos* as an exclusive activity of *anthrôpos*, and (b) to consider the differentia indicating a property, named by the adjective *'logikos'* as part of the "essence", the *ti esti* of *anthrôpos*. Since this property cannot be subsumed under any genus of being, *γένος τού δντος*, other than that of *ousia*, the possibility that *logos* be seen as a case of co-incidental being, *συμβεβηκος öv*, is excluded. If *logos* is neither an *ousia* nor a case of a *symbebëkos on* what, then, is its identity?

I will begin with a fundamental Aristotelian position, that truth and falsity are things "being said", statements referring to individual things. This is a relation between *legomena* and *onta*. When the statement qua *legomenon* suits the fact, whatever it may be in each case, then the statement is true, and false when it does not. Without this correlation between speech and what speech is about there can be no truth and hence no knowledge.

The involvement of language in the pursuit of knowledge is everywhere in Aristotle's works. Outside of this involvement, neither truth nor knowledge can be referred to, except in some metaphorical way. The visual arts, for instance, since they do not communicate orally, make statements only metaphorically; the *ergon* they produce requires supplemental verbal work to report what is being conveyed, besides colors, lines, visual effects in general. Even the poetic arts that depend on speech, dramatic, epic and lyric poetry, if truth is embodied in them, it must be articulated, brought back in the guise of statements free of metaphor and emotional tension. But the referential aspects of poetic works, as *onta* by *techne*, do not present a problem. With respect to truth they involve the use language in the background rather than in the foreground. Nevertheless, the truth they contain is a function of ascertainable references to *onta*.

The main question this paper will try to answer is "What is *logos*? What is its identity, how it is related
to *ousia*, and why it is not a *symbebêkos* on? This is the major issue in Aristotle. The prevailing interpretation is that *logos* is in some broad sense of the term "language". For example, Randall (1960), followed by Mesthene (1964), have argued in favor of language, the source of which is *nous poïetikos*, which in turn generates *logos*. More recently, Wedin (1988) has concluded independently and more persuasively that *logos* is essentially language as well as a faculty, the latter being distinct from *nous* and *dianoia*, yet intimately connected to both. The issue Wedin left unanswered was the identity of the faculty involved and its precise location as the source of *logos*. In this paper my remarks are limited to explaining an alternative answer in the context of the following problem: how are the two *differentiae*, "logical" and "political", in the two respective definitions of *anthrôpos* (Pol. 1253a9-10: λόγον δὲ μόνον ἀνθρώπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων, and 1252b30: ὁ ἀνθρώπος φύσει ζῶν πολιτικῶν) interconnected.

Reconstructing Aristotle’s theory of *logos* calls for more than collecting and enumerating the diverse functions of *logos*, such as sending signs, uttering warnings, exclaiming or refusing, exhibiting anger and threats, or announcing pleasures and pains. All these uses, naturally enough, when verbal sounds are used, fall within the domain of *logos*, but the problem of its identity cannot be solved through a theory of sound, grimace, gesture, even language. Nor is *logos* the same of *nous*, conventionally translated as reason, despite certain interconnected operations. Two pitfalls must be avoided here: (a) collapsing the faculties of *nous* and *logos*, for by so doing neither the identity of *logos* nor the nature of language is properly revealed; and (b) translating the expression ζώον λογικόν as "rational animal". The latter conceals a misleading rendition since it makes *logos* interchangeable with "reason", in this case with *nous*. The two adjectives, ‘logical’ and ‘rational’, the one Greek the other Latin, do not cover the same grounds technically speaking. The term ‘rational’, as Kerferd has suggested, does not refer directly to *logos* and its diverse meanings.

The thesis I defend is that the concept of *logos*, no matter how many operations it covers, is not an appendix of *nous*. I hope to show that *logos* is best understood in connection with the faculty Aristotle call τὸ κριτικὸν (*to kritikon*). A special function of *to kritikon* includes the power to signify by means of articulate sounds. *Logos*, seen as the *entelechēia* of the *kritikon,* fashions and develops systems of signs, including the complexes system of language, as its efficient and material tools, i.e. its communicative, including the audible, media.

