Eudemian Ethical Method

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Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology, whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to be grateful for when they consider recent studies of the topic. Owen's pioneering efforts in his now classic "Tithenai ta phainomena" to upgrade the status of dialectic to serious partnership with syllogistic in science and metaphysics has been modified and elegantly extended in Nussbaum's "Saving Aristotle's Appearances" in the Owen festschrift. While both of these scholars have drawn heavily on material from both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (hereafter abbreviated NE and EE respectively), their primary focus has been on scientific reasoning in general and not specifically on the practical disciplines of ethics or politics. Two recent studies by Irwin and Barnes, however, have concentrated on what they both call Aristotle's methods of ethics, drawing on a rich critical tradition of close study of the Aristotelian works stretching back to the early 19th Century. Their use of the plural might suggest a possible differentiation of Aristotle's thoughts on the subject by reference to various works or to different stages in his development but one quickly discovers that this is not the case. This is because both Irwin and Barnes follow the general pattern of scholarship in this area in not distinguishing, for instance, between NE and EE discussions of the topic and in drawing indifferently upon both works in formulating an overall picture of Aristotle's approach to ethical method. They do not raise the question I wish to address here, then, in spite of the searching and valuable
surveys of relevant passages in both works that they do provide, not to mention the modest defence of Aristotle that they offer in comparison with other ethical methodologists (e.g. Sidgwick and Rawls). The question which I freely admit is not altogether new is: are there any distinctive contributions that the EE, as opposed to the NE, makes to the study of ethical method? Since Kenny's two recent studies have shed a powerful new light on the relationship between the two works I believe it is time to consider the question afresh. It is true that Kenny's predecessor in this particular vineyard, D.J. Allan, 25 years ago in the same Symposium Aristotelicum that featured Owen's path-breaking paper, weighed in with his "Quasi-mathematical method in the Eudemian Ethics", a paper which clearly offers a plausible answer to my question. Allan claimed to find a distinctive "mathematical pattern of deduction" at work in the EE, one that applies "Euclidean method" to ethical argument and draws more freely than does the NE on other Aristotelian works such as the Metaphysics for its premisses. His account, however, seems vulnerable in light of an important distinction that Barnes, especially, has pressed in connection with the Posterior Analytics, viz. that between a method designed for research or the discovery of the archai or starting points of a science that need not be cast in syllogistic form and the rather different methods recommended for presentation of the results of inquiry which may well call for a rigorous, axiomatized system. If such a distinction is feasible for theoretical sciences, it would seem even more likely that in ethics one need not oppose as irreconcilable the more informal dialectical method of presenting and sifting through various endoxa (opinions which have found favor with the many or the wise) and a formally valid deductive demonstration such as that found in EE II.1 (1218b31-1219a39), an argument which, as Woods has observed, "is considerably more elaborate than the corresponding argu-
ment in E.N. Thus, even if Allan were correct in directing our attention to a preference in the EE for a quasi-geometric laying down of hypotheses, this fact would not preclude simultaneous appeal to the endoxic method for the generation of acceptable archai or starting points. Furthermore, while the NE does not use 'hypothesis' in its technical sense (as does the EE at 1222b28 and 1230b30) in its undisputed books (i.e. I-IV and VIII-X), it does, as Kenny notes, employ 'hypokeitai' in the requisite fashion at least once at 1104b27. The most convincing reason for not treating Allan's proposal as the key to a distinctive ethical method, however, is that the best and clearest statements of endoxic method in the entire corpus are either to be found in exclusively Eudemian material or in the so-called common or disputed books (NE V,VI,VII = EE IV,V,VI). This can be easily established by consulting any of the authorities already mentioned. Owen, Nussbaum, Irwin and Barnes all use the same passage from the book on akrasia, i.e. 1145b2-7, as well as similar remarks from the same discussion, as the foundation for their conceptions of endoxic method. Even more striking than this is the appeal to undoubtedly Eudemian passages such as 1216b26-34 or 1214b28-1215a7. None of these scholars have paused to ask why the choicest passages for illustrating the method come from outside securely Nicomachean borders. That such distinguished Aristotelian interpreters ignore this question testifies to the overwhelming inertia of the tradition's full 10-book NE, influencing even those who appreciate the EE's potential contributions to theory but see no reason to award it the disputed books let alone entertain the possibility that its undisputed portions may represent an advance on the NE. In the light, however, of Kenny's systematic study of these and other questions concerning the relationship between the two works, the fact that the Eudemian environment is particularly hospitable to endoxic method by comparison with the NE is surely
worthy of note, even extended examination.

