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Aphrodite Alexandrakis, Barry University, “Plotinus: The Origin of Art’s Beauty”
aalexandrakis@mail.barry.edu, Sat 9 room 2

In Ennead V.8.1., Plotinus refers to Pheidias’ chryselephantine statue of Zeus and says: “…perceived by the senses but understood what Zeus would look like if he wanted to make himself visible.” Naturally, Plotinus had not seen that statue himself for by that time it had already been destroyed. He must, however, have seen other sculptures made by Pheidias, or their copies. It is on the basis of these works that he made the above remark. Evidently, Plotinus was aware of the significance and power of images on people. This insight he had inherited from his teacher Ammonius Sakkas.

This paper discusses first the artistic environment within which Plotinus lived. This will help us comprehend Plotinus’ own understanding and statements on artistic works; the role of visual forms, such as sculpture, painting, and architecture, and how these influenced his thought on beauty. It will be suggested that Plotinus’ notion of the power of ‘love’ is crucial to his theory of beauty. As he says, “The longing of love is the longing of beauty itself.” (Ennead III.5.1).

Majid Amini, Virginia State University, mamini@vsu.edu, “The New Paradox of the Stone: Mele and Smith versus Ghazali and Duns Scotus” Sat 11 room 9

The classical paradox of the stone that whether an omnipotent being can create a stone that the being itself cannot lift is traditionally circumvented by a response propounded by Thomas Aquinas that even omnipotent beings cannot accomplish the logically impossible. However, in their paper ‘The New Paradox of the Stone’, Alfred R. Mele and M.P. Smith attempt to reinstate the paradox without falling foul of the Thomistic logical constraint. According to Mele and Smith, instead of interpreting the paradox as posing a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings – represented by God at two different times – the paradox can be reformulated as posing a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. Mele and Smith are thus able to reinstate the paradox by arguing that there is no logical impossibility in the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to probe the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings in view of the theological arguments for the “unicity of the omnipotent”. In particular, the discussion focuses on Ghazali and Duns Scotus in their attempts to prove that there can be only one omnipotent being. The last part of the paper is concerned with the question that even if, à la Ghazali and Duns Scotus, there is no possible world in which two omnipotent beings can coexist, does that indemnify the concept of omnipotence against the indictment of incoherence as intended by the original version of the paradox of the stone?

Etin Anwar, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “Islamic Mysticism and Human Salvation” anwar@hws.edu abstract pending Sat 9 room 9
Anne Ashbaugh, Colgate University, “Useful Pleasures (Plato)”  
aashbaugh@mail.colgate.edu Sun 11 room 1  
The essay examines Plato’s ‘false pleasures’ and explains how these pleasures function to foster the virtuous life in a way analogous to how ‘useful falsehoods’ function in justificatory theories of knowledge. The study aims to clarify in particular what makes a pleasure ‘false’ and why the characterization, albeit strange at first glance, is quite appropriate. In addition, the study hopes to show Plato’s twofold contribution both to ethics and epistemology.

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Jesse Bailey, The Pennsylvania State University, “The Cratylus on Political Discourse and the Limits of the Polis” jib122@psu.edu Sat 4 room 2  
(Extract): Considering the opening line of the dialogue, and its invocation of the *koino*, the community formed in *logos*, we begin to see how Cratylus’ hubris cuts himself off from the formation of genuine community. He has the chance, in his meeting with Hermogenes, to form a community of discourse, but instead of choosing to recognize Hermogenes, he chooses to attempt a form of discursive domination.

G.M. Batchelder, Catholic University, “Truth in the Phaedrus” peitho@verizon.net Sat 4 room 2  
In the *Phaedrus*, soon after finishing his palinode, Socrates turns to a discussion of the difference between good and bad rhetoric. To be any good, he argues, a speaker must know the truth about his subject, whether he intends to deceive his audience or not. Critics dismiss this requirement as unrealistic on the assumption that by knowledge Socrates means an infallible grasp of reified universals. This paper argues, in reply, that the dialogue espouses a sober empiricism modeled expressly on natural science, and that its rhetorical canons thus merit review.

Martha Beck, Lyon College, “Plato as Jungian Artist; Socrates as Archetypal Psychologist” mbeck@lyon.edu Saturday 2 room 8  
Carl Jung distinguishes between artists whose works “spring wholly from the author’s intention to produce a particular result” and artists who tap into the collective unconscious and express emotions, experiences, and thoughts that are innate, embedded in the collective unconscious. He identifies Plato’s philosophy as archetypal, “Platonic philosophy…once having sprung forth from the unconscious of the human race (and not just in Asia Minor!)…could rearise anywhere in any time” (Collected Works, Vol. 11). Other leaders in the field of archetypal psychology, which began with Jung, have taken his ideas further. James Hillman, for example, says, “We know from both Plato and Jung that [the soul’s] health is its psychological integrity and that Eros is the integrating factor.” Hillman refers to Socrates as “that model of a psychologist, whose first concern was with the health of the soul, who had the gifts of clairvoyance, prophecy, and other psychic powers, which he attributed to the effect of the *daimon*, whose psychological anima showed in his susceptibility to and concern with beauty and in his mythopsychological imagination. . .[Socrates’] philosophizing is not abstract thought,
definitions, and eristics but a driven mission to move the soul toward awareness of its archetypal background...Eros [for Socrates] is the very means of true cognition, binding together in synthesis all psychic faculties of cognition, conation, and affectivity.”

This paper is an outline of a book that compares Plato and Jung. It briefly summarizes Jung’s concepts of the collective unconscious, archetypes, objective psyche, subjective psyche, endogenous and exogenous images, ego and shadow, complexes, animus and anima, and individuation and transcendence. It then sketches an outline of how these concepts can be applied to Plato’s dialogues, particularly the Symposium and the Phaedrus.

Jeremy Bell, DePaul University, “The Outside Within: Mimesis and Enthusiasm in Platonic Education.” jbell94@hotmail.com Sat 11 Room 2

It is striking that, after having attempted at length to demonstrate the theory of anamnesis in the Meno, Socrates concludes his argument by saying the following: “I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it” (86b5-c2). With this statement Socrates sets forth what I take to be not only the primary concern of the Meno, but, more broadly, of Platonic education or pedagogy in general. On the most basic level, Platonic pedagogy appears to manifest itself as a confrontation with and an attempt to overcome various stultifying forces which work to impede philosophical inquiry. In an attempt to provide an account of Plato’s critique of the sophists I focus on the role that sophists in particular play in promoting the idleness that Socrates finds to be detrimental to philosophical inquiry, and from this to derive, even if only negatively, an understanding of Platonic pedagogy as being promotive of motion and persistent inquiry. As a means of achieving this I appeal to the theme of Platonic enthousiasmos, which I take to be indicative of a certain open-ness or porousness of the soul, and which Plato presents as being fundamentally ambivalent thereby enabling, on the level of the soul, both previously mentioned educative states. It is, therefore, I argue, precisely this enthousiasmos that constitutes both the possibility and risk of education for Plato.

David Bennett, UCLA, “The Mu’tazilite Explanation of Perception” dbennet@ucla.edu Sat 9 room 9

Last year at SSIPS I delivered a paper on Mu’tazilite cosmologies and physical theory with special attention to al-Nazzām’s (d. 835?) doctrine of kumūn (“latency”—an account of physical change involving the interpenetration of natural bodies). My effort to bring the original contributions of pre-Kindian philosophers to light continues with the exploration of theories of perception—especially vision—in the late 8th/early 9th Centuries C.E.

Before the wholesale adoption of atomism by Islamic theologians, rival systematic treatments of the subject existed—even flourished. The fragmentary and second-hand nature of extant reports of the early Mu’tazilite doctrines has proven discouraging for modern researchers; so it was, apparently, for the falāsifa of the “classical” period who often further distorted already unreliable information about their
predecessors. Nevertheless, careful textual criticism applied to the earliest doxographies reveals that the physical theories of the early Mu’tazilites were not merely intended as ad hoc (and occasionally rather zany) parries of a nascent, theologically sanctioned atomism (or, for that matter, of the simultaneous emergence of Aristotelian hylomorphism). I argue that several important doctrines were deployed to support a coherent theory of perception, thereby rounding out what we would call a system of natural philosophy (i.e., concerning the nature of the cosmos and the manner of our experience thereof).

These doctrines vary immensely and their mode of explication reveals an active and intricate debate in the centers of Basra and Baghdad between c. 775 and 825 C.E. In this paper, I examine the proto-atomism of Abū Hudhayl (d. 841) in contrast with Nazzām’s materialistic system. The latter system allows for a physical model of perception coordinated with a material world in persistent flux: the spirit (rū’), as corporeal as the objects of perception (“accidents”—bodies, in Nazzām’s view), is interpenetrated with the objects, and perception consists in the manifestation of certain (corporeal) qualities latent in the spiritual substance. Yet the special role of motion—the only true “accident” for Nazzām—complicates this picture by introducing the act of a perceiver’s will in choosing sensibles (the manifestation of latent qualities does not otherwise involve motion). Several other Mu’tazilites were involved in the rebirth of experimental “sciences” in the early ‘Abbasid period; at the very least, a careful study of their positions provides a basis for the proper analysis of Kindī’s optics. Mu’tazilite theories of perception shaped the reception of Aristotelian philosophy in the 9th Century and introduced issues that had to be confronted by theologians and falāsifa alike for the next several centuries.

Ruby Blondell, University of Washington, Commentator, blondell@u.washington.edu
Sat 11 room 1

George Boger, Canisius, “Protagoras: Measure and Materialism” Sat 11 room 6
boger@canisius.edu
While we have precious few extant ‘fragments’ from the writings of Protagoras, we do have some lengthy treatments of Protagoras’ thinking in Plato’s Protagoras, Theaetetus, and Sophist. Taking Plato as having to re-present the philosophy of Protagoras rather accurately, if skewed for his purpose, or suffer criticism as an eristic pedant, we can see these dialogues as Plato’s assault on materialist philosophy and subordinately on epistemological questions. Plato banked his destruction of materialism on demonstrating an inadequacy of Protagoras’ measure principle to explain reality.

Anne-Marie Bowery, Baylor University, “Self-Mastery and Harmony: Two Models of Self-Care in Plato’s Republic” Anne_Marie_Bowery@baylor.edu Sat 9 room 7
Socrates’ discussion of the soul in the Republic enhances the more narrowly intellectualist approach toward virtue that appears to characterize his position in the Protagoras. While the Republic offers a more nuanced account of how the emotions motivate moral action, central passages in the Republic continue to cast the emotions in a negative light. However, a careful reading of key passages in the Republic reveals that Socrates presents his interlocutors with two models of how we can construe the proper relationship between reason and the appetites and emotions: the Self-Mastery Model and the Harmony
Model. Most of the negative descriptions of the appetites and emotions emerge when Socrates works with the self-mastery model. The harmony model, in contrast, allows for a more positive evaluation of the emotions and appetites. I trace out each of these models as they appear in the dramatic events and on the narrative level as well. I argue that each model has an important role to play at certain times and in certain contexts. However, the self-mastery model, though an effective means of regulating excessive appetites and desires, has both conceptual and practical limitations that are acknowledged in the text of the Republic itself. Given these limitations, I suggest that The Republic ultimately advocates the harmony model that strives to integrate reason and emotion over the self-mastery model that involves the subordination of the emotions to the rule of reason.

Sara A. Brill, Fairfield University, “Eros and the Art of Counting”
sbrill@mail.fairfield.edu Saturday 9 room 1

Plato’s frequent use and abuse of techne has long been a source of controversy. The ambivalence he displays towards techne in the Republic has been particularly well-documented. Socrates’ and Glaucon’s discussions of calculation in Books 6 and 7 get at the heart of this ambivalence: while the practitioners of techne make some use of number, they are not compelled, suggests Socrates, to the contemplation of the one which makes calculation a prelude to dialectic. Thus, techne and dialectic can be distinguished on the basis of how the practitioners of each take up number. In turn, it is implied throughout the Republic that how one takes up number is a function of that coalescence of innate ability and civic education that constitutes character. An emphasis on the relationship between one’s character and one’s use of calculation is especially pronounced in Books 8 and 9, wherein this relationship is deeply complicated by Plato’s presentation of two particularly perplexing calculations: Socrates’ attempt to mingle calculation and eros in the infamous nuptial number (546a-547a) and his attempt at quantifying the tyrant’s degree of remove from pleasure (587c-588a).

In this paper I argue that these presentations are not simply designed as comical displays of the failure of quantification (although they are certainly that), but also provide a demonstration of the effects of character—especially as regards one’s negotiation of the demands of eros—on how one takes up number. More specifically, I argue that the discussion in Books 4 and 5 of the shared relational structure of desire and knowledge is essential to understanding the dialogue’s complex treatment of calculation. Far from presenting calculation as devoid of erotic interest, Plato goes out of his way to emphasize its infusion with eros. I then examine the ambivalent status of techne in the Republic in light of this discussion of calculation.

Eve Browning, University of Minnesota – Duluth, “Aristotle on Brutishness or Moral Depravity”
ebrownin@d.umn.edu Not attending due to schedule conflict.

The vice of brutishness (theriotes, theriodes) or depravity is a puzzling moral trait. In NE, Aristotle gives an impressionistic account of it accompanied by bizarre examples which range from compulsive hair-pulling through fear of weasels to torture and cannibalism. What brings these behaviors together in the same texts? What part is played by brutishness in Aristotle’s program of describing the virtuous life? Is brutishness most properly considered a vice, or something off the moral charts and into the domain of
pathology? In this paper I set forth the relevant texts and show their puzzles, then draw 3 implications from them:

1. The question of moral responsibility for acts characterizable as coming out of brutishness turns out to be a complex one and linked to aetiology. Why does a person pull out his hair? Has he just started doing this or is it a fixed and stable disposition? How compulsive or necessitated is the behavior? Can he stop? Why on a different topic does a person roast people in a carefully constructed torture machine? This gives him pleasure, presumably. A fiendish and cruel pleasure but pleasure nonetheless. “Some things are not pleasant by nature but become so either through bad natures or injuries or habit.” This underscores Aristotle’s moral particularism.

2. Moral depravity or brutishness challenges Aristotle’s theory in a serious way. Naturalism of Aristotle’s type works best when humans can be shown to be “by nature” social, convivial, constructive beings with relatively easy emotional restraint mechanisms and a disposition to seek happiness benignly. It isn’t required that everyone be Little Mary Sunshine; but it is required that hardly anybody be Hannibal Lecter. To that extent Aristotle’s theory depends upon an empirical basis: if in some future or possible world, the Hannibals predominate statistically, Aristotle’s theory is rendered less useful. In Aristotle’s time a debate is raging in the background: that between physis and nomos as shapers of human destinies, as bases for moral behavior and as the anthropology underlying systems of law. In this debate Aristotle stands squarely on the side of physis. He is a philosopher who grounds even the most abstruse imaginings of the metaphysician in the curiosity of children, which curiosity he understands as physei.

3. What is the matter with barbarians? For Aristotle as he argues in the Politics, they don’t understand authority and autonomy. They enslave themselves to kings, and grovel before them. They give up their destinies to others, abandoning that most precious of human commodities autarkeia, self-sufficient self-rule. Brutishness puts us in mind of foreigners, and is perhaps found amongst barbarians, to the extent that it entails abandonment of self-rule: compulsive hair-pulling, running in terror from mice, phobias and obsessions and sadistic addictions all represent the surrender to urges which should not be at the helm in an organized life. Brutishness as an extreme of vice is dysfunction. Brutishness as a result of injury or disease is a sad accident of fate. Brutishness as a result of bad habits allowed to run unimpeded moves from the curious aberration to the reprehensible pattern to the irresistible compulsion, along a bell curve of blameworthiness. Thus the value of self-rule, or autonomy, in Aristotle’s system as in the proud polis which in Aristotle’s time is already eroding at the edges, is paramount in moral life and oddly enough, this little discussion concludes having brought Aristotle a little closer to Kant in this respect. Brutishness is an unfortunate sight to the eyes of Aristotle’s young aristocratic male audience largely because it is a vision of loss: loss of center, of balance, of community.

Edward Butler, “A Metaphysical Reading of Stoic Ekpyrôsis” epb223@gmail.com
Sun 11 room 2

While modern commentators have devoted most of their efforts to working out a satisfactory reading of the Stoic cosmogony as a univocal and materialist account of natural generation, appreciation of its properly metaphysical aspects has languished. Its central feature in this respect is the eternal recurrence of identical individuals in each
cycle. While the cyclicality involved in the Aristotelian cosmos allows species to replicate themselves endlessly, individuals are ephemeral. The Stoics, by contrast, while denying transcendence to Platonic and Aristotelian forms alike, make individuals the objects of a providence which eternally replicates these and just these individuals, a special status also embodied in Stoic epistemology through the doctrine of the individual quality (idia poiotēs). Starting from this fundamental value affirmed in the Stoic cosmogony, the paper goes on to argue that the ekpyrōsis, or ‘conflagration’, at the end of each world cycle, although it may have been treated at times as a physical occurrence, was also regarded by prominent Stoics as a primarily spiritual ‘event’. When read in this fashion, the ekpyrōsis completes the Stoic metaphysics with an account of the conditions of its own genesis as a cosmogonic consciousness in the individual.

Eric Butler, Villanova, “Aristotle’s Farbenlehre” james.butler@villanova.edu

In this paper I examine the basic premises and arguments involved in Aristotle’s theory of color. Upon close scrutiny of the most relevant texts, de Anima II.7 and de Sensu 1-3, I am unconvinced that his Farbenlehre can be rendered entirely coherent. But of course we owe it to him to come as close as possible to a coherent Aristotelian explanation of color, the proper object of vision. And this requires that we refrain from identifying any inconsistencies until we have “fought” as hard as possible to redeem them.

We can begin by laying down some fundamental and unarguable premises. We know, for instance, that color requires a transparent medium in order to actualize the eye, which is potentially colored (whatever that might mean). We know that color is located at the limit of a solid body. And we know that transparency is involved in the very definition of color: color is “the limit of the transparent in a determinately bounded body” (de Sensu 3, 439b12-13).

The trouble begins when we try to discern the precise relationship between color and the transparent. The English translation of Aristotle’s definition of color admits of two possible interpretations, depending on how we construe the possessive clause. We can think of these two possible interpretations as:

(A) [the limit] [of the transparent in a determinately bounded body], or
(B) [the limit of the transparent] [in a determinately bounded body].

Thus I conclude (based, of course, on more argumentation than I could provide here) that Aristotle’s Farbenlehre presents us with a dilemma. Either we ignore the aforementioned evidence that he attributes transparency to all bodies, in which case he has an admirably elegant explanation of color; or we accept that evidence, in which case, I am afraid, his explanation is ridded with too many confusions to take seriously. I do not know how to recommend one horn of this dilemma over the other, and so I am content to have presented it, as a dilemma, in as much rigorous detail as possible. Not every paper can have a happy ending, and this one does not—if happy endings are equated with resolutions. But responsible scholarship demands that, sometimes, we have to be as content to have diagnosed a problem as we would be to have solved it.
Jeremy Byrd, *Tarrant County College*, “The Necessity of Tomorrow’s Sea Battle”  
Jeremy. byrd@gmail.com  Sat 4 room 5

According to the traditional reading of *De Interpretatione* chapter 9, Aristotle rejects an unrestricted Principle of Bivalence in order to avoid the fatalist’s conclusion that the future is necessary. One obvious difficulty for such an interpretation is explaining why Aristotle took the fatalist argument seriously enough to reject an apparently innocuous logical principle. To overcome this difficulty, I distinguish between three different senses of necessity that might pose a significant threat to our free will: logical, nomological, and what I shall call tenseless necessity. While these first two senses are familiar, the third is based on the intuitively appealing principle that whatever tenselessly exists cannot be changed. I contend that the fatalism at work in chapter 9 rests on this principle.

Miriam Byrd, *University of Texas at Arlington*, “Did Plato Forget the Theory of Recollection in the Republic?”  
mbyrd@omega.uta.edu  Sat 11 room 7

Plato’s emphasis on the theory of recollection in the *Meno*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Phaedrus* strongly suggests that he also held it during the period in which he wrote the *Republic*. Why, then, did he neglect to mention the theory in this dialogue? In the *Republic* Plato develops his epistemological views, illustrating his views in the famous images of the sun, the line, and the cave, and providing detailed descriptions of the methods of hypothesis and dialectic. However, he makes no mention of the theory of recollection. I argue that Plato has not ‘forgotten’ his theory but describes the process of recollecting in Republic 7, 522-524e, referring to it as the process of “the soul summoning calculation and understanding (524b).” I suggest that making this identification will help us understand a viable epistemological method often obscured by religious imagery.

Silvia Carli, *Xavier University*, “Aristotle on the Role of Poetry in Ethical Education,”  
carlis@xavier.edu  Sat 4 room 7

The thesis of this paper is that according to Aristotle poems— and tragedies in particular— play a distinctive and unique role in moral education. In particular, it suggests that dramatic works refine our practical intelligence and reinforce passions that are useful to the constitution of a just political community.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* the Greek philosopher emphasizes that experience is essential for the acquisition of phronesis. Poems are relevant for the education of the citizens in the first place because they present the spectators (and/or readers) with a form of vicarious experience. The (good) poet produces plots in which the events happen “contrary to expectations yet because of one another” (*Poet*. IX. 52a 4). That is to say, he brings to the fore the inner logic of events that are complex and surprising by showing that they follow patterns of probability and necessity. In this way he refines our capacity to evaluate and understand the logic of the pragmata of the realm of human affairs, which is essential to the performance of virtuous and successful actions. It is for this reason that Aristotle claims that through works of imitation we learn.
Second, the tragic passions—pity and fear—tend to promote the identification of the spectator with the heroes who suffer undeserved misfortunes. We feel for them in a way that is similar to the way we feel for ourselves. For this reason the experience of the tragic passions can help develop philia towards our fellow human beings, and thus it can reinforce civic friendship, which, according to Aristotle, is the bond of the state.

Given that only muthoi that represent agents situated in particular circumstances and facing particular predicaments can affect our passions and call for the active exercise of practical intelligence, I conclude that poems are to be used as a complement to the more general teachings that Aristotle provides in the ethical treatises.

