Symbol and Structure in Heraclitus

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In any consideration of the fragments of Heraclitus, the most difficult, yet most necessary, question arises about the basic terms and relationships that lie behind the thought as we have it. Normally in any Aristotelian or post-Aristotelian explications of thought, this question would be unnecessary since both the terms of thought and the relationships implied are totally familiar to us and part of our common cognitive baggage. Unfortunately—or fortunately as the case may be—this is not the case with the Pre-Socratics in general and Heraclitus in particular.

Consequently interpretations of Heraclitus have led us into immense difficulty and confusion. Scholarship since eighteen hundred is a case in point. It is, however, interesting in an historical sense, since from it the necessity of a new interpretative stance becomes incontrovertibly obvious.

If one were to consider the critical opposition involved in Heraclitian scholarship, one could easily divide the stances into two fairly distinct "schools." The major difference between the two groups is that while the former has zealously devoted itself to the study of the specific meanings of terms within a larger scientific context, the latter has approached Heraclitus in terms of more general issues, e.g. logic, religion, nature, etc.

The one "school," as I see it, takes its inception at the time of Bywater's edition of the Heraclitan fragments at the end of the nineteenth century. John Burnet subsequently analyzed the fragments in materialistic and scientific terms. For instance, he argued that the "phenomenon of combustion" guided Heraclitus' choice of pyr (fire). He saw the Heraclitan prester in terms simply of a "hurricane accompanied by a fiery water spout." The stance was rigidly objective and materialistic. It is a stance that maintained itself for over half a century, even though the strain has become easy enough to detect.

I am speaking now specifically of W.K.C. Guthrie's presentation of the Pre-Socratic in his History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge 1962-1965). Heraclitus' "method of thinking" interests Guthrie considerably. He argues that this method is based upon neither polumathia or historia. What it is, however, he declines to say, except for applying the scientist's condemnation with faint praise: For him, Fragment 101 (ἐξειδομένη ἐμεωσετάν) shows Heraclitus' preoccupation with poetry. The Pre-Socratic is for him a prophet and poet. But is this so-called "poetic nature" not in fact somewhat difficult to apply to Heraclitus, for while he does lay claim to inspiration for himself, he condemns poets in general?

The most interesting section in Guthrie's book is one dealing with the uses of the word "logos" up to the time of Heraclitus. The reasoning behind this philological examination is somewhat subtle, for Guthrie wishes to investigate the various
meanings that could be unified into a single concept in Heraclitus' mind but which remain separate for us since we have no single word to express what he meant by "logos." But Guthrie finds difficulty in expressing the unity in meaning behind the concept even given its necessary unity from the Heraclitian point of view. He gives us, in effect, little more than a pasticcio of meanings that are only marginally relevant to the understanding of what the concept of Logos might mean. One feels an overdependence upon the lexicon with its minute understanding of particular words at the expense of attention to a larger, more informative context.

Guthrie argues that there is some naive combination of matter and spirit in Heraclitus' philosophy. The Logos is, then, part material and part spiritual. Can this combination be sustained without turning Heraclitus into a muddleheaded quack? It depends entirely on what Guthrie might mean by "material." His Cartesian mind/body division does indicate, however, that "material" in his book is "physical" and "objective." There is no symbolic nature involved. Guthrie takes it for granted, along with Burnet, that it was -- that is, perception for him is of necessity a perception of the material, physical, and objective world. For him: "the material aspect of the Logos is fire." The fire "represents for Heraclitus the highest and purest form of matter... or rather soul and mind themselves, which in a more advanced (sic) thinker would be distinguished from any matter whatsoever." It is difficult for me to accept as applicable to Heraclitus the basic premise of "matter" which Guthrie assumes time and time again in his study.

Guthrie, then as I read him, is so imbued with a certain physical and empirical point of view that he can think of the fragments in no other terms, and although he admits freely that what Heraclitus has to say about "matter" has nothing at all to do with what we consider to be matter, he nonetheless proceeds to approach Heraclitus in material terms, dividing the problem unnaturally into material and spiritual characteristics.

If Heraclitus spoke in terms of matter, then a scientific interpretation would be in good order; if not, then a nonmaterialistic viewpoint is called for. In any case, it is difficult indeed to see the real value of Guthrie's analysis. The dichotomy he establishes was, even on his own admission, unknown to Heraclitus.

The second school tends, if anything, to err on the side of overgenerality and a distinct preference for the philosophical stances of German Idealism. It was Schleiermacher who first dealt with Heraclitus in a comprehensive sense. His book is an excellent criticism of the sources of the fragments that lists each genuine fragment of Heraclitian doctrine as he sees it with commentary and translation. He does not insist on the strict ipsissima verba, however, as does Diels, and therefore has only made a collection of possible Heraclitian ideas—although, as Lassalle says, with
high critical ability.\textsuperscript{10} His commentary is useful but does not reveal clearly the critical stance of the second "school." Hegel is fundamentally more interesting on the question because of the remarkable similarity between his own logical processes and those of Heraclitus himself. His exposition of Heraclitus' philosophical content is given in and for his own terms and concepts, and the form of analysis is, therefore, rather like Aristotle's in Metaphysics A. But Hegel's exposition possesses one distinct advantage over that of the first school—also, as I have shown, given in its own terms and concepts—in that Hegel is capable of clarifying a method or structure of thought that lies behind the fragments in general rather than merely a select group of them. This is a distinct critical advantage.

Hegel evidently sees his own logic in that of Heraclitus—that is a similar hierarchical and heuristic movement that is structured upon a dialectic of opposites (Gegenstände)\textsuperscript{11} As he says, in Heraclitus there is a speculative method of thought that is capable of dealing validly with becoming as well as with the One.\textsuperscript{12} There exists a "truth of becoming" whose primary characteristic is its oppositional nature--a nature that allows the presence, on an equal basis, of Being and Not-Being.\textsuperscript{13} Hegel, as I read him, has uncovered the most pertinent characteristic of Heraclitian thought: the structure of an oppositional logic divorced from, but regulating entirely, the objective world of naive sense perception.

