Plotinus and Paranormal Phenomena

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The present paper, I should make clear at the outset, is intended primarily for classicists who are not specialists in Neoplatonism and will therefore tell experts in Plotinus little of which they are not already well aware. Its purpose is to explain Plotinus' views on a subject which finds itself, perhaps surprisingly, once again of some contemporary interest, and where misunderstandings and emotionally toned judgments are only too easy. It will be concerned as much with the reasons underlying Plotinus' beliefs as with those beliefs themselves, and in particular will show how his views on paranormal phenomena spring naturally from some of the most fundamental principles of his whole philosophy.

It need hardly be said, though it is a consideration more widely observed in theory than in practice, that in considering Plotinus or any thinker of the past, we must observe two basic principles. First, we should ask his questions and not ours; in other words we should not allot him marks for his supposed rationalism in terms of some eighteenth or nineteenth century criterion, but rather ask what it was reasonable for him to believe in the light of contemporary attitudes and of the evidence available to him. Secondly we must consider the whole of what he has to say and try to determine the general principles running through it, not simply extract a few accessible phrases and hope that they will do instead. Thus the common statement that Plotinus regards the stars as signs, not as causes, is based on a careless reading, out of context, of the opening words of the treatise II. 3, On Astrology, and cannot be reconciled with a careful study of the whole of that treatise or of Plotinus' other discussions in chapter 5 and 6 of the early work III. 1 On Fate and in the concluding section (IV. 4, 30-45) of the great work on The Soul. There are also odd little chapters or isolated remarks scattered throughout the Enneads that present a viewpoint apparently more or less at variance with his considered position. As Professor Dillon remarked in his paper last year, there is reason to suppose that his oral teaching contained even greater oddities. Thus the chapter II. 9. 14, with its attack on the Gnostics' use of incantations and their demonic theory of disease, has a somewhat more "rationalistic" ring than is usual with Plotinus; conversely, on a more "superstitious" level there are the chapter IV. 7. 15, on oracles from the dead, which so upset Brehier and the references to anthropomorphic daemons that crop up at various points, here, since space is limited, I propose, with one exception, to ignore such passages and to concentrate on Plotinus' general attitude.

If then, with this caution in mind, we seek to determine Plotinus' attitude to astrology, the paranormal phenomenon to which he devotes most space, we may note, first, that he was commonly regarded in antiquity as an opponent of astrology and, secondly, that this did not mean then what it would now. For, first, total denial of astrological doctrine was normally confined to the most determined materialists and sceptics, whose influence by the third century A.D. was virtually negligible, and, secondly, the motives of astrology's opponents were rarely what we should consider scientific, prompted as they largely were by the desire, on the one hand, to preserve human free will and, on the other, to defend particular theological views. Thus Christian attacks on astrology were greatly influenced by its association with pagan cosmic religion. But if, ignoring this question of motive we ask simply what it was reasonable for Plotinus to believe, we may observe that astrology, and paranormal phenomena in general, had the
sanction of most of the greatest scientists of the immediately preceding centuries (such as Ptolemy and Galen) and seemed supported by abundant empirical evidence. Thus Plotinus refers as matters of general acceptance to the possibility of divination, the influence of the heavens on terrestrial phenomena (III. 1. 5. 1-15, IV. 4. 31. 8-15) and the remarkable properties of stones and herbs (IV. 4. 35. 69-70). Perhaps even more important for him, the influence of the heavens, especially the sun, on physical phenomena on earth, was supported by Aristotelian authority, and from here it was a natural step to the acceptance of such less scientific notions as the moon's supposed connection with kleptomania (cf. III. 1. 2. 4-5); similarly the view that the stars influence man's lower soul and the events of his physical life could be derived from the Timaeus (where the younger gods were identified with the heavenly bodies) and from the Myth of Er's account of the Spindle of Necessity (II. 3. 9 and 15). Hence it would have been no more reasonable for Plotinus to reject such phenomena than for a modern philosopher, with no special scientific training, to reject Evolution or Relativity. Any doubts he might have had were likely to be quenched by his belief that he had himself on one occasion been the victim of a magical attack (V. pl. 10. 1-13). Hence, while certain individual cases might be called into question, the reality of such phenomena as a whole seemed beyond reasonable doubt.