Peter Celello, Bowling Green State U., “It’s Not Personal (or Non-Personal): Aristotle on the Relationship between Memory and Recollection” pcelell@bgnet.bgsu.edu sat 4 room 5

In her essay “Aristotle on Memory and the Self,” Julia Annas promotes a nontraditional interpretation of Aristotle’s “On Memory and Recollection”. According to Annas, when Aristotle writes about memory he is writing about “personal memory” and when he writes about recollection he is writing about one kind of “non-personal memory.” I argue that while Annas’s interpretation shows promise, it is ultimately unsuccessful both because the distinction between personal memory and non-personal memory is unnecessary in order to understand Aristotle’s theory and because certain passages in “On Memory and Recollection” seem to contradict Annas’s view. After offering a brief summary of Aristotle’s treatise, I focus on a few key passages in order to show that an interpretation that is more consistent with the traditional interpretation is preferable to Annas’s. I argue that recollection is best understood not as a kind of non-personal memory, but rather as a deliberate search, which, when successful, results in memory.

Chung-Yue Chang, Montclair State University, “Parmenides’ Being and Laozi’s Non-being: A Dialogue” c88yc@yahoo.com sat 4 room 4

To friends and foes alike, the Cartesian quest for absolute clarity and certainty in mathematical precision for all areas of human life has been the culminating, defining feature of Western rationality. This tradition traces back to Plato, of course, but its impetus belongs to Parmenides’ directive that “Being is, therefore, non-being is not,” a controversial view even during Parmenides’ own time. Parmenides’ student Zeno came to his defense with the famous Zeno’s paradoxes, intended to show that motion cannot be real, therefore non-being is not.

In this paper I will show that instead of supporting Parmenides, as intended, Zeno’s paradoxes actually destroyed Parmenides’ directive. Unintentionally, what Zeno’s paradoxes show is that, in effect, “Parmenides’ Being is rooted in Non-being.” This is the “ultimate paradox,” not recognized by anyone, much less by Zeno.

I will further show that Laozi, probably a senior contemporary of Parmenides from the other side of the world, can come to the aid of Parmenides and Zeno in this regard. A viable way to solve this “ultimate paradox” (Being is rooted in Non-being) is to understand the Parmenidean Non-being in terms of Laozi’s understanding of Non-being and motion as basic.
**Kevin Cherry**, *Notre Dame*, “Aristotle’s Polity: Equality or Hierarchy?”

One of the more puzzling aspects of Aristotle’s *Politics* is his usage of the same word—*politeia*—to describe both the genus of “constitutions” and a particular species within that genus. I argue that this usage, although different from our modern tendencies, is not uncommon with the Aristotelian ethical and political works. To take but the most prominent example: The different varieties of friendship discussed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* are arranged such that it is only true friendship, that which is developed most fully, which is worthy of the name of the genus in which it falls.

Taking this linguistic usage as significant, I argue that Aristotle sees the constitution of polity to be more appropriate to advanced and developed communities than the regimes often taken to represent his ideals. Aristotle is surely no democrat, yet his understanding of both the limitations and capacities of the many influence his practical political proposals. In particular, I emphasize the role of *phronēsis* in Aristotle’s account. Like friendship and *politeia, phronēsis* is a hierarchical term, but Aristotle believes that the many is capable of having a certain level of that knowledge and, if so, should rightly be given a place in the regime called *politeia*.

**Rose M Cherubin**, *George Mason University*, “Is There Paradox in Parmenides’ Fragments?”

At least with respect to the road of inquiry she seems to recommend, Parmenides’ goddess enjoins against saying and conceiving that *to eon* is not, or that it changes, is divided or multiple, or has a past or future (or present?). She also asserts that her mortal auditor cannot indicate what is not. Yet these very utterances of hers use negation and the future tense, and mention what is not. Moreover, the narrator’s tale of his journey invokes multiplicity and motion, and uses past tenses. What are these apparent discrepancies: are they contradictions, paradoxes, puzzles, contextual shifts, something else? Are they problems we can or should try to solve or to resolve?

**Catherine Collobert**, *University of Ottawa*, “Homeric Ethics: Prudence and Fame”

The heroic view of time in Homer is crucial to elucidating the heroic ethics which mainly rests on the quest for immortality. The quest is understood as the negation of time’s destructive force which manifests itself in human life as the process of aging and death. The quest for immortality being what drives the hero to act in a certain way, heroic ethics is grounded in the search for fame, which is the ultimate end to be attained by the hero. Indeed heroic immortality is defined as immortal glory.

Homeric heroes experience time in two ways: first as a source of uncertainty, and second, as fate. I shall defend the thesis that the two ways constitute the basis for two joint ethical postures: a prudential behavior, and a search for *kleos*. For Homer the value of human life is measured by a man’s ability to perform glorious deeds. The ability is in fact prudence. Prudence is critical for the hero to face uncertainty here and now. It is a key to success, which is of paramount importance because to be successful is for the hero a promise of fame. However because a hero is not a lone individual and his deeds make sense within the *polis*, achieving such an end requires a specific attitude. Based on a sense of *aidōs* (shame and respect), this attitude consists of having concern for others. A lack of such concern, as the suitors epitomize it, implies a bad reputation, which in turn means no fame.
Antonis Coumoundouros, Warren Wilson College, “Three Observations on the *Timaeus* and *Critias*” antonis_c@hotmail.com

Recent work on Plato’s *Timaeus* and *Critias* has revived much interest in these dialogues. In this paper I take up three issues relating to these dialogues. First, I argue that the references to Socrates’ speech on the previous day in the prologue of the *Timaeus* and Critias’ discussion of prehistoric Athens in the *Critias* do have in mind the *Republic* we possess. This has been the prominent interpretation for many centuries but several commentators have recently challenged it. Such commentators claim that the speech referred to in the *Timaeus* and *Critias* cannot be the *Republic* since several key notions present in the *Republic* are omitted in the other two dialogues. Such omitted notions are those of the philosopher king, the account of political and ethical decline, and the third wave in which Socrates attempts to argue that the *Kallipolis* can possibly exist in reality. I argue that despite such omission of important aspects of the *Republic*, what is present in the *Timaeus* and the *Critias* is enough for us to consider that the reference is the *Republic* indeed. Another argument commentators use to argue that the reference to Socrates’ speech on the previous day is not the *Republic* is that the festival which is the occasion for the speeches in the *Timaeus* and *Critias* is the Panathenaia and not the Bendidea and that these fell on different dates on the Athenian sacred calendar.

Second, I argue that Critias’ speech in the *Critias* is a speech intended to call into doubt Timaeus’ discussion of the creation of the world. I argue that Critias exhibits a strong skepticism about claims concerning the gods and claims about the natural world. I support this argument by pointing to several passages in the Critias and in light of what we know about the philosophical positions of the historical Critias.

Finally, I argue that it is quite plausible to consider that the *Critias* is a completed dialogue indeed and that Hermokrates was never meant to give a speech. In this final argument I follow and expand upon claims found in recent work on the *Timaeus* and *Critias* by Diskin Clay. I believe that the arguments presented in this paper contribute to a renewed appreciation of the place of these dialogues in the Platonic corpus and his intriguing discussion in them.

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Daniel Davenport, Boston College, “Beautiful Music: An inquiry into the philosophical life as depicted in Plato’s *Phaedo*” daniel@grayskies.net

With this paper I have posed the question of whether the afterlife is necessary for the philosophical life to be the best life within the context of Plato’s *Phaedo*. However, the paper does not try to impose a definitive answer to this question so much as use this question as a lens for viewing the dialogue itself. Several aspects of the dialogue, Socrates’ exhortation against misology in particular, argue on behalf of the philosophical life without immediately resorting to a need for rewards in an afterlife. In other words, I have tried to determine what encouragement, if any, the *Phaedo* offers for choosing the life of inquiry despite its dramatic setting which depicts the paradigmatic philosopher ending his own life having been condemned to death by his community.

Marguerite Deslauriers, McGill University, “Two-sexed: ‘Tragainai’ in Aristotle’s Biology” marguerite.deslauriers@mcgill.ca

With this paper I have posed the question of whether the afterlife is necessary for the philosophical life to be the best life within the context of Plato’s *Phaedo*. However, the paper does not try to impose a definitive answer to this question so much as use this question as a lens for viewing the dialogue itself. Several aspects of the dialogue, Socrates’ exhortation against misology in particular, argue on behalf of the philosophical life without immediately resorting to a need for rewards in an afterlife. In other words, I have tried to determine what encouragement, if any, the *Phaedo* offers for choosing the life of inquiry despite its dramatic setting which depicts the paradigmatic philosopher ending his own life having been condemned to death by his community.
Aristotle recognizes that some animal species are sexually differentiated into male and female individuals, where the sex is determined at conception. At the same time, he indicates that he is aware of individuals in sexually differentiated species that are not (or not clearly) either male or female. In the Generation of Animals and the History of Animals he discusses the case of dual-sexed animals and people (tragainai). He views these as anomalies, as a departure from nature in the process of conception.

These cases pose interesting questions for his theory of sex determination and the nature of sexual difference. The dual-sexed body raises two questions: (1) If the organs of the body develop for the sake of a function, and the function of a male animal is different from the function of a female animal, then how is it that some animals possess the organs for both functions? (2) If sex is determined by the movements in the male semen acting on the material in the uterus, then how can the same movements in the semen of the male parent both master and fail to master the matter provided by the female parent? I will discuss these questions within the broader context of Aristotle’s account of sexual difference and sex determination.

I argue that the important points to emerge from Aristotle’s discussions of anomalous cases are (1) that sex in an individual is always an accident (2) that sex is not two functions or capacities, but one, and (3) that as a result of (2) Aristotle recognizes intermediate states of sexual determination.

Pierre Destree, University of Maryland, “The art of writing the Republic against poetry” Destree@sofi.ucl.ac.be abstract pending Sat 2 room 1

Ryan Drake, Georgia Southern University, “Plato and Prodicus” Rtd126@hotmail.com Saturday 9 room 1

Among the sophists depicted in the Platonic corpus, Prodicus appears to occupy a privileged status. Whereas, for example, Gorgias, Hippias, Protagoras, and Thrasystratus represent sophistry in a decidedly negative light, Prodicus is consistently referred to by Socrates in the dialogues in terms of high praise, whether invoking his sayings (Euthydemus), calling himself Prodicus’ pupil (Protagoras), or reporting that he would occasionally send young learners into his care (Theaetetus). Scholars have tended to view Prodicus’ position amongst his peers accordingly, while some have gone farther to assert that Prodicus’ method of onomatont orthotes (correct distinguishing of names) exercised a profound influence upon the formation of Socratic dialectic.

This paper undertakes an analysis of Prodicus’ role in the only Platonic dialogue in which he appears in person, the Protagoras. It is here, roughly at the midpoint of the text, that Prodicus offers a brief display of his “divine wisdom,” as Socrates puts it, in his exhortation for a continued conversation between Socrates and Protagoras. While Prodicus plays a very limited part in the dialogue, I argue that his three distinctions (between disputation and wrangling, good repute and praise, and gladness and pleasure) in that short speech bear upon the dialogue’s critique of sophistry to a further extent than has been thus far recognized. Furthermore, I address what amounts to a challenge to Prodicus’ favorable position among the sophists, namely Socrates’ puzzling indirect dismissal of these three distinctions further on in the dialogue. Lastly, I offer an account of how Socrates’ dismissal can be seen as a means for differentiating Socratic and Prodician diariesis.
meckert@umassd.edu  Sun 9 room 2

In the *Meno*, we find the doctrine of recollection (anamnesis) presented as having its source with those who know the truths of religion. Socrates’ mention of the religious source of the doctrine is not a superficial feature of the dialogue. The mystery rites provide insight into the particular manner in which Socrates initiates his beginner level interlocutors, Meno and the slave boy, into philosophical dialectic. The structure of the mystery rites helps to clarify the broader significance of anamnesis that is demonstrated. Initiation rites into the Mystery Cults, such as Demeter’s, consisted of “things shown” (deiknymena), “things said” (legomena) and “actions performed” (dromena). This rite is preceded by an introductory phase in the initiation, myesis (“to close,” as in closing the eyes). The ritual, as a whole, effected a substantial change of perspective in the initiate. All three moments of the rites comprise the whole of the epopteia (“having seen” or “after seeing”), the highest rites at Eleusis. This paper will adjudicate between Jacob Klein’s “metaphorical” interpretation of this section of the *Meno* and Gregory Vlastos’ view that takes a more literal approach. Klein’s view that the *Meno* and this section in particular, contains levels dramatic enactment in “deeds” remains a helpful heuristic, while Vlastos’ view is supported not only through analysis of the enacted mystery rite in the *Meno*, but across other dialogues such as Symposium and Phaedrus. Socrates’ method of teaching or “initiation” bears a priestly stamp. Within this model he would have the role of hierophantes—he who makes sacred things appear—whose initiations and chants call up visions (the epopteia) among the initiated. As hierophant, he is able to do what he claims he does not do—he “teaches.” On the one hand, if it is the case that anamnesis in the *Meno* is not merely metaphorically associated with mystery rites (and anamnesis is itself not wholly metaphorical), the *Meno* may be an example (of a kind) of Socratically pious activity. On the other hand, one might be tempted to interpret this re-presentation as a kind of profanation of the mystery rites. It may be the case that both interpretations are plausible, and force the reader of Plato’s dialogues to reconsider the meaning of “piety” and “Socratic piety.”

Kumiko Endo, *New School University*, “Philosophies of Happiness: Some Western and Eastern Perspectives” abstract pending  kumikoendo@gmail.com  sat 4 room 4

Christos Evangelou, *Towson University*, “The Political Wisdom of Odysseus”
cevangelou@towson.edu  Sat 11 room 6
That Odysseus was the favorite hero of both Athena, the goddess of Hellenic wisdom, and Homer, the poet par excellence of Ancient Hellas, is evident from the fact that the poet devoted to this hero one of his two great poems, the *Odyssey*. However, a careful reading of the other poem, the *Iliad*, indicates clearly that even there Odysseus is exalted above the other two heroes who dominate the plot from beginning, the two protagonists in the unfolding Greek tragedy in Troy, Agamemnon and Achilles. Odysseus was able to overcome both the ruling power of Agamemnon and the matchless prowess of Achilles because of the power of his superior intellect, his unusual cunning, and his practical wisdom of human affairs, that was guided by Athena with deep insight and foresight.

More than any other Homeric hero, Odysseus is active in the epic drama, from beginning to end, on every front: in the main battlefield, in special military missions, in the general assembly of the warriors, and in embassies exchanged between the two feuding parties. Wherever Odysseus is, and whatever he does or says, his intelligence shines through his every political act and spoken word. In every case he saves the miserable Greek army from impending certain disaster. For instance, it was Odysseus’ wise advice that persuaded Agamemnon to try to come to terms with Achilles. Although ruthless Achilles was not persuaded at that time, later and after much pain and suffering he was forced to listen to Odysseus’ advice and limit his personal and limitless rage for the sake of the common good of the Hellenic host in the hostile territory of Troy.

Apparently his moment of triumph, as Homer saw it, came not when he was awarded the armor of Achilles in the contest with the great Ajax; or when Troy fell due to his strategic invention of the Wooden Horse; but when Odysseus met the shades of these heroes in Hades. They had all been dead, but he was still alive and in his way to beloved Ithaca. Little wonder, then, that even Helen herself will praise Odysseus above all other Hellenic heroes, including Menelaus, her chosen husband. Here in Troy and far away from Greece Helen can only sigh that she did not choose Odysseus for her husband. According to the legend, he was one of the Hellenic princes who courted the beautiful daughter of Zeus. Her dream would come almost true ages later, in Nikos Kazantzakis’ wonderful poem, *The Odyssey: A Modern Sequel*. Willingly, she will run away from Sparta again, but this time not with youthful Paris, but with crafty Odysseus, King of Ithaca, captain of his ship and in his way to Minoan Crete and to distant Pharaonic Egypt.

It is my purpose in this study to take a close look at Homer’s portrait of Odysseus, destined to become the Hellenic cultural hero over the centuries. I will discuss his role in the great epic drama as it unfolds. We will see him in action from the beginning, the moment when Achilles started his verbal attack on Agamemnon, to the end, the moment when Odysseus scolds triumphant Achilles advising him to think of the army too, not just his honor and his wounded pride. By exalting Odysseus above Agamemnon and Achilles, above Ajax and Menelaus, the Poet of Hellas apparently wanted to praise and to elevate the virtue (*arete*) of practical wisdom (*metis*) above the other heroic virtues, courage (*andreia*) and justice (*dike*). He thus set the stage for Hellenic *philosophy* to appear later.

William Evans, *St. Peter’s College*, “Teaching Plato’s *Republic* as a Tale of Three Philosophers” [WEVANS@spc.edu](mailto:WEVANS@spc.edu) sat 2 room 7

In the *Republic* Plato famously proposes that the best city would be ruled by philosopher kings, those who had left the cave, ascended to the knowledge of the Good,
and returned to the cave to rule in the light of that knowledge. However, this proposal is made by Socrates, who does not seem to fit the requirements of a philosopher king. Socrates expresses so many doubts throughout the *Republic* about various ideas under discussion that he seems to be quite a different kind of philosopher: the philosopher king possesses wisdom about the Good, but Socrates does not and instead is always searching for it. So there are two philosophers in Plato’s *Republic*. But there is one more philosopher we need to take into account: Plato himself, who wrote the book as a drama at least for audiences to read. So how should we read the *Republic*, and how should we teach it?

I propose that we take very seriously Socrates’ frequent doubts in trying to understand, with our students, the various “doctrines” of the *Republic*. I will begin with Socrates’ claim in Book II that he and his friends are not clever people and are like people whose eyesight is poor and therefore need some help in their search for the nature of the human soul and virtue. I will then focus especially on the many doubts Socrates expresses in Book IV, where the kallipolis has been established and where virtues both in the city and in the soul are allegedly discovered (– for examples, at 429a where Socrates says they have found – “I don’t know how” – wisdom in the kallipolis). Our students might be able to discern a contrast between Socrates’ interlocutors, who don’t pursue Socrates’ explicit doubts, and we, as readers, who should do that. Perhaps Socrates recognizes his ignorance and his interlocutors don’t recognize theirs. We and our students might then see what sort of virtues are necessary to participate well in Socratic dialogue, as full of doubts as it is, and how that might require us to re-examine the virtues of the soul proposed so hesitantly by Socrates in Book IV, as well as the very nature of the philosopher developed in Books V-VII.

I suggest that this leads us to see Plato, in writing this dialogue, as inviting his readers into the conversation: where Socrates’ interlocutors fail to appreciate his doubts, we teachers, together with our students, should not fail to do so. We might then be in a position to understand Socrates, throughout the *Republic* (not to mention in other dialogues) as the philosopher who always seeks the Good but does not possess wisdom about it. The *Republic*, on this reading, is a remarkably open dialogue. Plato did not write it as a vehicle for doctrines but as an invitation for us to engage in dialogue about virtue and the soul, by presenting an image of Socrates, the philosopher who is ever striving for but never possessing wisdom.

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**Margarita Fenn**, Boston College, “Dunamis, Energeia, Entelecheia: Parmenidean Identity in Aristotle’s *De Anima*” fennm@bc.edu Sat 9 room 3

“The soul is in a certain way all things, but not materially” *DA* 431b21-24. In *DA* BK I, Aristotle criticizes his predecessors’ accounts of sensing and knowing for materialism and incorrect use of like-to-like as an explanatory model. The influence of Parmenides resides in both. Aristotle starts a new paradigm in his account of nutrition, that he adopts for all perception: unlike-to-like. To exact this shift, he develops further and applies to *psuche*, the principles of *dunamis*, *energeia*, and *entelechia*. These principles release *psuche* from Parmenidean Identity, permitting *psuche* to be and not be,
to be one and many, to undergo alteration and remain one, thereby preserving identity in
difference.

Aristotle discards both like-to-like and unlike-to-unlike as inadequate models to
describe nutrition and the changing relationship between the nutriment and the faculty of
nutrition. He introduces a new model that fuses the old two: unlike-to-like. It is, more
importantly, the explanatory model which he adopts to account for all perception. I
propose that Aristotle’s deployment of *dunamis*, *energeia*, and *entelechia*, and his shift to
unlike-to-like as a new explanatory model, are the ways in which he conceptually solves
the problems of materialism, like-to-like, and Parmenidean Identity in previous accounts
of sensing and knowing.

**Coeli Fitzpatrick**, *Grand Valley State University*, “Prophetic Visions, Political Realities:
al-Farabi’s State and Religious Imagery” fitzpaco@gvsu.edu Sat 9 room 9

This paper examines al-Farabi’s discussion of religious imagery in his political
philosophy, reading al-Farabi’s explanation for religious imagery in light of his larger
argument that philosophy is prior to religion, but religion is still a purveyor of truth.
Unlike his precursor Plato, al-Farabi is somewhat more confident in human ability to
understand the purpose of the state—through imagery—and he argues that the imagery
“used” by religion will vary from nation to nation. Al-Farabi acknowledges that part of
the role of religion is to play on the non-rational parts of the human soul—those parts
where fears and desires may be stirred—in order to cultivate and maintain the virtues in a
society. Islamic philosophers have therefore typically interpreted metaphorically those
parts of the Qur’an which describe heaven and hell, thus reclaiming them for the domain
of reason (albeit in a reading that perhaps only philosophers will be able to truly
understand.) Al-Farabi claims that there is not one single religion, but many, each of
which uses different images as appropriate for the individual nation/culture in which the
religion is found. Philosophy proper, then may be in a higher place than religion(s), but
should philosophy engage in political discussion, it cannot but remain subordinate to
religion. In at least one sense, the philosopher-ruler still remains subordinate to the
prophet, who is the conveyor of the imagery to the masses.

**Marie Friquegnon**, *William Paterson University*, “The Cittamatra School as described in
Santaraksita’s Philosophy” FriquegnonM@wpunj.edu Sat 11 room 4

In Madhyamakalankara Santaraksita adopts a Cittamatra (idealist) position on the
relative level and a Madhyamaka position on the absolute level. I will suggest possible
ways in which he uses his Cittamatra position in his tantric text, Tattvasiddhi, to explain
how one can achieve enlightenment.