It seems to me possible to argue that both Hegel and Heraclitus comprehend the world from a speculative point of view that suggests a specific phenomenological realm between what we should probably call subjective and objective reality. Hence there is a likelihood of strong relationships between the Hegelian Vernunft and the Heraclitian idea of phronēsis. Olof Gigon twenty-five years ago indicated that he too appreciated the subjective quality of phronēsis. He calls it the Heraclitic "subjektive Korrelat."\textsuperscript{14}

The symbolic qualities of the logic of opposition were examined by Hegel's pupil, Ferdinand Lassalle. It was he who argued that a number of words found in Heraclitus are in fact symbols for the same principle or idea.\textsuperscript{15} Fire, Time, Flowing, etc. all represent in themselves a unity made up of a type of oppositional process between Being and Not-Being.\textsuperscript{16} Lassalle finds these symbols to be of a religious nature. But he also conceives of them in logical terms, and this is his important contribution to our own understanding of Heraclitus. For Lassalle these various literary or religious symbols represent in logical terms phenomena associated with a certain type of perception that form a part of a larger dialectic directed towards what I should call, the comprehension of the underlying Logos itself. One could and should argue that the logic of Idealism is speaking too strongly in Lassalle's analysis, as it is
ultimately in Hegel's, but what is so important for the present study is that they both stressed the symbolic as well as the structural nature of Heraclitian thought. Lassalle endeavored to place certain symbolic phenomena into a logical context that implies some kind of a ground of human comprehension, and while the Hegelian influences are obvious, it seems to me that both Hegel and he have indicated the central feature of Heraclitus as we have him in our present collection of fragments.

It is, then, the structure and symbol of Heraclitian logic that interests Hegel, Lassalle, and us. To begin with, both Germans describe an oppositional character that is all-inclusive but not static—that is, opposites are not a simple x/-x but an "Identität des Widerstreben den." Hegelian and Heraclitian opposites are not, then, opposites on one plane of thought or consciousness as they are for someone who might see logic working linearly and mathematically within the framework of objective sense perception—a framework which I think to Hegel would be based on Nichtsein and to Heraclitus on kathenicon. It is the hierarchical movement of opposites, the heuristic logic that continually puts phenomena into correlated opposition, that characterizes both men's thought.

The two "schools" of interpretation I have just described indicate, I think, that a third point of view might solve the dilemma of a certain overly-scientific philology on the one hand that cannot see the forest for the trees and of a certain overly idealistic philosophy on the other that sees the forest but at times neglects the oak. I am referring to a view towards which man like Hegel and Lassalle admittedly point but do not actually encompass. The basic terms of Heraclitian thought (that is, its symbols or the significant words that recur) and the relationships that draw the thought into comprehensible patterns have never been considered as the primary key to any understanding of Heraclitus. Yet, if one, following Harold Cherniss, makes a valiant attempt to discard the general Aristotelian prejudice of mind and then considers the fragments in simple symbolic and structural terms, a rather novel picture of the pre-Socratic world must perforce arise.

First, let us examine the symbolic content of Heraclitian thought—that is, the possible significance of those words which act as key concepts or points of meaning. The primary logical symbol in Heraclitus is the Logos. It is an omnipotent sign ruling both the subjective and objective world of perception and experience. here is a phenomenon, we are told, according to which all things come into being (γνωμένων γάρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόδε ...), that makes itself known to men—at least those who are capable of understanding it—in terms of words and deeds which Heraclitus has taken upon himself to set out in some detail (1). The phenomenon is also common, although in no way private (idios). It pertains not at all to man's separate and idiosyncratic nature but to the way he thinks that is to his phronēsis (Frs. 2, 113, & 114). One may easily consider the Logos to be a psychological, subjective phenomenon, deeply-rooted and dynamic. The hone of the Logos is the psyche which in itself has no limits, because it possesses the dynamism
of the Logos so deeply (...

of the Logos so deeply (...

Men, when associated with the Logos, are separated from the day to day world so it sometimes appears strange to them—that is, the objective, material world does not always seem to reflect the formal and holistic nature of the Logos itself, as of course it cannot because of the necessary objective and subjective orientation of the phenomenon at hand. (Διήνεκες άθλους λόγως τὸ ἕλιον ἐκεῖνος, τοῦτο διαφέροντα, καὶ οἷς καθίσματι ἐγκυμοσύνη, τώρα αὐτὸς ἐξοχήνος -72).

No, one of the most distinctive characteristics of the Logos is its holistic character—that is, it is one and makes all things one (οὐχ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ ἐκκύμοντος ὁμολογεῖν οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν πάντα εἶναι -50).

This one, this omnipotent psychological and experiential symbol, alone is wise. It is a phenomenon that is supreme since it is separated from all things (...

In what we should call the subjective realm, this one is best described in terms of the elusive physis of man (Fr. 123); in the objective realm of political life, however, the one assumes the form of nomos (νόμος καὶ βουλή εὐρεδαφά ευς). The traditional opposition of physis and nomos assumes in Heraclitus characteristics of a true phenomenological concept. 22 He, no doubt, assumes some original archaic distinction between the two. 23 In any case, objectively one must defend nomos just as one would one's polis (44). All men speaking with nous must put firm trust in this common, omnipotent phenomenon, just as the city does in law. This nomos is, in fact, the omnipotence of the Logos as it is revealed in objective, political law. (Εὖν νῷμο ἐγών ἀρχιτέκτων χρῆ τῇ ἐμῇ πάντες, ὅσοι εἰμὶ νόμῳ κάλλις, καὶ τοῦ ἐγκυμοσύνης, τρέφοντα τῷ πάντες τις ἀνθρώπης νόμοι ὡς ἐνὸς τῷ θεός νωτείς γιαρ τοσοῦτον ἐκόνου ἐπελθεί καὶ ἔπαικτο πάντα καὶ περιγίγνεται -114). In either realm the Logos is possessed of extreme power: it is omnipresent; it is impossible to avoid (τὰς ὑμᾶν κατα ἐν τοῖς λάθοι 16).

