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ENERGEIA AND ENTELECHEIA:
THEIR CONCEPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND RELATION

Stephen Menn, in his recent article on energeia and dynamis, has stirred the coals of recent controversy about understandings of Aristotle’s terms ‘energeia’ and ‘entelecheia’, controversy about which he himself seemed totally oblivious. While he offered us careful explorations of Aristotle’s texts, he took no note of similar studies from over a quarter century ago by Chen Chuang-Hwan and by George Blair, nor of the more recent works by Blair, Daniel Graham and John Rist. So much the worse for his efforts, since these cover much of the same territory with conclusions rather divergent from his own. He has been gently chastised by Graham for his neglect, and both of them in turn have been challenged by Blair for being over-simple in their engagements with the issues. And so the fires of controversy have been stirred again.

Menn does present us with the traditional questions: Why did Aristotle invent two new words for apparently much the same purposes? What must be their respective roles in our interpretations of them variously as activity and actuality? He does not, however, pick up John Rist’s interesting added puzzlement about why, once they do have some conceptually coordinated role for Aristotle in the psychology, did he not continue to employ it when he came to the practical philosophy. Blair, along with his more protracted challenge of sixteen aporiae, has put these three questions together into a single problematic: “The problem that now confronts us is... why Aristotle would have coined a different term after the coinage of energeia, and why he would now apparently have taken his first term, merged it with the second -- and then, presumably, have dropped the second one....” (Blair, 1995, 50) While the questions are much the same, as Blair remarks to Graham and Menn, “Unfortunately, it’s a bit more complex,” presenting his list of conundrums that more compound than refine a similar list in his book (Blair, 1992).

My hope here is not to fan the flames of controversy, but to refathom the depths of understandings that the issues call for. In short, I have my own story to tell about the coinings and employments of these technical terms. Like the stories of Menn, Blair, Rist and Graham, mine is a developmental one. In my telling of it, my aim is to show how Aristotle’s developments in the use of these terms played a part in his ontological distancing from Plato, and his own developing understanding of motion. At the outset, in my brief recounting of their stories, I will confine myself to the traditional questions, but I want to suggest in my telling something of Aristotle’s own problematics that bear especially on those contexts where both terms come into play. In the end, I hope to come to terms with some of the more complex issues considered by Blair, Graham, and Rist.

I. Some Stories Told

Stephen Menn reminds us early (1994, 88) of "the standard picture" which he traces back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, with the note that the view seems even then to have been already established. It finds its standard base in the account of the soul in the second book of Aristotle’s psychology, where the soul is defined as the first actuality of a body which has the capacity for life. So, the body is a potentiality as capacity relative to the soul as that capacity fulfilled or actualized. Here, Aristotle uses 'entelecheia' for this first actuality. But the actualized soul is a potentiality as ability relative to its performance of its proper function, and this activity is a second actuality. This gives us a matter/form...
relation for the potential/actual existence and an ability/activity relation for the potential/actual activity, with analogues between them of becoming from conditions to realizations.

**Menn's story** is that this static picture tends to collapse the significance of the two distinctions into a single general formula that blurs their differences and takes no account of the developments that made both contrasts necessary. He undertakes to show how the power/activity concepts are rooted in Plato's discrimination of possession and use, but how the potential/actual existence distinction is of Aristotle's own making, and his answer to the Eleatic problem of becoming. This Aristotle effects by using 'entelecheia' as a notion of the product of work, and by implication, dynamis becomes correlated as possible fulfillment, with a stronger sense than alethic possibility, but with a weaker sense of being than its correlate entelecheia, in which the product of the work is fulfilled. It is in sorting out the relation of this existence correlate of dynamis to kinesis, which he had before broadly construed as covering all activities, that he reverted in Metaphysics IX-6 to talk of energeia, and in the course of distinguishing activities from motions, came to take energeia as the telos for its dynamis, and so energeia became conceived as ousia. Thus, Menn's answers to the traditional questions are: Aristotle did not invent these words to the same purpose, but his treatment of the dynamics of motion required a conflation of their uses in Metaphysics IX-6 in such a way that the conceptual scope of energeia took over the roles of actuality of existence.

**Graham's story** finds much in Menn's to admire, affirming the sources in Plato for the power/activity contrast, but noting that there is "a world of difference between Plato's insight and Aristotle's theory." He also agrees that in the end Aristotle extends the use of 'energeia' to cover the uses devised for 'entelecheia', but takes issue with Menn's account of the productive source of this latter term, and with his treatment of the relation of dynamis to kinesis more generally. Graham requires us to distinguish three senses of dynamis: an activity sense (DA) in relation to energeia (EA), a substance sense (DS) in relation to actuality (ES), and a power sense (DP). He maintains that DA has no essential connection to DP, the latter requiring kinesis as its relagent, where the former requires only a capacity sense. He notes with authority that DS/ES does not appear in the early works and appears only in contexts where the form/matter relation can be presupposed (this proves to be but a corollary of his bigger story of Aristotle's two systems as told in Graham 1987). Key to this account is the concluding point that the DA/EA scheme accounts for the process of change in answer to Zeno, so that it is not only a correlate to the matter/form scheme, but a necessary component in its account of natural motion. Thus, Graham's answers to the traditional questions: Aristotle coined energeia for DA/EA in the context of his first system, then needed the conceptions of DS/ES in the context of his second for the dynamics of the matter/form scheme, for which he coined entelecheia. Aristotle may have come to conflate the two systems without seeing their incommensurability (an inference I draw from Graham 1987). So far as I can tell, Graham is silent on the third question, maintaining "entelecheia properly designates the top point of the scale of being, the point of completion." (Graham 1995)

**Blair's story** turns on stringent readings of Aristotle's derivations of the terms and a focus on the apparent conflation of their significance, on "why anyone but a madman would also take the 'modal' neologism and give it the active sense." (Blair 1995, 567) He maintains that the active sense was required to differentiate the capacity for living from "really living" in the sense of actively functioning according to those capacities. Aristotle then came to see the need for discriminating the power to do from the ability to be. This becoming sense requires a change in which what was deprived of its end (privation) came to have its end (form) within it. For this, Aristotle coined 'internal-end-having' to distinguish it from other teleological terms, as he had coined 'internal-activity-having'
when no other term served for acting as opposed to being able to act. On this reading, *energeia* was originally conceived as activity of living beings, and only became extended to other natural beings as having an internal dynamic as he worked out his principles for physical processes. The notion of *entelecheia* orginally served for metaphysical accounts of the nature of change more generally, but through his physical and psychological investigations, Aristotle came to see that not every *energeia* is an *entelecheia*, but that all *entelecheia*are *energeia*. Thus, the shift in *Metaphysics* IX-6, and the argument in IX-8 that modalities regarding form and matter can be explicated by treating them as a kind of having. Thus, Blair's answers: Aristotle coined two different terms at two different times to deal with two different kinds of tasks. At one stage he projected using *entelecheia* for both kinds, but came to understand *energeia* as the more generic. At this point *entelecheia* dropped out of his discourse, since *energeia* could now do the work of both terms.

