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The 33rd annual joint meeting of

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with

The Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science (SSIPS)

Abstracts Collection

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The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP)
The Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science (SSIPS)
Original Islamic Theology— analogous to its Judaic and Christian traditions—embeds a number of directives in economics suited for the medieval period. However, through the concept of *ijtihad* Islam also allows adaption of its praxis to actual contemporary arena. To that end, a number of predominately Muslim nations, opt for a secular type state— and not an Islamic Republic based on the so-called fundamentalists principle. The participants in this symposium discuss both the philosophical foundation of Islamic Theology—especially in context of Suras revealed prior to 1622 (*Hijra*) and adaptability of Islamic economic to contemporary 21st Century global village.

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6B “Why is Impiety Such a Danger to the Political Community? Religion as an Institution in the *Laws*”

The *Laws* is Plato’s latest, longest and, arguably, the most convoluted dialogue. Chiefly a work on, in modern terms, “political philosophy,” the text presents accounts of certain other topics of philosophical interest in connection to the nature and features of an ideal political community. Among these, the relationship between the human and the divine realms is of major importance. Accordingly, the full significance of the account of the divine presented in the *Laws* manifests itself only when it is appreciated that the proof of the existence, goodness and justice of gods presented, most extensively, in the Book X functions as a contributory preamble for the actual penal code. Hence, despite the proof of the priority of the soul over matter and its connection to the existence of god/s are significant on their own right as well, within the general framework of the project of the *Laws*, these accounts occupy a substantially functional place. This function, I suggest, is best understood in terms of its role in constituting a rationale for the penal system of the state, a type of, I suggest, ethically informed cosmological argument for the existence of political order.

In order to articulate this functional role, in this paper, I will first offer an exposition of the relations between souls, gods and motion in the cosmos. In the second section, I will elucidate the forms of impiety that are identified by Plato through the mouth of the Athenian. Finally, in the last section, I will attempt to articulate why impiety is considered such a danger to the political community. I will argue that the articulation of the theological element in the *Laws* makes sense insofar as religion is construed as an institution that serves the wellbeing and maintenance of the state. I will suggest the significance of this institutional role is best understood in terms of a rhetorical strategy that is adopted in the *Laws* that posits the realm of the divine as almost synonymous with that of the political. Much more importantly, as it is expressed by the Athenian, “serving the laws” is the way to “serve the gods” *per se* (7672.) Pious action is regarded as the basis for respect for the law and communal life, which is both the ground for the maintenance of social and political order and a part of the order in the cosmos. Hence, along the same lines, crimes against the state are treated as if they are equivalent to crimes against the gods (impiety) and observing the laws is taking to be on a par with observing the commands of gods. I suggest that religion is operating in such a way by offering support for the communal life in the society at an ethical level, by operating as the protector of the most important aspect of the political society that is described in the *Laws*, communal life.
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3B ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***
“The Role and Effect of Paideia as Culture in Classical Greece: The Case of Classical Art as Part of Paideia”

In the *Laws* (657e-659b), the Athenian suggests that the standard of artistic (poetic) value is not the degree of pleasure it gives to casual spectators, but the joy it inspires in the best spectators, namely, those who are trained (educated) - ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένοι - or the one who is supreme in both, perfection *(χορηγημένο)* and culture – παιδεία.

This paper discusses the notion of *paideia* /culture as used in the Platonic Classical Athenian educational system and the ideas involved. Did those ideas influence the various forms of Classical art?

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2B “The Unification of the personal with the Universal in the Ethics of Zoroastrian Theology”

A number of ethical theories fail to bridge the gap between a personal intentional ethics and a universal extensional ethics. This research documents and evaluates the specific features of Zoroastrian ethics – a genesis of Nietzsche’s ethics of will to power which harmonizes the will of the individual with a cosmic good will. Our major focus is the nature of evil “Ahriman” – not as a substantial entity – like the devil of monotheistic creeds – but as a privation of will to power.

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3C “Three Medieval Accounts of the Subject Matter of Logic”

This paper examines three different Medieval approaches to the subject matter of logic along with the interrelations between them. The first approach associates the subject matter of logic with acts of understanding; the second identifies the subject matter of logic with the syllogism; the third, with the argument. Versions of the first approach are championed by Thomas Aquinas, who takes the subject matter of logic to be beings of reason, and Avicenna, who identifies the subject matter of logic with second intentions. The second answer is endorsed by Duns Scotus as well as Walter Burley. An early version of the third thesis is posited by Albertus Magnus, who finds support for it in Alfarabi and Algazel, and later defended by John Buridan.

Generally speaking, the first answer was dominant among commentators in the period from the beginning of the systematic study of Aristotle’s logical works to the final quarter of the thirteenth century. The second period was dominant from the last quarter of the thirteenth to the beginning of the fourteenth century. The third answer was the most common among authors from the middle to later fourteenth century.

This paper begins by explicating the reasons given by different authors for taking the subject matter of logic to be what they take it to be. Second, it identifies the underlying logic whereby these larger shifts from the dominance of one answer to another occurred. In the first part of the paper, I present records gathered from over fifty thirteenth and fourteenth century manuscripts determining the standard order of reading of Aristotle’s logical works in and around Paris, along with the different changes that one finds over time. Next, I present the arguments given by Aquinas, Scotus,
Burley and others for their respective positions on the subject matter of logic. In the second part of the paper, I show that the shifts from one answer to another can be accounted for by larger shifts regarding the notion of a subject matter itself. In the earliest phrase, ‘subject’ is taken to refer to that which is directly addressed in all of the different branches of logic. In the middle period, however, the subject matter of a science is taken to be that which it is principally concerned with. Lastly, the final period seems to (perhaps intentionally) conflate these two approaches to the meaning of a subject matter: for instance, on the one hand, Buridan takes argumentation to be that which all the books of standard logical study are ordered toward; on the other, part of his rationale for rejecting the account of Scotus is to broaden this principal subject matter of logic to include non-syllogistic arguments; he also speaks of this same subject matter as being studied in the study of the integral parts (e.g. statements) that make up the subject matter of the other books in the logical curriculum (e.g. the De Interpretatione).

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1F “Would an Epicurean Marry?”

In De Rerum Natura, Lucretius argues that love is straightforwardly negative: lovers inflate their beloved’s physical and intellectual qualities, rendering the former blind to their partner’s true character, and lovers become jealous and vengeful. From the Epicurean perspective, love is a desire that is easily frustrated, but love’s unhappy effects are treatable with Epicurean therapy. If the therapy is effective—that is, if the lover becomes an Epicurean—the lover will lose her false beliefs about her beloved’s qualities and accept that love is incompatible with ataraxia. So, if the Epicurean will see her partner’s flaws for what they are and avoid love, why would she get married? In this paper, I argue that Epicureans could justify marriage on Epicurean grounds in at least two ways: first, an Epicurean might marry to ensure her own safety, the desire for which is arguably natural and necessary, according to Epicureans. Second, an Epicurean might marry in order to limit her anxiety about securing a sexual partner, if in fact she has such an anxiety and if she believes her partner will satisfy her sexually. In support of my argument, I contend that Epicureans believe sex is a natural and unnecessary desire, and sex is therefore acceptable under certain conditions, whereas love is groundless. Thus, although an Epicurean would not marry for love, since love is an empty desire based on false beliefs, an Epicurean might marry for sex or security, which would be consistent with Epicurean ethics. I argue further that my rendering of the Epicurean justification for marriage is superior to that of Martha Nussbaum, who claims that Lucretius believes marriage is the goal of Epicurean therapy insofar as the latter helps a lover see her beloved as a legitimate subject rather than as an object of infatuation. I contend that Lucretius’ philosophy of love is not as progressive as Nussbaum would like, and that her interpretation of the Epicurean lover’s new, enlightened perspective on the beloved as a legitimate other fails to explain on Epicurean grounds why the lover would marry.

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5G “Self-rule and Plato’s Philosopher King (Republic, 471d-480a)”

Plato’s strange call for a philosopher king in R 471d-480a has received a great deal of attention, particularly in terms of its political dimension. Important though it is to rule well the city, I will concentrate on the philosopher king writ small, or the psychological dimension of the claim. Thus, I will consider the philosopher king’s rule in the soul and the extent to which knowledge of the good,
the one, and being exert influence in becoming a just person. In the process, I will examine Plato’s arguments and the dramatic underpinning that irremediably unites the political and the psychological aspects of ruling in Plato’s Republic.

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1H “A Cosmological Assessment of Parmenidean Monisms”

Fragment B8.1-6 of Parmenides’s poem has traditionally been cited as evidence for monism. There, Parmenides claims that what-is is ungenerated, imperishable, a whole of a single kind, unshaken, complete, all together one, and holding together.

Scholars who attribute monism to Parmenides have attributed to him some variation of two main types of monism: numerical or ‘strict’ monism, according to which only one thing exists, or predicational monism, according to which each thing that is can only hold one predicate in a particularly strong way, and this predicate must indicate what that thing is. Predicational monism draws upon the argument that the poem of Parmenides is consistent with there being a plurality of Parmenidean entities. There are, then, three possible interpretations of Parmenides’s ontology: (1) Parmenides is a numerical or ‘strict’ monist (Guthrie 1965, Wedin 2014), (2) Parmenides is the kind of monist who will allow for a plurality of Parmenidean entities (Curd 1998, Nehamas 2002, Mourelatos 2008), or (3) Parmenides is not a monist at all (Barnes 1979).

Each reading of Parmenides draws strongly on extensive interpretation of Fragments B2, B4, and B6 of the poem, including the subject and number of the verb ‘esti’ that appears in B2.3-4, the modal ‘extensions’ of the two routes at B2.3-5 (that what-is is and that it is not possible for it not to be, and that it is right that what is not is not), and how many routes Parmenides’s goddess actually advocates as genuine routes for inquiry, among speculations about a number of other interpretive puzzles.

In this paper, the interpretive puzzle against which I assess these readings of Parmenidean monism is the cosmological portion of the poem from B9 to B19, which has been either ignored by interpreters, or recognized as problematic for a majority of interpretive approaches. The puzzle, roughly, is this: given the “signs” of what-is—this Parmenidean “one”—that are specified in B8, why does much of the poem consist of an elaborate and innovative cosmology that is formed by entities that do not fulfill the requirements set in B8?

My aims in this paper are twofold. My exegetical aim is to explore whether the cosmology is consistent with the kinds of Parmenidean monism outlined above, or if it de-commits Parmenides from monism. My methodological aim is to suggest that any reading of Parmenides must take at least three things into account that are external to Fragments B2, B4, B6, and B8: the cosmology (which will affirm or deny internal consistency to an interpretation), the history and development of Presocratic philosophy before and after Parmenides (which will influence how we view the narrative of ancient philosophy as a whole), and historical attributions of certain views to Parmenides that appear in ancient doxographies (including the type of monism that is attributed to him by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Plutarch).

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5B “Praising the Unjust: The Moral Psychology of Patriotism in Plato’s Protagoras”

In this paper, I consider the ramifications of an overlooked passage in the lengthy and bizarre interpretive interlude of Plato's Protagoras. Socrates makes a comic show of bending a Simonides
poem to his own will, but his emendations of the text also shed non-comedic light on his own philosophical commitments. In particular, Socrates charitably attributes to Simonides the claim that a person must force herself to praise those who harm her (345d-346c). I argue that this moral imperative to overcome one’s desire for retaliation in order to praise one’s family or country informs standing debates about Socrates’ submission to military authority, his patriotism, and his views about the relationship between virtue and self-control.

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1E “Avicenna on the Objects of Science”

Here is the puzzle:

- Avicenna normally requires existential import for universal affirmative statements. Thus, ‘every goat is an animal’ has as its truth conditions that goats exist and that animal is predicated of every such goat.
- Yet at the same time Avicenna says that the universal propositions of science may have subjects that do not exist in re. Nor do they exist merely in intellectu, as mental fictions, phantasms, or second intentions.
- To what then do the subjects of universal propositions in science refer?

The same problem arises today. A scientific theory talks of things that do not, cannot, or need not exist in re. In the semantic ascent of theory construction, many things are talked about, like frictionless surfaces or point masses or a $10^{27}$ dimensional configuration space that are said to have no real instances. How to connect up the talk of these things with individuals in re, in a “semantic descent”?

Here I offer a reconstruction of Avicenna’s position. Avicenna admits that there are quiddities for items like heptagonal houses, which have no real instances. This doctrine goes along with his view that there “are” possible beings that do not exist. From this perspective Avicenna allows for individuals in science that do not exist in re while still giving necessary features for individuals that do, via the interplay of the intellect and the imagination.

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1A Indian Philosophy Round Table: Rethinking Epic(s)

This roundtable brings together experts working on multiple epic traditions (Homeric, Indian, and English) that can be broadly described as “epic” with the goal of asking: what makes a tradition “epic”? What does it mean to study “epics”? And what should the goal of “epic studies” be within the context of wider literary and humanistic concerns and disciplines?

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5D “Gods Do Not Bluff, Though Humans May Err: A Response to Simon Brodbeck's 'Calling Kṛṣṇa's Bluff' ”

In his article “Calling Kṛṣṇa's Bluff: Non-Attached Action in the Bhagavadgītā” (2004), Simon Brodbeck argues that Kṛṣṇa’s argument for action in the Bhagavadgītā, namely, to act without attachment to the results of action, offers an insufficient criterion for
action. Brodbeck accuses Krṣṇa of sophism in accepting the consequences of every action, regardless of how horrific it may be. According to him, the aim of Krṣṇa’s argument is to cast the entire sphere of action as “sacred action” (96). This not only permits him to evade a condemnation of the specific action enjoined by him (killing the Kaurava relatives in war) but also entails a radical determinism. On this view, every action of the Krṣṇa-bhakta “contribute[s] to lokasamgraha, since every action is a vital part of what the loka, on this particular day of brahman, happens to be” (96). Brodbeck’s arguments about determinism and the Bhagavadgītā’s apparent indifference to the consequences of action recall the criticisms of other, weightier critics like Slavoj Žižek (1991 and 2003), but is mistaken nonetheless. The Bhagavadgītā is not interested in declaring all action to be sacred action; rather, it seeks to make a distinction between God or the Oversoul, who is the passive witness of all actions (see 5.14–15, 8.3–4, 9.8–9, 9.18, 13.22, 13.29, 13.31), and the active creation (see 3.27–28, 13.20–21). The yogi concentrates his efforts on identifying with that part of his being that is, in reality, inactive; in so doing, he transcends the manifest creation and comes to rest or to abide in God (see 6.20–21, 8.8, 8.12–13, 14.19, 14.23). In this paper, I will address the source of Brodbeck’s thesis and show that it rests on a confusion between the agent and action—a distinction fundamental for all schools of Indian thought except the materialists.

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1D “The Phaedo on Harmony and the Embodied Soul”

In this paper, I offer a reading of the Phaedo - focusing on Simmias' argument that soul is a harmony - which shows that Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul are intentionally inconclusive. I argue that a careful reading of the dialogue shows that Plato at least wants the reader to seriously consider that the soul cannot exist without the body. Socrates shows that Simmias fails to make a distinction between the body as a living entity bearing an animating ψυχή and the lifeless corpse. This is a distinction that Plato will insist we consider at 115d, where Socrates chides Crito for his lack of attention to this distinction; Simmias and Crito seem to make the mistake of treating the physical corpse as still “Socrates’ body,” not recognizing that some sort of ontological change takes place at death, at the departure of the ψυχή. They seem to believe – since the body will last longer than the soul – that the body remains what it was in life, minus the presence of the soul. Socrates insists we consider the fact that when the soul “leaves” the body, it does not leave the body intact; it is not Socrates’ body minus the ghostly presence of another thing. It is not as if we have removed the spirits from a bottle and have left the bottle itself unchanged. Full or empty, the bottle is what it is, and will change and suffer the same fate regardless of the presence of the spirits inside it. The body is not like this; as soon as the soul is “removed,” the body changes, and begins immediately to decay. This clearly implies that soul and body are not two simply distinct entities cohabitating in the same space, each with an individual nature to be defined in separation from the other. The soul and body, then, are ontologically intertwined. The body is not a corpse plus a soul, but is rather an ensouled body. Thus, the converse must be considered as well. Plato clearly wants us to consider the possibility that the soul is not “entombed” in a simply distinct body, but is rather an embodied soul. To understand the soul is not to understand something simply distinct from the active and living body of an animal, but rather to attend to the animate principle of a physical body. To understand the soul is not to attend to something otherworldly – as the “true-born philosophers” contend; rather, to understand the soul is always to attend to the active principle of a living thing.
This paper begins with definitions: five characteristics of tragedy from Kaufmann’s book, *Philosophy and Tragedy*, and eleven characteristics of tragedy from Aristotle’s *Poetics*. Second, it gives examples of Greek tragedies and how the plays fit the definitions. Third, it describes some of Plato’s dialogues as modifications of the tradition of tragedy. Plato shows the tragedy of the fall of Athens: how the Athenians abused their freedom and eventually lost their democracy. One aspect of this abuse were the ways the Athenians misread Homer and tragedy so they could quote from the culture’s sacred texts to justify their irrational ways of living. Plato also shows the way the tradition of comedy was vulgarized. Instead of being used as a way to educate people, so they would develop the power of soul Aristotle describes as “rational humor,” comedy became reduced to vulgar entertainment that encouraged a dissipated way of life. This degeneration was justified in the name of “free speech” in a “free” society. Socrates’ interlocutors are clearly living in the type of democracy described in Book VIII of the *Republic*: citizens regard all pleasures as equally legitimate. They think the hallmark of a free society is to allow everyone to take pleasure in whatever they want to. The citizens do not notice that such a society will eventually degenerate into chaos. The desperate need for order will make the city ripe for an opportunist tyrannical soul to take over. Finally, this perspective will be applied to the Charlie Hebdo incident. Some recent editorials about the incident will also be quoted, showing that the problem of the degeneration of culture in Athens is still a problem in “free,” democratic societies today. Plato’s “answer” is not to preach. Rather Plato created written dialogues that describe dialogues among citizens in a democratic society. These dialogues are intended to inspire people who live in societies with free speech to engage in their own dialogues about all the serious questions of life. The particular question this paper addresses is the problem of the degeneration of the arts, including tragedy and comedy, the effects of such degeneration, and how to prevent it.

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4D “Parrhēsia in Plato’s *Gorgias*”

Scholarly disagreement over the seriousness or irony of Socrates’ claim that Callicles possesses *parrhēsia* reflects an important tension within the *Gorgias* itself. Plato not only portrays Callicles as a believably *parrhēsiastic* figure whose brashness is easily mistaken for frankness, he depicts the two men vigorously contending for the claim to speak truthfully and frankly; this is to say that Callicles really does seem to understand himself to be speaking openly. Moreover, the conceptions of *parrhēsia* that Socrates and Callicles possess share certain important features. Most notably, both men understand *parrhēsia* to require that one says what one truly believes, and they are both deeply suspicious of the possibility that one is truly saying what one believes when one speaks either to or from the perspective of the many (*hoi polloi*) or the *demos*. Victory in this debate, therefore, will depend largely on the determination of who speaks from a perspective that does not merely give voice to the opinions, desires, and values of the *demos*. This paper argues that Callicles fails to speak *parrhēsiastically* because, despite his best efforts, he is unable to express any views that are not derived from the *demos*, thus his inability to speak frankly and to say what he truly believes results from the fact that he is unable to speak as himself.
This paper examines Gregory of Nyssa’s teaching on hierarchy of beings and the impact of the Tree of Porphyry on the hierarchy in Gregory. However in contrast to previous studies which have only pointed to the similarity between Gregory and Porphyry’s systems, it is shown that there are some significant differences between the hierarchies in the two. It is suggested that Gregory must have changed the order of hierarchical levels compared to that of Porphyry in order to align the logical and philosophical structure of the division of beings common for his time with the logic of the order of creation, described in the Bible. Then the paper analyzes how Dionysius the Areopagite, basing himself on the philosophy of Proclus, developed the doctrine of hierarchy of the highest participated principles established in accordance with the Neo-platonic tetrad Goodness, Being, Life, Mind. Dionysius’s doctrine of the hierarchy of beings, participating in the links of the tetrad, is analyzed. The Dionysius’s hierarchy of participating beings is compared with Proclus’s hierarchy as well as with the hierarchy of beings by Gregory of Nyssa. It is concluded that Gregory’s hierarchy influenced Dionysius’s hierarchy of participating beings, since Gregory’s doctrine of hierarchy is based on the biblical-cosmogonical order of natural being. Then, the paper examines the dependence of Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on Dionysius’s treatment of the Neo-platonic tetrad and on Dionysius’s doctrine of the hierarchy of beings participating in the tetrad (which was modified by Dionysius on the basis of Gregory’s hierarchy). In this regard, the paper analyzes Maximus’s view of the hierarchy of natural abilities possessed by the created beings. John of Damascus’s doctrine of the hierarchy of participating beings is viewed, and its dependence on Dionysius the Areopagite is pointed out along with some difference in the nature and the levels of hierarchy in comparison with the hierarchies of Dionysius and Maximus. The reasons for the difference are discussed.

William Ockham and Walter Chatton were frequent philosophical sparring partners during the fourteenth century. However, while engaged with one another in a dispute about (at least one version of) Ockham’s fictum theory, both of them appear to affirm the following metaphysical principle about separability:

When some thing really distinct from other things can in the course of nature exist without any one of them taken separately, and it does not depend essentially on any of them, then it can exist without all of them taken all together.

Commentators on this passage, such as Paul Spade and Marilyn Adams, have suggested that the principle seems obviously fallacious. The criticism seems to be that Chatton and Ockham have committed some sort of quantifier shift fallacy. More specifically, it seems like they are endorsing the possibility that (b) can follow from (a):

(a) It is not the case that there is an x such that u requires it;
(b) It is not the case that u requires that there is an x.
If this reconstruction is correct and complete, then the principle seems to permit unlicensed inferences.

In my paper, I argue that both Chatton and Ockham are committed to this principle – so we cannot extricate them from the problem by suggesting that they were using it merely arguendo. More importantly, I claim that the principle does not commit either of them to a fallacy. In order to understand why, I examine a seemingly central feature of the principle that is often overlooked by commentators discussing the passages: the role of essential dependence. I examine Chatton’s and Ockham’s distinct accounts of essential dependence, as well as important connections to traditional Aristotelian notions of dependence and priority. This will enable us to understand the relationship between their accounts of dependence and views of divine power (and logical possibility). These considerations, in turn, impact the ways in which each philosopher employs the separability principle.

I then examine one of Ockham’s critiques of ontological commitment to universals (i.e., realism about universals). In his critique, Ockham describes a particular form of realism that most commentators attribute to Walter Burley, and then criticizes it by invoking the separability principle mentioned above. Using my discussion of essential dependence alongside textual evidence, I argue that the form of realism Ockham describes does not appear to be Burley’s position, and that Ockham’s critique - especially his invocation of the separability principle and essential dependence - suggests that he has in mind a position like Chatton’s, rather than Burley’s.

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4C “Aristotle on Kalokagathia and Happiness”

In the last chapter of book VIII of the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle presents his account of kalokagathia (the term has been translated as “nobility” or “complete virtue”, I will argue in favor of a more literal translation, namely “being beautiful-and-good”). In my paper, I will claim that the account of kalokagathia in the EE supports what I call the Superlative Thesis that Aristotle explains at the beginning of the treatise, namely that happiness is the most desirable thing since it is the best, most beautiful and most pleasant thing of all.

In my interpretation, in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle aims at demonstrating the Superlative Thesis and the notion of kalokagathia is a fundamental step in the demonstration. As happiness is what combines the properties of the good, the beautiful and the pleasant in the superlative, similarly kalokagathia is the virtue that combines the qualities of being beautiful and good.1 Aristotle develops a pioneering view of kalokagathia as a philosophical concept that expresses human excellence: the kalokagathos is defined as the person who pursues the agathon and the kalon for their own sake. I will stress the fact that in Aristotle kalokagathia acquires a different connotation from the one it had before. From a term that used to indicate a class distinction, where members of the aristocracy deserve this laudatory designation, it becomes a term related to the ethical domain and it describes a particular ethical behavior.2

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1 Here, the term kalos, beautiful, has lost its reference to physical appearance.
2 Bourriot (F. Bourriot, Kalos Kagathos-kalokagathia, Zürich-New York, Olms, 1995) and Wankel (H. Wankel, Kalos kai Agathos, Julius-Maximilians-Universität zur Würzburg, 1961) argue in favor of two different theories on the origin and meaning of kalokagathia before Aristotle.
The *Eudemian Ethics* starts and ends with a discussion of three properties, the good, the beautiful and the pleasant: at the beginning of the treatise these properties are predicated in relation to happiness and at the end in relation to the most virtuous person as the person who experience them at the superlative. Both these discussions do not have a parallel in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and thus, they are a peculiarity of the *EE*. The discussion of the *kaloskagathos* is the ultimate demonstration that happiness is the best, most beautiful and most pleasant thing and it requires intellectual activity and virtues. I will show that for Aristotle the most perfect happiness, which has these properties in the superlative, is the happiness of the *kaloskagathos*. The ingredients of the happiness of the *kaloskagathos* are the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant and thus, his happiness is the most desirable thing. From this, I shall argue that the *kaloskagathos* has the best disposition toward virtues, natural goods, and in general toward how to act and to deliberate well in life.

I shall also address some problems related to the text of *EE* VIII.3. In this chapter of the *EE*, Aristotle employs concepts that are not thoroughly defined in his works, for example the idea of natural goods, but at the same time remain crucial for his ethical theory and for its conception of happiness.

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6A “The Problem of Death in Gregory of Nyssa”

The issue of death in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, is a deeply philosophical problem that exceeds the theological and soteriological frame. Most of all, it is a reference to the existential strife of the human life and a recognition of its traumas. There are two main aspects in the particular thanatological interpretation: a negative and a positive one. The negative aspect primarily concerns the removal of man from God. There would be no death, if man had remained close to God. Evil crept into the world because of man’s disobedience and his devotion to sin. Gregory claims that death, in a deterministic definition, is the end of this life, the cessation of that kind of existence that is connected directly to the flesh. Death is the exclusion from life, as an aftermath of man’s deliberate action of excluding God from his own life and rejecting his relationship with Him. Death occurs when the soul has departed from the divine realm. Man, abandoning his ontological commitment to the divine, falsifies his life, while being subjugated to the material.

In the positive outlook, according to Gregory, death is ultimately a benefaction to mankind. Through death, human sin ends, preventing the domination and the further perpetuation of Evil. The body itself is a neutral element in the synthesis of “nous” and “soma”, since it is not considered as a cause, but only as a means of evil. Thus, and despite the fact that the body remains ethically neutral, the deliverance from Evil can be achieved with the termination of the existing relationship between body and soul. Death is indeed a loss and simultaneously a birth, leading to a crucial meeting between God and the soul. Through logos, reason, which now persists in the transcendent nature of the human being, passions and irrationality are banished from life.

Gregory upholds that people have a natural tendency towards the Good. The supreme goal of a being is self-awareness. Knowing the true nature of beings and knowing himself, man becomes an immortal being. Knowledge is the route to immortality and to the liberation from all evil. Death is described as a stage in evolution, practically as a continuation of living. All in all, death demonstrates the omnipotence of God. If there were no death, God would surrender to the options that man would have established and He would accept the presence of Evil in the world. In that context, death cannot be conceived as a punishment to the human race. What is punishment indeed is life itself, where man has to endure his passions and his irrational desires. In Resurrection, the
totality of body and soul is saved, whereas man has rejected a life of sin at the same time with his own free will.

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1J “Are You Ready with Mr. Thomas Taylor to go Over from Jehovah to Jupiter?”

Leonard Marsh of Vermont thought the 19th century American Spiritualism of the Fox sisters and Andrew Jackson Davis, with its clairvoyance, spirit manifestations and communications, to be a garbled, diluted form of Iamblichean theurgy. His work *Apocatastasis or Progress Backwards (1854)*, addressed this issue of contemporary “heathen Christians” who have the effrontery to bring back the dregs of theurgic theory and practice as a substitute for Christianity. Your “apocatastatic” predecessors more cogently defended this “pagan patchwork”; understanding these late Neoplatonists, the learned extraordinary Thomas Taylor “honestly went over from form Jehovah to Jupiter, a Julian on a smaller scale.” If you would authentically and fully embrace this (erroneous) teaching, then follow Taylor.

Marsh’s strange apologetic strategy employs the Platonic notion of sterile and prolific periods, in which the cosmos alternately declines and is regenerated by divine descents. He saw ante-Bellum America as parallel to the sterile era of the Late Roman republic; comparing Andrew Jackson to Sulla, and other leaders to Caesar and co. That era led to the Roman Principate and to Christianity. Marsh compares contemporary Spiritualist phenomena to similar and superior 3rd and 4th century Neoplatonic accounts.

Most of his examples are drawn from Taylor’s translations, but occasionally he includes the original Greek. He makes the case that his fast moving era is on the brink of an “apocatastatic repetition” of late antiquity. Hence, the strange return of “neo-paganism” which Marsh sees as, at bottom, an occult form of polytheistic/pantheistic Nature worship, long ago superseded by Christianity. One gets the sense that Marsh fancies himself a new Origen of Alexandria or Augustine of Hippo. And with confidence not unlike that of his Patristic predecessors, he is sure that Christianity will “apocatastically” yet again “re-triumph” over this new, albeit confused form of theurgic Neoplatonism!

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2F “Polis-dweller: Animality and Human Bioi in Aristotle’s *Politics*”

In Book 4 of his *Politics*, Aristotle describes the politeia as a certain mode of life (bios tis) of the city (1295a40-1). In light of his treatment of the bioi of nonhuman animals, we could take this to mean that the politeia provides the principle that organizes the city’s structure and capacities into a coherent, discernable form (democracy, oligarchy, etc.). This paper explores how Aristotle’s conception of the polis as approximating organic unity affects the structure of his analysis of human political phenomena. It argues that the *Politics*’ sustained meditation on how to ensure the longevity of a city’s bios—its political ecology—must be read as a necessary compliment to its account of human nature, its anthropology. Not only does this help clarify certain aspects of what reads to more contemporary eyes as the curious structure of the *Politics* (part analysis of forms of power and authority, part handbook for maintaining specific power structures), it also tells us that for Aristotle an adequate philosophic analysis of human political phenomena requires an analysis of the kind of unity that is the city as well as the kind of unity that is the human.
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5E ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***
“Aristotle on Final Goods and Eudaimonia”

This paper argues (contrary to Roche, a member of the same panel) that Aristotle really does mean to identify eudaimonia with excellent activity alone. Aristotle makes, perhaps implicitly, a distinction between different sorts of thing that are valuable: between things that have value in a primary sense, such as excellent activity, and things that are valuable but not valuable in a primary sense, such as external goods (labelled “indifferents” by Stoics). This view allows us carve out a position between the extreme views that (1) eudaimonia consists in one intrinsic good to which all other goods are instrumental means, and (2) eudaimonia consists in a combination of intrinsic goods. While eudaimonia does consist in excellent activity alone, it is not the only valuable thing. Other things, such as friends, honor, family, etc. are valuable but not “good”; they are only valuable in a secondary or “indifferent” sense. They are neither merely instrumentally valuable nor constituents of eudaimonia.

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3E “Vicious Art or Vicious Audience? Understanding the Effects of Art on the Youthful and Vicious Audience in Aristotle’s Poetics”

According to Aristotle, tragedy can be morally instructive if managed correctly. We believe that this qualification—correct management of the instructive capacity of art—requires further investigation. In particular, Aristotle’s apparent acceptance of the arts must be critically reviewed through the lens of his moral psychology. This paper examines an Aristotelian analysis of the effects of tragic art on the moral psychology of persons of different character types. We contend that two distinct groups of people who lack keen moral perception—the youth and vicious people—render the efficacy of moral education through tragedy a delicate matter.

Those who benefit most directly from watching tragedy are what we shall call morally knowing subjects. A morally knowing subject is one who already recognizes the good in general (e.g., it is usually wrong to steal from and murder other people, and it is usually good to be charitable and truthful). Morally knowing subjects include the virtuous, continent, and incontinent characters (and, as we shall discuss, possibly older youths on the brink of developing one of these character types). Such a person has some knowledge of the good and, for that reason, can correctly identify and compare instances of injustice in the plot of a tragedy. The virtuous person is most keen to judge, as she already knows and loves the good. For her especially, tragedy is cathartic. Tragedy allows her to rehearse her moral knowledge while putting it into the context of orthogonal fear and pity. The continent and incontinent persons, like the virtuous, can easily identify sympathetic characters. Watching tragedy helps them to rehearse aligning their emotional responses with their moral knowledge. For them, tragedy can be most instructive. However, this educative value seems contingent upon the subject’s moral knowledge. For example, a morally knowing subject knows, prior to viewing a performance of Medea, that while adultery is wrong, filicide is worse. Such a subject might feel pity for Medea initially when her husband, Jason, betrays her. However, upon the realization that Medea will murder their children in retaliation, the morally knowing subject experiences fear for the children’s welfare, and no longer sympathizes with Medea. Inept moral perception might preclude one from having this morally correct emotional response.
Youths and vicious people each have, in a way, inept moral perception. Youths are uninformed and the vicious misidentify the good. At first blush, it might appear that tragedy would not help such people develop (or improve) their moral character. However, we argue that the spectacle relevant to youths and the vicious is much broader than the stage. Provided the vicious and very young playgoers are surrounded by mostly morally knowing subjects, they too can learn from tragedy. For instance, if a youth or a vicious person were to continue to identify with Medea even after her plans for filicide are apparent, but it is obvious that the majority of people in the audience feel differently, then the youth or vicious person might come to question their own moral judgment.

