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ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ Ο ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΣΜΙΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΣ, Sph. 262c6-7: The First and Littlest of Sentences

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How are we to interpret these words of the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophistes, in which he ostensibly attempts to prescribe a rule for logical syntax? And especially, what have they to do, if anything, with the Theory of Ideas or with Aristotle's logical syntax? In his Formal Logic (1955), A.N. Prior pointed out that the Stranger's prescription, that the first and littlest of sentences must contain a noun and a verb (Prior gives the example “Theaetetus is sitting down”), is easy to represent in a way that corresponds to orthodox logical syntax for monadic atomic sentences as they appear in the modern theory of quantification—φχ. The present essay begins with Prior and goes on to show that, while the Stranger's prescription for syntax as described in Prior's account has by modern standards a conveniently orthodox flavor, this syntax is violated again and again in the dialogues—a point which Prior did not address. While one example of irregular syntax, the self-predication, fascinated many mid-twentieth-century scholars, self-predication turns out to be but a special case of irregular syntax in the dialogues. It is important, perhaps, but certainly not more important than other examples of irregular syntax. Within the limited universe of monadic atomic sentence syntax extended with constants for existence and unity, in fact, all but three of the 14 resulting possible irregular forms are used in one or other of the three dialogues surveyed here—Euthydemus, Protagoras, and Parmenides.

The interlocutors break the Stranger's rule, for example, when they use sentences of the forms 'Holiness exists' and 'Holiness is just'. In fact, the Theory of Ideas, as it has been known from antiquity to the present, incorporates many sentences like these and thus requires that the Stranger's rule for syntax be broken. And so the dialogues contain a variety of sentences and sentence schemata that we and the Stranger consider ill formed and that we should expect to produce peculiar results when used in argument, as the paper shows that they do.

My purpose in this paper is to secure these points of fact rather than to urge a position about them. Nonetheless, it may not be out of place to suggest several cautions that have occurred to me about the interpretation of the texts. First, if the Stranger's prescriptions seem to make sense and to fit with the subsequent development of logic, there would seem to be no good reason to dismiss them as unnecessarily restrictive, as some idealists have done. Second, despite the occurrences of sentences of irregular syntax in the dialogues, it is not necessary to view Plato the author as hopelessly confused; there are no grounds for attributing syntactical insensitivity to someone who, himself, represents this insensitivity in an orderly and carefully structured way as characterizing the conversation of some of his fictionalized interlocutors. Last, one might consider the genre of the dialogues and the constant presence of eristic elements in them. If the dialogues illustrate the undesirable consequences of using ill-formed sentences, the author may have intended more or less to illustrate these consequences for his readers.

Prior's Account Reviewed and Modified

Clearly, the expression which heads this paper has to do with syntax. By 'syntax' I intend, following the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, "the arrangement of words (in their appropriate forms) by which their connexion and relation in a sentence are shown." The one passage in the Platonic dialogues which most clearly approximates a discussion of syntax in our sense is Sophistes 261D1-
263D4. Prior treated this section as a discussion of predicates—"operators which form propositions, not out of propositions, but out of names." It will prove worthwhile to quote Prior at length:

Ordinary speech is full of these [operators], and we commonly call them 'verbs'. Thus we might say that 'is sitting down' is an operator by which we construct the proposition 'Theaetetus is sitting down' out of the name 'Theaetetus'. Or we might call 'Theaetetus' the 'subject' of the proposition and 'is sitting down' the 'predicate', the subject being defined as 'what the proposition is about', or as the name of that, and the predicate as 'what is said about it'.

'Theaetetus sits' [Θεαίτητος κάθηται] was given by Plato as an example of the simplest form of proposition, his argument being that a proposition, in the sense of a form of speech capable of truth and falsity, must be at least complete enough to contain a noun and a verb. 'Theaetetus is sitting down' is true if he is in fact doing so, and false if he is not, while 'Theaetetus is not sitting down' is false if he is, true if he is not. . . .

This analysis of propositions into nouns and verbs, or subjects and predicates, is of course easy enough to represent symbolically. Given the symbols 'x', 'y', 'φ', 'ψ', 'θ', etc. as predicate symbols, and 'x', 'y', 'φ', 'ψ', 'θ', etc. as predicate symbols, and treating predicates as operators which form propositions out of names, we have 'φx', 'ψy', 'φx', 'ψy', as propositional formulae . . . . 2

Note that the name symbols that Prior gives are individual variables—variables that take names, demonstratives, or definite descriptions as their values; the predicate symbols are variables that take as values one-place, first-order predicates, rather than individuals.

Further, sentences are combinations of nouns and verbs that follow a certain pattern or rule of formation. The Stranger is quite clear that some combinations are appropriate and that some are not. As he says: "for the expressions show, neither this way [by combining only verbs such as 'walks', 'runs', 'sleeps'] nor that way [by combining only nouns such as 'lion', 'stag', 'horse'], neither action nor inaction nor the being of something nor of nothing, until someone mingles the verbs with the nouns" (262C2-5). As the Stranger says, when you combine a verb with a noun, there is a sentence that is τών λόγων ο πρώτος τε και οικιστάτος. The example is 'man learns' or 'a man learns', or ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει (see below, especially nn. 5 and 7), which is described also as the least and first sentence (λόγον . . . ἐλάχιστον τε καὶ πρῶτον, 262C9-10). We have an example here of the first and littlest of sentences—one noun, one verb, nothing else, not even an article.3

Prior's summary of the passage pretty clearly is correct in outline, and I shall follow its outline even as I expand on it and fill in additional detail. I shall expand on it because the Sophistes directs us in fact to consider more than just predicates—indeed, more than just subjects and predicates or nouns and verbs.4 For it tells us that verbs have to do with actions and that nouns have to do with those who perform the actions (262A3-7). And there is more yet, since verbs have to do with more than just actions; they indicate or do not indicate action or inaction or what something is or is not. And it tells us that they do so only in sentences. Sentences, that is, give us both actions and states of affairs.

