Aristotle on the Nature of Logos

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I. Synopsis

Attention has been frequently drawn to the problems attending attempts "to trace a long progression of meanings in the history of the word logos" (Kerferd). Especially difficult proved the assigning to Aristotle a place in this long progression. One of the reasons is that we have yet to reconstruct his theory of logos. The difficulty is not so much with the complexity of the uses of the term in his works as it is with the widely recognized fact that he left no special treatise on the subject of a doctrine of logos, not to be confused with the instrumentalities found in the so-called logical works that comprise the Organon. The doctrine is not to be found in the Metaphysics any more than it is treated in the biological works. Yet it exists, presumably with the pieces dispersed in the various texts, waiting for the investigators to find and fit the parts into a coherent whole. So far no such systematic opus has been produced, despite the number of interpretive attempts made in recent times to identify what may conceivably count for a doctrine of logos. The importance of such a doctrine or theory can hardly be denied, since it could, inter alia, provide the basis for a full explanation of the intriguing connection between the two definitions of anthropos as logical and political animal. In pursuing such a goal, certain interpreters found it tempting to reduce logos to language, broadly understood (Randall, Mesthene, and Wedin).

The central issue this paper explores is the possibility of detecting a way, supported with what the texts afford, to answer the question "What is logos", but do so not in the obvious sense of discussing the outcomes of its operations, e.g. discourse, account, demonstration or definition, nor by stringing together textual references to reconstruct the mechanics of articulating and communicating, but seeking to understand logos qua ousia, though not as logos of an ousia. The paper sets forth the parameters for an inquiry in hope to identify the components of this elusive doctrine.

II. The Problem of a Theory of logos.

An initial condition must be met to solve the problem regarding the building of a theory of logos, and it consists of two parts: (a) to view logos as an exclusive activity of anthropos, and (b) to consider the differentia indicating a property, named by the adjective 'logikos' as part of the "essence", the ti esti of anthropos. Since this property cannot be subsumed under any genus of being, γένος τού δντος, other than that of ousia, the possibility that logos be seen as a case of co-incidental being, συμβεβηκος διν, is excluded. If logos is neither an ousia nor a case of a symbebëkos on what, then, is its identity?

I will begin with a fundamental Aristotelian position, that truth and falsity are things "being said", statements referring to individual things. This is a relation between legomena and onta. When the statement qua legomenon suits the fact, whatever it may be in each case, then the statement is true, and false when it does not. Without this correlation between speech and what speech is about there can be no truth and hence no knowledge.

The involvement of language in the pursuit of knowledge is everywhere in Aristotle's works. Outside of this involvement, neither truth nor knowledge can be referred to, except in some metaphorical way. The visual arts, for instance, since they do not communicate orally, make statements only metaphorically; the ergon they produce requires supplemental verbal work to report what is being conveyed, besides colors, lines, visual effects in general. Even the poetic arts that depend on speech, dramatic, epic and lyric poetry, if truth is embodied in them, it must be articulated, brought back in the guise of statements free of metaphor and emotional tension. But the referential aspects of poetic works, as onta by technê, do not present a problem. With respect to truth they involve the use language in the background rather than in the foreground. Nevertheless, the truth they contain is a function of ascertainable references to onta.

The main question this paper will try to answer is "What is logos? What is its identity, how it is related
to ousia, and why it is not a symbebêkos on? This is the major issue in Aristotle. The prevailing interpretation is that logos is in some broad sense of the term "language". For example, Randall (1960), followed by Mesthene (1964), have argued in favor of language, the source of which is nous poiêtikos, which in turn generates logos. More recently, Wedin (1988) has concluded independently and more persuasively that logos is essentially language as well as a faculty, the latter being distinct from nous and dianoia, yet intimately connected to both. The issue Wedin left unanswered was the identity of the faculty involved and its precise location as the source of logos. In this paper my remarks are limited to explaining an alternative answer in the context of the following problem: how are the two differentiae, "logical" and "political", in the two respective definitions of anthropos (Pol. 1253a9-10: λόγον δὲ μόνον ἀνθρώπως ἔχει τῶν ζῴων, and 1252b30: ὁ ἀνθρώπως φύσει ζῷον πολιτικάν) interconnected.