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3A “Ineffability and Totality in Damascius”

The opening pages of Damascius’ Aporiai kai Lyseis offer, based upon established principles of Proclean metaphysics, a powerful critique of the very notion of a totalizing principle. This paper examines the conception of totality arising out of this critique, and argues that Damascius pursues radical consequences that are implicit in Proclus’ doctrine of the henads as a totality of unique and hence untotizable individuals, and that, in turn, the henadology is indispensable to understanding the proper significance of Damascian formulations regarding the Ineffable, Totality, and the nature of multiplicity. Damascius’ dialectic results in a totality which can neither be understood as the product of a singular principle, and hence inferred from that principle, even for an ideal knower; nor as the mere effect of all things, with a collapse into empiricism and relativism. Instead, totality must be grasped through the irreducible process of emergence, within the unitary manifold of the henads, of the immanent ontological principle of unification, and beyond this, of the intellective and finally psychical power of reflection upon this cosmogonic process. Damascius’ dialectic of totality in this fashion takes in a wider scope than the concept of totality in Proclus, which has a narrower intension than the concept of wholeness. Proclus thus subordinates totality to the integrity of the henadic individual presented as intelligible object, leaving the totality of the system itself ambiguously determined. Damascius takes the bull by the horns, and renders explicit the system’s grounding in a divine process in which factical divine subjects actively objectify themselves.

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6F “Bhakti and Henadology”

In henadological Platonism, the significance of ‘the One’ is understood to lie, not in an eminent singular entity, but in the modes of unity and the ways of being a unit. The science of units qua units, systematic ground and counterweight to substance-based ontology, manifests an organic bond with theology as the science of relation to supra-essential individuals, or Gods, on the one hand; while on the other, because of the basic nature of unity relative to being, doctrines respecting unity tend to situate themselves as critiques of ontology, with at once an analytical and soteriological value. Bhakti, which is not a sectarian movement but an inquiry at once speculative and practical into the nature of the relationship between the human and the divine, and that bridges the diverse genres of ancient Indian thought (theophanic/cultic, epic, and the diverse philosophical perspectives), displays key commonalities with henadological Platonism. The present paper begins the process of identifying these common themes with particular reference to the Bhagavad-Gītā and the Nārāyaṇiya. Chief
among these themes is the distinction between structuring cause and structured mixture which runs through Platonism from the Phaedo to the doctrine of principles, and which parallels the account of action in the Gītā as freedom independent of fruit or result, insofar as the latter pertains to the solidarity of worldly causality heteronomous to the agency of the ātman.

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5B “Socratic Harm”

In the Apology, Socrates makes many fantastic claims at his trial, perhaps none more so than his claims about harm and injury. For instance, he makes the following two claims:

1. Meletus and Anytus cannot injure Socrates because a bad man cannot injure a good man.
2. No one wants to be harmed

These appear obviously false. Contrary to (1), for instance, Meletus apparently can injure Socrates to a great degree; he succeeded in having Socrates condemned to death. And (2) appears to deny any motive to participate in detrimental activities such as smoking. If we suppose that harm is the same as injury, does Socrates have a notion of harm that might justify such claims? I shall argue that under a particular rendering of “Socratic Intellectualism” these claims can be justified. For if we properly understand the ultimate desire for one’s own good (i.e. happiness), coupled with the claim that virtue is wisdom and vice ignorance, we will see that one is harmed if and only if in a given set of circumstances one fails to maximize one's happiness over a complete life.

The key part of my argument will be to understand what constitutes the maximization (or lack thereof) of happiness. For we – along with Socrates (Prt. 358d) and Aristotle (NE I.10) – refer to happiness in two different ways. On the one hand, there are conceivable situations (like getting cancer) that one would clearly prefer to avoid, and avoiding them, we assume, makes one happier. On the other, when placed in an unenviable condition like having cancer, and having to choose between chemotherapy or letting the cancer metastasize, we claim that one choice would maximize happiness over the rest of one's life. Let us call the former use of happiness, Ideal Happiness: the most conceivable amount of happiness, even when circumstances may not allow it. And let us call the letter use of happiness, Circumstantial Happiness: to maximize the overall amount of happiness available to one, given the present circumstances, over the rest of one's life. Given these two different accounts of happiness, Socrates --with rare exception-- speaks of happiness in the Circumstantial way, and it is under this Circumstantial account of happiness that Socrates conceives of what is beneficial and harmful.

Coupling this Circumstantial account of happiness with another feature of Socratic Intellectualism, namely that:

virtue is an attribute of the soul and one that cannot fail to be beneficial, it must be wisdom, for all things in the soul in and by themselves are neither advantageous not injurious, but become advantageous or injurious by the presence with them of wisdom or ignorance … (Meno 88c).

Thus, when Socrates claims that Meletus cannot harm him, Socrates might admit that Meletus may be able to change the circumstances that Socrates finds himself in (e.g., Meletus can bring him into court and seek the death penalty). What Meletus cannot do, however, is cause Socrates in those circumstances to choose something ignorantly that would not maximize Socrates’ circumstantial happiness.
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6B “Divine Philosophers and the Nocturnal Council in Plato’s *Laws*”

Plato’s *Laws* differs from the *Republic* in one obvious way: in the *Laws* there is no formal position for philosophers in the constitution of Magnesia, while in the *Republic* the Kallipolis is ruled by a class of philosopher kings. Indeed, in the *Laws*, the subject of philosophers and their position in society is never explicitly raised by the Athenian in his description of the second best city. So, the question arises, where have the philosophers gone? Do they no longer serve a role in Plato’s political philosophy? The most likely place to look for an answer to this question is Book XII of the *Laws* where the Athenian introduces and explains the Nocturnal Council. Though the council’s official role is a subject of some controversy, it seems as though what goes on in this institution is the closest thing in the *Laws* to the activities of the guardian class in the *Republic*.

This paper will do three things. Section one will lay out the pertinent sections of the *Laws* concerning the composition of the Nocturnal council and its activities. My aim will be to describe what the day-to-day operations of the council consist in according to what the Athenian describes in the text. This will later allow us to understand the practical role the council plays in the constitution of the state. Section two will examine a controversy regarding the function of the Nocturnal Council in the constitution of Magnesia, namely, whether it serves as the official ruling body of Magnesia, returning philosophers to the ruling status they had in the *Republic* (a la Klosko, 1988) or if it is a looser, more informal institution wherein the ruling class spends its leisure time practicing and being educated in philosophy (a la Lewis, 1998). Finally, in section three, I will endorse a hybrid of these two views. I will argue that philosophy and the education of philosopher-citizens/rulers is not its official, or even proper, function. Rather, in the *Laws*, philosophers are “divine men” who appear regardless of the way a state is organized and how its citizens are educated. However, the Nocturnal Council is related to philosophy in two ways. First it is an institution through which philosophy is able to influence political practice. Second it serves as a safe haven for divinely inspired philosophers, should one appear in Magnesia.

References:


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3J "Caring about Wisdom and Truth in the *Apology* and *Phaedo*"

In the *Apology* and *Phaedo*, the philosopher is defined in part by reference to what he cares about. Whereas others care most about the body, wealth, and other externals, the philosopher cares about wisdom, truth, and the condition of his soul. This paper constructs an account of what it is to care about wisdom and truth by relying on evidence from both dialogues. Specifically, I argue that the *Apology* presents what I call the “Core Account” of caring, according to which to care about something is to attach value to it or to deem it worthy. This account is then developed in the *Phaedo* in terms of value-attaching beliefs that are grounded in states of desire and feeling. To care about wisdom and truth is to attach supreme value to those things in belief, where that belief is grounded in states of intense desire and pleasure. Observing the development of this account across the two
dialogues sheds light on further questions about Socratic intellectualism and the place of the *Phaedo* in Plato’s thought.

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21 “‘My Tongue did Swear, But My Mind Remains Unsworn’: Oaths and Persuasion in Pausanias *Symposium* Speech and the Instability of Opinion”

In the course of Pausanius’ speech on Eros in the *Symposium*, he notes the special place that Athens gives to lovers, and to lovers alone: the city allows them all sorts of excesses and ridiculous behaviour in the pursuit of the beloved. The city and the gods ignore when lovers break oaths in that endeavour. But what were oaths?

An oath was made by man to a god or the gods and was a kind of contract between them, and was made in a host of different situations and for different reasons. Thus this passing reference to the city’s indifference to the insouciance of the Lover by Pausanias, who is otherwise conservatively inclined, is remarkable insofar as it is, in fact, perfidious. If we add to this the high probability that the speeches in the dialogue itself were preceded by and under the auspices of an oath (cf. *Symp* 176a), the significance of 'oaths' within his speech should merit further investigation.

There are two other interesting points about Pausanius' account of Aphrodite Uranus and Aphroditite Pandemos. The first is that closely associated and often identified with Aphrodite Pandemos was the goddess Peitho or Persuasion. The connection would be clear and immediate to any Athenian and will soon be clear to us in our next point. Second, the cult of Aphrodite Pandemos was an ancient one. Traditionally, Aphrodite Pandemos / Peitho had *two* aspects, a higher *and* a lower one. For example, so while prostitutes, who had their own unique form of persuasion, were under her protection, so also was the city, and those who governed her, in civic harmony and the practice of democracy, where persuasion through reason and rhetoric played an integral and noble part. And yet astonishingly Pausanius sees only the base element in her and suggests a separate heavenly Aphrodite to compliment her, where, in fact, tradition provided that higher part *within* Aphrodite Pandemos. Thus in his speech, he innovates (or is part of a recent movement of innovation of) a new articulation of the human community (whether noble or base) to the divine, and he does so by univocally debasing the goddess traditionally associated with his own function in the city and the well-functioning of the city itself.

In both cases - breaking oaths and his presentation of Eros Pandemos / Persuasion - , I want to point to certain *instability* in Pausanius' presentation which can be best understood as an adumbration doxa or pistis within the Platonic line and where his position is more comprehensive and articulate than Phaedrus' (sensation / images) and less than Eryximachus' (dianoia / episteme). The goal of my paper is thus a new way to explain the significance of Pausanius' speech and, indirectly, the entire dialogue through the Line, an important principle and motif in Plato's work.

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3 The citation in the title of the paper comes from Euripides, *Hippolytus* 612.
4 This paper is part of a project to read the speeches in the *Symposium* according to the order of the Platonic Line. Phaedrus: sensation or images; Pausianus, doxa or pistis; Eryximachus, dianoia and Socrates / Diotima, noesis. The exceptions to this are Aristophanes' and Agathon's speeches, which I take to be both criticising Eryximachus, and, of course, Alcibiades, whose speech praises Socrates.
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3A “Damascian Grammatology, the Refutation of Skepticism and the Inner-development of the Unified”

Damascius follows Iamblichus in asserting that the first principle of all things is not to be found in the hypotheses of the Parmenides, but is 'above' or 'before' them, and should rather be described as 'the Ineffable'. The reason for this according to Damascius is because all discourse, even the apophatic kind, which we find in the first hypothesis, places one thing in relation to another. This also means that we cannot properly speak of the Ineffable as a cause or principle, for these cataphatic ideas place one thing (a cause) in relation to another (an effect). Causality can enter in the 'second' principle or One, traditionally associated with the first hypothesis of the Parmenides.

The topic of this paper will treat the third One, what Damascius calls the Unified, in particular, the first stage of the Unified, familiar to us from the systematic treatment given by Proclus: Being, Life and Thought. However, the difference between Proclus and Damascius on this topic hinges upon this first observation about the a-relationality of the 'unity' that is the Ineffable. For Proclus, the three moments of Being, Life and Thought are equal and interpenetrate each other. Damascius makes a similar but radically different move. He unifies this triad by doing two things simultaneously: first, he must emphasise the first moment of Being, for Being as such is a-relation, and thus most like the Ones above it. Second, he must nonetheless account for the moments of Life and Thought, the latter of which would seem to introduce division within the Unified and thus a separate perspective on Being. The danger of dividing being and thought by Damascius, and the sceptical implications for the impossibility of knowledge, has been noted by Sara Ahbel-Rappe, but I believe that the nature of the unity of the Unified has not yet been understood. Marie-Claire Galperine has noted the importance of time in Damascius' descriptions of various parts of his system. What she did not note is that Damascius uses different verb tenses and moods to describe the development of the Unified. He uses the present indicative to describe the sequential development of each moment, but when he examines the precise nature of the third moment, Thought, he uses present indicatives, perfect / pluperfect passive participles and aorists to describe the different relations it has to 'itself'. It thinks and is thinking (present indicative), and as such when it reflects on itself (for this is what it is), it realises that it is the conclusion of a process (using, perfect or pluperfect passive participles) but that 'development' is eternally and already achieved (using, aorists). Thus in its present, it realises its past (it is Being which has been discriminated), which already is an in-definite (a-orist) now (Being in itself is in-definite). It is Being. He is thus able to unify into one perspective, the three moments of Being, Life and Thought, but with the inner priority of the a-relationality of Being, and he uses grammatical distinctions to unify them. The Unified is, in the deepest sense, Being, but it knows this and so has a double relation to itself.

What is important here is that the measure of unity for Damascius is the kind of unity that is the Ineffable and it is Thought that provides a relational a-relationality peculiar to that thing which Damascius calls the Unified. It is through this new kind of unity that Damascius is able to unify being and thinking and thus escape sceptical strategies.

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4H “‘Not Neglecting the Work at Hand’: A Note on Socrates’ Debt to Asclepius”
“O Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius: but pay it and do not neglect (ἀμελήσητε) it.”

(Socrates in Phaedo at 118a6-7)

There has been much discussion of this line, Socrates’ dying words. Many interpretations have been put forward, reading it as nonsensical, ironic, sexually charged, or seriously philosophical. Most readings, however, draw on evidence internal to the Phaedo or perhaps from the other dialogues of Socrates’ last days, particularly the Apology and the Crito.

In this paper I offer not a new interpretation, confident that the many possibilities have already been explored and outlined. What I offer is instead new evidence. I consider a not often discussed passage from the third book of the Republic in which Socrates speaks of Asclepius and his disciples (405a-408d). Now, surely not every mention of Asclepius or the Asclepiads in the Platonic corpus is going to be relevant to interpreting Socrates’ final words. However, as I shall argue, the discussion in Rep. III is significant because of its relevance to the argument of the Crito and a strong case can be made for its relevance to Socrates’ dying words.

In the passage under consideration, Socrates cites Asclepius as having a certain wisdom in the way he practiced medicine: he would only prescribe determinate, short-term remedies in order to heal those with definite, curable illnesses. Asclepius did not, however, attempt to cure those with indeterminate or chronic illnesses, the treatment of which would disrupt the patients’ lives. Instead, he neglected these people’s illnesses so that they might not neglect their own work. Good men, Socrates concludes, “have no leisure to be sick, nor is it profitable to live in this way, paying attention to a disease while neglecting the work at hand (τῆς ἑπεμβαίνεις ἐργασίας ἀμελεῖσθαι)” (406d) since “he had a proper work, and if he could not do it, it would not be profitable to live” (407a). This passage vividly recalls the argument of the Crito and the Apology, though it is not often discussed in the literature on Socrates’ so-called debt.

If I am right about the relevance of this passage, then it provides some support for the thought that Socrates owes a cock to Asclepius—both in thanksgiving and to his honor—since he has not availed himself of any and all means to stay alive, but rather has focused on his proper philosophical task. He does not neglect his proper work by seeking to escape death, just like Asclepius and his good-natured patients. For Socrates this sacrifice is one of thankful tribute, but in his words to Crito and to the others we can discern a further purpose, thus explaining the plural verbs: the sacrifice to be made is also one of petition, that Crito and company follow Socrates by living out their lives not neglecting their own proper work of virtuous living and philosophical inquiry from fear of death.

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2C “The Objects of Dianoia in Plato’s Republic”

In Book 6 of Plato’s Republic, Socrates uses the image of the Divided Line to distinguish four mental conditions, two associated with the visible realm and two with the intelligible. He differentiates the subsections of the visible segment of the line, eikasia and pists, by the objects grasped by the soul in each. However, when he marks the distinction between dianoia and no announces the conditions associated with the intelligible segment, he contrasts them based upon their methods of inquiry. Socrates tells us that dialectic, the epistemological method of no, directly grasps the Forms, but he makes no mention of a unique class of objects associated with dianoetic reasoning, a methodology he associates with mathematics. Consequently, there has been a history of controversy within Plato
scholarship over the identity of the objects of dianoia, particularly the objects of mathematics, with disagreement as to whether Plato intended them to be Forms, intermediates, or sensible things used as images of the Forms. The thesis of my paper is that, though the truth of the mathematical sciences is grounded by the Forms, the objects grasped by mathematical thought fall into the general category of sensible things used as images of the Forms. These sensible things are not identical to the objects grasped in \textit{pistis}, however; they include mathematical structures within the sensible imagination. I present two arguments in support of this interpretation. First, I show that this interpretation of the objects of mathematics explains the connection between the two points on which Socrates criticizes dianoetic reasoning: its use of images and its deduction from unexamined hypotheses. Second, based upon Socrates’ use of “summoning” as the criterion a science must meet in order to be considered capable of turning the eye of the soul, I set out the pattern of reasoning in Socrates’ summoning examples (522e-526b). I argue that the same pattern is present when we become aware of the objects of mathematics, and since Socrates endorses the mathematical curriculum as series of summoners, and the objects revealed by this stage of the summoning process are sensible things used as images of the Forms, we have additional reason to accept this interpretation. Finally, I answer common objections made against the general view that objects of dianoia are sensible things used as images of the Forms.

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3D “God, Eternity, and Necessity: Avicenna’s anti-Aristotelian Proof for the Existence of God”

Avicenna’s modal proof for the existence of God is based on the assumption that if we reason from contingent beings to a necessary being, that necessary being must be God. Avicenna, Name Celia Byrne Institution University of Toronto Address 4 Devonshire Pl Email address celia.byrne@mail.utoronto.ca Date May 31st 2015 Are you willing to chair a session other than your own? (Y/N) Y Will you need an acceptance letter on letterhead? (Y/N) N Is your paper primarily about ancient Greek or Roman philosophy? (Y/N) N Are you a member of SAGP? (Y/N) N Is your paper part of a panel proposal? (Y/N) N Other information or requests If your paper is part of a panel proposal, please indicate the name of the organizer and the name of the panel. Paper Topic (Ancient Greek or Roman, Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy or Science, Medieval Western, Korean Philosophy, Neoplatonism, Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy; or, indicate John Anton topic listed on CFP). Islamic Philosophy Paper Title God, Eternity, and Necessity: Avicenna’s anti-Aristotelian Proof for the Existence of God however, also believes the world to be eternal. So, if eternity implies necessity, as Aristotle believes, Avicenna’s proof for the existence of God is merely a proof for an eternal world. In other words, for Avicenna to maintain the his modal proof is a proof for the existence of God he must show, contra Aristotle, why eternity does not eliminate the possibility of non-being. In this paper, I attempt to show just how he does that. First, I argue that Avicenna does not having a temporal interpretation of modality, which would equate the necessary and the eternal. Rather, I argue, his interpretation is grounded in the quiddity of subjects and their predicates and the external conditions in which these quiddities are found. Second, I show that Avicenna’s quidditybased interpretation of modality contains both things that are necessary-in-themselves and those that are necessary-through-another but possible-in-themselves. Having these two kinds of necessity allows Avicenna to respond to any Aristotelian objector who argues that the necessary being Avicenna arrives at in his proof is not God. For, if she arrives at something that she claims is not God, but is necessary, Avicenna would ask whether it is necessary-through-another or in itself. If it is necessary-through-another, then it is possible-in-itself, in which case it gets reincluded
in the category of possible things and Avicenna’s proof is fine. If it is necessary-in-itself, then it is God, for God is and can be the only being that is necessary in itself. Thus, I argue, by splitting the necessary into necessary-in-itself and necessary-by-another, Avicenna has Aristotle-proofed his argument for the existence of God.

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3G “Husserl’s Aristotelianism in the “Sixth Logical Investigation”: Meaning, Proposition, and Time”

Introduction: The study of the similarities between Aristotle and Edmund Husserl’s philosophies has rightly garnered an important place in the contemporary literature. By juxtaposing their epistemological approaches and their theories of essences, researchers have not only uncovered the significance of Aristotle’s philosophy for Husserl’s – thus demonstrating how phenomenology is partially a return to the Ancients. Rather, these studies have also revealed new insights into the works of both seminal thinkers. For this reason, it is surprising that there is yet to be a single study dedicated exclusively to comparing their analyses of meaning.

The need for such an examination becomes all the more evident when we recognize that Husserl engaged with Aristotle’s theory of meaning in the last chapter of his “Sixth Logical Investigation”. It section 69 of that chapter, entitled, “Arguments for and against Aristotle’s Interpretation”, Husserl directly answered, for the first time, what he called the core question of the Investigations: What kinds of experiences can function as the meaning of a proposition?

Thesis: In order to draw out the ramifications of this pivotal encounter between Aristotle and Husserl, this paper will be executed in two phases. We first exposit section 69 and thereby examine how Husserl interpreted Aristotle for his own ends. By subsequently measuring Husserl’s depiction of Aristotle against On Interpretation, we demonstrate how he presented a problematically oversimplified Aristotle. We now detail the content of these two sections.

Overview:
(1) In section 69, Husserl attempted to resolve his core difficulty by contrasting two viewpoints; Aristotle’s and a view Husserl defined only as “opposed to Aristotle.” Husserl claimed that Aristotle believed that propositions are sentences which assert something which can be true or false. As Aristotle (according to Husserl) claimed that questions and wishes are incapable of being so true or false, they are thus not propositions. Those of the opposed perspective claim that wishes and questions do have a truth-value, namely because they are statements about the speaker’s experience rather than about external states of affairs. After a series of torturous passages, which weigh the advantages and drawbacks of these two, Husserl ultimately sides with Aristotle.

(2) Through our investigation of On Interpretation, it will be shown how Husserl has given us a watered-down Aristotle. Specifically, we will focus on Aristotle’s allowance for the possibility of real alternatives with regards to statements about future events. We highlight Husserl’s omission of this because it holds great consequence for his theory of meaning. In Logical Investigations, Husserl established a binary opposition between statements which are eternally true or false, thereby collapsing the difference between statements about facts and those concerning essences. If Husserl would have incorporated the pertinent Aristotelian insight into his philosophy, he not only would have presented us with a more accurate picture of Aristotle, but he would have also been able to account for the different kinds of expressions in a more nuanced manner.

Bibliography

Primary:
Aristotle defines time as “the number of movement (kinēsis) with respect to before and after” (Phys. 4.11.219b2). The relation between sub-lunar substances—which have within themselves a principle of motion and rest—and time, therefore, appears unproblematic. Sensible substances, however, also perform perfect activities (energeiai) and in the passages in which he most clearly outlines the nature of such activities, the philosopher leaves the issue of their temporality unresolved. As a result, scholars have speculated about different ways of understanding it. This paper argues, however, that the Aristotelian corpus does offer precise indications on this issue. The Physics distinguishes between two modalities of being in time: being-in-time in virtue of one’s nature and being-in-time accidentally. The case is made that energeiai belong to the class of things that are in time accidentally and that this way of understanding their relation to time fits their distinctive nature and is faithful to the phenomena.

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2D “Complete Activity and Being-in-time”

Aristotle on Human and Animal Emotions

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4I “Aristotle on Human and Animal Emotions”
Aristotle spent much of his life and philosophical writings focusing on the study of nature, particularly of animals. He documented numerous dimensions of animals; their fascinating behavior, profound intelligence, and capacity for complex emotions. Aristotle would agree that there are deep continuities between non-human and human animals. In particular, he believed that both humans and animals experience a wide variety of emotions. However, only humans are held morally responsible for their actions. The ability to hold each other responsible depends in part on the way that the human rational faculty affects human emotions. In particular, human reason, language, and the ability to control one’s actions transform the nature of human emotions. In this essay I argue that Aristotle’s perceptual theory of the emotions applies to both humans and animals. Furthermore, a perceptual model can account for the similarities and dissimilarities between animal and human emotions. The uniquely human ability to rule one’s feelings (what psychologists call “emotion regulation”) makes humans responsible for their emotional reactions—which is the border between animal and human moral natures.

I will proceed in three steps. First, I will turn to Aristotle’s De Anima to see what capacities he ascribes to the animal soul. Second, I will offer my own interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of the emotions, what I call “affective perceptions.” This view is opposed to the more dominant judgment interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of emotions. Briefly, on the judgment theory, in order to have an emotion an agent must assent to a proposition about the object provoking the emotion; the agent cannot be merely aroused by the object to experience an emotion. Rather, assent is key. Finally, I will argue that the Aristotelian understanding of emotions as affective perceptions allows emotions to play a dual role. Both humans and animals have a perceptive faculty, and both can discern (агиевоν) whether or not what they perceive should cause fear (for instance). But only humans can freely and intentionally cultivate their character so that the perceptual object (the cause of the fear) appears differently. And when the end appears differently—meaning the perception changes—the emotion also changes. Aristotle ascribes emotions to animals and humans, but assigns emotions a primary role in moral responsibility ascriptions, something Aristotle seems to deny to animals.

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1H “Understanding, Paradox, and Parmenides B16”

Parmenides B16 presents an account of human cognition and understanding. It is usually taken to form part of the account of the untrustworthy opinions of mortals. Regardless of its proper location within the poem, it invokes difference, movement, and multiplicity — features that the goddess describes as fundamental to mortals’ opinions and as incompatible with what one must say and conceive on the road of inquiry that she recommends.

What kind of a claim about human understanding might B16 represent? What could B16 say about the epistemological status of its own claims, and about the epistemological status of each part of the poem? That two-sided question will be the focus of this paper.

a. Does Parmenides mean to espouse the account of human understanding and cognition (phronein, noos, noema) in B16? Answering affirmatively summons a number of well-known problems: In what sense could he espouse an account that is fundamentally at odds with the way the goddess says one must say and conceive what is on a road of inquiry oriented toward aletheia?

Those who include B16 in the “opinions of mortals” section and who argue that Parmenides denied the veracity of those opinions encounter serious problems as well: What are we to make of those accurate accounts of the moon and planets? What is untrustworthy in this account of mortals’
Recent scholarship has sharpened this side of the question. Attention has not been focused on the other side of the question, namely the relationship between B16 and the claims of each part of the poem.

b. Are we to understand B16 as saying that through their belief that everything is Light and Night, mortals implicitly conceive that cognition comes to us through the mixture (of Light and Night) in our parts? Or are we to understand it as saying that (according to the goddess) cognition actually does come to us that way? Or are we to understand it to mean that according to the goddess, cognition actually does come to us through the mixture of something which we imperfectly specify as Light and Night?

Could we tell the difference? Could we tell which of these was the case? Does Parmenides indicate that he thinks we can? Is Parmenides really claiming that our purported Light-Night composition is capable of letting us know with accuracy that we are of Light and Night? And what would be the consequences if he were?

Further, the tale of the journey and both parts of the goddess's speech use negation, invoke difference and change and multiplicity, and in general conform in many ways to the conceptual framework the goddess attributes to mortals in B8.53-61 and B9. Does this reflect confidence in the Light-Night conception as a starting-point for an adequate account of what-is? Or does it produce a paradox, wherein the Light-Night conception undermines itself but we would have to use it in order to deny its adequacy?

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6D “A Neo-Confucian Debate on Mind, Emotion, and Desire”

The aim of this paper is to examine a Neo-Confucian debate on human mind, emotion, and desires, focusing on Dai Zhen’s denunciation against Song (宋) Neo-Confucianism, especially that of Zhu Xi. Dai Zhen, the most important and critical Confucian thinker of the Qing (淸) dynasty and a representative critic of the Song/Ming (宋明) Neo-Confucianism, pointed out that since the Song, the writings of Confucius and Mencius have been seriously problematic because scholars have borrowed the words of Laozi and Buddha for their interpretations of the Confucian classics. Based on the idea of qi (氣) and his interpretation of the Confucian classics, he tried to remove such polluted readings and to re-shed light on the Confucian vision. For the project, one of Dai Zhen’s main targets was Zhu Xi, a synthesizer of the Song Neo-Confucianism, whose understanding of the Confucian classics, Dai Zhen thought, has caused philosophical damages to correct understanding of the Confucian tradition.

In this paper, I will seek to find answers to the questions of what philosophical value Dai Zhen’s criticism of Zhu Xi can provide and whether Dai Zhen’s view of emotion and desires can be free from the problem of Zhu Xi’s system. In doing so, I will suggest that the difference and similarity between their ideas toward correct understanding of the Confucian classics and their philosophical problems will be a significant key for examining the question of how we can approach the Confucian tradition from our current standpoint.

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5B "Socratic Intellectualism, the Unity of Virtue, and the 'What-is-X?' Question."
Central to Socratic Intellectualism is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. But does Socrates also hold that there is only one virtue and that “courage”, “justice”, “piety”, “temperance” and “wisdom” are merely different names for the same knowledge, i.e., knowledge of goods and bads? Or does Socrates hold the more conventional view that there are five distinct virtues and identify each somehow with a different specific way of specifying the knowledge of goods and bads? It would seem incompatible for Socrates to hold both of the above. However, in contemporary Socratic scholarship, several ingenious attempts – e.g., (Ferejohn 1982, 1984) and (Brickhouse & Smith 2000, 2010) – have been made to show how, for Socrates, virtue though one can have parts with distinctive essence and definition of their own. Key to these attempts is the assumption that Socrates’ what-is-X question should be read at least in part as a search for the (analytically determined) essence of X. Given this assumption, and given the centrality of the what-is-X question in Socratic inquiry, it is only reasonable to conclude that Socrates is committed to there being different specific virtues and that there is a need to reconcile this commitment of Socrates with his claim that there is one virtue with five different virtue names. I shall argue (a) these contemporary attempts to elucidate Socrates’ position on virtue and knowledge fall short of attributing a singular coherent philosophical project to Socratic inquiry even if they succeed in smoothing over certain seeming surface inconsistencies in what Socrates explicitly said about the specific virtues in the Socratic dialogues and (b) (more importantly) these attempts have underappreciated the theoretical nature of explanatory project that underlies and motivates Socrates’ what-is-X question.

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2I “Why the Art of Glaukos is Unnecessary (Phaedo, 108d)”

In the Phaedo, Socrates’ account of the Myth of the True Earth is immediately preceded by a mysterious allusion to a proverbial “Art of Glaukos.” This paper is an attempt to explain why Socrates makes this reference only to peremptorily dismiss it, claiming that it is not needed (ἀλλὰ μὲντοι, ὦ Σιμία, οὐχ ἦ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἴναι διηγῆσασθαι ἃ γ᾽ ἐστίν). Socrates’ allusion to Glaukos’ mysterious art has prompted speculation about the nature of Glaukos’ techne. Diskin Clay explains Socrates’ reference to Glaukos by citing a parallel passage from the Republic, “where Socrates offers Glaukos ‘of the sea’ as an image of the disfigurement of the incarnate soul” (Republic 611d).\(^5\) Clay finds the image of a monstrous Glaukos established in Greek lore: “We do not know what Plato’s source for this image of Glaukos might have been, but the few fragments from Aeschylus’ Glaukos Pontios render some details: he is described in terms of the Republic as a beast with human form, covered with shells, mussels, and shellfish.”\(^6\) Clay is most assuredly on the mark when he concludes, “The marvelous art of Glaukos is that of passing beyond the mortal, trasumanar.”\(^7\) Thematical, this reading makes the most sense in context, and best fits the other Platonic reference to Glaukos from the Republic. Clay notes that one of the traditional theories of the Scholiasts speculates that Glaukos was a drowned sailor who came back to life.\(^8\) Moreover, Socrates’ allusion


\(^6\) Ibid., 235.

\(^7\) Ibid., 236.

to Glaukos’ art and the phrase ‘of the sea’ may class Glaukos with Er, Triptolemos, and Trophonius, among other Greek figures, who have died and been transformed, but not fully gone over to the other side. These specters serve as intermediaries, once human; they now dwell at the cusp of the lower world serving as immortal and prophetic oracles to the mysteries of the afterlife. Alcibiades’ ‘Satyr Marsyas’ references indicate Socrates is Hermes’ old helper. He is a psychagogue, or perhaps more properly he should be understood as a Hermetic psychopomp, but playing this role for the living rather than the dead ( Symposium 215b–c). For Socrates, immortality is achieved in the choices and actions of this life, which explains why he claims Glaukos’ art is not needed (Phaedo 108d). The indefinite continuance of life in a degenerated body in a twilight world is a false immortality—to use Hegel’s phrase it is a schlechte Unendlichkeit. It is only the philosopher who can negotiate the manifold pitfalls of immorality and reach true immortality (Phaedo 114c). Thus, the arcane art of Glaukos is the false art of procuring everlasting life.

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1] “The Identity of Intellect and Intelligibles in Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus”

This paper examines the “identity doctrine,” i.e., the claim that nous is (or becomes) the noēta, in Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus. For both thinkers, this doctrine makes a claim about what kind of being the intelligizing intellect has or acquires, not a claim about the intellect’s relation to objects outside itself—although both thinkers also consider questions about how some knowers relate to external objects. This paper studies what Alexander and Plotinus mean when they speak of the intellect as being the intelligible, and how this metaphysical approach to intellection differs from common construals of intellection as being about some object. I also suggest that the identity doctrine in Alexander and Plotinus helps illuminate a classic problem found in a medieval thinker, Thomas Aquinas.

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5H “Aristotle’s Argument for Private Property”

In Politics II, Aristotle defends private property on the grounds that, without it, one could not exercise the virtues of generosity and temperance, nor gain the pleasure associated with the exercise of those virtues (1263a37-b14). The argument is significant because it offers a virtue theoretic, rather than the standard deontological or consequentialist, defense of private property. Yet, the argument fails, according to some commentators. Terence Irwin claims that one can exercise generosity without exclusive ownership over the property one gives. The argument also has defenders. The reconstructions from Barbara Koziak and Robert Mayhew focus on the pleasure gained in giving one’s own property; and Mayhew’s reading focuses, furthermore, on the pleasure of autonomy in the exercise of generosity.

But these interpretations fail to bring out the significance of the historical background of the argument. I claim that Aristotle’s virtue theoretic defense of private property draws on a topos represented by figures such as Democritus, Archytas, and Isocrates. According to that topos, the rich

9 Apology 41a.


rightly possess their property, but ought to practice generosity and temperance by sharing with the poor. Their sharing, moreover, eliminates enmity between the classes in the city and promotes homonoia and the flourishing of the poor and rich alike, and of the city as a whole. Aristotle’s defense of private property follows this topos, but innovates by appealing to a native capacity for self-love to explain both immoderate and appropriate attachment to property. This reading receives some support from Plato’s Laws (736ce), where self-love is implicated in excessive love of property. Aristotle’s defense of private property is that, without it, the self-love that is native to us cannot be well cultivated; similarly, without private property, self-love cannot be marshaled into a creation of a genuine form of homonoia in the city.