Before going on to contrast the two works on questions of method in some detail, it will be helpful to appeal to an important hypothesis about the common or disputed books. Although there is not space to argue the point here, I have elsewhere outlined Kenny's treatment of the problem and even so skeptical a scholar as C.J. Rowe has been convinced by Kenny's arguments. The claim is that the disputed books are clearly more at home in their Eudemonian rather than Nicomachean surroundings, a result based on a "succession of arguments, historical, philological, and philosophical" presented in The Aristotelian Ethics, especially those based on the computer-assisted statistical study of vocabulary and style which constitutes the heart of Kenny's case. An indication that the book as a whole makes a very strong case, indeed, can be seen in Rowe's recent admission that his own previous intuition (shared by most scholars, perhaps) that the NE contained the CB (Common Books) as an integral part of an organic whole had been "deal[t] a near-lethal blow" by Kenny's work and that he is now inclined to accept Kenny's solution to the CB problem, having renounced his own earlier and opposing position. Although many no doubt remain unconvinced by this controversial call for a radical re-assessment of our views of the EE-NE relationship I will nonetheless hypothesize for purposes of this discussion of methodology that references drawn from the middle books (to be referred to by the familiar Bekker numbers with a CB prefix, e.g. CB 1145b2-7) are not to be treated as expressing NE doctrine; indeed, the opposite is more likely to be the case, viz. that they reflect EE content that may or may not be compatible with NE views.

The strategy in what follows will be to look first at undoubtedly NE passages for methodological remarks, noting how spare such as can be found really are when compared with un-
doubtlessly EE material. Eventually we shall be in position to suggest that it is the EE and not the NE which must be given the credit for containing the fullest account of a fully self-conscious employment of endoxic method in ethics, the same general method that commentators are so ready to see at work in other important Aristotelian works such as the Physics and Metaphysics. That such a finding would tend to support Allan's "impression...that the systematizer [the author of the EE] is the later Aristotle" as well as Kenny's conjecture that the EE postdates the NE is a partial and tentative result of a series of related investigations that I've begun in order to test Kenny's hypothesis.

In the first book of the NE the most explicitly methodological passages are two (viz. 1094b11-27 and 1098a26-b8), both of which stress the need to give up any thoughts of achieving accuracy (ακρίβεια) in ethical-political inquiry primarily due to the variability of the subject matter itself as compared with that of geometry, say. This, of course, is a familiar and endearing theme in Aristotle's ethics but the passages taken together do not compare very favorably with EE I's chapter 6 as a whole which provides a clearly worked out account not only of endoxic method at 1216b26-35 as employing phainomena as witnesses and paradigms of the truth but also introduces more subtlety and scientific sophistication in its discussion of what to look for in a properly philosophical account. Whereas the NE is content to recommend that the educated person be sensitive enough to expect demonstration from a mathematician but not from a rhetorician, the EE worries about even the experienced and capable going astray by being urged to swallow arguments that are "foreign to the inquiry (ἀλλοτρίους) and idle (κενούς)" [Woods' rendition of 1217a2-3; unless otherwise indicated further English versions of EE passages will be drawn from this (partial) translation]. That is, those students
who know that they should welcome explanations of the why (to dia ti) of things as well as the that (to ti) (1216b38-9) and that philosophers should never "speak in an unconsidered fashion (εικη), but always with reason" (μετὰ λόγου) (1217a1-2) still may be taken in by the "ignorance" or "charlatanry" of "men who neither have nor are capable of architectonic or practical thought" (1217a3-7). An example at this juncture would certainly help but, perhaps, the criticism at b21 of Plato's Form of the Good will suffice if we grant that a "logical" point about Forms belongs to another study (ξετέρας αιτιατιβίς), one "foreign to" ethics or politics, strictly speaking. The language of the dismissal - λέγεται λογικος και κενως - recalls 1217a1-2, at least in part, although it must be admitted that Plato cannot be accused of trickery or ignorance. If this is an example, then, it will be of a very sophisticated lack of relevance but one that the student of ethics should still resist nonetheless.