Reconstructing Aristotle's theory of logos calls for more than collecting and enumerating the diverse functions of logos, such as sending signs, uttering warnings, explaining or refusing, exhibiting anger and threats, or announcing pleasures and pains. All these uses, naturally enough, when verbal sounds are used, fall within the domain of logos, but the problem of its identity cannot be solved through a theory of sound, grimace, gesture, even language. Nor is logos the same of nous, conventionally translated as reason, despite certain interconnected operations. Two pitfalls must be avoided here: (a) collapsing the faculties of nous and logos, for by so doing neither the identity of logos nor the nature of language is properly revealed; and (b) translating the expression ζῷον λογικόν as "rational animal". The latter conceals a misleading rendition since it makes logos interchangeable with "reason", in this case with nous. The two adjectives, 'logical' and 'rational', the one Greek the other Latin, do not cover the same grounds technically speaking. The term 'rational', as Kerferd has suggested, does not refer directly to logos and its diverse meanings.

The thesis I defend is that the concept of logos, no matter how many operations it covers, is not an appendix of nous. I hope to show that logos is best understood in connection with the faculty Aristotle call τὸ κριτικὸν (to kritikon). A special function of to kritikon includes the power to signify by means of articulate sounds. logos, seen as the entelecheia of the kritikon, fashions and develops systems of signs, including the complex system of language, as its efficient and material tools, i.e. its communicative, including the audible, media.

Another preliminary note must be added at this point. It concerns the intelligible aspects of things and logos as dynamis and energeia. In one sense, all facts are "logical", but they are so only dynamei, i.e. their logical aspects are in principle cognizable and formulable in discourse. But it takes human logos to articulate the logical structures of the world and render them as knowledge. This is the logos, as the actuality of the kritikon when it cooperates with the other powers of the soul. Briefly put, whereas things or onta do not have logos qua energeia they do so qua dynamei; they are logical in that they are intelligible.

III. Reconstructing the theory

Given the philosophical importance of the doctrine of logos it is important not that we try to explore its theoretical foundations, especially in view of the celebrated dictum that man is by nature a logical animal, whereby logos is introduced as the differentiating feature of human life. Aristotle added to this definition something else: "makers of things" that human beings are deliberate makers. If humans are logical by nature and not by chance, they must possess such faculties or powers that make the features of being political and being logical interrelated and coordinate. That humans know or cognize by nature is a plain enough fact. We possess sense organs that enable us to discriminate one thing from another as needed for survival. The issue then is not about sensing or knowing, leaving epistêmé aside for the moment, but knowing logically, i.e. in accordance with logos. It is this issue that calls for looking into this peculiar activity by asking: What does it mean to have logos and use it; briefly put, What is logos? All situations of communication enter the domain of logos but logos goes beyond the level of either sound, grimace, gesture, even language. Still, logos is not the same as reason (nous) despite the overlapping of their operations. Collapsing the two faculties does nothing to help reveal the nature either of language or logos. Translating ζῶον λογικὸν as "rational animal" makes logos interchangeable with reason. But these two adjectives, logical and rational, do not cover the same territory. What would Aristotle have to say about this facile interchange in the translations? One response would be to say that the term "rational" does not refer
directly to *logos* and its diverse meanings, as Kerferd has suggested. What I am suggesting is that conceptually, *logos* covers a set of operations connected with but still different from those of reason (*nous*). In the sequel I will try to outline the differences, hoping that what I say might help remove a few cobwebs, rather than add more to the existing ones.

III. Proposal for a solution

There is a long tradition that goes back to the beginnings of Greek philosophy and poetry that recognized *logos* as a cosmic element and source of intelligibility, sometimes rivaling other *archai*, especially *nous*, for the central position of the ultimate origin of order. Aristotle, it would seem, moved away from speculative and mythical accounts opting for one that would accord with the facts and sustains confidence in their intelligibility. In explaining relative praise and blame in case of minor deviations from *mesotês*, i.e. of certain types of ethical judgments, Aristotle says that in these cases the judge does not err (λανθάνει), and adds:

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ο δέ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἕπι πόσον ζησττάς οὐ ρέειν τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὔδεν τῶν
αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαύτα ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἐκκατοτα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσις. Nic. Eth. 1109b20-22
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Yet to what degree and how much a man must be blamed is not easy to determine by definition. For this is true of all sensible objects; regarding cases of degree in particular circumstances the judgment (κρίσις) lies with sense-perception.