Besides defending a new version of the virtue theoretic defense of private property, this line of interpretation also has the benefit of drawing attention to the significance of self-love in the political life, and in offering a new reading of Aristotle’s account of generosity, the significance of which has not been fully appreciated in accounts of the political virtues.

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1E “Material Supposition in the Fourteenth and Early Fifteenth Centuries”

Several fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century theories of supposition have been criticized by Stephen Read on the ground that they lack coherent explanations for how the range of a term’s material supposita (briefly, ‘M-range’) is determined. Read furthermore argues that two later developments jointly solve this problem — the elimination of non-significative supposition and the introduction of non-ultimate concepts. I argue that Read’s criticism does not apply to William of Ockham, whose relation of subordination is sufficient for determining a term’s M-range. This approach requires that grammatically related terms, such as ‘hircus’ and ‘hirco’, are subordinated to the same concept. I argue that this is a coherent view and outline a treatment of concepts on which they come with markers for case and other grammatical categories. I then consider some evidence that suggests Ockham may have had a similar view in mind.

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3F “Pleasure as Part of Teachable Virtue in the Ring Structure of the Protagoras”

A close reading of the Protagoras shows that it is one of Plato’s most artful dialogues despite its seemingly disjointed nature. One of its episodes in particular has sparked debate amongst scholars. Does the discussion of a hedonistic calculus at the dialogue’s end reflect Socrates’ worldview or Plato’s during his early career? This paper argues that while Plato is not a hedonist, the dialogue advocates a vital role for pleasure in the imparting of virtue.

The evidence for such a view emerges in the previously little noticed ring structure of the dialogue. Using criteria put forth by Mary Douglas in her book Thinking in Circles: An Essay on Ring Composition this paper will argue that the Protagoras’ structure is highly contrived and intentional, helping to lead the reader to a more deeply philosophical understanding of the work as a whole. The intentionality of the ring structure of the Protagoras can be seen in the beginning, end, and the exact middle point of the dialogue. The various episodes are clearly delineated by the appearance of pleasure in the interlocutors and the alternation of the main speaker, a strategy that Mary Douglas and Rachel Barney both argue is found in the Iliad’s alternation of day and night in each episode. Further evidence for such a ring structure can be found mirroring episodes on either side of the middle point of the dialogue that, when read together, provide answers not present in them.
individually. A subtle dramatic flourish completes the structure with Socrates’ indication of an appointment he has to keep in the middle and the end of the dialogue which, I argue, is with the friend he is speaking to in the very opening scene.

The ring structure indicates that pleasure is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for teachable virtue. Pleasure is a secondary, but necessary goal for determining the answer to the initial question of the dialogue set forth by Hippocrates and Socrates: Is virtue teachable? What Socrates seeks in talking with Protagoras is to determine whether or not the sophist is a good teacher, and then whether or not what he claims to teach, virtue, can be taught at all. The entire dialogue, as a result of its ring structure, gives strong evidence that virtue is, in fact, teachable. Virtue is something that can be taught through proper training so that pleasure derives from it. Yet all along virtue is always pursued for its own sake, removing hedonism as the ultimate aim.

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6E “Reading Aristotle’s Ethics After J. S. Mill”

Contemporary scholars like Martha Nussbaum and John McDowell argue that Aristotle does not justify ethical claims on a metaphysical or otherwise extra-ethical basis, but does so instead by reflecting on and rendering coherent the ethical beliefs and practices within his situated Greek worldview. This understanding of Aristotle’s ethics can be characterized by three claims:

(1) Practical human affairs are so complex that any descriptive or prescriptive judgments determined through the course of ethical inquiry will hold true only for the most part.
(2) Ethical inquiry is carried out by a “dialectical” (or we might say “endoxic”) method whose primary purpose is to reflect on and render coherent the ethical beliefs of a community.
(3) This method is articulated in a remark prefacing Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in Bk. VII of the Nicomachean Ethics (1145b2-7).

In my paper I want to argue that claims (1)-(3) give us a misleading account of Aristotle’s ethics, and that J.S. Mill’s empiricist logic was chiefly responsible for popularizing this account. Why should we think claims (1)-(3) are misleading? Claim (1) seems at odds with the great extent to which Aristotle’s ethical works are devoted to developing and clarifying definitions that hold true always, and not just for the most part. Claim (2) misrepresents the structure of Aristotle’s ethical works, since coherence - whatever exactly that may entail - does not seem to be the only desideratum guiding inquiry. Aristotle makes sure that his definitions of ethical phenomena not only agree with our ethical beliefs about it, but also specify the proper genus and differentia of the phenomena, are stated in terms that are “prior” and “more knowable” than the definienda, and avoid any unclear or equivocating expression. Finally, claim (3) seems false insofar as we have good reason to doubt that the “dialectical” or “endoxic” method guides all of ethical inquiry. For if we look at Aristotle’s ethical works on the whole, it is clear that many if not most of the discussions therein neither raise nor resolve any theoretical difficulties at all.

Having clarified the problems with this account of Aristotle’s method in ethics, I will then argue that Mill was largely responsible for popularizing this account. I will show that his empiricist logic became the framework shaping the interpretations of Aristotle offered by which a number of anglophone scholars in the second half of the nineteenth century, including George Grote (1850), Alexander Grant (1857), Henry Sidgwick (1874), J.A. Stewart (1892), and John Burnet (1900). Grote, for example, sees Mill’s “admirable” logic as importantly “enlarging and recasting” the work of Aristotle. Despite the innovations that Mill made upon the logic of Aristotle, Grote nevertheless downplays their differences: “we must recollect that the distance, between the best modern logic and
that of Aristotle, is hardly so great as that between Aristotle and those who preceded him by a century."

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5D "Modi, Obama, and the Gita: The Politics of a Diplomatic Gift."

The Bhagavad Gita remains a powerful political work in the modern world. Recently the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, has utilized the Gita as a diplomatic gift in China, Japan, and the United States. The Indian External Affairs Minister has proposed declaring the Gita a “national scripture” of India. The talk will consider Modi’s gift of a Bhagavad Gita according to Gandhi to the American President, Barack Obama, as part of a political and religious rhetoric.

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2H “The Homonymy Principle in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals”

Aristotle argues that a body or a part without its formal principle is a body or part only by name. For example, the hand of a corpse will be a “hand” only by name, since it no longer has soul in it and thus it is no longer able to exercise its function. Something analogous occurs in the case of artifacts: a wooden axe, unable to cut, will be an “axe” only by name. This way of reasoning has come to be known later in the literature as the “Homonymy Principle” (HP). Aristotelian scholarship has focused on Aristotle’s account and use of the HP in the De Anima and has discussed the HP primarily in the context of intense discussions about the proper matter of a living body. But not much attention has been paid to his account of the HP elsewhere in general, and almost none has been paid to its use in the GA in particular. This is surprising, since Aristotle uses the HP in the GA several times. In this paper I explore how Aristotle uses the HP in the GA, thus beginning to fill a lacuna in recent scholarship. Although yet in an exploratory way, I am able to show that Aristotle uses and expands the HP in new and interesting ways. I first consider briefly the five passages in which Aristotle uses explicitly the HP outside the GA (De Anima, Metaphysics, Politics, Parts of Animals, and Meteorology), offering next a brief summary of their account and use of the HP. In the central part of the paper I analyze in some detail the four passages of the GA in which Aristotle uses the HP (three times explicitly, one time only implicitly), comparing the results with previous accounts and uses of the HP outside the GA. Of particular interest is Aristotle use of the HP in the context of generation, during which bodies and their parts are incomplete. I conclude that, within a fundamental consistency as regards the account of the HP as found elsewhere, Aristotle’s use of the HP in the GA is new in several important respects, and therefore worth considering. For example, instead of using the HP to determine when a particular body or part is a body or part only by name, in the GA Aristotle uses the HP to determine whether and when that which comes to be (e.g. seeds) have soul in them. Interestingly, he also uses the HP to determine which soul must be had (nutritive or sensitive), as well as in what mode (in dunamis or in energia), if the parts that are being generated come to be ensouled.

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1A Indian Philosophy Round Table: Rethinking Epic(s)
This roundtable brings together experts working on multiple epic traditions (Homeric, Indian, and English) that can be broadly described as “epic” with the goal of asking: what makes a tradition “epic”? What does it mean to study “epics”? And what should the goal of “epic studies” be within the context of wider literary and humanistic concerns and disciplines?

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2J “Some Problems in Translation of Tajik-Farsi Mystical Language Texts to Ordinary Language English”

This study focuses on the problems on translating to clear English, the Tajik-Farsi allegorical texts. Our foci include the complexities of Tajik-Farsi mystical icons and intentional psychological concepts. In our analyses, we focus on the mystical vocabulary of Jallal ad-Din Rumi (1207-1273) in Divan Shams related to “salvation” as well as “the stages of mystical ascent” in ibn Sina’s (980-1037) Isharat wa-l Tanbihat, Book IV.

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2I “Characterizing the Kalon in Aristotle”

Commentators on Plato and Aristotle usually claim that the term ‘kalon’ is ambiguous. This is reflected in the arsenal of English words used to translate ‘kalon’: ‘beautiful’, ‘fine’, ‘noble’, ‘admirable’, ‘honorable’, ‘genteel’, and even the more generic ‘good’ (among others). This has also led some commentators to the position that there are distinct senses of ‘kalon’, most importantly, distinct moral and aesthetic senses. In the case of Aristotle in particular, Irwin argues (i) that Aristotle counts ‘kalon’ as a homonym, (ii) that in ascribing kalon to diverse entities he does not ascribe the same property in each case, and yet (iii) that he does not think that he is equivocating on ‘kalon’ when he does so. The aim of this paper is to show that ‘kalon’ in Aristotle’s writings should be interpreted as relatively unified in meaning and far less ambiguous than has commonly been supposed. Further, I argue that the ascription of kalon to an entity involves ascribing the same underlying properties: order (taxis), proportion (summetria), and determinateness (horismenon). (I may, tangentially, mention salient comparisons with Plato’s usage of ‘kalon’, but Plato’s account deserves a paper unto itself.) My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I draw both on Aristotle’s explicit discussion of the kalon and on a wide range of uses, which suggest strong uniformity of meaning. One task here will be to show that many statements and arguments Aristotle offers would lose their force, or (in some cases) turn out to be incoherent, if the term does not have a strongly uniform meaning. Second, I show that the main textual evidence offered by scholars in order to argue that ‘kalon’ is ambiguous or equivocal can be accommodated by my interpretation. I conclude with considerations in favor of translating ‘kalon’ with the English word ‘beautiful’.

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2G “Relativity, Relata and Relatives in Pyrrhonian Scepticism”

Relativity (pros ti) is a lynchpin of Pyrrhonian Scepticism. However, Sextus’ discussion of relativity in Scepticism leads to puzzles. In this paper, I address these puzzles by getting clear on what notion of relativity Sextus operates with.
There are three puzzles. First, *pros ti* is both the eighth of the ten modes of Aenesidemus
(*PH 1 135-40*) but also the mode to which all ten a reduced (*PH 1 38-40*). Second, *pros ti* is included
in the five modes of Agrippa (*PH 1 167*), but seems either redundant or to imply that all relations
are irreflexive. Third, arguments that Sextus gives against certain relative concepts involve false
premises. Sextus’s critique of signs assumes that to grasp a related thing, one must grasp what it
relates to. Sextus’s critique of proof assumes all relations are irreflexive. Sextus’s critique of causes
assumes that related things exist at all times their correlates exist.

I argue that Sextus operates with a view of relativity on which each of these apparently
irrational moves makes sense. First, I distinguish ‘relata’ from ‘relatives’. Relata are any two items
related by a dyadic relation. ‘Relatives’ are items such that a relation is essential to the concept of
item. For example, smoke is a sign of fire, so smoke and fire are relata. But ‘being a sign of fire’ is
not part of the concept of ‘smoke’, so smoke and fire are not relatives. On the other hand, ‘being
sign of a signified’ is part of the concept of ‘sign’, so sign (and signified) are relatives. Second, I
argue that Sextus takes relativity to involve relatives on the basis of textual evidence in *M 8 161.4-
163.1*, *M 8 164-5* and *M 8 453.1-454.1*. Third, I show that the puzzles described above can be solved
if we recognize that relativity often involves relatives and not relata in Pyrrhonian Scepticism in
general and Sextus in particular.

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1F “Ancient Liberty and Modern Medicine”

This paper explores the distinction between ancient and modern freedom and its implications for
contemporary biomedical ethics. In his famous 1816 essay, Benjamin Constant characterizes ancient
freedom as a kind of collective participation in the life of the community. In contrast, modern
freedom resides in the individual rather than the collective and in the pursuit of private aims rather
than communal obligations.

The concept of modern freedom (or to use Isaiah Berlin’s formulation: negative liberty)
often dominates discussions in biomedical ethics. Individual autonomy is a bedrock principle: it is
used to frame debates over the creation of new life, the enhancement of existing life, and the
difficult question of what end-of-life choices should be permitted.

However, there are two problems with proclaiming the ultimate victory of modern freedom.
First, individual liberty is often regarded abstractly and in legalistic terms. The concept of a rights-
bearing patient is not the same as a private individual grappling with the existential dilemmas
inherent in creating, enhancing, and terminating life.

Second, reconsidering the idea of ancient freedom allows us to recognize an analogy
between that concept and modern references to human nature. It is true that the *political* sense of
ancient freedom is, for the most part, extinct (i.e. representative, rather than direct, democracy is a
much more viable model for large pluralistic societies). Yet modern references to human nature as a
kind of Self (as in Daniel Callahan’s distinction between Self and World) are reminiscent of the
ancient regard for individuals as part of a whole. Leon Kass’ repugnance towards human cloning is
rooted in his defense of human nature as a kind of collective, rather than individual and personal,
self.

I conclude that the victory of modern freedom over ancient freedom is only apparent
and superficial. We do not have sufficient regard for the personal and existential character of dilemmas
in biomedical ethics. Nor do we recognize how the concept of human nature, as employed in these
debates, is a reinvention of the ancient conception of freedom as collective participation.
In his *Meditations*, Marcus-Aurelius mentions Heraclitus by name more than any other philosopher aside from Socrates and Epictetus. His impact on the text is such that Long (1996) reduces the influence of Greek philosophy on the *Meditations* to the Stoics and Heraclitus. This paper attempts to show just how pervasive Heracliteanism is in Marcus’ writings. It is by no means intended as an exhaustive survey of all Heraclitean passages in the *Meditations* – which would be a near impossible task. Rather, by discussing a few focused examples, I hope to highlight the way in which Heraclitus’ thought, imagery, and hints of his style can be traced throughout the work. The value of this is twofold. Firstly, Marcus’ own interpretation of the fragments provides a unique perspective on Heraclitus’ work, which has mostly been overlooked. Secondly, I will show that an understanding of Heraclitean fragments can enhance our reading of the *Meditations*.

Heraclitus had a well attested influence on Stoicism, and Stoic sources are crucial to our understanding of his work. Interestingly, Marcus’ interpretation of some of Heraclitus’ most famous fragments differs from that of earlier Stoics. For example, Marcus uses the Heraclitean imagery of the river in flux repeatedly. He once (at *Med.* VI.15) does so in terms reminiscent of a discussion of the same image by Cleanthes and Zeno (SVF 1.519 = B12). Yet, as I show, there can be no doubt that while the latter’s interpretation of the fragment is psychological, Marcus’ is not. Similarly, I argue that Marcus uses Heraclitus’ ‘sleeping man’ fragment (*Med.* IV.46 = B73) to make a typically Stoic argument regarding our evaluation of indifferents. Sextus Empiricus (MVII.126-34 = A16) suggests that other Stoics, on the other hand, used it to illustrate their view that all men are citizens of a cosmic city. Marcus therefore offers new insight into the treatment of Heraclitus’ work. In addition, the divergence of interpretations tells us something about Marcus’ Stoicism and shows that even within a given school of thought the same fragments were understood differently.

Knowledge and understanding of Heraclitean fragments can also enlighten our reading of Marcus’ text. I conclude the paper by highlighting a number of passages in which we can see a stylistic influence. This philological, rather than philosophical, influence is perhaps surprising. It should encourage us to consider the variety of ways in which Heraclitus’ writings might have been perceived. More significantly, I will argue that it can help us make sense of at least two difficult passages in the *Meditations* which have troubled editors of the text for over a century.

Select Bibliography

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6G “Healing Light: Neoplatonism and 13th Century Philosophy of Medicine”

This paper examines Neoplatonic influences on the development of philosophy of medicine in the 13th century. In particular, it argues that for some philosophers at the time, the adoption of a version of divine illumination as well as some Neoplatonic astronomical views was held to provide
grounds for medical principles to serve as first principles in scientific demonstrations. In particular, principles concerning what plants to use as medicines to treat a particular disease, and when and how such plants ought to be administered to a patient were held to require a Neoplatonic basis if they were to be counted as scientific principles.

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1F “Plutarch, Epaminondas, and Montaigne’s Invention of Society”

In his Essais, a book teeming with references to and admiration for ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, Montaigne describes Plutarch of Chaeronea as “the most judicious author in the world,” and as a philosopher who, in his Lives, teaches us virtue. Meanwhile, Montaigne ranks the Theban general Epaminondas as the most outstanding man among the ancient Greeks and Romans, above Homer, Alexander, and even Socrates. This essay is an attempt to give an account of Montaigne’s choice of these somewhat unlikely philosophical heroes. In sum, I argue that Montaigne’s admiration for Plutarch and Epaminondas is inseparable from what Ann Hartle has called Montaigne’s “invention of society.”

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6A “The Problem of Death in Gregory of Nyssa”

The issue of death in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, is a deeply philosophical problem that exceeds the theological and soteriological frame. Most of all, it is a reference to the existential strife of the human life and a recognition of its traumas. There are two main aspects in the particular thanatological interpretation: a negative and a positive one. The negative aspect primarily concerns the removal of man from God. There would be no death, if man had remained close to God. Evil crept into the world because of man’s disobedience and his devotion to sin. Gregory claims that death, in a deterministic definition, is the end of this life, the cessation of that kind of existence that is connected directly to the flesh. Death is the exclusion from life, as an aftermath of man’s deliberate action of excluding God from his own life and rejecting his relationship with Him. Death occurs when the soul has departed from the divine realm. Man, abandoning his ontological commitment to the divine, falsifies his life, while being subjugated to the material.

In the positive outlook, according to Gregory, death is ultimately a benefaction to mankind. Through death, human sin ends, preventing the domination and the further perpetuation of Evil. The body itself is a neutral element in the synthesis of “nous” and “soma”, since it is not considered as a cause, but only as a means of evil. Thus, and despite the fact that the body remains ethically neutral, the deliverance from Evil can be achieved with the termination of the existing relationship between body and soul. Death is indeed a loss and simultaneously a birth, leading to a crucial meeting between God and the soul. Through logos, reason, which now persists in the transcendent nature of the human being, passions and irrationality are banished from life. Gregory upholds that people have a natural tendency towards the Good. The supreme goal of a being is self-awareness. Knowing the true nature of beings and knowing himself, man becomes an immortal being. Knowledge is the route to immortality and to the liberation from all evil. Death is described as a stage in evolution, practically as a continuation of living. All in all, death demonstrates the omnipotence of God. If there were no death, God would surrender to the options that man would have established and He would accept the presence of Evil in the world. In that context, death cannot be conceived as a punishment to the human race. What is punishment indeed is life...
itself, where man has to endure his passions and his irrational desires. In Resurrection, the totality of body and soul is saved, whereas man has rejected a life of sin at the same time with his own free will.

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3E “Aristotle on Vice by Choice”

Scholars have recently engaged in a fundamental debate over how we should understand the vicious character whom Aristotle calls the _akolastos_ (variously translated as the "self-indulgent", "intemperate", or "unrestrained" person). The debate arises from the fact that Aristotle appears to say contradictory things about the _akolastos_ in different parts of the _Nicomachean Ethics_. In _NE VII_, Aristotle argues that he acts viciously "by choice" and therefore has "no regrets." But in _NE IX_, Aristotle portrays the vicious person as at odds with himself and full of regrets. Drawing on the first set of passages, scholars such as Julia Annas and Terence Irwin have argued that we should see the _akolastos_ as a "principled" agent whose beliefs, desires, and actions are unified around the consistent pursuit of vicious ends. By contrast, those such as Jozef Müller who emphasize the second set of passages contend that the _akolastos_ is a "conflicted" agent who pursues whatever seems pleasant to him at the moment and lacks a unified, consistent character. In "Aristotle on Vice by Choice," I argue that the reasons put forth by Müller in a recent attempt to show that the _akolastos_ cannot be a principled agent do not succeed, and, more broadly, that we need not interpret the _akolastos_ as exclusively "principled" or "conflicted": rather, we should see it as a strength of Aristotle's account that he recognizes a range of ways to be a vicious person.

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3G “Aristotle’s Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth”

The terms constituting the title of this paper are often used by philosophers, but they are also often used ambiguously, with no definition of either “real” or “correspondence”. Yet, we apply both the terms “realism” and “the correspondence theory of truth” to Aristotle. Whatever it is that we might infer of a developed theory by either of those titles, an examination of how things that don’t exist fit into an ontological schema should be immediately interesting. For in the case of realism, things that don’t exist, if they are anything at all, would not be real, if we are to equate reality with existence. These difficulties, however, are easily surmounted and, I submit, only arise in the context of more contemporary literature, where we begin to equate terms such as “real” and “extramental” (or “material”, or “objective”, or “independent of a subject”). Such equivalencies only result if we consider anti-realism in opposition to realism; however, the distinction itself does not seem to have arisen until relatively lately (relative, that is, to the history of philosophy).

That Aristotle was a realist is very infrequently questioned. Jack D. Davidson asserts in the opening paragraph of “Appearance, Antirealism, and Aristotle” that anti-realism is commonly believed (among philosophers) to be a recent development, “certainly not endorsed by any thinker
prior to Kant.”

The purpose of his paper is to defend Aristotle’s perceived realism against the charge of Martha Nussbaum, who characterizes Aristotle as a sort of Anti-Realist.

I claim that Nussbaum’s concept of anti-realism and Davidson’s concept of realism are similarly flawed, for both introduce into the definition of “realism” a divorce between knower and known, specifying that anything real must be both extralinguistic and extramental. This skewed definition of “real” already assumes anti-realism of a sort, for it defines a reality distinct from thought and language, and implicit in such a definition is that thought and language themselves are not real.

We have no reason to suspect that Aristotle would make the same implicit claim—namely that thought or language itself is somehow less real than the things to which it is supposed to correspond. As we move further away from the things, into thoughts and linguistic representations, the possibility is introduced not to be less real, but to be subject to the possibility of not being true. If we were to assume that Aristotle is, in fact, a realist, and also that thought and language are not as real as extramental, extralinguistic objects, then this would put us in serious danger of defining thought and language themselves as not existing, for what exists is real.

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3B ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***

“Socrates as Teacher of Virtue and Corruptor of the Youth: The Case of Alcibiades”

Xenophon expressed his amazement that his fellow Athenians convicted their best philosopher and most virtuous citizen on such charges as impiety and corruption of the youth. His book, the Memorabilia, is devoted to defending his beloved and respected teacher of virtue.

Regarding the charge of corruption of the youth, he stated as a fact that: “Among the associates of Socrates were Critias and Alcibiades; and none wrought so many evils to the state. For Critias in the days of the oligarchy bore the palm for greed and violence; Alcibiades, for his part, exceeded all in licentiousness and insolence under the democracy.” (Memo. 1.17)

My purpose in this study is to address the following questions: Did Socrates have some corrupting influence on Alcibiades and other Athenian youth? What exactly was the relationship between these two Athenians who dominated the political and intellectual stage of their city in the turbulent last third of the fifth century BCE? Was Socrates a corruptor of youth or a teacher and paragon of virtue? How, in Socrates view, is a potential political leader to be trained?

By identifying and critically analyzing the evidence found in the Platonic Dialogues, especially Alcibiades I; Xenophon’s works, especially the Memorabilia; and Plutarch’s Alcibiades, it will be shown that the cause of Alcibiades’ corruption was not Socrates, but his unlimited political ambition and the Athenian Demos who fueled it with their adoration of him.

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5I Round Table Symposium: Adaptation of Medieval Islamic Theology to the 21st Century Central Asian Secular State


Original Islamic Theology—analogous to its Judaic and Christian traditions—embeds a number of directives in economics suited for the medieval period. However, through the concept of *ijtihad* Islam also allows adaption of its praxis to actual contemporary arena. To that end, a number of predominately Muslim nations, opt for a secular type state—and not an Islamic Republic based on the so-called fundamentalists principle. The participants in this symposium discuss both the philosophical foundation of Islamic Theology—especially in context of Suras revealed prior to 1622 (*Hijra*) and adaptability of Islamic economic to contemporary 21st Century global village.

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4C “Contemplation as *Eudaimonia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: On Embodiment, *Phronesis*, and *Sophia*”

What makes a life devoted to theoretical wisdom and contemplation so (allegedly) un-Aristotelian? By defining happiness as contemplation in Book X.6-8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is Aristotle suggesting *either* you live the life of contemplation *or* you will not be, to any degree, happy? Is Aristotle’s point that in order to be happy, one must earnestly attempt to detach oneself from the human condition, disengage from one’s social situation, and effectively turn one’s back on the world of particularities? Do deliberation and choice become obsolete in the life of contemplation? Rather than attempting to reconcile the seemingly irresolvable tension between the allegedly conflicting definitions of happiness in Books I and X in the *Ethics*, I will consider the role of embodiment, our social reality, and our perpetual need to deliberate and choose throughout Aristotle’s *Ethics*. I will suggest that for Aristotle, embodiment (and all of its associated limitations), as well as our social situation, are necessary conditions of ethical excellence, and remain so throughout the *Ethics*—even the seemingly disjointed chapters in Book X. Beyond this, I want to suggest that *sophia* and *phronesis* are not, and should not be construed as, mutually exclusive activities. Insofar as one is human—embodied, limited, finite, always already immersed in a world of particularities with others—*phronesis* never drops out of the picture, and thus remains a crucial dimension of human excellence, even in the life of contemplation.

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1D “Images of Food and Feasting in Plato’s *Republic*”

In this paper, I suggest there is a tension between the bodily need for food and the subordination of corporeal desires to psychic desires in Plato’s *Republic*. Several scholarly interpretations of the soul in the *Republic* suggest that an appetitive desire such as the desire for food is inferior to the spirited or rational desires, just as the body is inferior to the soul. Throughout the *Republic*, desire for food is linked with the appetitive part of the soul, as well as the tyrannical soul and regime. This hierarchy of soul over body is nuanced, however, as the care and nourishment of the body is vital to both body and soul. Food imagery and the desire for food play an integral role in the education of the soul and the narrative trajectory of the *Republic*.

The first section of this paper examines the setting and opening scenes of the *Republic*. The dialogue opens with Socrates and Glaucon about to return home from a festival, when they quickly interrupted in their journey. Dinner is promised to Socrates and Glaucon in Book I as a way to lure them to Cephalus’ house (327a-328a). While it is never apparent that the interlocutors of the *Republic* do eat during their lengthy conversation, the desire for food acts as an impetus for the feast of
conversation that Socrates enjoys in both the Republic and so often elsewhere in Plato’s dialogues. This bodily desire, therefore, need not be curbed, but fostered into higher desires.

The second section examines Glaucon’s desires. I first look at the origin of the “city of pigs” and the “luxurious city” in Book II. The desire for food causes Glaucon to interrupt Socrates’ description of the "city of pigs" and provoke discussion of the "luxurious city" (372d-e). While Socrates eventually reverts back to his original “city of pigs” as the better city, Glaucon’s interruption—and by extension, his desire—acts as an impetus for advancing the conversation. I then examine Glaucon in relation to the tripartite soul of Book IV and the types of souls and regimes in Books VIII-IX of the Republic. Socrates describes the soul dominated by appetitive desires as like that of the tyrant, the fifth and final soul. In response to Glaucon’s challenge at the beginning of Book II, Socrates spends the majority of the Republic trying to turn Glaucon’s appetitive desires to higher, rational desires.

In conclusion, I connect the imagery of food and feasting in the Republic to its larger cultural context in Classical Athens. Plato’s dialogues themselves acknowledge the importance of food and feasting in Athenian society, whether in private meal gatherings (Symposium, Gorgias) or public festivals (Republic, Timaeus-Critias). His Socrates, furthermore, while standing trial, proposes that the Athenians provide him with meals for the rest of his life as a counter-penalty to execution (Apology 36b-37a). I suggest that Plato appropriates the importance of food and feasting, as well as the health of the body in general, for the philosophic pursuit of wisdom.

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4A “Reading the Phaedrus at the School of Athens”

The enigmatic description of the vision of the ‘region beyond heaven’ in the Phaedrus have naturally attracted much attention, not least that of the Neoplatonists of the School of Athens. This paper proposes to examine two interpretations of this passage. Both are the products of Athenian Neoplatonists, sharing a common root in the lectures given by Syrianus, yet each arrives at substantially different conclusions. These differences, we shall argue, are proof that the spirit of debate and hermeneutical diversity, hallmarks of the Greek philosophical tradition, still reigned amongst one of the last philosophical communities of Antiquity.

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2E “Santaraksita’s Synthesis of the Madhyamaka and Cittamatra Traditions”

As Jonathan Gold has pointed out, the Cittamatra and Madhyamaka distinction did not exist at the time of Vasubandhu, who considered himself a Madhyamaka philosopher. Similarly, Santaraksita was able to affirm aspects of Cittamatra thought without abandoning the Madhyamaka. His motivation for accepting the idealist view on the relative level was to make sense of the insight, held also by Descartes, that awareness cannot be denied without contradiction. He argued, however, that awareness cannot be identified with perception of objects.

Santaraksita rejects any attempt to define awareness. The most he will claim is that a series of causes produces both awareness and that which comes into awareness.

On the absolute level the causality appearing on the relative level can be shown via Nagarjuna’s arguments, to be non-existent. What then of awareness? Awareness, he claims, is ultimately emptiness. But emptiness, for Santaraksita, is not nothing, but rather the end constituting enlightenment, wisdom and bliss beyond duality and conception.
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4I “Aristotle on Reproduction, Survival, and God”

There is a fairly common and uncontested view among scholars that, for Aristotle, reproduction is a means to survive. Balme, for instance, claims without an argument that “reproduction is…the individual’s attempt…to survive”; Polansky reports that it is a means for the plant or animal to preserve “its own life as much as it can” ii and Johnson describes reproduction as “a kind of attenuated immortality,” and a means to “survive eternally”. iii The main source for this position is a well-known passage in De Anima ii 4, wherein Aristotle posits god as a final cause of reproduction for the apparent purpose of explaining why this capacity belongs to the nutritive soul, “the first and most common capacity of the soul” (415a24-25). iv Aristotle’s answer is that “the most natural function of animals…is to produce another such as itself…in order that it may partake in the eternal and divine insofar as it is able” (415a26-b1).

At issue is the role of god in scientific explanations. If the above-mentioned scholars are correct, and organisms survive through their offspring, then Aristotle does not need to evoke god to why reproduction, like nutrition, is fundamental to the life of an organism. Assuming that teleological explanations are organism centered—that the organism is the beneficiary of its nature and functions—on this line, reproduction and nutrition belong to the same capacity because they have the same end: an end that does not require justification beyond Aristotle’s self-evident refrain that it is better to exist than not to exist.” Accordingly, on this interpretation, the postulation of god as reproduction’s final cause is but a poetic metaphor used to describe the work of reproducing: a metaphor that carries no philosophical or scientific weight.

Yet careful attention to the biological treatises reveals that neither the benefit nor fundamentality of reproduction is evidenced by the empirical facts, at least as Aristotle describes them. In brief: reproduction robs the body of vital nutriments, cutting short the lives of organisms who copulate frequently or produce abundant seed; not all creatures able to absorb nutriments are able to reproduce; reproduction tends to emerge at a later stage of development and depart earlier than the capacity for nutrition. The aim of this presentation is to show that Aristotle needs god to explain why reproduction is as beneficial and fundamental to life as the acquisition and absorption of food, such that those who cannot reproduce its kind must be imperfect. In the first part of this presentation, I will describe the observations suggesting that reproduction, on the one hand, is detrimental to the both the males and females involved; and, on the other hand, that it is a separate, higher-ordered capacity. I will then describe how god is meant to show that reproduction and nutrition belong to the same capacity. In the second part, I will explain why Aristotle is committed to the view that reproduction is within the domain of the nutritive soul.

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2A “The authorship of ps-Simplicius’ In de Anima”

The authorship of the commentary on Aristotle's De Anima ascribed in the manuscript tradition to Simplicius of Cilia is contested. Ilsetraut Hadot has recently reasserted arguments in favor of the historical identification of Simplicius as the author of the commentary, in response to Bossier-Steel's hypothesis of an authorship by either Priscian of Lydia or another member of the late antique Greek
philosophical community centered around the Athenian Academy closed in 529 CE by Justinian I. In this paper I will revisit and reexamine the issue of authorship, in light of the recent analysis of Hadot and others, as well as an examination of the interpretive methods and positions adopted in those commentaries more securely attributable to Simplicius. In doing so, I hope to shed additional light on the question of resolving the authorship of In De Anima.

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4G “Knowing Virtue by having a Relationship with It: A Study of the Meno”

The Meno’s opening is surprisingly different from all the Platonic dialogues that come before it, and I include here the Socratic ones. First, we do not have an obvious dramatic setting; second, Socrates is the one who is asked a question. “Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?” (70a1-3). While Socrates is famous for his search for propositional definitions, here he brings up an interesting analogy: “knowing what virtue is” is similar to “knowing who a person is.” Socrates says, “If I do not know what something is, how could I know what qualities it possesses? Or do you think it is possible that someone who does not know at all Meno, whoever he is, could know whether he is good-looking or rich or well-born, or the opposite of these?” (71b) Instead of using a person, Socrates could have given here other possible examples. He could have said, “do you think that someone who does not know at all what a triangle is would be able to say what properties such a thing has?” After all, other examples from the dialogue have a connection with geometry: the slave boy is asked to find out the area of a square, and Meno is given the definition of shape as an example of the kind of definition he should give regarding virtue. This raises the question why Socrates uses the analogy with a person.