The Logos reveals itself directly in language. Heraclitus declares that it has something to do with what people say or hear: "A stupid man is wont to be all aflutter at every Logos"—87. "In Pirene was born Bias son of Teutames whose Logos is more than the others"—39. "Of as many men as I hear logos from, no one comes to this, so as to know that sophon ἐστι separated from all"—108. These three fragments reveal that logos are qualitative phenomena—that is, logos are better than others. They are better because they tend to describe or communicate the condition of the one supreme Logos which is "separated from all." We have, then, a Logos here that is some sort of explanation of things, and it appears to me that the connection between this "explanation" and
the Logos itself could possibly have something to do with the structure or intent of this explanation—that is, how oppositional or specifically logical, i.e. "possessed of the Logos" it might be. There is some evidence, for example, that it was Bias who uttered the first of the Heraclitian aphorisms containing that the many are Lad and the few good (οὶ πολλοὶ κακοὶ ὄλυσι δε ὄγοι 104). The aristocratic intent is clear, and if indeed the point may be pressed to the extent than the second half of the fragment be Bias' too, then we are presented with the whole oppositional structure of Heraclitian thought. One could then argue that it was the "logical" way in which Bias expressed himself that attracted Heraclitus.

Generally speaking, then, the Logos of Heraclitus is a phenomenon peculiar to man, one to which man has access through his own particular intellect or comprehension. The region of the Logos is, however, not always apparent to men; it does not deal solely in terms of what we should probably call "scientific perception" or the purely objective world. It explains the subjective and objective in terms of an underlying unity whose oppositional structure may reveal itself in what a man says—perhaps even in the way he says it. There can be little doubt that we must derive the definition of the Logos from our understanding of the way it structures the world.

The Logos is also revealed to man in a set of subordinate symbols or extraordinarily meaningful words that man in turn uses to apprehend its nature. Heraclitus himself speaks of oracular signs that symbolize and do not hide: (ο ἄνετο, οὐ τὸ μαντεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἄλοιχ, οὐτε λέγει οὐτε πρύτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει 93). The symbol of the Logos is, in our terms, philosophical in inspiration; its logical symbols are, however, although there should be no excessive surprise in the fact—clearly grounded in lyric and epic literature and used widely by the other Pre-Socratics. There are several of these "minor symbols." Take, for instance, "gold." Then Heraclitus speaks of preferring sweepings to gold (9); he speaks most assuredly of those who prefer to ignore the Logos—a Logos he clearly indicates in 22 that is not material gold but a symbolic one: "Those seeking gold dig up a great deal of earth and find little." Perhaps it is man's logical conjectures themselves that he sees symbolized as "beautiful objects of children" (καλῶν ἀδύναμα 70) "beautiful in the sense that they might relate to the Logos, "of children" because man does not necessarily limit his thoughts, as he should, to "logical" ones.

There is some indication that the circle is also important for Heraclitus: "Common are the beginning and end in a circle (εὐνοῦν γὰρ ἀρχή καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου—103). Parmenides (5) also uses the symbol, as does Empedocles to an even fuller extent (17.13, 25.1, 35.10, et al). For Heraclitus it very possibly has something to do with a certain circular-dialectic
the Logos is capable of following. The road in Heraclitus symbolizes both the oppositional and tensed structural quality of the Logos: "The road up/down is one and the same" --60.27. The road may also indicate dialectical as well as oppositional qualities within the structure of the Logos: "The way of cloth-carder is straight and crooked." It too is "one and the same" --59.28. In other words, could it be that the Logos moves back and forth in an oppositional fashion while maintaining a forward course? I shall proffer examples of this dialectic subsequently. The hodos or heuristic quality of the hodos maintains important symbolic connotations in Heraclitus. One may not forget where this road leads (71) -- i.e., to a total comprehension of the Logos itself.

The underlying, tensed quality of the "logical" structure is represented also by Fris. The symbolic term is one previously exploited by Hesiod in the Theogony. Here again it takes on the unifying and connecting power of an underlying third term. War is "father and ruler of all." It creates opposites: men and gods and, among men, some slaves and some free (53). "It is necessary to know that war is common" (80) -- it shares that attribute with the Logos in Fr. 2. Heraclitus continues his identification of symbols by equating Dike with Fris (Strife). Just as all things come about by Fris and Need--80 (εἰςβεβαίω ὁ ἔλεος ἡ δίκη κατ' ἔνα ἀντίκτυπον ἐφεύγει διὸν, καὶ διότιν ἔρων, καὶ ἄρειμα Γάρνα κατ' ἔρων καὶ ἀρεά). Strife is a symbol of a third term uniting the oppositional structure of the Logos. It is a symbol easily taken from Heraclitus' Hesiodic background and one of several, along with chruseon and Dike that Heraclitus reduces to a simple equation with the Logos or its parts.

The sun is used at times as a symbol too. It is not always clear how much importance Heraclitus puts in it since, after all, he refuses to abide with purely objective astrological phenomena (consider for instance the possible collective meaning of fragments 42, 105, and 120). But if one were to take the sun as a phenomenological symbol -- that is one within the realm of symbolic perception-- the sun whose nature, as Hesiod does not know, is directly concerned with unity--or being one (106), then it very likely becomes another symbol for pyr. What is most important, however, is that the sun may easily be construed in symbolic terms-- that is, as a word of unusual significance-- also in the lyric poets. One clear example among many is Himmermus Diehl in which the golden cup of the sun, in moving from one side of a man's horizon to the other, obviously lies in an area formed by the intermediary of subjective and objective worlds within a man himself. Another similar example is Steisichorus Diehl 6. It is not surprising that Heraclitus would adopt the symbol for his own use. He speaks of the circular boundary of bright Zeus (οὐρας αἰθρίου Διός -120) with much the same meaning as Himmermus and makes the rather difficult statement that "the sun is new each day" (6) which I interpret as a way of
drawing attention to the insubstantial nature of the objective sun that is always being created anew and which may be covered by a man's foot (3) and does set (hence being "new each day"). What Heraclitus is pinpointing is a symbolic phenomenon that does not set or rise—that is a phenomenon which one cannot avoid (16). Than too the sun probably forms a simple equation with the symbol, fire—in their affective qualities, the major attribute of all symbolic perception, they hold much in common. And it is this fire or light that man "touches upon" or "kindles" for himself, even at night when the physical sun does not shine and he cannot see it (ἀνθέως ἐν εὐφόρῃ φῶς ἅπαντι ἑαυτῷ ἔκοψεν ὁ ἦλθες ... 26).