Ἀισθήσις is called a σύμφυτος κριτικῆ δύναμις, a natural faculty within *aisthesis*. This critical power reaches beyond sensation, as we shall see. Yet, by being present in the operation of sensation, by being activated along with the sensation in the activity of the sensing of sensible objects, its work extends beyond what the sense organ does. Aristotle speaks of the *kritikon* also in *Post. Anal.* 99b35, where he states that it is present in all animals equipped with the power of sensing, but in the case of human beings, who retain the effects of sensing as memories, which in turn are subject to the unifying process of *nous*, the *kritikon* becomes the transmitting supplier of materials for knowledge (γνῶσις) once the formation of universals is done. Hence, we have a special and very important case of *kritikon*. As we shall see, the *kritikon* is present in, or rather co-operating with, all the other faculties; to state this process differently, it is the same *kritikon*, pervasive and common to all the other parts of the soul; indeed it has the same unity as the soul itself.

Each sense organ is in a neutral condition prior to its activation and in a state that lies between contraries, i.e. the contraries as properties of the corresponding sensible objects. Their perceptible range of properties, depending on the capability of the sense organ, is covered potentially. The actualization of the power of the sense organ is one thing, the judgment related to every instance of perception, quite another. The latter is the work of the *kritikon* in *aisthesis*. Instances of cold (psychron) and hot (thermon) are experienced only as they differ from the neutral condition of our sense organs, i.e. as cases of excess and deficiency (ὑπερβολή, ἐλλείψις): ώς τῆς αἴσθησεως ὁδον μεσότης τινος ὀθός τοις ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητῆς ἐναντιώσεως (De An. 424a4). In the same work, and referring to Plato's *Timaeus*, Aristotle uses the verb *krinein*, to judge and to discriminate:

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κρίνεται δε τα πράγματα τα μεν νω, τα δε ἐπιστήμη τα δε δόξη, τα δ’ αἰσθησει.
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Things are judged, some by reason, others by knowledge, others again by opinion and others by sensation. (Hicks tr.)

The important thing here is that *krinein* is done through a variety of agents, and hence it is a common operation, or rather a co-operation used by *nous, epistēmē, doxa* and *aisthēsis*. Here is where the *kritikon* of human beings is radically different from what it does in a limited way in other animals. The brief discussion on the *kritikon* in *De Anima* Book II, where a slightly different list of powers of the soul is given, need not detract from the account of *kritikon*. The list of powers is not used to introduce for the analysis of the pervasive function of *kritikon*. To understand the operation of *kritikon*, we need certain distinctions
introduced in *De Anima* II 4, where he says that the inquirer must ascertain what each faculty is, be it the *noëtikon*, the *aisthëtikon*, or the *threptikon*. Here the *noëtikon* replaces the *dianoëtikon*. And in *De Anima* III 2, 426b12-13, he declares that each sensation discriminates and judges: *krînein*:

\[ \text{ἐκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἴσθητοῦ ἐστίν. ὑπάρχουσα τῷ αἴσθητιρῷ ή αἴσθητηρων καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἴσθητος διαφορὰς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὸ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεύσις.} \]

Each sense is concerned with its own sensible object, being resident in the organ *qua* sense-organ, and judges the specific differences of its own sensible object. Thus sight pronounces upon white and black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest (Hicks tr.)