In this paper, I show that Plato has Socrates make this analogy in order to perform the answer to the question that starts the dialogue. Learning virtue does not necessarily produce the ability to define it, but rather to act out of it. The analogy with knowing a person works because a person is not known propositionally, but rather in taking the person within one’s heart, as, I venture, it happens in the case of virtue, where learning it also means becoming virtuous. I will show that the structure of the dialogue supports this interpretation. Here, I only mention that the first half of the text, up to Socrates’ portrait as a torpedo fish, is a series of elenchī that have as purpose cleansing Meno’s soul. This brings Meno in the position to be able to take Socrates within his heart, to know him—and thus he offers the portrait. After this moment, the dialogue changes, and the elenchī are no longer directed to Meno. At the end, the purpose of the dialogue is to show that learning virtue is to be able to have a relationship with it, just as it is for persons.

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4F “Memory, Identity and Palingenesis in Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura: The Reassemblage Hypothetical at 3.843-61”

At De Rerum Natura 3.843-61, Lucretius introduces a thought experiment intended to appeal to a Platonically-inclined opponent who, in worrying about death, worries about future reincarnation. According to the thought experiment, after death and the passage of many generations, the atoms
which once constituted an individual come to be again in the arrangement that previously constituted that individual. Lucretius argues from the premise that we are not now concerned about any previous self we might have been, since we lack memory of such an existence, to the claim that, if palingenesis were to occur, we would not have memory of, and so would not care about, our current selves. He then concludes, relying implicitly on the symmetry principle, that we ought not, therefore, currently care about any future self which may come to be. While recent work on the palingenesis passage has corrected a long-standing misinterpretation, this passage raises a question about how memory operates within the materialistic reductive Epicurean system to which Lucretius subscribes. If the only things that exist per se are atoms and void, and the very same atoms that constitute an individual now come to be in the very same arrangement in the future, then how could the future instantiation of this individual lack the memories that the individual currently possesses? I argue that memory, for Lucretius, consists not in particular atoms or their arrangement, but in a cultivated propensity for one’s atoms to engage in motions of specific types upon contact with the eidos of certain external objects. Memory is a matter of imprinting, and so a future self will not be imprinted in the same way as the current self, even if the atoms which constitute each are (a) identical, and (b) identically ordered.

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5E ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***

“The Role of Friends in Eudaimonia”

Aristotle thinks that friends are an essential part of a flourishing human life and asserts that they are the most valuable of all external goods. But what is the precise relationship between friends and eudaimonia? I argue that there are three ways in which friends may contribute to eudaimonia. First, friends are instrumentally valuable; they facilitate our virtuous activity by providing us with opportunities to benefit them, and they offer us benefits in return. Second, friends are especially pleasant, and the pleasure we experience in living together with our friends amplifies the perceived value of both the friendship and our own living. Of course, this pleasure is conditionally valuable: only the perceptions of value that virtuous agents have are accurate, and only the pleasure that virtuous agents reap in their shared living is a candidate constituent of eudaimonia. Third, the virtuous activities of a virtuous friend are themselves objects of the agent’s own virtuous activities of awareness and, as such, become integrated into the agent’s own eudaimonia. The result is that, in the ideal case of friendship between two virtuous friends who share their lives, each friend contributes to the eudaimonia of the other both non-constitutively as well as constitutively.

14 James Warren, “Lucretian Palingenesis Recycled,” Classical Quarterly 51.2 (2001). Scholars have traditionally interpreted the palingenesis passage as introducing memory or continuity of consciousness as a necessary condition for personal identity. Perhaps influenced by Locke’s theories of personal identity, modern commentators argue that Lucretius considers the reassembly hypothetical and then denies that a future incarnation would matter because this future incarnation would simply not be us. Because the individual lacks memory of her past self, she and her past self lack the sort of connection that preserves individual identity over time; hence, there is no cause for self-concern in relation to that previous self. On the contrary, Warren rightly argues, Lucretius thinks that this future instantiation will be the same individual, though that future version will lack the memories of the current version. Even though the future instantiation is the same individual, in Lucretian terms, the current individual ought not to be concerned about this possible future self precisely because that future self lacks memory of a previous self.
Though he has had his defenders,¹ most scholars regard the character of Thrasymachus in Book I of Plato’s *Republic* as a bad lad. Indeed, in a recent unpublished piece,² Ralph Wedgwood declares: “In the character, beliefs, and desires of Thrasymachus, Plato aims to personify some of the most diabolical dangers that lurk in human nature,” and to represent a force that Kant would later describe as “radical evil.”³ Rachel Barney also finds Thrasymachus especially defective both morally and intellectually: because he is “opinionated, arrogant, bad-tempered,” he is completely “hopeless” as an interlocutor.⁴ It is for this reason, Barney explains, Socrates turned to “the talented and tractable” Glauc and Adeimantus as more suitable interlocutors in Book II. It is for this same reason, according to Dusty Hoesly and Nicholas D. Smith, that Socrates’ response to Thrasymachus in Book I was never intended as a serious argument. For, according to Hoesly and Smith: it is impossible to argue with such “belligerent,” “arrogant,” and “bestial” individuals. Instead, Hoesly and Smith argue, Socrates responded to Thrasymachus’ position in the only way that he could, namely to “chastise and shame”⁵ rather than to argue rationally.

I believe that such an assessment of Thrasymachus’s character and intellect, and of Plato’s assessment of Thrasymachus’s character and intellect, is mistaken. While he certainly had significant character flaws and ample room for philosophical growth, like Socrates and unlike Socrates’ other interlocutors in the *Republic*, Thrasymachus had what Socrates considered the most important virtue of all: a single-minded commitment to discovering the truth. When Thrasymachus enters the conversation, his anger and frustration are entirely justified, even if they muddle his thinking and lead to counter-productive expressions of hostility. Indeed, I will argue that the main lesson we should take from the *Republic* is that Thrasymachus’s primary vice is not his peevish questioning of conventional moral norms, but instead his failure to go further— to challenge conventional conceptions of the good life and to imagine alternative possibilities for the future. Were he to take these additional steps, I argue, he and Socrates would come to the same conclusions. They would be, as Socrates later declares that they are, friends (498d).

³ Ibid., 1.
⁵ Dusty Hoesly and Nicholas Smith, “Thrasymachus: Diagnosis and Treatment,” *Dialogues on Plato’s Politics: Selected Papers from the Ninth Symposium Platonicum* (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2013), 61.
Statements in Plato establish the “eye of the body” as a parallel for the “eye of the soul” and correlate parallel concepts with each. The parallels are between the “eye of the body” and the “mind’s eye,” between vision and reason, and between sight and insight. These equations are used to establish a bridge between Plato and Plotinus in this investigation of visual analogies in the dialogues (Phd. 81, Phdr. 250c, Cra. 400c, Rep. 507a-519c, Soph. 265b), Enneads (e.g., On the Three Primary Hypostases and What is the Living Being?), and in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus. The method combines techniques from information science with philosophical and philological analysis. I employ this approach to develop an outline of a sequence of classifications presented in the Platonic dialogues and to show that there are identical serial patterns in Plotinus and Porphyry. I use these parallels to argue for the consonance of Plato and Plotinus and for the continuity of the tradition.

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**5F “Water and Wing: Parallelism in Zhuangzi I-VII and Plato’s Sophist, 265a-268d”**

New digital tools and interdisciplinary techniques for comparative research on ancient writings have uncovered startling regularities in the organization of information in source texts from different cultures in antiquity and from very early times. These studies have demonstrated that there are a number of clear connections among texts and traditions that were previously thought to be unrelated. Perhaps the most significant discovery has been the recognition that the ordering of information in sequential patterns known as parallelism (a-b-c-a-b-c) and “chiasmus” (a-b-c-b-a) is a worldwide phenomenon. Scholars have identified rhetorical sequencing of information in Gilgamesh, Homer, Plato, the Bible, and other major early collections. Scholarship on the ancient Chinese book of *Zhuangzi*, however, has focused almost exclusively on the analysis of content. Little attention has been paid to interpreting the book in terms of its form. This study offers a comparative analysis of the sequential form of the topics and ideas in *Zhuangzi* I-V and Plato’s *Sophist* 265a-268d. This approach combines information theory and methods with philosophical and philological techniques. The study concentrates on a text analysis of topics that deal with water and wings. Comparison of discussions of water and wings shows that the tacit order of the topics in the narrative in the inner chapters of *Zhuangzi* is a near identical match with the topics in the series of definitions presented by explicit instructions in Plato’s *Sophist*. It is unlikely that the number and density of similarities in the ordering of information in the two texts would have occurred by chance or accident. Similarities in the sequencing of information are evidence that points to cultural connections between the philosophical traditions of *Zhuangzi* and Plato. I argue that these findings have major implications for understanding what these ancient texts meant to the cultures and societies that produced them, and for re-evaluating both the history of their reception and their continuing influence.

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**3C “Reasoning about Divine Attributes in Anselm of Canterbury and Henry of Ghent”**

In this paper I examine how the thirteenth-century Parisian master Henry of Ghent (†1293) integrates a line of reasoning from Anselm of Canterbury’s *Proslogion* into his account of God’s attributes. In the last quarter of the thirteenth century, after the death of Thomas Aquinas and before the rise of John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent is one of the leading masters in theology at Paris. Henry’s two major works are his fifteen *Quodlibeta*, disputed between 1276 and 1291/92, and his magisterial yet unfinished *Summa or Quaestiones ordinariae*, which comprise a programmatic part on
human knowledge and theology as a *scientia*, or codified body of knowledge, and detailed discussions of God, divine attributes and the Trinity.

In article 50 of his *Quaestiones ordinariae* Henry of Ghent explores whether (and how) there is delight (*delectatio*) in God. Henry’s theological and philosophical deliberations are guided by his explicit reception of Anselm’s reasoning about divine attributes in the *Proslogion*, especially Anselm’s principle in chapter 5 that we must attribute to God “whatever it is better to be than not to be” (“quidquid melius est esse quam non esse”; ed. F. S. Schmitt I, p. 104, l. 16; cf. ed. I. Logan 2009, p. 36). As Henry of Ghent puts this ‘Anselmian rule’ in article 50, q. 2, “quod est in creaturis non attribuitur Deo nisi sit omnibus et semper ‘melius esse ipsum quam non ipsum,’ secundum regulam Anselmi”; ed. M. Führer, Leuven 2007, p. 185, ll. 5-6).

My analysis has two parts: first I investigate how Henry distinguishes various types of delight in order to define precisely what it means to take delight in something; then I examine how Henry employs Anselm’s principled approach in determining the way in which delight ought to be maximally attributed to God (“ex hoc iuxta regulam Anselmi videre quomodo Deo summe debet attribui”; ed. cit., p. 187, l. 46).

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2E “Understanding Vasubandhu’s Buddhist Analysis of Ineffability”

If we begin from the assumption that the versified Yogācāra treatises attributed to Vasubandhu share a common philosophical motivation, we are justified in connecting Vasubandhu’s claims of the ineffability of ultimate reality with his claim that all language is figurative, and his analysis of all knowledge into three perspectives. The result is a clever system that circumvents the nihilism and self-referential incoherence typically associated with anti-realism and moral relativism. This paper will outline Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra view and explore its potential use toward a constructive, Buddhist naturalist approach to philosophy of language and ethics.

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6I “Principles in Philolaus and the *Philebus*”

For Aristotle, the main philosophical contribution of “the Pythagoreans” was the (to his mind) extravagant proposal that the constituent elements of things are numbers. Scholars have agreed that Aristotle has in mind here Philolaus and his followers. But since the publication of Huffman’s groundbreaking study of Philolaus, it has been generally acknowledged that Philolaus’ main point is epistemological: numbers function as prior epistemological principles by which physical things are to be known, and these numbers themselves have prior principles (odd and even). For example, the numerical ratios that are found among numbers are causal principles to the musical relationships found among certain tones, but not vice versa. In this respect, Philolaus moves beyond earlier Pythagoreans who posited explanatory principles in columns of opposites. He prioritizes certain principles over others, and identifies their logical relationships as reflective of causal relationships. In so doing, he takes important steps in the direction of Aristotle’s philosophy of science. But there is no evidence that Philolaus took the epistemological principles by virtue of which we grasp causal relations to themselves be metaphysical principles. It is for this reason that Huffman makes a sharp distinction between numbers, which for Philolaus grounds our knowledge, and the metaphysical principles of limiters, unlimiteds, and harmony.
It is Plato who explicitly identifies epistemological and metaphysical principles. The paper concludes by considering one respect in which he does so. Building on Philolaus’ thoughts concerning the roles of limiters and unlimited as metaphysical principles, the Philebus grounds the distinction on a more basic distinction between the Limit and the Unlimited. These are both metaphysical and epistemological principles. In identifying the two kinds of principles Plato is either correcting Philolaus, or is drawing out an identification between epistemological and metaphysical principles implicit in Philolaus’ account.

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3B ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***
“Hope and the Philosophical Life: Competing Conceptions of Elpis in Alcibiades, 1”

If wonder is the beginning of the philosophical act, then hope is the fuel that keeps it active. Philosophy needs both to survive: without wonder, there would be no questions raised, no answers sought, no philosophy of which to speak; and without hope, the lover of wisdom would lose motivation and fall into despair. That Plato understood philosophy’s dependence on wonder and hope is evident from the opening pages of Alcibiades 1. First, there is Alcibiades’ wondering why Socrates has not spoken to him until now (103a). Then, there is Socrates’ hope that his daimonion, which had hitherto silenced him, will not oppose him in the future (103b). But that is not all. There are also the contrasting hopes of Alcibiades and Socrates: whereas Alcibiades hopes to become unsurpassed in political power and glory, Socrates hopes to convince Alcibiades that true power comes from self-knowledge (105d–e). The emphasis on wonder and hope at the beginning of Alcibiades 1 is no accident: it is Plato’s way of highlighting to readers the birth of a philosophical relationship. By the time of the Symposium, that once auspicious relationship has fallen apart. Alcibiades has lost his sense of wonder and has traded the hopeful fellowship with Socrates for lonely despair.

Plenty of attention has been given to the rise and fall of the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates, but often ignored is the discussion of hope in Alcibiades 1. Not all hope, according to Plato, is conducive to philosophy. Alcibiadic hope is rooted in the here and now: it looks to the dark and ungodly (134e) and, thus, is blind and wanders (117b). Socratic hope, by contrast, lies in the otherworldly: it looks to the divine and brilliant (134d) and, thus, confers sight to the hopeful, allowing them to see more clearly the fortunes of themselves and others (135e). Of the two, only Socratic hope alone can provide the impulse to philosophy. Alcibiadic hope can result only in misery and despair. This paper will focus on Plato’s discussion of hope (elpis) in Alcibiades 1 and will attempt to locate this discussion within the broader context of his conception of the philosophical life.

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4D “Flattery, Frankness, and Same-Saying in the Gorgias”

This paper concerns the disposition toward truth that is cultivated in Socratic practice. Among the most prominent of the norms governing Socratic conversation are the injunctions to say the same (the consistency constraint) and to say what you believe (the frankness constraint). In this paper I am primarily concerned with the latter. I argue that a central passage of the Gorgias (481d-483a) reveals that Socrates and Callicles have opposing positions on the relevance of frankness to the capacity for same-saying. Developing this opposition allows me to distinguish a genuinely Socratic disposition toward truth from mere frankness.
According to Callicles, self-contradiction arises when a person flatters the crowd by falsely avowing conventional opinions. Anyone who frankly states his or her true beliefs without succumbing to shame will always speak consistently. Underlying this position is the belief that every individual is equipped by nature to identify and seek their own good. This entails that the individual has epistemic authority over what is good for them (transparency of the good), that the variety of goods are not internally contradictory (unity of the good), and that the individual can pursue the apparent good without internal resistance (motivational intellectualism).

Against this, Socrates argues that the source of self-contradiction lies in the orientation of one’s desire. He agrees that those who flatter the crowd contradict themselves, but implies that flattery is a universal condition: everyone always seeks to mirror the beliefs of whomever it is that they love. This condition can be made to serve the ends of truth if the object of desire is itself consistent. When Socrates claims that he only speaks consistently insofar as he seeks to flatter his beloved, Philosophy, who always says the same, he elides the difference between flattery and philosophy that is otherwise rigorously maintained in the dialogue. Thus for Socrates the good is not transparent and the variety of apparent goods are not unified, but one’s attachment to apparent goods must be forsaken in favor of an attachment to the true good as it is revealed through philosophy, i.e. by measuring our speeches against the ideal of same-saying. The person with the correct disposition toward the truth is not shamelessly frank but ashamed before and beholden to the truth. It is only by cultivating this disposition that one becomes able to overcome internal resistances to rational action.

This analysis allows me to distinguish between two senses of truthfulness at work in Socratic practice. Frankness is initially necessary to expose the interlocutor’s soul to Socrates’ diagnostic and prognostic care. However, refutation occasions a moment of aporia and subsequent conversion. In order to remain both frank and consistent, the interlocutor must abandon their attachment to beliefs on the basis of ownership, which is the only attachment Callicles values, and pursue beliefs that will be cultivated as motives for action only insofar as they prove consistent. The injunction ‘say what you believe’ becomes ‘believe what you say’. Thus a successful interlocutor is a subject of the truth first, and of their own beliefs only secondarily.

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6G “Demonstration as a Criterion of Truth in Peripatetic and Neoplatonic Philosophy”

In this paper, I attempt a speculative reconstruction of an early imperial Peripatetic view on the criterion of truth. On this view, the criterion is proof (apodeixis), a learned competency in logic that can be applied to theoretical or ethical philosophy, based on the articulation of our innate preconceptions (prolepseis) of the categories of predication, recognizing the overarching division of essential from accidental predication. I attribute this view to Andronicus of Rhodes (1st century BCE) and Boethus of Sidon (1st centuries BCE-CE), based primarily on Neoplatonic sources. I will argue as follows. (§1) Andronicus of Rhodes, followed by later Peripatetics (excepting Boethus), promoted logic as the first step in Aristotelian philosophy. He likely also anticipated later Peripatetics and Neoplatonists in treating proof (apodeixis) as a criterion of truth. (§2) This view had roots in Antiochus of Ascalon’s elevation of dialectic—in the Stoic sense of that word—to the status of criterion, a position that Antiochus credits to the Old Academy and Aristotle in contradistinction to the orthodox Stoics. (§3) But New Academics, including Cicero, maintained that Antiochus’ valuation of logic was undermined by skeptical puzzles turning on ambiguity: among
other difficulties, Stoicism lacked a systematic account of equivocation and semantic vagueness. (§4) Andronicus, I suggest, responded to those puzzles later in the first century BCE. Andronicus followed Antiochus in valuing logic as a criterion, but substituted Aristotelian *apodeixis* for Stoic dialectic; he also situated the *Categories* at the head of the Aristotelian curriculum. On Andronicus’ view, the *Categories* is a semantic treatise that forfends against puzzles of equivocation by introducing a clear distinction between essential and accidental predication, grounded in our natural intuitions about the semantic categories in which simple referring terms successfully refer, facilitating the construction of definitions and demonstrative proofs (*apodeixis*). Hence the *Categories* is the first step on the road to truth. (§5) But exactly how are these intuitions cultivated? Andronicus and his pupil Boethus maintained that we all have preconceptions (*prolepseis*) of the ten categories in which meaningful predication is possible, and the *Categories* enables us to articulate these preconceptions.

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1C “A More Salutary State: Platonic and Epicurean Arguments Against the Fear of Death in al-Rāzī’s Spiritual Medicine”

This talk will focus on Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyyāʾ al-Rāzī’s *Book of Spiritual Medicine*, which offers its readers a battery of therapeutic arguments against various irrational passions (construed as maladies of the soul). The book culminates in an attempt to cure the most deeply-rooted and dangerous passion of all: our fear of death. I suggest that al-Rāzī’s approach to this topic can be read as a pragmatic reconciliation within the Islamic tradition of two antipodal philosophical orientations: Platonism and Epicureanism.

Al-Rāzī (ca. 250/854-313/925 or 323/935) is an unusual figure amongst the classical Islamic philosophers, for various reasons. He gained a notorious reputation as a freethinking heretic, due to his exclusive reliance on intellect, his bold critique of prophecy and his hostility towards religious traditions (including Islam). Further, in a tradition dominated by the influence of Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, he identified explicitly with the philosophy of Socrates and Plato. Some scholars have additionally argued that one can find distinctly Epicurean doctrines woven throughout al-Rāzī’s writings (atomistic materialism, ethical hedonism, etc). Other have rejected this reading because al-Rāzī himself seems not to have had any demonstrable access to Epicurus’ writings and because much of his putative hedonism can be traced back to Platonic texts (e.g., the *Philebus*). However, the question of al-Rāzī’s ‘Epicureanism’ does not hinge entirely on his ethics. As I shall argue, al-Rāzī’s treatment of death in the final chapter of the *Spiritual Medicine* involves therapies of the soul that are unmistakably Epicurean.

Al-Rāzī’s arguments against the fear of death in fact exemplify his creative syncretism of Platonic and Epicurean ideas. Throughout the *Spiritual Medicine*, al-Rāzī repeatedly and explicitly draws upon Socratic-Platonic strategies, and one accordingly expects a similar approach in the final chapter of the book. Socrates (at least in the *Phaedo*) had tried to cure his interlocutors’ thanatophobia by proving the deathlessness of the soul, a commitment that al-Rāzī himself claims to share. Yet when the chips are down, he sets aside any Platonic account—ostensibly due to practical constraints of time and space—and instead offers up a paradigmatically Epicurean argument against the fear of death, complete with detailed objections and replies. In short, the soul perishes with the corruption of the body, and since the death of the body entails the cessation of any possible experience including pain, death is literally “nothing to us”. On the face of it, this is very odd, since Plato and Epicurus’ positions regarding the ontological status of the soul seem diametrically opposed. Yet al-Rāzī’s last minute slight of hand draws attention to the underlying commonality of their therapeutic
approaches, captured nicely by his framing statement: “This disposition [fear of death] cannot be dispelled from the soul entirely, unless it be satisfied that it will pass after death into a state more salutary to it than its present.”

The pride of place that al-Rāzī gives to the Epicurean philosophy at the very climax of the *Spiritual Medicine* raises some interesting questions: does he himself believe this is actually the correct account (despite his self-proclaimed allegiance to Socrates and Plato)? If it’s not true, how are we to understand its presumed therapeutic or even salvific power? Is it a merely a provisional teaching, appropriate for those who have not (yet) had the time, leisure or inclination to pursue philosophy seriously and grasp the full rational force of Plato’s more thoroughly considered stance? If so, how might it be situated relative to true philosophical conclusions on the one hand and the presumably misleading mythopoetic claims of revealed religions on the other? Through this discussion I hope to shed light on two issues: (a) the status and function of Epicurean doctrines in al-Rāzī’s thought and (b) the soteriological function of knowledge in classic Islamic philosophy (asserted by al-Rāzī and codified by subsequent thinkers such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā).

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2C “Carpenters, Painters, and the Categories of Imitation”

In *Republic* X, Socrates tries to distinguish the painter from the carpenter and god by saying the painter imitates that which appears as it appears, in contrast to imitating that which is as it is. However, he does not mention the other two obvious categories of imitation: imitating that which is as it appears and imitating that which appears as it is. In this paper, I consider in some detail all four categories and Socrates’ treatment, or non-treatment, of them. I argue that the imitative distinction between carpenter and painter is not strong enough to support Socrates’ prejudice against the painter.

Along the way, I come to a few significant conclusions. First, perhaps contrary to Socrates’ opinion, no human can imitate that which is as it is. Neither, it would seem, can the god accomplish such imitation since, for example, there can be only one formal bed, and any other bed the god could make would not be able to imitate the formal bed as it is, but only as it appears. Next, as Socrates says, painters, by imitating carpenters, imitate that which appears as it appears. However, this description is not exhaustive, in part because some painters imitate other painters. In doing so, they can imitate that which appears as it is. More importantly, however, if carpenters’ inferior imitations can be imitations of the forms, there is also reason to think that painters’ imitations can, (sometimes in a more inferior but still real way), imitate the forms and need not merely be imitations of physical things. Ultimately, then, instead of there being a particularly significant difference between the painter and the carpenter in terms of imitation and appearance, their work shares an imitative kinship, and at the very least they form a more incremental chain than Socrates seems to want to accept.

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1G “Architecture, Engineering, and the Problem of the Earliest Geometrical Diagrams”

In important studies on the origins and early developments of geometry in Greece, Reviel Netz argues (1999 and 2003) that while the earliest lettered diagrams that survive trace not earlier than
Aristotle (and they are outside geometry proper, in any case), the earliest geometrical diagrams can be traced to Anaxagoras, Hippocrates, and Oinopides of the mid-5th century B.C.E. While these do not survive, Netz makes a speculative inference based on later reports that mention diagrams in their papyrus rolls. The origins of geometry in the story he tells focuses on geometrical diagrams that are not diagrams of temples or buildings, for instance (though none of these survive either), but rather where the diagrams are the objects-in-themselves.

It is my claim that Netz has the whole picture wrong. We have evidence of a lettered geometrical diagram a century before Anaxagoras and Hippocrates in the tunnel of Eupalinos of Samos (Pythagoras’ backyard), and mathematically precise geometrical diagrams from the first half of the 7th century in the Temple of Artemis in Ephesis (more or less in Thales’ and Anaximander’s backyard). Netz does not seem to know about this evidence but his approach dismisses it out of hand. While Next wants to focus on the geometrical objects as a thing-itself, what he misses is the metaphysical meaning of geometrical diagrams, and hence the origins of geometry: only because the diagram was originally practical – a plan for a temple or tunnel – did it open the door to the discovery of an unchanging reality that nevertheless has relevance to our time-bound world of experience.

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4I “Aristotle and Non-Human Animal Perception as Flourishing”

It is well known that Aristotle allows non-human animals a perceiving soul. Non-human animals do not, according to Aristotle’s scala naturae, have an intellective faculty. However, they are similarly thought to have potentiality to engage with their environments in a way more complex than plants. The difficult issue with non-human animals, however, is the great diversity that exists among them. When Aristotle organizes them in terms of a general faculty of perception, he then must get more precise regarding the varied potentialities for perception that clearly exists in the animal kingdom. A partial solution to better organization of non-human animals is differentiating distance senses (seeing, hearing, and smelling) from tactile senses (taste and touch). While all animals have the latter, he observes that only more complex animals have the former. Why is this the case, and what does it mean for an animal, and thus an animal’s perceptive capability to be more complex? Recent scholarship has investigated the role of phantasia in animal perception; phantasia, like distant sensing, on Aristotle’s account is relegated to only some animals. Likewise, readers of Aristotle have wondered about the possibility for perception to be a telos on Aristotle’s account. Isn’t it, rather, simply instrumental—a means by which animals find and catch prey and mates, thus allowing them to attend to the basic requirements for living? In this paper, I propose that non-human animal perception on Aristotle’s account is intended as an end in itself. Non-human animals have cognitive faculties that are not simply in service to base requirements for life; these faculties, when used habitually, allow non-human animals to flourish in a sense analogous to human flourishing vis-à-vis intellective engagement and employment of the rational faculty. In this presentation, I explore the conditions for non-human animal flourishing on Aristotle’s account.

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2F “A Politics to Come: Benevolence and the Nature of Friendship in Aristotle’s Ethics”
The virtue of friendship \((\textit{philia})\) inhabits a preeminent role in Aristotle’s ethical treatises. From the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} to the \textit{Eudemian Ethics} and \textit{Magna moralia}, friendship functions as the preliminary foundation for the possibility of political community. In what follows, I suggest that a certain condition of friendship, benevolence, must be present in order for political community to most fully manifest itself as a natural phenomenon. However, the role of benevolence \((\textit{eunoia})\) throughout the Aristotelian corpus remains ambivalent. For Aristotle claims that the disposition of benevolence as a kind of feeling \((\textit{pathos})\) always retains the possibility of both becoming friendship and the impossibility of attaining friendship proper. Benevolence is the ambivalent origin of a friendship that is yet to be enacted and thereby remains inoperative \((\textit{argia})\). As I shall argue, Aristotle’s account of benevolence, indeed its ambivalent origin, is first modeled upon his definition of nature \((\textit{physis})\) in \textit{Physics} Beta 1 as the source of both the enactment \((\textit{energeia})\) and non-enactment of all natural things, their growth and decline. The \textit{nature} of benevolence reveals the possibility of a unique species of friendship, political friendship \((\textit{politike philia})\), a friendship that at once remains open to its own enactment through the cultivation of concord or like-mindedness \((\textit{homonooia})\) yet always essentially retains its fundamental inoperativity. The inoperativity of both benevolence and political friendship thereby exposes the ambivalent and tenuous nature of political community as such.

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5H “Ethical and Political Marginality in Aristotle and Plato”

In their presentation of the ethical and political aspects of ancient philosophers, most commentators focus on the normative definition of the excellent man, such as the Aristotelian prudent man and the Platonic just man. But what about those beings who do not fit into the frame of the paradigmatic ethical and political behavior? What do these classical philosophers have to say about what it is to be other than the model of the good man or citizen? Part of the exploratory answer I want to present has first to do with what “otherness” means in this ethical and political context. Depending on how different the other is from the “same” considered as the positive term of reference, this other can be conceptualized in different ways. It can be thought of straightforwardly as the symmetrical and negative definition of the term of reference, or as its attenuated version. Yet, conceptualizing this other is sometimes difficult; Aristotle’s beast is a case in point. If we take the Aristotelian political animal as the term of reference, being a woman or a slave is different from being a beast. The women and the slaves can be integrated into the domestic community of the oikos, while the beast cannot be integrated into any kind of community at all. Second, and as a consequence, it is no surprise that ethical and political otherness in Aristotle and Plato has been studied so far mostly for the “others” which are easier to understand, like and slaves inside the city, and foreigners outside the city. But very little has been said about the middle or intermediary otherness of those beings living inside the city but at its margins. Their otherness is more difficult to grasp because they fit neither into the ethical and political standards of the good behavior and city nor into the opposite standards. Taking Aristotle’s beast \((\text{Eth. Nic. VII, 1, 1145a15-35; 1148b19-1149a23; 1149b23-1150a1})\) and Plato’s beggars \((\text{Rep. VII, 520a-521b; VIII, 550c-553a; Laws XI, 936b-c})\) and incurables \((\text{Gorg. 525c-526b; Laws IX, 854a-c; XII, 941d-942a})\) as my examples, my claim is that these marginal cases are significant in two respects. 1) Their marginality helps us to better understand by contrast what it means to be a good man or citizen. 2) It also shows that classical politics and ethics are to be understood as ceaseless processes of evolution and transformation between opposite poles, rather than as a set of norms and legal prescriptions.
I show how Plato’s conception of *being as capacity* and the realization of *capacity in combination* implicitly drives the entire set of arguments that culminates in Plato’s discussion of semantics, specifically his “definition” of truth at 263b4–5. I discuss the *concept* that Plato’s “definition” of truth expresses and how his *conception* of truth extends beyond it. Although Plato’s conception captures the basic correspondence intuition that a statement is true only if there is something in the world *in virtue of which* it is true, his view lacks a commitment to a correspondence *relation* between statements and *facts or states of affairs that obtain* or objects. Plato’s conception of truth is something more minimal that avoids the problems with the inflated correspondence view.

As Plotinus fervently argued, the origin and ground of everything knowable, conceivable, and describable must itself be unknowable, inconceivable, and ineffable. Such a radical difference between things and their ultimate foundation appears as necessary to Plotinus in order to posit a cause for these without conflating it with them: “For since the nature of the One is generative of all things,” Plotinus says, “it is not any one of them” (VI.9.3). Consequently, the only way we may come to the principle of all things is through a method of negating and denying all of the determinations that belong to beings.

Although this method is deeply ingrained in Neoplatonic thought, indications of its inadequacy become formulated with ever greater explicitness in the later Neoplatonic tradition. The problem, in short, is that by negating all characteristics of the One and rendering it wholly absolute, it ceases to have any relation (even a causative one) to the reality that it is supposed to found. The negative method thus always seems to depend, perhaps at times surreptitiously, upon the assertive or kataphatic method to which it is opposed. I intend to investigate this tension as it emerges within the Neoplatonic tradition, and conclude by briefly considering how it is resolved in Christian inheritors to this tradition Dionysius and Eriugena.

Zhuangzi affirms the equality of all life. But what we encounter initially are the radically different natures among the multitude of forms of life. Zhuangzi emphasizes the unity among all forms of life underlying the apparent differences.

To know that east and west are opposites but also interconnected – this is knowing the use and the qualities of things (*Zhuangzi* 17).

Recognizing the differences of individual natures is not the culmination of Zhuangzi’s ethics but simply the starting point of establishing equality and the common point of view.
Take a stalk of grain and a pillar, a loathsome being or Xishi, things however extraordinary, unusual, astounding and inexplicable – they all become one in the light of the dao (Zhuangzi 2).

How is equality established? By regarding things from plural perspectives and recognizing the interconnections among them. This is the all-encompassing perspective of the dao in one of Zhuangzi’s most celebrated allegories, the conversation between the Yellow River and the North Sea.

The Lord of the Yellow River said, “Whether external or internal to things, how do we distinguish between what is noble and low, great and small?” Ruo of the North Sea replied, “When we look at them in the light of the dao, they are neither noble nor base” (Zhuangzi 17).

Recognizing that the differences among people and creatures are inessential, all are seen in a continuum of interconnected existence. Zhuangzi questions the conventional wisdom regarding good and evil and superior and inferior.

One is a ruler and another a subject – that is but for a time. In a changed age, one would not be able to look down upon another (Zhuangzi 26).

With the “proper light of the mind” we can find “the pivot of the dao,” on which the equality of all rests.

In Zhuangzi we recognise a precursor of defenders of the “sovereign virtue” of equality in contemporary political thought. Ronald Dworkin has articulated clearly in what “the deepest moral assumption” of political thought and practice consists: each person has an equal intrinsic value and “dignity” and ought to be treated with equal respect and be given equal rights. In Taking Rights Seriously Dworkin argues that all lives are of equal value from an objective standpoint.

In his defense of human rights, Dworkin has amplified his conception of equality as “the principle of shared humanity”.