This brings us to the most individual feature of Plotinus' own approach, its extreme generality. A modern investigator of psychic phenomena will normally proceed by first assembling alleged cases of such phenomena, then examining their authenticity; finally, if he is bold enough, he may propound a theory to explain them. A roughly similar procedure, though using much less rigorous criteria, was followed by the Stoics, with their collections of case histories of allegedly fulfilled prophecies, echoed in Cicero's De Divinatione. By contrast Plotinus shows no interest in the truth or falsity of such individual cases; instead he proclaims his willingness to accept such phenomena as are generally admitted, provided they admit a rational explanation, and proceeds to frame a general theory that will explain as many, or as few, of them as subsequently turn out to be justified. His procedure in fact has strong resemblances to Hume's attempt to frame a single decisive argument to demolish any case of an alleged miracle that either has been produced or ever can be. Yet, while Plotinus may be thought wise, in the light of our remarks at the end of the last paragraph, to have confined himself to general principles, his generality even so goes far beyond what would appear necessary. Thus Hume in the second part of his famous essay does in fact proceed to apply his principle to some alleged cases of miracles, both ancient and modern. Similarly while Sextus Empiricus in his attack on astrology (Adv. Math. V) refers to the alleged influence of "Saturn" or "the Moon", Plotinus simply refers to the view of "one star as operating by cold and another by liquid fire". In fact, of course, such extreme generality was a characteristic of his mind and exhibits itself in similar form in his attacks on contemporary Gnostic and Middle Platonic views, where his concern is not at all with the individual authors or systems in question but solely with the general principles they represent; hence the difficulty modern scholars have found in identifying his sources and opponents.

Next to the generality of Plotinus' discussion its most striking point is perhaps the small number of phenomena he examines. If such isolated references as those noted earlier are excluded, his concern is almost entirely with three of them, astrology, the object of several discussions already listed, magic and, a phenomenon not generally included in this class, petitionary prayer, both the latter two being dealt with in the latter part of the treatise On the Soul (IV.
4. 30-45). By contrast there is no more than a brief allusion to "natural
mantic", the soul's alleged ability to foresee future events in dreams or
prophetic ecstasy and even less reference to most other phenomena. The reason
for Plotinus' concentration on the three phenomena mentioned is, of course,
their special relevance to his metaphysical and religious concerns, especially
the two noted earlier. Admittedly Plotinus' conception of free will, like that
of many other philosophers, is very different from the popular one; what is,
however, of fundamental importance for him is that man's essential self belongs
to the intelligible order and is therefore free from any determinism imposed
by the sensible world or the fate governing it. On the theological side there
was the need to safeguard Plato's basic principles that the gods are never
responsible for evil (Rep. II. 379-80) and are free from change (ibid. 380-1),
in particular that they cannot be moved by prayers or sacrifices (Laws X. 905-7).
These points acquired special importance for Plotinus in the light of the need
to defend the world-soul and celestial gods against the Gnostics' charge that
they are evil or that their knowledge, at best, is inferior to that attainable
by man. These considerations are clearly paramount both in Plotinus' discussions
of astrology and in his examination of prayer. Thus at the start of the latter
three problems are set out. First, the fact that many prayers are answered
only after a long time would seem to imply that the gods have memory, (IV. 4.
30, 14 ff.); but this in Plotinus' view is impossible, first because memory
constitutes an inferior way of knowledge compared with pure intuitive insight
and, secondly, because memory of this world would involve an interest in the
world on the gods' part similar to that which causes the fall of the human soul. Secondly, and even worse, many prayers are for evil things; but gods can give
only good (ibid. 5 ff.). Finally there is the problem posed by theurgy, the
attempt to invoke and manipulate divine powers by ritual magic, with its impli­
cation that the gods are subject to human constraint and that "even the whole
heaven can be bewitched by men's audacity and art" (ibid. 28-30); it was a
primary concern for Plotinus' successors, whether their acceptance of theurgy
was partial (as with Porphyry) or total (as with Iamblichus), to show that their
views did not involve unacceptable consequences of this kind.