Prior's outline also needs to be filled in with additional detail. As the careful reader will have noted, the example of the first and littlest sentence that the Stranger actually gives (ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει) is not the one that Prior reports. We get to Prior's example only in the next step, where we are told that the sentence must be about something—τινός (262E5-6). This something, we
find out, is a πράγμα (262E12), and so the τίνος is actually πράγματος τίνος. The Stranger sums up: “I shall speak then to you a sentence by linking thing to action (συνθε’ις πράγμα πράξι) through name and verb (262E12-13).” Here at last is Prior’s example—Θεαίτητος κάθηται (263A2).

With this insertion of detail, it becomes clear that the dialogue develops the logic of Θεαίτητος differently from the logic of άνθρωπος. ‘Άνθρωπος clearly is not a proper name but a common one, whether we translate ‘man learns’ with Burnet or ‘a man learns’ with some others. The Stranger seems to be sensitive to the difference of a common name from a proper name. Only after having made his first point about monadic atomic sentences (atomic because uncompounded, monadic because containing only one-place predicates) with the example άνθρωπος μανθάνει does he go on to the next little point—‘Ετι δὴ σμικρόν τόδε—about a sentence’s being of something (τίνος); τόδε suggests something new that is coming into view rather than just a continuation. Note that the Stranger speaks in the singular—σμικρόν τόδε—rather than in the plural. He is pointing to the next single step in the argument and not beyond it for the moment.

But there is another point as well: the sentence must be of a certain kind or quality (ποιόν δε γε τινά, 263Al 1). It has seemed clear to many modern writers that the Stranger has truth-value in mind here, though Burnet thought that it was the having of a tense. For present purposes, the important thing is that these are distinct items in sequence. Indeed, the dialogue is a sequence of questions and answers in which the Stranger leads his interlocutor from the more easily granted to the less easily granted. Thus it would be difficult to pay too much attention to sequence. While the sentence with άνθρωπος is not presented as τίνος, the sentence with Θεαίτητος is presented as τίνος. As a sentence which is τίνος, it can be of a certain kind or quality, whatever we take that kind or quality to be. In other words, άνθρωπος appears to operate as an expression that can take names of individual men as values; the sentences that result can be of a certain kind or quality, but the sentence schema with the variable άνθρωπος cannot be of a certain kind or quality. The difference is that of some particular man or άνθρωπός τις from άνθρωπος simply; and Theaetetus is άνθρωπος τις—a particular man.

If there were any doubt about the logical sequence of this argument, it ought to be alleviated somewhat by referring to Aristotle, who makes a similar stepwise distinction to a similar purpose in Chapter VII of de Interpretatione, where he uses the examples ‘man is white’ or ‘a man is white’ (έστι λευκός άνθρωπος, 17b9-10) and ‘Socrates is white’ (έστι Σωκράτης λευκός, 17b28). The use of the same predicate with άνθρωπος and with a proper name appears to have become a sort of standard example in Academic discussions of logical syntax, and a Latin version found its way to the mediaeval scholastics through Boethius’s commentary.

Why does the Stranger go so carefully through these steps? We can approach an answer to this question, perhaps, if we pay attention to the obvious point that the Stranger has left out. In Greek, the simplest sentence, in our sense, is not exemplified by άνθρωπος μανθάνει or Θεαίτητος κάθηται, as the Stranger and Prior say it is. Because classical Greek is an inflected language, the simplest sentence actually consists of the verb alone with its personal endings, and so not two words but one word. Thus the Stranger clearly is saying something unusual and perhaps counterintuitive and so needs to make good his ground at every step. Why does he pursue this line? Probably because he is concerned with the relation of reference to truth. The verb alone with its personal endings does not identify the subject of the verb; instead, it gives us an embedded name variable. Any of us, for example, can hear someone say
‘he is white’; but if we don’t know to whom the embedded ‘he’ refers, we cannot determine the truth value of the sentence, just as we could not with ‘a man is white’.

Even in this modified version of Prior’s account, however, the Stranger’s words contrast starkly with the actual variety of monadic atomic sentence syntax in the dialogues. While Θεάτητος κάθηται fits the ϕχ notation, many other monadic atomic sentences in the dialogues do not. The best known examples, though not the only ones, are the self-predications. These and the other syntactically irregular sentences can be recognized as such and compared more easily if we employ a clear notation for expressing them rather than leaving them in a natural language. Adapting and extending Prior’s predicate calculus notation makes sense even though predicate calculus as a system excludes these irregular formulae—for example, sentences of the form ‘ϕϕ’ or ‘ψψ’, to follow Prior again—as not well formed. Indeed, Prior himself remarks that “to predicate a predicate-of-individuals of predicates is meaningless;” and, according to him, failure to take account of this fact and to embed it in restrictions on substitution leads inevitably to the paradox which he states as

ψψ = ~ψψ,

the paradox that non-self-predicability is non-self-predicable if and only if non-self-predicability is not non-self-predicable.9