Among the most fundamental of all moral principles is the principle of shared humanity: that every human life has a distinct and equal inherent value. This principle is the indispensable premise of the idea of human rights, that is, the rights people have just in virtue of being human, and it is therefore an indispensable premise of an international moral order (“Terror and the Attack on Civil Liberties”).

Dworkin explained that the principle of shared humanity is an expansion of Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative, “Regard humanity as an end and not as a means”.

While for both Zhuangzi and Dworkin equality is central, Zhuangzi’s concern for well-being of all extends beyond Dworkin’s defense of equality of all human beings and Zhuangzi’s advocacy of equality does not adopt the language of the theory of rights.

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11 “Plato and Aristotle’s Discord with “New Music”: Immoral, Anarchic, Feminine
Our most extensive source on new music is a commentary supposedly written by Plutarch, On Music. The Plutarch’s commentary links the critique of this new, non-traditional music to Book III of Plato’s Republic, and then argues that this new music is the chief enemy of the harmonia that Plato and Aristotle attempted to institute from the Republic to the Laws to the close of Aristotle’s Politics. Beginning in Chapter 15 of the Plutarch’s commentary, the Plutarch sets up an opposition between ancient and new music, with Plato and Aristotle being on the side of ancient, simple, mathematical, manly, Doric music and harmony that used very few strings and notes, and, on the side of new music, the practitioners of polyphonia and polychordia, like Melanippides and Timotheus, respectively. According to the Plutarch, this new style of music that Plato and Aristotle prohibit in their political works is not merely the instrument of the flute and the lyre, nor is it the dithyramb itself, but rather a certain style of music or a new kind of dithyramb that the Plutarch associates with the feminine, the anarchic, the immoral, and the revolutionary. This paper considers the chief characteristics of this style of music alongside the discussions of new music in Plato’s Republic, Plato’s Laws, and Aristotle’s Politics. Special consideration will be paid to the relationship between gender, music, and politics.

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3F “Socrates and Callicles on Nature: Gorgias, 481b-486d”

Recent scholarship on the Gorgias has tended to focus on the relationship between Socrates and Callicles. Some scholars (e.g., Raphael Woolf) have suggested a common ground between the Socratic and Calliclean positions; others (e.g., Nalin Ranasinghe) have suggested instead that the two positions have little in common. In this essay, I attempt to supplement such interpretations by focusing on the theme of nature (physis) and by offering a reading of Gorgias 481b-486d, i.e., the two speeches by Socrates and Callicles, respectively, at the beginning of their interchange. I argue that insufficient attention has been paid to Callicles’ identity; to the strange format of Socrates’ speech; and to Callicles’ understanding of nature. It is only when these topics have been examined that we are in the proper position to evaluate whether there are points of philosophical contact between Socrates and Callicles.

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4E ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***
“Aristotle on Accidental Causation”

There are two prevalent approaches to elaborating Aristotle’s notion of an accidental cause, one based on explanation, the other based on frequency. These approaches enjoy immense popularity as interpretations of Aristotle. But there are passages in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Physics that suggest that the two approaches attribute a particular claim to Aristotle that he would have denied. After explaining this flaw, I use those same passages to suggest a better analysis of Aristotle on accidental causes. The main finding is that the new analysis shows that, for Aristotle, the notion of an accidental cause illustrates exactly what it is for something to be a cause.

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6I “The Paradigm of Weaving in Plato’s Statesman”
In the Plato’s *Apology of Socrates*, Socrates claims that the god has used his name in order to make him a paradigm [*paradeigma*], “as if he would say, “That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom” (23a-b). In a series of six papers, I have pursued Plato’s conception of “*paradeigma*” in an attempt to understand the paradigmatic character of the philosopher, Socrates. A previous paper, “The Paradigm of the Paradigm” (2014), focused on the Stranger’s account of “*paradeigma*” in Plato’s *Statesman* (277a ff.) to explain the way in which pupils, having learned the letters of the alphabet and short, easily understood syllables, words, and phrases, might use these to comprehend more complex as yet unrecognized syllables, words, and phrases. Thus, paradigmatic reasoning, I argued, is neither deductive nor inductive, but a special kind of analogical reasoning-reasoning not from part to whole, or whole to part, but from part to part (Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II. xxiv, 68b 38 ff.).

In the present paper, I shall return to Plato’s conception of a “paradigm,” however, not as it appears in *The Apology*; rather, I will consider the way in which the Stranger applies the paradigm of the paradigm to the stated task of the *Statesman*, namely, to provide an account of the true statesman. The Stranger claims that a paradigm is needed because many people have various different ideas about how best to govern a city; the true statesman, however, must be differentiated from these. To accomplish this task, the Stranger asks, “What example [*paradeigma*] could we apply which is very small, but has the same kind of activity as statesmanship and would enable us satisfactorily to discover which we seek?” (*Statesman* 279 B). In answer to his own question, the Stranger suggests weaving as an apt paradigm of the activity of statesmanship. Hence, in this paper I will consider why the Stranger chooses weaving as a paradigm of statesmanship; whether this paradigm actually does aid us in understanding statesmanship; and if it does assist us in comprehending this political activity, how does it achieve this end? My intention in considering the paradigm of weaving is learn more about Plato’s understanding of and use of paradigms.

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4C “Aristotle on Wish and the Apparent Good”

On Aristotle’s view, everyone desires happiness, the highest and most complete human end. Yet agents have many opposed projects aimed at bringing about a variety of different ends. A problem at the heart of Aristotle’s ethics is thus to explain how it can be correct to say both that agents seek many things and that they desire one thing. One way to address this problem is by attributing to an agent a number of opposed psychological parts, canonically in the concept of acrasia. This allows the description of an agent’s acting against her own wishes as involving a fracturing of desire, in which irrational desires split off from and thwart rational desires. However, in

this paper I argue that, aside from acrasia, there is a distinctive way in which even the rational desires of agents may oppose one another. On the view I defend here, the object of every rational desire is an apparent good, and thus misrecognition of an end can cause cases of disagreement among agents even when the agents are not acratic. Thus the concept of rational desire is dependent on a psychological view that makes subjective states of appearance a constitutive part of wish.

The paper is accordingly divided into four sections. In the first I reconstruct the dilemma Aristotle sets up between the naturalistic conception of the ancient materialists who took every particular that appears as good to be actually good, and the Platonists who took the good to be something unrelated to appearances. I argue that Aristotle wants to dissolve the dilemma by giving a psychological rather than an ontological account of the good, and in so doing must develop a theory of how goods are presented to us. In the second section I give a brief resume of the concept of wish (boulēsis) in Aristotle's ethics. I claim that, as a rational desire for an end, wish counts as an internal reason for acting in a certain way but also as an instance of that end's appearance as good. In the third and central section, I argue that on Aristotle's view, wishing for something requires that one imagine it. This suggests a mediating role of imagination between beliefs and desires, which opens the possibility of making desires rationally evaluable. In the final section, I return to the dilemma and argue that Aristotle's account of wish explains how misrecognition of the good can be explained in non-doxastic terms. The intermediacy of imagination between sense and thinking gives Aristotle the resources to maintain a position between the relativist view of the ancient materialists, and the intellectualist view of the Platonists. By formulating a theory of wish that avoids both the relativist and intellectualist extremes, Aristotle is able to offer a non-doxastic account of moral failure.

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6I “Due Measure and Paradigms in Plato's Statesman”

Midway through the Statesman we learn that all the arts depend for their existence on due measure (284a-b). Since dialectic is also an art, due measure must be central to the art of dialectic as well. In this paper I focus on one of the contributions which due measure brings to dialectic, namely helping the dialectician select and use the most suitable paradigms at different stages of the investigation. Paradigms are proposed in order to guide the dialectical art of collection and division. The fittingness of these illustrations is to be determined with one eye to the purpose and content of the investigation, and with another to the interlocutors and/or audience expected to follow the exercise.

The Stranger pursues the search for the statesman in two episodes of collecting and dividing the arts. The early division (258a-267b) is carried out under guidance received from the implicitly adopted paradigm of a shepherd. The later division (287b-305e) is carried under the explicit paradigm of the weaver.

My present investigation focuses on two questions: (a) In what ways are the two paradigms fitting at the stages at which each of them is used? and (b) How is due measure in general reflected in our choice and use of paradigms? Correspondingly, the paper is structured in three parts as follows:

Part I: What is due measure?

Part II: How is due measure reflected in the choice of the weaver paradigm after the earlier use of the paradigm of the shepherd?

This investigation reflects on the philosophical impacts of an epic poetry on formation of a national identity. The case is the longest epics-historiography in the world-consisting of approximately 60,000 verses, namely, the celebrated The Book of Kings (Shahnameh ) (Book of Kings) by Ferdowsi ( 940-1020 ). During this period, the Farsi speaking people (which includes the present areas of Tajikistan, Iran, parts of Uzbekistan (Smarkand and Bokhara), as well as Afghanistan experiences an identity crisis to separates themselves from the Arabs who conquered them in the 7th century. Written in Farsi, with a minimal use of borrowed Arabic words, this epic proffered a unified vision of as well as the glorification of the Farsi (Tajik-Persian) speaking people from a mythical genesis of the world and human societies to the rise of Muslim empire. In addition to epic poetry, this is a period when some philosophers such as Avicenna (980-1037), whose majority of work is written in Arabic, began to write technical philosophical works in Farsi. There is a general consensus that Shahameh in fact was a pivotal factor in the birth of a new nation with emphasis on a single language instead of being a member of a transnational religion –represented by the secularization, “Arabization,” and weakening of the Caliphates. This study, also points how the USSR employed “the Russian Language” as an important vehicle of “Soviet-ization” of Central Asian countries. In addition to the philosophical issue of how language may be used as a bases of national consciousness, this research address a number of specific Shahamneh philosophical issues such as fate and destiny, moral tensions between fathers and sons, different facets of duty and the phenomenology of the tragic hero.

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This presentation is part of a current research on Islamic values. It examine the recent literature on the study of religion with culture, e.g. the writings of T. Hall, R. Pilgrim, and R. Cavanagh. In addition it compares praxis of Islam in various contexts such as Arabian lands, Indonesia, and America. Moreover, our analyses includes application of archetypal Islamic themes to contemporary case, as the following examples illustrate: (i) Ummah (community) à unified community to Medinan civil society to Global Muslim community; (ii) Inshā’allah (God’s will) à integrated (physical/spiritual) individual to logical certainty to “no/negative maybe.”

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Socrates in the Phaedo proposes that one of the aims for those practising philosophy is “to practice for dying and death” (64a). He then speaks of true philosophers as desiring death and deserving death of a particular sort (64b). The literal reading of Socrates’ statements take him to be speaking of physical death. In this paper an analogical interpretation is considered and proposed, one that argues that Socrates’ treatment of death and dying applies in salutary ways to the event of suffering or undergoing refutation.

The argument proceeds first by investigating in what way suffering a refutation is like dying, focusing on how refutation can lead to giving up one way of life (as rationally justified) and taking
up another. To be refuted would be, in a sense, to be slain and for one trying to live with consistency between belief and action such an event would entail the passing away of one’s old life. Courtesy of this kinship between death and refutation, it is argued that insights are afforded into 1) seeing in what context the true philosopher would desire his own refutation, viz., for the sake truth and wisdom; 2) exploring the need for the virtues of fortitude and temperance in the face of competing motivations that make refutation undesirable, e.g., desire for honour, power, pleasure and the like; 3) grasping the danger of misology for a rationally ordered life; and 4) understanding Socrates’ hope that a better life among better gods and better men await the philosopher in the ‘afterlife’, i.e., life after refutation. Reading death as refutation, therefore, allows one to accept a certain sort of dying as possible and desirable for the philosopher many times in a single lifetime.

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2B “The Vision of a Global Philosophy of Economics in the Achaemenid Empire”

The celebrated 20th Century historian, Arnold J. Toynbee (the author of A Study of History) considers The Achaemenid Empire (550-330 BC) as the first trans-national universal state. A remarkable feature of this dynasty that had Athens as a colony lies in practicing tolerance in diversity of religions and languages. However they established a unified military security and economic system for the entire empire. This paper investigates two specific features of this empire: (i) the philosophical economics of the Achaemind administration with a trans-national domain and (ii) the applicability of the model of practicing tolerance on religion and cultural diversity, and the need of the globe—in the 21st century for a unified—transnational military security and economic organizations such as the World Bank and the China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

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The difference between substance and artifact has always been an important distinction within Aristotelian metaphysics. We give ontological priority to substance, and classify non-substantial things like artifacts into less fundamental categories. Yet this Aristotelian framework is somewhat counterintuitive; pre-reflectively, we tend to think of artifacts like tables and houses as having the same “level” of being as substances like cats and humans. In this paper I will briefly explain what I take to be the salient differences between substance and artifact as Aristotle presents them. As we will see, substance and artifact share many of their supposed differences, with some artifacts prima facie appearing to meet the various conditions for substancehood. This makes it difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between substance and artifact, or to give a secure definition of what makes a thing a substance.

Despite the complications in discriminating between substance and artifact, through an examination of Aristotle’s texts I argue that Aristotle successfully manages to draw this distinction. Further, not only is Aristotle correct to indicate that there is a difference between substance and artifact, but in the course of examining why he holds this distinction we will gain greater clarity on the nature of substance, which reveals that Aristotle gives conditions for substancehood that many contemporary
thinkers have neglected. While many contemporary philosophers are correct to note Aristotle’s criterion of ontological independence for substance, this condition alone is insufficient to differentiate between substance and artifact, and it misses two other necessary conditions for substancehood. I will argue that in addition to ontological independence, there is also a principle of epistemological priority, as well as a principle of self-realization that non-substantial beings do not meet. These three conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for substancehood, and without understanding all three of these conditions in the right way, we fail to grasp what it is that distinguishes substance from non-substantial entities like artifacts. By examining Aristotle’s distinction between substance and artifact we thus clarify his conditions for substancehood, and in the process gain insight as to how we should define substance in the contemporary discussion.

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4B “Philosophy of Higher Education in the Middle East and Early Islam”

The foci of this presentation include philosophical themes embedded in the tradition of higher education and research in ancient Middle East and the medieval Islamic world, including: (i) the Sasanian Dynasty (224-651 AD) and its centers of learning in Ctesiphon, Resaina, Gundeshapur; the latter housed the Greek philosophers, the Syriac speaking Nestorian Christians who took refuge from the Byzantine Emperor Zeno in A.D. 489; also Justinian in 529 banished philosophers from Athens, while Khosrau I gave refuge to them to be employed in the Sasanian learning centers; (ii) The establishment of one of the first Universities, Al-Azhar in Egypt in 972, that began as the Shi’a center of learning and transformed to be as the kernel of Suni Islamic Theology. A comparison will be made between the philosophies of development of higher education in the pre-Islamic middle east, Islam, and the universities in the mediaeval Christian tradition.

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6B “The Impious and the Philosopher: Impiety Laws in Laws, X, as a Critique of Rule by Law”

This paper seeks to argue that the laws against impiety, laid out by the Athenian in Laws, X, can be seen as advancing a critique of those governments which place ultimate authority in the laws. These laws against impiety require that those who question the gods fo state, even those who do so out of a virtuous character, are at best to be placed in prison until they recant their views or at worst to be put to death for such questioning. The implications of such laws appear to be troubling, as Socrates was put to death for committing impious actions; for Plato to endorse laws that condone punishments for the impious can be seen as a form of intellectual patricide, as this approves the idea that his mento needed to be punished in some way for questioning the religious customs of Athens. C.J. Rowe argues in “Killing Socrates,” that when such an implication seems to arise from a series of comments made by the Elean in the Statesman, rather than reading Plato as endorsing the killing of his mentor, we should instead understand that the passage in question was intended to serve as a critique of the practice of fixing laws in place. However, Rowe failed to account for the impiety laws when making his argument and thus the thought that Plato may be endorsing punishments for philosophy once again rears its head. One may attempt to argue that the Athenian would not intend for Socrates-like figures to be punished, that if they could provide an argument motivating their questioning and thus be absolved of any punishment but this line of argument is faulted; first, Robert Mayhew argues in “Persuasion and Compulsion in Laws, 10,” that the Athenian does not seem fully committed to this sort of rational persuasion and second, even if the Athenian were
committed to rational persuasion, the description of the punishments for impiety appears to offer no room for one to rationally persuade her punishers that her impiety does have a legitimate basis. If we take these comments made by the Athenian as reflective of Plato’s actual views, then it seems as though Plato indeed agreed that those people like Socrates need to be punished for their impious acts. However, if the laws against impiety are instead read as a criticism, in the fashion that Rowe suggests, then a much more interesting picture emerges. We see instead that Plato is forwarding a massive, sweeping criticism against the rule of law, that it fails us in some fundamental way as a system of governance. Even when the best sort of laws are selected in a fashion that is guided by reason, they still place us in a position where we punish those Socrates-like individuals for their public questioning of metaphysical matters. Deferring to the laws, even in the best circumstances, requires us to harm the philosophers.

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5I Round Table Symposium: Adaptation of Medieval Islamic Theology to the 21st Century Central Asian Secular State

Original Islamic Theology —analogous to its Judaic and Christian traditions— embeds a number of directives in economics suited for the medieval period. However, through the concept of *fitnah* Islam also allows adaptation of its praxis to actual contemporary arena. To that end, a number of predominately Muslim nations, opt for a secular type state—and not an Islamic Republic based on the so-called fundamentalists principle. The participants in this symposium discuss both the philosophical foundation of Islamic Theology—especially in context of Suras revealed prior to 1622 (Hijra) and adaptability of Islamic economic to contemporary 21st Century global village.

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11 “The Mathematics of Mimesis Reconciling Plato’s Aesthetics in the Laws and the Republic”

Given the scathing attack upon the poets in Book X of the Republic, many scholars have interpreted Plato as having a distinctly negative stance regarding the fine arts. This traditionally accepted interpretation suggests that the fine arts, i.e., poetry, painting, etc., are to be avoided due to their reliance upon imitation (*mimesis*), their concern with the particulars of the world (as opposed to the universal forms), as well as their ability to inspire immoral behavior in much of the citizenry. However, when one looks to Plato’s later political works, most notably the Laws, we find that this outright dismissal of the arts found in the Republic becomes problematic, especially when one takes into consideration the importance Plato ascribes to *mimesis*. Interestingly, not only does Plato praise *mimesis* in the Laws, but further, this praise is given on account of the positive moral influence such artistic performance provides. What we find then is an apparent contradiction between Plato’s views on art within his two major political works. On the one hand in the Republic, a condemnation of the arts on account of their imitative natures and ability to seduce the citizenry into bouts of immorality, and on the other hand in the Laws, we find Plato praising *mimesis* for its ability to cultivate morality in the citizens of Magnesia. Given this contradiction, an investigation is required to determine if it is possible to reconcile these seemingly disparate stances on art provided by Plato’s political works.

In an effort to resolve this issue, scholars have suggested that the *mimesis* of the Laws is not an attempt to imitate the sights and sounds of the physical world, but rather, an effort to imitate the forms themselves. In other words, the music and performances of the Magnesian choruses are an
attempt to mimic the harmony and balance of the form of Beauty. And, while the example of music in the *Laws* does seem to present a possible solution to the problem of inconsistency between the dialogues regarding the fine arts, I would contest that to truly bridge the gap between the disparate views on *mimesis* in the *Laws* and *Republic*, we need to salvage not only music, but also the plastic arts, i.e., painting, sculpture, etc. To explain, music is founded upon the basic mathematical principles of division and ratio, and is therefore already closely aligned with the harmony and balance that Plato would seek. Conversely, the plastic arts are seemingly dependent upon the physical world and the objects therein, a condition that, as the account of the painter in *Republic* X shows us, is, for Plato, truly unacceptable. Therefore, if there is to be a true consistency in Plato’s views regarding *mimesis*, then we must take on the challenging task of establishing precisely how the plastic arts might produce works that imitate not the physical world, but rather, similar to the music of the *Laws*, the form of Beauty itself.

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1G “‘Separating the Small and the Great:’ Plato and the Right Use of Mathematics”

In Plato’s image of the cave, the prisoners, having escaped the cave, will not only see the reflections of the real things and the real things themselves, but eventually also the sun. As the image of the sun makes clear, the sun stands for the Good, the absolute beginning and foundation of existence and knowledge.

How the sun can be seen, that is, how knowledge about the Good can be acquired, is one of the main topics of the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*. In this regard, not only the three images of the sun, the line and the cave are of the highest relevance, but also the subsequent section on the educational program in the ideal city. In it, Plato prescribes ten years of mathematical studies, five years of dialectic, and, finally, fifteen years of practical activity in the state – which education eventually leads a select few to seeing the Good and thus to being fit to act as rulers of *kallipolis*.

What has puzzled scholars most about this program is the utmost importance of mathematics: for in what way might mathematics be conceived of as actually contributing to understanding the world and moral values, let alone the Good?

Though this paper does not endeavor to give an all-encompassing answer to this question, what it will try to do is to explain why Plato, at least in the mathematical passage in the seventh book of the *Republic*, is regarding mathematics as a necessary and indispensable tool and method for discovering “reality.” In particular, it will be discussed in what regard the mathematical disciplines are conceived of as acting as the “helpers in the conversion” of the soul towards the Good. In doing so, it will be shown that mathematics can fulfil its specific function because it allows to describe and represent the human perceptions of the physical world in such a way that “the small and the great are separated,” in contrast to their natural state of being confused. And that it is just for this reason that mathematics has “a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.” As such, then, it becomes transparent why Plato regards mathematics as the very “prelude” to dialectic, which in turn provides the ultimate knowledge about the forms and, eventually, the Good itself.
All in all, this paper will contribute to a better understanding of what epistemic function mathematics has as a method for Plato and, in particular, how its right usage might lead to recognizing the true, “real” nature of the world including the highest moral values like the Good.

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3I “The Stoic Response to Epicureans: Far More than Another 'Cradle Argument' ”

It is well known that the Stoics and the Epicureans do not agree on the human ‘highest good’ (summun bonum) – that to which all things are to be referred: the former hold it to be moral virtue, the latter, pleasure. But they also disagree over human beings’ principia naturalia, or natural starting points. That is, they dispute what we by our nature seek for its own sake from the beginning of our lives. This topic is of interest since it appears to be indicative of our highest good. It is Epicurus’ view, as related by Torquatus in Cicero’s dialogue, de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, that ‘every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks pleasure and rejoices in it’ (I.30). And it seems to be in part in view of this that the Epicurean school claims that pleasure is our highest good. The Stoics, we are told in the dialogue, object to this with an alternative account of the behaviors of newborn animals as well as young human beings. Babies do what they do, on the Stoic view, because they care about the soundness and well-functioning of their bodies and they love themselves (III.16-17). And the young of our kind, it is argued, take delight in cognitions (cognitiones, comprehensiones, perceptiones, catalepses) even with no further motives (III.17).

The goal of this study is not only to understand the difficult passage in III.16-17 as an argument on its own, but also to delimit the dialectical role it plays and the role it is required to play in the Stoics’ response to the Epicureans.

First, I will attempt a satisfying interpretation of the reasoning in III.16-17. §16 is especially difficult. The Stoics ascribe to newborn animals a series of self-relating features: being ‘conciliated’ with oneself, having a sense of oneself, love of oneself, etc. But the inferences they allege, especially the one from self-sensing to self-loving, are obscure. In contrast with what has been attempted thus far in the literature, I will propose a reading that is hopefully both authentic and independently plausible.

But how successfully does the Stoic explanation of babies and young humans’ behavior in III.16-17 undermine support for the Epicurean thesis that pleasure is our summun bonum? I argue that it is successful – in challenging pleasure as our only natural starting point, not necessarily in disproving it to be one at all. Further, although the Epicureans somehow appeal to the their own interpretation of infants’ behavior as a sign of the human highest good, the Stoics need not and – I will suggest – do not appeal to their own stories about babies and the young for this purpose. Indeed, if my interpretation of self-love in III.16 stands, then the Stoic model of personal development in III.20-21 (personal oikeiōsis) suggests that the above stories about humans when they are small are actually irrelevant for what the final good is for a matured human being. That is, even if the Epicureans were right that pleasure was the only natural starting point.

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5F “A Puzzle about Enkrateia in Mencius”
Should one act as the virtuous person would act, even though they currently lack the proper sentiments or motivations from which the virtuous person would act? Mencius, a classical Confucian, appears to give us conflicting answers that, according to David Nivison, mirror “a genuine perennial dilemma of moral life”. On the one hand, Mencius seems to urge his interlocutors to act or convert right away, once they know that something is right or wrong to do (3B8, 1A7). On the other hand, he also appears to be opposed to such immediate actions in 2A2, where he cautions his disciple that being too eager in one’s moral cultivation may in fact set one back. I try to achieve two things in this essay. First, I will suggest that Mencius in 2A2 in fact does not discourage us from imitating the outward deeds of the virtuous so much as reminding us to also do the inner, day-to-day work of reflection – which is central to the Confucian conception of moral self-cultivation. Reflection not only can gradually dispose us to respond with the right sentiments and thoughts to the right aspects in future situations, but – I argue – it also can retroactively reconcile our sentiments with a correct choice we formerly made from an imperfect motive. And this also seems to be a partial solution to what, since Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, has been called the problem of moral luck. Second, I will show that Mencius’ anecdotes in 1A7 and 3B8 are not only compatible with what he preaches in 2A2, but they are in fact illustrations of the very practice of reflection, which I have interpreted him to be recommending implicitly in 2A2. The Mencius we find in these anecdotes is no mere theoretician, but a masterful rhetorician and counselor, engaging his interlocutors in moral reflection. Mencius did not just tell us an insightful story about human motivation and moral cultivation – he was part of it.

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2A “The Musical Soul: Aristides Quintilianus’ Platonic Theory”

Music theorist Aristides Quintilianus agreed with the Pythagorean Panaceus that for music, "most important and most perfect is its capacity to yield the ratios of that which men find hardest to understand, the soul, and not only the individual soul, but the soul of the universe as well." (De musica, 1.1 36-40).* Aristides' dates are uncertain, (sometime between Cicero and Martianus Capella), but translator Thomas Mathiesen noted Neoplatonic themes and styles of interpretation. Arguments for earlier dating include the lack of reference to 2nd century Claudius Ptolemy's Harmonics; however, building on Mathesien's observation of references to a monochord instrument first described by Ptolemy then by Porphyry,** Aristides also makes use of astrology categories from Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos not present in earlier astrological writings. Given this, I will examine his theory about the relationship between the individual soul, various components of music, namely harmony, rhythm, and meter, and the symbolism of the astral gods on the circles of the Same and Other (Timaeus). Of the arts, Aristides elevates music to be an integral part of one's whole life and not just a period of development, for "every action should at last be set in order by music alone." (De musica, 1.1, tr. Mathiesen, p. 71). Dialectic and rhetoric cannot be exercised properly without the soul first being purified by appropriate music. A closer look at the soul's musical quest toward consonance and phonesis will show that his theory is not only Neoplatonic, but proto-theurgic, as it starts from the structures of the sensible world and symbolic connections for the sake of the soul's education, purification, and ascent. I'll conclude with some comparisons to Proclus' aesthetic methodology, which was integral to his theurgic theory and practice.


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2A “The Present Moment, the Soul and Neoplatonic Happiness”

Focusing his attention on the Epicureans and the Stoics, Pierre Hadot brilliantly unpacked the structural analogy underlying the Hellenistic “experience of time,” i.e. that despite their profound differences, each school valued the present moment at the detriment of the past or future.

Remarkably, the Neoplatonic tradition also venerated the significance of the present as Plotinus clearly argued that the immortal soul’s desire for eternity and absolute reality is lived in the ‘actuality of life’ right now: “[T]he desire of life seeks existence, it will be the desire of the present, if existence is in the present. Even if it does want the future and what comes after, it wants what is has and what it is, not what it has been or is going to be; it wants what is already to exist; it is not seeking for the everlasting but wants what is present now to exist now.”

Overall, for Plotinus, time tempts the human soul into a sea of dispersion, into a never-ending series of discrete nows admitting of destruction, a future ‘no longer.’ Insofar as we desire happiness and well-being and well-being is identified with absolutely real being “[happiness] must not be counted by time but by eternity; and this is neither more nor less nor of any extension, but is a “this here’ unextended and timeless.” So, in the end, the goal of the present project aims at showing how Plotinus shares in this uniquely Hellenistic experience of time insofar as he invites his students to live in the present, therein transcending temporality, corporeality and death.


2 Enneads, 1.5.2.10-15.

3 Enneads, 1.5.7.25-30.

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6C “Philosophical Themes in Islamic Ecology”

This study reflects on the mystical monistic Islamic vision of “the unity of being” (al-wahdat al-wujud) according to which humanity is embedded in “nature.” Analogous to the African notion of “Ecophilia (love of home-nature), the human self is not de-alienated from nature. The result is an integration of “the human good” with “ecology”. An interesting example is Muslim’s attitude towards human corps after death of a person, as well as the recognition of dependence of human being with nature, as well as affinity with the heavens and earth. According to a majority of modern thinkers, the greatest problem of humanity lies in alienation; to that end, the outcome of Islamic mystical monism is “de-alienation”.

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2J “The Silk Road and the Philosophical Vision of Globalization of Economics in Medieval Central Asia”
This paper investigates the rise of philosophies of globalization of economics due to the successful rise of international trade in “the Silk Road” from Xian to Venice. The paper argues that Tajikistan’s rich religious and political heritage, had already embedded a transnational vision of a humanity beyond its national contexts.

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2J “Tripartite Vision of Law in Ancient and Medieval Central Asia”

This study delineates three dimension of law in Ancient and Medieval Central Asia: Natural-Scientific Law (the world order), Human Societal Law –Legislation, and Spiritual Theological Laws . We shall focus on the third category as it proffers a synthesis between societal and a pragmatic theories of Law.

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6H “Plato and Mousike: Singing and Dancing the World into Being”

“Each person should spend the greatest and best part of his or her life in peace. One should live out one’s days playing at certain games—sacrificing, singing, dancing” (Laws 803d).

As Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson write in Music and the Muses, mousike is “that union of song, dance, and word to which the Muses gave their name” (1). They also note that mousike was “markedly self-reflective” and that it “always loomed large in the realm of myth, that most malleable form of Greek creative and reflective discourse” (1). This paper argues that, although literate and a consummate writer, Plato was also master of the best of the oral culture in which he was educated.

Eric Alfred Havelock argues in The Muses Learn to Write, that the verb, “to be” means something different in a literate consciousness than in an oral one. He says that in a literate mind “to be” “links [a person] as a ‘subject’ to a series of predicates connoting something fixed, something that is an object of thought: the predicate describes a class or a property, not an action. In the idiom suitable for this purpose, the verb ‘to be’ is used to signify not a ‘presence’ or a ‘forceful existence’ (its common use in oralism) but a mere linkage required by a conceptual operation (105).

I will look mainly at the Politeia and the journey of homecoming after Socrates and Glaucon “went down to . . . Pieraues” (327a), as Homer’s Odysseus “went down into the house of Hades” (23.252) and returned to Ithaka, the journeys in each transformative. The title, Politeia might best be translated as constitution, in the sense of the make up of the polis and its citizens’ souls (Brann; Sallis). Although the word politeia does not have a specific etymological connection to the arts of the Muses (mousike)—poetry (including epic and theatre), mathematics, astronomy, myth, history, music and dancing—mousike is evoked and invoked from the start. In the Politeia, justice becomes a practice of living—self-reflectively, musically, a composition of an erotically wise (and practically wise),
courageous, and moderate self and/in society patterned on the dancing rhythms and musically mathematical intervals of the heavens.

As in nearly every aspect of life about which he writes, Plato subjects underlying cultural assumptions, often taken for true without question, to careful scrutiny, using (not rejecting) the tools of an oral culture, rooted in the arts of the Muses—the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory. In the performance of philosophy, uses the fluid tools of an oral culture to sing and dance a just society and soul into being, as a living, embodied presence.

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3G “Organon or Oracle: The Use of Names in Plato’s Cratylus”

Plato’s Cratylus begins with the question whether there is a natural correctness of names, or whether they are the mere artifacts of law or convention (onomai). In order to resolve the question, Socrates first seeks to understand the praxis of naming as part of the more comprehensive praxis of speaking (legein, 387c). The name is then defined as the tool or instrument (organon) by which we teach other and divide being like the shuttle divides warp and weft in the making of the woven textile. Like all instruments, names have both a maker and a user: it is the law-giver (nomothetēs) who makes the name (onoma), but the dialectician who will use it well (kalō khrēsetai, 388b-d). This evolving definition raises several puzzles. The intuition behind the definition of names as a kind of tool of instruction and distinction suggests a common-sense and instrumental understanding of language as the means of communication between competent speakers. We use words to refer to things. But the identification of the dialectician as the only proper user of names seems to contradict this view, for the dialecticians “use” of names is contrary to the ordinary usage. While ordinary usage puts one name after the other in order to communicate through speech, dialectic isolates the name itself in order to understand its true significance, as if the proper use of the lyre were its repair and tuning. Finally Socrates an even more puzzling understanding of the “use” of names. Under the “inspiration of Euthyphro” he begins to propose various etymologies of names, as one “singing oracles (khrēsmodein, 396d, 428c). By bringing “use” (khrē-omai), from its ordinary instrumental sense back to its more originary semantic register of “consulting an oracle” (khrē-omai), Socrates reveals the deepest dimensions of the human relation to logos, which can never be grasped through the paradigm of instrumentality.

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1E “Peter John Olivi on Reference-fixing in Cognition: Between a Purely Causal or Purely Descriptive Account”

Despite what little has been written on Peter John Olivi (1248-1298), more and more scholars have gained interest in his innovative account of cognition. In particular, Olivi was an early and vocal critic of, at the time, common “Aristotelian” accounts of cognition which he saw as overly passive and as introducing unnecessary and harmful “veils” of intermediaries into the cognitive process. Instead Olivi saw cognition as involving a direct and active attention to external objects. But debate has already sprung on the question of how this cognition (or reference) becomes fixed to particular objects for Olivi: One scholar, Robert Pasnau (1997), has argued that Olivi thinks that cognition becomes fixed to an object because it is the causal terminus at the end of an act of attention; so he
would be offering something like what modern scholars call a causal account of reference-fixing. Another scholar, Han Thomas Adriaenssen (2011), has argued that, rather, Olivi thinks that cognition becomes fixed to an object by being a similitude of it; this account would be more like what moderns call a descriptive theory of reference-fixing. In this talk I want to argue that Olivi’s account likely fits somewhere between the extremes of a pure causal and a pure descriptive account of reference-fixing. My interpretation can especially solve certain puzzles that arise once we consider this part in light of the other parts of Olivi’s theory of cognition: e.g. how can Olivi’s account be causal if he doesn’t think cognition is just a passive effect and why think reference is fixed by an internal “similitude” when, as a direct realist, the object is just that (potentially) right in front of one?