Another preliminary note must be added at this point. It concerns the intelligible aspects of things and *logos* as *dynamis* and *energeia*. In one sense, all facts are "logical", but they are so only *dynamai*, i.e. their logical aspects are in principle cognizable and formulable in discourse. But it takes human *logos* to articulate the logical structures of the world and render them as knowledge. This is the *logos*, as the actuality of the *kritikon* when it cooperates with the other powers of the soul. Briefly put, whereas things or *onta* do not have *logos* qua *energeia* they do so qua *dynamai*; they are logical in that they are intelligible.

III. Reconstructing the theory

Given the philosophical importance of the doctrine of *logos* it is important not that we try to explore its theoretical foundations, especially in view of the celebrated dictum that man is by nature a logical animal, whereby *logos* is introduced as the differentiating feature of human life. Aristotle added to this definition something else: "makers of things" that human beings are deliberate makers. If humans are logical by nature and not by chance, they must possess such faculties or powers that make the features of being political and being logical interrelated and coordinate. That humans know or cognize by nature is a plain enough fact. We possess sense organs that enable us to discriminate one thing from another as needed for survival. The issue then is not about sensing or knowing, leaving *epistēmē* aside for the moment, but knowing logically, i.e. in accordance with *logos*. It is this issue that calls for looking into this peculiar activity by asking: What does it mean to have *logos* and use it; briefly put, What is *logos*?

All situations of communication enter the domain of *logos* but *logos* goes beyond the level of either sound, grimace, gesture, even language. Still, *logos* is not the same as reason (*nous*) despite the overlapping of their operations. Collapsing the two faculties does nothing to help reveal the nature either of language or *logos*. Translating *zoon logikon* as "rational animal" makes *logos* interchangeable with reason. But these two adjectives, logical and rational, do not cover the same territory. What would Aristotle have to say about this facile interchange in the translations? One response would be to say that the term "rational" does not refer
directly to logos and its diverse meanings, as Kerferd has suggested. What I am suggesting is that conceptually, logos covers a set of operations connected with but still different from those of reason (nous). In the sequel I will try to outline the differences, hoping that what I say might help remove a few cobwebs, rather than add more to the existing ones.

III. Proposal for a solution
There is a long tradition that goes back to the beginnings of Greek philosophy and poetry that recognized logos as a cosmic element and source of intelligibility, sometimes rivaling other archai, especially nous, for the central position of the ultimate origin of order. Aristotle, it would seem, moved away from speculative and mythical accounts opting for one that would accord with the facts and sustains confidence in their intelligibility. In explaining relative praise and blame in case of minor deviations from mesotê, i.e. of certain types of ethical judgments, Aristotle says that in these cases the judge does not err (λανθάνει), and adds:

ο δέ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτός οὑ ρέδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἐκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσις. Nic. Eth. 1109b20-22

Yet to what degree and how much a man must be blamed is not easy to determine by definition. For this is true of all sensible objects; regarding cases of degree in particular circumstances the judgment (krisis) lies with sense-perception.

AÏσθησις is called a σύμφυτος κριτικὴ δύναμις, a natural faculty within aisthesis. This critical power reaches beyond sensation, as we shall see. Yet, by being present in the operation of sensation, by being activated along with sensation in the activity of the sensing of sensible objects, its work extends beyond what the sense organ does. Aristotle speaks of the kritikon also in Post. Anal. 99b35, where he states that it is present in all animals equipped with the power of sensing, but in the case of human beings, who retain the effects of sensing as memories, which in turn are subject to the unifying process of nous, the kritikon becomes the transmitting supplier of materials for knowledge (gnôsis) once the formation of universals is done. Hence, we have a special and very important case of kritikon, pervasive and common to all the other parts of the soul; indeed it has the same unity as the soul itself.