While a detailed comparison of particular passages such as those of the last paragraph are desirable in a fuller study, a somewhat more impressionistic approach will indicate the type of contrast I believe there to be between the NE and EE on matters of method. If we focus on the technical vocabulary of endoxic method, especially as described by Barnes, a surprising fact emerges fairly clearly, viz. that the undoubtedly Nicomachean portions are noteworthy for their relatively slight employment of key terminology. Take 'endoxos' itself, for instance, a word that can almost always be translated as 'reputable' or 'of good repute' even when it occurs in the familiar neuter plural (τα ενδοξα) meaning 'the reputable things', i.e. reputable views or opinions. Barnes notes that before Aristotle (first?) the adjective to views or tenets 'endoxos' typically modified men of considerable standing in the community in the orators and Xenophon.17 What is most remarkable about its occurrences in the NE is that they all (apart from CB 1145b5, of course) corre-
pond to this ordinary Attic usage. 1098b28 refers to a "few reputable men" (ολίγοι καὶ ἐνδοξοὶ ἄνδρες), for example, while 1122b31-2 mentions the "well-born and reputable" (τοῖς εὐγενεσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις). The neuter plurals at 1127a21 and b25 are also understood along the same lines as Irwin's translation makes clear when he renders them both as "the qualities that win reputation", the sort of thing that Socrates, Aristotle's example here, disavowed having. Thus, none of these NE occurrences approximate the typical use of 'endoxa' as found in the Topics (in its "definition" at 100b21, for instance, or as frequently found elsewhere - 104a21, 159b13, 14 et passim) or The Rhetoric (e.g. 1355a17, 1357a10). Now, it is true that the undoubtedly Eudemian avoids the term altogether and this may be significant. By Kenny's hypothesis, however, we are entitled to see its crucial appearance in the following central passage about akrasia as credited to the EE account:

Here, as in all other cases, we must set down the appearances (phainomena) and, first working through the puzzles (diaporesantes), in this way go on to show, if possible, the truth of all the beliefs we hold (τα endoxa) about these experiences; and, if this is not possible, the truth of the greatest number and the most authoritative. For if the difficulties are resolved and the beliefs (endoxa) are left in place, we will have done enough showing. (Nussbaum's rendering of CB 1145b1-718)

Two other terms that are featured in this passage also worth comment. The neuter plural τα φαινόμενα in the typical sense of 'the things that seem to be the case' or 'the apparent facts' as reflected in what is usually said (τα λεγόμενα) can be found elsewhere in the NE only at CB 1145b28. This situation contrasts most sharply with the example of the undoubtedly Eudemian which repeatedly employs the term (e.g. at 1216b28, 1217a13, 1228a19, 1235a31, b16-17, 1236a26 and b22). This observation of an important difference between the NE and EE vocabulary is not meant to obscure the fact that occurrences of the cognate verb
phainesthai (e.g. at NE 1095a30 or 1113a21 as Irwin¹⁹ for one, interprets them) in a suitable context might be amenable to the general method of tithenai ta phainomena. But, it does suggest for the NE a much less developed technical vocabulary than that which can be routinely observed in the Physics, for example, as described by Owen.²⁰ When we see that the EE, on the other hand, does conform to this pattern it does seem to reflect a stage in the development of endoxic methodology that is more self-conscious than that at work in the NE.

The second important term referred to above, viz. δια-πορεῖν ('puzzling through') as well its near synonym ἀπορεῖν and the noun aporia can be found at NE 1096a12, 1100a21,30,b12 and 1101a35 although the EE usage of these terms is significantly more extensive. Susemihl’s index provides more than 20 relevant examples. This again suggests that the endoxic method’s pre-occupation with overcoming or resolving aporia ('puzzlement', 'no way out') is more routinely at work in the EE than in the NE if we can use relative frequency of technical terminology as a rough guide. Furthermore, the CB’s pithy ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὑρεσις ἔστιν (1146b7-8) - "for the solution of the puzzle is a discovery", a remark which captures and admirably compresses the final stage of the general method as described most fully by Barnes, should not be awarded to the NE as is the custom if Kenny is right about the disputed books.

That such key terms so crucial to an understanding of endoxic method as those just canvassed are quite at home in the EE (with the exception of 'endoxos'), while being either unused in the relevant application in the NE (ta endoxa, ta phainomena) or underutilized therein (diaporein, aporein, aporia), bears out our preliminary observation that the EE's explicit concern with methodology is more pronounced than the NE's as well as more in line with what can be seen elsewhere in the corpus where the method is at work on non-ethical subjects (e.g. the Physics or
Metaphysics.)