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5A “Imagination and the Two Intellects”

In De Anima and De Memoria, Aristotle writes that thinking is impossible without an image. He says little about the sense in which he means this and why it might be true. This claim seems excessive in light of the fact that Aristotle also allows for kinds of thinking which would seem not to involve images of any kind. The most obvious examples are the active intellect in De Anima III.V, the thinking of the unmoved mover in Metaphysics XII, and even the activity of contemplation in Ethics X.7-8. In this paper I attempt to bring Aristotle’s various accounts of thought and imagination together in a way that resolves this tension. To do so, I propose a set of qualifications to add to these competing claims. I argue that we limit the scope of Aristotle’s claims about the relationship between thinking and images, and limit the role of the active intellect. First I argue that Aristotle’s claim that thinking is impossible without an image need only apply to embodied human thinking but that it is true for all acts of human thinking. On the basis of this, I argue that human thinking functions independently of the active intellect, and that the active intellect refers to a kind of thought that is higher than human thought. I conclude with a reflection on the implications this interpretation of the relationship between thought and imagination has for how we must understand the nature and possibility of the human life of contemplation.

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6A “What Role Does Pride Play in Augustine’s Philosophy?: A Corrective to R. R. Reno on Augustine’s Discussion of the Most Fundamental Vice”

Augustine’s account of virtue and vice in his philosophy remains understudied despite the significant fruit that such exploration could bear. In this analysis, I offer a corrective to R.R. Reno’s interpretation on how Augustine makes the vice of pride central to his philosophical account of how any sin is committed. First, I outline Reno’s basic discussion of the connection between prideful self-love (Augustine’s emphasis in Confessions and in City of God) and the theme of idolatry that is typically highlighted in both the Old and New Testaments, the Scriptures that Augustine is committed to. Reno essentially discusses Augustine’s analysis of the Fall of the angels as well as of Adam and Eve and seeks to link them to Augustine’s own “fall” in his famous pear theft in Book 2 of his Confessions. Furthermore, Reno desires to draw a connection between the role of the gang that encourages the theft in Book 2 and the idolatry theme that even appears in City of God, in addition to key biblical passages. Second, I seek to correct Reno’s Platonic interpretation of the pear theft by arguing that “evil for evil’s sake” was actually Augustine’s true, albeit confused, motive in that incident. In addition, I
submit that Reno’s ranking of the comradeship as a strong motive in the theft should be changed by understanding the camaraderie as a mere catalyst in the act of thievery.

With this new understanding of the theft episode, I finally delineate how it is still possible for the vice of pride (Augustine’s account in *City of God*) to be connected to the theft in the overall context of Book 2 of *Confessions*. Moreover, I include additional considerations that still allow for the role of the friends to be linked with the idolatry motif that Reno discusses. I concur with Reno’s use of certain passages from *City of God* to connect the friendship role to the idolatry emphasis, but I include other passages, especially from Book 12, that bolster the general conclusions that Reno attempted to draw in his own initial interpretation.

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4A “Criticism in a Gnostic Mode: The Subversive Appropriation of Source Texts in Late Antique Gnostic Thought”

The Subversive Appropriation of Source Texts in Late Antique Gnostic Thought

It has long been recognized that late antique Gnostic thought had an irreverent ambivalence if not outright hostility towards the tradition(s)—biblical or philosophical—from which it emerged. This ambivalence has famously been described in terms of “pseudomorphosis” (Hans Jonas), “protest exegesis” (Kurt Rudolph), or “creative misprision” (Ioan Couliano, borrowing from Harold Bloom). In the context of the theme Critical Approaches to Religion in Post–Classical Antiquity, I would like to suggest that Gnostic authors of the 2nd–3rd centuries CE engaged in an extraordinarily innovative critique of received textual tradition which appears to be more or less unique in the ancient world and which gave rise to unparalleled if often under–appreciated intellectual creativity. This specifically Gnostic critical method has two fundamental elements. The first and most obvious element is the subversive re–appropriation of source–texts so as to demonstrate familiarity, even mastery, of the tradition, while simultaneously re–interpreting the text mischievously, in a manner quite different from, and often diametrically opposed to, the apparent intent of the original author. This includes what has been called “inverse exegesis,” such as the oft–mentioned Gnostic re–valorization of the serpent of Eden, but—as I have argued elsewhere—it may also be perceived in the tacit Gnostic interpretations of various aspects of Plato’s dialogues. To give one example, several texts demote what is clearly meant to represent Plato’s realm of Forms to a mediocre intermediate stratum, far below the transcendentalia apprehended uniquely by the Gnostics themselves, thus tacitly elevating themselves above the academic philosophers; or similarly, to give another example, several Gnostic texts implicitly disparage the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* according to Plato’s own critique of the lowly human artist in the *Republic*. The second, somewhat more obscure element—what I would like to focus upon here—is the tendency of certain Gnostic authors to incorporate into their mythology an explanation for the ostensible mediocrity or insufficiency of the original textual source–tradition from which they had themselves emerged—a tradition which is treated with extreme epistemological skepticism—within the totality of their own system, and thus to demonstrate, through a kind of ‘aetiology of error,’ the superior or even transcendental aspect of their own understanding. This Gnostic critical method curiously anticipates the notions of ‘false consciousness’ characteristic of the nascent critical approaches of modernity (e.g., Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, etc.).

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2C “Polis Virtues in Plato’s *República*”
At Republic 368d, Socrates and his interlocutors set off to investigate what justice (dikaiosune) is in polities and, later, in individuals. Clearly, then, justice is the virtue that is the main focus of the Republic. But in Book IV, Socrates and his interlocutors consider three other virtues of cities: courage, wisdom and moderation. All four virtues are required if a polis is to be completely good. The kallipolis is held to be completely good, thus it should possess all four polis virtues. However, certain other commitments in the Republic raise the question of whether the four polis virtues are compatible with one another. For example, in certain prominent cases, each “doing one’s own” (as justice requires) is at odds with citizens standing in a relation of homonoia (as moderation requires). If the four polis virtues are not compatible with each other, the project of the Republic fails, by Plato’s own lights.

My paper has three aims: (a) To explore how the four polis virtues are compatible with one another; (b) To explore how polis justice is related to the other three polis virtues; (c) To explore the implications for the “unity of the virtues” thesis which is endorsed elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. I argue that justice is the “enabling virtue” of the kallipolis – the other polis virtues could not exist nor be effective without justice.

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3J “Falsemakers in Aristotle”

I argue that Aristotle takes the structure of truthmakers of affirmative claims to have a high degree of structural similarity. The truthmaker for an affirmative claim is always a unity of some kind. For example, the substance Socrates is the truthmaker for the affirmation 'Donald is human,' and the accidental compound pale-Donald is the truthmaker for the affirmation 'Donald is pale.' The truth of an affirmative sentence is always grounded in the existence of some entity. In the case of denials, however, the story is different. The truth of denial 'Socrates is not tan,' and the falsity of the affirmation 'Socrates is tan,' needn't be grounded in anything that exists at all. I further argue that negation turns out to be a heterogeneous matter for Aristotle, and that we can find reference to this heterogeneity in Aristotle's discussions of various types of opposition in the Categories.

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5A “The Realization of Being in Aristotle’s Account of Coming-to-Be”

The aim of this paper is to focus on the question of when being is actualized in primary substance as ousia. More generally, we can understand the question in Aristotelian terms as asking after the change in which being itself is actualized in the coming-to-be of a particular living individual entity. My focus is on the way in which an individual member of a species comes-into-being and accounting for the dynamic change that must occur from a potential being what-it-is to its actually being what-it-is. I begin with a comparison of Aristotle's comments in the Physics and Metaphysics regarding change (kinesis) and substance before examining his specific comments in Generation of Animals and On Generation and Corruption regarding animal generation in order to show how Aristotle’s descriptions of change and actualization are consistent if we further take into account his very specific comments from De Anima regarding kinesis. By drawing on Aristotle’s arguments particularly through a reading of De Anima II.4 and following, I examine the soul’s specific capacity for change. Central to my claim is that for living creatures, it is the soul which provides the necessary kinesis to realize being and allow self-nutrition to take place within the now living organism. It is my
contention that by bringing the *Metaphysics*, the biological treatises, and *De Anima* together we may gain a fuller account of how Aristotle’s natural teleology functions with relation to his ontology.

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2H “Per Se Accidents in Aristotle”

Aristotle profusely repeats the thesis according to which ‘in itself’ (kath’ hauto, per se) and ‘by accident’ (kata sumbebêkos, per accidens) are mutually exclusive predicates. However, in different locations of the first book of the Posterior Analytics, the philosopher mentions, both explicitly (APo. I 7, 75a38-b2; I 22, 83b17-23) and implicitly (APo. I 6, 75a18-22; I 10, 76b11-22; I 28, 87a38-39), accidents which are ‘in themselves’ (sumbebêkota kath’ hauta). Moreover, in the first passage these are mentioned, he seems to refer to a previous place where the notion of accidents per se would have been introduced, or assumed, and, therefore, in which the distinction between the two types of accidents would have been made somehow. How should this new, seemingly contradictory, vocabulary of accidents ‘in themselves’ be understood and in which previous passage is it grounded? In his edition of the treatise, Ross saw an implicit reference in the text to the second sense of ‘in itself’ presented in the classification of APo. I 4, 73a34-b16, and many commentators to this day have followed this suggestion. Yet this association, as we try to argue in this paper, seems to be wrong for two reasons: on the one hand, because the second sense (like all senses in that classification) is explicitly conceived in opposition to accidents; on the other hand, because that sense of ‘in itself’ concerns divisive differences (differentiae divisivae), that is, differences as predicates of the genus. This being so, however, which passage does the text in APo. I 6 refer to? In the sense expected by the majority of commentators, one would have to say: to no passage. In fact, what is entailed by Aristotle’s statement in 75a38 is that the notion of ‘in itself’ was already defined, not that accidents kath’ hauta were already defined. To this extent, accidents ‘which are not in themselves’ should be simply understood as predicates that do not satisfy any of the four senses of ‘in itself’ listed in APo. I 4. This understanding is in accordance with the content of the latter text, where the presentation of each new sense of ‘in itself’ ends with the declaration that that which is not in itself in that sense is an accident. In the light of this, the excerpt of APo. I 6 refers indeed to APo. I 4: not, however, to an alleged definition of accidents kath’ hauta which is not there, but to the four criteria with respect to which the accidents introduced in APo. I 6 can be said ‘not to be in themselves’. The reference pertains, therefore, to the whole passage and not specifically to the second sense laid down therein. If this is so, we must conclude that APo. I 4 does not produce an exhaustive list of the senses of ‘in itself’. It merely offers one classification of the senses of this notion, a classification whose nature we will attempt to determine in this paper. However, other classifications are possible, among them the one that concerns us, the classification of ‘in itself’ as a discriminating feature of a class of predicates within the set of accidents, whose principle we also try to determine in this paper.

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1A Indian Philosophy Round Table: Rethinking Epic(s)

This roundtable brings together experts working on multiple epic traditions (Homeric, Indian, and English) that can be broadly described as “epic” with the goal of asking: what makes a tradition “epic”? What does it mean to study “epics”? And what should the goal of “epic studies” be within the context of wider literary and humanistic concerns and disciplines?
There is one formal aspect of Greek tragedy as an art form that is supposed to have both a political function and an educational (didactic) function: its dialogical character. Dialogue on stage symbolizes public debate, rational, moral, and political criticism, consensus building, and democracy. At least, that is what it has come to represent to a Western mind that perceives classical Greek culture as the cradle of democracy and secular philosophy. From a cross-cultural, comparative perspective, however, it is not self-evident that these qualities should automatically be attributed to its formal dialogical character. Dialogue is not by definition a democratic and rational form of communication. A comparison with dialogues in the Mahabharata epic and its Bhagavadgita will reveal similarities and differences. It will be argued that the main differences relate to the persuasive powers of authority and language.

John Rist’s recent book Plato’s Moral Realism: The Discovery of the Presuppositions of Ethics reads the Platonic dialogues as records of Plato’s ongoing attempts to articulate a metaphysic of morals. This paper contends that the book’s chapter-length reading of the Republic, for all its merits, is deficient in crucial respects because it pays insufficient attention to the dramatic aspects of the dialogue. The paper is divided into three sections. (1) A first section offers a short summary of an interpretive approach to the Platonic dialogues that is derived from the French scholar Rene Schaerer, and is well articulated by Mitchell Miller. The Schaerer/Miller approach focuses upon the significance in the dialogues of mimesis, irony, and a four-part dialectical-rhetorical compositional structure. (2) A second section provides a very brief summary and very brief initial critique of Rist’s interpretations of (a) the analogy between the tripartite city and tripartite soul, (b) the censorship proposals in Books 2 and 3, (c) the proposals concerning “holding women and children in common” in the first half of Book 5, (d) the parable in Books 8-9 of the decline of the “aristocratic” city into tyranny. (3) A third section sketches, using the Schaerer/Miller approach, alternative interpretations of (a) through (d).

Socrates’ moral psychology and his account of virtue are intellectualist, or so we maintain. That is, the principal role in his philosophy is played by the intellect—the irrational playing a role only as filtered through the intellect. In this discussion we present the vital elements of Socrates’ intellectualism and respond to some of the more persistent objections to them.
This paper studies whether Anaxagoras’ contemporaries called him φιλόσοφος. Answering this illuminates the post-Milesian rise of (ethical not cosmological) ‘philosophy’ in Athens. It also helps explain Socrates’ particular iconicity. Evidence comes from aspects of the fourth-century depiction of Socrates; Thucydides; and other testimony about Anaxagoras.

Both Plato and Xenophon defend Socrates against the slander that he replicated Anaxagoras, himself tried for impiety in Socrates’ middle age, as an atheistic investigator of the things above and below the earth. Plato elsewhere spells out Socrates’ disillusionment with Anaxagoras’ nous theory; Xenophon goes further, denying Socrates had any concern for natural theory. They present Anaxagoras as having sought naturalistic (and religiously heterodox) kosmos explanations. They also reveal the impression Anaxagoras had on Athenians: as, perhaps paradoxically, both an idiosyncratic and a socially influential astronomer, whose reflections must have had political relevance.

The case for Anaxagoras’ being called philosophos depends on the above and Plato’s and Xenophon’s presentation of Socrates as having been slandered with traits explicitly assumed to be characteristic of ‘philosophers.’ In Plato, Socrates articulates the cliché about philosophers: they investigate the things above and below the earth, disbelieve in gods, and teach the art of words. In Xenophon, the cliché about philosophers is that they teach the art of words. Plato supports the view that if Socrates is associated with both Anaxagoras and ‘philosophy’ for the same reasons—naturalist inquiry—then plausibly Anaxagoras himself was associated with ‘philosophy.’

Now, Xenophon might suggest otherwise. He associates philosophy with the art of words; yet neither he nor Plato associates Anaxagoras with the art of words. Interestingly, other evidence may: In the Funeral Oration, Pericles acknowledges, responding to criticism, that Athenians do ‘philosophize,’ but that they do so beneficially. Pericles goes on to gloss ‘philosophizing’ as debating politically-salient issues before problems emerge. Thus ‘philosophizing’ meant effective deliberation/persuasion. Pericles was a student of and advocate for Anaxagoras; Plato’s Phaedrus says Pericles, preeminent orator, learned high-flown talk from Anaxagoras. Athenians may therefore have seen Anaxagoras as a teacher of the art of speech.

Thus we circumstantial evidence that Anaxagoras—and because of him, Socrates—may have been called a philosopher. This raises interesting questions:
1. What explains Anaxagoras’ having both meteorological and rhetorical interests?
   – Theories of (cosmic) retribution and (personal) responsibility explain it, and the macrocosmic—microcosmic parallels opened by the concept nous.
2. How would being associated with Anaxagoras and ‘philosophy’ condition Socrates’ self-understanding?
   – Socrates’ practice may have looked different from Anaxagoras’ but led to similar consequences for the importance of self-knowledge.
3. Was it really Socrates who gave philosophy its moral or definitional turn?
   – At least the ‘Socraties’ did seem to give ‘philosophy’ a more pronounced reflexive turn, turning not just to our nature as natural beings but as epistemic (and thus also moral) agents.

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3D “Why Ibn Sina’s ‘The Necessary Existent (al-Wajib al-Wujud)’ is not the God of Monotheism”

The presentation begins by constructing a meta-language for ibn Sina, with the primary notions of “being” as the designative term, and rules as modalities of “impossibility,” “contingency” and “necessity.” Next, notes is ibn Sina’s second version of the ontological argument that a concatenation of “being” with “necessity”, resulting in “a necessary being” leads to assertion of “The Necessary Existent.” The final thesis of this presentation is that ibn Sina’s ‘al-wajib al-wujud’
is distinct from the God of monotheism for at least the following three reasons: (i) God creates the world. While The Necessary Existent emanates the cosmos; (ii) God calls for salvation of humanity by selection of Prophets, where in ibn Sina—as pointed out by previous investigators—salvation is purely due to the power of individual’s “love” without any divine intervention; and finally (iii) unlike the monotheists, ibn Sina and his follower Nasir ad-Din Tusi, deny “will” to the Necessary Existent. Our finding corroborates the view of theologians such as al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) that ibn Sina’s system is incompatible with orthodox Islamic theology. Moreover, our reading of ibn Sina supports a third “mystical” version of the ontological argument proving the necessity of foundation of a being-such as “The One,” one of Plotinus that is a “supra being-substance”, rather than the transcendent God of the theologians.

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“Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations: The Transformation of the Experience of the Present in Moral Progress”

Highlighting in Stoic research has been the considerable attention drawn to the striking common point that emerges in late Stoicism: that the present moment is radically different in conceptual status from the future and past. According to the practical orientation, shared in late Stoicism, Marcus Aurelius, like Seneca before him, translates the primacy of the present into the urgency and importance to live in the present moment instead of being burdened by the unchangeable past or postponing life and hope to the uncertain future. Because our life is limited, and because we possess nothing but the present, Marcus Aurelius argues that we should attend to and take advantage of the present moment, concerning ourselves with nothing but the current fate allotted to us, the present task at hand, and the moral action underway. The goal, then, is to live according to nature, an old Stoic tenor, by focusing on the present moment.

Recently, Jean-Batiste Gourinat and Christopher Gill interpreted differently this account in the Meditations. Gourinat thought that Marcus’ focus on the present shows that ethical progress is not highly important to the Stoic emperor:16 In contrast to this rather deflationary account, Gill sheds a quite different light on the urgency to focus on the present moment. 17

In this paper, I disagree with Gourinat and take one step further in Gill’s direction by elaborating on the attention to the present moment and the urge to live the present. I will differentiate the experiences and concepts of the present in accordance with moral progress in the Meditations, and thus

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16 “However, all these ethical exercises do not seem to be precisely devoted to self-progress. They are rather an “escort through life,” as Marcus says about philosophy (II.17). There is no real sense of his own moral progress in Marcus’ Meditations. What we have, on the contrary, is rather the sense of a repeated effort to keep himself at a sufficient level of harmony and to do his best at every moment of his life, with the idea that his life may come to an end - *there is no more time for improvement, but now is the moment: “as if you were dead and have not lived up to now, you must use the balance of what remains to live according to nature”* (VII. 56)*."

17 “In some cases, this idea [of living in the present moment rather than overtime, GM] is used to encourage urgent attention to profound ethical questions or pressing ethical tasks… Marcus encourages himself to see a cosmic context for his ethical project of self-improvement. Thus, while recognizing the finitude of his life (“there is a limit set to your time”), he sees this as also part of the natural order, and a reason not for despair, *but for pressing on with this ethical project.*”
will show that according to Marcus Aurelius, a transformation of the experience of the present is an integral part of moral development.

In the first part, I will analyze the emotion of pleasure and the good affective state of joy with regard to the present, to which the states refer. For, both pleasure and joy are judgments about present goods: about what appears to be good in the former case and what is truly good in the latter. Furthermore, affectivity provides the appropriate ground for analyzing the present in the different stages of moral progress because moral progress goes hand in hand with a respective development in affectivity: one starts with (bad) emotions and ends not with diminished emotions, but with corrected versions of them, with good affective states. I will thereby show how Marcus’ reflections presuppose and draw both on the traditional Stoic theory of affections (πάθη) and good affective states (ἐὑπάθειαι) for the cases of pleasure and joy; respectively, especially with regard to the two kinds of the present moment involved: the present of the person succumbing to pleasures and of the person in joy. Not only will their experience prove to be radically different, but also the difference of the concept of the present involved will arise, the former coinciding with the Chrysippean concept of the present, the latter reminding of the Apollodorian concept.

After introducing two different concepts of the present, in the second part of my paper, I will position them within moral progress as depicted by Marcus Aurelius: with pleasure, among other passions, at its beginning and joy at its culmination. To do so, I will focus on Med. 12.3, with the aid of which I will organize the rest of the relevant reflections in the Meditations. This is an extremely important passage for my interest, in which Marcus Aurelius describes moral progress with regard to time. The present that we may live at the endpoint of moral progress emerges as a cosmic present: interestingly, it is here that Marcus Aurelius refers to Empedocles’ Sphairos and his divine joy. This present differs not only from the utterly fleeting present of indulging into pleasures, but also from the one that Marcus urges himself to delimit and separate from past and future whenever emotionally burdened. Suchlike philosophical exercises are conducive to emotional relief and make up a stage of moral progress toward its possible peak, but not its peak. Therefore, what we gain by focusing on Med. 12.3 is an even more nuanced division of the –now- three experiences of the present and their integration into the Stoic emperor’s’ moral project. To live the present moment, whose primacy I will evaluate against the traditional Stoic background, on which the Stoic philosopher builds, is no banality, but an ideal to live up to.

In the third part, I will remark on the particular combination of ethics and physics, following my analysis of this particular topic. Physics is the part of philosophy that the early Stoics believe is home to the investigation into the nature of time and the concept of the present. It has not eluded Marcus Aurelius that time intrudes on the moral sphere nor the fundamental interrelationship of ethics and physics. On the contrary, a remarkable degree of integration between physics and ethics emerges. In particular, I will conclude that Marcus’ project of moral progress is predominately a “lived physics”.

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4J “A Note on Professor Heath and ‘Natural Slavery’ ”

In a recent paper, Professor Heath has suggested some revisions to the traditional view of Aristotle’s description of the doulos phusei. For Heath, Aristotle’s douloi phusei “do not suffer from a comprehensive failure of autonomous rationality (246).” They do not “lack a conception of intrinsic
value (252).” They may be “extremely intelligent (253).” They are not “subhuman (258-259).” Still, one of these “lacks the capacity to make reasoned judgements about what he should do consistently with his conception of living well in general. And this renders him incapable of living a worthwhile human life (253).” This individual, according to Heath’s Aristotle, has a limited impairment which affects practical reasoning alone (not scientific or technical reasoning) in such a way that the individual doesn’t deliberate well, especially with respect to what would meet all the requirements of fine action and would integrate values and behavior in the individual if the individual were not so impaired. This apparently is a chronologically mature individual who may even be clever and perhaps successful in a job but makes a mess of life, as people say. Aristotle thought that there were such people for empirical rather than ideological reasons (244, n. 2). Heath professes to believe that there are no people who fit this description (244, n. 4), presumably for empirical reasons. This is in part an empirical question.

In this note I suggest a further revision related to a passage in Pol. I to which Professor Heath adverts but which he has not analyzed—1252a30-34. Here Aristotle says that there must be “the ruler phusai and the ruled because of preservation. For the one who is able to foresee with the intelligence must be the ruler phusai and the one who gives direction phusai, and the one who is able to work with the body must be the ruled and the donous phusai.” Heath presents this passage in the context of “natural slavery,” an expression whose putative Greek counterpart—presumably hē donous phusai or hē douleia phusai—does not occur in the Pol. Because the scholarship has developed as if such an expression did occur, it is worth considering what this expression might mean if it did occur. I do so here in an attempt to resolve the empirical question.


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Ruling and Being Ruled: Haemon’s Double-Bind”

In Sophocles’ Antigone, King Creon gives a persuasive speech on the value of loyalty to the state which he conflates with unquestioning obedience to him. In effect, L’état c’est moi. Haemon, a loyal son and wise counselor challenges this vision of statecraft and edifies him on the value of a more collaborative leadership where he has taken the opinions of his subjects into account. The interchange between them on ruling and being ruled offered a lot of material for speculation to their democratic and aristocratically minded audience and to moderns, as well as those interested in a more enlightened definition of a demagogue.

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“Aristotle as Literary Critic? The Case of Aeschylus in the Poetics”

The Poetics is often read as a manual of literary theory, although, at times, classicists well emphasize Aristotle’s particular purposes in writing the treatise (most recently, Ford 2015). Yet, how does Aristotle treat individual playwrights? The case of Aeschylus, on which I shall focus, provides us with an excellent case study. Because of the scarcity of Aeschylean citations and references in the Poetics and elsewhere, it has been assumed that Aristotle disliked the tragedian and his works. Aristotle’s reservation in referring to Aeschylus’ plays, however, appears to derive from his idiosyncratic theoretical interests. Apart from the Poetics 4 (4.1449a15-18), which sketches the role of the dramatist in the development of the genre, Aristotle is not concerned with any individual
appraisal of the playwright in the treatise. His habit of citing without naming the author as well as textual corruptions often may lead scholars to different interpretations of the passages in which Aeschylus's tragedies are, or may be brought as examples, as in a comparison involving Euripides and Aeschylus (Poet. 18.1456a17). However, in the vast majority of cases in the Poetics, judgment is not passed on the plays or dramatists but on particular dramatic devices. Sometimes Aristotle surprisingly admires Aeschylean scenes that we may think he should not, such as the recognition scene in the Libation Bearers (Poet. 16.1455a4-6), whose logic seems questioned already in Euripides’ Electra (518-44). It is then rather surprising that Aristotle, who is keen to point out dramatic improbability, finds this Aeschylean scene to be quite compelling. The philosopher may admire the scene from the Choephoridae (166-80) because Electra and the chorus describe how the tokens could reveal the identity of Orestes through a kind of syllogistic progression, reminiscent of his own definition of syllogism in Prior Analytics (1.24b18-20). Other times scholars may assume that Aristotle implies harsh criticism of Aeschylean drama, as in the case of reading opsis, “spectacle” (a different proposed reading being haple, “simple”) and the plays in Hades in the fourth species of tragedy (Poet. 18.1455b32-1456a3), when the text of the Poetics is too damaged to permit full speculation and no play is clearly named or critiqued per se. Far from being a critic preoccupied with literary analysis, Aristotle uses references to tragedy to support philosophical points, which can be understood only in relationship with the rest of the Aristotelian corpus.

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1B “Why Does the Happy Man Need Friends? Aristotle on Virtue Friendship”

In IX.9 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle addresses the question of why the flourishing and seemingly self-sufficient man needs friends. Aristotle provides two apparently distinct responses to the question, which I will refer to as the “Utility Account” and the “Identity Account.” The first part of my paper describes the core difference between the accounts: while the Utility Account depicts friends as means to the happy life, the Identity Account presents the friend “as another self” to the good man, one whose flourishing existence is, in some sense, identified with the good man’s own.

The Identity Account has long puzzled commentators, who have been inclined to dismiss it in favor of the Utility Account. In the second and third parts of my paper I argue that this trend is misguided and that the Identity Account offers Aristotle’s most profound reflection on the nature of the relationship between two virtue friends.

I will show that according to the Identity Account the happy man identifies his friend with his own existence, and thus finds his friend choiceworthy in the way that he finds his own life choiceworthy. This reading is suggested, I argue, by an earlier passage in IX.7 on the relationship between a benefactor and his beneficiary that closely parallels the Identity Account in important respects. Aristotle contrasts the popular view that the benefactor’s concern for his beneficiary stems from a calculated hope for future repayment with his own view that the benefactor sees the beneficiary as a product of his activity and thus as identified with himself. The contrast between the popular view that focuses on utilitarian concerns and Aristotle’s own view that focuses on identity is the same, I argue, as the contrast between the Utility Account and the Identity Account. I also show that Aristotle employs the same line of reasoning both in his explanation of the benefactor’s behavior and in the Identity Account. I argue that these parallels justify the conclusion that in the Identity Account Aristotle means to identify the happy man with his friend.

In the third part of the paper I examine the nature of the identity relation that links the happy man and his friend. The happy man and his friend collaborate in excellent practical and theoretical activities and thereby share in flourishing. I argue that their flourishing cannot be analyzed as the
sum of distinct parts but must be grasped as a unified whole; both friends realize themselves in the same flourishing activity and hence identify themselves with this activity. Insofar as both individuals identify themselves with the same flourishing activity, they also, by transitivity, identify with one another. On the Identity Account the happy man thus needs his friend not because of any utility the friend provides to him, but because his own well-being is actually identified with the well-being of his friend.

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4H “Socrates’ Sense of Friendship in Plato’s Euthyphro”

Conventional reading of Euthyphro emphasizes piety as the main theme in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro. This reading tends to marginalize friendship as a theme in this dialogue. In this paper, I do not seek to replace piety with friendship as the major theme in this dialogue. Rather, I want to explore what being philosophical demands of friendship – especially friendship with a philosopher. There is no question that in conventional wisdom, Crito does what conventional understanding of friendship calls for. He is ready to do the most he can to save Socrates from imminent death. He will do whatever is necessarily to help Socrates escape from prison and avoid certain death. During Socrates’ final days, he is a frequent visitor. On the day Socrates is to be put to death, he comes to prison very early in the morning to persuade Socrates to go to exile. Crito is unsuccessful. Socrates’ view is that it would be unjust to go into exile implying that an unjust life is not worth living. This view is central to Socrates’ approach to life. True friendship with a philosopher demands of anyone who desires to be a friend of a philosopher that he or she take justice seriously. In other words, following the course of justice is a prerequisite for being a philosopher’s friend. Justice is seen not only as a political virtue but also a personal virtue. Put differently, the political is personal and the personal is the political. Friendship with a philosopher is a political friendship.

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2B “Some Differences between Greek and Islamic Philosophical Traditions”

There is a common agreement among historians of philosophy that Greek philosophers - especially Plato, Aristotle, The Stoics and The Neo-Platonists- are the original sources of ideas developed in Islamic philosophy. This paper clarifies, some salient differences between the Greek and the Islamic Philosophical Traditions.

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4H “The Young ‘Historical’ Socrates”

Lately, I’ve been rethinking the portrait of the “historical” Socrates, to see what we can know about his early life. My aim is to understand when his “eureka” or 
exaiphnêς moments concerning his “self-conscious” encounters with the divine may have occurred.

In this paper, I’ll try to reconstruct the life of the “historical” Socrates to show that, while still a “young man,” he developed a following among the “children” of the elite as one who introduced a radical new form of education into Athenian culture. In contrast to other intellectual mavericks, notably Anaxagoras and Protagoras, Socrates is deeply religious—self-conscious (sunoida
emautōi, Ap. 21b4-5, 22c8) that he was divinely inspired and also god’s representative on earth—a task that was exceedingly difficult (συνοίδα emautōi, Ἰύμ. 216a3, b3).

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4A “Lucian’s Critical Spirit and Irreverent Laughter”

In this paper I intend to describe the type of scepticism and cynicism exemplified by Lucian of Samosate in the second century of our era. I will try to show how, thanks to his rollicking humour and his stylistic liberty, Lucian was able to bring the critique of religions and superstitions of all sorts, of dogmatism, and of philosophical sectarianism to a point rarely, if ever, reached in Classical Antiquity. Through an examination of some of his finest essays (e.g. Hermotimus or the Sects, Alexander or the False Prophet, The Sects for Sale, Iuppiter Tragedus) I will also endeavour to explain how he both anticipates and, with rediscovery of his writings during the Renaissance, nourished the atheism and the agnosticism that characterize Modernity.

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4B “Contemporary Secular Society and Islamic Medieval Theories of Finance”

Our presentation initiates with the account of the medieval Islamic philosophical foundation of economic with its emphasis on practice of finance based on societal welfare and justice. Finally we shall how the original Islamic economic views were adopted to be compatible with the contemporary needs of secular predominately Muslim nations.

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4E ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***

“The Principles and Elements of Nature in Aristotle’s Physics, I”

In the first book of the Physics, Aristotle argues that the principles (ἀρχαί) of nature are subject (ὑποκείμενα), form (εἴδος), and privation (στέρησις). His argument for this claim relies on the claims that (i) each change occurs between some pair of opposites or an intermediate between the two. The opposite that is gained is the form and the opposite that is lost is the privation. (ii) Each change involves some other principle, the subject, which admits of a change between a pair of opposites. Since Aristotle’s search into principles proceeds by focusing on the structure of change, most interpret the principles of nature as principles of change, where this means, according to Robert Bolton (1991) and others, that changes are constructible out of subject, form, and privation. For example, they understand Aristotle as claiming that a change like warming exists because, say, a stone is coming to be warm from being cold. On this reading, Aristotle’s goal in Phys. I is to identify the most general kinds of entities that changes are constructible out of: for any change C, C is constructible out of some subject, some form, and some privation. A problem for this interpretation is that, in Phys. I.2, Aristotle characterizes his inquiry into the principles of nature as an inquiry into the primary constituents and elements of natural beings (184b22–25). In Phys. I.7 he concludes that each natural being is composed (σύγκειται) of a subject and a form, e.g., Socrates is composed out of some subject and some form, two of the principles of nature (190b17–23). These passages suggest
that the principles of nature are the elements of natural beings and not the elements of change: for any natural being X, X is constructible out of some subject and some form. There seems a tension, then, in Aristotle’s search for the principles. The fact that his argument proceeds by focusing on the structure of change suggests that the principles are the elements of change, but the fact he regularly characterizes his views as one about the elements of natural beings suggests that the principles are the elements of the beings that undergo change. In this paper, I argue that the principles are the elements of natural beings but in a way that explains his remarks about the structure of change. In Phys. I, at least, Aristotle assumes that all natural beings are the product of some change. His investigation of change, I claim, is in service of identifying the structure of these beings: by identifying the general structure of change, we are able to identify the structure of the products of each change and hence the structure of natural beings.