Each sense organ is in a neutral condition prior to its activation and in a state that lies between contraries, i.e. the contraries as properties of the corresponding sensible objects. Their perceptible range of properties, depending on the capability of the sense organ, is covered potentially. The actualization of the power of the sense organ is one thing, the judgment related to every instance of perception, quite another. The latter is the work of the kritikon in aisthesis. Instances of cold (psychron) and hot (thermon) are experienced only as they differ from the neutral condition of our sense organs, i.e. as cases of excess and deficiency (ὑπερβολή, ἐλλεῖψις)· ως τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὖν μεσοτης τινος οὕσης τοις ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητής ἐναντιώσεως (De An. 424a4). In the same work, and referring to Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle uses the verb krinein, to judge and to discriminate:

κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν νῦ, τὰ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὰ δὲ δόξη, τὰ δ’ αἰσθήσει.

Things are judged, some by reason, others by knowledge, others again by opinion and others by sensation. (Hicks tr.)

The important thing here is that krinein is done through a variety of agents, and hence it is a common operation, or rather a co-operation used by nous, epistêmê, doxa and aisthesis. Here is where the kritikon of human beings is radically different from what it does in a limited way in other animals. The brief discussion on the kritikon in De Anima Book II, where a slightly different list of powers of the soul is given, need not detract from the account of kritikon. The list of powers is not used to introduce for the analysis of the pervasive function of kritikon. To understand the operation of kritikon, we need certain distinctions.
introduced in De Anima II 4, where he says that the inquirer must ascertain what each faculty is, be it the noëtikon, the aisthëtikon, or the threptikon. Here the noëtikon replaces the dianoëtikon. And in De Anima III 2, 426b-12, he declares that each sensation discriminates and judges: kríne:

Each sense is concerned with its own sensible object, being resident in the organ qua sense-organ, and judges the specific differences of its own sensible object. Thus sight pronounces upon white and black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest (Hicks tr.)

This particular chapter is crucial. Aristotle uses the verb legein to mean "to identify and report" differences in sensible qualities as between sweet in the case of taste, and white in that of vision, and to show that they are cases that go beyond the differences encountered in the same sensation, as it is with different colors. Here legein is used to identify and judge differences. He argues that krínein has to be one and the same faculty in carrying out all instances of judging and for all sensible differences. Therefore, no separate sense organ is needed for this pervasive operation. Judging is built into all sensation and all the other faculties. Thus in De Anima III 2, 426b15-24:

Thus it is clear that the flesh is not the ultimate organ of sense; for, if it were, it would be necessary that which judges should judge by contact with the sensible object. Nor indeed can we with separate organs judge that sweet is different from white, but both objects must be clearly presented to some single faculty. For, if we could, then the mere fact of my perceiving one thing and your perceiving another would make it clear that the two things were different. But the single faculty is required to pronounce them different, for sweet and white are [pronounced] different. It is one and the same faculty, then, which so pronounces, so it also thinks and perceives. Clearly, then, it is not possible with separate organs to pronounce judgment upon things that are separate: nor yet at separate times, as the following considerations show. (Hicks tr.)

The conclusion follows, stated in the form of a question:

The answer that shapes up is that the krínon while logically divisible (díaireton), locally and numerically is also indivisible (adíaireton); hence it is one, and it judges simultaneously. Insofar as it is divisible it is plural, for it uses the same point at the same time twice. Such is the faculty of the krínon. And in De Anima III 3, Aristotle refers to two different characteristics which par excellence define the soul: (a) movement from place to place and (b) noein (thinking), krínein (judging), and aisthanesthai (sensing). He writes:
δοκεί δέ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφότεροις γὰρ τούτοις
crίνει τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων). (427a19-21)

Both thought and intelligence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the soul in both
of these judges and recognizes something existent. (Hicks tr.)