Obviously, nothing uncovered so far suggests any fundamental change in method from one work to the other, an "epistemological break" as it were with his methodological past, but rather a more systematic development, perhaps, and more extensive employment of techniques for discovery that had been nurtured by Aristotle from his Academy days. Whether a stronger claim than this can be defended is difficult to say at this stage of the investigation. One additional word that may be a sign of a negative attitude toward some endoxa, those held by the hoi polloi, is χαριεῖς, which means 'refined', 'cultivated', 'accomplished' in Attic prose of the 4th Century B.C. It can be found nine times in the NE but not at all in the EE. Since the Topics first opposed the views of the many to those of the wise, playing off each against the other whenever possible, although both are sources of endoxa, Aristotle's works are studded with this sort of dialectical relationship. When the NE uses 'charientes' in place of the more customary 'sophoi', then, the contrast with the EE is worth comment. The term itself is familiar from Plato who employs it to refer to a group of wags or witty critics (comic poets like Aristophanes?) at Republic 452B and also later in the same work at 605B where Grube translates it as "the better sort of citizens" (χαριεῖς-τερον). Aristotle's usage is similar in that it can be restricted to a particular sub-group of specialists (the best doctors at NE 1102a21) or, more typically, to denote the truly cultivated gentlemen of the polis who will be expected to behave with appropriate noblesse-oblige (1128a31, b1,1162b10). We know from the Politics that mere position in the social structure does not bestow the quality of refinement (1297b9); hence, a degree of culture and sophistication are no doubt necessary. In spite of this, however, there can be no doubt that 'chariei' is a term with overtones of class and suitable breeding, a note
not heard in the EE. A typical appearance of the word occurs at NE 1095a18-19 where it obviously does duty for 'sophos'. After noting that both hoi polloi kai hoi charientes agree on synonyms for eudaimonia he goes on to point out with some emphasis that hoi polloi don't provide the same account of its nature or essence as hoi sophoi. Similarly, at 1095b22, whereas the many are drawn toward a life of shameful self-indulgence the charientes kai praktikoi (the refined with a practical orientation, taking the καὶ explicatively) prefer honor (time). Thus, by his choice of loaded language Aristotle seems to betray an attitude of favoritism toward the opinions of the wise or refined, a fact which threatens to undermine the objectivity of the endoxic method. That is, we are presumably supposed to sift through all relevant opinions that are worth study, preserving the best and discarding the rest. The danger of bias would be even more apparent if a negative attitude toward the many were also evident (as in the case of Plato). Now, Barnes claims to see here at NE 1095a18 "[r]espect for the views of οἱ πολλοὶ" even as he notes in passing a text that clearly goes against this suggestion, viz. 1095b16 where the many are linked with those who are φορτικῶτατοι ('most common', 'most vulgar') in their choice of the lowest of the three lives. The picture seems to be one where the unanimous agreement of the many, the wise and the refined, such as we find in the equation of eudaimonia with to eu zēn and to eu prattein (1095a19), is a sufficient guarantee of the worth of the endoxon. Where they differ, however, the "better sort" are more likely to be in the right. A good example comes from Book X where Anaxagoras' view of what makes for the happy man is said to appear strange to the many (NE 1179a13-15) who judge by externals; the author goes on to say "the beliefs of the wise would seem to accord with our arguments" (Irwin). It is true that Aristotle goes on to suggest that the truth in practical matters must be judged by deeds
and life as it is actually lived (al7-20), seeming to suggest a return to the many's terra firma. The appearance is misleading, though, for, by the end of the chapter we are once again on the side of the wise and the contemplative, secure in the assurance that they are the most beloved of the gods as well as the happiest of men (1179a29-32). The impression, then, of the preparation of a brief for the wise carefully prepared by the NE as a whole certainly contrasts at first glance with the advice offered a would-be sophistical refuter at SE 173a20-23 where an even-handed strategy is recommended:

You ought to lead men to opinions opposed to those of the majority (πολλοί) and of the wise - if a man speaks as trained arguers do, you should lead him to opinions opposed to the majority; if he speaks as do the majority, to opinions opposed to expert reasoners. (Forster)

Even here the author can not help but point out at a28-31 that the opinion of the many is only nomos ('custom', 'law') while things said by the wise reflect physis ('nature') and alētheia ('truth'). In other words, even supposedly democratic Sophists show a decided preference for the wise. We expect Aristotle not to be similarly biased if he is to remain faithful to his method and yet the NE can be read (I don't say must be) as vindicating the charientic side of debates more often than not.