**Dylan Futter**, *Fordham University*, “Elenchus and Belief-formation”
mrapollinax@gmail.com Sun 11 room 1

Much of Socrates’ activity as a philosopher consisted in examining people about
virtue. In Plato’s earlier dialogues, he is presented as enquiring into the essence of such
traits as wisdom, courage and piety. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Socrates’
method of philosophising is how unsuccessful it is. One problem is that his method seems
only to destroy common belief without generating anything substantive in its place.
Another is that it seems incapable of getting anyone to relinquish his unsupported beliefs.
Indeed, it is striking how very few of Socrates’ interlocutors give up their original beliefs even after being driven into contradiction. Euthyphro runs away, Thrasydamus tries to run away, and Callicles appears to be entirely unmoved by reason.

Plato is acutely aware of these problems. In the *Meno*, he undertakes to show that Socrates’ method of inquiry is capable of generating substantive results. In the *Gorgias*, he reveals why some people are not moved by rational argumentation. And in the *Republic* he proposes a complex model of moral belief-formation, which explains the possibility of breakdown in Socratic method, and shows the way to a resolution.

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**David Garrison**, *University of South Florida*, “Poetic Paradox: Truth, Lies, and Memory in the Fragments of Xenophanes”  
Dgarriso@mail.usf.edu  
Sun 9 room 1

Xenophanes of Colophon has posed an enigma for historians of ideas for well over 2000 years. The first philosopher-poet, though certainly not the only and perhaps not the greatest, he is also one of the first social and literary critics. He directly challenges the heroic worldview of Hesiod and Homer, the way people speak of the Gods, and the behavior of citizens and of cities. Yet he does so in the language of the poets. In Xenophanes’ poems, we see a new standard of human excellence governing a new skill, a skill rising from the tropes, practices, and ideals of an earlier age but which engages the reality of the new polis where negotiation and consent are as important to the healthy city as confrontation and dominance. Not the least of the difficulties Xenophanes presents is in regards his supposed position on the status of human knowledge. Historians have tried to categorize him and epistemologists of every ilk have attempted to co-opt his position to their own; however, even with the renewed interest in his cryptic and much fragmented work in the past century, little resolution has been offered. He has been called a skeptic, a robust empiricist, a rationalist, a fallibilist, a critical philosopher, and a naturalist. Moreover, as I will attempt to show, the defense of each of these positions is roughly equal in strength (and thus in weakness as well). If this is the case, then it seems equally reasonable to doubt that Xenophanes has given us a stout epistemology at all or if that was ever his intent, and if this is the case, then we may perhaps wonder if we must either accept Harold Cherniss’ position that Xenophanes is a rhapsode and poet who has made it into the history of philosophy by mistake or alter our definition of philosophy with respect the early Greeks.

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**Marie George**, *St. John’s University*, “The Underpinnings of the Ancient Classification of the Four Temperaments”  
migphilosophy@hotmail.com  
Saturday 2 room 8

Those of us familiar with the ancient classification of the temperaments (sanguine, melancholic, choleric, and phlegmatic) find it useful for sizing people up so as to better interact with them. Why though do those categories work so well? What is the basis of this division into four? I maintain that there are three principles operative in this subdivision: 1) whether emotions are readily engaged or engaged with difficulty; 2) whether the emotions are superficial or more profound; 3) whether concupiscible or irascible emotions predominate. I maintain that these principles of division give the following classification:

Emotions are engaged with difficulty: phlegmatic
Emotion are readily engaged: sanguine, melancholic, choleric
Emotions are superficial: sanguine
Emotions are more profound: melancholic, choleric
Emotions are concupiscible: melancholic
Emotions are irascible: choleric

With a view to verifying my thesis, I consider which temperament mixtures should in principle be compatible or incompatible with the temperament mixtures that are actually observed.

Lloyd Gerson, University of Toronto, Commentator Sat 4 room 1
lloyd.gerson@utoronto.ca

Twyla Gibson, University of Toronto, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Plato’s Unwritten Doctrine.” twyla.gibson@utoronto.ca Sat 11 room 5

A number of scholars have suggested solutions to the issues surrounding Plato’s “unwritten doctrines.” This study offers a new proposal. I rely on the recent work of Mary Douglas (2006) and others concerning ring composition, the formulaic technique that places meaning at the center of the work framed on either side by parallel sequences of classifications. Noburu Notomi (1999) identified ring composition as the principle governing the overall plot pattern of Plato’s Sophist. I build on Notomi’s findings by arguing that there are smaller rings within this larger ring. Focusing on the instructions for the definition of mimesis (264c-268d) presented by the explicit statements of Plato’s Stranger, I present a diagram of the ring (via powerpoint). I demonstrate that the ring serves as the framework for organizing the classifications into a series of corresponding parallelisms on either side of a midpoint, based on principles of analogy, polarity, and symmetry. Diagramming the ring and the correspondences makes it possible to identify places in the sequence that the Stranger omits or passes over in silence when he presents his instructions.

Next, I briefly compare the sequential order of the topics and ideas in the definition of mimesis with the organization of the discourse in two earlier passages in this same dialogue. Superimposing the template of the mimetic definition over top of the discourse in other sections of this same work makes it easier to see how the classifications form a latent and stable background even as the content varies.

After that, I use the ring for the definition of mimesis as the master pattern in the search for implicit structures in other dialogues. Comparing (again via powerpoint) the mimetic ring with the organization of the discourse in key passages that deal with imitation in other works shows that the definition recurs — in whole or in part — in other dialogues, including works regarded as spurious. In fact, it is my argument that there are no discussions of imitation in Plato’s dialogues where parts of the series do not occur.

Seeing so many different passages that manifest the same form (however briefly) makes it possible to shift perception from foregrounding the content that varies with each instance, to the background organization that remains constant and invariable. Each new example increases the ability to recognize the circular definition and the meanings that inhere in this form. We see how the classifications add dimensions of meaning to the explicit statements in a passage, how they clarify ambiguities, cut through irony, and frame interpretation. Since items that are missing from the framework in one passage are
often given or “written” in others, collecting multiple examples of the same series and combining elements listed in each classification makes it possible to tentatively “figure out” some of the “unwritten” elements in a way that may be confirmed or falsified in accordance with scientific standards of verification and proof.

I then generalize the findings from the definition of mimesis to other definitions and to the dialogues as a whole. Turning back to the Sophist, I show how the sequence for mimesis is woven together with other definitions (perhaps The Hunter or the Merchant of Learning) to produce the structural fabric of the discourse in this and one other dialogue. I explain how recognizing that the definitions are mapped onto rings changes the way we read Plato’s writings, and brings clarity to the cluster of issues surrounding the “unwritten doctrines.” I conclude that Plato’s dialogues contain both an exoteric and an esoteric teaching. The exoteric Platonic teaching is expressed in the content of the “written” statements; all the information required to find the ultimate principles is contained in the dialogues. The esoteric teaching is impressed on the dialogues by way of the form of the content. The “unwritten doctrines” must be inferred, reasoned out, “produced” by listeners (and readers) who “see” how the content and the principles that give shape to the content interact, and to use this insight to go on and generate the unwritten teaching within themselves.

Owen Goldin, Marquette University, “Aristotle and Circular Reasoning,” owen.goldin@marquette.edu Sat 2 room 5

Within Posterior Analytics 1.3, Aristotle presents an argument that the objects of episteme must rest on principles that are not themselves objects of episteme. This argument is built on a subordinate argument that circular demonstrative chains are impossible, for they generate an infinite regress. Aristotle’s argument parallels standard foundationalist arguments in epistemology, to the effect that if knowledge requires a justification, the bases of justification cannot be known (at least in the same sense) lest there be an infinite regress. Yet Aristotle is not an epistemological foundationalist, except in regard to the very special kind of knowledge that is episteme. For example, the principles of episteme are themselves justified through a web of argument, observations, and dialectical exchanges, of which no component has any pride of place. In regard to the sort of justification that lies behind the principles of the sciences, Aristotle is a coherence theorist. Why will the argument of APo. 1.3 not call into question Aristotle’s own account concerning the justification demanded by the principles of the sciences? In this paper I suggest that the answer lies in different role played by the lines of argument at work in each case. One’s grasp of principles is the cause of the episteme one has in regard to a demonstrative conclusion, and, once the kinds of causes are disambiguated, causation, as Aristotle sees it, cannot be reciprocal. In contrast, one’s cognitive attitude towards the premises and observations that are components of a circular, dialectical line of justificatory reasoning cannot in the strict sense be considered as causing the knowledge of the proposition that is justified. Accordingly, although dialectical justification is circular, the circle is not vicious.

Frank Gonzalez, Skidmore College, “Where in the Symposium is the Philosopher? (And where is Plato?)” fgonzale@skidmore.edu Sat 2 room 1
There is a tendency to read the *Symposium* as if Diotima had written it, i.e., to see the different speeches on love as steadily progressing towards and culminating in Socrates’ speech, which in its turn leaves these speeches completely behind. Yet Plato seems deliberately to complicate, if not even sabotage such a reading in a number of different ways: by having some speeches forgotten, by disrupting their order, by suppressing replies to criticism, and by allowing for a major intrusion that robs the philosopher of the last word. Instead of offering an ascending ladder to enlightenment, the *Symposium* provides us with a kaleidoscope of incomplete, conflicting and complementary perspectives which the philosopher must continually confront and in all of which he can to some extent see himself.

The present paper will attempt to show why we should avoid identifying not only what Socrates says with what Diotima says, but also Socrates’ speech on love with Plato’s speech on love. Plato’s speech on love is the *Symposium* as a whole. Just as Socrates is made to express the truth about love in a dialogue, so does Plato choose to express this in a much more complex dialogue. In both cases any interpretation of what they say has to be sensitive to the dialogical situation they create. Does the *Symposium* then have anything to teach us about the nature of love? While this would be hard to deny, the word ‘teaching’ should not deceive us into thinking that we are dealing here with something we can pin down by identifying it with what Diotima or any other character says. Plato is everywhere and nowhere and cannot be pinned down or plugged into an orderly sequence (some intellectual development, for example). This is not because Plato is tricky or deceitful. Rather, this is because philosophy, and *a fortiori* love, is itself everywhere and nowhere and cannot be pinned down.

Edward J. Grippe, Norwalk Community College, “Democratic Implications in Plato’s *Republic*” egrippe@ncc.commnet.edu

(Extract) That the polis should benefit if the philosophers become rulers or the rulers philosophers (*Republic*: 473) is essential to Plato’s republican construct. Most interpreters have taken this to mean that in some fashion those persons whose souls are governed by reason should lead the state’s citizens who are captivated by the detrimental allures of pleasure or power. Thus envisioned, the leadership Plato offers appears to be a benign paternalism that is inherently unequal in composition. This seems to be confirmed in Book VIII of the *Republic* with the condemnation of the egalitarian democratic form of government as ego-centric and dominated by appetite (562-563). Nevertheless, one may recall that Plato has Socrates further argue, with concern, (564-566) that the anarchy which democracy breeds opens the way for manipulative demagoguery and ultimately the coercive tyranny of strongman rule. Thus with the dialectic transformation of libertine democracy to its repressive opposite, the force of Heraclitian flux demands a stabilizing element to bring about political equilibrium and to avoid a corresponding reaction to oppression; hence Plato’s call for the Philosopher King and his wise rule. …

For Plato reading becomes a sense catalyst, and as such the written dialogue, despite—or like in the *Republic* because of—its paternalistic excesses, is the surrogate midwife to Socratic existential breakthrough. Specifically, in this way we are called to think about and to object to the claims about the Kallipolis, and thereby are encouraged to become the rulers of ourselves, the Philosopher-Kings of our lives, by being critical thinkers in our own right—like the wise Socrates and unlike the intemperate
Thrasymachus. And since there is no limit as to how many ‘rulers’ can be in a republic, if the proper education is advanced, in the spirit of the Theory of Recollection, it is implied in the Republic what is stated outright in the Apology: All may be wise when they come to realize, as the returning Philosopher does, that they know that their knowledge is worth little. For in principle all citizens of a republic can be philosophers, and these philosophers ought to be kings. Therefore, a democracy, when populated by lovers of wisdom, does not run counter to the republic envisioned in Plato master work. Rather they become the guardians of it when the Philosopher(s) “rule(s)” by serving.

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John S Hendrix, Roger Williams University, “Perception and Language in Plotinus” 
  jhendrix@rwu.edu Sat 4 room 6

In this paper I will argue that in the thought of Plotinus, how we perceive the world around us is determined by how we use language. In the Enneads IV.7.6, Plotinus distinguishes between perception and what might be called apperception, or multiple perceptions. Actual perceptual experience is multiple and diversified; perceived objects have no necessary connections in size or position, and can be perceived in a variety of ways by the different senses. But in human perception all objects and acts of perception are unified to form a coherent whole which structures the world around us. When the fragmented and variable objects of perception “reach the ruling principle they will become like partless thoughts...”; they are organized in a conceptual process through the mechanisms of language. The perception of forms in matter is determined by reason made conscious. In I.1.7, “the faculty of perception in the soul [lower intellect] cannot act by the immediate grasping of sensible objects, but only by the discerning of impressions printed upon the animate [intellect] by sensation: these perceptions are already Intelligibles...” The discerning of impressions printed upon the intellect by sensation is the function of discursive reason in language, not immediate sense perception; perception is a function of language. Since the sensual impressions, or mnemic residues, in perception are copies and derivatives of intelligible forms, perception itself is a copy and derivative of reason. Thought in Plotinus is composed of mnemic residues of perceived objects, what Plotinus calls “imprints” in “recollections” (V.3.2). Our thoughts are propelled by the desire created by the multiple and fragmented images of perception reconstructed in language. “The reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental images present to it which come from sense-perception, but combining them and dividing them...”

Blake Hestir, Texas Christian University, “Aristotle on Truth and the Synthetic Structure of Language, Thought, and Reality.” bhestir@tcu.edu Sat 11 room 3

Aristotle famously proclaims in Metaphysics Gamma 7: “For to state of that which is that it is not or of that which is not that it is is false, and to state of that which is that it is or of that which is not that it is not is true.” Aristotle is inclined to think of this as a definition of truth and falsity; we are inclined to wonder what he means by it. Many people have considered this to be the expression of a correspondence theory. I argue that it’s not. I return to Aristotle’s remarks about truth, meaning, and the functionality of thought in De Interpretatione and De Anima. Employing the fairly recent notion of
biosemantics (or as I term it for Aristotle, teleo-biosemantics) to help explicate Aristotle’s semantic theory, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of language has much more to say about his account of thought than some scholars think. I offer some reasons why Aristotle might have defined truth in terms of statements, rather than thoughts, and show that for Aristotle neither statements nor complex thoughts need be or even can be in exact one-to-one correspondence with states of affairs when those statements or thoughts are true. Given this conception of thought and language in the early works and Aristotle’s remarks about truth and being in the context of Metaphysics Gamma 4 and 7, I argue the best Aristotle has is a theory of truth that smells suspiciously deflationary.

Beverly Hinton, West Virginia University, “The Subject Criterion in Metaphysics Zeta.” whlentz@aol.com Sun 9 room 3

In Metaphysics Zeta 3, Aristotle defines the subject criterion for substance as that of which other things are predicated but which is itself not predicated of anything else. He offers a reductio argument of this claim, and asserts that the criterion is insufficient because it leads to the unacceptable position that matter is substance. In this paper, this reductio argument is examined in order to assess two possible interpretations of this argument: one which rejects the subject criterion altogether as a criterion for substance, and another (that I support) which rejects only the subject criterion as stated. As stated, the subject criterion appears to sanction an apairesis or a method of stripping away all predicates in order to reveal the subject. I argue that the apairesis as conducted in the reductio reveals only a truncated subject and so fails to reveal how the subject can contribute to substance. This result in turn necessitates a revision of the original criterion, but does not involve a whole scale rejection of the subject criterion. The final version of the revised criterion will read: subject as substance is that of which properties are predicated but which is not predicated of other things, and that which contributes to the ability of substance to be a tode ti and separate by allowing for the complexity necessary for the discrete manifestation of properties.

Hyun Höchsmann, New Jersey City University, “Can the Divided Line dispel the Aporia in the Meno?” hhochsmann@NJCU.edu Sun 9 room 2

There are three varieties of aporia in the Meno: Meno’s, his attendant’s, and Socrates’. The aporiai of Meno and his attendant are induced by Socratic elenchus. To Meno’s taunting complaint that he is a stingray in action and in appearance Socrates replies disarmingly that if he numbs others he is no less stunned himself. Socrates’ aporia is dispositional and chronic: it arises from Socratic wisdom (the knowledge of one’s own ignorance) and motivates and directs his elenchus in the Meno and in other dialogues.

The aporia brought on by Socrates in the role of a stingray does not undermine the confidence of the worldly Meno. He seeks to subdue Socrates with a declaration of the impossibility of knowledge: if we know we would not need to look for knowledge and if we do not know how can we look for what we do not know and recognize it when we find it? If Meno appears keen to pin Socrates down with this move, we might say, without undue malice, that it would absolve him of the charge of ignorance since no one can set out on a search for knowledge. To surrender to Meno would amount to yielding to the Sophists’ claim that there is no objective knowledge.
Socrates swiftly retaliates to dismantle Meno’s purported paradox of knowledge as a pseudo sophistic dilemma by taking two distinct paths simultaneously: upward to the gods and downward to the ground of geometry. Socrates proclaims that virtue is dispensed by the gods to poets, prophets, and politicians. Divine dispensation of virtue remains a mystery since those who possess virtue can neither communicate how it comes about nor impart it to others. But knowledge as recollection is possible even for the untutored as Socrates demonstrates on the ground with a proof in geometry. What the poets and the oracle sayers possess is incommunicable and irrational while knowledge of geometry is demonstrable and rational. Has Socrates himself succumbed to what he has accused Meno of by breaking knowledge into two kinds? Or are they two ways of knowing or attaining the same thing, virtue itself?

Application of the Divided Line from the Republic provides a way of dispelling the varieties of aporia in the Meno in stages of conjecture, belief, understanding, and reason and shows the ascent from perception to knowledge without invoking the gods and virtue possessed by the divinely inspired poets and prophets.

Hyun Höchsmann, New Jersey City University, “Zhuangzi on Forgetting the Self” Sat 2 room 4

The great man has no thought of self (Zhuangzi 17).

When people have forgotten external things and heaven, they may be regarded as men who have forgotten themselves. The man who has forgotten himself can be regarded as one who can be identified with heaven (Zhuangzi 13).

It can be said that he is one with all that exists. Belonging to all that exists, he has no individual self. Having no self, he does not see things as his possessions (Zhuangzi 11).

To expand the self from transitory states to ever wider sphere and to be “without concern for the self and have few desires”– these are the goals to be achieved by forgetting the self. Zhuangzi is frequently regarded as an adherent of subjectivism or relativism – that all knowledge and values are subjective or relative and that there is no universal moral point of view. This is erroneous: Zhuangzi emphasizes the unity among all beings.

The sage aims at removing the confusions and doubts that dazzle people. Because of this he does not use his own judgment but abides in the common principle. This is what is meant by using the light of nature (Zhuangzi 2).

Forgetting the self can free us from partiality of isolated perceptions. Highest happiness is attained not in exclusive concern with the interests of the self but in the realization of freedom from the confinement of individuality. Zhuangzi regards arriving at a common point of view and achieving unity with all that exists as the highest happiness.

Being in harmony with all people is human happiness (Zhuangzi 13). Amplitude of purpose and action, and the realization of the harmony between the mind and the universe constitute the true nature of man.

To understand what originates and sustains all is the highest beauty and highest happiness. One who knows this highest beauty and highest happiness is the complete man (Zhuangzi 21).
M. Andrew Holowchak, Wilkes University, “Misfortune as a Rite of Passage: Stoic Sagacity and the Unfortunately Fortunate ‘Sage’” mholowchak@hotmail.com

(Extract) No life is worthy of a sage that is not without its share of misfortune. Seneca ups the ante, as he often states that a life fraught with misfortune is preferable to one that is relatively misfortune-free. Thus, Odysseus’ 20 years of suffering would itself seem to be a life worth choosing again.

In this paper, I address the following questions. Is misfortune a needed component of a virtuous life for a Stoic sage? If so, to what extent? I examine such questions first from a conceptual slant and then from one that is empirical. I draw chiefly from, and restrict my comments principally to, the works of Seneca and Epictetus.

J. Noel Hubler, Lebanon Valley College, “Getting the Truth Out: Truth and political discourse in Aristotle’s thought” mnhubler@comcast.net

Despite numerous efforts, Plato is unable to formulate a viable political theory, because he is never able to formulate a theory of knowledge that allows for mediated knowledge rather than the direct cognition of forms. By contrast, Aristotle develops a theory that allows for truth to emerge reliably through political discourse as a result of two features of his theory of knowledge that are lacking in Plato’s theory of knowledge: the theory of analogy and the syllogism. Syllogism and analogy allow Aristotle to develop a theory of knowledge that allows truth to be attributed to political discourse, thus allowing the development of standards of truth appropriate for political and legal discourse.

First, Aristotle’s theory of analogy allows him to develop a more flexible theory of truth than found in Plato. For Plato truth is a matter of the direct cognition of the forms and other types of knowledge fall short of genuine knowledge and into hypothetical knowledge or mere opinion. For Aristotle, terms like being, one, and truth are pliable and apply to different things differently. However, their various applications are not merely equivocal, but are all related to a common core meaning and thus can be studied in a coherent way. So Aristotle believes truth can be found not only in the intuitive grasp of fundamental principles, but also in processes of rational inquiry including those employed in legal and political discourse.

Through the doctrine of the syllogism, Aristotle shows how the intuitive grasp of fundamental principles can be extended through chains of reasoning into complete sciences. Although syllogisms extend the content of understanding beyond the intuitive grasp of first principles, nevertheless, syllogistic sciences preserve truth, albeit in a different form than that of direct intuition.