This particular chapter is crucial. Aristotle uses the verb *legein* to mean "to identify and report" differences in sensible qualities as between sweet in the case of taste, and white in that of vision, and to show that they are cases that go beyond the differences encountered in the same sensation, as it is with different colors. Here *legein* is used to identify and judge differences. He argues that *krînein* has to be one and the same faculty in carrying out all instances of judging and for all sensible differences. Therefore, no separate sense organ is needed for this pervasive operation. Judging is built into all sensation and all the other faculties. Thus in *De Anima* III 2, 426b15-24:

\[ \text{ή καί δήλον δτι ή σαρξ ούκ εστι το έσχατον αισθητήριον· άνάγκη γάρ ήν άπτόμενον αυτού κρίνειν} \]

Thus it is clear that the flesh is not the ultimate organ of sense; for, if it were, it would be necessary that which judges should judge by contact with the sensible object. Nor indeed can we with separate organs judge that sweet is different from white, but both objects must be clearly presented to some single faculty. For, if we could, then the mere fact of my perceiving one thing and your perceiving another would make it clear that the two things were different. But the single faculty is required to pronounce them different, for sweet and white are [pronounced] different. It is one and the same faculty, then, which so pronounces, so it also thinks and perceives. Clearly, then, it is not possible with separate organs to pronounce judgment upon things that are separate: nor yet at separate times, as the following considerations show. (Hicks tr.)

The conclusion follows, stated in the form of a question:

\[ \text{άρ' οὖν άμα μὲν καὶ άριθμῷ άδιαίρετον καὶ άχώριστον τὸ κρίνον, τῷ εἶναι δε κεχωρισμένον; (427a2-3)} \]

Is, then, that which judges simultaneously in its judgment and numerically undivided and inseparable, although separated logically? (Hicks tr.)

The answer that shapes up is that the *krînon* while logically divisible (*diaireton*), locally and numerically is also indivisible (*adiareton*); hence it is one, and it judges simultaneously. Insofar as it is divisible it is plural, for it uses the same point at the same time twice. Such is the faculty of the *krînon*. And in *De Anima* III 3, Aristotle refers to two different characteristics which *par excellence* define the soul: (a) movement from place to place and (b) *noei* (thinking), *krînein* (judging), and *aisthanesthai* (sensing). He writes:

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Both thought and intelligence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the soul in both of these judges and recognizes something existent. (Hicks tr.)

However, that a judgment may occur as a product of an activity, cannot come about unless the elements of which it is composed are brought together as a combination of thought units, noëmata. And it is this combination of noëmata that constitutes truth and falsity. Another way of putting it, as it is said in the Organon, truth and falsity are properties of statements, and statements are in fact symplokai noêmatôn, each noêma communicated as phonê semantikê. In De Anima III 8, 432a 11-12, we are told what phantasia does not do; it does not perform any symplokê noêmatôn, and this deficiency is readily explained by what it is that phantasia supplies: phantasmata, not noëmata. Here is where Aristotle should have re-introduced krinein, if he wanted to formulate a theory of language. Actually he does provide the rudiments for such a logos, but only in passing, in III 9, 432a15-19:

The soul in animals has been defined in virtue of two faculties, not only by its capacity to judge, which is the function of thought and perception, but also by the local movement which it imparts to the animal. Assuming the nature of sensation and intellect to have been so far determined, we have now to consider what it is in the soul which initiates motion. (Hicks tr.)

The capacity to judge, to notice, to record and to communicate differences, belongs to both sensing and thinking, g̱ritikos nous is not to be in any living body unless that body is equipped with the power of sensation. Next we notice another crucial passage bearing on our theme; it occurs in De Motu Animalium 6, 700b17 sqq.:

Now we see that the things which move the animal are intellect, imagination, purpose, wish and appetite. Now all these can be referred to mind and desire. For imagination and sensation cover the same ground as the mind since they all exercise judgement though they differ in certain aspects as has been defined elsewhere.10 (Forster tr.)

The key expression kritikê γ̱ερ πάντα is translated by Nussbaum (1978) "all are concerned with making distinctions." It will not do to limit the kritikon to the mental operation of making distinctions. kritikon, as used is this passage, does not explicitly refer to the function of detecting existing and discoverable differences in the variety of symbebekota; the analysis of the genera of being has shown why the items collected under each genus render each a pollachös legomenon.11