Is the EE more even-handed? There are some signs that it is when we consider, for example, how it deals with first philia (the primary sort of friendship that exists between two equally virtuous men) when contrasted with the parallel NE treatment. The latter account is uncomfortable with the clear fact that men call pleasure-friends and utility-friends philoi; it proposes therefore to derive these secondary forms καθ' ομολόγητα from the primary and governing use of the word (πρῶτος καὶ κυρίος) as said of virtue-friends (NE 1157a25-32). In what certainly appears to be a reply to this passage the EE rejects the idea that pleasure-friends are not really friends because
they fall below first philia standards of reliability (EE 1236b 17-21). Introducing the important idea of pros hen homonymy, the EE goes on to claim:

Therefore to confine the use of the term friend to primary friendship is to do violence to the phainomena, and compels one to talk paradoxes; though it is not possible to bring all friendship under one definition. The only remaining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in a sense all sorts are, not as having a common name by accident and standing in a merely chance relationship to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather as related to one thing. (Rackham, 1236b21-6)

This obvious defence of ordinary language via the sophisticated device of 'focal meaning' certainly appears to be a careful reaction to the NE's predicament of wishing to maintain a rigid hierarchy of eide of philia and yet deign to speak with the vulgar of friends whose only ties are pleasure or utility. The EE brings in one of the most powerful tools from the metaphysical arsenal to rectify the situation. Each form of philia is related to a common focus while the priority of virtue-friendship is preserved without flying in the face of the many's way of talking or siding only with the charientes.

The argument of the last paragraph will no doubt be resisted by many scholars and much more needs to be said to shore up its main assumptions. Pending that, can anything of the impressionistic variety avail us here? Does the EE, for instance, show a more positive attitude to the many than the NE? At 1222a17 the agathos is said to feel delight (chairein) as he should (hos dei) even if it is more delight than the hoi polloi experience and at 1222a40 both we ourselves and the many posit as a vice opposed to the mean state a direction we are more inclined to embrace. Neither of these texts casts aspersions on the many. The brave man at 1228b34 and 37 is said to be less vulnerable than the hoi polloi kai hoi pleistoi to certain pressures, but this is not surprising nor detrimental to the many. A hint of
snobbery seems to emerge at 1238a27 where it is said that "even the many would agree" with a claim about philia but this passage is hardly an indictment. Again, at 1243a38 a slightly cynical tone seems to lie behind the statement that hoi polloi pursue to kalon ek periousias ('out of a state of surplus or plenty'), implying that virtue is easier to go after when times are good. But, while certainly true enough, such an observation need not betray a sustained antipathy to the many as we saw conveyed, for instance, by the 'most vulgar' label noted above in the NE. None of these or similar passages that crop up in the EE would support such a negative stance although one very important text not yet mentioned has been interpreted by Barnes as recommending that "opinions peculiar to ϑη πολλοὶ, the vulgar herd, should be ignored".22 This is the textually very difficult passage at 1214b 28-1215a7 which requires emendations that are far from certain:

It would be superfluous to examine all the opinions about happiness that find adherents. Many opinions are held by children and by the diseased and mentally unbalanced, and no sensible man would concern himself with puzzles about them; the holders of such views are in need, not of arguments, but of maturity in which to change their opinions, or else of correction of a civil or medical kind (for medical treatment is no less a form of correction than flogging is). Similarly, neither need we examine the views of the many; they speak in an unreflective way on almost any topic, most of all when they speak about this; only the opinions of reasonable men should be examined; it would be strange to present argument to those who need not argument, but experience. But, as each inquiry has its own problems, so, evidently does that concerning the best and highest life. It is these opinions, then, that it is right for us to investigate; for the refutation of those who dispute a certain position is a demonstration of the opposing view (Woods, with my emphasis on the sentence at a3)