However, that a judgment may occur as a product of an activity, cannot come about unless the elements
of which it is composed are brought together as a combination of thought units, noëmata. And it is this
combination of noëmata that constitutes truth and falsity. Another way of putting it, as it is said in the
Organon, truth and falsity are properties of statements, and statements are in fact symplokai noëmatôn, each
noêma communicated as phonë sëmantikë. In De Anima III 8, 432a 11-12, we are told what phantasía does not
do; it does not perform any symplokë noëmatôn, and this deficiency is readily explained by what it is that
phantasia supplies: phantasmata, not noëmata. Here is where Aristotle should have re-introduced krinein, if
he wanted to formulate a theory of language. Actually he does provide the rudiments for such a logos, but only
in passing, in III 9, 432a15-19:

épeι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὄρισται δυνάμεις ἡ τῶν ζώων, τῷ τὲ κριτικῷ, δ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ
αισθήσεως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ κινεῖν τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, περί μὲν αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοοῖ διωρίσθω
tousta, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κινοῦντος, τὶ ποτὲ ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς σκέπτεον.

The soul in animals has been defined in virtue of two faculties, not only by its capacity to judge,
which is the function of thought and perception, but also by the local movement which it imparts
to the animal. Assuming the nature of sensation and intellect to have been so far determined, we
have now to consider what it is in the soul which initiates motion. (Hicks tr.)

The capacity to judge, to notice, to record and to communicate differences, belongs to both sensing and
thinking, grītikos nous is not to be in any living body unless that body is equipped with the power of sensation.
Next we notice another crucial passage bearing on our theme; it occurs in De Motu Animalium 6, 700b17 sqq.:

όρώμεν δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βουλήν καὶ
ἐπιθυμίαν. ταύτα δὲ πάντα ἀνέγεται εἰς νοον καὶ δρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ η φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἰσθήσις τὴν
αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ νόχωραν ἔχουσιν. κριτικά γάρ πάντα, διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐν ἄλλους
diaphorás.

Now we see that the things which move the animal are intellect, imagination, purpose, wish and
appetite. Now all these can be referred to mind and desire. For imagination and sensation cover the
same ground as the mind since they all exercise judgement though they differ in certain aspects as
has been defined elsewhere.10 (Forster tr.)

The key expression κριτικά γάρ πάντα is translated by Nussbaum (1978) "all are concerned with making
distinctions." It will not do to limit the kritikon to the mental operation of making distinctions. kritikon, as used
is this passage, does not explicitly refer to the function of detecting existing and discoverable differences in
the variety of symbebekota; the analysis of the genera of being has shown why the items collected under each
genus render each a pollachös legomenon.11

Nussbaum's comment following the dismissal of associating kritika with judging is not relevant to the
present discussion; what stands out is what she understands to be her agreement with Cooper's position,
although she cites only the conclusion of an argument. Assuming that she has correctly stated Cooper's
position on the issue, the latter's interpretation finds no support in Aristotle text. The claim Nussbaum puts
forth is excessive and draws from selected passages certain irrelevant conjectures, especially the ones that are
said to pertain to (a) reflective judgment and (b) verbal performance. In the first place, Aristotle is associating
the faculties to which he refers — a point Nussbaum fails to acknowledge — with the only animal that possesses

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them, i.e., the human animal. Hence, it is misleading to bring into the discussion all living beings, especially the ones that Aristotle credits with a limited degree of intelligence, as he does in the *De Anima*. Furthermore, it is these complex discriminations in the co-operation of the faculties, generally of *aisthesis, dianoia, and nous*, that constitute the content of cognitive verbal performances. This is precisely where language begins: in the pervasive operations of the *kritikon*. It should be noted that the *kritikon* does not initiate the discriminations it reports, nor does it create the contents it judges. However, its effectiveness is such that it alone of all the faculties decides what constitutes the difference between fiction and reality.