Finally, syllogism serves as a model for Aristotle’s sign theory that then forms the basis for political discourse. Aristotle understands signs as less certain syllogisms that although lacking apodictic certainty, still can provide reliable guidance to the truth appropriate for their discourse. In legal and political discourse, orators employ signs and partial syllogisms to argue their cases and in most instances, juries and deliberative bodies arrive at the truth.

As Hannah Arendt points out, political “power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company” and “where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities” (The Human Condition, p. 200). Through analogy and syllogism, Aristotle establishes a model for truth in the political and forensic realms. Although legal
and political truth is not as certain as the truth of mathematics, nevertheless, orators, lawyers, and politicians can still be held to a standard of truth appropriate to their discipline, within the rigors of logical reasoning.

**John Humphrey**, *North Carolina A&T*, “What Euthyphro Knows”  jfh47@yahoo.com  
Sat 4 room 2

The *Euthyphro* opens with Socrates on his way to the Stoa of the archon, i.e., the Porch of the King, the court buildings located in the marketplace, where he is to receive his indictment when he happens to meet the seer (mantis) Euthyphro. In the ensuing dialogue, the reader learns that the seer is also on his way to the court, not, however, to be accused, but to accuse his own father of murdering one of Euthyphro’s own laborers. While this particular man works for Euthyphro, Euthyphro has loaned the man to his father to work on his father’s farm in Naxos. Quite obviously shocked by Euthyphro’s account of his intention to charge his father with murder, Socrates questions the seer about his intended actions—a discussion that settles on a consideration of piety. Euthyphro, however, justifies his intentions by appealing to the poets’ tales of the actions gods. If Euthyphro believes he can defend his actions by appealing to the poets, he must at least be familiar with the works of the poets. But what else does Euthyphro think that he knows? This essay, however, does not consider what Euthyphro does or does not know; rather, my intention is to examine what Euthyphro claims to know. I will be especially interested in whether or not Plato’s Socrates does in fact reject all of Euthyphro’s attempts to define piety.

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**Jenn Ingle**, *Frostburg State University*, “Teaching the Audience How to Fish: Paideia in the *Theaetetus*”  jingle24@gmail.com  Sat 4 room 1

If we view Plato’s dialogues in their historical and cultural context, one in which texts – oral and written – are produced to serve the needs of Greek *paideia*, the question that arises is how did Plato’s dialogues work to educate their audience? This paper will argue that in the *Theaetetus*, Plato is teaching the audience a method of *paideia*: philosophy. The old saying holds true even here: if you give a man a fish, he will eat for a day, but if you teach that man to fish, he will eat for a lifetime. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato does exactly this: rather than giving the audience a definition of knowledge, he teaches them *how* to reach a definition of knowledge. He teaches them philosophy through critiques of other types of *paideia*, each instantiated by a character.

Plato uses historically significant figures as Socrates’ interlocutors throughout the dialogues because it is necessary for the use of a literary technique that draws on the audience’s common knowledge: dramatic irony. The success of the technique relies on the audience members’ knowledge of historical fact, so that they might grasp the irony of the beliefs that the character holds. Dramatic irony was a staple of fifth-century tragedies; for example, we can see that Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex* employs the technique in that it assumes the audience already knows what happens in the end; the audience is presumed to be ‘omnisicient’. The audience watches Oedipus make his mistakes that ultimately lead to his fate; they see that the qualities of his character prove to be the same qualities that are his undoing. It is only through their full knowledge of the Oedipus
myth that the tragedy gains a secondary character: the audience is able to reflect on Oedipus’ choices and the qualities of his character while the action of the play unfolds, increasing the emotional impact of the drama and providing a secondary message about self-discovery.

While the internal audience searches for a definition of knowledge, the external audience is instructed in what is *unique* about philosophy as a pedagogical practice, Socrates’ *dialegesthai*. Both the dramatic action of the dialogue and the content of the discourse exchanged between Socrates and the two mathematicians constitute an instance of pedagogy. What we, members of the external audience, are learning is what is *required* for knowledge – even as Theaetetus and the internal audience strive to learn what the essence of knowledge is. We learn *how* to acquire knowledge.

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**Bernard Jacob, Hofstra University, “Just Puzzles from EN Book V”**
[ Bernard.E.Jacob@hofstra.edu](mailto:Bernard.E.Jacob@hofstra.edu) Sat 4 room 7

In the latter half of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Epsilon, Aristotle raises and attempts to answer puzzles (aporiae) about justice. For some commentators they are no more than that, just puzzles, casual logical problems or current disputes. Most readers pass over them without comment, except for the chapter on equity. But to other commentators the puzzles seem to be designed to underline two ways in which Aristotle seems to diverge from Plato. On the one hand, the puzzles permit Aristotle to affirm his commitment to the law while establishing the virtue of demanding less than one’s due in appropriate circumstances, that is, becoming an equitable man (epieikes)), which emerges, in Chapter 10, from the legally recognized power of the judge or magistrate, while obeying the laws, to improve them (epieikeia). Plato’s Stranger speaks slightly, in the Statesman, of the laws (as opposed to spontaneous action of a royal ruler) and denies the separateness of the political from other social relations.

On the other hand, a second and perhaps ultimate aim of the puzzles is to permit Aristotle to reject Socrates’ apparent premise of the Republic, that the polis is an organism strictly analogous in structure to individual human soul itself. That misconceives the nature of political affairs, says Aristotle, for justice requires at least two individuals (1138a19-20). My paper will begin a study of these puzzles.

**Tao Jiang, Rutgers University, “Free Will in the Cross-Cultural Context” abstract pending**
[ tangxyang@gmail.com](mailto:tangxyang@gmail.com) Sat 2 room 4

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**Shalahudin Kafrawi, Moravian College, “Necessary Existent in Razi and in ibn Sina”**
abstract pending [skafrawi@gmail.com](mailto:skafrawi@gmail.com) Sat 11 room 9

**Emily Katz, Duquesne University, “Forms, Numbers and First Principles: Plato’s ‘Lectures on Philosophy’”**
[ eckatz@hotmail.com](mailto:eckatz@hotmail.com) Sat 11 room 5

In *De Anima* I.2 404b18-27, Aristotle discusses ideas from what he calls the “lectures on philosophy” (en tw peri filosofia legomenw). Since he has just been speaking
about Plato’s *Timaeus*, and commentators have been unable to locate these ideas anywhere in the dialogues, most conclude that this passage presents views from Plato’s oral teachings. Some have used this reference to support their position that Plato reserves his most important ideas for oral teaching in the Academy. While I agree that this passage discusses Plato’s oral teachings, I do not share the conclusion that these ideas differ in any significant way from the views he expresses in the dialogues. There are two apparent discrepancies between the oral teaching of lines 18-27 and the dialogues. First, while Aristotle reports that in the “lectures on philosophy” Plato says that the ultimate principles are “the One” and “primary length, breadth, and depth”, in the *Philebus* he calls them Limit and the Unlimited, and in *Timaeus* he calls them Being, the Same and the Different. Second, while Aristotle reports at 404b24 that Plato identifies the Forms with numbers, commentators do not believe that this is part of Plato’s written teaching. Are these differences important, and are there ideas in these oral teachings that are not even implicit in the dialogues? Does this passage give us reason to believe that Plato’s oral teachings are significantly different from what is written in the dialogues? I examine the ways in which the ideas of the “lectures on philosophy” described in *De Anima* 404b18-24 are different from views Plato maintains in the dialogues, and show that these differences do not provide evidence that Plato withholds key ideas from his writings.

**Jari Kaukua, University of Jyväskylä, Finland, “Neoplatonic Influences on Avicenna’s Discussion of Self-awareness”**

Recent research has shown Avicenna to be one of the most insightful medieval thinkers when it comes to the topic of self-awareness. He places considerable explanatory weight on the phenomenon (as can readily be seen once we put the famous thought experiment of the flying man firmly in its context in Avicenna’s psychology) and provides a careful analysis of various types of self-awareness. Indeed, in this latter respect he seems to be on par with some of our most acute contemporaries – not a mean feat considering the degree of our obsession with the phenomenon. Avicenna’s treatment of self-awareness is thrown in particularly striking relief when it is considered against the somewhat scant material that can be unearthed from the general Aristotelian background. Yet in itself, this deviation from orthodox Aristotelianism is hardly surprising, since Avicenna’s theoretical interest in self-awareness is largely driven by his subscription to a dualist account of the human being. Bearing this in mind, it has often been suggested that a great deal of what seems innovative in Avicenna’s psychology in fact relies upon a firm Neoplatonic precendancy. Yet not an awful lot of detailed study (particularly with regard to the topic of self-awareness) of the precise nature of these alleged influences has been pursued to date. Moreover, despite the vigorous scholarly interest in the Arabic Neoplatonic material, the topic of self-awareness is still pretty much an unwritten chapter. On the other hand, recent studies on Plotinus’ conception of selfhood suggest that his theoretical interests were somewhat different from those of Avicenna. My paper will chart the Arabic Plotinus in light of Avicenna’s treatment of self-awareness. Preliminary answers will be sketched to two closely related questions: (1) In what sorts of roles does self-awareness figure in the Arabic Plotinus? (2) What kind of description does the Arabic Plotinus give of self-awareness?
Thomas M. Kerch, Georgetown University, “The Concept of To Metrion in Late Plato”
tmkerch@ktk.cnedsl.com Sat 11 room 5

An examination of Plato’s Statesman, Philebus and Laws suggests that political and moral philosophy is treated rather differently in these dialogues than in a work such as the Republic. There is an emphasis in the Republic on the need to apprehend the Good in order to have a well-harmonized soul and community; practical philosophy is grounded in metaphysics. In the Statesman, it is the expert in the art of statesmanship who, like a weaver, intertwines opposing individual character traits to bring about the best type of individual and citizen. The Philebus examines the problem of the best sort of life, whether it should be a life of intellect or a life of pleasure, whose choice is crucial for living well. Finally, the central focus of the Laws appears to rest on the notion that a life lived under the guidance of a well-legislated legal code is a more practicable, and possibly better, solution than the one proposed in the Republic.

I wish to argue that the shift in Plato’s thought from an emphasis on the need for a well-harmonized soul to the more practicable claims encountered in the later dialogues is grounded in the concept of due measure (to metrion). There are two principal aspects of due measure which I shall examine: first, the way in which due measure is central to Plato’s political and moral philosophy; second, how due measure underlies his philosophical methodology.

In respect to Plato’s late philosophy, the change is first signaled in a passage in the Statesman (283c284e). Rather than apprehending the Good, the notion of what is in due measure begins to take precedence as the foundation for Plato’s thought. It is the task of the statesman to find the middle between extreme states and to assist individuals to live in accordance with what is in due measure. Turning to the Philebus, we find that the concept of due measure is critical for Plato’s argument. After arguing that pleasure by itself is not the good, Socrates proclaims: “pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor again the second, but the first … somehow concerns measure, what is in due measure, and the opportune … “ These notions are precisely those employed in the Statesman. Finally, the political, legislative, and educative programs articulated in the Laws are grounded in the concept of due measure. Passages in the work that indicate that Plato conceived the project of the Laws in terms of due measure and moderation. These concepts are central to what constitutes the best type of regime, the manner in which a law-giver legislates, and the education which the citizens receive in respect to the political community; due measure is essential to ensure the proper establishment of a polis, its continued existence, the laws by which it is governed, and the way in which the citizens live as politically and morally responsible agents. Without a grounding in due measure the polis risks destruction.

In respect to Plato’s philosophical methodology, the concept of due measure appears to be a variation of the method of division and collection. While diairesis establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a thing of a particular kind, the method is insufficient since it necessarily discards one of the terms after the division, ultimately resulting in the definition of a thing that is potentially arbitrary, depending on the choice of terms posited for division. By incorporating the concept of due measure into his philosophical methodology, Plato is able to make use of terms the method of division and collection would necessarily have ignored, with the result that there is a more reliable and encompassing definition. To put this another way, the method of
division sets up a dichotomy between two apparently contrary classes, while the argument for due measure permits a third class to be found, one which posits a middle between the two classes. The incorporation of due measure within Plato’s philosophical methodology permits the establishment of the necessary and sufficient conditions in which two contrasting or opposite classes may be reconciled into a third type of class which partakes in elements of both.

Rodman King, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “The Concept of Signification in Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione*” king@hws.edu. Sat 11 room 3

Scholarship in Aristotelian semantics has entered an exciting period. New interpretations have argued that his semantic views are deep, sophisticated, and defensible. This recent research is an outgrowth of the work of many Aristotle scholars, who over the past thirty years or so have successfully debunked various myths and misinterpretations surrounding Aristotle's semantic thought. Although much of the turbid air surrounding Aristotle's semantic thought has been cleared, there are still a number of continuing debates.

Traditionally, *De Interpretatione* is considered the centerpiece of Aristotle’s semantic theory. In it, he discusses the *signification* of expression types and sentences. On the surface some of his comments appear elliptical and obtuse. In the past, many commentators have identified Aristotle's concept of signification with meaning. This has led them to charge Aristotle with providing a woefully inadequate semantic account. In an effort to defend Aristotle, some more recent commentators have argued that any apparent unclarities that arise from the traditional view of signification are due to the fact that Aristotle does not present any semantic theory at all. Still other scholars have attempted to construct accounts of Aristotelian signification that not only preserve the semantic import of Aristotelian signification but also are immune to the objections presented against the traditional view. In this paper, I will focus on critically analyzing interpretations of σημαία (and its cognates) in *De Interpretatione* and categorizing the various interpretations according to different approaches to Aristotelian signification. In addition, since there is no authoritative view regarding Aristotle's concept of signification, I hope that this discussion will aid in the development of such a view.

Janelle Klapauszak, Baylor University, “Glaucón’s Role in the Republic” Janelle_Klapauszak@baylor.edu Sat 11 room 7

It is often true in Platonic dialogue that the *point*, the conclusion of the text, is not made in the philosophical discussion, but in the dramatic elements that surround it. In this paper I will defend my view that the *point* of the Republic is to demonstrate that philosophy is able to convince Glaucón that the just life is preferable to the unjust. In the first section of this paper, I will give some initial support for this claim, drawing on the pedagogical reading of the Republic given by Leo Strauss and Alan Bloom. In the second section, I will make a case that the city in speech is for Glaucón, that it appeals to his character, and that it is intended to draw him in, show him a picture of himself, and teach him to reorder his own soul. While this project is in line with Strauss’ interpretation, it is a project Strauss and Bloom have addressed only briefly in their work. Finally, if Socrates is trying to convert Glaucón, then it seems the most important question we can ask is whether Socrates succeeds. I will argue in the third section that Socrates does succeed in
converting Glaucon, and will attempt to draw out a principle of pedagogy from this success.

Aimee Koeplin, Loyola Marymount University, “Drinking, Fighting, and Singing: Symposia as Moral Education in Plato’s Laws” akoeplin@lmu.edu Sat 2 room 2

(Extract): In this paper, I will first discuss Plato’s account of sophrosune in the Laws and the early educational program meant to inculcate sophrosune in the young citizens. I then argue that developing the virtue of sophrosune is critical in developing the other virtues, including and especially wisdom. Finally, I argue that what Plato has to say about the role of drinking parties shows that appropriate emotional responses are indispensable to the life of virtue.

Andrew LaZella, DePaul University, “Speaking in the Flux: The Cratylus on Names, Tombs, and Flux.” atlazella@hotmail.com Sat 11 room 2

The Cratylus ends on an aporetic note. Having unsuccessfully resolved an ontological debate between his own theory self-same forms and the Heraclitean theory of flux, Socrates maintains that names cannot adjudicate the matter. He states that “…no one with any understanding will commit himself or the cultivation of his soul to names…” (440c). This follows from Socrates’ earlier claims that it is better to learn from the things themselves than from their names (439a-b). And yet because we mortals are bound to language, our possibility for direct, non-discursive, insight seems limited to the occasional and un-anticipatable divine or daimonic encounter.

Despite the aporia of the Cratylus, I will argue, the dialogue nonetheless manages to show that the nature of language itself reveals the impossibility of Heracliteanism. Once Socrates commits us to some form of linguistic naturalism in opposition to Hermogenes’ radical conventionalism (Section I), ontological Heracliteanism becomes impossible (Section II.A). Because there are no objects in flux to endure the charges of language, the nature of language points beyond the flux to a non-material, and thus, intelligible excess. I will argue that Socrates undermines ontological Heracliteanism in attempting to frame his own version of linguistic naturalism. Thus beyond his argument against flux, which arrives on the underbelly of the main argument, Socrates shows that linguistic naturalism need not be a mimetic naturalism, i.e., names look like or resemble the objects which they signify (Section II.B). What Socratic naturalism reveals is, not what things look like, but their endurance: that something remains. Thus against its seeming aporia, the Cratylus concludes that from language, we can infer something exceeding the flux, which—whatever else it may be—does not undergo constant change.

Susan Levin, Smith College, “Platonic Theory and Methodology as a Guide to Contemporary Reflection on End-of-Life Care” slevin@email.smith.edu Sat 2 room 8

Discussions regarding end-of-life care, including active and passive euthanasia, play a central role in contemporary medical ethics. Such reflections are often permeated by the view, associated with Christian morality, that each human life has irreplaceable merit and is sacrosanct. Such an orientation, when taken to its furthest limit, yields the
conclusion that human lives should be preserved and prolonged to the fullest extent that the vast achievements of medical technology allow. Although commentators regularly speak as though serious reflection on the provision of end-of-life care were largely a modern activity, this is not in fact the case. Plato is the first philosopher in the Western tradition to take a clear and systematically defended position on this topic, albeit one that, where known, is sure to be highly controversial.

In Book II of the Republic, Plato foregrounds what Julia Annas has termed the Principle of Specialization, according to which each human being is suited by nature (kata phusin) to a particular societal or sociopolitical role, and each person should perform the function that corresponds to her natural endowment. In his subsequent account of the community in which such roles are paramount and emotional attachments to individuals are not permitted to form, Plato asserts unapologetically that lives whose possessors’ capacity to undertake the jobs for which they are naturally suited is erased or crucially jeopardized are, objectively speaking, no longer worthwhile and, therefore, should not be sustained. Translated into the environment of contemporary medicine, this position would issue, at minimum, in the removal or withholding of artificial nutrition, hydration, and respiration—not to mention treatment modalities such as transplants and dialysis—not only from those in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) but also from those whose impairments erased or sharply curtailed their capacity to engage in the activities that their abilities best equipped them to pursue.

In this paper, having briefly surveyed the central prongs in contemporary reflections on end-of-life care, I present key evidence from Plato, showing how so doing casts new light on the matter and allows one to foreground vividly what is at stake in the choices one makes among leading strands of thought in this crucial area. Salient here is Plato’s insistence that those with the finest and most stable character are best positioned to achieve sound conclusions about individual and societal well-being. Also key is his contention that assessments of medical benefit and futility intrinsically involve value judgments, ones that are often most fruitfully made in what we would call an interdisciplinary setting. Although this claim about value judgments may appear self-evident to those steeped in ancient philosophy, “courts, health care institutions, and religious communities have been too eager to assert that they do not make quality-of-life judgments” (102), and “some writers have argued that we should reject moral judgments about quality of life and rely exclusively on medical indications for treatment decisions” (136; quotations are from Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics [Oxford, 2001]). As Beauchamp and Childress argue, however, “medical judgment alone cannot determine whether efforts should be undertaken” (ibid., 193). Plato’s highly normative concept of technê—according to which medicine is not a self-sufficient enterprise but instead requires guidance from philosophy as to what, most fundamentally, goodness qua order and harmony encompasses—yields a framework in terms of which one may approach and construe what is most salutary in his account. I conclude that, unpalatable as facets of his theory may be, Plato’s approach includes elements the brusque rejection or ignorance of whose capacity to engage us would be strictly our loss—one that, given the stakes, we would be ill-advised to absorb.

Yihong Liu, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, “Islamic Philosophy in China” yihongliucn@yahoo.com Sat 4 room 4
Islam enjoys its long history of more than 1300 years old since its introduction in the middle of the 7th century (around the beginning of the Tang Dynasty). The exchange between China and Arabs has a long history. It could be traced back to the period even before the rise of Islam.

With an extensive exchange between China and other nations, especially in the heyday of the Tang and Song Dynasties, Islam was finally introduced into the Chinese territory. The new type of culture such as the theory of Unique of Allah and the religious ceremony was brought to us. Because of the effective policy of the equal importance of the three religions that had been pursued by the first Emperor of the Tang, Li Shimin, Taoism had become popular, Buddhism had flourished, and Confucianism had thrived. The tripartite balance of the three religions impelled Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism to communicate ideas with each other, forming an open-minded cultural mentality.

On the other hand, because the Islamic religion itself was not so much interested either in missionary work or biblical translations at the very beginning of the spread of its ideas, if we compare it with Buddhism, it has developed very slowly in China. It is probable that the whole Chinese society lacks understanding of Islam. Therefore Islam was simply regarded as folk custom of the Arabs.

An Islamic study over its doctrine and philosophy began in the end of the Ming (1368-1644 A.D) and the beginning of the Qing (1616-1911 A.D) dynasty. The research on Islam was all carried out by the Chinese Muslim scholars. They worked very hard and tried to interpret the doctrine of Islam with the traditional Chinese concepts of Confucianism and Taoism. One of the outstanding figures, Wang Daiyu (1570-1660), had studied particularly in the field of rationalistic sciences taught by different Chinese philosophical schools. He was honored as the one, who had comprehended deeply and thoroughly “the four studies,” the rationalistic Confucian philosophy, Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam. But later on, he concentrated only on Islamic studies. He wrote several works on Islam, such as Qingzhen (Islam) university, the true interpretation of Islam, and the correct answers on Islam, etc.

We found that there were some inter-influences between Chinese philosophy and Islamic philosophy, when we came to see some translated works of Islamic doctrine by Chinese Muslims.

Liu Zhi, in the book of “Tianfang Xingli,” has generally described the origin and the evolution of the universe. It says that originally there is no name for the nature of the universe. The ultimate reality exists but is formless. At the primeval state of the universe, there emerged only “one,” the ultimate reality, regarding it as the beginning, the truth emerged and perspired. Since then, knowledge, ability, character and wisdom emerged.