Similar concerns are uppermost in Plotinus' critique of astrological doc­
trine, which seems in its contemporary form, to have come under heavy Gnostic
influence. Armstrong, in his introduction to II. 3, lists among Plotinus'
objections, in addition to the charge that they exaggerate the stars' causality,
the points (1) that they make the stars evil and the cause of evil to men,
(2) that they make them changeable and subject to variations of mood, and (3)
that they regard them as acting independently and capriciously instead of following
the rational and orderly direction of Universal Soul. With regard to the
first point Plotinus observes that to conceive the stars as harming beings
who have never harmed them is to charge them with acting in a manner unworthy
even of decent men, let alone gods; indeed it is doubtful whether even bad
men would act in such a way, unless they expected some profit from so doing.
As for the idea that the stars derive sexual pleasure from driving human beings
to adultery, it is simply absurd (II. 3. 6. 1-4). Equally absurd are the
anthropomorphic view that the stars change from good to evil according to whether
they see each other or not, or that such changes depend on whether they are
rising or setting or pass from day into night; for such terms have meaning only
in relation to the earth, not for the stars themselves. Hence both Plotinus'
general metaphysical views and detailed arguments of this kind require the
rejection of any such view of the nature of the stars' causality.
There is, however, another way of conceiving that causality which is no less repugnant to Plotinus' basic principles, and that is to conceive it in materialist or corporeal terms. Against this Plotinus argues, first, that the idea that the stars operate through cold or moisture is inconsistent with the true view of them as composed of pure fire; secondly, that material causation could not in fact produce all the effects the stars are supposed to produce. We may indeed suppose that the stars influence man's bodily constitution and thereby affect his lower, irrational soul, but the effect of such influence would be severely limited and could scarcely produce all the variations in character the astrologers allege. And how in any case could they cause lucky or unlucky events, such as noble birth or the discovery of a treasure? In fact, however, there is no more reason to suppose the stars to be causes of all they indicate than are the birds from whose observation diviners draw omens, and there are some events which they indicate of which they obviously cannot be the cause, namely those, like noble ancestry, whose roots lie in the past. (II. 3. 14. 2-4, III. 1. 5. 41-53.) Similarly the Aristotelian principle that the sun and the heavens contribute to the birth of living beings also severely limits their influence; the sun does not produce a horse, but merely gives something thereto (II. 3. 12). The stars are thus only one of many causes, hereditary and environmental, whose relative importance is determining a being's nature requires careful investigation, a view in support of which Plotinus quotes the stock examples of beings born at the same time with totally distinct characters and destinies (III. 1. 5. 5-9). The most important restriction on the stars' causality however, will become clear if we examine the world-view in terms of which Plotinus regards astrology and other paranormal phenomena as finding their explanation.

The answer, in Plotinus' view, lies in an adaptation to his own system of the Stoic doctrine of "cosmic sympathy", the view that the sensible universe constitutes "one living creature embracing all living creatures within it, and having one soul reaching to all its parts, insofar as each thing is part of it" (IV. 4. 32. 4-7). There is thus a network of invisible psychic forces linking everything within the cosmos, each of whose parts, like those of any other living being, may exercise a sympathetic effect on, or itself react in sympathy with, any other part (II. 3. 7, IV. 4. 32). Similarly, just as a man's character, or the state of his liver, may be inferred from his eyes, so one part of the cosmos, such as the stars, may indicate what is happening in another part (II. 3. 7. 4-10). Thus even when the stars are not causes, they may be signs, they are like letters for those to read who can. For just as other living things develop from a seed according to the natural law governing their development, so the universe is governed by a single directing principle, the Universal Logos, which is the source of its activities and brings them into harmony with one another. Hence the interactions between its parts may be compared to the movements of a dancer, whose limbs move in perfect co-ordination at each step under the direction of the single rhythm governing the whole dance (IV. 4. 33). Thus any accusation that the stars act at random falls to the ground, since their actions spring not from their individual will, but from their being parts of the universal organisms, and hence follow the direction of the Universal Logos (II. 3. 6. 10-20).