IV. The *kritikon* as entelecheia

It would seem that the best way to settle the problem under consideration is to associate *logos* with *entelecheia*. We may now make a preliminary exploration of a path already suggested. Perhaps we must introduce the concept of *entelecheia*, for it is in this ontological connection we may identify the nature of *logos* as both *dynamis* and *energeia*. But to defend this hypothesis would require that there be an analogous passing of *logos* from first *entelecheia* to second *entelecheia*, i.e. to *logos* as it develops to nearing its own completion. The process would reveal how *logos* makes itself known in action. Integral to this process is understanding the intelligible features of the world, how its knowable aspects become "logical" or rather, if one prefers, how *logos*, as the object of *logos*, becomes the content of human *logos* and includes itself in attaining completion.

A way to begin would be to say that *logos* is an *arche*, and be viewed as the other side of the coin, whereby *nous* is the one and *logos* is the other, and say that the soul, in its capacity as *nous*, grasps the principles and universals that *logos* uses and articulates. By making *audible* the principles that *nous* intuits, *logos* informs experience by means of the requisite significant symbols for communication. It is *logos* that enables communication to take on the shape of words, propositions and syllogisms. But *logos* does more than that: it also enables the language it fashions to articulate the emotions and desires in naming and expressing the states of the *psyche*. Even in this area of change and experience the *kritikon* arranges, discriminates further, chooses and connects general concepts. Hence, whatever cannot fit the measure of *logos* is either chaotic or self-contradictory, both being outside the power of *aisthesis* and *nous*, and hence forever excluded from the realm of science, indeed from all significant discourse.

The principle of contradiction, a principle of *logos*, in control of all meaningful language, is true of all discourse, of all propositional talking about things, of *legomena haplos* and of *onta*, insofar are they are said to be. The processes of *onta* although delimited within contraries are themselves not subjects of contradictories. The latter are not principles of *onta*, for they occur as simultaneously paired propositions when forcibly conjoined. Thus, as cognizing conjoins *ta legomena* to *ta onta*, the principle of non-contradiction obtains, just as it does in the case of *legomena* as well as in that of the named things constructed by the *technē* of discourse. The latter can be perfectly illustrated from the way *onta* occur in the world of poetry, which is what makes the *logos* of poetry or poetry as *logos* significant and true.12

It is one thing to investigate language, quite another to investigate *logos*. This is so because language and *logos* are not identical; it also explains why language can be inquired into, be a subject matter, but still it is not *logos*. *Logos* about language and *logos* about *logos* are simply not the same activity, although both carry the meaning of special inquiries. The former is feasible, the latter is not. Caution is advised at this point lest we postulate a realm of the *alogon*, that which may be inferred as being outside or beyond *logos*, the non-*logos*, the ontological *alogon*. Chance events are unrelated to what is *alogon*, i.e. what cannot be experienced and explained; actually they are explainable but unpredictable; they happen incidentally.

V. Logos and the Polis

We may now return to the remark made early in this paper concerning the connection between the *logikon* and the *politikon*. If the *polis* is prior by nature, so is *logos*. And if *polis* is for the sake of *eudaimonia*, *hóu henêka*, so is *logos*. *Logos* is teleological, just as are all the faculties of the soul, indeed the soul itself is. *Logos* is inseparable from the meaning of the *telos* of human beings. Separating *logos*, in whole or in part, from the *telos* that belongs to it or from the *telos* of the *polis*, is fatal to the pursuit of *eudaimonia*. Hence, treating *logos* in abstraction, i.e. apart from the political context, or vice versa from the context of *logos*, leads to serious errors. But when treating is done in the name of some analysis, all it can mean is that only a select aspect of
logos or polis is actually being lifted from the total field and given prominence beyond its representative value. In other words, the part is turned into the whole. When logos is understood as prior or arché, the coming into being of polis is a necessary natural event. Seen thus, the polis is not to be understood as the outcome of social contract.\textsuperscript{13}