In the book of “the true interpretation of Islam” of Wang Daiyu, the author interpreted the absoluteness of Allah in the field of ontology with the Chinese concept, “Taiji,” the supreme ultimate in the chapter of real law. The author said, “To say, “Wuji is nothing but Taiji, and Taiji is the primary source from which the two opposing principles, Yin and Yang came into being.” That means there is nothing but “one,” that is, “the primary source from which tens of thousand things emerged; and millions of things are all of one origin.” In the field of humanity and morality, the author said, “The nature means nature as light. Allah has demonstrated the great destiny first and given it to all of us.”
He criticizes the idea held in Chinese philosophy, “destiny is nature, and nature is Tao” because it is not clear. But, what is presented in Islamic philosophy, “Allah is the absolute” presents precisely “the primary source of reason and vitality; and the origin of destiny.” In the chapter of the practice, it says, “To see one’s self clearly, modesty always follows; it is the primary source of all kinds of goodness; not to do so, is a root of all kinds of badness.” “To be modest, one will have no selfishness; and having no selfishness, one receives goodness all the time.” “To observe these carefully, one realizes gradually the fact that Allah is the primary source of himself.” “If one knows who is his Lord he would yield to what destiny is assigned to him. To be obedient to destiny is the origin of all goodness. Not to be so, it is a root of all badness.” Therefore, there are two principles for man’s practice: to see oneself clearly, one becomes modest; to know who is his Lord one begins to yield to the destiny. This is in accord with what is taught in Confucianism.

Summing up both the Islamic doctrine and the religious philosophic works, we will see the following characteristics of the Chinese Islam:

1. The philosophical thought of Chinese Islam in the Ming and Qing Dynasties shows the tendency of incorporating Confucianism into Islam and annotating Islam with Confucianism. The concepts of Confucianism were applied in the free translation of Islamic religious books or in other words, to interpret the Islamic doctrine with Confucian terminology.

2. Applying the Confucian thought to justify the correctness of the theoretic interpretation, such as Liu Zhi’s “Tianfang Dianli.”

3. To gain a thorough understanding of the Islamic doctrine through mastery of all relevant materials of the Confucian thought in order to elaborate its true meaning and make a new and systematic Islamic ideology, such as Liu Zhi’s “Tianfang Xingli.” The Chinese translation works of the Hui nationality followed the way by combining the two ancient cultures into one and formed a brand new culture, the Chinese Hui styled Islamic philosophy. It is not only of great value to the historical development of the ideology of both Hui and the feudal Chinese society, but also constitutes an important part of Islamic culture of the world.

Adam Seth Lobel, Harvard Divinity School, “The Ontological Existence of External, Mind-Independent Objects in the Great Perfection Tradition of Longchenpa” Sat 11 room 4 alobel@hds.harvard.edu

This paper explores the ontological existence of external, mind-independent objects in the Great Perfection tradition of Longchenpa. I begin by describing a simplistic interpretation of the Great Perfection tradition as a form of idealism. I then provide numerous examples of Longchenpa’s virulent critique of idealism and his consistent efforts to distinguish between the (false) claim that “all phenomena are mind” and (his) claim that “all phenomena are the display of the nature of mind.” In order to clarify this issue, I present Longchenpa’s relationship with the Mind Only tenets as well as the primacy of Prasangika Madhyamaka in his system. I conclude by analyzing the cosmological, poetic, ontology of the Ground (gzhi). I move from Longchenpa’s critique of idealism to his account of phenomena as neither inner nor outer, mental nor extra-mental. I utilize a range of texts from Longchenpa’s brilliant corpus, including his 7 Treasuries, his two “trilogies,” and his treatise on distinguishing mind and the nature of
mind. In general, I frame the discussion in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind and claim that Longchenpa offers a unique position on the contested relationship between mind and world.

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Dan Maher, Ave Maria University, “Human Happiness and Friendship in Aristotle”  
Dan.Maher@avemaria.edu  Sat 9 room 8

Commentators regularly associate Aristotle’s account of friendship with his teaching on human happiness and devote a great deal of attention to his argument that the happy human being needs virtuous friends. Nevertheless, they do not often consider how the teaching that there are two forms of happiness corresponding to the two forms of virtue (or excellence) affects the account of friendship. Specifically, the role of friendship in happiness suggests that there ought to be, in keeping with the difference between intellectual and moral excellence, two kinds of virtuous friendship. In this paper I argue that Nicomachean Ethics supports this contention and that Books VIII and IX anticipate the twofold teaching on happiness in Book X. Specifically, I claim that Aristotle’s account of friendship supports the superiority of the contemplative to the moral form of happiness and shows that the contemplative life retains an attachment to political or social human nature.

The significance of the distinction between friendship based in moral and in contemplative excellence can be recognized in Aristotle’s discussions of self-love and of whether the happy human being needs friends (IX.8, 9). Two important differences help to display a certain superiority of contemplative friendship to the friendship based on character. The first difference arises due to the incomplete sharability of morally virtuous actions by comparison with that of the activities of contemplative friendship. Accordingly, contemplative friends more genuinely wish what is good for one another as human beings. The second difference consists in the fact that intellectual virtue, as exercised in contemplative friendship, more properly befits human nature than does moral virtue. This implies that there is a way to live in accord with the best or most divine thing in us without aiming to live the life appropriate to god. The two differences together illuminate Aristotle’s preference for the primary over the secondary form of happiness.

Roopen Majithia, Mount Allison University, “Aristotle and Śaṅkara on the Nature of Ethical Choice”  rmajithia@mta.ca  Sat 4 room 7

How are we to understand Aristotle’s requirement that for the good person ethical action must always be chosen for its own sake, given that he also says that ethical action must be (a) loved, (b) undertaken for the sake of the fine (noble), (c) chosen for the sake of an end determined by wish? Does Śaṅkara’s claim—following a standardly accepted view in the orthodox Vedic tradition—that one must act not for the sake of the fruit of one’s action, i.e., that one must act from detachment, mine the same intuition? Or, at the very least, shed some light on the issue? These and other related issues will be raised and discussed in this presentation.
Deepa Majumdar, Purdue North Central, “A Search for Agape in the Enneads of Plotinus” dmajumda@pnc.edu, dmajumdar@earthlink.net Sat 9 room 2

In Ennead III.5(50) Plotinus explores Plato’s notion of Love (eros), understood as a “substantial superhuman reality, a god or a spirit … responsible for producing the affection of love in the human soul” and reconciles Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium by distinguishing Love as god from Love as daimon (Armstrong). The heavenly Aphrodite, which is a most divine kind of soul, gives rise to the “appropriate Love” – a “beautiful Love who has come into existence as a reality always ordered towards something else beautiful, and having its being in this, that it is a kind of intermediary between desiring and desired, the eye of the desiring which through its power gives to the lover the sight of the object desired.” In his passages on mysticism, Plotinus describes the ascent of the hypostases (Intellect and soul) towards the One – through love. In Ennead VI.7(38).34, the hypostases soul gets an “intense love” that makes it rise beyond intelligible shape in order to develop a likeness to its object of love – the One, which appears “suddenly” in soul. Again, in VI.7(38).35, Intellect is so intoxicated, or “out of its mind” with love for the One, that it reverses its gaze from the “things in itself,” to the One, which transcends it. In this paper, I hope to explore Plotinian love as a mode of mystical contact – by drawing a relationship between the Love that arises from the heavenly Aphrodite and the love that the two lower hypostases (Intellect and soul) bear towards the One. By contrasting this higher love with the love for “earthly things” which Plotinus exhorts us to fly from in Ennead V.1(10).1, I hope to make a case for Agape in the Enneads of Plotinus.

Greg McBrayer, University of Maryland, “Tyranny, Philosophy, and Freedom: A Platonic Conception of Freedom in Light of the Socratic Paradox” gmebrayer@gvpt.umd.edu Sat 9 room 5

Early in the Gorgias, Polus argues that freedom is doing whatever one wants, and Socrates does not deny Polus’ understanding of human freedom. Instead, he denies that most human beings do what they want to do. Rather, they do what seems best to them. I will try to understand Socrates’ account of human freedom (eleutheria) in light of the rest of this conversation with Polus and Socrates’ subsequent argument with Callicles. Polus intimates his desire for tyranny, but expresses—wittingly or otherwise—reservations. Callicles, however, gives a passionate defense of the tyrannical life in this dialogue, based on the argument that the tyrant alone has the power to live however he wants to live. This is the only free life, according to Callicles, and those who subscribe to traditional morality are slavish. Both arguments point to an investigation of power, freedom, and knowledge, and we learn later that the famous Socratic Paradox has been with us all along. The paradox teaches that a human being is only free to do what he wants when he acts with knowledge.

Marina McCoy, Boston College, “The Rhetoric of Alcibiades in the Symposium” mccoyma@bc.edu, Sat 4 room 2

I plan to talk about the rhetoric of Alcibiades. While the other speakers are more formally rhetorical, I want to explore what is rhetorical even in this speech of a drunk, erotic man, and also to talk about how this plays into Plato’s rhetoric in the dialogue, by giving Alcibiades the last word.
Dana Miller, *Fordham,* “Plato’s Problem with Mental Pleasures” dmiller@fordham.edu  
Sun 11 room 1  
Knowing something is pleasant. I take this to be obvious. Plato, however, seems to be committed to denying this fact of experience. Plato’s various accounts of pleasure show it to be something that accompanies a “filling of a lack” or restoration of the natural state. Following this model he can claim, somewhat awkwardly, that it is pleasant to gain knowledge, but when knowledge has been gained, pleasure should cease. Accordingly in the *Philebus* we find that “the most godlike life,” which consists of knowing, does not experience pleasure. I argue that Plato is quite aware that this claim is problematic, as far as humans are concerned, and that he makes several unsatisfactory attempts to mitigate it. But if he cannot show that knowing is pleasant, his account of pleasure is in trouble. One subtle distinction made in the *Philebus* may, however, rescue Plato. I examine whether this succeeds.

Deborah Modrak, *University of Rochester,* chair Wheeler Panel sat 11 room 3; President SAGP dmod@mail.rochester.edu

Mark Moes, *Grand Valley State University,* “Plato’s Craft Analogy in *Timaeus* and *Statesman:* Anticipations of Maimonides and Aquinas” moesm@gvsu.edu Friday Evening; “The Craft Analogy and Plato's Political Theology” Sun 9 Room 4  
(The following abstract introduces both presentations):  
Plato’s analogy between expertise in a particular “first-order” craft such as carpentry or medicine, on the one hand, and the “second-order” practical wisdom of the moral sage or the statesman, on the other, is an important leitmotif of a number of dialogues. One can argue its central importance in both early and late dialogues, e.g. in the Euthydemus, Charmides, Gorgias, Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Statesman, and Philebus. Presupposing a reconstruction of Plato’s conception of the craft analogy, the paper attempts to elucidate some aspects of the theological and political significance Plato’s use of the analogy in the cosmology of the Timaeus, especially in texts describing the activity of the divine demiourgos and of the lesser gods at 28a-29d and 41a-42d. It attempts to show important interrelationships between the Timaeus texts and three other texts: the discussion of divine and human craftsmen in Republic 10, the Myth of the divine shepherd in the Statesman, and the final definition of statesmanship in the same dialogue. It provides a reading of these texts which supports an interesting (perhaps non-standard) account of Plato’s views both of the political freedom appropriate to the citizen and of the freedom of choice appropriate to a human being living under divine providence. I summarize a reconstruction of the craft analogy, with brief reference to crucial texts in the Charmides, Euthydemus, and Republic. This summary includes an articulation of a distinction found in the Euthydemus between productive and therapeutic crafts, the former being a craft that operates upon inanimate materials and the latter being a craft that operates upon animals, either non-human animals or free and responsible human animals. I then focus upon therapeutic crafts that operate for the benefit of free and responsible human clients, turning to some Platonic texts which stress the responsible freedom that must be respected by therapeutic craftsmen in their clients (in Timaeus, the Republic’s Myth of Er, the Statesman, and the Laws). Next I discuss several senses, suggested by texts in Republic, Timaeus, and Statesman, in which such therapeutic crafts...
might count as “second-order” crafts. Three of these are (1) a sense in which a second-order craftsman operates upon free and responsible first-order craftsmen who do not possess skill in the second-order craft (as when a statesman exerts a beneficent influence upon carpenters or physicians); (2) a sense in which a second-order craftsman operates upon persons who are apprentices to the second-order craft (as when a statesman attempts to train apprentice statesmen); (3) a sense in which the second-order craftsman works reflexively upon his own character (as when an agent aspiring to moral virtue deliberates with a view to becoming more virtuous). The results of the discussion of a Platonic conception of second-order therapeutic crafts operating upon free and responsible human agents are then employed to articulate readings of the texts in Timaeus, Republic, and Statesman which support my suggested account of Plato’s views both of the political freedom appropriate to the citizen and of the freedom of choice appropriate to a human being living under divine providence. These presentations are parts of a larger project attempting to show that the craft analogy appears in the theistic philosophies of Maimonides and Aquinas (not to mention the philosophies of contemporaries such as Michael Polanyi and Alasdair MacIntyre): conceptions of God’s relation to the created world, of God’s knowledge of particulars, of God’s relation to creatures possessing free will, including conceptions of the relation between divine omniscience and human freedom, of providence generally, of the importance in both theology and ethics of non-theoretical and practical ways of knowing, and of the interrelations among rules, virtues, and goods in ethics and politics.

Eske Møllgaard, *University of Rhode Island*, “Word and Concept: East and West”
eske@earthlink.net Sat 4 room 4

In this paper I will discuss perhaps the greatest difference between eastern and western philosophy: eastern philosophy is based on the word of the master; western philosophy is based on the concept. It is often assumed that this difference makes the two traditions incommensurable. I will argue, however, that the opposition between word and concept is internal to both traditions, and, furthermore, that the emphasis on the word in the east and on the concept in the west in fact opens up a possibility for a dialogue between the two traditions. I suggest that such a dialogue may help establish a new balance between word and concept in philosophy. The paper considers the function of the word in Confucius, Zhuangzi, and in Chan/Zen, and comparisons are made with Heidegger’s late philosophy and some of Gadamer’s later essays.

Holly Moore, *DePaul University*, “Images of Mediation in the Eclipse Analogy of Plato’s *Phaedo*.” hmoore2@depaul.edu Sat 11 room 2

Before he responds to Cebes’ counter-argument to his account of the imperishability of the soul, Socrates pauses to appreciate the perils of misogy, and then relates his own philosophical path as an example of what he calls a ‘second sailing’. As the explanation of what this secondary path must be Socrates proclaims that because of the events he has narrated and his having failed at looking into beings, he fears he may be blinded like astronomers who, eager for a direct vision of the exceptional sight of the eclipsed sun, are blinded by it unless they look at the image of it in some medium, like water. That this medium is *logoi* is the answer to the immediate question of the identity of the second sailing. However, ambiguity arises concerning whether both Socrates’ disappointments (with the direct investigation of beings as well as his failure to learn or discover the good) are equally likened to the blinding that happens when one looks
directly at an eclipse. While there is no ambiguity concerning the claim that looking exclusively at things (as Socrates claims natural philosophers do) produces blindness, interpreters may argue that the failure to grasp the good and binding threaten to blind just as much as the failure to gain knowledge through sensing things (pragmata). Support for this interpretation invariably requires interpolation of the ideas expressed in Republic VI, namely that the good is like the sun and that it is beyond being (epikeinas tēs ousias). However, I show in this paper that the interpretation of the image of blindness as deriving from an attempted access to the good and binding is unfounded both on the basis of the analogy given in the Phaedo as well as on the basis of what is said of the good in the Republic. Simply put, Socrates’ analogy in the Phaedo requires that one be blinded by what obscures the source of vision, not the source itself. What remains to be determined, then, is the identity of the analogue of this obstruction. In what follows, I will argue that as a correlate to the mediating work of logoi (as the safe images of things), the forms too perform a mediation—that between the good and things—and it is just this mediation that logoi are able reveal in a manner most suited to our souls. Just as the interposed moon reveals the visible (still blinding) face of the sun, the forms reveal the intelligibility (still overwhelming) provided by the good. This is confirmed when we return to see that the first order of mediation that the forms offer still risks blinding our souls; that blinding seemed originally to do both with the good and with things is attributable to the forms’ function as mediating these two. Finally, logoi are identifiable as a second-order mediation (a second sailing) able to provide a medium proper to our souls.

Parviz Morewedge, Director GSP, “Tusi on Human Pleasures as a Necessary Obligation for God” pmorewed@gsp-online.org Conference Director; Sat 11 room 9 abstract pending

John Mouracade, University of Alaska Anchorage, “An Aristotelian Approach to Non-Reductive Materialism” afjmm2@uaa.alaska.edu

Non-Reductive Materialism has taken up a dominant position among the competing accounts of persons. However, non-reductive materialist accounts of human persons or other mereologically complex entities must provide a basis for their ontological commitments. In many cases, the defenses offered appeal to considerations of self-maintenance, internal unity or structure. These views bear a resemblance to Aristotelian metaphysics, as some contemporary metaphysicians have noted. However, these theorists need to do more than tip their hats to Aristotle. They need to employ the resources of Aristotle’s hylomorphism in order to explain the unity of living things. Contemporary metaphysician’s appeal to unity, structure and order is best understood as form in the Aristotelian sense. I argue that a robustly Aristotelian notion of form is philosophically defensible. I further argue that as any particular strand of DNA can be represented mathematically (that is, formally), DNA is well suited to play the role of an Aristotelian form.

Nazif Muhtaroglu, University of Kentucky, “Sadr’us-Sharia’s Account of Free Will” nazifm@yahoo.com Sat 11 room 9

The problem of free will is much discussed in many different traditions in the history of human thought. In this paper, I will try to present and discuss Sadr’us-Sheria’s view on
free will, those of a theologian in the Sunni School of Islamic thought. Although his solution to the problem of free will is given in a different context from Western philosophy, the main elements of his analysis have a close similarity to some elements in contemporary analytic philosophy. Sadr’s ontological assumptions and his application of them to the free will debate seem to be shared in a certain degree but in a different context by John Searle and Gilbert Ryle. So by focusing on Sadr’s solution to the problem of free will, I will try to show how some metaphysical elements can have an enlightening role in understanding the nature of free will. And I will try to show how some important metaphysical assumptions were shared by philosophers belonging to different traditions along the history by relating Sadr to Searle and Ryle.


In this paper I propose to present Aristotle’s treatment of dependency, by which I mean reliance on someone else for guidance, assistance, or representation in the normal affairs of life. Aristotle’s treatment of dependency as it remains to us today focuses mainly on the household. Except for the head of the Greek household, all of its sometime members—wives, children, widows, orphans, bondmen and bondmaids, the aged—typically were dependent in some measure upon the head, though some of these might come to be independent with maturation or manumission, and some of them might be very wealthy in their own right even if dependent. Since the institutions of the Greeks may not have been exactly as ours are, expressions such as ‘wife’, ‘bondman’, and the like must be used with some caution. Aristotle recognized also the situation in which even heads of households might be dependents or because of their poverty. In some of these cases, the dependents had to rely on a patron or to represent them in the courts and perhaps elsewhere.

I shall begin with two passages from Aristotle’s *Atheniensium Respublica*, one of which illustrates the social condition of some Athenian dependents at Solon’s ascendancy in 594/3, the other of which considers the situation of one group of Athenian dependents in about 330. Then I shall go on to Aristotle’s *Politica*, which addresses people who apparently were dependent not because of social conditions but because of their own inabilities—the natural bondmen or because of their poverty. In some of these cases, the dependents had to rely on a patron or to represent them in the courts and perhaps elsewhere. Finally, I shall take up Aristotle’s provision for his dependents in his own will.

Mary Mulhern, *Brookside Institute*, “Aristotle’s Analytical Tools,”

The extant dialogues of Plato give evidence of Academic interest in and debate over many questions, some of language, and these seem to have prompted Aristotle to devise a battery of analytic tools to resolve some of the logical or linguistic conundra, with the aim of raising the level of dialectical discourse, but especially in the service of demonstrative science. Prompted by problems and anomalies mooted in Plato’s dialogues—especially the problem of homonymy, Aristotle devised a categorial analysis of ordinary language and a formal language that accommodated both ordinary language premisses and demonstrative premisses, of first and higher order. This paper assembles evidence for Aristotle’s having devised such a battery of analytic tools from texts in the
Categories, On Interpretation, Topics, and Prior and Posterior Analytics and makes suggestions concerning which problems and anomalies mooted in Plato’s dialogues they were meant to solve.

William E. Murnion, Philosophy Works, “Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind”  
philosophyworks@optonline.net Saturday 4 room 8

As a review of Aquinas’s four major works – Scriptum super Sententias, Quaestiones Disputatae, Summa contra Gentiles, and Summa Theologiae – shows, Aquinas’s philosophy of mind was the theoretical foundation of his theology. He based it upon the mind’s self-knowledge evident in its understanding of material things, itself, and God. This self-knowledge, he argued, was both evident to each individual and subject to philosophical analysis. Tracing the development of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is, therefore, not just illuminating in itself, but revealing of the development of his thought.

Daniel W. Murphy, Saint Peter’s College, “Does the Proslogion ‘Solve’ the Monologion?” dmurphy2@spc.edu Sat 4 room 8

The central thesis of my paper is that St. Anselm’s Proslogion, and especially its famous argumentation in P 2-3, can be interpreted as a specific, successful philosophical response to the limitations of the Monologion’s argumentation for the existence of God and this text’s embedded conception of how to talk about God. In accordance with this thesis, over the course of the paper I aim generally to show that there are significant, relatively well-defined philosophical issues which relate the Monologion to the Proslogion and which can help account for why Anselm wrote the Proslogion.

My attempt to illuminate these issues is not intended to conflict fundamentally with Anselm’s comments in the Preface to the Proslogion that the ontological argument fortuitously ‘came to him’ after much contemplation. On the contrary, I aim to clarify better the complex and all-too-often overlooked philosophical links between the Monologion and Proslogion, so as to complement Anselm’s comments in the Preface without contradicting them.