Paranormal phenomena in Plotinus' view provide empirical confirmation that the doctrine of cosmic sympathy, like those of the unity of all souls and the organic nature of the sensible cosmos, on which that doctrine depends, is correct. But he is equally emphatic that without it even the ordinary
phenomena of sense-perception would be impossible (IV. 5 passim). Most important is the fact that the doctrine is a necessary consequence of his view of reality as a hierarchy of degrees of unity, in which the sensible world’s organic unity constitutes the best possible imitation, on its own level, of the unity-in-diversity of the intelligible cosmos. Hence on two vital points Plotinus transforms the Stoic theory to accord with his own metaphysics. First of all the interaction between the world’s parts should not be conceived, as the Stoics conceived it, in crudely mechanistic or corporealist terms. What determines the sympathetic reaction between one part and another is not, Plotinus maintains, a matter of far and near, but of like and unlike; action may take place between two parts separated by vast physical distances and without affecting intervening objects in any way (II. 4. 32. 13-25). Similarly a medium between the eye and its object is necessary only incidentally, to ensure that both form part of the same psychophysical world organism: sight depends not on the transmission of an image through a medium, but on a sympathetic reaction of the object and the organ of vision (IV. 5. 2-3). Whether such effects are beneficial or harmful depends on whether the nature of the recipient is in harmony with that of the agent; hence evil effects are due, not to the stars’ deliberate intention, but to the individual’s inability to receive their gifts in their pure state. But in any case, since both giver and recipient fall under the direction of the Universal Logos, such evil is so only for the part; viewed in the context of the whole universe—and here Plotinus agrees completely with the Stoa—there is nothing evil or unnatural, though the conditions of the physical world do not always permit each of its members to have what it would like.

The second fundamental point on which Plotinus corrects the Stoics is that in his view each individual is subject to the Fate governing the sensible world only insofar as he is part of that world. But, as we have seen, the higher souls of both men and gods belong to the intelligible order. Hence the latter, living wholly by their higher souls, are at all times totally free from the network of forces governing this world; man, on the other hand, has to choose whether to live by his true self or to submit to his lower being and thereby subject himself to the domination of Fate. It is true that his higher soul, in her descent, has joined herself to the harmony governing the sensible order and that even her acts are therefore indicated by the stars; this is possible since, deriving as they do from the same intelligible source, all souls are ultimately one (IV. 3. 8. 1-4, 12. 12-30). But as long as man remains on that level, the stars are only signs for him, and no more. This Plotinus takes as Plato’s meaning in the Timaeus and Republic X, and especially of the famous remark in the latter that “virtue has no master.” The consequences of this view for the divine souls will become clear if we examine Plotinus’ treatment of magic and petitionary prayer.

These phenomena Plotinus regards as similarly explicable by the magician’s learning to apply the same psychical forces as are already naturally operative within the physical world. The magician’s power, he once again stresses, depends on his situation within that world and his ability to adapt himself to its forces so as to draw on them. For instance there is a natural magical attraction which leads men to fall in love, and love-magic involves simply a skillful application of the forces it involves (IV. 4. 40). Once again, however, the power of magic extends only to men’s body and lower soul. Hence even the sage is not immune to a magical attack on his body or lower soul; he may, for instance, fall sick or even face the danger of death, and have to
resort to counter-spells to repulse the attack*. But his true self remains
immune, and contemplation, the soul's inner self-concentration, secures his
essential being against attack; conversely the man whose goal is action in
the external world has already yielded to that world's beauty and thereby
succumbed to its magical spell (IV. 4. 43-4). It is easy, reading such passages,
to dilute Plotinus' references to 'magic' into a mere metaphor. This, however,
is a mistake parallel to the view, which he rejects, that the stars' power
over men resides only in their beauty, not in the stars themselves or their
groupings (ibid. 35. 57ff.). Plotinus recognises the efficacy of the incantations
and gestures used by the magician (ibid. 40. 21 ff.), as also of the stones
and herbs he employs (ibid. 35. 69-70). Hence the paradox of his position.
It is true that falling victim to magic is in his view no more mysterious
than falling in love or the emotional appeal of a piece of music (ibid. 40.
24-6) 30, but this is because in his view the sensible world, penetrated as
it is with magical forces, is already a more mysterious place than the ordinary
man believes it to be. Hence the man who pursues action for its own sake
is already a victim of the same forces as a magician would use against him.
The title "paranormal phenomena" is thus misleading; the trouble is that the
common man admires only what is unfamiliar and fails to see the same powers as
operative in the everyday things he takes for granted. Similarly, being un­
willing to recognise that "soul" and "life" admit of degrees, he regards
only beings that visibly live and move as alive. Yet, if he conducted a
proper philosophical inquiry, he would see that the activities of supposedly
inanimate things, such as the burning of fire, are inexplicable without the
power of a sustaining and governing soul (IV. 4. 36. 15 ff., 37. 1 ff.). Here
is yet another of the dominant themes running through Plotinus' whole philosophy.
On the one hand, here, as elsewhere, he shows himself determined on a rational
explanation of phenomena; yet this in its turn he regards as possible only
by totally overthrowing the common-sense view of the world.