Rist's story, like Graham's, is part of a more inclusive and grander vision, one that culminates in a projected dating of the whole corpus of Aristotle's works. On the development of the conception of *energeia* he takes *Topics* VI, *Ethics Eudemian* VI, and *Metaphysics* IX-6 as the pivotal texts. In the Topics passage, he follows De Strycker (in Owen, 1968) in finding the *dynamis/energeia* distinction rooted in Plato's distinction of possessing and using an external good -- a point not unlike that later to be made by Menn. But in VI-8, Aristotle notes that for at least some pleasures, the end is in the activity itself, not in the completion or cessation of it -- a nascent notion of *entelecheia* before the term was coined. In EE VI, still reflecting on pleasure, he needs a notion of *energeia* without motion to account for the pleasure of God's activity which does not involve change. These conditions move the conceptions forward toward *Metaphysics* IX-6, and indeed toward the account of God in XII-6, but Rist maintains that Aristotle never clearly realized the potential of treating questions of existence on analogue to the questions of motion. Indeed, he finds in *Metaphysics* XI and *On the Soul* II Aristotle trying out a division of labour between *energeia* for activity and *entelecheia* for actuality, but for no apparent reason then abandoning it. So, Rist's answers: Aristotle began with modifying Plato's distinction through explorations of understanding pleasure, came to the notion of end within on the basis of values of activities for their own sake, explored the utility of the *dynamis/energeia* contrasts in opposition to Eleatic/Megarean arguments against motion and becoming, but never solidified his conceptions of the relative tasks for his two technical terms.

So, what then is the upshot of this scholastic review? Certainly it shows that there are some important commonalities, suggesting that these stories are at least varieties on the same subject. Some divergences indicate more than variation. And, in the end, there is some need for a justification for all of the fuss. The commonalities are easy to spot. There is general recognition of the first appearance of *energeia* in the *Protrepticus*, of its contrast with *dynamis* being grounded in Plato's later work, and of conceptual advances that make the contrast Aristotelean rather than Platonic. There is also a consensus about the contrast between at least two types of potentiality, one related to activity and the other to existence. Whatever their views on the traditional activity/actuality contrast, they all see the introduction of *entelecheia* as initially relative to coming to be issues, and as required for and/or buttressed by the matter/form distinction as Aristotle outlines it in his principles of nature. Because *Metaphysics* IX-3 deals explicitly with the Megarean *aporiae* (which begin with questions about potentiality for action and motion, but quickly expand to include potentiality for coming to be) and IX-6 gives a formative juxtaposition of the two technical terms, there is a consensus that this book is a key (if not the key) to the questions with which we began. What gives the recent stories common cause is their consensus that the traditional story as a static account of coherent conceptions continuously held by Aristotle is no longer an option for our interpretation. Insofar as we continue to find Aristotle's thought culturally interesting -- indeed in some ways conceptually compelling -- for our
own thinking, we too must rethink what Aristotle has to say about these matters. My own story is such a rethinking.

II. Aristotle's Aporiae Rethought

In his own writing, Aristotle increasingly focused on setting out his questions for discussion, his accounts of the *phaenomena* (which included the opinions popular and expert) and his formulations of the *aporiae*. So far, I have focused on second order problematics and opinions, those about our received texts and traditions, and only derivatively on what Aristotle was undertaking. The attention to first order questions on the matter at hand must be largely speculative, and as my scholastic excursus into the third order may suggest (comments on comments on comments about *dynamis* and its relatants), the complexity of relevant background and of conceptual ramifications may be too great for a single story. Still, it seems a better place to begin than from the critiques of Menn by Blair and Graham. To take up Blair's second-order conundrums requires that we accommodate to Blair's already laid out analysis, and to begin with Graham's formulations of DA/EA and DS/ES as the watershed for the "two systems" locks us in to his theoretical frame. Rist's account of the development shows us how distinct a story can be, and should give us pause about how to norm such stories in the end. In the beginning, I hope to use many of the insights from the other stories as well as some of my own for a reconstruction for the broader problematic.

Aristotle was, from beginning to end, a Platonist. His defense of the Academy in the *Protrepticus* could serve as a blueprint for his own mature work just as well as for his early work in Plato's school. He believed that the theoretical informs the practical, that the world is rationally coherent, and that the reasons for its nature are discoverable through human inquiry, and that for such inquiry to result in knowledge it must account for the eternal verities of its constitution. He also followed Plato in treating philosophy as inquiry rather than as doctrine, making the dialectic of their discourses over twenty years more than an academic exercise. If we can take seriously the correlations of the first part of the *Parmenides* with the accounts given by Alexander of Aristotle's notebooks on *ideae* and Aristotle's own summary in *Metaphysics* I-9 (see Olshewsky 1995a), we will be ready for a much earlier and richer picture of their differences than the one that Menn suggests (94) in terms of Aristotle being dissatisfied with the fifth hypothesis in Plato's *Parmenides*. The complaint that "though philosophy seeks the cause of perceptible things, we [Platonists] have given this up" (992a25) is one that must not only have preceded Aristotle's own work in physical science, but that in Plato's *Timaeus* as well. Aristotle early set for himself the task of accounting for the motion of perceptible things. Indeed, we may find in Plato's characterization of the giants a poking fun at Aristotle and Eudoxus, these ruffians from the provinces, who would devise their theory of forms in relation to matters perceived. What he wrests from them in the *Sophist* is the concession that for perceptions to be perceptible, they must have a source in nature that gives the dynamics to that disposition to be perceived. What is then claimed, and never challenged in this dialogue or elsewhere in Plato's writing, is that the mark of being is its *dynamis*, the power to affect something else, or be affected (247e). "We proposed as a sufficient mark of real things the presence in a thing of the power of being acted upon or of acting, in relation to however insignificant a thing." (248c) This required of the friends of the forms attention to the reality of becoming, and also the mixing of the forms and the theory of predication that followed. Already implicit here are matters of dispositionality of being as well as of doing.