A predominant symbol in Heraclitus, then, is fire (pyr). It is very likely the main symbol for the Logos. Fire with its accompanying images or movement and color is a phenomenon used extensively in Homer and the lyric poets. It should not surprise us that Heraclitus adopted it as a primary symbol. At many times in the literature the phenomenon is largely non-material, non-prosaic. Take, for instance, Homer's comparison of god-like Hector to a flame (... φλάγχε ἐκείνῳ ἔκτοτε ήν I 13, 688) or the anger in Antinous' eyes that burn like fire (... φόσος δὲ οὗ πυρὸς λαμπρῶντι εἰς ἔκτον ... Od. 4. 662). In the Hymn to Pythian Apollo (440-445) the God's flame (phlox) and his shining, brilliant appearance are used in a religious and spiritual context. Radiance and light are indications or symbols of the god himself.29 The symbolic importance of fire may also be seen in Hesiod's Theogony at the point when Zeus no longer holds back his might but hurls his lightning against the enemy. He hurls "an awesome flame." The earth burns. Fire is all about. An "unspeakable flame" (φλόγα ὡστετος) rises to the upper air, and thunder and lightning blind his foes (Theogony 689-699). The destruction of one realm and establishment of another takes place in a great holocaust of light and fire. There are hundreds of other examples of fire as a phenomenon with wide non-materialistic overtones in the literature—Pindar, for instance, made startling use of it in Oly. 1.1. The point is that as a symbol it came ready made for Heraclitus, and it should not surprise us that he should turn to such a traditional word for the symbol of his Logos.30

For Heraclitus the symbol of the thunderbolt steers all much in the same way it does in the above example from Hesiod's Theogony (Heraclitus 64).31 The phenomenological cosmos was, is, and will be everlasting fire, kindling and quenching in measure (κόσμον τύπει ... ἐν ἀεί καὶ ἐστιν καὶ ἐστάτι πῦρ ἀείζων, ἀπὸ μέτρα καὶ ἀκοσμενώμενον μέτρα ... --30). Fire's most salient feature is this ability to measure and be a measure (metron), and it is by this feature that it is tied so strongly to logic. "Fire having come will judge, and will take hold of all things (πάντα γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐξελθὼν κρίνετ' καὶ καταληψεῖται --66). The "judgment" has immediate reference to fire's ability to measure. The "measure" is exchanged for all things in the phenomenological realm, just as in the physical one goods are exchanged for gold, and gold for goods (90).
The ideas of measured, oppositional, and dialectical change are symbolized by fire. It acts as a third term, underlying and connecting specific terms in a logical proposition or sometimes the whole proposition itself. The opposites day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, satiety/famine are manifestations of one you (no theos) who like fire when mixed with spices allows a man to name anything according to his pleasure (ὁ θεός ἡμέρα ἐφθάνη, χειμῶν θέρος, πέλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λυμός, ἀλλοτριάς ὁ ὄγκος ἐπηρέα ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνθρωπος). In considering the solstices or circular turnings (tropai) of fire, Heraclitus speaks of sea formed of the opposites, earth and prešter. But at this point the use of symbols has quite obviously expanded into the realm of structure, and we are confronted with the relationships that draw his thought into comprehensible patterns.

The philological and logical ground of the Heraclitian Logos, a poetic and logical device, is the well-known, but little understood, use of opposition. For us at the simplest level, oppositions are stated by a syntactical placement back to back. Take, for instance, the simple opposition of immortals and mortals in 62 (ἐθανατοί θυμοί, θυμοί ἐθανατοί ...). The opposites have no syntactical relationship except their immediate correlation with one another. It is in the placement of the words themselves that Heraclitus reveals the archaic sense of identity in opposition. In 67 he once again makes use of this syntactical juxtaposition: "The god is day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, satiety/famine" (ὁ θεός ἡμέρα ἐφθάνη χειμῶν θέρος, πέλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λυμός). And yet another example is 60: "The road up/down (ἀνά κάτω) is one and the same." This type of immediate juxtaposition extends to ideas of different grammatical forms—e.g., "it in changing rests" (84).

Grammatically, a slightly modified method of presenting opposites is to link them by a conjunction. This method is especially effective in those fragments which suggest or actually state a third term. Fragment 65 is merely a statement of connected opposites: "Need and satiety," but a statement such as "the road of ladders is straight and crooked (ἐθάνατα καὶ σκαλινὶ "--59) or "the same thing is inherent in one, living and dead, and awake and sleep and young and old, for the former having changed is the latter and the latter changing back is the former (84) are structural phenomena pointing to a third term (the "road" in the first case and "the same thing" in the second) which is the unifying principle of the Logos. The "river fragments" make a similar use of connected opposites: "It is not possible to stop twice in the same river...they scatter and combine...both approach and depart (ποταμῷ γὰρ οὖν ἐστὶν εἰμίναι δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ...σκίνθησι καὶ πάλιν 35 συνάγει...καὶ πρόσει ταῖς ἐπεξεργασίαις"--91). This "approaching" and "departing" is, however, in a strict dyadic form and thought, for as Heraclitus says elsewhere, "upon men stepping in the same rivers different and again different (ἐπέκειται καὶ ἐπεκείται) waters flow (12). It is the dyadic phrase ἐπέκειται καὶ ἐπεκείται that dictates the oppositional nature of the fragment itself because of the strict sense.
of disjunction yet identity the words imply. Yet everywhere the underlying third term, or the Logos as unity, is symbolized by the river—the river that elsewhere unifies life and death, the ultimate opposition for man: "we step in the same river and we do not; we are and are not" (ποταμὸς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ...εἴμεν τε καὶ σῦ εἴμεν —49Α). In describing the "joints" or harmony of his "logical" structure, Heraclitus again makes use of both the oppositional mode of speech in its simplest form and also that mode in its conjunctive one: "Joints are whole and not whole, brought together/separated, in tune/out of tune, both from all things one and from one all things" (συνάψες ἄλα καὶ ὄψ ὄλα, συμμερήσεως διαμερήσεων, συνάξων διάδον, καὶ ἐκ πάνων ἐν καὶ εἷς ἐνὸς πάντα —10). I shall speak at greater length concerning these "joints" subsequently; merely note here that Heraclitus has hit upon a convenient and natural syntactical, oppositional mode to express the underlying unity of his thought by placing opposites either back to back or connecting them conjunctively.