As for the structure of the paper, its first main part surveys Anselm’s contemplation in M 1-4 of the natures and goods of the things of the world, an a posteriori consideration (to construe this term broadly) which is the basis of his demonstrations that God exists.1 This first part also examines Anselm’s work in the Monologion to build a complex theory of reference and truth (dealing with both creatures and God), defined primarily in terms of a kind of correspondence theory but also including a conception of intellectual intuition named as the “acute gaze of the mind” (acie mentis). I conclude that by the end of the Monologion, this combination of this text’s early a posteriori argumentation for the existence of God and its theory of reference and truth puts Anselm in a difficult place with respect to his conception of God. Namely, we find Anselm hovering between a nascent, pre-Thomistic ‘analogical’ conception of God and a non-analogical conception as the Monologion comes to a close. In building to this conclusion, I make brief but specific reference to relatively recent commentary which has dealt with this issue, but as this commentary itself has limitations,

1 M 1-4 combine participation theory and elements of cosmological argumentation and gradation of beings to demonstrate the existence of God.
it has not been conclusive as to whether Anselm holds to an analogical position or a non-analogical position.²

I then move into the second main part of the paper, which deals principally with the *Proslogion*. First, I examine P 2-3 to argue that the *Proslogion’s a priori* conception of God responds to and offers a way of overcoming the limitations of *Monologion’s a posteriori* argumentation for the existence of God and as well dissolves the resultant analogical/non-analogical tension. But while the very nature of the *a priori* argumentation dissolves this tension, I acknowledge that there are limitations of the famous argumentation across P 2-3. However, I interpret these limitations and their significance not by isolating P 2-3 and reducing the *Proslogion* to these two chapters - a popular, exclusively epistemic move which also seriously threatens to violate the unity and wholeness of the text - but by studying Anselm’s own recognition of these limitations, which is concentrated in his lament in P 14-18. My main conclusion here is that while P 14-18 provide closure to an epistemically-centered conception of God, this closure is at the same time an opening of sorts. It is a transitional move to a different concern - namely, how the course of *fides quaerens intellectum* opens up to articulate an ethical conception of God.

Recalling the grounding context of *fides quaerens intellectum* (which applies to both the *Monologion* and *Proslogion*), I argue that faith calls Anselm to articulate his conception of God not only in epistemic terms, but also in terms of ethical community, which is the content of especially the closing chapters, P 23-26. Re-addressing the “insignificant man” (*homuncio*) of P 1, in P 25 Anselm exhorts one to “Love the one Good in which are all goods, and it shall suffice you. Desire the simple Good which itself is every good, and it shall be enough for you.”³ The one whom Anselm originally implored to understand God in an epistemic sense in P 2-3 is now encouraged to love God in a sense which acknowledges God as the source and sustenance of all worldly things that are good. ‘Understanding’ or ‘knowing’ God means little if this does not also come with the rejoicing in the happiness of one’s neighbor. Ultimately, Anselm’s work in the *Proslogion*, weaving reason and prayer in both its epistemic and closing ethical considerations, achieves more clearly and concisely than the *Monologion* a mindful wholeness with respect to how to conduct the an allocution to and articulation of God.

John Murungi, Towson University, “On Stoic Love” jmurungi@towson.edu

What would a stoic love relationship be like? In such a relationship, what would one be seeking form the other, and can one get what one is seeking from the other? Can one embrace such a seeking without compromising one’s well-being? The paper explores answers to these questions in the light of what Seneca says in his work, “Letters from a Stoic”. To the extent that Stoicism was or is taken by stoics as philosophy, philosophy itself is implicated in the answers that one gives to these questions. For the answers to be taken in this context, it is, or it should be clear that the questions are essentially from philosophical questions. If they are taken to be philosophical, any one who claims to be a

² A version of the debate occurring sporadically from the 1970s through the 1990s and through numerous publications was the debate between Jasper Hopkins and Gregory Schufreider.
³ *Complete Treatises*, 109 ; Schmitt, vol. 1, 118.
philosophy, inevitably, has to take stock of one’s love relationship. That is, the manner in which one is implicated in a love relationship reflects one’s philosophical life, and the philosophical life that one leads calls for a specific love life. In support of Seneca, I want to argue that human well-being is strengthened when in a love relationship one is not a slave of the other. Conventional love life is a life of bondage, and liberty, which is essential for human well-being, calls for philosophy to take an anti-conventional stance. The inevitable question, How is one to live? - the question that animates Socrates’ philosophical life - is exactly the question that animated Seneca too, and the one that has to animate our philosophical life, if we choose to be philosophers.

Gerard Naddaf, York University, “The Role of the Poet in Plato’s Ideal Cities of Callipolis and Magnesia” naddaf@yorku.ca Friday Evening

Plato’s criticism of poetry and the poets in the Republic is notorious. Scholarly variations on Plato’s attitude toward the poets and poetry are considerable: some argue that only mimetic poetry is banned; still others contend that some mimetic poetry is allowed. I agree that mimetic poetry is not entirely abandoned in Callipolis. However, my primary concern is with the “role” of the poet – a crucial point that is almost invariably passed over in silence by scholars who maintain that Plato did not banish all poetry from the ideal city of the Republic. Thus in the first part of this paper, I will argue that the poet and his techne are indispensable for the realization of the ideal city. I will begin with an analysis of Plato’s claim at Republic 379a that, as “statesmen”, the philosophers must not engage in poetry themselves, but only provide the tupoi or models that the poets must follow. This must be taken seriously and is consistent, I will argue, with Plato’s principle of the natural division of labour, that is, since the specialization of functions is axiomatic and thus the multiplicity of tasks unlawful and unnatural, then it follows that Callipolis will need “professional” poets. This, in turn, will explain a number of references to professional poets throughout the Republic. It will also clarify the controversial passage at Republic 607a that the only poetry allowed in the new state will be “hymns to the gods and encomia for the good.” I will show through a variety of examples, including a linguistic analysis, that these are still intended to be “mimetic” in character. Finally, I will argue that the famous Atlantis story/myth is meant to be an encomia to the “Callipolitians” themselves in action (Timaeus 19c-d; 20e-21d).

In the second part of this paper, I will argue that Plato is even more positively disposed toward poetry and the poets in Magnesia than in Callipolis. My arguments follow from a number of observations with regard to traditional poetry: the twenty or so references in the Laws to the traditional iconic poets, Homer and Hesiod, are overwhelmingly positive; the Athenian’s admiring and unequivocal admission that a number of great poems have come down from the ancients; and Plato’s numerous references to professional poets (656c; 662b; 802b; 811e; 816e; 935e; 936a). I will show that the textual evidence suggests that these poets are indispensable in Magnesia since it is clear that they, like the professional teachers and musicians with whom they collaborate, are salaried foreign employees. Plato, in fact, contends that legislators will
use their creative talents, among other things, to revise and re-arrange the less scandalous pieces of poetry from the past. But Plato, I will argue, goes further again in his endorsement of poetry. The legislator of Magnesia is characterized as the “poet” (e.g., 2.671c), the “demiougos” (965a), and the “tragedian (817a-d) par excellence.” Moreover, the discourse of the Laws is characterized as “divinely inspired” and as resembling a poem (poiesei, 811c). Finally, I will argue that the laws of Magnesia are meant to be poetised and thus set to music and performed in a manner reminiscent of Homer dramatic poetry. From this perspective, it should follow that poetry and the poets are the sine qua non of the ideal state of Magnesia.

**Debra Nails, Michigan State University, “Not by Dialogue Alone” nails@msu.edu Sat 11 room 1**

Plato’s words lie there on the page, saying the same thing time and again, regardless of who should read them or ask them to give an account of themselves. The dialogues do not contain ‘teachings’ — especially not in the sense that the teacher-pupil relationship was understood in Plato’s Athens. Words cannot provide knowledge, cannot provide more than an image of truth. Yet that image is worth having, if one does not mistake it for the real thing. I argue that other necessary conditions for formal knowledge ought not to be neglected by those who troll the dialogues for doctrines.

**Siobhan Nash-Marshall, [sfnm1@yahoo.com] Manhattanville College, “Boethius, Anselm, and Freedom of the Will” Sat 4 room 8**

Saint Anselm’s definition of freedom as rectitudo — “the power always to choose, or to consent to, that which is morally upright” — in the De Libertate Arbitrii and in the De Casu Diaboli starkly contrasts with modern definitions of freedom, which often rely upon the principle of alternative possibilities. This paper will examine St. Anselm’s definition and one of its significant historical precedents – Boethius’s Consolatio IV – in order to defend the doctrine against some of its contemporary objectors.

**Griffin Nelson, University of Dallas, “A Dilemma Concerning the Selection of Guardians in Plato’s Republic” griffintnelson@gmail.com Sat 9 room 7**

Plato uses the Principle of the Natural Division of Labor (PNDL) to claim that every person in the state has a nature which suits her for a certain pursuit. Thus, natural qualities become the basis upon which some are selected for guardianship. This means that at the time of the founding of the state there must exist some with a guardian’s nature, otherwise selection on the basis of nature would make no sense. But Plato also says that in this state we will not select those who already possess the guardian nature since they owe no debt to the state; instead, this state will create those with this nature. This is done by giving non-guardian natures a guardian’s education. However, if we select those with a non-guardian nature to undergo the guardian’s education in order to create guardians, then Plato violates the very principle which founded the state, which claims that a pursuit is given based on having the right natural qualities for it. It would amount to giving farmers a guardian’s education (or pursuit) in order to create guardians, a clear violation of the PNDL. Thus, it seems impossible at the time of the founding of the state to begin the cycle of good breeding either with ones who possess the guardian
nature or with those who do not. The complications from such a conflict are developed and a solution is offered.

**On-cho Ng, Penn State University, “Zhu Xi on Reading the Classics”  oxn1@psu.edu** Sat 2 room 4

As a philosophical exploration of the import and purport of Confucian classical exegesis, the paper uses Zhu Xi’s commentaries on the *Classics of Changes, Great Learning* and *Doctrine of the Mean* to illustrate the uniquely Chinese ways of approaching the classics and parsing their meanings. At the same time that the paper capitalizes on the interpretive possibilities opened up by Western hermeneutic theories, especially those of Gadamer, it seeks to free our understanding of the Chinese act of reading from the moorage of the Western philosophical outlook and framework by construing the Confucian enterprise of classical studies in terms of what I describe as “religious hermeneutics.” By seeing how the classics are read by Zhu Xi through both Confucian and Western hermeneutic lenses, we not only historically reconstruct the ways in which the classics made sense to him, but also philosophically engage some contemporary hermeneutic issues, such as the nature of the texts, the import of received interpretations, authorial intents, reader’s responses and so on.

**Xiaomei Niu, Lycoming College, “Primitivism in Chinese and Western Literature”  bjxiaomei78@yahoo.com.cn** Sun 11 room 3 abstract pending

**Heidi Northwood, Nazareth College, “‘Promethean Thought’ in Plato’s *Protagoras*: Foresight, Calculation, and the Unity of the Virtues”  hnorthw6@naz.edu** Sat 9 room 5

At the end of Plato’s *Protagoras*, Socrates memorably says: “I like the Prometheus of your fable better than the Epimetheus; for he is of use to me, and I take Promethean thought continually for my own life when I am occupied with all these questions” (361C-D, trans. W.R.M. Lamb in Loeb edition). The question of this paper is what is meant by ‘Promethean thought’. While it is clear enough that Socrates would prefer the Prometheus to the Epimetheus in *Protagoras*’ fable (as Epimetheus botches the job of the distribution of faculties to the living animals leaving humans without any resources to survive), what Prometheus represents to Socrates and what he might mean by ‘Promethean thought’ is less than clear. In the fable, Prometheus stole fire and wisdom in the arts from Hephaestus and Athena. With these gifts humans were able to speak, invent and build shelters, clothes, and nourish themselves from the land (322A). These gifts also, Protagoras himself says, led to humans being the only creature that worshipped the gods, establishing altars and holy images (322A). But fire and wisdom in the arts were not enough for humans’ survival; without the civic art (hê politikê technê) humans could neither defend themselves against wild beasts nor could they live together in a community without doing each other harm. Consequently, Zeus sent Hermes to give humans the additional gifts of aidôs and dikê (322C). And so while Prometheus fixed Epimetheus’ mistake, he was not able to provide humans with everything they needed. So again, the question: why would Socrates say that he takes ‘Promethean thought’ for his own life?
This paper explores this question and suggests, ultimately, that Socrates may be criticizing Protagoras by saying this. In a nutshell, I hope to show that Prometheus’ gifts, fire and wisdom in the arts, insofar as they lead to language and calculation (which Socrates later says is “the art which saves our life” (356E)), and insofar as they already give rise to at least a form of piety (as mentioned above), give humans all they need. This, it will be suggested, is largely what is behind Socrates’ arguments for the unity of the virtues: with fire, with rational thought, comes those virtues that would make possible civic life. And so while Socrates would be the last to say that the gods are unnecessary for a virtuous life, Zeus’ gifts of aidôs and dikê in Protagoras’ fable, will be a consequence of, or perhaps will be the gifts of Prometheus for Socrates.

Kevin Olbrys, University at Albany, “Aristotle on Moral Motivation and Akrasia,”
olbrys@verizon.net Sat 9

I offer an interpretation of Aristotle on weakness of the will that answers two different interpretive questions: First what the difference is between Aristotle’s and Socrates’ accounts of akrasia; second, whether the conclusion of an Aristotelian practical syllogism is an action. I argue that Aristotle agrees with the Socratic thesis that akrasia is impossible, but only with respect to the intemperate agent, who I characterize as lacking moral knowledge. However, with respect to the akratic agent, who I characterize as possessing moral knowledge, genuine akrasia certainly is possible. I also argue that Aristotle cannot hold that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action, because the practical syllogism occurs within bouleusis, and the final proximate cause of any human action is either a prohairetic orexis, or an epithumic orexis. Which one actually motivates in any particular situation depends upon the agent’s developed character. I thus place Aristotle’s theory of moral motivation within his overall teleological theory of animal movement.

K. Darcy Otto, California State San Bernardino, dotto@csusb.edu
“A New Understanding of the Resemblance Regress (Parmenides 132c-133a)”

This paper closely analyses the second regress argument of the Parmenides (132c12-133a7) and attempts to answer the question: what is so bad about having an infinite number of Forms? The usual answer to this question is that an infinite number of Forms contradicts the assumption that there is only one Form of each type (e.g., there is Beauty, but not Beauty2). In this paper, I argue that a better answer may be given: the premises that Parmenides uses to generate the regress are themselves inconsistent - and so we need not import any additional assumptions to show that the regress argument is a bad one.
Immanuel Kant, with his many postmodern followers, still very much represents the main stream environmental philosophy in the west. Scholars are polarized on Kant’s treatment of nature and the sensible. On the one hand, some see Kantian philosophy as the antithesis of environmental movement. For example, Ronald Beiner and Eliot Deutsch argue that Kant’s dualistic view of reason vs. sense, persons vs. things, and culture vs. nature, etc., in the second Critique permeates into his treatment of aesthetics in the Critique of Judgment. This radical dualism and the elevation of persons over things sets the tone in justifying humanity’s subjugation of non-human nature as an inferior value-free physical whole determined entirely by mechanic and scientific laws. Accordingly, they argue that Kantian philosophy further lends support for technological dominance, if not outright exploitation, of nature in the modern and postmodern world. On the other hand, Marc Lucht argues that contrary to common perception, Kant’s aesthetics “offers significant resources for environmental ethics”: the disinterested character of aesthetic judgment “raised the possibility of a manner of motivating a noninstrumental and responsive . . . attitude toward nature” (Lucht, 127).

Unlike Kant’s philosophy, classical Daoism (c. 6th-4th century BC) on the contrary is often cited by deep ecologists as an ideal of environmental philosophy. Although they are many centuries and a world apart, Immanuel Kant and classical Daoism nonetheless share certain similar philosophical interest. First, both are concerned with freedom and autonomy. Second, both see the externals as hindrance to freedom. Third, both recommend reducing egoistic desires and a return to the inner self for freedom. Nonetheless, these two traditions also differ on how to define freedom, the externals, and the interior self. For Kant, freedom in its full sense (not simply in the partial sense like aesthetic freedom) is “to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world” (Groundwork, 109 [452]), which requires total transcendence from the sensible. For Daoism, however, to be free both aesthetically and morally is to be “united with the sound and breath of things” and to return to Nature (Dao) (Zhung Zi, ch.12).

In this paper, I would like to argue that despite Lucht’s eloquent defense of Kant’s environmental philosophy, there are internal difficulties in Kant’s system. Kant’s aesthetic treatment of the beautiful and the sublime in the third Critique ultimately fails to accord nature with respect. This failure not only undermines any non-instrumental environmental ethics but it also sells short the moral dignity of persons that Kant so strongly defends. What is lacking in Kant’s philosophy is a thoroughgoing notion of embodied inter-subjectivity. On this front, I would like to suggest that classical Daoism, although with a transcendental tendency similar to Kant, provides a framework that can remedy the Kantian dilemma. I will demonstrate this thesis by elucidating (1) the essential Daoist principle of non-duality and how this principle transforms the human-nature relation into one of reverence, (2) that the principle of non-duality entails an Daoist practice of non-action (wu-wei) that is neither quietist nor activist, and (3) how this non-dual understanding of culture-nature relation and of wu-wei enhances, rather than undermines, our moral relation with nature and other humans in real life.
Linda E. Patrik, Union College, “No self, but many bodies” patrikl@union.edu Sat 11 room 4

The conclusion Buddhist philosophers draw from their analyses of the impermanent constituents and multiple causal conditions of an existing thing is that there is no self. Whether analyzing one’s own being or things appearing in the external world, one finds no inner core or component that has inherent existence. This is what is meant by the Buddhist theory that within yourself or other things, no self can be found. Vajrayana Tibetan Buddhist theories agree that there is no self, but they describe multiple bodies with differing levels of appearance, from coarse to subtle, which manifest as a person. This paper examines Vajrayana Tibetan discussions of the bodies to which human consciousness is linked, and it shows how Tibetan theories of embodiment are more complex than theories of mind/body dualism.

Eric Perl, Loyola Marymount University, “On Being Alone Together” eperl@lmu.edu Sat 9 room 2

The concluding words of Ennead VI.9, “the flight of the alone to the alone,” are, as Armstrong remarks, “the only words of Plotinus at all generally known and remembered.” This phrase, and similar expressions elsewhere in the Enneads, are often taken to mean that Plotinus calls for a radically non-social, self-isolating “mysticism,” in which the sage separates himself from all other persons and beings in his pursuit of the One. Closer examination, however, reveals that by being “alone” Plotinus means not being separate from others, but rather being free from the impurities, the dilution of non-being, that keeps us from ascending to the One. To be “alone” is to be apart from what Plotinus calls “the other man” (VI.4.14), the lesser self that is subject to the passions. It is not the spiritual ascent but, on the contrary, the fall of the soul into sensuality that Plotinus describes as a closure of the self to others, a self-isolation (IV.8.4), here using the term “being alone” (monoutai) in a pejorative sense. Conversely, it is the ascent to intellect that brings us into communion with all others (V.8.11, VI.5.7). The way to true togetherness with others is not the life of sense, of busyness, of exteriority, in which the other remains external to the self, but rather the life of intellect, of contemplation, of interiority, which is not a self-closure but rather the opening of the self to embrace, to coincide with all others.

Marty Plax, Cleveland State University, “Socrates’ Political Defense of Holiness: Plato’s Euthyphro” plaxim@sbcglobal.net Sat 11 room 6

There are reasons to argue that the so-called “philosophic” reading of the dialogues do not, nor cannot, satisfy Socrates’ own characterization of wisdom. In the Republic he spoke of three parts of the soul – the rational (logos), appetitive (eros) and spirited (thumos). If the rational part of the soul is to control the other two, then reason’s attempt is not rational, but driven by passion and spiritedness. If reason is to be the key to wisdom, it must produce harmony or balance with the other two parts of the soul. How this is accomplished becomes known only by means of a dramatic interpretation of Platonic dialogues that balances the philosophic interpretations. The proposed paper will be based on a dramatic re-enactment of Plato’s Euthyphro.

The Euthyphro appears to be about holiness. Yet the subtitle of this dialogue, “About Holiness, An Attempt,” reveals that the discussion is going to be a failure from
the start. Even Socrates fails to provide a clear definition of it. Plato appears to have meant to demonstrate that the subject might not be amenable to discursive investigation. A dramatic re-enactment of the drama of the dialogue demonstrates that the conversation took place before Euthyphro came before the King, not afterwards. Socrates’ inquiry into Euthyphro’s understanding of holiness proves, in the end, to be something that Euthyphro, at the beginning of the dialogue, feared most, that Socrates would be a defense witness for his father. Socrates’ defense was of holiness itself, and especially the holiness of the family.

Through his questioning, Socrates exposes Euthyphro’s claim that he is being holy by enforcing some divine notion of justice is, in reality, a way of hiding his desire for vengeance. That his idea of justice is distorted is evidenced by the fact that he wished to indict his father for murder, when, by his own account, his father would, at worst, be accused of manslaughter. At the time of the events upon which Euthyphro is basing his case, his father was ambivalent about what to do with a murderer. Euthyphro’s idea of justice however, permits no pity or empathy for anyone who is ambivalent about what a just act is. Such ambivalence is not just intolerable; it is unjust. Socrates’ questioning successful induces ambivalence in Euthyphro himself. Socrates’ arguments reveal that Euthyphro’s quest for recognition and fame amounted to competing with the gods for recognition, a competition he could not win without himself appearing irreverent or impious.

The *Euthyphro* reveals that the philosopher’s caring for (*therapeiai*) the city is exhibited by his defense of the view that the gods are important to stability of both the family and the city. But that form of caring produces its own *aporia*, as the fate of Socrates shows. Socrates’ own defense of his own holiness and piety before the King ended in failure and in this sense was “an attempt” as well.

Marcin Podbielski. The King’s College, “The Noble Lie of Perfect Cities”

mpodbielski@tkc.edu Sat 2 room 7

Most commentators who venture to discuss the nature of Plato’s perfect cities find it necessary to deal with the question: Is Plato a utopian? Having asked it, one must offer, in turn, a precising definition of the very notion of utopia. It is not difficult to realize that the history of various ways of answering the question can be a subject in itself.