Whether or not this move was influenced by Hippocrates' conception of nature in the terms Plato describes in *Phaedrus* 270d, he and Aristotle both came to share with Hippocrates the principle of compositionality: Change presupposes complexity, a differentiation of the mover and the moved. What separated Aristotle from Plato was his
principle of constitutionality: the nature of the unit of motion must be understood in terms of its structured whole rather than simply in terms of the materials that make it up. In this, Aristotle's Categories stands as an early counterpoint to Plato's theory of predication, and his early critique of Plato's eidetic atomism in Physics VII-3 is a counterpoint to the reduction of perceptible reality to eidetic predicates in Timaeus 50. He repeatedly protests that material is never a *that*, but a *thaten* (e.g., never wood, but wooden), and that *ousia* must be the subject of discourse which is so constituted not to be attributed to something else, either in it or of it. His critique at 992b1-8 makes just this point: the latter-day Platonists suppose that the being of things lies in the mathematical constituents that underly them, but such a view leaves us with no account of motion and annihilates the study of nature. So, from very early on, Aristotle's subject ontology separated him from Plato's predicate ontology. In this separation lies the need for an account of the constitution of the individual being, the *tode ti*, which will not be analyzable into its component parts, and the need for an account of motion that can be articulated in terms of the nature of the unit of motion, also the *tode ti*, which will not violate the principle of compositionality. While the form/matter distinction, and its articulation in terms of principles of becoming, is absent from the Organon, it is already implicit in its logic, from the subject ontology of the Categories to the dynamics of motivation in the Topics.

Because Aristotle thus opposed Plato from the outset on these fundamental ontological issues, he generated problems of his own making that were not a part of the Academic enterprise. For Plato, the constitution of the perceptible individual is reduceable without remainder to the dispositions of its compositional components. This places the nature of the thing in its qualitative components, which have their significance and reality in turn through their formal constituents. The *this* is but a spacio-temporal locus in the receptacle of becoming, and individual becoming is only a rearrangement of conditions, an alteration. It is the apparent, derivative becoming that changes through rearrangement, but the *ousia* itself never changes, because that, on Plato's analysis, is the transcendental eidetic reality out of which the generated beings are constituted. Aristotle persistently opposes this reduction of generative change to alteration, but finds in his account of the principles change from privation to fulfilment with an enduring subject, that the individual can be the unit of change for all varieties save one: that in which the individual itself ceases to be, and another becomes. In his attempt to address the general problems of motion and change, he is confronted with the special problem of substantial change, one generated by the combination of his principle of compositionality and his principle of constitutionality. It is out of work on this problematic that hylomorphic conception of natural beings is born.

Aristotle shared with Plato the Eleatic inheritance, but their ontological differences made divergent paths for their research programs. For Plato the question of how generation of perceptible beings is possible found its answer in the concession to mixing the forms. The answer then to the problem of generation was alteration. He continued to wrestle with the one-and-many problem, which even with the "gift of the gods" in terms of of the limited and unlimited, he acknowledged was a problem "never to cease to exist;... never to pass, never to fade." *(Philebus* 15d-17a) Aristotle saw this latter problem as a case of misplaced being, outside the realm of becoming and in the roles of attribution and alteration. In addressing the problem of change of a qualified sort, where the individual undergoes motion in place, quality and size, the principles of motion can continue to coincide with the principles of predication, but in the case of generation, becoming *to haplos*, something more is required.
III. A Story Retold

My story proceeds in four stages. In the first, where 'energeia' is a relative neologism in Aristotle's vocabulary, it occupies no noticeable systematic role. The undisputed developmental beginning, given our textual evidence, lies in the Protrepticus. There, for the first time, in his defence of the Academic enterprise against attacks from Isocrates' school (whether before or after the writing of the Antidosis need not concern us), Aristotle speaks of 'kath energeian' in counter-distinction to 'kata dynamin' (Rose/Ross 14, Düring 79). While Aristotle has as the focus of this defence justification of pursuit of phronesis both for its utility and for its own sake, he does so in an idiom peculiarly his own, differentiating theoretical from practical endeavours, the "so called" moral virtues from the (implicitly) intellectual ones, nature and art from chance. Nor is this nominological sorting simply a reporting enterprise, since his notion of nature already shows its divergence from Plato's own. The teleological turn on the fulfilment of nature not only points forward to Aristotle's claim to have discovered explanation in terms of the for-the-sake-of-which, but gives concurrent contrast to Plato's account of the generation of the soul before the body, since Aristotle's nascent naturalistic teleology leads him to claim here that "soul is later than body" (Ross 11). In short, even though Aristotle is here put forward to defend the enterprise of the Academy, that in no way implies that he is putting forward company doctrine.

The order of Düring's reconstruction invites a less auspicious beginning to the dynamis/energeia distinction than it is traditionally accorded. The Ross locus would place the contrast early among our fragments, and might lead us to cast this as the basic informing contrast for the rest of the defence. But if we put the fragment in its place (or at least Düring's placing), we may be struck by how varied Aristotle's terminology is in differentiating having and exercising. Even though he uses some form of 'energeia' ten times, this is the only fragment in which he contrasts it with 'dynamis', which itself appears in fifteen other fragments. Nor does Aristotle use 'energeia' exclusively for the task of accenting activity, using some form of 'chreis' twenty times (often in context with 'energeia') and other modes of expression to make his basic point that the activity of thinking is better than just the capacity to think. While most of the instances are in nownal form, they are never the focal subject of the discourse. He is not talking about the nature of energeia, but about the nature of thinking and other animate faculties and functions, speaking at one point about multiple functions for a single organism with more than one faculty. We have no reason based on our text to suppose that here Aristotle is introducing a new technical term in contrast to dynamis.

Indeed, there is a sense in which Aristotle is not introducing a new term. An adjectival form ('energos, -on') appears in such authors as Herodotus and Zenophon, and verbal ones appear in Zenophon, Hippocrates, Gorgias, and Plato. If we were not looking back on the Protrepticus from the vantage of our acquaintance with the later treatises, we would likely take no note of 'energeia' as a neologism, and regard the specific contrast between kata dynamin and kath energeian as having no special place in the argument. On my telling of the story, this is only perhaps the first time we know of Aristotle using 'energeia' or making the dynamis/energeia contrast.

On the surface it may seem, as Menn asserts and Graham affirms, that Aristotle is just lending his own terms here to the contrast already implicit in Plato's own discussions of learning and knowing as the master had worried through them in the Euthydemus and the Theaetetus. The mixed presence of chreis and hexis perhaps encourages such an hypothesis. In the former he has Socrates observe "that people use the word 'learn' in two senses -- first, when one has no knowledge at the beginning about something, and then after gets the knowledge, and second, when one already having the knowledge uses this
knowledge to examine this same thing done or spoken." (277e) If this leads us to expect a new tack on Meno’s dilemma, we may find it echoed in the simile of the aviary, in which a distinction is drawn between having knowledge and possessing it (197c-200c). But the latter distinction of possessing from having is not the same as the former between having and using, and they aim at different ends. The former concerns are with benefits of use over possession (280d). The latter draws a distinction between possessing (having the bird in the aviary or the coat in the closet) and having at hand (the bird in the hand or the coat on ones back) with the aim of setting conditions for exploring how one can be said to have knowledge, yet arrive at a false conclusion. Aristotle’s concern in drawing a distinction between \textit{kata
dynamin} and \textit{kathenergeian} was to argue for the life of reason on the grounds that exercising knowing and perceiving are more perfect in their being than just the power to do so (Düring B79, ff.). However common one finds their \textit{aporiae} about the acquisition, possession and use of knowledge to be, there already lie in them the seeds of the developing divergent ontologies that emerge in Plato’s \textit{Timaeus} and \textit{Philebus} on the one hand, and in Aristotle’s \textit{Categories} and in his attempts at a treatise on motion in \textit{Physics VII} on the other. At that stage of their divergent developments, the emergence of \textit{energeia} at best becomes a clue to their differences in understanding the dynamics of being.