But of course ‘ϕϕ’ or a similar expression must be employed if a self-predication or the Self-Predication Schema is to be represented in a notation comparable with the notation that we use for regular sentences and schemata; and comparability is critical. Granted, the results of extending Prior’s approach to representing irregular forms in addition to ‘ϕϕ’ are likely to be logically odd. It is, after all, precisely in their paradox-producing role (pace Meinwald) that self-predications and other irregular sentences appear in or must be used to reconstruct the arguments of the dialogues.10 For repeatedly in these dialogues, an expression of a certain syntactical character, although it has an accustomed syntactical position to which it is well suited, is moved to an unaccustomed position without losing its original syntactical character and associations. And so my strategy here is to represent the syntax of these forbidden sentences by arranging in illicit ways, and without regard to the usual substitution rules, name and predicate symbols that, by themselves, are perfectly legitimate. The resulting formulae which contain at least one variable are sentence schemata, while those which are composed entirely of constants are sentences. For convenience, we may speak of all of them as sentences. Of the 18 nonredundant combinations, 4 are regular or approximately regular and therefore mostly benign. These include ϕχ, Ox (Prm. 129B5), xx, and E!x, which represent Prior’s regular sentences and three kinds of sentences about individuals which should seem relatively harmless to empiricists, whatever their appeal to traditional Platonists. The remaining 14 exemplify many of the kinds of sentences that would be associated with a Platonic Theory of Ideas. But they are irregular all the same; and because they are irregular, one has every right to expect, if the predicate calculus, which presumably reflects some of our intuitions about the world as we know it, is at all sound, that they will contribute to puzzles if they are used.

I propose, therefore, following Prior’s lead but going somewhat beyond it, to use two subject variables and two predicate variables to represent some of the simplest sentence forms envisaged in the Platonic dialogues. Further, I introduce the familiar existence predicate constant E! and the unity constant O to accommodate especially the language of the Parmenides. The resulting six symbols yield 36 possible sentences or two-place arrays as follows:

**MONADIC ATOMIC SENTENCES IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES**
Of course, of these, 18 are redundant, leaving:

**NONREDUNDANT MONADIC ATOMIC SENTENCES**
**IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES**

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Examples of most of the irregular sentences can be found in the dialogues. At the end, I shall give a summary list in which each of the sentences is marked with ‘S’ and a numeral from 1 to 18, with the numerals based on reading from left to right beginning with the first row.

**Irregular Syntax in Three Dialogues**

Some of the most instructive examples occur in the *Euthydemus* and the *Protagoras*. As each example of irregular syntax is introduced in the discussion that follows, its number in the summary list at the end is given in parentheses for ease of forward reference. ‘S6’, for example, which is illustrated in the text below from the *Euthydemus*, designates ‘yx’ in the summary list.

*Euthd. 300E1-301A6:*

Kάγῳ εἶπον· Τί γελάς, ὦ Κλεινία, ἐπὶ σπουδαῖοις οὕτω πράγμασι καὶ καλοῖς;

Σὺ γὰρ ἢδη τί πῶς τοῦ ἔδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πράγμα;

ἐφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.

'Εγώγε, ἐφη, καὶ πολλὰ γε, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.

'Αρα ἢτερα ὄντα τοῦ καλοῦ, ἐφη, ἢ ταὐτὰ τῷ καλῷ;

Κάγῳ ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὕπὸ ἀπορίας, καὶ ἡγοῦμην
dίκαια πεπονθέναι ὅτι ἐγρήξα, ὁμος δὲ ἢτερα ἐφην αὐτῶν
gε τοῦ καλοῦ· πάρεστιν μέντοι ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι.

'Εάν οὖν, ἐφη, παραγένηται οἱ βοῦς, βοῦς ἐι, καὶ ὅτι

νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος ἐι:

So I remarked: Why are you laughing, Cleinias, at such serious and beautiful things?
What, have you, Socrates, ever yet seen a beautiful thing? asked Dionysodorus.
Yes, I have, I replied, and many of them, Dionysodorus.
Did you find them different from the beautiful, he said,
or the same as the beautiful?
Here I was desperately perplexed, and felt that I had my deserts for the grunt I had made:
however, I replied that they were different from the beautiful itself, though each of them
had some beauty present with it.
So if an ox is present with you, he said, you are an ox, and since I am now present with
you, you are Dionysodorus.¹¹

In this passage, Socrates volunteers, as an analysis of why he can say that things are beautiful, that each
of them has something of beauty, or perhaps some particular beauty,¹² or this beauty, present with it—
πάρεστιν μέντοι έκδοτος αυτῶν κάλλος τι. Here κάλλος τι is what the Stranger would identify as
the πράγμα identified by a name; compare Theaetetus, who is άνθρωπος τις. The πάρεστιν
sentence is presented by Socrates as an alternative analysis of sentences about a beautiful thing
(καλόν πράγμα) or beautiful things—alternative, that is, to the analysis that things are beautiful
because they are the same as or identical to the beautiful, or τα ύ τά τ φ καλώ, which is the analysis that
Dionysodorus has offered (301A1). Being present to something, Socrates suggests, is not the same as
being identical to it; but being present to it does mark it in a characteristic way.

Dionysodorus puts Socrates’ analysis to the test: if πάρεστιν or παραγενη ται (is-present-to)
sentences provide a sound analysis of regular attributive sentences, shouldn’t we be able to say that
the presence of an ox makes something an ox or that the presence of Dionysodorus makes something or
someone Dionysodorus? Here Dionysodorus has spoken not of oxness as present with Socrates but of an
ox so present: he has put individual symbols—‘ox’ and ‘Dionysodorus’—where, thinking of the
Sophistes, we should have expected predicate symbols.