Petitionary prayer, for Plotinus, is only one application of magic among
many. Just as one string may vibrate in harmony with another, so prayer may
evoke a sympathetic response from the world-soul or the lower soul of one of
the celestial gods (IV. 4. 41). Hence, if we describe them as "hearing" the
prayers addressed to them, we should be clear that this involves a mere auto­
matic response on their part without will or awareness (IV. 4. 26. 1-4). Similarly
there is no reason why prayers should not be answered only after a considerable
time, without our having to ascribe memory to the gods (ibid. 43. 11-12). The
stars' attention is wholly concentrated on their higher soul's contemplation of
the intelligible world, while their lower soul is wholly free from the passions
that perturb men, since the body they govern is either (in the case of the stars)
composed of a purer substance than curs or (in the case of the world) all-
containing and without external wants or dangers, and hence admits of automatic
control, without deliberate, conscious attention. Hence, if there is any place
in Plotinus' thought for any form of divine grace, this does not involve change
or deliberate intent on the gods' part. For both men and gods the only worthy
object of contemplation is the intelligible world; hence the only prayer worthy
of the philosopher is the soul's silent concentration upon that order. This
is why Plotinus ranks petitionary prayer on such a relatively low level and
exempts the gods from any conscious concern with it; as Bréhier observes:
"jamais le culté n' a été plus extérieur, plus réduit à son côté matériel que
dans sa doctrine". On such an explanation it is clearly no more remarkable
that wicked men's prayers should be answered than that they should draw water
from streams, or use any other natural force; but since the world is subject
to divine law, they will subsequently have to pay for their sin (IV. 4. 42. 14-19). What is especially noteworthy is the contrast not just with popular religious ideas, but with the Stoics' continual stress on the deliberate and anthropocentric nature of divine benevolence. Thus, whereas they had seen divination as one of the most obvious benefits bestowed on man by God, for Plotinus the stars are fully occupied with their own business, and the possibility of astrological divination is merely a necessary but incidental and unintended consequence of their movements. Similarly that procreation can occur unintentionally and without awareness is for Plotinus a sign that the gods' gifts may be similarly unintended (IV. 4. 37. 21-5); Seneca, on the other hand, while admitting that we owe gratitude to our parents whether they intended to beget us or not, denies emphatically that the gods can have failed to intend the good they do us (De Benef. VI. 23). The contrast speaks for itself.

Finally, that theurgy can in Plotinus' system play no part in the soul's return to the intelligible order is clear from the fact that its operations, like those of any form of magic, must remain confined within the sensible cosmos. We have already remarked Plotinus' indignation at the theurgists' claim to command the World-soul; but the Gnostics' boast that their spells have power even over the intelligible beings arouses even greater resentment on his part (II. 9. 14. 1-11). The episodes from Porphyry's biography that have sometimes been taken as showing that Plotinus himself practised magic have been fully dealt with by Professor Armstrong and need no treatment here. A careful reading of them will show that, while Plotinus may not have disapproved of ritual worship for others, he saw no need to engage in it himself; that, while he permits the sage to use magic for the limited practical purpose of self-defense, this has nothing to do with theurgy; and, while he was on one occasion persuaded to attend an evocation of his guardian daemon (which turned out to be a god), the only daemon that really interested him was the metaphysical conception of the daemon as an inner psychological principle. This is the subject of the treatise III. 4, On our Guardian Daemon, which Porphyry claims was inspired by the event in question; if so, Plotinus will have astutely seized the occasion to turn his pupils' attention away from popular religion towards philosophy.