Can there be aretê without logos? Since aretê is hexis proairetikê, the act of proairesis is indicative of logos functioning as the detection of differences and the shaping of choices, thus providing a guide to the action; it is present as deliberate action become habitual.\textsuperscript{14} Aristotle writes in \textit{Politics} I 1, 1253a 30-36:

\begin{quote}
Φύσει μὲν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πάσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν· ὃ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίος· ὃσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελειωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζώων ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἦστιν, οὕτως καὶ χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπώτερη γὰρ ἄδικια ἔχουσα ὑπάλληλο, ὃ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὑπάλληλ ἔχων φύεται φιλοσοφεῖ καὶ ἄρετῆς ὡς ἐπὶ τάναντα ἐστὶ χρηστάναι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἐνεύ ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφοροδίαν καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον.
\end{quote}

The impulse to form a partnership of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first united people in such partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and right. For unrighteousness is most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and excellence, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of excellence man is the most unholy and savage of animals, and the worse in sexual indulgence and in gluttony. (Rackham tr.)

Logos does not vanish even when seriously abused. It is still there but distorted, or rather it is dysfunctioning. And so will the polis in which such dysfunctioning becomes acceptable social habit. The price to be paid is suffering under deviant constitutions.

NOTES

1. That logos cannot be turned into an accidental on comes up in connection with the logos tès ousias of anthrôpos, whereby the ousia words are anthrôpos, zôon, and the word logikon serves as the differentia. It would be peculiar, to say the least, to call what the adjective logikon names a ousia since what it names belongs to another ousia as the property that differentiates anthrôpos from all other species of living things. Furthermore, calling logikon an ousia would violate the stipulation that there cannot be an ousia of ousia, i.e. against the case of on in \textit{Categories} 1b whereby οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστι, οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένῳ λέγεται. The alternative is to view logos in the context of what anthrôpos is qua ousia.

2. This is an immense topic. The entry "logos" in the \textit{Oxford Classical Dictionary}, devotes only two to three sentences to Aristotle; the rest of the article goes on to discuss the uses of logos in religion. The absence of a systematic treatment of logos in its rich and applied senses as well as contexts is difficult to explain. For instance, there is very little in Hicks' commentary on the \textit{De Anima}, despite the exegetic comments on individual passages where the term logos occurs. The same holds for Ross's commentary on the same work. I have found no single book that treats logos in the context of a comprehensive theory.

3. A close discussion of the merits of these positions is reserved for a longer version of this paper under preparation for publication.

4. \textit{De anima}, III 428a 1-5: εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ' ἀνέγομεν φαντασμά τι ἤμεν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἰ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, μᾶλλον τὸ γεγομένον ἐγώ, καθ' ἄν τι κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ή ἡμνόμεθα. τοιαύτη δ' εἰσὶν αἰσθήσεις, δύο, ἐπιστήμης, νοοῦ. "If imagination is the process by which we say that an image is presented to us, and not anything which we call imagination metaphorically, it is one of the faculties or states or habits by which we judge and speak truly or falsely." (Hett tr. Loeb, with changes).
5. Since the listing of the passages referring to the operations of *logos* is not exhaustive it does not guide the reader to look for those that pertain to a theory about *logos*. See Bonitz *Index Aristotelicum*, where the related passages are listing under the following heads: word, language, or speech; thought; reasoning; mathematical proportion, and relation. For Plato's list, see F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (1935), 142, n. 1.

6. In his article "*logos*" (*Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, volume 5, pp. 83-4), Kerferd has drawn attention to the problems that attend any attempt "to trace a logical progression of meanings in the history of the word" (*logos*). He notes that such attempts are now generally acknowledged to lack any secure foundation, and even to try to trace out the history of a single "*logos* doctrine" in Greek philosophy is to run the risk of searching for a simple pattern when the truth was much more complex. The reason he gives is plain enough: the word *logos* covers any of the following: word, speech, argument, explanation, doctrine, esteem, numerical computation, measure, proportion, plea, principle and reason. One may conveniently want to add to this intriguing list, but it should suffice to explain the complexity of the undertaking. Kerferd is correct in the case of historical collections of uses found in different periods and thinkers. The problem I discuss in this paper deals not with the difficulties that confront the effort to discover "a single *logos* doctrine" in Greek philosophy but whether Aristotle had such a doctrine not reducible to the set of uses of the word.