Mrs. Sprague explains that Dionysodorus “has spoken not of oxness as present with Socrates (as
he ought to do if he is to meet the theory of Forms on its own grounds).”¹³ And of course she is quite
correct. From a syntactical standpoint, the paradoxical result is made possible by suggesting that
κάλλος τι is present, since κάλλος τι makes τό καλόν into πράγμα τι. Thus the statement βούς εί
has not the form φε; nor does it have the form xx, since it is not the ox or Dionysodorus or Socrates who
is present to himself. The whole point of the argument, remember, is that Socrates is offering an
alternative to the identity analysis; presence is not the same as identity. The form of the sentence can
only be μχ (S6).

Mrs. Sprague described this passage as a joke, and some readers have relied on her description to
dismiss it as in some way unserious and thus to justify failing to come to grips with it in detail. That was
not her intent, as she has confirmed.¹⁴ The passage calls into question the coherence of the notion of
presence because it requires the interlocutors to say what is present, and they say, naturally enough, that
something is present, assuming that that something is some individual thing. And so they are led astray.
It is a joke with serious consequences.

Prt. 330C1-2.

η δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τι ἐστιν ή οὐδέν πράγμα; ἐμοί μὲν
γὰρ δοκεῖ τί δὲ σοί;

is justice something, or not a thing at all? I think it is; what do you say?
‘Justice is some particular thing’ (ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τι ἐστιν) exemplifies the sentence schema χφ (S7). The surrounding passage presents an argument whose syntactical irregularity, I think, has not been appreciated fully.\(^\text{15}\) The argument runs that if many particular things (actions or persons) can be just (see 329E5-6, πολλοὶ ἐκεῖνοι), which exemplifies φχ, and if justice is a particular thing, which exemplifies χφ, then justice can be just (ϕϕ), as we see Socrates leading Protagoras to admit. And Socrates gets Protagoras to admit also, by way of explanation, that if justice is πράγμα τι, it is then such, or of a kind, as to be just (τοιοῦτον . . . ὁ δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι, 330C7-8) even as, presumably, the other individual πράγματα that are just.

Prt. 331A7-B1.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης
οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πράγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιον ἀλλ᾽
οἷον μὴ ὁσιον ἢ δ᾽ ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδίκον
ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον;

Is not holiness something of such nature as to be just, and justice such as to be holy, or can it be unholy? Can holiness be not just, and therefore unjust, and justice unholy?

The discussion of justice leads into an ostensibly similar discussion of holiness, which, however, has a syntactically different result. Socrates secures the admission that holiness also is πράγμα τι (330D4) and, by degrees, leads Protagoras to admit that holiness is of such a kind as to be holy (τοιοῦτον . . . ὁ δὲ δίκαιον, 330D5-6) and so is (can be?) holy. This admission, of course, exemplifies the self-predication schema (ϕϕ) (S2). The next step is to get Protagoras to admit, since justice is of a sort to be holy, and holiness of a sort to be just, that justice is holy and holiness just. From a syntactical standpoint, ‘justice is holy’ and ‘holiness is just’ in the lines quoted here both exemplify the ϕφ (S1) schema—a sentence which contains two different predicate symbols, both apparently of the same logical order, and which is not a self-predication.

In short, in the arguments from which these three texts are taken, there are four sentences (or sentence schemata) all of which depart from the description of τῶν λόγων ὁ πρώτος τε καὶ σιμπλέκτης in the Sophistes, according to which each one should have occurring in it a noun and a verb, approximately speaking, with, as we should say with reference to Prior’s notation, the noun to the right and the verb to the left.

Since the Parmenides has been thought to be the work of works on the Self-Predication Schema, which plays such an important part in the Third Man Argument, it is useful to see what happens with other irregular sentences and sentence schemata in that dialogue. Two examples are suggested by the introduction to the dialogue.
“And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard Zeno speaking just now?”

Parmenides asks the young Socrates whether there seems to him to be a likeness itself separate from the likeness we have, also the one and many and all such as he had just heard about from Zeno. These are interrogative sentences about Ideas; they ask whether certain Ideas exist. Adopting the $E!\phi$ notation, we can say that these sentences have the form $E!\phi$ (S15). Whatever one thinks of the practice, existence is used as a predicate in the Parmenides.\textsuperscript{16}


Οἶμαι σὲ ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἕν ἕκαστον έἰσθαι ἐν

“I fancy your reason for believing that each idea is one is something like this;”

Next is the sentence ‘each Idea is one’ (132A1). This sentence can be represented as an exemplification of the schema which has a predicate constant to the left and variable ‘$\phi$’ to the right. In what follows, ‘$O$’ will be employed as a unity constant in this schema—‘$O\phi$’ (S11)—and in other schemata and sentences.

These two new kinds of sentence clearly depart from the orthodox regular syntax described in the Sophistes. In doing so, they set the stage for other instances of irregular syntax which occur in the Hypotheses. Here are a few:

*Prm* 137B4.

εἶτε ἕν ἔστιν εἶτε μὴ ἕν

“that the one exists or that it does not exist?”

‘Unity exists’ (ἕν ἔστιν) may be the most important and notorious irregular sentence in the Parmenides, since it is the hypothesis of Parmenides himself as presented in the dialogue and is the lead-off assumption in the First Hypothesis (137C4). It may be represented by $E!O$ (S17). Here, of course, we see the two predicates that dominated the introduction together in the same sentence; but one of them—unity—has moved into the place of the individual symbol.