There is, however, one chapter from the earlier part of the treatise On the Soul (IV. 3. 11), which appears to accord theurgy at least a qualified respectability and which, since it has often been overlooked, is worth discussing even in violation of our earlier injunction against giving too much weight to isolated paragraphs. Here Plotinus remarks that "the ancient sages", who sought to secure the gods' presence in shrines and statues, considered the nature of the universe and realised that Soul would be easy to attract if a suitable receptacle were prepared for her (ibid. 1-8). In seeming to tone down the passage's theurgic implications, Dodds notes Plotinus' further remark that what is needed is a representation suitable "in any way" (ibid. 7 τὸ ἀποστρατέυσιν μιμητικά), which, he claims, "seems to involve denying any specific virtue to magical rites of consecration". But, as we have seen, while Plotinus may be taken here as denying that such rites are always necessary, our other evidence shows clearly that he did believe in their efficacy. And that special rituals and ritual objects were in fact used in the construction of such images is clear from our ancient evidence, such as the Hermetic Asclepius' defence of the Egyptian image cult (paras. 23-4, 37). That the cult of magical images in fact originated in Egypt is accepted by Dodds himself, and there is a strong resemblance between the reference here to the "ancient sages" and that at V. 8. 6. 1 to the "Egyptian wise men".
Admitting then the theurgic reference of the passage, we may see in it a much more tolerant attitude, at least to magic of this kind, than appears in the latter part of IV. 4, with its implication that magic constitutes a distraction for the philosopher that is at best superfluous for him and at worst a danger. On the other hand not even in IV. 3. 11 is there any hint that theurgic ritual plays any part in the philosopher's ascent and here, as elsewhere, the powers invoked by the theurgist do not go beyond the level of soul. Hence in the debate as to the value of theurgy Plotinus would here be on the side of Porphyry against Iamblichus; more precisely, Porphyry, in framing his view of theurgy as an easier first step for the average man, took care not to depart from his master's metaphysical views39. On the other hand a follower of Iamblichus could note the implication of the latter part of IV. 3. 11 (8-26) that the divine intelligences are indirectly present in their statues through the intermediary of their respective souls in the same way that the solar intelligence is indirectly present in the physical sun through the intermediary of its own soul, and might wonder whether, if Plotinus had developed this idea, the difference between him and Iamblichus might turn out to be mainly one of emphasis. Yet not merely would the difference of emphasis even so remain fundamental; as has been shown elsewhere it rests upon profound metaphysical differences between Iamblichus and his predecessors regarding the relation of the several orders of Reality to one another, and especially regarding the status of the human soul. Furthermore a reply to the charge that the theurgists claim to subject the gods to human constraint was possible only in the light of Iamblichus' new stress on the role in theurgy of divine grace, a concept present only in embryo, if at all, in Plotinus40. What IV. 3. 11 does seem to show is that Porphyry's advocacy of ritual as an easier way for those unable to pursue philosophy directly is far less un-Plotinian than has often been supposed, and may perhaps have had Plotinus' tacit approval, or even encouragement. If so, not merely would Plotinus have been in no danger of departing from his own principles; he would of gone a long way towards removing one of his system's greatest weaknesses.
NOTES

1. II. 3. 1. 1-3: "Οτι η των αστρων φορά σημαίνει περί ηματον τα έσομενα άλλα όσω αντι παντα πολες, ως τοσ τοσ κολλοις σοδεσται, εφόπται... The erroneous interpretation is maintained by even a scholar of the calibre of Dodds; cf. "Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety" p. 15.

2. Cf. e.g. Iamblichus De An. 377. 9ff., discussed on pp. 9-10 of that paper.

3. Cf. p. 188 of his Budé notice to the treatise; for another view cf. Harder's note ad loc.

4. II. 1. 6. 54, III. 5. 6-7, IV. 3. 18. 22-4, IV. 4. 43. 12-16.

5. As in the sixteenth century "with the learned and the studious the question was not so much whether astrology was true, but whether all of it were true", Sir Charles Sherrington, "Man on his Nature" (Cambridge 1941) p. 59. Similarly those who have read e.g. Ine's praise of Christianity for its opposition to astrology ("Philosophy of Plotinus" I. p. 51) may be somewhat startled by the amount of astrological lore that Medieval Christians in fact accepted. For Plotinus as an opponent of astrology cf. Firmicus Maternus, Mathesis IV. 11-14, quoted by Henry, "Plotin et l' Occident" pp. 31-4.