A simple way of solving the problem of Plato’s utopianism was offered recently, however, by Malcolm Schofield. In his book *Plato: political philosophy* (Oxford–New York 2006), Malcolm Schofield argues that, on the one hand, any political project must be idealistic since it propounds ideals that constitute the common point of reference for a type of social life. On the other hand, every political project should be practicable at least in part in order to be treated as a serious “contribution to the understanding of political and social life”. Thus, “Plato has to negotiate his way between a Scylla and a Charybdis”, and while putting forth an ideal he presents his visions as a kind of not unrealistic project.

While this type of solution seems attractive and convincing, Schofield does not consider two features of Plato’s political projects. They are omnipresence of evil in the projected polities which Plato calls good and perfect, and remarks in which Plato’s main characters see these political projects as close to mythical accounts. Does it mean that Plato is aware of the tension exposed by Schofield? If so, in which terms does he express it?
Therefore, the problem of evil and imperfection of Plato’s perfect policies seems worth exploring. Is Plato only pretending to carry out the purges that he speaks of in the Statesman and metaphorically in the Republic? Secondly, one may ask why Socrates is making his perfect state in the Republic a fiction. As I tried to show in my presentation on 2006 SAGP Conference, Plato creates, in the Republic, a complicated web of pictures and metaphors, with the crucial metaphor of painter, in order to describe various confusing nuances in the relationship between his cities and the realm of ideas. While unravelling this almost Gordian knot, one realizes that Socrates asks his interlocutors, in effect, to pretend that the “mythical story” about his perfect city of philosophers-kings is true, even though what he tells is possibly nothing more than a mysterious model in the heavens whose identification with an ideal city occurs only inside the story.

Therefore, instead of commenting on Plato’s utopianism through comparing his models with our modern concepts and views of utopia, one should rather first address the following questions: Does Plato ask the same of his readers as his Socrates asks of Glaucon? Are Plato’s perfect cities an educated version of the “Noble Lie”? And if so, for what reason do we need this illusion? What kind of answer is either offered or suggested by Plato’s texts themselves?

Julie Ponesse, University of Western Ontario, “Aristotle on Luck and Chance”
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In the middle of the 4th c. B.C., on his way to mapping out the nature and number of causes in Physics II, Aristotle provided a theory of accidental causation that stands out as anomalously precise in the history of philosophical interest in the problem. Many readers, however, claim that Aristotle’s technical definition of tyche, as ‘what might have been due to thought and for the sake of something’, is incompatible with what they see as a broader notion of tyche in the ethical texts, as ‘whatever benefits or harms us that is beyond our control’. My aim here is to show that Aristotle’s theory of accidental causation, which runs from Physics II.4-6, not only firmly underpins, but is given practical force by, the discussions of luck in the ethical texts.

Gerald A. Press, Hunter College and CUNY Graduate Center, “Equivocal Critics of Non-Dogmatism” Gerald.press@hunter.cuny.edu Sat 4 room 1

Recently several criticisms have been published of non-dogmatism and the “new Platonism” that holds this view. The criticisms involve equivocations on the “teachings” or doctrines putatively taught and on the manner in which the teaching is (or is not) being done. In this paper I will suggest clarifications and precisions of these concepts in virtue of which the critics will be seen to have missed the mark. Contrary to the presumption of Beversluis and others, I will argue that the burden of proof in the case is on those who claim that Plato propounds doctrines in the dialogues. Besides these essentially logical and terminological reasons for doubting the dogmatic approach, recent historical research indicates that the dogmatic conception of Plato’s philosophy is an artifact of post-Platonic ancient Platonism.

Anthony Preus, Binghamton University, “Aristotle on Oligarchy” apreus@binghamton.edu abstract pending; conference organizer, sat 4 room 3

This essay addresses (briefly) the following issues:
a) What is the relationship between Aristotle’s “oligarchy” and Aristotle’s “aristocracy”?

b) What is the significance of the dialectic between “oligarchy” and “democracy” in Aristotle’s *Politics*?

c) Does it make sense to say that the United States system of government is in practice an Aristotelian oligarchy?

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**Diana Quarantotto, University of Pisa, “Imitating the stars: Aristotle on life as eternal being” diana.quarantotto@libero.it Sat 2 room 3**

My paper is an inquiry into Aristotle’s theory of sublunary life and it is focused, particularly, on the issue of the material (anatomical-physiological) realization of the nutritive-reproductive life function. The inquire will be carried out from a cosmological point of view, i.e. by considering sublunary living matter within the whole Aristotelian universe, in the light of its broad general structure, its parts and the relations between them. The reason for this choice is that the cosmological point of view seems to be not only one of those used by Aristotle himself, but above all a primary one, since it is linked, I’ll suggest, with the ‘what is it’ question about sublunary life. This is because, in Aristotle’s view, sublunary living matter is organized according to a mimetic relation to supralunar life, i.e. because the nutritive-reproductive activity of sublunary organisms is described as an imitation, brought about through improper means (i.e. the contrary potentialities which sublunary organisms are composed of), of supralunar life. The similarity between supralunar and sublunary life regards eternity. Supralunar living things are numerically–i.e. unconditionally–eternal, since either they lack matter or are composed of ether. By contrast, sublunary living things are numerically generable and corruptible, since they are composed of contrary potentialities which destroy each other. And yet, albeit numerically generable and corruptible, sublunary living things are formally eternal in virtue of the nutritive-reproductive function (apart form those which are generated spontaneously), i.e. by imitating through their improper means the circular movement of the stars. Put differently, sublunary living matter is provided with a kind of organization which enables it to use the physical properties by which it is generable and corruptible in such a way as to turn its generability and corruptibility themselves into their contraries, i.e. ungenerability and uncorruptibility, without stopping to be at the same time, but in a different respect, generable and corruptible. Hence, from this cosmological point of view, the cycle of generation of each species can be described as a numerically unitary, continuous, circular, and hence eternal, process which is brought about through discontinuous and morphologically changing material structures (i.e. the individual organisms, which are subjected to morphological changes during their ontogenesis), i.e. as a single process which goes on continuously and eternally through the metamorphosis of living matter. Given this, the main questions to address are: How does sublunary matter accomplish this continuous eternal process of generation? How do sublunary organisms imitate supralunary living things through their improper means? What kind of unitary principle of organization lies behind a process which, albeit regular and recursive, displays such complexity, i.e. a process which goes on through discontinuous and morphologically changing material structures? Answers to these
questions should be useful, I’ll suggest, in order to grasp Aristotle’s view of the ‘mechanisms’ and hence of the meaning of life, as well as to face age-old problems of Aristotelian scholarship like those about the status of form (individual or universal), the relation between form and matter, and more generally the causal structure of sublunary life. The principal idea underlying this inquiry is that the causal distinctions used by Aristotle in order to define sublunary life can be clarified from the cosmological point of view, i.e. by considering sublunary life in the light of what it is an imitation of and how it accomplishes this goal. In other words, the relation of imitation through improper means seems to be useful to sharpen our understanding of what sublunary life is in Aristotle’s view. My point will be that the main definitory trait of life is to be an eternal complete process, i.e. an *energeia*.

-Grego Recco, St. John’s College, “Platonic Kakotechnia: the lessons of bad distinctions”

The distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires drawn in the *Republic* is only apparently a technical specimen of Platonic doctrine. While not quite incoherent, it is full of tensions that render it unusable for its ostensible purposes. These tensions are highlighted by the language in which the distinction is expressed, by the immediate context (distinguishing the oligarchic from the democratic character), and by the subtly painted portrait of Adeimantus, with his more or less oligarchic preoccupations concerning austerity, pleasure, and political stability. Plato depicts Socrates gently trying to move Adeimantus away from these views, which Socrates does by mirroring Adeimantus’ own concerns back to him so that their incoherency may become visible.

Plato’s goals in presenting this exchange include challenging a naïve set of presuppositions about the being and value of desires, which he accomplishes by associating those views with the oligarchic person. Desires, Plato wants us to see, are not uniquely defined by their “objects” nor by the activities associated with their satisfaction; their value cannot be discerned without reference to their cohabitation with other desires. They are not static and unchanging entities whose value for life is given in advance, for they can be transformed through education; in fact, they *must* be educated (even “persuaded”), for they cannot merely be suppressed.

If Plato has a “theory” of desire, the way to find it is to trace a path in thought beginning from Adeimantus’ inchoate preconceptions and preoccupations, continuing through Socrates’ “technical” refinement of them, and pointing ultimately toward something more adequate.

Christopher Roberts, New School, “Plato on Learning Virtue without a Teacher: *Meno* 87b2-89c4”

At 87b2 Socrates and Meno turn from a discussion of the method of hypothesis to an attempt at its correct use. Socrates proposes to use the method of hypothesis to answer Meno’s initial query with which the dialogue began: is virtue taught (or) can virtue be taught? By 89c4 Meno has concluded that yes, virtue is acquired by teaching. The following is an analysis of this brief argument and the many philosophical problems it
raises. We will proceed by, first, presenting a straightforward summary of the argument, and then placing it in a broader context. Only after getting all the pieces on the table can we evaluate Plato’s argument, but it is here that we will have the most to say. Perhaps our most important finding is that Plato employs the resources needed to distinguish different kinds of knowledge such that we can hold virtue to be knowledge while also believing that virtue cannot be taught. A few remarks at the end will perhaps allow us to see more of the significance of this argument.

David G. Robertson, Felician College, “Talk and Politics in Plotinus”
djdh_robertson@hotmail.com Sat 4 room 6

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus explains linguistic understanding by a theory of psychic unification, not primarily as the transfer of linguistic meaning from one mind to another. Ultimately, the intelligibility of linguistic expression depends on the outflow from the One, parallel to the intelligibility of all other products of soul. In his discussions of the categories, Plotinus develops important aspects of his metaphysics of language, in particular the nature of language (its essence) as a special kind of activity. As such, it is an incorporeal entity. I follow with sound and hearing, explaining how linguistic understanding is made possible for an audience. Finally, I address the interpersonal, ethical, and political dimensions of talk, with reference to his view that even practical understanding in talk exchanges is really the unification of souls in pursuit of higher realities. This comes to a surprisingly serious account of the ethical and political aspects of attaining knowledge of what is said, within a conceptual framework that tries to accommodate the instrumentality of language use within a scheme of assimilation to the One. I intend this paper as a light correction to the usual scholarly emphasis on the limits of our language when faced with the One.

Dan Robins, Stockton College, “Xunzi on the Benefits of Music”
dan.robins@stockton.edu Sat 2 room 4

As is well known, the Mohists’ arguments against music appealed to a conception of benefit that gave no weight either to the enjoyment music brings or to its aesthetic properties. It is widely thought that in his arguments against the Mohists, Xunzi implicitly rejected this conception of benefit by appealing both to enjoyment and to aesthetic considerations. This paper attempts to show that this gets Xunzi’s arguments badly wrong. Though he may well have recognized music’s aesthetic value, he does not invoke to this value against the Mohists. And far from treating enjoyment as a benefit that music can provide, he treats it as a possible source of disorder that music helps bring under control. If anything, Xunzi’s arguments against the Mohists imply a conception of benefit even thinner than their own. The paper concludes by suggesting that we can best understand Xunzi’s appeal to such a thin conception of benefit by situating it in the context of an intellectual discourse that was not governed by specifically Confucian values.

David Roochnik, Boston University, “What is Theoria?” roochnik@bu.edu Sat 2 room 5

Nicomachean Ethics X.7-8 has generated an intractable debate concerning the nature of “complete happiness.” Does it consist solely in a life of theoria? If so, how can this notion be reconciled with earlier sections of the NE? If not, what is to be made of the
extraordinary praise the “theoretical life” receives in X.7-8? This paper supplies a necessary prolegomenon to this debate: it attempts to explain what theoria actually is. In particular, it argues that Aristotle’s use of inflections of the verb theorein, which are ubiquitous throughout the corpus and often have the “mundane” meaning of “study” or “look at,” is philosophically connected to the “exalted” sense of theoria presented in X.7-8. This thesis supplies a useful tool by means of which the very end of the NE can be coherently integrated into the work as a whole.

Thanassis Samaras, George Washington University, “The Question of Justice in Republic One” as578626@albany.edu Sat 11 room 7

In this paper, I revisit the question of the consistency of Thrasymachus’ position on justice in the First Book of the Republic. The paper falls into three parts. In the first part, I examine two influential interpretations of the sophist’s views, G.B. Kerferd’s and T.D.J. Chappell’s, and argue that neither one fully resolves the riddle of Thrasymachus. In the second part, I claim that the sophist has a ‘descriptive’ theory of justice, not a ‘prescriptive’ one, and that no moral command to act in any particular way follows from this theory. In the third and final part, I argue that the essential problem with Thrasymachus’ theory is not the incompatibility between his two definitions of justice in 338c and 343c, as it is usually assumed, but the fact that in Book One he uses two different and irreconcilable conceptions of justice, one ‘descriptive’ and one ‘conventional’ one. It is because the sophist uses the term ‘justice’ to mean different things in different parts of the text that his overall position is ultimately inconsistent.

Kenneth Sayre, Notre Dame, “Plato and Wittgenstein on what their works teach us” Kenneth.M.Sayre.1@nd.edu Sat 4 room 1

In keeping with his Seventh Letter, Plato’s SYMPOSIUM has Diotima teaching Socrates the path toward wisdom rather than instructing him in philosophic doctrine. Plato himself probably learned similar lessons from conversations with the historical Socrates, focused on the process of gaining understanding rather than on doctrinal instructions. As Diotima to Socrates, and as Socrates to Plato, so Plato’s dialogues stand to the properly prepared reader. Plato’s written conversations teach skills of pursuing philosophy (the love of wisdom) rather than passing Plato’s understanding of the subject on to the reader (something the Seventh Letter says is impossible).

This distinction between doctrine and skills of inquiry is comparable to that between saying and showing in Wittgenstein’s TRACTATUS. In that work, what can be meaningfully said is limited to propositions picturing the way things stand in the world. In delimiting the range of meaningful language, however, the TRACTATUS also marks off domains of value, such as ethics and aesthetics, the contents of which can be shown while not meaningfully said. By Wittgenstein’s own testimony, the main point of the TRACTATUS was to enable the reader to be shown things that could not be expressed in meaningful language.

Yet another helpful comparison is with the distinction between learning HOW and leaning THAT tracing back to Gilbert Ryle’s THE CONCEPT OF MIND. Both Plato’s dialogues and Wittgenstein’s TRACTATUS are works intended to teach their readers
HOW to do philosophy rather than teaching them THAT such and such philosophic doctrines are the case.

**Michael Shaw**, *Utah Valley State College*, “The vexed relationship between Plato and the poets” [shawmi@uvsc.edu](mailto:shawmi@uvsc.edu) abstract pending Saturday 9 room 1

**Bongrae Seok**, *Alvernia College*, “Empty Heart and Metaphysical Emotion of the Neo-Confucian Mind” [bongrae.seok@alvernia.edu](mailto:bongrae.seok@alvernia.edu) Sun 11 room 3

This paper discusses and critically evaluates Neo-Confucian perspective on morality and emotion. Neo-Confucianism raised the moral foundation of human being at the level of the eternal principles in the universe but neglected natural development of individual needs and desires. In particular, dynamic and active contribution of emotion to self development was largely ignored and devalued in Neo-Confucian tradition. This paper analyzes the overemphasis of Neo-Confucianism on self control and self examination in the calm and contemplative mind and contrasts it with alternative views of how emotion contributes to morality in the eastern and western philosophy to demonstrate that the nature and function of emotion was misunderstood in Neo-Confucianism.

**John E. Sisko**, *The College of New Jersey*, “Homoeomerity, Anhomoeomerity, Individuation, and Change in Anaxagorean Physics” [sisko@tcnj.edu](mailto:sisko@tcnj.edu) Sat 9 room 6

According to Aristotle, “Anaxagoras posits as elements the homoeomeries” (GC I.1, 314a18). It is not clear, however, whether Aristotle means to indicate that Anaxagoras actually considers the elements to be homoeomorous or instead means to indicate that those things which Anaxagoras holds to be elements are also things which he himself (Aristotle) considers to be homoeomorous. Without any direct evidence from the fragments, the issue of whether Anaxagorean elements are to be viewed as homoeomorous or anhomoeomorous reduces, first, to the question of whether either model fails to be consistent with the known principles of Anaxagorean physics. Second, if neither model proves to be inconsistent with what is known of Anaxagorean physics, then the broader issue reduces to the question of whether one of the models provides a better theoretical fit with Anaxagorean principles.

Barnes holds that only homoeomerity is consistent with Anaxagoras’ core principles. Graham contends that both homoeomerity and anhomoeomerity are consistent with what is known of Anaxagorean physics, but that anhomoeomerity provides a better theoretical fit. In this paper, it is argued that (1) homoeomerity alone provides a basis for individuating objects in Anaxagoras’ system and (2) anhomoeomerity alone provides a basis for explaining phenomenal change. Thus, it is suggested that (3) considerations of homoeomerity and anhomoeomerity reveal a heretofore-latent infelicity within Anaxagorean physics.

**Steven Skultety**, *University of Mississippi*, “Is there Competition in Aristotle’s Ideal City?” [skultety@olemiss.edu](mailto:skultety@olemiss.edu) Sat 2 room 6

This paper focuses upon the interpersonal conflict that takes place among human beings within that political community Aristotle considers best – the so-called “city of our prayers” of *Politics* VII and VIII. Here too however, firmly in the realm of
interpersonal relations, we should not begin by assuming that we are looking for one kind of thing that goes by many names. We should not, for example, take it for granted that all political conflict is civil war [\textit{stasis}] writ big or small, dangerous or innocuous. We should not assume that competition, partisanship, legal dispute, assembly debate, and civil-war are just different words for what is essentially the same sort of “disorder.”

I make this proposal not simply because it strikes me as being more Aristotelian in spirit — it is alive to the possibility that terms like “conflict” and “order” may be \textit{homonymous} — but also because it helps us to avoid assuming ahead of time that Aristotle’s ideal city must be found to be \textit{either} “open”, free, and chaotic or “closed”, authoritarian, and structured, or that these are the terms in which we must work out a complicated balance or some hermeneutical blend. Such approaches suggest that Aristotle has a set attitude toward conflict (or order) \textit{as such}. In this paper I shall argue that the ideal city of \textit{Politics} VII and VIII makes such an interpretation impossible: while \textit{stasis} and partisanship are to be \textit{utterly} abolished, competition is to be \textit{promoted}.

\textbf{P. Christopher Smith}, \textit{U. Mass Lowell}, “Understanding, Horizon Fusion, and the Odyssey’s Reversed Similes: A Gadamerian Reading of Penelope’s and Odysseus’ Gespräch.” \texttt{Paul_Smith@uml.edu} Sun 9 room 1

A remarkable example of an “inverse simile” in the Odyssey (8.523-31) will serve nicely to introduce our considerations of the relevance of this rhetorical figure for Gadamer’s hermeneutics:

As a woman weeps, her arms flung round her darling husband, a man who fell in battle, fighting for town and townsmen, trying to beat the day of doom form home and children. Seeing the man go down, dying gasping for breath, she clings for dear life, screams and shrills but the victors, just behind her, digging spear-butts into her back and shoulders, drag her off in bondage, yoked to hard labor, pain, and the most heartbreaking torment wastes her cheeks. So from Odysseus’ eyes ran tears of heartbreak now (Fagles 8.588-98 (522-31).

This startling, upside down comparison provides a perfect paradigm for Gadamer’s idea of horizon fusion, i.e., the merging of the experience of someone other than, and in this case even opposite to oneself, with one’s own experience, so that the other’s perspective becomes continuous with one’s own. We for our part will assume, however, that for human beings what Gadamer calls \textit{Verständnis} or understanding, is only the end result of what begins as a contest, an agôn, in which each party first seeks to establish her or his “being for self” by reducing the other to mere “being for another,” only to discover that losing this contest is precisely what makes possible getting beyond it to valid community with the other and mutual recognition of each other’s “being for self.” The exchanges between Odysseus and Penelope, culminating in another reversed simile (23.233-40), will be used to exemplify this (Hegelian) dialectic.

\textbf{Richard Stichler}, \textit{Alvernia College}, “Confucius in the European Enlightenment” \texttt{richard.stichler@alvernia.edu} Sun 11 room 3

During the European enlightenment Confucian civilization and culture held a particular attraction for the West. The endless religious wars and sectarian conflicts of the
seventeen and eighteenth centuries fueled the search for an ethical and political system based on universal human reason. In Confucianism Leibniz discovered a non-Christian system of “natural morality” that he claimed agreed with the fundamental principles of Christian ethics. Leibniz was deeply impressed by Confucian civilization and maintained that the Chinese were more advanced in ethics and politics than the West. As a world statesman closely involved in the affairs of Asia and Europe, Leibniz attempted to bring Chinese missionaries to Europe to teach the West about Confucian natural morality. By working closely with Jesuit missionaries in China who followed the ecumenical policies of Matteo Ricci, Leibniz sought to realize his “grand design” of establishing global cooperation and harmony between Asia and the West. But his vision of a pre-established harmony between China and Europe was undermined by his leading disciple, Christian Wolff, who rejected Leibniz’s view that Confucian ethics was based on a theistic form of natural religion. Although he considered Confucianism compatible with Christian ethics, Wolff maintained that its doctrine of natural morality was atheistic and did not need the support of natural religion. This led to a change in attitude. Kant would later argue that Confucianism lacked any understanding of practical reason.

David Storey, Fordham University, “Matter, Metaphysics, and Goo: Against Prime Matter in Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy” storey19@msn.com Sun 9 room 3
Over the last half century, a debate has unfolded over whether or not Aristotle believed in the existence of “prime matter.” The opponents in this debate are those that defend the traditional view—so-called “prime materialists”—and those who reject it—such as Hugh King and William Charlton. Despite the limitations of and differences within and between these two camps, I argue that it is all but impossible that Aristotle held to any such doctrine of prime matter. The concept of prime matter—of pure potentiality—is precisely that: a logical concept that is unintelligible when reified and put in place as the bottom rung on Aristotle’s scala natura. Prime matter “in itself” is a metaphysical holdover masquerading as a physical, corporeal stuff, and any attempt to reconcile such an empty metaphysical ornament with an empirical, scientific approach to nature is ill-conceived.