Some scholars may be concerned with the fact that the text goes back and forth between ‘unity’ with the article and without the article—τὸ ἕν and ἕν. The weight of scholarly opinion does not find a difficulty here, however, since, while abstract substantives such as ἕν often take the article, the use of the article is not entirely uniform even in Attic.\textsuperscript{17} Perhaps it would be more fastidious to follow Jowett and omit the article in translation when it does not occur in the Greek, whether the choice for a translation is ‘one’ or ‘unity’. But many translators do not follow Jowett. In any case, it does not seem to make much difference to the way the hypothesis proceeds.

*Prm.* 137C9-D3 (and 143A6-9).

'Αμφοτέρως ἄν ἄρα

οὔτως τὸ ἕν πολλὰ εἶν ἄλλ' οὔχ ἕν. — 'Ἀληθή. — Δεῖ δὲ γε
“Then in both cases the one would be many, not one.” “True.” “Yet it must be not many, but one.” “Yes.” “Then the one, if it is to be one, will not be a whole and will not have parts.”

‘Unity is one’ is the first item to be proved in the First Hypothesis. Although unity is the subject at the beginning of the Hypothesis (εί έν έστιν), Parmenides uses a pronoun as subject when he says that it is necessary for unity to be one (137D1-2). He then goes on to clarify his point, however, by using ἐν έσται τὸ ἐν (137D3), which more obviously is a sentence of the form \( \text{O}_1 \text{O}_2 \) (S13).

While there is much more to be mined from Hypothesis I, the next three examples of irregular syntax are drawn from the longest of the eight—Hypothesis II.

Prm. 142B7-8.

Ούκουν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς εἴη ἄν οὐ ταύτον οὐσα τῷ ἔνι.

“Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one;”

As the discussion begins anew, Parmenides moves quickly to another important inference from \( E!O \). It is that the existence of the One would exist but would not be the same as the One. This is a tricky passage; but apparently it means that the existence of unity would not be the same as unity. Hence the new form \( E!E! \) (S18)—the sentence that the existence [of the One] exists.

Prm. 142D1-5 et passim, esp. 142E6-7.

εἱ τὸ ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνὸς, ἐστὶ δὲ οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκεῖνου οὐ ὑπεθέμενα, τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος, ἃρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὄλων ἐν ὃν εἴηι αὐτό, τοῦτον δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τὸ τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἴηι;

“If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?”

tὸ τε γὰρ ἐν τὸ δὲ ἄει ἰαχεὶ καὶ τὸ δὲ τὸ ἐν

“for always unity has being and being has unity;”

In a new subargument from Parmenides’ hypothesis, where unity is predicated of existence—εἱ . . . λέγεται . . . τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, which we represent by ‘\( O!E! \)’ (S14), we find something between the more usual formulae and the metalogical language of Aristotle.\(^{18}\) The assertion that follows in 142E6-7, however, while perhaps metalogical, is not hypothetical.
"And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two."

The sentence that unity is related to an Idea, for example shape, has the form $\phi O(S4)$. In fact, unity, since it is $\tau oio\text{utou}$, will participate in a certain shape—$\sigma x\hat{\text{i}}mato\text{s }d\hat{\text{i}}\text{ tivos}$; it will be straight or round, for example. Here several pieces come together. In particular, unity comes to be portrayed clearly as of such a sort as to be able to have first-order predicates predicated of it.

These examples show, I think, that irregular syntax in the dialogues is much more extensive than has been recognized and that it is integral to a range of apparently important arguments, some of which recur. What is the connection to the Theory of Ideas?

**Irregular Syntax and the Theory of Ideas**

For intuitive purposes, consider the following natural-language examples of the 18 nonredundant formulae, reading from left to right beginning with the first row and designating them successively 'S1', 'S2', and so on. The examples are suggested by the *Euthydemus, Protagoras,* and *Parmenides* but are standardized so that ‘holiness’ and ‘holy’ replace $\phi$ in its two positions and ‘justice’ and ‘just’ replace $\psi$ in the same way. As noted above, four of these are unremarkable; they are not marked in any way. Of the 14 irregular sentences remaining, those corresponding to the 11 examples given in the passages preceding are shown in bold face in the following list, and the three remaining possible irregular sentences are shown in italics:

**SUMMARY LIST OF EXAMPLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S1</th>
<th>$\psi \phi$ Holiness is just.</th>
<th>S10</th>
<th>$x E !$ Existence is a particular thing.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>$\phi \phi$ Holiness is holy.</td>
<td>S11</td>
<td>$O \phi$ Holiness is one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>$\phi \chi$ A particular thing is holy.</td>
<td>S12</td>
<td>$O x$ A particular thing is one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>$\phi O$ Unity is holy.</td>
<td>S13</td>
<td>$O O$ Unity is one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5</td>
<td>$\phi E !$ Existence is holy.</td>
<td>S14</td>
<td>$O E !$ Existence is one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>$\chi x$ A particular thing is another particular thing.</td>
<td>S15</td>
<td>$E ! \phi$ Holiness exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>$x \phi$ Holiness is a particular thing.</td>
<td>S16</td>
<td>$E ! \chi$ A particular thing exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S8</td>
<td>$x x$ A particular thing is a particular thing.</td>
<td>S17</td>
<td>$E ! O$ Unity exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9</td>
<td>$x O$ Unity is a particular thing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many Platonists probably would accept most of these sentences as true, and most uncommitted parties would recognize all or most of them as endemic to Platonism. The reason is that they reflect clearly the object-language discussion of Ideas that one actually finds in the dialogues if not the metalinguistic account of the Theory developed by Wedberg. They certainly are enough to suggest a Theory of Ideas.