6. That the Epicurean system does not admit the possibility of divination is in his view strong evidence of that system's falsity (III. 1. 3. 13-17).


9. IV. 4. 31. 29-32: νόν δε τα πάσαν η τος πλεξότος συγχωρομένα εξσάντες οὕτως ἔχειν, δόσα διὰ λόγον φανεχται, περιφανόν λέγειν ἵνα τού τρόπον...

10. Cf. II. 3. 5. 1ff., IV. 4. 31. 32ff. The main exceptions are II. 3. 6. 1 where the names Ares and Aphrodite have special reference, and the very doubtfully authentic section II. 3. 12. 12ff., an apparent reply to II. 3. 5.

11. Cf. Puech's remark (Sources de Plotin) p. 181 on the extreme generality of Plotinus' anti-Gnostic polemic and the problems it poses.

12. For natural mantic cf. III. 1. 3. 15-16. There may be an allusion to telepathy at IV. 9. 3. 6-9; cf. Dodds' discussion at op. cit. p. 165 n.8; on the Neoplatonists' general lack of interest in telepathy cf. ibid. pp. 165-6.


17. II. 3. 1. 6 ff., 2. 16-21, IV. 4. 31. 48-57.

18. II. 3. 1. 12-24, 3-4, 5. 6-10, etc.; III. 1. 6. 11-18.


20. II. 3. 3. 27-8, III. 1. 5. 33-7, 6. 23-4.


22. II. 3. 7. 4-6. 20-3, III. 3. 6. 17-22.

23. In addition to the passages so far noted cf. also IV. 9. 3. 1-9.


25. For Neoplatonic criticisms of Stoic mechanism cf. SVF. II. 342-3; the crudity of the Stoic view of divine agency is also brought out by Epictetus I. 14 and the Stoic-influenced De Mundo.


27. II. 3. 9-10, III. 1. 8-10, III. 3. 6, IV. 4. 34, etc.


29. IV. 4. 43. 1-11. Whether these "counter-spells" are only a metaphor for the soul's power of contemplation, as Armstrong suggests (Phronesis 1955 p. 76), must remain doubtful. In any case there is surely no suggestion, as Armstrong implies, that they are used to repel a magical attack on the sage's higher soul; for Plotinus is emphatic that the higher soul, especially that of the sage, is immune to magic; this is why the sage cannot fall victim to love-spells (ibid. 43. 5-7). The counter-spells are rather to repel an attack on his irrational element (ibid. 7-8). (There is admittedly a difficulty, in that Plotinus seems to say that philtre-love requires the consent of the higher soul, which would contradict his other statements about magic, but his reasoning may be:--(a) such love requires the consent of the level on which a man lives; but (b) in the case of the sage this is the rational soul, which can never yield to magic; hence (c) such love is impossible for him. In any case, the sage's higher soul is even here clearly stated to be unaffected.)

30. Cf. also the echoes in the passage of Plato's condemnation of the effects of art on the irrational soul. For Plotinus' view of magic cf. also II. 3. 15. 13-17, IV. 9. 3. 1-6.

31. Cf. IV. 4. 35. 38ff., 37. 18ff., 40. 27ff., 42. 1ff.; on the differences between divine and human souls cf. e.g. II. 9. 2, IV. 3. 4. 21ff., IV. 8. 2, etc.

32. Cf. IV. 9. 4. 6, V. 1. 6. 8, V. 8, 9, 13.

33. Bude IV. p. 53.
34. For the Stoic view cf. e.g. Cicero De Div. I. 38. 82, for Plotinus cf. II. 3. 3. 25-8, 9. 34-9, III, 1. 6. 18-24, IV. 4. 39. 13-18; with these passages contrast esp. Seneca De Benef. VI. 20ff.


37. Ibid., pp. 292-5.

38. Ibid., p. 293.


40. For the difference Cf. "Neoplatonism" pp. 118-23 and Dodds: Proclus, Elements of Theology p. xx.