Oppositions may also be detected in total sentences in which more complicated ideas are juxtaposed or where one half of an opposition is implied. Whether a third term is expressed or not, in many instances an inclusion of both ideas in a single and simple sentence permits a remarkable degree of unity in expression. One may also begin to recognize in certain of these statements some of the secondary dialectical properties of Heraclitus' logical structure.

In the uncomplicated sentence, "if there were no sun, it would be night" (ἥλιος...ἐνθράν —99), Heraclitus makes use of the opposition between light and dark to reveal the polarity that occurs within his logic. That one opposite must imply the other is revealed in those fragments in which only one of the pair is fully stated. "Things await men who are dead that they do not expect or imagine" (27)—i.e. A content of death, albeit unknown, is implied by the content of life which does not find statement in the fragment. "Doctors cutting and burning are accused of taking no worthy pay for their acts" (58). They deserve their pay, however, for the doctor's act—a kind of third term—necessitates cutting and burning—phomena that in themselves imply their opposite, curing and health. Or consider: "They would not know the name of justice, if these things [presumably "unjust things"] were not (23). Justice assumes its definition by injustice. The one cannot exist without the other. Both are combined by a logical third term. men; however, see not this connection and assume things to be either unjust or just (τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἁγαθὰ καὶ ὀικατὰ, ἀνὴρταν δὲ ἢ μυνὶς ὁ ὀμελὴσαι ἢ δὲ ὀικατα —102). The unified, dualistic Logos lies as a third term behind the solely disjunctive view of opposites in the realm of men.

War for Heraclitus, as the third term, "has established some as gods and some as men; he has made some slave and some free" (53). Opposition by correlation is accomplished by the familiar men...de construction in the Greek. In another in-
stance, sea, as a third term, unites good and bad. It is good for fish and bad for man (61). Positive and negative qualities are inherent in one unifying phenomenon. Another excellent example of a third term posited in order to unify opposites occurs in 63 (Ἐνθα ὁ ἐδύναται ἐκκατάστασε καὶ ὕπαλαξε γίνεσθαι ἐγερθεὶς ἐκλευτὶ καὶ νεκρῶν). Some "being" arises that awakens --i.e. brings into full consciousness of the Logos—and guards the opposites of the living and the dead.

When opposites are linked by certain verbs, the dynamics of the structured opposition become clear. For instance, "cold things grow warm, a warm thing cools; moist dries, parch is moistened" (τὰ ψυχρὰ ἰέρεται, ἅρμον ψυχεῖται, ὑγρὸν ἀπαλεῖται, καρφυλένων νοτύζεται --126). Sickness makes health sweet and good, famine/satiety, weariness/rest (νόσος ὑγείας ἐκποιέσεν ἥν καὶ ἄγατον, λινὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάκαυσιν --111). The negative opposition can force a movement to the positive. The life-death opposition is also an active phenomenon. In a fragment that is clearly based on the oppositional nature of alphabetic privatives and the characteristically Greek realm of identity and opposition between mortals and immortals, Heraclitus reveals a dynamic movement in the Logos: "(immortals/mortals) / mortals/immortals), living the death of those, and dying the life of those (ΔΑΝΑΤΟΙ ΘΥΝΤΑΙ, ΘΥΝΤΑΙ ΔΑΝΑΤΟΙ, ΘΑΥΜΕΣ ἓκείων ἡμῶν δάνατον, τὸν ἐκείων ἔτην τεθνεῖτε --62).

A similar opposition is formed, as I see it, when Heraclitus opposes wet and dry psychē. To become wet is a delight for an improperly guided psychē and a death for the properly guided one. Defined ultimately by the dryness of his psychē--i.e. by his comprehension of the Logos--man, as the unifying third term in which the warlike opposition occurs, "lives the death that is the wet psychē while in man the wet psychē lives or takes life from the death or lessened comprehension of man (ψυχή_updated τέρψεν ἢ δάνατον ὑγραμφάγεσθαι... ζῆν ἡμᾶς τὸν ἐκείων δάνατον καὶ ζῆν ἐκείνας τὸν ἠμέτρον δάνατον -- 77). Within one area there is a constant opposition and identity of terms, moving dynamically from one state to the other.

Heraclitus goes beyond merely expressing certain conditions in which the oppositional nature of the Logos is realized. There exists a specific set of fragments in which this nature itself is more closely discussed. These are fragments dealing with the dynamics, the "joints," "harmonies," and "measures."

In a world of fluids where parts are impossible to identify, Heraclitus saw the symbols of the unifying dynamics of the Logos. I have already discussed the phrase ἑτερὰ καὶ ἑτερὰ in reference to rivers (12) as one that establishes the dyadic nature of Heraclitus' logic, as does the indistinguishable mixture of earth and sea within the convenient third term, προστήρ», in 31. The dynamics of the logic are also represented by the stirring of the barley drink that separates into two parts if not kept in motion (125). The phenomenological cosmos or Logos is in a constant state of tension and movement between opposites. As in a river there is a continual
"scattering and combining", approaching and departing, the former of the two changes into the latter and the latter, changing back, is the former. It is quite clear that the "joints" or the way the Logos is constructed are dyadic structures of reciprocal oppositions. These "joints" or "harmonies" are real only in the unapparent phenomenological world; the apparently paradoxical connections we actually seek in the physical world -- i.e. those oppositions to which Heraclitus has devoted so many fragments -- are only weaker examples of the stronger. That which is opposed is in agreement and from differing things comes the most beautiful means of joining (τὸ ἀντίστοιον συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφέροντων καλλίστῳ ἁρμονίᾳ). The masses "do not understand how a thing differentiated from itself agrees," that "a joining together is a changing to the other side, (καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐν τῷ διαφέροντι) just as in the case of the bow and the lyre". The structure of the Logos, then, is formed about tensed dyadic "junctures," like the tensed part of the bow or lyre (see also 48) -- junctures that change constantly from one to the other; the dynamics of flux rest upon a stable dualism of opposites.