The mark of possession in the \textit{Theaetetus} is having gained a power, a \textit{dynamis}, over the possessed. This same mark becomes the mark of real things in the \textit{Sophist}, first as a device for wrestling from the giants a common characterization for both embodied and bodiless reality (247e), but then for confronting the friends of the forms with the recognition that “a power of acting and being acted upon belongs to becoming,” and thus is not compatible with their own notion of real being (248c). But where Plato begins with the notion of possession as the power of having, similar to the simile of the aviary (247a), he ends with a characterization of power to affect or to be affected as the mark of reality. The power has shifted from the ability of the subject of attribution to the attributes themselves, and becomes spelled out in the account of the various capacities of blending that are possessed by the greatest kinds. The epistemological base for error is false attribution, but the ontological basis for anything becoming the case is the capacities of the forms to blend. Plato is thus on his way to a predicate ontology, in which the constitution of the world is understood in terms of the formal attributes out of which it has become according to their powers for mixing, and the constitution of the individual is a composite of its attributes, determined by their powers for mixing.

This way of thinking of individuals as composites of properties becomes blocked for Aristotle by his teleological naturalism at precisely the point (following Düring’s reconstruction) where his term ‘\textit{energeiai}’ appears in the plural (B 64). Here (and I suspect only here, out of all the existing corpus), he considers the possibility of a plurality (\textit{diaphoro
eisin
ergeiai}) for individuals which are “composite and divisible into parts”, but concludes that “if one is becoming his nature by more than one power (\textit{ek pleionon
dynameon
sumpephukos}), it is clear that when someone is disposed by nature to come to completion by its several powers (\textit{hos ap\'h
dou pleio
depthuken
apoteleisthai}), the work (\textit{ergon}) is always the best of these (B 65). He has set this conclusion up with the claim that each thing is counted as excellent by virtue of its bringing to completion in the best way (\textit{kallist\' apotele}), that which is the work according to the nature of each (\textit{ho
depthuken
ergon
hekastou}) (B63). Here, we have already not only a naturalistic teleology that moves us toward the two aspect account of it “\textit{to men kata
dynamin
to
de
ergeiai}”, but also a conception of constitution in terms of function that moves in the direction of conceiving the unit of being in terms of the unit of action, rather than in terms of properties or attributes.

Where Plato, by virtue of his concession to treat the forms in terms of their powers for mixing and of his conception of propositions as a complex of attributes relative to a situation, came to place primary being in the predicative position, Aristotle, by virtue of his
teleological naturalism and his conception of completion according to function, came to place primary being in the subject position. The supposition that one could have more than one energeiai left behind by the recognition that the function of the composite incorporates the dispositions of the parts, so that diverse capacities find their integral fulfilment in a unified nature when they operate according to the telos of that nature. Were an individual a composite, and divisible into parts, those parts would not operate according to the nature of the composite, but each according to its own nature -- they would each be individuals. It is by virtue of an individual's telos according to its nature that we come to recognize it as that sort of individual. It is by virtue of an individual's most perfect and unimpeded activity (teleaenergeia kai akolutos) that it is being most fully what it is. Both rational coherence and practical efficacy require that we construe such a perfection as a single unity, and this requires the individual to be both the unit of being and the unit of action.

While we thus find already in the Protrepticus the seeds of Aristotle's program in teleological naturalism, we don't find here the dynamis/energeia distinction playing a well-formed determinate part. Even though the Categories serves as a logical counter to Plato's predicating ontology, the dynamis/energeia distinction plays no part. Indeed, neither term appears in the treatise. Where forms of 'energeia' do appear in the Organon, they are no more notable nor distinctive than those instances appearing in the Protrepticus. The several instances of an infinitive form in Prior Analytics serve to differentiate an active sense of knowing analogous to the active sense of thinking already considered. The instance in Topics V-8 which Rist found so suggestive has no analogues or continuences in other places, where the uses relating to psychological functions and effectiveness prevail. Only once do we find use and activity contrasted with capacity and disposition (124a22), which would not likely gain our notice if we did not already know that the contrast was to become something special for natural and metaphysical philosophy. In the first stage of my story, the distinction has no specialized role, was not a conceptual break-through, was in itself nothing special, though it contributed incidentally to the beginnings of Aristotle's teleological naturalism.

The second stage of the story must then deal with roles of the dynamis/energeia distinction in natural philosophy. Here, as I will suggest, the most interesting treatments require us to consider the dynamis/entelecheia distinction as well. I have argued elsewhere (Olshewsky, 1994) for beginning this stage with Physics VII as Aristotle's earliest work on nature, and will make no further apology for doing so here. In Physics VII -3, the issue at hand was not only whether alteration is always by sensible causes, but whether as it is "natural to suppose" there is "alteration in figures and shapes, and in states and in the processes of acquiring and losing these." (245b6) The alluded natural supposition must surely be to Plato's discussion in the Timaeus 50ab where the issues and the illustrations are the same, but the conclusions diametrically opposed. Plato's model is the double mixing of the forms, first the higher, then the mathematical, to generate an individual entity in the temporal and spacial receptacle. At 50a, only the receptacle is to be properly regarded as a 'this', devoid of particular forms (schemata), but capable of receiving forms. Any coming to be or passing away of a particular form must be a matter of alteration, all change a change in quality, and attribution of being to any particular form to be denied. Suppose someone points to a figure of gold, and asks what it is. "By far the safest and truest answer is, 'that is gold,' and not to call the triangle or any other figures which are found in the gold 'these', as though they had existence, since they are in the process of change while he is making the assertion...." (50b) Aristotle counters that when we consider something that has become shaped (schematismomenon), we do not refer to it in

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2The TLG and I have failed to find those few instances that Blair 1992, 8, says are in the Categories and the Posterior Analytics.
terms of that out of which it is fashioned: "the statue 'bronze' or the pyramid 'wax' or the bed 'wood', but rather adapting the words, we call them respectively 'brazen', 'waxen', 'wooden'." (245b11) Thus, where Plato would deny any reality to the particular constitution of an individual, asserting that its coming to be is but an alteration of non-sensible forms, Aristotle accords reality primarily to the form and habits of the individual, denying the very existence of any unobservable alteration.