Henri Teloh, Vanderbilt University, “The Drama/Philosophy Distinction and Distorted Interpretations of Plato” mmtn@comcast.net Sat 11 room 1
Many interpreters of Plato employ a distinction which partially determines how they interpret the dialogues. The distinction comes in various formulations: form/content, literary/philosophical, doing/saying, and drama/philosophy. When scholars believe that these formulations distinguish distinct kinds of things, then distorted interpretations occur because they privilege one side at the expense of the other. Moreover, the distinction itself is wrong. Both content and form are aspects of the drama, and are not distinct types of things. It is all drama, and we must harmonize words and deeds to get a good interpretation; for the philosophical drama depends upon the other dramatic aspects for part of its meaning, just as the rest of the drama depends upon philosophical assertions for part of its significance. Only then can we argue about what, if anything, Socrates believes, and then on the basis of Socrates’ beliefs what, if anything, Plato believes.
Chad Trainer, “Pythagoreanism’s Imported Ingredients” stratoflampsacus@aol.com  
Sat 9 room 6  
Greece’s earliest philosophers, the Milesians, were concerned primarily with the ultimate nature of cosmic matter. The Pythagoreans, by contrast, sought the source of the cosmic order. With respect to its interest in the cosmic order’s causes, Pythagoreanism was wholly true to its Ionian origins. However, in addressing this and other matters, Pythagoreanism imported pre-philosophic beliefs and practices from the East that were at variance with the disinterested reasoned accounts of the world to which the earlier Milesians aspired. Thus, in place of the Milesian philosophers’ rationalistic materialism, Pythagoreanism espoused a mystically based dualism that was the source of the otherworldliness and asceticism in much subsequent classical thinking. The prevalence and seniority of this mystical, transcendentalist feature in Greek thought ought not distract us from its fundamentally foreign and alien nature.

Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, Binghamton University, “On the Two-Fold Characterization of Ousia in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Zeta” lewcassity@hotmail.com  
Sun 9 room 3  
As Aristotle himself notes, the question “what is ousia?” has always been a source of puzzlement (Z1.1028b3-4). One puzzle concerning ousia is whether it is a particular independent thing (a tode ti) or the knowable essence of a particular something (the to ti en einai). I will approach this puzzle by showing that Aristotle characterizes ousia in two ways in Zeta. On the one hand, Aristotle characterizes ousia as an enhylos eidos or sunolon, the primary example of which is a particular living thing. On the other hand, Aristotle characterizes ousia as the universal articulation of something, for particulars are in themselves unknowable. These two characterizations of ousia can be reconciled by understanding the first sense as an ontological characterization of ousia and the second sense as an epistemological characterization of ousia. An investigation of episteme in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics will clarify how these two senses of ousia relate. I will show that ousia as a particular being-at-work which presents itself to nous has an ontological primacy, but when we speak of and know this particular ousia we can only do so with respect to its universal essence. Finally we will see how these two senses of ousia are inextricably linked, for the epistemological sense of ousia is fundamentally dependent on the ontological sense, and this ontological sense of ousia is inarticulate in of itself.

Adriel M. Trott, Villanova University, “Political Freedom and The Internal Archē: Deliberation in Aristotle’s Politics” adriel.trott@villanova.edu  
Sat 2 room 6  
Recent works on Aristotle’s Politics consider the claim that the polis is natural. Communitarians and civic republicans turn to Aristotle to ground the community while classical liberals ground natural rights through the same claim. While I think both readings of Aristotle’s claim present problems and require a renewed effort to understand physis in Aristotle as an internal principle of change, that is not my concern in this paper. My concern is rather the difficult question of freedom that accompanies any claims to justify or legitimate political community or individual rights from nature. If there is a ground, if the polis is natural, necessary and given, is freedom possible? Aristotle’s critique of the freedom found in democracy leads us to wonder whether he considers freedom a worthy measure of living (democracy defined as rule by those who are free,
1280a5, 1280a24, 1290b18, freedom is mark of democracy 1294a12, freedom is whatever one wishes to do 1310a32, 1317b12-17). Yet his emphasis on free rule as the rule between equals, his view that political rule is free rule (1277b8, 1325a28-30), leads us to conclude that there is a sense of freedom that Aristotle commends to us in his practical work. This is not a freedom to do whatever one pleases, as one does in a democracy. What kind of freedom then is it?

In this paper I argue from Aristotle’s treatment of the relation between choice and deliberation, that political freedom is not free will, as it is for the moderns, but having the power to act from an internal principle of movement. This account of freedom requires us to consider what political community and political action is for Aristotle, in light of his claims that it is natural. In this paper, I show how the notion of physis as an internal principle of movement does not exclude but affirms freedom, when freedom is having the power to actualize one’s choice, the final stage of the deliberative process. I explain how the freedom that deliberation and the choice with which it concludes indicate is a freedom of power that arises from an internal principle. Moreover, this principle is not a given essence but a developed capacity, and as a developed capacity affects one’s power to continue to act. This internal principle is not the will, the sign of freedom for Descartes, but a capacity developed through habituation both to deliberate and to act on the choice made as a result of deliberation. This development shows the structure of activity as that which produces the capacity for more activity, and in that sense, increases the freedom for virtuous life. This interplay between the potential and its actualization is found in the freedom of the individual and mirrored in the freedom of the polis: both move from an internal principle to develop habits (or institutions) that increase the potential for further activities, and yet are not determined or necessitated by those habits or institutions.

Toy Tung, John Jay College, “Coercion and Rule in Augustine, Thomas, and Some Twelfth-Century Thinkers: Are Natural Law and Natural Rights the Same For Persons and States?” ttung@jjay.cuny.edu Sat 4 room 8

The relationship between natural law and natural rights in medieval thought before Ockham is far from clear. Focusing on coercion and prerogatives of rule, this paper will examine whether natural law and natural rights were construed differently for individuals and for polities. Certain distinctions of Rufinus, Otto of Freising, and Hugh of St. Victor connected natural law and natural rights to the progress of history and to the political rather than individual body. The historical context of the progress of the Church, in which twelfth-century thinkers discussed natural law and natural rights, differs significantly from Augustine’s idea of an irreparable post-lapsarian schism between human and divine law, nature, and reason. And yet, Augustine seems also to argue for rights, like coercion and servitude, which he defends more as societal rights than as individual rights. This paper will examine the way twelfth-century thinkers implicitly distinguished between the “natural” rights of polities and individuals; and it will frame those issues by the polarities of Augustine’s and Thomas’s treatment of similar questions, whether implicitly or explicitly.

Philippe Turenne, McGill University, “Yogacara as Madhyamaka: Shakya-mchog-ldan’s Interpretation of the Five Treatises of Maitreya” philippe.turenne@mail.mcgill.ca Sat 11 room 4
This paper fleshes out the details of the 15th Century Tibetan writer Shākya-mchog-ldan’s interpretation of the Five Treatises of Maitreya as treatises explaining the Madhyamaka view of Mahāyāna Buddhism. By rejecting the commonly accepted doxographical notion that accepting Yogācāra theories such as that of the three characteristics and emptiness of other imply adherence to the Mind-Only school, Shākya-mchog-ldan presents a new form of Madhyamaka that can include both the emptiness of self and the emptiness of other, and that allows the Five Treatises of Maitreya to be interpreted literally without any conflict with the self-emptiness Madhyamaka primarily treated by Nāgārjuna and his followers.

Geert Van Cleemput, George Washington University, “Happiness in Aristotle’s Protrepticus” geertvancleemput@hotmail.com Sun 9 room 4 abstract pending

Michael Wagner, University of San Diego, “Why Can’t Lovers Just Be Friends? Plato’s Eros and Aristotle’s Philia” mwagner@sandiego.edu Sat 9 room 2

Aristotle’s analysis of philia in Nicomachean Ethics may be read either as an alternative conception of love to Plato’s eros (that is, as distinct type of love), or as a more extensive conception encompassing eros as a special case. There is indication in the text that Aristotle in fact thinks the latter, in which case features of Plato’s conception of eros unaccounted for by Aristotle’s analysis of philia would derive from more general differences between their philosophies (for example, regarding the soul’s origins, nature, and destiny). This paper explores this thesis as context for identifying similarities and differences between the two conceptions as they pertain to human interactions and relationships.

Joanne Waugh, University of South Florida, “Philosophy: The Very Idea” jwaugh@cas.usf.edu Sat 11 room 1

Answering the questions ‘What does Plato teach?’ and ‘How does he teach it?’ requires that we answer some other questions as well viz., ‘to whom are the dialogues directed?’ and ‘why does Plato choose to write as he does?’ Too often readers identify the “teachings” of Plato with what Socrates says to the interlocutors in the dialogues. Even were one to assume that Plato has some inkling of his place in what would come to be philosophy—an assumption for which there is little or no extant evidence—the audiences for whom Plato is writing is comprised of those of his fourth century contemporaries who will read—or more likely hear—the dialogues. There is, of course, no reason to assume that his audiences were always the same, nor that the circumstances or occasions in which they heard the dialogues were.

It should go without saying that for Plato and his contemporaries, ‘philosophia’ does not mean what it means for us. Indeed, the term hardly appears in the fifth century and its meaning is contested nearly half way through the fourth. It is Plato’s conception
of *philosophia* that leads him to write *Sokratikoi Logoi*. That Plato writes as he does because he believes this is the manner in which *philosophia* should or must be written should also go without saying. Indeed, the “propositional” or “doctrinal” way of understanding Plato not only assumes what it instead has the burden of proving; it also ignores both the dramatic context within the dialogues and the historical context in which Plato wrote them. In so doing, this approach erases the differences between the audience in the dialogue, and the audiences of the dialogues, ancient and modern. What Socrates says to the interlocutors in the dialogue means something different to Plato’s audience, for its members know the character and careers of the fifth century dramatic personae of the dialogue. This allows Plato to use tragic and dramatic irony for is his fourth century contemporaries in getting them to see what he wants them to see. We cannot grasp what this is if we do not understand the dialogues as episodes in the history of Greek literature.

Armed with some preliminary answers to the questions, ‘to whom are the dialogues directed?’ and ‘why does Plato choose to write as he does?’ we can address the questions of what, if anything, Plato teaches and how. That *philosophia* is introduced by Plato as an alternative to traditional Greek *paideia* is supported by evidence internal and external to the dialogues themselves, but we should take care that we do not assume that *paideia* for the ancient Greeks maps on exactly to our notions of teaching. ‘Paideia’ does not refer primarily or solely to a body of propositions to which one assents upon understanding their meaning; ‘paideia’, rather, is a way of being, living, and acting with others in the world. This way of living, on Plato’s view, requires consideration, if not acceptance of certain central ideas: the idea of the soul as the seat of reason as well as of emotions and passions; the notion of introspection; and an awareness of inferential reasoning. But these are ideas the necessity of which is shown in the dialogues rather than stated by Socrates or other of their dramatis persona. These are also ideas that enable us to teach ourselves.

Michael Weinman, St. John’s College “‘The best thing in all of nature”: Aporetic unity in Aristotle’s ontology and theology” mdweinman@gmail.com Sat 9 room 3

Debates about *Metaphysics* resist easy categorization, let alone solution; yet, it shouldn’t be overly controversial to say that of all difficulties in articulating a consistent account of what is going on in the text as a whole, the most central is the very question of its wholeness. That is to say, for those—both anciently and now, as Aristotle might put it—who have really lived with Aristotle’s thinking, no dilemma remains more insoluble than whether and to what extent the account of *nous* and *qevo/a* in Book *L* can be said to be of a piece with the discussion of being as being that is called for in Books *A*-*E* (I-VI), and which everyone agrees can be found in at least Books *Z*, *H*, and *Q* (VII-IX). I am committed to the view that *L* is of a piece with the text as a whole, as I argue elsewhere. I aim here, however, not to convince us one way or other about this controversy, but merely to say that we cannot locate this debate in a reading of *L*, as parties to the debate are wont to do, but rather must see how the problem is internal to the work as a whole. I do so by pointing to a series of crucial early passages which present what “the big questions”: Is the study of “being as being” about finding out what all beings share, insofar as they are beings, or is it about finding what being “in itself” might be, as an independent thing? In either case, what does the way we parse “being as being”
dictate in terms of the relation between the cosmological nou~j presented in L? These questions, difficult or impossible as they may be, demand our attention as careful readers of Aristotle, and they cannot be answered by one or another reading of that presentation.

Roslyn Weiss, Lehigh University, “A Happy City of Unhappy People; A Happy Soul of Unhappy Parts,” rw03@Lehigh.EDU Sun 11 room

(Extract): Given the analogy between city and soul in Plato’s Republic, it is reasonable to expect that the relationship between whole and parts in the city will be replicated in the relationship between whole and parts in the individual soul. What I should like to propose in this paper is that just as Callipolis, the beautiful city crafted in Plato’s Republic, is a happy city though none (or at most only one) of its parts is happy, so, too, the corresponding philosophic soul is happy though none of its parts is.

It is perhaps somewhat peculiar to speak of either the happiness of a city or the happiness of the parts of an individual soul. Happiness would seem to apply properly only to individual human beings—not to cities and not to parts of an individual’s soul.

In an attempt to make sense of the notion of a happy city and happy parts of a soul, let us consider two possible senses of happiness—an “objective” sense and a “subjective” one—determined respectively by two distinct criteria. In its “objective” sense, happiness is determined by the criterion of justness. I shall call this criterion for happiness its “Socratic” criterion. (See Crito 48b, Gorg. 470e, Prot. 313b, and Rep. 1.354a.) On this criterion, if we want to know whether a city, the classes in a city, an individual, or the parts of an individual soul are happy, we would ask if they are just.

Mark Wheeler, San Diego State University, “Aristotle on Truth, Truthmakers, and Propositions” mark.wheeler@sdsu.edu Sat 11 room 3

I state and, briefly, defend my interpretation of Aristotle’s focal concept of truth, comparing it with the view defended by Paolo Crivelli in his Aristotle on Truth (Cambridge, 2004). I then consider the possibility that Aristotle posited propositions. Crivelli and Peter Simons (1988) have argued that Aristotle’s semantic theory presupposes the existence of propositions, although they differ over their nature. Agreeing with their basic point, I address and reject their different proposals, and I argue for an ideational account of Aristotelian propositions. I close with a discussion of how my interpretation bears on the question of truth-makers in Aristotle’s semantic theory.

Lisa Wilkinson, Nebraska Wesleyan University, “A Logos of Muthos: Parmenides’ Poem” lwilkins@nebrwesleyan.edu Sun 9 room 1

Many philosophers recognize the Homeric elements in Parmenides’ poem, but few, if any, interpret Parmenides within the context of an oral tradition. Rather, Parmenides’ thought is juxtaposed to something called Homeric, poetic, or mythic thought—thought that is not necessarily irrational but lacks the logical rigor of philosophic analyses to come. In this way, poetry is not compatible with philosophy (i.e., muthos and logos represent two very different ways of communicating) and while Homer represents the former in archaic Greece, Parmenides and other sophoi represent the emergence of logos from an earlier, mythic tradition.

While it is undeniable that Parmenides’ poem is unique within the literature available to us from archaic Greece, it is questionable whether any of the sophoi would
recognize a distinction between muthos and logos prior to Plato’s coining of the term “philosophy” in the fourth century. In other words, while we interpret Parmenides deeply within what we identify as the origin of logical, rational, and scientific analysis, our interpretations presuppose a certain understanding of both the history and purpose of philosophy that fifth and sixth century thinkers might not recognize as their own.

With these issues in mind, in this paper I briefly rehearse some of the most influential contemporary interpretations of Parmenides’ poem. I then suggest how Parmenides’ poem must have been composed and performed within the communicative practices of an archaic Greek oral tradition. Further, the archaic Greek oral tradition constitutes and sustains a certain understanding of language that might ill fit our contemporary accounts of the intent of Parmenides’ poem. In conclusion I suggest that reconsidering Parmenides in terms more appropriate to his own yields greater insight into not only Parmenides’ thought but also the distinction between logos and muthos as it bears upon our understanding of the origin of philosophy.

Russell Winslow, St. John’s College, “Aristotle on Being and Thinking”
Russwinslow@yahoo.com Sat 9 room 3

By first considering Aristotle’s reflections on nutrition and begetting offspring, in this essay, I will offer a reading of threptikê psychê as the most primordial (and hence most subtending) model after which all activities of soul are analogously fashioned. The first section of the essay, the section presented for our panel, will offer the textual ground upon which to offer this interpretation of the nutritive soul. Consequently, such work will enable us to hint at the primary trajectory of this preliminary labor: namely, how the activities of sensuous perception (aisthesis) and noetic perception (nous) can and must be thought as analogous to and/or structurally similar to the primary activity in the nutritive soul, genesis. Indeed, the overall aim of this paper is to retrieve from Aristotle a way of thinking about noetic perception in a manner which is in fact analogous in its performative character to the Aristotelian telos of sexual reproduction or the begetting of offspring. In obvious contrast to the modernist conception of thinking as active possession, as the intellectual grasping gestures of an agent, Aristotle offers us a way of reevaluating our own conception of thinking, and it is in the service of this reevaluation that I undertake the first steps of the interpretation represented by my talk.

John Wolfe, University of South Florida, “The Poetic Aristotle” jwolfe@luna.cas.usf.edu
Sun 9 room 1

It is traditional to treat the remains of Aristotle’s exoteric works as offering a portrait of his early philosophical positions. These works, the argument usually goes, represent a less developed but still systematic philosophy, one much closer to Plato than the supposedly more mature work of the received Aristotelian corpus.

One major problem with this approach is that it ignores the context within which Aristotle’s exoteric works functioned as well as their literary form. As many of Aristotle’s exoteric works take the form of dialogues, the attribution of any view expressed in the fragments to Aristotle himself is problematic to say the least. The most well preserved of these works, the Protrepticus is not dialogical in character. However, its status as a work of exhortation, directed at an audience uneducated in philosophy and
its methods provides an alternate explanation for the comparative simplicity of its philosophical contents.

This paper is an attempt to develop a more nuanced approach to reading Aristotle’s exoterica, one that evaluates their philosophical contents while taking into account the details of form and audience.

James L. Wood, Boston University, “Aristotle’s Slavery Problem” woodj@bu.edu Sat 4 room 3

(Extract): I shall devote the first portion of this paper to a critical examination of Aristotle’s account of slavery on its own terms, and give some indication of its connection with other aspects of his political philosophy. In the second part I shall turn to a closer investigation of the problem that Aristotle’s conception of the slave poses for his account of human nature and virtue in the Ethics, and argue that they are ultimately incompatible. Then I shall argue, with reference to Hegel, that the institution of slavery as Aristotle conceives it not only degrades the virtue of the slave but also the virtue of the master, so that Aristotle’s conception of the good life is distorted by his disparagement of menial labor. Finally, I shall argue that his conception of the philosopher as the greatest of human beings is flawed by the absolute opposition he implicitly supposes to exist between the philosopher and the slave. My suggestion at the end is that when Aristotle’s account of virtue, the good city, and philosophy is freed from its entanglement with the defense of slavery, it becomes possible to reconcile Aristotle’s portrait of human excellence with the limitations of human nature, to reunify his portrait of the philosopher with his portrait of the virtuous man, and to re-appropriate the Socratic ideal of self-knowledge as the ultimate goal of the good life.

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Charles M. Young, Claremont Graduate University, Commentator Charles.Young@cgu.edu Sat 2 room 1

-Z-

Anna Zhyrkova, Tel Aviv University, “John of Damascus’ Notion of Being” zhyrkova@post.tau.ac.il Sat 4 room 6

In the history of philosophy, as well as in the history of theology, the doctrine of John Damascene is generally regarded only as a compilation of texts of Neoplatonic and patristic authors. Therefore it is usually considered to be of a little philosophical originality and importance. If this judgment is accurate, it is hard to explain why Damascenus was accepted as one of the greatest authorities not only by the theologians of the Eastern Church, but also by the famous representatives of Western Medieval philosophy, such as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. By the 12th century, when Damascenus’ works were translated into Latin, there was good access to his probable sources, such as the Commentaries of Porphyry and other Neoplatonists. In spite of this, Damascenus was considered an original and important philosopher whose authority was comparable to Porphyry, Avicenna and Augustine.
In my opinion, one of the most interesting and challenging elements of the doctrine of John of Damascus is his conception of being. He distinguishes three modes of being: simple being, qualified being and actual/real being. These modes characterize the unqualified substance, qualified substance, i.e. species, and a certain individual respectively. Among them, only the actual being of individuals is a being per se, while other kinds of being subsist by participation in the individual. It follows from Damascene’s definition of nature and hypostasis that the essential content of an entity is distinct from its being. This distinction appears to exceed the one found in Plotinus and Neoplatonists, namely the distinction between absolute and determinate being. In fact, Damascenus’ conception of being seems to be closer to the Christian philosophy of middle ages than to the Greek or patristic tradition.

Coleen P. Zoller, Susquehanna University, “Plato on Psychic Politics: Differing Prescriptions for Psychic Health” zoller@susqu.edu Sat 9 room 7

In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates says that a doctor does not give the same prescription for health to all patients; instead, one prescription is given to the healthy patient and a much more restrictive prescription to the diseased patient (505 b-c). The analogy between medicine as care of the body and politics as the care of the soul is of central importance to the recommendations Plato has Socrates make about how an embodied inquirer should live. Usually Socrates calls for a life of moderation, but sometimes an ascetic life appears to be suggested. In this paper I will argue that this tension is not due to Plato being conflicted or indecisive about how he thought an embodied inquirer should live. Instead I will show that these “mixed messages” reflect Plato’s attempt to have Socrates write two different prescriptions for psychic health. He addresses the ascetic-sounding call to soul-love to those who have yet to make the first of two transitions required for the proper care of self. These hedonistic “body-lovers” must transition first of all to soul-love. Meanwhile, to those who have already made the transition from body-love to soul-love he directs his call for a life of moderation. The moderate life is one in which the soul is prioritized over the body without entirely denouncing the physical. Here I will concentrate on the Republic and Phaedrus with an eye toward squaring their psychic politics with this vision of the good life that requires two distinct transitions.