The tensed polarity of opposites results in a measured regularity in the universe -- that is, certain "culminating" boundaries. They are symbolized, I believe, in Heraclitus' use of the seasons that bring all things. These "measures" are established patterns of logical behavior. The symbol of the sun, for instance, maintains its measures. If it did not the oppositional nature of Dīke -- i.e. The Logos would set it astraight (Ἡλίως γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερῆσει μέτρα, εἴ δὲ μὴ, Σεινῦσ μὲν Δίκης ἐξίκουροι ἑξευρήσουσει). Yet, Heraclitus' concept of the measured oppositional and structural nature of the Logos led him to express not only an oppositional structure involving a third connecting or underlying term but also to express a structure and its dynamics in which this third term unifies and identifies phenomena that are by nature qualitatively superior or inferior to one another. This was, of course, Hermann Frankel's discovery.

Frankel labels the logical apparatus of the Heraclitian dialectic "A geometrical mean." "A device to express the inexpressible and to explain the unexplainable." Given three planes, there is a movement embracing lowest and highest by means of the middle term. A good example of such a movement is found in 79: "A man is called foolish before god just as a child before man" (Ἄνὴρ νηπίος ἡκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὑκουσκε παῖς πρὸς ἀνήρ). "Thus," as he says,
"man, being the geometrical mean, may be called wise when compared to a boy, and childish when compared to god. He combines opposite qualities." However, it would seem that another point of the proportion god:man:boy is to express the superior term (god) in terms of the relationship between god and man and man and boy. There is a definite sense of a higher-lower relationship in the fragment. 36 is another case in which a mean is used to make the logic include a higher and lower term: "For psychai it is death to become water, for water it is death to become land. Water comes out of earth and psychai from water." Psychai:water::water:lane. In the alternating course of the logic, emphasis seems to be placed upon psyche as the desired point of departure and point of arrival while water is the mean or third term between the lowest and highest elements. The combination of fragments 32 and 83, neither of which are considered ipsissima verba but are obviously close paraphrases, form a third example of such a proportion: "The most beautiful ape is ugly compared to the race of men"; "The wisest of men will appear an ape in relation to god in wisdom, beauty, and everything else." God:man:man:ape. The same dynamic hierarchy applies as it did before. As Fränkel comments, "the essence of the pattern is that mundane values, when compared to the paramount, are tantamount to their opposites, the non-values."

"The pattern implies...the statement that the middle element B (man), when considered from a higher standpoint, is no better than its apparent opposite C (ape). Thus Heraclitus can reduce the equation to a shorter form by simply asserting that B virtually amounts to its opposite C. The thrust of the dynamic is at the expense of the lowest term and depends upon a constant shifting in the definition of the third or mean term.

Now if the "mean principle" is carried one step further—that is, if a second mean is introduced—the circular nature of the logic becomes apparent and the dynamics are once again resolved into a stable structure. Through a geometrical progression a complete cycle of mutual relations come into being. 76, a close paraphrase of the ipsissima verba, presents us with a fine example of this enlarged geometrical proportion: "fire lives the death of earth and air lives the death of fire, water lives the death of air, earth that of water." Earth:fire::fire:air::air:water::water:earth. The dialectic here is circular, and the structure steadfast.

It should be clear by now that the structure of the thought purposely overrides or defines its hierarchical nature. Yet another way by which the structure deals with qualitatively disparate phenomena occurs when oppositions entailing a third term are used to imply a three-termed opposition of one order higher. At these times the superior term of the first three-termed opposition is in itself a mixture of opposites and becomes a mean in an opposition of a higher order that cannot be expressed as mathematically as above examples. In discussing the "solstices of fire" (31), Heraclitus makes the seemingly uncomplicated statement "the transformations of fire:first
sea—on the one hand, half the sea is earth; on the other, half is preštor (εὔρος τροφα ἐπὶ τὸν ἡμίςτος, ἡμίςτος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμίςτος γη, τὸ δὲ ἡμίςτος προστήρ). The opposition originally is earth/sea/preštor. But the implication is clearly sea/preštor/pyr because the preštor is a mixture of fire and water. A three-termed opposition implies within it a three-termed opposition a degree more advanced.

26 is another clear example of this type of structural impetus: "Living and asleep man approximates one who is sleeping" (... τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ζωῆς, ἀρρητῶς εἰς τῶν ζωῆς τῆς ζωῆς) The first opposition is death/sleeping-life/waking-life; but just as sleeping-life touches upon death and waking-life, so waking-life must touch on sleeping-life and something higher which I should call "true life." So the following opposition is therefore implied: "sleeping-life/waking-life/life.

The process here is again more geometrical since the middle term of the larger proportion (death:sleep-waking::sleep-waking::life), considered from the point of view of real life, is no better than its apparent opposite: death. An even stronger way of fashioning the same thing is to state, as does Fragment 21, that normal life awake is death, putting sleep aside entirely, thereby making normal life the middle term in the incomplete opposition: death/normal life/... which demands "true life" to fill the void. When the highest term is not apparent the structural force engendered by identical oppositions appears all the more powerful.

To what extent other fragments in the Heraclitian corpus reflect the impetus of the third term is largely conjectural. Fragments may indeed be considered as belonging to larger proportions. Frankel, for instance, observes that this is probably the case with 117 ("A man whenever he is drunk is led being tripped up by a boy not yet come to man's estate..." (boy:man:man:god). I have given some indication that such an approach is possible in my foregoing comments. This sort of piecemeal examination may even give some place for a fragment as short and normally incomprehensible as 74 "children of parents" (child:parents::parents: (god)) or for a fragment as strange as 20 which might express some sort of logical relationship between children, parents, and a higher term: "having come into being they wish to live and possess their fate, but rather they desist and leave their children to possess theirs." Perhaps even 52, that peculiarly winsome fragment, "time is a child playing a game of draughts; the kingship is in the hands of a child" is related to the same expanded opposition and is intended to emphasize some sort of structural potential inherent in even the lowest term of the comparison.
The point is that the structure of a three-termed proportion exist in Heraclitus and does encompass and define certain seemingly hierarchical properties. What is most evident, however, is an archaic structuralism, a particular type of philological phenomenology, that works or appears through the major holistic symbol of the Heraclitian Logos-- one that works so clearly in fact that Heraclitus the obscure should become for us Heraclitus, Logician of the Archaics.
1. John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophers* (London 1963, first edition 1892), 145, 148-9. He argues further that "night" and "winter" were produced from the earth and sea because Heraclitus "saw, of course, that valleys were dark before the hill-tops (155)."