7. Book II lists the following: nutrition (*threptikon*), appetency (*orektikon*), sensation (*aisthëtikon*), locomotion (*kinëtikon kata topon*), understanding, reasoning (*dianoëtikon*), and *nous*. *OREXIS* includes desire, (epithymia), *thymos* and *boulësis*. Aristotle adds that the animals that have *dianoia* also have *logismos*, implying that this is the special case of human beings. Lowe (1993) in his otherwise interesting article discusses how *krînëin* is used in the activities of sensation and thinking but stops short of arguing whether *krînëin* is a distinct faculty.

8. Hamlyn (1968) 121, however, thinks otherwise; he writes: "This chapter is a rambling one, but it begins and ends with a consideration of what are fundamentally the problems of self-consciousness." A different perspective, such as the one presented here, is reached when the chapter is read as providing support in the form of argument for a theory of judgment that in turn provides the needed evidence that connects *krînëin* to *legein*.

9. The expression "pronounced by" in Hicks' translation has been placed within brackets since it misleads the reader to infer that Aristotle is referring to perceptions rather than perceptible things.

10. The passage may well be *De Anima* III 427b 14.

11. Associating *kritika* with judging, Nussbaum (1978) 334, remarks, has been defended by several scholars, Farquarson, Forster and Louis; references to Farquharson (1912), Forster (1937) and Louis (1952). Nussbaum argues in favor of dismissing the view that associates *kritika* with judging "because all these are faculties which are involved in discriminating or making decisions. To support her position she refers the reader to a 1973 unpublished essay by J. Cooper, titled "Aristotle on the Ontology of the Senses," read at the Princeton University Conference on Ancient Philosophy. Nussbaum understands Cooper to have "concluded from a careful survey of the uses of *krînëin* in connection with *aïsthësis* in the *DA* that there is no need to interpret it as implying that any kind of explicit or reflective judgment is taking place — and in particular that it need not be associated with 'explicit verbal performance or the disposition to such — as indeed we can readily infer from his assertion of *krînëin* to animals, despite his rather low estimate of animal intelligence'. I regret not having seen Cooper's article.

12. Randall (1960) expresses a reservation that helps make clear why his interpretation of *logos* is objectionable. "Aristotle's conclusion may be stated: Whatever is can be expressed in words and discourse. There is nothing that cannot be talked about, nothing wholly inaccessible to discourse, nothing 'ineffable'. But discourse is not its own subject matter — unless the talking is about language itself. Discourse is 'about' something that is not itself discourse; though what it is about — its subject matter — has a discursive or logical
character, and that character, that intelligible structure, is just what discourse can express and state. Whatever is can be known. There is nothing that is unknowable" (122). If this is Aristotle's position, it would be impossible for logos to inquire into logos, and hence impossible to arrive at a theory of logos.

13. According to Randall: "The 'reason why' man lives in a polis, to dioti, is that alone of all animals man possesses logos, the power of speech. It is significant that the same logos that makes man a 'rational animal' in its sense of 'reason' also in its sense of discourse and language, makes him a 'political' or social animal. For speech serves to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the right and the wrong. Through speech it is man alone who has a sense of good and bad, right and wrong. And it is in partnership in these things that makes every human association, from family to the polis." (254)

14. A key to understand the effective role of logos is given in Metaphysics 1020a4, where Aristotle states the following: ὅστε ὁ κύριος δρός τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἄν εἶ ἀρχή μεταβλητική ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ. In De Caeo 301b 18: φύσις μὲν ἐστιν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχουσα κινήσεως ἀρχή, δύναμις δὲ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλῳ. How does this formulation of logos qua dynamis work in the case of language? Logos "moves" language, actualizes it, so to speak. In fact, the actualization of logos effects the refinement and perfecting of language.
Bibliography