Nussbaum’s comment following the dismissal of associating kritika with judging is not relevant to the present discussion; what stands out is what she understands to be her agreement with Cooper’s position, although she cites only the conclusion of an argument. Assuming that she has correctly stated Cooper’s position on the issue, the latter’s interpretation finds no support in Aristotle text. The claim Nussbaum puts forth is excessive and draws from selected passages certain irrelevant conjectures, especially the ones that are said to pertain to (a) reflective judgment and (b) verbal performance. In the first place, Aristotle is associating the faculties to which he refers — a point Nussbaum fails to acknowledge — with the only animal that possesses...
them, i.e., the human animal. Hence, it is misleading to bring into the discussion all living beings, especially the ones that Aristotle credits with a limited degree of intelligence, as he does in the De Anima. Furthermore, it is these complex discriminations in the co-operation of the faculties, generally of aisthesis, dianoia, and nous, that constitute the content of cognitive verbal performances. This is precisely where language begins: in the pervasive operations of the kritikon. It should be noted that the kritikon does not initiate the discriminations it reports, nor does it create the contents it judges. However, its effectiveness is such that it alone of all the faculties decides what constitutes the difference between fiction and reality.

IV. The kritikon as entelecheia

It would seem that the best way to settle the problem under consideration is to associate logos with entelecheia. We may now make a preliminary exploration of a path already suggested. Perhaps we must introduce the concept of entelecheia, for it is in this ontological connection we may identify the nature of logos as both dynamis and energeia. But to defend this hypothesis would require that there be an analogous passing of logos from first entelecheia to second entelecheia, i.e. to logos as it develops to nearing its own completion. The process would reveal how logos makes itself known in action. Integral to this process is understanding the intelligible features of the world, how its knowable aspects become "logical" or rather, if one prefers, how logos, as the object of logos, becomes the content of human logos and includes itself in attaining completion.

A way to begin would be to say that logos is an arche, and be viewed as the other side of the coin, whereby nous is the one and logos is the other, and say that the soul, in its capacity as nous, grasps the principles and universals that logos uses and articulates. By making audible the principles that nous intuits, logos informs experience by means of the requisite significant symbols for communication. It is logos that enables communication to take on the shape of words, propositions and syllogisms. But logos does more than that: it also enables the language it fashions to articulate the emotions and desires in naming and expressing the states of the psyche. Even in this area of change and experience the kritikon arranges, discriminates further, chooses and connects general concepts. Hence, whatever cannot fit the measure of logos is either chaotic or self-contradictory, both being outside the power of aisthesis and nous, and hence forever excluded from the realm of science, indeed from all significant discourse.

The principle of contradiction, a principle of logos, in control of all meaningful language, is true of all discourse, of all propositional talking about things, of legomena haplos and of onta, insofar are they are said to be. The processes of onta although delimited within contraries are themselves not subjects of contradictories. The latter are not principles of onta, for they occur as simultaneously paired propositions when forcibly conjoined. Thus, as cognizing conjoins ta legomena to ta onta, the principle of non-contradiction obtains, just as it does in the case of legomena as well as in that of the named things constructed by the technē of discourse. The latter can be perfectly illustrated from the way onta occur in the world of poetry, which is what makes the logos of poetry or poetry as logos significant and true.12

It is one thing to investigate language, quite another to investigate logos. This is so because language and logos are not identical; it also explains why language can be inquired into, be a subject matter, but still it is not logos. Logos about language and logos about logos are simply not the same activity, although both carry the meaning of special inquiries. The former is feasible, the latter is not. Caution is advised at this point lest we postulate a realm of the alogan, that which may be inferred as being outside or beyond logos, the non-logos, the ontological alogan. Chance events are unrelated to what is alogan, i.e. what cannot be experienced and explained; actually they are explainable but unpredictable; they happen incidentally.

V. Logos and the Polis

We may now return to the remark made early in this paper concerning the connection between the logikon and the politikon. If the polis is prior by nature, so is logos. And if polis is for the sake of eudaimonia, hou heneka, so is logos. Logos is teleological, just as are all the faculties of the soul, indeed the soul itself is. Logos is inseparable from the meaning of the telos of human beings. Separating logos, in whole or in part, from the telos that belongs to it or from the telos of the polis, is fatal to the pursuit of eudaimonia. Hence, treating logos in abstraction, i.e. apart from the political context, or vice versa from the context of logos, leads to serious errors. But when treating is done in the name of some analysis, all it can mean is that only a select aspect of
logos or polis is actually being lifted from the total field and given prominence beyond its representative value. In other words, the part is turned into the whole. When logos is understood as prior or archê, the coming into being of polis is a necessary natural event. Seen thus, the polis is not to be understood as the outcome of social contract.13