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This paper examines philosophical elements found in Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya ulum al-din). This work is one of the most influential Islamic texts on Kalam, Jurisprudence, and Sufism among Sunni Muslims, but scholars have often regarded it as an unphilosophical work. Al-Ghazali has been considered as an opponent of philosophy who vehemently attacked it in the Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-falasifa). I argue, however, that al-Ghazali continues to use philosophical reasoning in the Revival, for it contains a significant amount of philosophical elements, especially those that are in line with the Aristotelian tradition. In his recent book, the First Islamic Reviver, Kenneth Garden claims that the Revival is more philosophical than it has been assumed, and I advance his project through providing more details of the Revival’s philosophical elements in relation to the role that knowledge plays in the good life. Al-Ghazali’s discussion on the importance of knowledge in the pursuit of happiness is modeled after the ethical theory of Aristotle found in Nicomachean Ethics. As Aristotle argues that the good life requires knowledge, al-Ghazali claims that knowledge is the foundation of happiness in the life of hereafter and defines it as the most excellent attribute of humans. The connection between the knowledge of God and human perfection that al-Ghazali makes is also derived from Aristotle’s discussion on the divine in Nicomachean Ethics as well as Metaphysics although it needs to be pointed out that the meaning of the divine for Aristotle is different from that of God for al-Ghazali. The main books of the Revival that I use in this paper are Book 1, the Book of Knowledge (Kitab al-Ilm) and Book 21, the Marvels of the Heart (Kitab sharh ajaib al-qalb).

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This paper ties into a larger project, in which I argue that the Euthydemus is not only concerned with the nature of philosophical protreptic, but that eristic argumentation serves a significant purpose: to outline the limits of philosophical discourse itself. This paper specifically focuses on the First Eristic Scene (275d-277c), in which the sophistic brothers, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, call into the question the ability to articulate—or present—a rational account of the nature and process of learning. My main claims are as follows:

4D “Eristic Argumentation and the Limits of Philosophical Discourse in Plato’s Euthydemus”
1) However farcical and contentious in their presentation, the eristic arguments, insofar as they center on the nature and process of learning, do raise a relevant, meta-philosophical issue.

2) The meta-philosophical issue, in this instance, involves the question of whether or not we can articulate a rational account of the nature and process of learning.

3) While Socrates does not take up this question in the first, protreptic exercise, it is relevant to Socrates’ conversionary protreptic.

In defending claims 1) and 2), I first give an overview of previous interpretations regarding the function and philosophical value of (or lack thereof) of the eristic arguments in this passage—specifically Sprague (1965), Gerraughty (1981), Chance (1992), and Scolnicov (2013). My main critique of these interpretations is that they do not take into account the meta-philosophical nature of the issue in the dialogue and the way in which Plato addresses it—specifically in *Meno* and *Theaetetus*.

In defending claim 3), I suggest that eristic argumentation is not merely a foil to the philosophical protreptic, but that it also highlight the limits of the philosophical protreptic. The eristic display accomplishes this by forcing the issue of whether or not we can articulate a rational account of the very processes that are relevant to philosophical protreptic—in this case, learning.

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1) “The Body of Knowledge in Plato’s *Theaetetus*”

In the famous digression of the *Theaetetus*, Socrates and Theodorus discuss two kinds of lives, the life of the crooked lawyer and of the otherworldly sage (172c–177c). As they conclude the digression and return to the topic of knowledge, Socrates appears to extol the life of the sage, who flees from this mortal world in order to become like a god (*homoiōsis theōi*) (176b). This digression, especially how seriously we ought to take Socrates’ exhortation to the godlike life, has received considerable scholarly attention [1]. While I agree that the digression offers several structural axes for an interpretation of the dialogue (mortal–divine, city–cosmos, particular–universal), I will generally disagree with those scholars who take the otherworldly exhortation seriously. Furthermore, while it is true that there are important and obvious differences between the sage of the digression and Socrates’ own description of his practice as the midwife of ideas, I argue that the digression helps frame the crucial role that embodiment plays in the acquisition of knowledge. The crooked lawyer and the otherworldly sage of the digression are caricatures that express the role the body plays in education. The lawyer, on the one hand, is literally warped by his experiences in the courts, and the sage, on the other, has no experiences at all to direct his wild ascent. Indeed, learning requires a cooperation between the body that experiences *pathē* and the soul that thinks and speaks *logoi*. This cooperation expresses itself in the habits formed by Theaetetus in his conversation with Socrates. Hence, knowledge and wisdom depend upon an embodied character properly shaped and developed in moral education. Although Theaetetus’ idea must be left behind, he has made progress. The philosophical conversation leaves a lasting, positive effect on him, since as we learn from Euclides and Terpsion, he has gained in intellectual humility and wisdom and lived a fine life.

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5H “Education for Politics and the Writing of History: The Case of the Hipparchus’

The pseudo-Platonic Hipparchus begins and ends with an elenctic investigation of the love of gain (to philokerdes). Socrates inserts into his investigation of this topic an historical interlude on the career of Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus and his death at the hands of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. The authorship of the Hipparchus is typically not attributed to Plato, perhaps because the use of elenchus seems uninspired and the historical interlude too abruptly introduced. Without addressing the question of authorship, the present paper examines the thematic connections between the examination of the love of gain and the historical interlude. Both the inquiry into love of gain and the historical interlude are devoted to exposing typical failings of the spirited part of the soul and its love of honor. First, the interlude on Hipparchus should be read in connection with Thucydides’ discussion of the sons of Peisistratus. Thucydides attempts to draw a clear line between, on the one hand, the killing of Hipparchus as a result of a lovers’ quarrel and, on the other, the sort of serious political action that history treats. The author of the Hipparchus, by contrast, sees the killing of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton as the result of a deadly competition over prowess in educating Athenian youth for political life. Thus, the historical interlude opposes Thucydides’ attempt to distance the killing of Hipparchus from the realm of serious political affairs. Socrates engages in this historical interlude partly in order to portray the death of Hipparchus as an example of the harmful effects of excessive attachment to honor and competitive values. Second, the elenctic investigation of love of gain that surrounds the interlude is intended to reveal the need for self-examination in Socrates’ interlocutor. Socrates’ questions serve to diagnose dangerous tendencies in the interlocutor’s spirited impulses. The interlocutor at first indulges his spirited instincts by expressing contempt for profit-seeking and the love of gain. However, he fails to maintain any distinction between the love of gain, which he sees as contemptible, and the desire for good, which he admits is shared by all. This result recapitulates one pattern found in Book 9 of the Republic as well as in Thucydides’ description of Spartan leaders, namely that those who are motivated by the love of honor are frequently transformed into lovers of gain.

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3A “The House that Jack Built: A Homeric Metaphor for Procline Metaphysics”

Plotinus’ doctrine that all things are a product of contemplation can be well expressed by means of an architectural metaphor: while in one sense a building is made by construction workers, in another and more significant sense it is made by the architect who designs it. If we transfer this metaphor to Proclus’ more elaborate system, it becomes still more fruitful. The many levels in the construction process—workers, foremen, contractors, architect, executive—correspond to various levels of causality, from nature up to the one-being. The metaphor captures an extraordinary range of features in Proclus’ metaphysics: procession and reversion; analogical causality; analogical transcendence; transcendent negation; self-constitution; subsistence kat’ attian, kath’ hyparxin, and kata methexin; monads and manifolds; procession by remission; why some things have paradigmatic forms and others do not. The One may be represented by the patron or donor who funds the entire project while taking no part in it, and the henads by the payments received by the various figures.
Since all metaphysical discourse is necessarily metaphorical, an exceptionally apt metaphor like this one can genuinely enrich our understanding of Proclus’ complex system.

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6E “Aristotle on Blame, Sympathy, and Equity”

In *Nicomachean Ethics* Book III, Aristotle addresses questions about action, moral responsibility, and blame. When we are harmed, Aristotle claims that it is right to forestall blame by offering sungnōmē if the action was not up to the agent who harmed us or when the action is such that it would “overstrain” human nature (e.g., NE 1109b30-32, 1110a23-26, 1136a5-9). Why, however, is such a response justified? In the case of the former (when the action was not up to the agent), the answer seems clear: blame is to be forestalled since she contributed nothing to the action, and it is not really her action at all (1110b2-3, 16-17). But in the latter case, which is classified as a mixed case, why is blame forestalled?

One answer is that sympathy is playing an important role in forestalling blame. This other-directed feeling for another agent allows the virtuous agent to refrain from blaming the agent responsible for a harm done to her because she sympathizes with the agent. She recognizes that wrong acts done from very human sorts of errors are wrong, but nevertheless refrains from blaming on the grounds of sympathy, knowing that such wrongs spring from impulses and emotions common to all.

I will argue, however, that this view is not Aristotle’s. Aristotle’s account of pity in the *Rhetoric* is instructive for indicating when and for whom it is judged appropriate to offer fellow-feeling, indicating that if sympathy were offered it would be offered to a very limited subset and on grounds that often seem irrelevant to fellow-feeling. Rather, I argue that the grounds on which sungnōmē is appropriately offered are those of fairness or equity. That is, blame is forestalled not because the virtuous agent sympathizes with the agent who harmed her, but because she recognizes it would not be fair to blame him in a particular circumstance. This, I argue, makes clearer sense of why it is unfair to blame the harming agent in circumstances where almost no one would do the right thing; it is not because the virtuous agent wouldn’t do the right thing and thus she sympathizes with him (for perhaps the virtuous agent could withstand the pressure and do the right thing), but rather, since she understands that since hardly anyone would withstand the pressure, it is equitable to forestall blame in this circumstances, as a matter of what is decent and just. Thus, the virtuous agent thus does not refrain from blaming because she feels badly for the agent, but rather, because it is the just and equitable thing to do.

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6F “From the Salvation of *Logos* to the Salvation by *Logos*: Equivocations of a Platonic Project”

In the *Phaedo*, a dialogue devoted to the question if something of us is immortal, Plato states that "to speak wrong words is not only a fault against speech (*logos*) itself, but it also infects the soul with evil" (115e). Taking care of one’s soul implies taking care of its internal *logos*. Both are subject to a special kind of mortality - on the one hand even the unjust soul of the tyrant is immortal (see *Republica* X), but on the other hand the tyrant damages the most living part of its soul, that is the intellect - and both can be saved under certain conditions. Of course religion already delivers messages about afterlife and supplies various techniques to produce for the future a happy stay in the yonder world, but philosophy might start when just the way you use logos is experienced to
determine right now your ontological relationship to life and death. Thus the correct performance with *logos* becomes a *telos* and not only a means for an external *skopos*. But *logos* means both reason and language. For example, to save a myth by giving him a temporal beginning, a middle and an end is not the same thing as to save an argumentative *logos* by avoiding self-contradiction. Furthermore, in Indian Vedas, immortality is also to be found in the perfect use of what Greek philosophers could call *logos*, but the poets of the Vedas seem to be more interested in the grammatical rightness of language. Thus in India the language of immortal gods, in contradistinction to mortal speech, is defined rather by its adequacy with the eternal rules of words formation than by its adequacy with the essence of things. Nevertheless, both in the Vedas and in Plato, the salvific mystery consists in a highly selective *praxis* of language, which gives place to the full realization of the meaning power, but the supreme knowledge does not stand beyond language in some ineffable realm. There is an immanent depth in language and this is why it is originally kindred with the various modes of being that specifically belong to the soul. As well in the very center of the individual soul as in the rare perfect form of language the opposition between singularity and universality is supposed to be overcome. Therefore we may wonder if Vedic tradition definitely belongs to what we call "religion" in the West, with dogmas and faith, or if it can remind us of ancient forgotten ways to reach the same goal as that which Greek pioneers of philosophy aimed at, but which now seem to have been made impassable by the crisis of modern Western reason?

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**5J** “Was Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time? Eternity and Time Through Analogy and Participation”

In the debate about God’s eternity, one of the main problem of this theme is about the ontological *status* of the time and the temporal entities in respect of the eternity. In particular many authors tried to criticize some medieval philosophers and theologians such as Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas himself. Above all, William Lane Craig and, after the much-discussed article of Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann *Eternity*, argued about the philosophical position on time and eternity in Thomas Aquinas, using the after-McTaggart language, which is the contrast of A vs. B theory of time, and concluded Aquinas was a B-theorist.

In my paper I suggest that this conclusion is mistaken. First of all, I will underline Aquinas’ metaphysical background on time, which derives from Aristotle’s conception on time, which is that time, as change, does not completely depend on the existence of souled animals, but also on existence of *primum movet*. Then, there are also metaphysical reasons to sustain that Aquinas is not a B-theorist. Aquinas defends openly a threedimensional position, excluding the possibility of fourdimensionalism, and thus the possibility of the validity of B-theory18 in Aquinas’ metaphysics. However, taking the definition of B-theory and the effects that entails, such as eternalism and fourdimensionalism, I think there are other consequences unacceptable for Aquinas. Now I will present these consequences and I will provide other reasons to think that Aquinas is not a B-theorist through a glaring counterexample about the souls in the afterlife.

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18 Trenton Merricks defends the idea that B-theory has as a inevitable consequence the four-dimensionalism (see T. Merricks (1995), *On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Substances*, «Mind», 104: 523-531). This, following Merricks, would show that the difference between B-theory and A-theory is not only due to a verbal disagreement but to a real disagreement.
I will show the central role of the notions of \textit{nunc} and \textit{duration}, which are to be interpreted by the use of analogy.

Finally, I will rephrase Craig’s ambiguous sentence
\((f)\ «\text{all the events are present eternally to God»}\)
in
\((n)\ God sees that all contingent events exist eternally.

In this sentence, ‘eternally’ could be intended in three ways: [1] ‘for ever and ever’ (\textit{ab aeterno}), [2] ‘at every instant’ and [3] ‘ontologically always being in its own \textit{duratio},’ each of them is to be made explicit in two way, the \textit{de re} way and the \textit{de dicto} way. Then I show which one of the given interpretations \((n)\) coincides, and which one Aquinas intended to sustain.

At this point of my paper, what I have sustained entails another difficulty: we should accept that there are two different ontological levels of reality in Aquinas, i.e. the human temporal level and the divine eternal level, which cannot stay together, because one corresponds to the tensed and dynamic order, and the other to the static and tenseless one.

Time and eternity do not measure the same things, because on one hand time measures contingent things, and on the other hand eternity is the measure of God Himself. As it has been underlined by Harm Goris,\(^{20}\) eternity and time are not species of the same \textit{genus} for Aquinas. This means that \textit{duratio} is not a univocal term because it is not predicated in the same sense both for ‘eternal’ and ‘temporal extension’: terms like ‘duration’, ‘presentiality’,\(^{22}\) and so on, are used by Aquinas in an analogical sense.\(^{23}\)

My paper reveals the fundamentally different setting of the contemporary philosophy of time and the metaphysical structure of Aquinas’ thought: McTaggart and the contemporary philosophers of time think the temporal A-properties or the B-relations as subsisting by themselves. According to Aquinas, time does not subsist only thanks to the \textit{primum motum} and the soul’s numeration, but above all it owns its being to God.

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\textit{3I “Powers and Laws in Philo of Alexandria”}

Traditionally, historians have taken the Scientific Revolution to mark the birth of the idea of law of nature proper, and have generally been rather reluctant to speak of laws of nature when discussing statements about uniform natural occurrences that are not formulated in obviously quantitative fashion. The (pre)history of this concept, however, can be traced back at least as far as the Stoics and arguably even farther – if one takes into account relevant passages which are extant from

\begin{itemize}
\item[I:\textsuperscript{19}] W.L. Craig (1989), \textit{Was Thomas Aquinas a B-theorist of Time?}, «The New Scholasticism» 59 (4): 482.
\item[I:\textsuperscript{21}] See for example SG, I, 55, 2.
\item[I:\textsuperscript{22}] For example, in this passage «Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does not pass away, eternity is present in its presentiality to any time or instant of time» (SG, I, 66, 7) I think it is quite evident Aquinas’ analogical use of the terms ‘present’ and ‘presentiality’.
\item[I:\textsuperscript{23}] See for instance Aquinas’ analogical interpretation of ‘tensed’ verbs predicated of God in \textit{In sent.} I, d.8, q.2, a.3, answer obj.1: «Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando verba temporalia dicuntur de Deo, intellectus noster non attribuit divino esse illud quod est imperfectionis in singulis temporibus, sed quod est perfectionis in omnibus; aeternitas enim includit in se omnen perfectionem modo simplici, quae est in temporalius divisa et temporibus diversis; \textit{cum tempus imitetur perfectionem aeternitatis, quantum potest recte.}»
\end{itemize}
Presocratic treatises or present in some of the more philosophical Hippocratic writings, as well as the emphasis placed on natural regularity in Plato’s *Timaeus* and in a number of Aristotelian works (*Meteorology* I and IV, *Generation of Animals* II and V etc.).

Middle Platonism occupies a particularly interesting place in the early history of the idea of law of nature. My paper will focus on Philo’s contribution in this respect and, while it is arguably impossible to completely extricate references to physical laws from the thicket of the moral and theological implications of Philo’s handling of *nomoi phuseōs* and related expressions, I will explore primarily the cosmological sense of such laws. I argue that a proper understanding of Philo’s sometimes tantalizing references to the regular and predictable workings of nature can be guided by some of his favorite political metaphors (cosmic democracy etc.), by the pervasive *tupos* imagery, the defining functions of the Logos, and especially by his appeal to the concept of powers. In the final section of my paper, I will offer a tentative account of the genesis and influence of Philo’s treatment of laws of nature, and I will point out significant similarities with approaches to natural regularity in other authors, including Pseudo-Aristotle (*De mundo*).

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**3B **IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON**

“The Public Face of Philosophy in *Magna Graecia*: The First 100 Years”

Philosophy began in Sicily and Southern Italy with the arrival of Xenophanes and Pythagoras from Ionia around 540 BCE. Relying on recent studies by Carl Huffman, Leonid Zhmud, and Robert Hahn, I discuss the social context of the flowering of early Pythagoreanism. I also characterize the social location of the philosopher-poet Xenophanes. I then go on to people that they influenced, remarkably original thinkers: Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles, and to literary figures with philosophical interests, like Epicharmus, and the rhetorical theorists Corax and Tisias. My concern in this essay is not so much about the remaining text of these thinkers, but with their relationships with each other and with the society in which they functioned. I hope in a later essay to continue this discussion past 450 BCE to present a picture of the context of philosophical activity before philosophy became primarily Athenian.

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**4B “Cosmogony and Ethics of Classical Zoroastrian Philosophical Theology”**

This paper addresses three dimensions of the ethics of Zoroastrian cosmogony. (a) First, the genesis of the cosmos is depicted in the light of dialectical tension between the dualistic aspects of the universe; first, there is Ahoramazda, the Wise Lord of pure light and righteousness confronting the Ahriman, the demonic expression of darkness. Initially there lies a void between them. The confrontation is processed by various actions, including Ahoramazda’s creation of a material (gētīg ) as well as spiritual (mēnōg) entities. The continuum of creations include: the sky which embedded the world; second water; third earth; fourth vegetation; fifth animal (bull); six the primordial human being (Gayōmard); and finally fire.

(b) Second, Ahoramazda’s agenda is the success of its human creatures in their self-realization of well being by noble thoughts, actions and worlds. In contrast. Ahriman, or evil depicts not an
affirmative reality by a deprivation of rights, good intensions, right acts and successful life-praxis (e.g. knowledge, family, industry, and societal life).

(c) Finally, this model unites humanity with the wise Lord, where human beings can serve themselves and the divine by their material success- harmonizing personal and divine, theory and praxis.

In sum, Zoroastrian ethical cosmology present a monism which was very likely used by Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus. The monistic vision of emanation and return in Neoplatonims, that competed with the monotheistic cosmogony of creation, perhaps has its roots in Zoroastrian philosophical theology.

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3H “The Digression in the Theaetetus and Pindar's Nemean, 10”

At Theaetetus 173c, Socrates embellishes his description of the “chorus leader” of philosophers with a quotation from Pindar: “it is really only his body that lives and sleeps in the city, while his mind, having deemed all these matters to be worth little or nothing, disdains them and flies off in every direction, as Pindar says, ‘beneath the earth’ and geometrizing the things on its surface, and astronomizing ‘beyond heaven’ [ἀπορίαν σαν πανταχ' πέτεται κατά Πίνδαρον τά<ς> τα γάς ὑπένερθε] κατά τά ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, “οὔρανον θ' ὑπερ” ἀστρονομοῦσα], and searching after in every way the complete nature of each whole among the things there are, lowering itself to nothing that lies near at hand” (173c3–174a2; reading the Oxford Classical Text). The standard view is that Socrates is quoting from a lost poem: the Teubner edition of Pindar’s fragments groups the phrases together as fr. 292. In his 1921 Loeb edition of the Theaetetus, however, Fowler attributes the quotation to the final epode of Pindar’s Nemean 10, where Zeus grants Polydeuces the choice whether to “escape death and hateful old age, and come by yourself to live on Olympus” (83–84), or to share an equal fate with his brother Castor: “then you may live half the time beneath the earth and half in the golden homes of heaven [ἡμισυ μὲν ἐν πνέοις γαίας ὑπένερθεν ἑων, | ἡμισυ δ' οὐρανοῦ εἴ χρυσοῦς δόμοσιν]” (87–88; trans. Race). To my knowledge the possibility that Socrates is echoing these verses has never been explored in any depth. In this talk I offer a defense of Fowler’s attribution and consider the implications for interpreting Socrates’ “digression” and in particular his praise of the philosophical life.

In the first part of the talk I discuss textual problems and argue that recent editors of the Theaetetus have been wrong to reject the manuscript reading of 173e5 (τά τά γάς ὑπένερθε) in favor of Clement of Alexandria’s version (τά<ς> τα γάς ὑπένερθε). If Socrates intends only γάς ὑπένερθε to be Pindaric, then there is greater resemblance between the Theaetetus and Nemean 10 passages than scholars have thought. The second half of the quotation (οὔρανον θ' ὑπερ) poses an additional challenge but is not decisive against Fowler’s attribution. In the latter part of the talk I turn to the recent debate over how seriously we should take Socrates’ praise of the philosopher and the ideal of becoming like God (see Rue 1993, Sedley 2004, Peterson 2011, Giannapoulou 2013). If the Nemean 10 hypothesis is correct, I argue, this lends support to the view that his portrait of the philosopher should not be read as a straightforward endorsement. In short, Polydeuces’ unhesitating choice not
to “escape” (φυγήν: 83) mortality to live forever among the gods, but to share his brother’s fate, should prompt us to reconsider Socrates’ exhortation to “escape” (φεύγειν) from the mortal to the godly realm “as quickly as possible” (ὅτι τάχιστα)—where “escape” (φυγή) means achieving “likeness to God to the extent one can” (176a8–b1).

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2D “Primary Substance: Categories V and Metaphysics VII”

Aristotle’s treatment of primary substance has been the focus of a long-standing and deep-seated controversy, trained principally on the prima facie contradiction between the account of substance offered in Categories V, wherein sensible particulars are held to be primary, and the ‘central books’ of the Metaphysics, wherein forms appear to be accorded primacy. Every possible interpretation seems to have its supporters—with some scholars plumping for the account of substance offered in the Categories, others defending the account found in the Metaphysics, and still others offering various compatibilist and developmentalist readings.24 In this paper, I will provide a novel compatibilist interpretation.

Following a treatment of the account of primary substance found in Categories V (§1) and select portions of Metaphysics VII (§2), I will offer an interpretation of primary substance that accounts for the apparent inconsistency between these two works (§3). The Categories, I will argue, takes primary substances to be what are most knowable to us; it is thus a work that accords primacy to sensible particulars, which subsist through change. The Metaphysics, on the other hand, takes primary substances to be what are most knowable in themselves; it is thus a work that accords primacy to changeless forms. By understanding the term ‘primary’ in two senses—as end-points of a spectrum ranging from what is primarily knowable to us to what is primarily knowable in itself—the Categories and the Metaphysics will be seen as continuous and complementary works.

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3F “Plato’s Gymnastic Dialogues”

It was not mere coincidence or even convenience that led Plato to found his school at the Academy gymnasium. In fact, he sought to revolutionize the educational activity there by adapting agonistic techniques to intellectual inquiry, by harnessing gymnastic exercise to more spiritual understanding of areté, and by directing gymnastic eroticism toward a transcendent ideal of beauty. In this paper, I identify a group of “gymnastic dialogues” among Plato’s work, in which Socrates uses athletic strategies and techniques to promote the cause of areté, very often in a gymnastic setting. About half of these dialogues (i.e. Gorgias, Enthymenus, and Protagoras) show Socrates competing with and defeating sophists—or, more specifically, the sophistic understanding of education for areté. In the other half (i.e. Lysis, Charmides, and Theaetetus), Socrates acts more like a coach by inviting youths to direct their love of victory (philonikia) toward the love of wisdom (philosophia), and by instructing observers to direct their love of youthful beauty toward the transcendent love of beauty itself (an argument completed in Symposium). I call these gymnastic dialogues because their method includes

its own form of stripping, struggling, and tripping, but Socrates’ challenge aims ultimately at a more philosophical idea of athletic *aretē*.

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**1B “Social Virtue and Aristotelian Identity: The Monadic in Friendship”**

Although Aristotle claims that our identity is fundamentally political—an identity revealed in friendship—the virtue of temperance can be construed as having a non-social aspect that delineates a component of human identity that is not socially determined but independently (monadically) constituted. For Aristotle, human beings share characteristics with the animal kingdom but are distinguished by human will that constitutes the rationally political—the basis for social concord and virtue. Aristotle emphasizes that “no one would choose the whole world on the condition of being alone” (*Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9.1169b17-18). The capacity for choice that rationality implies points not just to a normative aspect of behavior but to an ontology of man’s essential and distinctive nature as socially conditioned.

The relationship of a man to himself can become the basis for the elemental social relationship of friendship, a relationship that presents the paradigm of society as a cohesive harmony bound by love, respect, and emulation. Friendship has a dual function in character development, serving both to mirror essential aspects of character and to mold identity in the direction of the quality of one’s friendships.

The virtues, by which man’s capacity for a good and happy life are fostered, largely have social well-being as an object. Generosity can most clearly be displayed in relation to others. War is a social enterprise, so the virtue of courage is by implication social in nature. Temperance, by contrast, is demonstrated primarily in relation to oneself, in the moderation and regulation of one’s passions and impulses, and so does not require friendship to develop and be exemplified. One can construe temperance as having two dimensions, one that promotes societal health and another that promotes individual health. The latter component is the monadic that correlates with the epistemic center of subjective account that generalizes its significance across the animal kingdom.

Much of Aristotle’s analysis of the source of friendship in a person’s relation to himself can also be used as a basis for the construction of moral value. Although Aristotle appears to define man as a political creature, and so seems to see the political and hence the relational minimally in a dyadic nexus of two friends, the reconstruction of social virtue from a singular relationship of one to oneself reveals a core of monadic and epistemic primacy at the center of Aristotle’s work. This becomes most clear in the analysis of temperance, which, while a facilitator of virtue that can benefit society, can also be seen as the virtue of self-regulation to the self, a virtue that enhances longevity, health, and well-being. Men and women may find themselves happiest when pursuing a temperate life of intermediate and moderate satisfactions. However much this pursuit may benefit society, it also benefits the self.

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**4F “The Preconception of the Just”**

In this paper, I discuss the Epicurean preconception (*prolepsis*) of the just. Preconceptions are a notoriously difficult notion in Epicureanism and so I begin by providing a brief account of Epicurean preconceptions, emphasizing the following three features. First, I argue that preconceptions should be understood as empirically formed universal images that are always true.
Second, I claim that this does not mean that we have direct empirical access to the thing that we have a preconception of, but rather that we may also indirectly arrive at a preconception: while preconceptions are gained through empirical observation, their objects do not need to be empirically perceptible in a direct way. Third, finally, I suggest that prolepseis fulfill a dual function within Epicurean epistemology: (I) they allow us to come to know certain conceptual schemata (‘universals’) and (II) they allow us to recognize an instance of something as being an instance of a conceptual schemata. After outlining this general account of preconceptions, I turn to how it applies to the case of the preconception of the just. First, I explain in what way the preconception of the just is a universal image that is always true. Second, I argue that our access to what is just is empirical yet indirect on Epicurean theory. And third, by drawing on Lucretius’ account in On the Nature of Things V, I show that, according to the Epicureans, agents really come to know the just via the preconception of the just and that they classify a certain thing or action as just given the preconception of the just. Finally, I suggest that this last feature of Epicurean theory makes it particularly interesting, since it opens up the possibility of recognizing and remedying injustices. It inaugurates the possibility of social change in the case of unjust laws.

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5E ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***

“Aristotle on Excellence, Happiness and External Goods”

In this paper, I defend a qualified inclusivist interpretation of Aristotle’s view of the relation between eudaimonia and external goods (which I take to include bodily goods as well as those that lie outside both the body and soul of a person). I believe that the value of external goods, for Aristotle, depends on the character of the agent possessing those “goods.” Excellent people benefit from external goods because (but not only because) they employ them properly. Vicious people, on the other hand, derive no benefit from, and may even be harmed by, their possession of such goods because they employ them improperly. Following Plato, Aristotle compares excellent people to healthy people; he takes vicious people to be analogous to diseased people. Just as ordinary food and drink benefit and satisfy healthy people, excellent people derive benefits and gratification from external goods (such as friends, honor, power, intelligence, etc.). On the other hand, a diet befitting a healthy person may provide no benefit to, and even harm, persons who suffer from serious, and perhaps, “incurable” (aniatos) diseases. Aristotle argues, therefore, that virtuous activity “controls” (kurial) happiness: it provides the form of a life in which an agent chooses, relates to, or uses a variety of external goods, a form of life guided by practical wisdom and a desire to accomplish what is fine (kalon). Vicious activity, by contrast, controls unhappiness. It leads an agent to adopt a mode of life guided by foolishness and unbalanced emotion and desire.

If the view just sketched is roughly correct, it occupies a position between two views defended by previous interpreters of Aristotle. For it implies that Aristotle does not believe that excellent activity is the only good that makes a direct contribution to eudaimonia (exclusivism), and it implies that eudaimonia is not simply a grab-bag of non-instrumental goods (simple inclusivism). Rather, on my account, external goods make a direct contribution to a person’s happiness but only on the condition that the person pursues, employs, and enjoys those goods as excellence demands. My view sees no inconsistency between saying that (1) external goods are only conditionally good, but (2) they can make a direct contribution to a person’s happiness -- once the condition of their goodness is satisfied.

After presenting and defending my interpretation, I consider a variety of objections to it. Most of the remainder of the paper involves answering these objections. I mention here just three of
the objections. It has been argued (by Eric Brown) that my position is not well-supported by NE I, the main text dealing with the issue of the relation between *eudaimonia* and the external goods. This text suggests that virtuous activity alone constitutes *eudaimonia*, and all other goods, including intrinsic goods, lie outside of this activity. Also, it is argued that if “proper use” of external goods means merely “virtuous use”, my view collapses into exclusivism. If it means “beneficial use”, my view cannot account for the idea that excellence “controls” *eudaimonia*. Finally, it may be said that my view implies an inexplicable asymmetry between happiness and unhappiness for Aristotle. For on my interpretation, while virtue is not sufficient for *eudaimonia*, vice is sufficient for unhappiness. I offer responses to these and other objections.

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6E “Aristotle’s *Thumos*: A Broader Reading”

In his recent *Aristotle on Desire* (2012), Giles Pearson has argued that Aristotle’s notion of *thumos*—often translated ‘spirit’—should be understood to mean just *orge* (often translated ‘anger’). He thinks it unsatisfactory that we should understand *thumos* motivations to involve “competitive exertion, a spirit of resistance, resistance to domination, a sense of honour, the will or drive to fight when required” (2012, 124), which are traditionally involved in a Platonic understanding of *thumos* and are imported into Aristotle by some commentators (e.g. Cooper, 1999, “Some remarks on Aristotle’s moral psychology”). In this paper, I first want to resist this interpretation by arguing that Aristotle’s texts reveal an understanding of *thumos* that is both more Platonic and broader than Pearson claims. I begin by a close reading of *EN* II.5, in which Aristotle stresses the difference between a capacity (*dunamis*), an affection (*pathe*) and a habit (*hexis*). I aim to argue that, in understanding *thumos* as capacity, we should realize that it is what enables not just *orge*, but variety of affections. Yet, as I will go on to show, even if Aristotle merely meant ‘orge’ by his use of ‘thumos’, it would still be true that the view of *thumos* that Aristotle holds is more Platonic than Pearson argues. Hence, second, I argue that *thumos* involves a sense of honor insofar as *orge* itself involves a sense of honor. To miss this connection between *orge* and honor is to misunderstand how Aristotle uses ‘orge’. Thirdly, by looking at Aristotle’s discussion of the virtue of courage in the *EN*, as well as passages about *orge* in the *Rhetoric*, I will argue that it is *thumos* enables certain kinds of competitive exertion. Thus, it will turn out that Aristotle’s view of *thumos* is both broader than merely *orge* and quite Platonic. Finally, as I gesture at the end and hope to develop elsewhere, this account of *thumos* can help us understand an important issue about Aristotle’s list of the moral virtues, raised recently by Dorothea Frede (2015) what, if anything gives unity to the list? In part, *thumos* helps provide unity.

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5C “Platonic Sources of Philosophy of Persons in Medieval Tajik Iranian Mystical Poetry”

This paper investigation focuses on the following tripartite Platonic account of persons embedded in Mediaeval Tajik Iranian Mystical Poetry: (a) depiction of the world as a continuum cosmos whereby a person can ascent from the merely contingent physical animal to a mystical intimacy with the absolute Good (to *agatho, al-khair al-mahdhl*); (b) The allegorical iconic use of “symbolism of light [the sun, illumination, heat, empathetic reception, pure reflection and flame of love’]; (c) and finally the identification of knowledge as the logos in the path of self-realization. Major references will be the poems of Jalallaladin Rumi (1207-1273), and Nur ad-Dīn Abd ar-Rahmān Jāmī (1414-1492).
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**5C** “Analyses of Philosophical Terms in Firdousi’s *The Book of King* (Shahname)”

This research depicts the philosophical pre-supposition of the Tajik-Iranian intellectuals in the 11th-13 Century prior to the onslaught of the Mongols. Philosophical theme depicted in this epic, include (a) the illusion of freewill and the reality of determinism- fate-destiny; (b) identification of knowledge with power as knowledge deciphers the logoi of the universe; (c) occasional love and long run alienation –especially of the tragic hero; (d) the sensitive ethos of encounter of fathers and sons and the young and the aged; (e) contingent and feeling movement of love–and human suffering; and finally the rule of language as the essence of societal integrity.