**Objections and Responses**
It may be objected that if this syntactical approach were plausible it would have been suggested before and that so it must be defective in some way. My response is that there is a good explanation for its having been overlooked. A clear view of these syntactical issues was very difficult to capture, or to recapture, in the period between the decline of appreciation for the technical character of the Greek and the development of skill in using modern notations to elucidate these texts. In Plato studies, the landmark work arguably is that of Dürr, which appeared only in 1945. Although Dürr’s work remains impressive and very instructive, hardly a decade, which is barely a moment in academe, had passed when scholarly attention became riveted on one irregular form—the self-predication—to the virtual exclusion of all others; and the appearance of self-predication in the Third Man Argument became a topic of controversy so intense as to distract many scholars from asking more inclusive questions about syntax in the dialogues. Platonic scholarship that addresses issues which can be regarded as syntactical at all still tends to be preoccupied—too narrowly, I suggest—with self-predication in the Third Man Argument. And so it should not be surprising that broader issues of syntax were overlooked.

A second objection might be that many sentences of these irregular kinds are not asserted to be true in the dialogues and so need not be taken seriously. Whether they are asserted or only entertained is indeed an important question. Truth, however, is different from sense, and the question appropriate to the present account is whether these sentences are regarded by the interlocutors in the dialogues as having sense. The answer is that at least some interlocutors apparently regard them as syntactically admissible sentences; their syntax is not attacked explicitly as making them senseless, even though they are used to produce refutations. They are presupposed implicitly to be well formed.

Thus these objections actually carry little weight, and certainly not enough to obscure the evidence provided above for examples of syntax which are anomalous by commonly accepted standards.

Summary

In this paper I have shown that the orthodox syntax suggested in Sophistes 262C6-7 and the surrounding text is not adhered to in the dialogues. Within the limited universe of monadic atomic sentence syntax extended with constants for existence and unity, in fact, all but three of the 14 possible irregular forms are used in one or other of the three dialogues instanced here. Self-predication, which, in the mid-twentieth-century, fascinated so many scholars, turns out to be just one among the many varieties of irregular syntax in the dialogues.

The nonadherence of other interlocutors to the Eleatic Stranger’s description of monadic atomic sentences enables these interlocutors to talk about Ideas in the dialogues in familiar ways; unless the syntactically irregular sentences were used, the interlocutors would not have been able to talk about Ideas the way they did. The dialogues contain a variety of sentences and sentence schemata that we commonly consider ill formed and that we should expect to produce peculiar results when used in argument. Of course, there are no grounds for attributing syntactical insensitivity to Plato the author who, himself, represents this insensitivity in an orderly and carefully structured way as characterizing the conversation of some of his fictionalized interlocutors.

The appearance of these irregular sentences in the dialogues apparently engaged Aristotle, who devoted much attention to what can and what cannot be predicated of what. Thus in Aristotle one finds a theory of predication which systematically excludes the irregular sentences. The Categoriae addresses what can and cannot be said of what in the normal course of things, and the Topica addresses, for example, unity and existence as predicates. I would suggest in closing that the apparatus I have offered here provides a largely unexplored way to reconstruct the controversies of the Academy and to track the
way they led into the development of what we have begun to understand as Aristotle's theory of predication.

NOTES

1The English translation of the title may be viewed as provisional, since the sense of the Greek original is argued for in the course of the paper. The text of Plato is that of J. Burnet, Plato's opera (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1907). It is a pleasure to acknowledge useful criticisms of earlier treatments of this material by John Anton, Lynn E. Rose, Gerald A. Press, Joanne Waugh, and David Wolfsdorf as well as extensive comments on interim versions by Mary Mulhern.

2A.N. Prior, Formal Logic, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 72-73. My references are to this second edition. In treating this material from the standpoint of syntax rather than semantics or ontology, I am following the traditions of both grammar and logical analysis. As Goodwin and Gulick say: “A sentence expresses a thought in words. Syntax treats of the relation of these words to one another.” Cf. William Watson Goodwin and Charles Burton Gulick, Greek Grammar (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), p. 195, §876. And as Carnap says, writing in the 1930s in a vein that was to influence much subsequent thought on the subject:

the development of logic during the past ten years has shown clearly that it can only be studied with any degree of accuracy when it is based, not on judgments (thoughts, or the content of thoughts) but rather on linguistic expressions, of which sentences are the most important, because only for them is it possible to lay down sharply defined [formation and transformation] rules. And actually, in practice, every logician since Aristotle, in laying down rules, has dealt mainly with sentences.


3In his otherwise often felicitous translation, White offers a questionable approach to rendering λόγος in these lines. White writes: “‘Speech’ throughout this passage translates the word logos (on which see n. 29, supra). Plato uses the word here so that a single word by itself does not count as logos. One might wish to translate the word by ‘sentence’ or ‘statement’. That, however, would be too narrow, because Plato uses logos in a much broader way.” See Nicholas P. White, Plato, “Sophist,” translated, with introduction and notes (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 57, n. 74. Of course, strictly speaking, Plato does not use λόγος in either a broad or a narrow way in the dialogues, whatever his interlocutors do. Each speaker in each dialogue is different from each other speaker and also from the author; the main speaker in this dialogue is the Eleatic Stranger, not Plato.