Can there be areté without logos? Since areté is hexis proairetikê, the act of proairesis is indicative of logos functioning as the detection of differences and the shaping of choices, thus providing a guide to the action; it is present as deliberate action become habitual.14 Aristotle writes in Politics I 1, 1253a 30-36:

Φύσει μὲν ἡ ὀρμή ἐν πάσιν ἐπί τὴν τοιαύτῃ κοινωνίαν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἁγαθῶν αἰτίος· ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελειωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ἔρων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν, οὕτως καὶ χωρισθέν ὑμοί καὶ δίκης χειριστὸν πάντων. χαλεπωτέτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὑπλα, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὑπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονῆσαι καὶ ἀρετής αὐτε ἐπί τάναντα ἐστὶ χρήσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἐνευ ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐξωθην χειριστὸν.

The impulse to form a partnership of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first united people in such partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and right. For unrighteousness is most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and excellence, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when devoid of excellence man is the most unholy and savage of animals, and the worse in sexual indulgence and in gluttony. (Rackham tr.)

Logos does not vanish even when seriously abused. It is still there but distorted, or rather it is dysfunctioning. And so will the polis in which such dysfunctioning becomes acceptable social habit. The price to be paid is suffering under deviant constitutions.

NOTES

1. That logos cannot be turned into an accidental on comes up in connection with the logos tês ouias of anthrôpos, whereby the ouias words are anthrôpos, zoon, and the word logikon serves as the differentia. It would be peculiar, to say the least, to call what the adjective logikon names an ouias since what it names belongs to another ouias as the property that differentiates anthrôpos from all other species of living things. Furthermore, calling logikon an ouias would violate the stipulation that there cannot be an ouias of ouias, i.e. against the case of on in Categories lb whereby oûte en ūpokemênoi ëstai, oûte kato ëpokemênoi légetai. The alternative is to view logos in the context of what anthrôpos is qua ouias.

2. This is an immense topic. The entry "logos" in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, devotes only two to three sentences to Aristotle; the rest of the article goes on to discuss the uses of logos in religion. The absence of a systematic treatment of logos in its rich and applied senses as well as contexts is difficult to explain. For instance, there is very little in Hicks' commentary on the De Anima, despite the exegetic comments on individual passages where the term logos occurs. The same holds for Ross's commentary on the same work. I have found no single book that treats logos in the context of a comprehensive theory.

3. A close discussion of the merits of these positions is reserved for a longer version of this paper under preparation for publication.

4. De anima, III 428a 1-5: εἶ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία καθ' ὧν λέγομεν φαντασμά τι ἡμῖν γέγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἰ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, μιὰ τις ἐστὶν τούτων δύναμις καθ' ἐξις, καθ' ἄν κρινόμεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἡ ψευδόμεθα. τοιαύτα δ' εἰσὶν αἰσθήσεως, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς. "If imagination is the process by which we say that an image is presented to us, and not anything which we call imagination metaphorically, it is one of the faculties or states or habits by which we judge and speak truly or falsely." (Hett tr. Loeb, with changes).
5. Since the listing of the passages referring to the operations of *logos* is not exhaustive it does not guide the reader to look for those that pertain to a theory about *logos*. See Bonitz *Index Aristotelicum*, where the related passages are listing under the following heads: word, language, or speech; thought; reasoning; mathematical proportion, and relation. For Plato's list, see F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (1935), 142, n. 1.

6. In his article "*logos*" (*Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, volume 5, pp. 83-4). Kerferd has drawn attention to the problems that attend any attempt "to trace a logical progression of meanings in the history of the word" (*logos*). He notes that such attempts "are now generally acknowledged to lack any secure foundation, and even to try to trace out the history of a single 'logos doctrine' in Greek philosophy is to run the risk of searching for a simple pattern when the truth was much more complex." The reason he gives is plain enough: the word *logos* covers any of the following: word, speech, argument, explanation, doctrine, esteem, numerical computation, measure, proportion, plea, principle and reason. One may conveniently want to add to this intriguing list, but it should suffice to explain the complexity of the undertaking. Kerferd is correct in the case of historical collections of uses found in different periods and thinkers. The problem I discuss in this paper deals not with the difficulties that confront the effort to discover "a single *logos* doctrine" in Greek philosophy but whether Aristotle had such a doctrine not reducible to the set of uses of the word.