2. One might expect G. S. Kirk's *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge 1954) to be a better example of modern English scholarship on Heraclitus. I have selected Guthrie not only because of his later date of publication (Cambridge 1962-1965), but also because he seems more willing to make a comprehensive statement concerning the content of Heraclitus as a whole, while Kirk limits his comments to an arbitrary selection of the "cosmic fragments." Kirk, although he reveals clearly the speculative weakness of the "school" does supply some helpful emendations and translations of specific concepts. It is impossible to gainsay his aid in this major respect. One could also choose M. Marcovich's *Heraclitus Editio Maior* (Merida 1967) since, although he has performed an admirable and invaluable task in bringing together critically the opinions and texts of both "schools" involved, Marcovich has avoided, in my opinion, any truly comprehensive statement of the Heraclitan worldview because, like Guthrie, he is too dependent upon the categories of post-Aristotelian philosophy (e.g. his insistence that Heraclitus "envisaged" four levels of the Logos: logical, ontological, epistemological, and ethical, 67, cf. also 305).


5. Ibid., 424.

6. Ibid., 6. For an even more interesting and amusing account of the juxtaposition of "unconscious" and "subtle thinking" see Ibid., 428.
7. Fragment 55 (ὤς γγν. ὁφις ἀκοη μάθησις ταύτα ἐγώ προτιμεῖ) does indeed indicate that Heraclitus was dependent upon some kind of perception, but there is no reason to believe that this "perception" should be interpreted by Gutherie's particular understanding of the term.

8. Ibid., 432.

9. Ibid., 440, 457, 467, 479, et al.


12. Ibid., 344. "Dass Sein ist das Line, das Erste; das Zweite ist das Werden--zur dieser Bestimmung ist es fortgegangen. Das ist das erste Konkrete, das Absolute als in ihm die Linheit entgegengesetzter. Bei ihm ist also zuerst die philosophische Idee in ihrer spekulativen Form anzutreffen...."

13. Ibid., 349. "Heraclit sagt, Alles ist Werden; dieses Werden ist das Princip. Dies liegt in dem Ausdrucke: Das Sein ist so wenig als das Nichtsein; das Werden ist und ist auch nicht. Die schlechtthin entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen sind in Eins verbunden; wir haben das Sein darin und auch das Nichtsein."


15. Lassalle, op. cit., 16-17. "So sind Feuer, Zeit, Kampf, notwendigkeilt, Weg nach Oben und Unten, Fluss, Gerechtigkeit, Friede, u.s.w. (πῦρ, χρόνος, πόλεμος, εἰμπρένη, ὁδὸς ἐν νάτω, Ἀἴχη, Εἰρήνη, etc.) mit welchen Benennungen wir--mit noch vielen andern--in seinen Fragmenten sein Princip bezeichnet finden, nur gehauft Namen, nur die verschiedene sinnliche Aussprache eines und desselben Begriffs, ein und dasselbe bedeutend und in ein und derselben Hinsicht gewählt oder vielmehr nur, was sich später klarer herausstellen wird, verschiedene Wannungen und Abstufungen oder Potenzirungen desselben Begriffs."


19. Concerning the phrase ἕυνε γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς in fragment 2, I am inclined to agree with Kirk (op. cit., 57) that a gloss by Sextus is probable. It is difficult indeed to establish enough of a difference in meaning between the two words to make any such statement clear in Greek.

20. Kirk (ibid., 68) puts forth an interesting translation for ὄμο - λόγος - εἶν in the present fragment: "to tune in with λόγος." I shall deal extensively with this "tuning in" subsequently in my discussion of the non-obvious nature of the realm of the Logos. At present I wish only to point out this possible use of the verb as an affirmation of the "logical" idea Heraclitus is advancing.

21. Kirk (ibid., 386-391) argues that this fragment is corrupt, and I tend to agree at least in so far as I have accepted his reading ὑπὸ κυβερνᾶται over Diels' ὅτεν ἐκκυβερνῆσθαι. The method of this "one" is by far the most important factor here. Certainly it is not man's gnose that guides all things through all things but man's comprehension of how things are guided. The structure or method is what Heraclitus is indicating.

22. I make no use of an involved concept of "phenomenology." And although I suspect the thrust of certain modern phenomenologists (e.g. Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, or even Cassirer) would point to a position similar to my own, I use "phenomenology" to mean simply the study of events that occur in a "realm" somewhere between the material and objective world of a scientist and the spiritual and subjective world of a solitary man. In the phenomenological realm events (phenomena) are interpreted through a particular type of perception in terms of symbolic and structural characteristics.

23. The term "archaic" is one designating a type of thought based on rigid underlying structures. Arche in its meaning of "beginning" so designates its structuring principle. We have here a term descriptive of Greek literature from Homer through Aeschylus and Herodotus.


25. Bruno Snell (The Discovery of the Mind [New York 1960], 146) shows clearly that he is well on the way towards comprehending the symbolic nature of the Logos within man. He says, "In as much as the logos pervades everything it manifests itself in the individual also; and yet it is set apart from all (fr. 108) since it transcends the particular. The mysterious essence, the vital tension, reveals itself through significant particular events which man uses as symbols to apprehend the divine." Strip this statement of its transcendental and mystical tone in addition to the idea that the symbols involved are solely "events" and not tangible
"objects," and it applies easily to the symbolic, phenomenological realm we are investigating at the present time.


27. Kirk prefers to regard this fragment as "another statement of an instance in which apparent opposites are only relatively opposed" (op. cit., 112), and while a relative point of view is possible (i.e. depending upon the person's position at the top or the bottom), there also is the absolute possibility of a person in the middle of the road, looking up and down and comprehending that the road itself is both "one and the same," acting as a third term connecting opposites. While I partially agree with Kirk (ibid., 109) in that the statement is "devoid of general physical application," still its symbolic rather than physical nature surely is more important.