White’s tacit move from the observation that an interlocutor says something to the assertion that Plato says it—the Plato Says Fallacy—has an unfortunate effect on his interpretation and translation. Once he commits the fallacy, the fact that the expression is used elsewhere in the dialogues by other interlocutors in other ways suggests to him that Plato had a conglomerate understanding of λόγος and that therefore we should make our translations vague enough to try to cover all the uses of λόγος by all the interlocutors who use it anywhere. Quite the contrary; we should translate so as to be faithful to whatever the instant interlocutors, be they ever so aberrant, are up to. The proper form of the breadth question is: Does the speaker in this dialogue, then, use λόγος in a much broader way? The answer is No; he uses it in a different way, not a broader one. In some cases, of course, ‘speech’ is an appropriate translation. “Just for example,” White writes later in n. 74, “in 268b Plato speaks of ‘long logos’ and ‘short logos’ but clearly is not talking about long and short sentences.” But of course Plato is not talking about long and short sentences, because Plato is not talking at all. The Stranger is talking; and, just as one would expect, the context shows that the Stranger’s two uses are completely different. In the former case the Stranger is talking about sentence syntax; in the latter he is talking about two kinds of more extended speech—oration and conversation. Λόγος is an homonym, and perhaps a deceptive one. The two places call for two translations—‘sentence’ and ‘speech’.

4The issue of nouns and verbs or subjects and predicates—two distinct ways of approaching the text—is a bit vexed, especially with respect to verbs. What are to count as verbs in the present case? Jason Xenakis took the somewhat broadening view that “rHEMA sometimes means predicate.” See “Plato on Statement and Truth Value,” Mind 66
(1957), p. 168. William Bondeson observed that “μη μεγα (257B7) [not big] and τι (237D2) [the indefinite pronoun ‘a particular thing’, actually at D1; see also n. 14 below] are stated to be ‘ρηματα as well as what would ordinarily be called verbs such as ‘walks’, ‘runs’, etc.” See “Plato’s Sophist and the Significance and Truth-Value of Statements,” Apeiron viii, 2 (1974), p. 43. And elsewhere, Bondeson suggested more directly that ‘predicates’ would be a better translation than ‘verbs.’ See ‘Plato and the Foundations of Logic and Language,’” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975), p. 37. Then as now, while we speak of writing with nouns and verbs when we are talking about style, in place of ‘verb’ we often use ‘predicate’ or an equivalent when we are talking about the same basic sentences, and we want predicates to include different parts of speech.


6 Burnet, p. 287, n. 1. Burnet was not unaware of the alternative. As he added on p. 289, n. 1, “Most commentators understand by ‘quality’ the truth or falsehood of the statement, but that would make the argument puerile.” Among recent writers, Antonia Soulez (La grammaire philosophique chez Platon (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991) exemplifies the view that the quality must be the having of a truth value, apparently because she regards this section as the semantic part of the Sophistes (“la partie sémantique du Sophiste,” p. 285; “détour sémantique,” p. 165).

7 It was presumably because Aristotle saw the expression ἀνθρωπος as a kind of variable that he used quantifiers to bind it. Ackrill laments: “It is a pity that Aristotle introduces indefinite statements at all. The peculiarity of the indefinite statement is that it lacks an explicit quantifier . . . .” Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, translated with notes by J.L. Ackrill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 129. But of course it’s not surprising that Aristotle should have proceeded as he did if indefinite expressions had been an issue in the Academy. Dürr, in a wartime paper that Prior may not have seen, took a different but interesting view of this passage which shows clearly the influence of Lord Russell. Dürr noted that ἀνθρωπος μανθανεi differed logically from Θεαττος καθηταi since, on his view, the shortest sentence or kürzester Satz needed a proper name or Eigenname to fit into the scheme of Russell’s atomic sentences. ἀνθρωπος μανθανεi did not count as a kürzester Satz because it had only a universal concept or allgemeine Begriff and so belonged in Russell’s treatment of general propositions. In its focus on formulae which appeared to be well formed from the standpoint of modern logical syntax in authors such as Russell and Whitehead, Dürr’s treatment excluded irregular formulae. See K. Dürr, “Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik: Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des Dialoges Sophistes,” Museum Helveticum 2 (1945), pp. 166-194, especially p. 192.

8 See, for example, Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Commentarii in librum Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ, C. Meiser, ed., second edition (Leipzig: Teubner, 1880), chapter 7 (pp. 135-178), where we see homoeand a range of proper names. William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 197, fill in some of the background.

9 Prior, pp. 290-291.


"This and other extended translations are from the versions in the Loeb Classical Library.

12 Following James Riddell, A Digest of Platonic Idioms (Oxford, 1867; reprinted Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, Publisher, 1967), § 50. Many English scholars seem to agree with Riddell, whose Digest was an appendix to his commentary on the Apology in their translations of Plato. Beyond the issue of the indefinite, there remains the little noticed fact that both Dionysodorus and Socrates appear to offer dyadic relational analyses of the monadic analysandum—
that is, that both \( y \) is identical to \( x \) and \( y \) is present to \( x \) are relational. The interaction of monadic sentences with other kinds of sentences in the dialogues is the topic for another study.


"See "The 'Euthydemus' Revisited," presented to the International Plato Society, Trinity College, Toronto, August 19, 1998, p. 27, where Mrs. Sprague writes: "I feel privileged to join with a group of younger scholars who not only take the dialogue seriously, but also, in a hierarchical manner, take its seriousness seriously."

15 Although, again, Mrs. Sprague's observation was right on the point: "I feel myself that Socrates, when he asks Protagoras at 330C, 'Is justice a thing or not', is deliberately misleading the sophist, and that he asks the question in order to persuade Protagoras: to place justice in the same class as particular just acts[italics mine]. When Protagoras does this, it then appears reasonable, as it perhaps would not otherwise have done, to inquire whether this thing, justice, is itself just or unjust." See *Plato's Use of Fallacy* p. 28, n. 15.