If we accept the Greek text behind this translation, it certainly does look as though a resolute opposition to the views of the many is, after all, at work in the EE. Still, one should be wary of endorsing this option. Irwin joins Décarie23 in treating the underlined phrasing above as an obvious intrusive gloss and a
glance at Susemihl's apparatus or even Barnes' discussion reveals many proposals for generating a sound text. What does seem clear, however, is that the EE has added the sick and insane to the NE's youths as unlikely sources of endoxa worth serious consideration and it does carefully specify its reasons for each exclusion. In this connection it is at least curious that a passage from the Metaphysics, viz. 1009b5-6, mentions the sick and insane as sources of error even if per impossibile only two or three persons were found to be still healthy and sensible. It is tempting to suggest that in composing the EE Aristotle has decided to broaden his account of those unlikely to merit attention to their endoxa beyond the inexperienced young so disparaged in Book I of the NE. There remains, of course, the considerable difficulty of reconciling the rest of this important passage with our suggestion that the EE's way with the many is benign. Only a full-scale philological treatment of the disputed passage starting from the manuscripts themselves can be expected to resolve this issue, making a further advance possible.

At this point our study of vocabulary and selected explicit methodological passages has provided some support for questioning the widely held traditional assumption that the NE either shares unequivocally and to the same degree the endoxic method of the EE or that in any case it represents an advance on the latter. We cannot claim, of course, to have demonstrated that the opposite opinion is true, either. Considerations have been advanced, however, that scholars sympathetic to Kenny's case for the EE can and should pursue in future research. This should, above all, concentrate on detailed comparisons of lengthy and parallel texts where endoxic method is at work. The three books on friendship are a prime candidate for such study as some individual chapters on particular virtues. In an APA presentation last year I urged an interpretation of the EE's treatment of the aporiai about friendship that sees it not only as fuller, better documented
and more carefully laid out than its counterpart but, more im-
portantly, it shows clearer signs than does the NE of the "a-
poremetric method" at work in the Metaphysics that Alan Code has
so well described in recent contributions. In this regard it
is worth quoting one more passage from the EE:

Accordingly a line of argument must be taken that will
best explain to us the views held on these matters and
at the same time solve the difficulties and contradic-
tions. And this will be secured if the contradictory
views are shown to be held with some reason. For such
a line of argument will be most in agreement with the
phainomena: and in the upshot, if what is said is true
in one sense but not in another, both the contradictory
views stand good. (Rackham's translation of 1235b13-18)

Nothing so programmatic nor as systematically connected with CB
VII passages can be found in the parallel NE account of philia
even though its discussion as a whole is considerably longer
than the EE's. These and other differences between these two
works surely merit further study in the light of Kenny's con-
clusions. Even if the drift of the above comments on Eudemian
ethical method are contrary to the prevailing winds, I take
comfort from the following remarks with which Kenny himself
brings his first book to a close:

No doubt, when finally pressed, most scholars would say
that their belief in the [temporal] priority of the EE
to the NE rests not upon any particular argument but
upon their over-all impression of the respective philo-
sophical merits of the works. Such judgments are, of
course, partly a function of variations in the fashion-
ableness of criteria for judging philosophical merit:
they are also very much a function of how closely a
text has been read, analysed, and meditated upon. It
will only be when the EE has been for some time as
carefully and widely studied as the NE has been for
centuries that we shall be able to make an unclouded
judgment about their comparative worth.

6 Ibid., pp. 307, 318.
10 Nussbaum, p. 269; Irwin, pp. 196, 200; Barnes (fn. 3), p. 495.
11 Nussbaum, p. 285; Irwin, pp. 195, 197; Barnes (fn. 3), pp. 504-5.
15 Allan (fn. 5), p. 318.
16 "Owen and The 'Single-Science' Argument in the Eudemian Ethics", to appear in a volume of essays from the 1983 Owen Symposium on Aristotle edited by R. Dancy and published by the University Presses of Florida; "Testing Kenny's Hypothesis About the Eudemian Ethics: The Case of Philia", presented at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in March, 1984 and available upon request from the author; "Is άγαθον a pros hen equivocal Aristotle's Ethics?", presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in October, 1984; see also the article mentioned in fn. 12 above. I am grateful, indeed, for a year's stay at the Center for Hellenic Studies in 1982-3 where this work began.
17 Barnes (fn. 3), pp. 499-500.
18 Nussbaum, p. 267.
20 Owen, pp. 113 ff.
21 Barnes (fn. 3), p. 504, fn. 32.
22 Ibid., p. 504 (text).
24 "Testing Kenny's Hypothesis..." (fn. 16), pp. 6-8.