In this assertion of the reality of the informed individual, we may sense the beginnings of the hylomorphic accounts of becoming, since we have here already the reference to the hyle of something as that out of which it is made, and the suggestion that its constitution as an individual existent has to do with what form or shape it is in. But form and matter are not here set out as the constitution of the individual, nor even as the causes of change as they are in Book II, nor is change yet conceived according to the principles of something undergoing change from a privation to a fulfillment of the condition under change as it is in Book I. More important to our story, there is here no mention of substantial change, even though conditions of generation for individuals are considered. There are only three kinds of change: in place, in quality and in quantity, and of these locomotion is primary (243a36). He acknowledges that the shape and structure (morphe and skema) have something to do with coming to be, but only in an effort to argue that genesis is not basically alteration (246a1-5). In this discussion, energeia does not play any positive role, appearing only in talk about the active use of psychological faculties, and here with no contrast to dynamis. But we must look in vein for any such role for energeia in the first two books either. In the first book, there is only an interjected forward reference to dynamis and energeia as the resolution to the problem of becoming in the Metaphysics. In Book II-3, in his discussion of ways of speaking about causes, Aristotle notes that they all may be spoken of kata dynamin or kath energeian, but gives no account of motion or change as moving from the one to the other. It is only when he finally gets to talking about how motion and change take place in III-1-3 that he comes to expose a role for energeia, and there we find for the first time its interaction with entelecheia.

Among the predicables discussed in the Categories, motion (kinesis) is never mentioned, but six different kinds of change (metabolé) are listed (15a1, ff.) and generation and destruction are among them, though we found in Physics VII no treatment of these latter. In the Topics, in a discussion of classification, kinesis is classified under the genus of energeia (125b15). In Physics II-1, natural beings are characterized as having within themselves a principle of motion and rest, with respect to place, alteration, or growth (192b12), but with no mention of energeia in this place just where one might suppose that its etymology as the having-of-the-work-within would seem most to call for it. In Physics VII, kinesis and metabolé seem to be in free variation, neither relating directly to energeia. It is not until III-1 that we are told "kinesis is the entelecheia of the dynamis being, whenever the being in entelecheia is in energeia, not as itself but as kineton." (201a28). This is intended as an elucidation of the definition already given for kinesis as "the entelecheia of what exists in dynamis, insofar as it exists in dynamis" (201a10). Here, existence is not limited to the tode ti, but includes the how-much and the as-such as well, because they are here conceived as units of change relative to their contrarieties, and "there are just as many forms of motion and change as there are of being." (201a9) So, we have here a different perspective on being as the unit of motion from the received presumption that it is just the hylomorphic individual. This requires of us a different gloss on the principles exposed in Book I and the causes exposed in Book II. Where form is spoken of there, it is seen as the fulfillment of the change from the privation of that form, with some subject undergoing that change. It is not limited to the sort of form that constitutes the nature of the individual, since it can be also the form of quality, of quantity, or of place predicated of the individual. Here, and presumably in I and II, eidos is the telos of any change. In like manner, the account of natural causes in which the final
and formal are the same (II-7) need not lead us to limit our understanding to a hylomorphic model for causes. If we go looking for a hylomorphic model for natural being and motion in the books of the *Physics* before VIII -- in the sense of an individual as a composite of form and matter -- we will be at a loss to find it there. The term that becomes Aristotle's favorite for the concrete individual ('sunolon', taken as a whole) in *Metaphysics* VII appears nowhere in the *Physics*, and is indeed never employed for that use anywhere in the extant physical works. Nor is the term for composite ('syntheton') used in connection with the compound of form and matter anywhere in the physical works. We may find the accounts of motion to be implicitly hylomorphic, but the explicit characterization of the combination of *hyle* with *morphe* and *eidos* as the constitution of the perceptible individual has to await the *Metaphysics*.

How then are we to parse Aristotle's definition of motion? The relation of *entelecheia* to *energeia* here seems to be an enabling constitution for a being to have its work within it. It is by virtue of the constitution of something as that something that it is enabled to be the potential for becoming something different. This enabling to do of the fulfillment of that form thus becomes also the pattern for enacting the change. That which is white can become that which is black, but only according to the conditions for the change from one color to another as determined by the constitution that enables the enactment. Human beings beget other human beings, but only according to the reproductive conditions of their specific biological constitutions. The constitution of any being, in whatever form it is, is both the enabler and restrainer for the manner in which it can become something else, and the motion will not take place until that constitution is in such a state that it already has its work within it.

This definition of motion can be seen as aiming at dynamitizing the account of the causes of motion in II-7. If the form of being is in a state of fulfillment in that form, and that constitution by its nature has its work within it by its nature, then the motion will happen according to that nature, because the form within and the end within and the work within are all one in natural motion: the nature of the being which is in motion. At the same time, the course of change is constrained by the end and work within the being that undergoes change, that out of which the change takes place. So we have the four causes implicit in the definition of motion. In the cases where the changing beings have contraries, the subject of the change (to *kineton*) is the individual that endures through the change, and so is at once the mover and the moved, its mover and its undergoer. This is the burden of the discussion in III-3. The tasks of *entelecheia* and *energeia* are determinate throughout these chapters, fairly clear, and operate in tandem. The former is the constitutional fulfillment of any form of being, and that end-within is what gives it the potential for change, having also by virtue of that constitution the work-within to bring about a course of action. These roles continue through the discussion of infinity to the end of the book. After that, except for a brief discussion of elemental change in IV, the term *entelecheia* does not appear again until Book VIII.

In considering motion in relation to the infinite and to time, he continues to speak of motion and change indifferently. He even remarks at one point that "we need not distinguish at present between motion and change" (218b19). However, in Book V he points out that every motion is a kind of change (225a35), but "of all things that have no contraries, there are opposite changes... but no motion" (230a8). In alteration, "it is not whiteness but whitening that is a motion" (224b15). What is in motion, the *kineton*, is the individual moving from the condition of non-white to white. It is the individual that is moving, changing with respect to quality, but the individual as that individual remains the subject, now of one quality, then of its contrary. But when the individual changes, it cannot be moving, because it is not the subject that is undergoing the change. In this important sense it cannot be the individual that is undergoing the change: At the end of the
change that individual is no more. It is no longer the *kineton*, and so substantial change cannot fulfill the definition of motion. This requires that we reconsider the roles of *energeia* and *entelecheia* in substantial change.