Of course there have been other attempts to tease out the argument out but many of them focus on ontology and few show an interest in syntax. As Gregory Vlastos noted in his introduction to the Jowett-Ostwald translation: "All through the modern literature one will find the assumption that there is a deep ontological import in his talk of justice, etc., as a 'thing' (peira, 330cd. 349b; chremata 361b) or 'reality' (ousia 349b). But if that is the case, why isn't the issue joined at that point?" See Plato, "Protagoras" (Indianapolis and New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), p. lii. n. 10. Indeed, one might ask, why not? My subject here, of course, is not ontology at all but the syntax of sentences that a person with a certain ontological outlook might use, however unwittingly.

David Gallop, following up on Vlastos in "Justice and Holiness in *Protagoras* 330-331," *Phronesis* 6 (1961), focused on the relations to one another of \( \text{o} \), \( \text{τοιοῦτον} \), and \( \text{όμοιος} \). In his view, though, translating these words posed "a major difficulty in interpreting the whole passage." (P. 86, n. 3.) Indeed, Gallop translated \( \text{o} \) by "of the same class" and shortly found that he was involved in discussing the metaphysics of homogeneity, or likeness of class. As he said in the same place: "In order to preserve their 'sortal' connotation [the connotation of these three adjectives], I have tried, in spite of the awkwardness, to render Socrates' argument in terms of homogeneity rather than similarity." In fact, though, there is no need to introduce the language of classes at this point. Indeed, there is nothing especially difficult about \( \text{τοιοῦτον} \) and \( \text{o} \) (talis and quals), which are just the demonstrative and the relative pronoun adjectives answering to the interrogative \( \text{τίο} \) (qualis) and the indefinite enclitic \( \pi \). "\( \text{όμοιος} \) raises a separate issue, since it arguably has no more relation to the others than do any other nonpronominal adjectives. Once into this line of reasoning, however, Gallop argued that "Socrates is less interested at 330C in 'Justice is just' than this [reconstructed argument for] the identity of justice and holiness would suggest. He uses it only as a stepping stone to 'Justice is of such a class as to be just.'" (P. 88, n. 3.) By this point, Gallop had lost interest in self-predication, considering it tineessential. (p. 91); and he certainly was not interested in other instances of irregular syntax.

Following Gallop in some particulars, Roslyn Weiss, in "Socrates and Protagoras on Justice and Holiness," *Phoenix* 39 (1985), paid little attention to syntax in her reconstruction of the argument, and so she did not recognize that the use of \( \text{τοιοῦτον} \)... \( \text{ο} \) is offered as an explanation of why, say, justice can be just and so is not merely another way of saying that justice is just. In fact, contrary to Gallop, she asserted expressly that "there seem to be two acceptable ways of saying 'Justice is just'" (1) \( \text{η} \) \( \text{δικαιοσύνη} \)... \( \text{δικαίου} \) \( \text{έστιν} \) (330c4-5), and (2) \( \text{έστιν} \)... \( \text{τοιοῦτον} \) \( \text{η} \) \( \text{δικαιοσύνη} \) \( \text{ο} \) \( \text{δικαίου} \) \( \text{έστιν} \) (330c7-8).1 (P. 337, n. 9.) Thus she collapsed into one the two different steps and their corresponding syntactical forms that, in our separate ways, Gallop and others including myself recognize as different parts of the argument. She then went on to assert that, in these highly technical dialectical discussions, \( \text{ο} \) is used as equivalent to 'is' and 'means resembles'." (Nn. 9 and 10.) Her assertions, however, lack any visible support. What the argument shows is that once justice, say, is identified as \( \text{πράγμα τι} \), it can be treated as of such a kind that things like being just or being holy can be said of it; sentences such as 'justice is holy' are made to seem syntactically plausible.

Jerome Wakefield, in "Why Justice and Holiness are Similar," *Protagoras* 330-331, 3 (1987), provided still another extended account of the argument but, when he came to the self-predications and the \( \psi φ \) sentences,
he noted expressly that they were established "in ways not to be considered here." (Pp. 273-274.) Thus the syntactical issues fell through the cracks yet once more. Again, writing in more or less the same tradition as Vlastos, Michael Frede recognized self-predication in this passage but completely overlooked the other instances of irregular syntax. See his introduction to Plato, "Protagoras"; translated, with notes, by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), pp. xxiv-xxv. See also my n. 4 above.

16 This passage occurs in a discussion of the three great challenges to the Theory of Ideas: (1) determining what items the Theory covers—the population of the World of Ideas; (2) meeting certain paradoxes connected with the doctrine of participation (or another suitable relation); and (3) showing that Ideas, if there were such, would fall within the purview of human knowledge. See J.J. Mulhem, "Plato, Parmenides 130D3-4," Apeiron 5, 1 (1971), pp. 17-22. R.E. Allen has pointed out in connection with existence as a predicate in the Parmenides that "there is a sense of existing or reality that applies to individuals; and it is prior to the quantificational sense" in Plato's Parmenides: Translation and Analysis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 278.

17 Goodwin and Gulick, p. 206, §942.


19 Anders Wedberg, Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1955). What Wedberg calls theses of the Theory of Ideas are not object-language sentences that belong to the Theory, although three of the sentences in our list have clear relations to Wedberg's theses:

S2. \( \phi \phi \) Holiness is holy to Wedberg's (6) The Idea of Y-ness is (a) Y (p. 36).
S11. \( \phi \phi \) Holiness is one to Wedberg's (10) Ideas are not compounded of parts (p. 41).
S15. \( \phi \psi \) Holiness exists to Wedberg's (3a) There is exactly one Idea such as that it is by participation therein that a thing is Y (p. 30).