28. Kirk, op. cit., 97-104 makes an argument for the reading of grapheon for gnapheloi. Would, however, Heraclitus be interested enough in writing per se to aphorize such a concept? The question perhaps is moot, but for the time being Marcovich's reading (op. cit., 163-4) of gnaphel from gnaphos, "a cylindrical carding comb or roller... able to fulfill a rotary movement as well," appears more appealing.

29. Ἐντικίνησις ἄλλης ἔρευνας ἄναξ ἐξάρτωσθαι Ἀπέλλων Ἀστρείῳ εἰςδέμενος μέσῳ ἑματι, τοῦ δὲ ἀγο τολμοῦται ἀπουθαναίος ψωτόντος, σέλας δὲ ἐν οὐράνῳ ἤκους ἐς διαθέματο πατέσαντο διὰ τρικάλων ἑρμήνευσιν, ἡμὰρτο γε γὰρ ἐνθα ἐφυλακοῦμενος τὰ ἀ ἰλα, παῖσιν δὲ κρίσαμεν καταχωριζόμενοι διὰ τὸ ἀ πήλες, There from the slip arose lord Apollo, the far-working, appearing like a star in the middle of night. From him Flew about many flashes of light. The bright flame reached heaven.

he entered the sanctuary through precious tripod.
There kindled he a flame, making manifest his-shafts.
The bright flame held fast all Crisa.

30. It should perhaps be noted that pyr in the Greek language itself is never in the plural and that phlox appears in the plural only later (Aristotle Hete. 341b2, n. 392b3, 400a30, Orphica L. 178, Nicetas Epigrammaticus Fr. 74.48). The singularity of fire or flame immediately draws the words away from a purely physical world where fires and flames are perceptively obvious and into a realm of thought that is easily interpreted in symbolic terms.
31. I agree with Kirk, op. cit., 356 in his understanding that in this fragment there is implied an identification between fire and thunderbolt.

32. It is in his understanding of pyr and its relationship to kosmos and Logos that I disagree with Kirk most strongly. He claims that this fragment (30) represents the cosmos as "a huge bonfire" (op. cit., 317) -- an idea derived immediately from Burnet's consideration of the phenomenon of "combustion" (op. cit., 145) -- and weighs the idea that Logos and kosmos might be equated (in my own view creating an unnecessary confusion between an active logical principle and the more passive ground on or in which the Logos acts). He speaks of the Logos as "a constituent formula which applies to all things, which inheres in and actually is a part of all things, and therefore (?) could be treated as concrete (?)" (op. cit., 315). At this point he goes on to display his reluctance to grasp fire as a symbol: "but fire cannot be identified with the formula of the underlying identity of opposites based upon regularity of exchange, because it has or displays that formula itself (?), and is qualified as ἀπὸ ἀποθέμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποδημημένον μέτρα ......" If Kirk could have conceived of fire, not as a physical phenomenon--i.e. the cause of the "huge bonfire"--but as a symbol which, like all symbols, may be identified with anything and necessarily must display the phenomenon with which it is identified--in this case the formula of the Logos--he would have had little trouble with the simple and immediate relationship between fire and Logos. An overly physical, materialistic, and objective point of view (I detect it even in his use of "concrete" for instance) has led Kirk far astray at this one crucial point. Others have thought differently. Lassalle in the middle of the last century clearly recognized the symbolic properties of fire in Heraclitus, and C.S. Jung in his speaking of the concept of πύρ ἀπόθεμα places the term in its primitive, symbolic context. He argues that it "borders on the primitive notion of an all pervading vital force, a power of growth and magic healing that is generally called mana." This primordial archetype "dates from the time when consciousness did not think, but only perceived" (Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Collected Works [New York 1959] IX. 1,33) --"the eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears" (101a). Nowhere is the division between the scientific and the phenomenological points of view clearer than between Kirk and Jung on the phenomenon of pyr in Heraclitus.

33. John Burnet seventy-five years ago (op. cit., 148-9) argued that the Heraclitian pëxtet was simply a "hurricane accompanied by a fiery waterspout," thereby revealing his overly objective, scientific bias.
It is to Kirk's credit (op.cit., 331) that he identifies Prester with celestial fire.

34. Kirk (ibid., 252) is probably correct in taking 84a and 84b (καματός ἐστι τοῦ αὐτοῦ μόχθεν κατ' ἀρχήσεως) to represent the oppositional paradox: "change is rest, no-change is weariness." Yet, to describe the combination in terms of paradox is to play too easily into the hands of those who dismiss Heraclitus because of alleged "obscurity" and the use of "hidden meaning."

35. I agree with Kirk (ibid., 312) when he argues that malin should be excised; it ruins the elegance of the oppositional statement.

36. The sophistic nature of this fragment is quite clear. Documents such as the Dissoi Logoi abound in such arguments as they do in "paradoxes" like the bow (48). In Heraclitus, however, the point is not the practical or legal application of his statements, as it is for the sophists, but their structural and symbolic import. In other words, Heraclitus made use of any type of example as long as structurally or symbolically it revealed the phenomenological conception of the Logos.

37. The "measured regularity" of the universe must, of course, deal directly with Heraclitus' use of "metra." Perhaps the secret of their meaning lies philologically in the word's use in Homer where attributes of force or power and expanse in a very active sense are evident -- e.g. I.11.225, Od. 4.668 or 4.385 where a measure is used in the sense of the "measure of depth," et al.


39. I find Marcovich's commentary most interesting on this one point---not so much in what he says but in how he diagrams the situation involved (op.cit., 287):

```
      Fire
     /    \
    /      \
   /        \
  Earth    Prester
    ↓        ↓
     Sea     Sea
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He indicates clearly (285) that the central underlying term of the given collocation of words is...
"sea" (πρῶτον θάλασσα). The interesting thing now to note is that, given the implication of a three-termed opposition a degree more advanced, the diagram must be:

As is the case in this structural, transformational logic, Fire maintains its symbolic supremacy even when appearing as a term that is symbolically of equal rank with others. Fire or Logos is the transformational symbol that lies steadfast behind the structure of all change.