In *On Coming to Be and Passing Away* (*CBPA*), Aristotle undertakes the task of accounting for substantial change. Here, as is often noted, 'entelecheia' gets more frequent use than 'energeia'. Less often noted (and often masked by translation) is that both appear almost exclusively in an adverbial use, most often as a dative of manner or effect, but sometimes with 'kata' as an accusative of manner or of classification. Moreover, both usually appear in contrast to *dynamai* used in the same manner. In such form, it is easy to see how the supposition of an indifference in translation between "actually" and "actively" might have begun. In most instances one translation seems to serve as well as another, although translators has served us ill by transforming the adverbials to substantives, and then artificially imposing some sort of contrast. Casual reading might well lead us to believe that Aristotle is here trying out a relatively new technical term, either because he finds it more appropriate to substantial change or because he envisions replacing his model of work-within with one of end-within.

Closer examination gives us some important contrasts. Perhaps the most important is that most uses of the newer term are in talk about *genesis*, "ek dynamai ousias entelecheiastousian" (320a13, 320a15, 320b33, 317b26, and other passages offer similar examples). Even when, as in the case of *men-de* constructions, the contrast is not an explicit from-to, the clear import is to consider *dynamis* antecedent to *entelecheia*. In the contrasts of *energeia* with *dynamis*, the reverse is the case: The former gets the *men-*clause, the latter the *de-*.

In substantial change, the accent is on becoming from the being that potentially has the nature in question to the being which has the fulfillment of that end within itself. "For coming into existence requires the being *dynamai* to be there before (*prouparchein*), but not the being *entelecheia.*" (317b17) The change from not being this thing to being this thing is to this thing with the end-within. In alteration and growth, the focus is on the activity of the work-within to bring about a contrary condition. "So, the *energeia*thermon is *dynamai* psuchron; the actively cold is potentially hot." (334b21) Here, the end-within enables that which with respect to its work-within is hot to become cold through its work. But the becoming is not hot becoming cold, or a change in the nature of the end-within, but rather a change in quality effected by the nature of the thing without altering the nature of that thing. This is at least an echo, if not a refinement, of the definition of motion we found in Physics III-1, having *energeia* explicitly and *entelecheia* implicitly in place. However facile our talk of actually and actively may be, the account at 317b of substantial change could not have been done in terms of *energeia*, nor could the account at 334b of alteration have been done in terms of *entelecheia*.

So, this second stage of the story is about Aristotle's attempt to make good the promise of the the principles of motion. Having formulated the principles, and having defined those beings which are constituted by nature as having within themselves a principle of motion, and having articulated that principle in terms of explanation where the formal, final and efficient causes often coincide, he seeks in Physics III-1 to give the meaning of motion in these terms. His definition attempts to delineate how the three causes can coincide: the nature of the thing constituted with its end-within by virtue of that constitution has its work-within to bring about change. This makes motion constitution in action, and requires the conception of the end-within informing the work-within because it has a nature that is the subject of changes between contraries. But with respect to being there is no motion because there is no contrary to a substance (225b), so there can be substantial change, but not according to the definition for motion. In regard to substantial change, an account had to be given which would explain how the end-within itself could change. In his accounts both of natural motion and of substantial change, Aristotle seemed
to have well conceived and definitely differentiated understandings of *energeia* and *entelecheia*. In the physical works there is neither ambiguity about their meaning nor confusion about their roles. It is the next stage of the story where the trouble begins.

Since the work of Werner Jaegar, the focus of scholarship on the middle books of the Metaphysics has been intense. Whatever the history of the editing of this work, each of the middle books is substantial in its own right, and there is still considerable debate over how to view their interrelations. Viewed from the standpoint of our problematic, it is tempting to say that Aristotle was trying out an account of substance in terms of *entelecheia* in *Zeta*, then in terms of *energeia* in *Eta*, and then attempted to put them together in *Theta*. But while the explicit topic of *Zeta* is substance, *entelecheia* is not one of the candidates and doesn't even get mentioned until half way through the book. There, after two instances (1034b17; 1036a7) treating the *genesis* of things according to the patterns we already found in *CBPA*, the role of *entelecheia* is exclusively in showing that universals cannot be substances, the focal concern of VII-13. The point at 1039a 1-23 is to show that no substance can be composed of substances present in it as having their own ends within. Were they each to have their end within, that would make them fully entities in their own right, and thus they would no longer be constituents of the whole. In this discussion, there is no suggestion of defining the reality of a being in terms of *entelecheia* (this only gives the condition a being is in and the discussion only argues for there being one per being). Nor is there any identification -- or even direct association -- of the thing's *entelecheia* with its *eidos* or *morphe*. Rather, this employment of *entelecheia* results in a problematic about the impossibility of defining an individual.

This problematic is taken up in the next book with some surprising turns: Matter is affirmed as acknowledged substance (1042a32), having been explicitly denied that status in VII-3; matter is defined as "that, not being a *tote ti*, actively, but is one, *dynamet" (1042a27); and the problematic is set to discover what substance is as *energeia*, presumably the task already completed in VII-17, where the differentiation was not in terms of *dynamis* and *energeia*, but in terms of *stoicheia* and *arche*. We need not here enter into the quandries over whether *Eta* is an alternative to *Zeta* or its sequel. What we must see here is that for the first time Aristotle makes a correlation of the form/matter distinction with the *energeia/dynamis* one. In VII-3 the groundwork was laid by introducing the concrete individual as *to ek touton*, out of the matter and the shape or form which constitute its being as an individual. The conclusion of VII-17 was that the substance of an individual is primarily the principle by which it has the nature that it has, rather than its matter. In VIII-2, we are told that the determination of the matter is the *energeia* itself. In a single Becker column (1043a), Aristotle moves from considering differentiae as not the substance, but as that most resembling *energeia*, to a coupling of *energeia* sometimes with substance and sometimes with *morphe*, as he had coupled *eidos* and *morphe* in the preceding book, indicating a terminological variance on the same thing. He concludes with acknowledging that "it is not clear sometimes whether a name (indicating a substantive) means the composite being (*suntheton ousia*) or the *energeian and the morphen*" (1043a30). In this brief passage, Aristotle has not only set us up to accept the form as the primary principle of being (which was never claimed in the preceding book explicitly, even though hinted at), but by associating *energeia* with *morphe* he put into place the standard analogue between the form/matter distinction and the *dynamis/energeia* one.