7. Book II lists the following: nutrition (*threptikon*), appetency (*orektikon*), sensation (*aisthëtikon*), locomotion (*kinëtikon kata topon*), understanding, reasoning (*dianoëtikon*), and *nous*. *Orexis* includes desire, (*epithymia*), *thymos* and *boulësis*. Aristotle adds that the animals that have *dianoia* also have *logismos*, implying that this is the special case of human beings. Lowe (1993) in his otherwise interesting article discusses how *krînëin* is used in the activities of sensation and thinking but stops short of arguing whether *krînëin* is a distinct faculty.

8. Hamlyn (1968) 121, however, thinks otherwise; he writes: "This chapter is a rambling one, but it begins and ends with a consideration of what are fundamentally the problems of self-consciousness." A different perspective, such as the one presented here, is reached when the chapter is read as providing support in the form of argument for a theory of judgment that in turn provides the needed evidence that connects *krînëin* to *legein*.

9. The expression "pronounced by" in Hicks' translation has been placed within brackets since it misleads the reader to infer that Aristotle is referring to perceptions rather than perceptible things.

10. The passage may well be *De Anima* III 427b 14.

11. Associating *kritika* with judging, Nussbaum (1978) 334, remarks, has been defended by several scholars, Farquarson, Forster and Louis; references to Farquharson (1912), Forster (1937) and Louis (1952). Nussbaum argues in favor of dismissing the view that associates *kritika* with judging "because all these are faculties which are involved in discriminating or making decisions. To support her position she refers the reader to a 1973 unpublished essay by J. Cooper, titled "Aristotle on the Ontology of the Senses," read at the Princeton University Conference on Ancient Philosophy. Nussbaum understands Cooper to have "concluded from a careful survey of the uses of *krînëin* in connection with *aîssthësis* in the *DA* that there is no need to interpret it as implying that any kind of explicit or reflective judgment is taking place — and in particular that it need not be associated with 'explicit verbal performance or the disposition to such — as indeed we can readily infer from his assertion of *krînëin* to animals, despite his rather low estimate of animal intelligence'." I regret not having seen Cooper’s article.

12. Randall (1960) expresses a reservation that helps make clear why his interpretation of *logos* is objectionable. "Aristotle’s conclusion may be stated: Whatever is can be expressed in words and discourse. There is nothing that cannot be talked about, nothing wholly inaccessible to discourse, nothing ‘indefinable’. But discourse is not its own subject matter — unless the talking is about language itself. Discourse is ‘about’ something that is not itself discourse; though what it is about — its subject matter — has a discursive or logical
character, and that character, that intelligible structure, is just what discourse can express and state. Whatever is can be known. There is nothing that is unknowable" (122). If this is Aristotle's position, it would be impossible for logos to inquire into logos, and hence impossible to arrive at a theory of logos.

13. According to Randall: "The 'reason why' man lives in a polis, to dioti, is that alone of all animals man possesses logos, the power of speech. It is significant that the same logos that makes man a 'rational animal' in its sense of 'reason' also in its sense of discourse and language, makes him a 'political' or social animal. For speech serves to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the right and the wrong. Through speech it is man alone who has a sense of good and bad, right and wrong. And it is in partnership in these things that makes every human association, from family to the polis." (254)

14. A key to understand the effective role of logos is given in Metaphysics 1020a4, where Aristotle states the following: ὡστε ὁ κύριος δρος τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἐν εἰς ἀρχή μεταβλητική ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἀλλίῳ. In De Caelo 301b 18: φύσις μὲν ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχουσα κινήσεως ἀρχή, δύναμις δ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἀλλίῳ. How does this formulation of logos qua dynamis work in the case of language? Logos "moves" language, actualizes it, so to speak. In fact, the actualization of logos effects the refinement and perfecting of language.
Bibliography