By the time he returns in VIII-6 to the question of the cause of unity in definition and number (implicitly, in essence and concrete individual), for which the discussion regarding *entelecheia* had posed the crucial problem in VII-13, he is convinced that he has solved the problem: "But if, as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other is actively, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty." (1045a21). The conception of unity of the concrete individual is achieved by no longer
thinking of its constitution in terms of its attributes or in terms of its parts, as people "in their usual manner of definition and speech" tend to do, since either of these leads to the problematic of the multiple entelecheiae: If the attributes or parts make up the individual as constituents of its constitution, while still having each its end-within, then that individual will be perforce a composite of substances, and thus not a united individual. If we see the individual as composed of form and matter, then we can still affirm the principle of compositionality, that change presupposes complexity, without having to conceive of that complexity in terms of elements that are the constituents of constitution. That complexity is now conceived in terms of form and matter, for the first time placing the hylomorphic account of being on record. "The account uniting into one and also distinguishing regarding potentialities and havings-the-end-within is the explanation that is sought (aiotn d' hoti dunameos kai entelecheias zetousi logon henopoion kai diaphoran). It is, as has been said, that the proximate matter and the form are this also, the one potentially, the other actively, so as to seek the explanation of what is the sameness of unity and of being an entity; for whatever is an entity, the potentially and the actively are somehow one, so as there is no other explanation short of how there is movement from the potential to the active." (1045b16-22)

We may regard these last remarks in Eta as the conclusion of an inquiry, or (as I suppose) the preface to one. Which it is will make some crucial differences about how we see the unity of Zeta-Eta-Theta, but it is not necessary to answer that question to draw some clear conclusions about the roles of entelecheia and energeia in the first two books. In the first book, entelecheia is brought into the discussion to present a problem about unity and definition relative to concrete individuals; in the second, energeia is brought in to speak to that problem, with the resulting thesis that the individual is a hylomorphic unity in which the being's constitution as proximate matter and form is distinguished in terms of potentiality and having-its-end-within, and its unity preserved in the conception that in some sense the proximate matter as potential and the form as active are one and the same. How this distinction works will be the same explanation as how the unity works, and both will be tied to how movement takes place from the potential to the active. Aristotle has not been careless with his terms here. The mark of the distinction of the individual, as individual, is its constitution of having its end-within, but as the problematic of VII-13 shows, this requires the distinction from attributes and parts out of which the individual is constituted, which can be relative to this individual's constitution only potential, and can be relative to their own end-within considered distinctly only potential. So, viewing the individual in terms of its end-within accents the distinction of the constitution from the elements that make it up. If, however, we see that what is the proximate material of that constitution has the potential for enacting the work-within, then in motion according to that work-within, the potential becomes active, and we can see in that unity of action the unit of the natural being. In the physical works we found different ways for energeia and entelecheia to relate to their potentialities. The claim in VIII-6 is that an explanation of how energeia relates to dynamis as a unity in motion will be an explanation of how the entity can be one in being while distinguishing the proximate material out of which it is constituted from its constitution conceived in terms of having its end-within. To conceive of the explanatory needs in this way, Aristotle needs both energeia and entelecheia. At the same time, such a conception blocks any conception of a terminological shift from Zeta to Eta.

It is against the background of these developments that we can now approach the more thorny passages in Book Theta. Aristotle begins by telling us that about the individual we have now distinguished talk in terms of the subject and its predicates from consideration in terms of potency, having-its-end-within, and activity (ergon), and we will now proceed to consider dynamis and entelecheia. The problematic focus here again is on the relation of the unified constitution to the materials that make it up. The projected solution again lies in understanding the relation of the potential to the work-within relative to motion. But even
at the outset we are promised two strikingly new dimensions to this inquiry: 1) that the
relation of potency to the having-the-work-within will carry us "beyond the cases that
involve reference to motion which alone have been spoken of" (1046a2); 2) that the account
of the relation of that basic distinction to motion will serve to explain the other kinds of
potency as well. In considering potencies, both the originate power to change and the
capacity to undergo change are seen as potencies of motion; non-rational potencies are
powers to change directly (as fire heats) while rational powers admit of contraries (as
medicine cures or kills); some potencies are innate, others come through practice. In none
of these is there clear indication of potency without reference to motion. When it comes
time to give definition to *energeia*, he begs off on grounds that "we must not seek definition
for everything, but be content to grasp the analogy" (1048a37), having concluded that
"energeia is the being in existence (to huparchein) of a thing not in the way which we
express by *dynamis*" (1048a31) The upshot of this *via analogia* is that "some are as
movement to potency, and the others as being to some sort of matter" (1048b7). This
hardly seems to be satisfying relative to the proclaimed problematic. It does suggest that the
extension of the *dynamis/energeia* distinction is to take over the province of the
*dynamis/entelecheia* distinction as we found it in CBPA. The contrast he draws is between
movements that have a limit and the action (praxis) in which the end is present. In the one
case, the activity is not complete until it is no more (when you have completed walking you
are no longer walking), while in the other the end is present in the activity (in seeing, you at
once see and have seen). The former he calls movement, the latter *energeia*. (1048b18-34)

In this extension, the discriminations already set for *energeia* and *entelecheia*
continue to have force. *Energeia* is still dependent on *entelecheia* for matters of existence.
Non-existent things may be said to exist potentially, but they do not have potential
existence (147a30-2). They are merely objects of thought or desire until some movement
brings them into existence, at which point each will have its end-within. For something to
be, it must be in some definite constitution, some *entelecheia*. Further, by the very nature of
*energeia*, the work-within, it has work as its end. Its coming to be is for the sake of that
end. "Matter is potentially just because it may come to its form (eidos); and when it is
actively, then it is in its form." (1050a15) Even as this makes a sense to how *dynamis* and
*energeia* are one, the conclusion grounds this very point in *entelecheia*: "For the *ergon* is
the telos, but the *energeia* is the *ergon*, on which account the name *energeia* is drawn from
*ergon*, and exerts all of its powers toward *entelecheia*." (1050a22) In the account of
motion, *entelecheia* was the constitutional basis for the work within; in the ontology,
*energeia* finds its existential basis in the *entelecheia* of its form and the fulfilment of its
work in that same end. By expanding the conception of *energeia* from the principle of non-
substantial change to the principle of all motion and rest, he is able to identify it with the
eidos and ousia of the individual, and by conceiving it as working from the base of its
existent nature and working toward the fulfillment of that nature, he is still able to ground
that activity in the *entelecheia* of its being.

This third stage of the story, then, gives us an enhanced role for *energeia*, and a
diminished one for *entelecheia*, but without a disruption to their basic conceptions and
relations. Where *entelecheia* was the focal concern of substantial change in CBPA, it
became evident through its employment to disprove the substantial status of universals that
it could not serve as the explanation of substance in Aristotle's new hylomorphic
conception. By expanding the role of *energeia*, he felt (however we may judge the success
of his effort) that he could maintain the principle of compositionality and the principle of
constitutionality, still maintaining that the individual is the unit of reality and that its
constitution is made determinate by its form, but that its form is now to be understood in
terms of the activity (*ergon, praxis*) of the individual's work-within. Although this
conception is still based in the *entelecheia* of the thing for its existence and its end, the
diminished role of the end-within is reflected in the different accounts of priority in IX-8 and in V-11 (1019a1-14).

The irony of this account of the third stage is that it makes "the standard picture" presented in On the Soul look anomalous. Not only are there more instances of 'entelecheia' in this treatise than in any other, but here it is identified with the subject of the treatise, which is taken to be the form and being of any ensouled body. In I-1, Aristotle takes it as "a question of utmost importance" to determine whether soul is potentially, or "is it not rather an entelecheia?" (402a27). In II-1, making clear that ousia is entelecheia and that soul is entelecheia not in the sense of energeia, he defines the soul as "the primary entelecheia of a natural body having life dynamê"(412b29). The clear presumption of a hylomorphic account of the ensouled body together with the understanding of the form as the substance of the concrete being presuppose the ontology of Metaphysics VII, but they indicate no sense of the problematic about entelecheia that we found there. Further, had he been equipped here with the expanded role for energeia as set forth in Metaphysics IX, which covered all being, at rest as well as in motion, he would not have relegated it a secondary class of entelecheia here on the grounds that soul is a being prior to its exercise. Indeed, the very assertions about priority in IX-8 would seem to preclude such a conclusion here. I can only respond to the irony with bemusement that On the Soul must find a place in the third stage of the story of energeia and entelecheia, but seems blocked from doing so by the very conditions that make sense of this stage. It must somehow be suspended conceptually between the concluding problematic of Book Zeta and its proffered solution in Book Theta.

The fourth stage is, I think, less mysterious. In this stage, entelecheia drops out of consideration entirely. It appears in none of the other psychological works, in none of the practical works and in only a few instances in the biological works. Several factors account for this. One is the expanded role for energeia already noted in Stage III. Ontologically, Aristotle decided that it could do tasks of accounting for the determinate individual that entelecheia could not do. Another is that the problematics of generation and constitution having been settled, there was no longer need to talk about them. As he says in Parts of Animals, "the relation of dynamis to entelecheia we already know" (642a1). But, in addition to this, Aristotle makes clear in On the Soul that the inquiry is best conceived not in terms of the nature of the soul considered generally, but in terms of the specific faculties of specific ensouled beings. Perhaps more influential is the conceptual development that takes place in the last book of this treatise in treating the activity of various psychological facilities as the result of an actualization process accounted for by an interaction of the organism with its environment. Aesthesis, for instance, is the actualization of the aesthetikon and the aestheton, dual dispositions for perceiving. When he concludes that orexis is the resultant activity of the orektikon and the orekton, he not only has a new model for understanding the role of desire in action, but a new way of conceiving the relation of activity to constitutionality. While this is not the place to elaborate that conception, I think it is not incidental that the use of entelecheia ends in the chapter before the discussion of orexis begins. In any case, I suppose that all of these factors conspired not to the rejection or abandonment of the notion of natural constitution as having-the-end-within, but to entelecheia's gentle obsolescence. The treatise that remains an anomaly for the third stage of my story becomes the watershed for the fourth.

IV. Some Concluding Comments

The précis of my own story, then, amounts to this: Aristotle in the beginning introduced dynamis/energeia as a device to accent the activity of thinking as better than the capacity to think. Not until the definition of motion in Physics III-1 does it come into any technical role, used in tandem there with entelecheia to explain in definition the
configurations of explanatory coincidence outlined in II-7. The differences between substantial change and types of motion required special attention to **entelecheia** in matters of *genesis*, but without any basic alteration to the tandem roles already found in the definition of motion. Only when confronted with the problematic of definition and unity which was elaborated in terms of **entelecheia** in *Metaphysics* VII-13, did it become necessary to extend the role of the *dynamis/energeia* distinction beyond accounts of movement to accounts of being. Even here, **entelecheia** continues to have its role as the fulfilled constitution of the concrete individual, but the expansion of the role of **energeia** and the change in the analysis of fulfillment of desire made it no longer necessary to consider the role of **entelecheia** in the practical and biological works.

In my telling of this story, I have not attended to all of the important details. Satisfactory translation remains a problem, and I have avoided that task in the interest of attending to the consistency of the concepts. I favor 'fulfillment' for **entelecheia** and 'enactment' for **energeia** because these preserve the "end-within" of the one and the "work-within" of the other. But, as I have persistently noted, the terms seldom appear in substantive form, and these proposed translations would not transport well into modifiers, adjectival or adverbial. My objections to 'actuality' and 'activity' are that these terms blur the very distinctions that I have been at pains to preserve, and thus contribute to the problems rather than alleviating them. If we could in our connotations put the "act-" back into 'actual', we would be ready to see Aristotle's ontology in ways that blur the differences between actuality and activity, and be better equipped to challenge the mechanized and extensionalized presumptions of twentieth century thought. Even this, however, would still leave us without a satisfactory translation of the tandem roles that my story finds persistent throughout Aristotle's writings.

Several other issues also still need addressing. Not all of George Blair's conundrums disintegrate by letting go of his presumptions. I suppose that the role of intentionality implicit in his concerns about modals especially deserves further exploration. Appraising detailed differences between the several stories may well serve to make some fresh starts on old problems in understanding Aristotle, with ripple effects beyond concerns with the **energeia/entelecheia** distinction. I may view with amusement Blair's need for the *deus-ex-machina* of a treatise on **entelecheia** that no one has ever heard of (no suggestions in the ancient lists, no references in other extant texts) in order to preserve any semblance of coherence to his own story; but I equally view with chagrin my own ironic anomaly of leaving out of account the standard picture as set forth by Stephen Menn.

These several stories have some commonalities, even though they fail to match in detail. All seem agreed that in Aristotle's development **energeia** came into use before **entelecheia** and continued in use after it. Though there are suggestions in several of the other stories that the doubling of terms is somehow both necessary and important, none finds for the two terms any consistent divisions of labour, and most conclude either explicitly or implicitly that it becomes a matter of indifference which term is in use. The moral of my story is this: By beginning with Aristotle's own projects instead of preconceived models, and following his work through several formative stages, we find in the end not only significant differences of usage for the two terms, but consistent significance for them throughout the course of their employments. The one crucial shift is in the expansion of the use of **energeia** in *Metaphysics* IX, which my telling finds required by the problematic for **entelecheia** exposed in VII-13. At this place, and not until then, the understanding of being as enactment finds its explication.

I do not suppose that this telling of my story will somehow be the final word. Even as we speak, Alfred and Maria Miller are at work on their own account, already having given some preliminary tellings (1996, 1997). We can even see their thesis in their
projected title for a Fall, 1997, conference: "Entelecheia as Function and Formal Cause; Energeia as Outcome of Material and Efficient Causes". In response, I might be tempted to join George Blair in maintaining, "Unfortunately, it's a bit more complex." Based on my own telling of the story, I am more inclined to maintain that it is simple in a somewhat different way. My telling shows how the dynamis/energeia distinction, begun modestly to defend the enterprise of theoretical inquiry, became in the end the basis for understanding the nature of being as such.

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Works Noted