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**5J** “The Problem of Singular Propositions for Aquinas: A Direct Reference Reply”

In this paper, I consider to what extent Aquinas can address the problem of singular propositions by adopting a quasi-direct reference account of singular propositions. The problem of singular propositions is the problem of giving an adequate account of the content of propositions containing singular terms such as ‘Socrates’ and ‘this man’. Aquinas confronts this problem because of a parallel problem concerning singular cognition and because of his affirmation of the semantic theory of signification. The problem of singular cognition, for Aquinas, is his at least apparent difficulty in providing an account of how we acquire singular concepts such as the concept *Socrates* or *this man*, as opposed to common concepts such as *human being*. Because of this problem of singular cognition, it seems that Aquinas will also face the problem of singular propositions, for he explains propositions in terms of signification theory, which is a relation between words, concepts, and things. On the paradigm case of signification, a common term such as ‘human being’ will immediately signify the concept *human being* and ultimately signify the common nature of human being. It would seem then that in the case of singular propositions, a singular term such as ‘Socrates’ would immediately signify the singular concept *Socrates* and ultimately signify the individual form of Socrates. However, according to the problem of singular cognition, Aquinas has no account of the singular concept *Socrates*. So, without an account of the singular concept, how is he to explain the content of the term ‘Socrates’ or to secure the relation between the term ‘Socrates’ and Socrates himself? One possible way out for Aquinas is to accept a kind of direct reference theory. If one is a direct reference theorist (such as Saul Kripke and David Kaplan), then one offers an account of singular propositions and singular terms without an account of singular concepts; for, according to a direct reference theorist, the content of terms and the connection between words and things is not brought about by means of concepts. I argue that Aquinas cannot accept a direct reference theory *in toto*, since it conflicts with signification theory; nevertheless, he can offer a quasi-direct reference theory insofar as he admits that an underdeveloped psychology (i.e., account of concepts) need not disqualify a semantic theory.

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**6G** “Evil Souls: The Dualism of Plutarch and Numenius”
As Dillon and others have pointed out, the doctrines of principals (ἁρχαί) in Middle Platonism often have strong dualistic tendencies. In this paper, I propose a comparison between two paradigmatic forms of that dualism: Plutarch (45-120) and Numenius (late 2nd century).

In chapters 45 to 60 of *Isis and Osiris*, Plutarch interprets a broad variety of philosophical and theological currents – Zoroastrianism, Platonism, Pythagoreanism – as being fundamentally structured by a set of two opposing principles, one good, one bad. The ontological model for this two-principle doctrine, as Heinze, Krämer and Hager have shown, is no doubt the old academy teaching of Xenocrates and the opposition between the Nous-Monas and the ἀόριστος δύας. Somewhat surprisingly however, Plutarch does not associate the dyad with matter. Instead, the force opposing providential designs is taken to be the evil world soul of the «Nomoi» (896d-898c), as Plutarch construes it at *De animae procreatione in Timaeo*, chapter 7, 1015 E. For its part, matter will be interpreted along Aristotelian and Stoic lines as purely passive and thus as incapable of functioning as an active force of evil.

Numenius’ dualism is likewise founded on the opposing principles of Xenocrates, except in his case the ἀόριστος δύας is directly identified with matter (fr. 52). As such, the evil world soul becomes in a certain sense superfluous. Numenius nevertheless insists on its existence, though in this case as an internal source of movement and not as a force that stirs up matter from the outside, as is the case with Plutarch. This difference in the status accorded to matter and to the soul is reflected in their respective interpretations of the *Timaeus*, where Numenius associates the ἀνάκρη of 47e-48a with matter, whereas, for Plutarch, matter is originally neutral and ἀνάκρη refers to the soul. According to the testimony of Porphry (fr. 44), Numenius’ cosmic dualism was mirrored in his psychology, where he posited not two opposing parts of the soul but two entirely different souls – a rational one and an irrational one. This doubling of the soul, in which, as Phillips points out, the two souls remain in continuous and irreconcilable hostility to each other, marks a much stronger dualism that that of Plutarch.

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1B “Aristotle’s Preliminary Definition of Friendship”

Aristotle is widely read as defining friendship, or friendship “proper,” as “mutually recognized goodwill,” (NE 1156a2-4) where “goodwill” (eunoia) is “wishing good things for another for their sake” (NE 1155b31-2). I will argue, to the contrary, that this is not Aristotle’s true definition of friendship. It rather serves as a plausible preliminary definition that Aristotle criticizes and rejects over the course of his investigation in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Indeed, “goodwill” or “wishing goods for another for their own sake” has a much more tenuous place in Aristotle’s understanding of friendship than is usually recognized.

Aristotle rather explicitly rejects “mutually recognized goodwill” as a definition of friendship (NE 1157b17-19, 1158a5-10). However, his ultimate reasons for this rejection are not as apparent. I will argue that they can be discerned by reflecting on the import of his examples and claims throughout his discussion of friendship. In particular, Aristotle’s subsequent demotion of goodwill goes hand in hand with his elevation of the mutual desire that friend’s have for each other’s presence (ibid.). This

re-evaluation occurs on the heels of the observation that prolonged distance dissolves friendship and friendly love (NE 1157b10-13). And given that, That on account of which people are friends being destroyed, the friendship (or “friendly love”) is also destroyed, since the friendship (or “friendly love”) exists in relation to these things (NE 1156a22-4), it follows that the presence of the friend, or its not too distant prospect, is an essential condition of friendship and friendly love.

I will then argue that the fact that mutual presence is an essential condition of friendship and friendly love is best explained by understanding friends to most fundamentally desire the presence of the other friend. Thus, when one’s friend is not, and will not foreseeably be, present to oneself, the friendship and friendly love eventually becomes “forgotten.” But this implies that the personal love that friends exhibit is not “pure” goodwill, but is naturally tied to, even subordinated to, their more fundamental desire for each other’s presence (as is also implied by NE 1159a5-12 and 1166b30, 1167a10-12). Such a conclusion requires that Aristotle’s initial account of friendship in terms of goodwill be rejected in favor of one that gives priority to the friend’s mutual desire for each other’s presence, which is exactly what Aristotle does.

I will then discuss one other reason that comes to light for rejecting the definition of friendship as “mutually recognized goodwill.” Aristotle later claims that friendship requires equality and an equal return (NE 1159a33-b3, 1163b9-14), and he is quite explicit that, in order to meet this requirement, friends, even virtuous friends, must pay back each other’s benefactions (NE 1157b33-36, note antapodidōsi, 1164a34-1164b2, note amoibēn.) This further suggests that friendly love is not motivated by pure goodwill, for otherwise, the friend who performs a benefaction would receive a sufficiently choiceworthy “return” just from witnessing the resulting happiness of his friend.

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6H “Aristotle's Best Plot-type: Oedipus in Ch 13 or Cresphontes in Ch 14?”

Oedipus is cited by Aristotle as being the best tragedy in Ch 13. Yet he explicitly gives it only the silver medal in Ch 14, behind Cresphontes, Iphigenia, and Helle, which end happily. No one has ever reconciled this severe discrepancy to the satisfaction of the profession. In recent work, I have argued that the catharsis, pity and fear clause is illegitimate in the definition of tragedy and that pity and fear probably only apply to one or a few of the four sub-types of tragedy given in Ch 18: complex tragedy, tragedy of suffering, tragedy of character, and spectacular tragedy. Given the ability to take a fresh approach because of that work, I start the analysis anew to attempt to reconcile the different evaluations of Oedipus.

Because the reasons why katharsis is inauthentic have been out since 2003 (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy), I give only a very brief summary why it is not the goal of all tragedy for Aristotle, and why rather the rest of the text shows that (proper) pleasure or the like is truly the goal for him. I spend a little more time on the reasons why pity and fear likewise cannot be in the definition of tragedy, because they were barely addressed in 2003 and have been greatly supplemented recently, while formulating a reply to Stephen Halliwell’s criticism of my 2003 article, in his Between Ecstasy and Truth (2012). The fuller, and I believe insuperable reasons, are now in a book that is being evaluated for publication and hence are generally unknown. They stem from Aristotle saying explicitly in Ch 13 that three of four tragic plot-types have neither pity nor fear, and from other legitimate tragic
plot-types in Chs 2-18 that in his own words also do not have pity, or that we can easily deduce do not have both emotions required by the definition.

After this background, I give two samples of the previous attempts to resolve the dilemma at hand in order to show how unpersuasive they are, and then start my own analysis. Given that “pity and fear” are not necessary for Aristotle for all plot-types, one new possibility is that the chapters were originally discussing different sub-types of tragedy. *Oedipus*, then, might be the best plot for one type of tragedy (requiring pity and fear) whereas the best plots in Ch 14 might be coming from a discussion of a sub-type (say, complex tragedy) that did not require pity and fear, and that gives the kind of enthrallment and proper pleasure from recognition or reversal (or both). Of course, this entails that sections of the treatise were lost, or that Aristotle explained some of this in lecture, but Ch 18 arguably proves that point anyway, given the lack of any previous recognition of tragedies of suffering or of character in the extant mss.

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6D “Heaven and Moral Efficacy: Stoic Way and Confucian Way”

This paper discusses different philosophical attempts to explain moral efficacy under various conditions of external contingencies. Confucianism is the tradition of virtue that emphasizes the efficacy of self-cultivation and moral excellence. But how can early Confucian philosophers explain unexpected and uncontrolled events and conditions of life where moral excellence cannot be fully expressed. How can they explain fate, destiny, and luck that can make us incapable, our lives less meaningful, and the world amoral chaos? When faced with unexpected and undeserved misfortune, can a Confucian agent still virtuous? Stoic philosophers argue that virtue is a solid inner quality of the mind and a virtuous moral agent is unaffected and undisturbed by external contingencies of life. That is, a virtuous person can be happy even on a torture rack. Immanuel Kant argues that moral significance lies solely in one’s full dedication to universal and rational rules of morality. It seems that fate and luck lie outside one’s moral duty and responsibility. What would early Confucian philosophers say about moral efficacy and virtue? I will argue that, unlike Stoic philosophers and Kant, early Confucian philosophers (particularly Confucius and Mencius) developed ways to explain both the efficacy of inner moral excellence and the relevance of certain external contingencies through their unique notion of heaven (tian 天).

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4F “Two Forms of Reasoning about Pleasure in Epicureanism”

The structure of Epicurean ethical theory is notoriously obscure. The Epicureans suggest that canonic contains the methodological principles that properly structure any inquiry and the epistemological principles that properly structure any theory. Elizabeth Asmis has done pioneering work on how canonic actually structures Epicurean physics (*Epicurus’ Scientific Method*); I propose to do the same for their ethics. In physical reasoning, the Epicureans have two modes of belief-assessment. Predictive beliefs (*prosmenonta*) are true when attested (*epimarturein*) by future sense-perception and false when not-attested; causal beliefs (*adēla*) are true when not-contested by any
sense perception and false when contested (*antimarturein*). I argue that these same two modes of reasoning underlie two hedonic strategies in their ethics. The first strategy exploits observed regularities in our experiences of pleasure and pain, but this strategy falls short in important ways. The second strategy proceeds by inquiry into the ultimate causes of our pleasures and pains; this strategy, pursued correctly, yields the happiest possible life. I also argue that these two strategies relate to Epicurus' distinction between mortal and immortal happiness and goods. I conclude by suggesting, briefly, that this way of looking at Epicurean ethics undermines a common objection to their instrumentalist understanding of the value of virtue and friendship.

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4G “The Good Beyond Being in the *Republic* and the *Parmenides*”

The focus of my study is the relationship between the infamous “good beyond being” of *Republic* 509b and the dazzlingly simple one of *Parmenides* 137c-142a. Taking Glaucos's statement that Socrates will elucidate the former at “another time” as my cue (506e), I argue that this good beyond being is explicated in the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, but framed as a discussion of the one beyond being — or, more specifically, a one that neither is nor is not. Though my interpretation shares affinities with Middle- and Neo-Platonic interpretation of the first hypothesis, this is not a paper about Plotinus' (or any Middle- or Neo-Platonists') interpretation or reception of the *Parmenides*. Rather, I hope to paint a compelling picture of a one beyond being — foreshadowed in the *Republic*, and then discussed in the *Parmenides* — for Plato scholars by adducing abundant historical, textual, and philosophical reasons for deeming this a genuinely Platonic position, and not merely Neo-Platonic fancy.

In section 1, I examine the good beyond being in the *Republic*, suggesting that Glaucos's comment about discussing it at “another time” can be read as Plato's promise to elaborate upon this notion in the future. In section 2, I examine the preface of the *Parmenides*, paying close attention to its allusions to the *Republic*. I argue that these allusions are hermeneutic clues to read the *Parmenides* in conjunction with the *Republic*, and thus for reading parts of the *Parmenides* as potentially fulfilling the promise discussed in section 1. I then provide reasons in section 3 for allowing the identification of the good and the one, such that a philosophical discussion of a one beyond being can, without contradiction, be taken as the promised elucidation of a previously mentioned good beyond being. In section 4, I bolster my reading of the first hypothesis by showing that any other ontological positioning of the one would lead to an incoherent and contradictory theory of forms.

The upshot of this discussion is a demonstration of the metaphysical import of the one beyond being's role in the ontological hierarchy of intelligible and sensible things. These considerations, I suggest, should lead us to think that an “apophatic” interpretation of the first hypothesis is not only possible, but also in accordance with Plato's intention. By linking the good beyond being of the *Republic* and the one of the first hypothesis, we will come to a better understanding of both, as well as a more resolute comprehension of Plato's metaphysics in general.

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6C “Contemporary Significance of Farabi’s Views on Language”

This investigation focuses on the works of Abu Nasr al-Farabi (872-950), especially his Book of
Letters (Kitāb al-ḥurūf : commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. There will be an examination of his major theses- such as the difference between the copula (‘existence’) in Semitic Languages such as Arabic and Indo-European languages such as Attic Greek and Persian. In addition, we shall discuss the relevance of the works of al-Farabi and new themes in the field of translation studies.

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2D “Ontological Priority in Aristotle’s Categories”

My paper focuses on Aristotle’s notion of ontological priority in Categories, and examines two recent proposals on priority. In Categories Aristotle clearly wants to ascribe to primary substances (particular things) ontological priority over all other things: non-substances and secondary substances (species and genera, under which primary substances fall). Yet, it is far from clear what notion of priority would make plausible his priority claim on behalf of particular substances. What has been the standard account of priority — a is prior to b just in case a can exist without b, but b cannot exist without a — does not deliver the desired result. For even if other things cannot exist without primary substances, it is not clear whether primary substances could exist without them. This worry is most urgent in the case of secondary substances, species and genera, which are commonly considered to be essential to primary substances. If they are essential, then primary substances cannot exist without them. Hence, this notion of priority fails to capture the relevant priority relation.

Recently, Phil Corkum and Michail Peramatzis have offered alternative accounts of priority, which can be roughly summarized as follows. According to Corkum, a is prior to b just in case a has an ontological status independently of b, while b has an ontological status in virtue of being related to a. According to Peramatzis, a is prior to b just in case a makes b be what it is, but b does not make a be what it is. What is common to both is that they reject the modal-existential notion of priority described above (and so they hold that Aristotle’s claims in Categories should not be construed in existential terms). Their accounts help, in my mind, to illuminate the priority relations between primary substances and non-substances. Yet, as I hope to show, they invoke some questions. In the case of Corkum, the crucial question is what precisely does the ontological status consist of. For if species and genera are essential to primary substances, then it is not obvious in what sense primary substances have a status independent of them. This question becomes even more urgent in the case of Peramatzis’ account: if species and genera are essential in that they make particulars be what they are, then it seems to follow that they enjoy priority over primary substances, not vice versa.

I end by sketching an account of priority, based on Categories 12, which is similar to Corkum’s and Peramatzis’s account in that it is non-modal in character, but differs in that it does not reject the existential implications of Aristotle’s claims. Roughly, I argue that primary substances are primary because they explain why species and genera exist (they exist because they are predicated of primary substances), while species and genera do not explain why primary substances exist (they are explanatorily basic). This account has also implications for our understanding of Aristotle’s essentialism in Categories. I propose that although species and genera reveal what primary substances are, they are not essential in the sense of making them be what they are — primary substances are what they are, and so exist, all by themselves.

The Bhagavad Gītā exhibits a noted tension between agency and determinism. On the one hand, Krishna enjoins Arjuna time and again to perform his duty as a warrior; on the other hand, Krishna expounds a deterministic metaphysics that leaves no room for the freedom of decision and action presumed by the language of duties. This paper delineates an interpretation of the Gītā under which (a) these inconsistent passages of the text are seen to be descriptions of the same phenomena from different and mutually incompatible points of view; and (b) moral duties are seen to be instrumental fictions intended to allow a diligent agent to proceed to an awareness of the nullity of all agency, and thus to attain the only kind of freedom that the Gītā recognizes.

Aside from its exact title and genre, there are two great questions surrounding Cyropaedia. The first is how we are to conceive of its romantic element, i.e., whether Xenophon means for us to accept Cyrus as the darling of fortune he seems to be, or, as the disintegration of his empire at the end suggests, to take his rise and triumph as an unstable false appearance. The second is how to take Diogenes Laertius' remark (3.34) that Plato and Xenophon were rivals and Cyropaedia should be paired with (and thus respond to) Republic. This paper will argue that Cyropaedia is a sustained interpretation of Republic that traces its imagery systematically.

Xenophon says that his theme begins from "how democracies are overthrown by those wishing to be governed in some other way" (Cyr. 1.1.1). Plato set Republic during the last phase of the Peloponnesian war at the home of Athens' leading arms manufacturer, Cephalus. He creates for the political reformation of Glaucon a space in which to imagine the consequences of creating a system of government according to his own deeply flawed desires. That is, one might describe Republic as an extended fantasy of someone "wishing to overthrow the democracy and be governed in some other way."

Xenophon introduces the βασιλική τέχνη, the "kingly art of ruling" or how to win the willing obedience of subjects through an allusion to Socrates' dialogue with Thrasymachus about the craft of ruling in Republic I (343b-344c). Xenophon contrasts the willing obedience of flocks with man's resistance to being ruled. Flocks, he says, "even allow their shepherds (νομέας) to use their flesh as they wish" (Cyr. 1.1.2). This recalls Socrates characterization of Thrasymachan politics as the belief that shepherds raise sheep not to make them good in and of themselves, but for feasting or sale (Rep. I 345c).

Many other themes unite the opening of Cyropaedia and Republic I. Socrates had gone to Pireius "to view the goddess" (θεάσασθαι), and is induced to turn around and go back there to be a spectator again of the relay race by night (θεάσασθαι). Xenophon proposes to show rulers as "marvels" (θαυμάζονται 1.1.1), which he uses to introduce Cyrus (1.1.6). The verb θαυμάζω nicely captures the ambiguity required for his theme of suggesting Cyrus as an exemplar of Plato's perfect
secret criminal. It means at once both "to admire" and "to regard as something beyond human experience, like a wonder or monster." Xenophon prepares the reader for the centrality of such ambiguity to his theme when he describes Cyrus as having acquired willing subjects through war, and a fiercely loyal following of admirers through the studied use of fear (1.1.3-4).

Most tellingly, Xenophon shares Plato's concern that justice cannot be merely "repaying what is owed," but while Plato seems to imply that the greatest risk of tyranny is when the intemperate man like Glaucon pretends that taking what he desires (sex, money, power, like Gyges) is justice, Xenophon interrogates the opposite danger, when the temperate man like Cyrus pretends that utterly selfless giving to others can turn the whole world into slaves.

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**1E “Reference, Time and Modality in Arabic Logic: The Avicennan Tradition”**

The paper investigates various interpretations of modalized propositions in the Arabic tradition, with a specific focus on Avicenna (d. 1037) and the post-Avicennan tradition particularly Khūnajī (d.1248), and Kātibī (1276). I will present some major types of alethic, temporal, and combined alethic/temporal modalities in the substantial and descriptional reading, and the later distinction between essentialist and externalist reading. These notions will be discussed in connection with the role they play in framework of an Avicennan theory of demonstration.

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**1A Indian Philosophy Round Table: Rethinking Epic(s)**

This roundtable brings together experts working on multiple epic traditions (Homeric, Indian, and English) that can be broadly described as “epic” with the goal of asking: what makes a tradition “epic”? What does it mean to study “epics”? And what should the goal of “epic studies” be within the context of wider literary and humanistic concerns and disciplines?

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**5C “Ancient Zoroastrian Ethics and its Influences on Medieval Shi’a Theology and Nietzsche’s Philosophy”**

The ethical ontology of Zoroastrian (13th Century BC) doctrine as expressed in the Avesta, focused on the tripartite doctrine of “Good-Noble” thought (pinādr-i nīk), “Good-Noble” Word-Logos (guftār-i nīk) and Good action-praxis (kirādr-i nīk). There is a universal consensus that both Shi’a theology (as depicted by Naṣīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī [1201-1274]) and F. Nietzsche’s ethics of “the will to power” are derived from the Zoroastrian theology. This research reflect on a prima facie paradox that while Nietzsche’s vision emphasizes “the will to power”, the ethics of N. Ṭūsī is akin to L. Tolstoy’s remarks in the epilogue of War and Peace, that “free will is an essence of life, but it is an illusion”. We shall search for the possible roots of these paradoxes on “will” in the classical text of Avesta.
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3F “The Structure of Euthyphro, 9c-11b: An Assessment of Recent Proposals”

The argument at *Euthyphro* 9c-11b continues to be a source of puzzlement for historians of philosophy. In this paper I assess two recent papers, one by Matt Evans and the other by Lindsay Judson, each of which examine the structure of this argument. I find that both papers have laudable attributes, but Evans’ is overall preferable because of its simplicity and its more accurate handling of key parts of the text. Finally, I identify several problematic areas of Evans’ reconstruction and offer a new proposal.

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6C “An Ancient Vision of a Just Global Empire in Central Asia”

This study reflects on the mystical monistic Islamic vision of “the unity of being” (al-wahdat al-wujud) according to which humanity is embedded in “nature.” Analogous to the African notion of’ Ecophilia (love of home-nature), the human self is not de-alienated from nature. The result is an integration of “the human good” with “ecology”. An interesting example is Muslim’s attitude towards human corps after death of a person, as well as the recognition of dependence of human being with nature, as well as affinity with the heavens and earth. According to a majority of modern thinkers, the greatest problem of humanity lies in alienation; to that end, the outcome of Islamic mystical monism is “de-alienation”.

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5J “Aquinas on Divine Concurrence and Qualitative Change”

Aquinas’s account of God’s concurrence with secondary agents has received surprisingly little attention in the recent scholarship, and Alfred J. Freddoso’s characterization of it has been mostly taken for granted by medieval and especially early modern scholars in the last two decades. In this paper I intend to show that aside from what Freddoso sees as Aquinas’s main solution to the problem of divine concurrence and secondary causation, Aquinas develops at least two other aspects of this account. These aspects, in turn, can perhaps help to solve some of the difficulties that Freddoso’s Aquinas (which is, to be fair, admittedly comes rather from Suarez than Aquinas himself) faces.

First, I start with a brief characterization of concurrentism and its alternative positions, then present some possible motivations for taking concurrentism seriously. After that, I turn to Freddoso’s account of concurrentism, which, as will be seen, can be mostly discerned from what Aquinas says about creation and not from his explicit treatment of secondary causation. According to this account, both God and the secondary created agent are immediate causes of the same effect insofar as the former provides its existence while the latter provides its essence. Then, I will turn to the two other models that Aquinas entertained at least at some points in his career; the model of what I will call the indeterminate/determinate esse, and the model of principal/instrumental causes. According to the former, the contribution of God and the secondary agent can be understood in terms of giving indeterminate and determinate esse, while according to the latter, God acts through the secondary agent as if it were his instrument, that is, by applying its power and moving it to action. I
will show that although these three models might be regarded as emphasizing different aspects of the same account, nevertheless, especially the last one (that also happens to be Aquinas's most considered view on the subject) can help to overcome some of the difficulties raised by the other two when applied to particular instances of qualitative change, such as a particular fire's warming up a particular pot of water placed next to him.

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4G “Remarks on Laws, 623c3-4, and its Context”

While the Greek text of Laws 627e3-4, “τρίτον δὲ που δικαστὴν πρὸς ἄρετὴν εἴπομεν,” is agreed upon by BURNET, ENGLAND, and DES PLACES, the translation and interpretation of these two lines enjoys much less consensus. ENGLAND, DES PLACES, SAUNDERS, and SCHÖPSDAU either translate or interpret these lines to mean that the third-mentioned judge of the brothers in an unruly family is superior to the prior two judges, while STRAUSS, PANGLE, BENARDETE, and BRISON AND PRADER either translate or interpret these lines to mean that the third judge is inferior to the prior two judges. In this paper I show that the disagreement regarding translation is not resolvable on philological grounds and argue for a translation that leaves the philological question open: “Let us speak also of a third judge regarding virtue.” While I argue for a neutral translation of this passage, I believe that the disagreement between the above-mentioned scholars is extremely fruitful for philosophical analysis, as it raises the question of the function of this passage within the argument of Book 1 of the Laws. The question at issue is whether the recognition of the communal nature of the polis leads to an expansion of one’s moral perspective (ENGLAND, SAUNDERS, and SCHÖPSDAU) or the limiting of it (STRAUSS, PANGLE, and BENARDETE). An adequate answer to this question lies far beyond the bounds of this short paper, especially as the discussion of the three judges occurs at an early stage in the dialectical development of the Laws. Accordingly, I primarily focus on articulating what is at stake in this question. I conclude by noting that from the immediate context of 627e3-4, Kleinias’ claim that the third judge is “a great deal better” than the other two judges (628a4-5) is warranted, as the standard by which the judge in question is measured is “with regards to the correctness and faultiness of laws” (627d3-4).

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6B “The Argument Against Traditional Theism in Laws, 10.905d8-906c7”

In Book X of Plato’s Laws, the Athenian identifies three pernicious forms of impiety that the preludes to the laws on impiety must systematically refute. The three impious claims are: (1) gods do not exist (i.e. atheism); (2) the gods do not care about humans (i.e. deism); and (3) the gods can be appeased via gifts and sacrifices (i.e. traditional theism). The Athenian and his companion treat each claim in descending order of attention and complexity, refuting first atheism (887c6-899d3), then deism (899d5-905d7) and finally traditional theism (905d8-906c7). The argument against traditional theism is by far the shortest of the three and has received the least attention in the literature, in part because of its peculiar structure—it functions by presenting a comparative evaluation of the gods who ex hyposthesis are appeased by sacrifices and mortal rulers who might also be similarly appeased by gifts—and in part because many have found its major conclusions to be already established (or at least taken to be established) by the previous arguments. However, since traditional theism represents both the most widespread (885d, 948c) and the worst (907b, 948c) form of impiety, the
Athenian’s refutation of it merits closer scrutiny. In this paper, I provide a careful analysis of the argument as a self-standing but dialectical reductio ad absurdum, whose core premises are taken from the traditional theist’s own belief set. In §1, I defend the characterization of the third impious claim as distinctive of traditional theism, bringing in evidence from the Republic. The refutation naturally divides into two sections: in §2, I show how the Athenian carefully sets up the terms of the reductio in a series of steps that lay out the terms of the comparison set (905d8-906c7), and in §3, I examine the implications of the reductio (906c8-907b9). In the next section, §4, I provide a critical evaluation of the argument, laying out four distinct criticisms of its structure, effectiveness and soundness as a self-standing argument. According to these criticisms, the argument is a very poor one indeed. However, I then reassess the argument in §5, by considering it in light of the argument’s context and the stated function of the prelude to impiety (907b10-d1). In particular, I argue that the argument is dialectical in that it relies on premises that would be acceptable to the traditional theist and motivational, in that it is aimed at generating in its recipient an emotional response that will motivate moral and doxastic change. On my analysis, the argument, while by no means perfect, is neither as poor nor as derivative as it is often taken to be. In the conclusion, I briefly connect my reading of this argument to the question of the function of the preludes in general and to the place of the Olympian gods in Book X’s theology.

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2H “Posterior Analytics, II, 19: Two Kinds of Universal, Two Kinds of Epagoge”

In his comment to the final chapter of the Posterior Analytics, Ross observes that Aristotle seems to describe two different types of induction, “alike only in being inductive.” In line with this idea, I intend to show that the induction of principles in Post.An. II, 19 occurs in two stages: first, through the aisthesis-mneme-empeiria process we grasp a vague and indistinct universal which cannot be used as a principle of science and, in a second time, from this vague universal we induce a precise and definite universal that will be a principle of science. The model of this second induction we would find in Post.An. II, 13. Analyzing both texts, I intend to show that the first stage of induction would reach only a name and just in the second and scientific induction we could grasp a definition and principle of science. In this sense, Aristotle’s epagoge will not be exclusively dialectic or empirical.

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2B “Muslim Classical Perception of Societal Self and the Contemporary Crisis of French “Self-Identity”

This research concerns the relevance of medieval Islamic communitarian notion of persons as a dimension of community (polity) to the 21st Century. The focus of our research is the political and social challenges encouneters by the French tradition of personal identity as a French citizen, irrespective of religious persuasion. In addition, our study reflects on the potential demographical dynamics of Muslims- and the a-historical, a-temporal, pre-Hegelian dogma of age of reason/enlightenment of a static world order imposed by Europe upon the globe with its, presumption of colonialism, racism and anti-feminine perspectives.

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1A Indian Philosophy Round Table: Rethinking Epic(s)
This roundtable brings together experts working on multiple epic traditions (Homeric, Indian, and English) that can be broadly described as “epic” with the goal of asking: what makes a tradition “epic”? What does it mean to study “epics”? And what should the goal of “epic studies” be within the context of wider literary and humanistic concerns and disciplines?

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6A “Art and the Inner Light: Augustine on Artistic Creativity and Aesthetic Experience”

This paper attempts to situate Augustine’s philosophy of art and aesthetics within the historical traditions of these fields. One suitable way to accomplish this is by discussing the rationality of both artistic creation and an audience’s aesthetic experience, a topic that has gained much attention in recent literature. I begin by contrasting Augustine’s views with those of two predominant historical figures, Plato and Kant. I then provide a discussion of three themes of Augustine’s aesthetic theory: the world as created according to number and wisdom, the world as a symbol of the divine, and aesthetic experience as a means of delight and joy. In light of this discussion, I examine Augustine’s stance on the rationality/irrationality debate. I conclude the paper with a brief overview and discussion of the relevance of Augustine’s thought to contemporary debates.

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2G “Religious Life and Intellectual Safety in Sextus Empiricus”

In this paper, I examine the Pyrrhonean understanding of the relation between philosophical inquiry and religious life as presented by Sextus Empiricus.

First, I look at the way Sextus introduces his discussion of god in PH III.2 and M IX.49, and attempt to arrive at a consistent reading of his overall agenda. I offer a unitary reading of these passages, on the basis of which I argue that Sextus understands his Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy that distinguishes itself from the kinds of dogmatic rashness exemplified by other philosophers as well as the pre-philosophical views of ordinary men.

Then I go on to discuss the scholarly charge of hypocrisy, according to which the Sextan, given their suspension of judgement, cannot live a sincere religious life. I give due attention to the so-called autonomy approach, according to which, due to contingent cultural conditions, religion is a special case for the Pyrrhonean: since ancient religion does not require belief, suspension need not affect the possibility of leading a pious life. In reply, I argue that the autonomy approach is unsatisfactory, and that the Sextan position accommodates religious observance in the overall life of the Pyrrhonean.

Finally, I look at Sextus’ various uses of ‘safety’, and arrive at a reading that connects it to his project of suspending judgement. Connecting the notion of philosophy as understood by Sextus with the possibility of a Pyrrhonean life, I arrive at a consistent understanding of the sense in which Sextus takes his position to be safer than that of those who philosophise in a different manner.

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3I “Place and Setting in Cicero’s *Academica*”
Traditional interpretations of Cicero have found him “unoriginal.” Thelma DeGraff (1940) suggests that this interpretation comes from Cicero himself, since he “would never have dreamed of claiming originality in philosophical research.” As a result, we tend to assign Cicero’s philosophical works two major contributions, neither of which gives much credit to Cicero’s own ideas: (1) the translation of Greek ideas into Latin, and (2) the transmission of the history and detailed arguments of the Hellenistic schools that are otherwise lost. We often then lift out of their context arguments in his philosophical dialogues in an effort to understand the controversy surrounding a particular problem, such as the criterion of knowledge. Useful as this tactic may be for its purpose, it undermines our ability to recognize the way in which Cicero offers some kind of original contribution. If we allow, as A. A. Long (1995/2002) claims, that rhetoric and philosophy are never wholly separate for Cicero, a full comprehension of his works must attend not only to the arguments they contain, but also to their dramatic and rhetorical devices. Along these lines, I focus on the role that place and setting have in Cicero’s Academica. I argue that Cicero uses place as a metaphor for knowledge in the Academica, and travel, for the passage from ignorance to wisdom. Because the dialogue is concerned with knowledge claims, I contend that Cicero intertwines this dramatic feature of the Academica with the overarching theme of the work and the content of its dramatized arguments. Appreciating Cicero’s rhetorical moves should illuminate philosophical contributions obscured by focusing only on the arguments. Cicero’s use of place and setting deepens the meaning of the argumentation in the Academica and subtly changes their significance. This challenges traditional interpretations that find Cicero unoriginal. His own contribution can be found in his ability to convey philosophical ideas not simply through arguments, but through dramatic and rhetorical devices. This approach offers a new perspective on the arguments concerning Academic epistemology in the context of the Academica.

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2A “Hermias, Syrianus, and Proclus on Phdr. 246b: How Some Living Creatures are Mortal and Others Immortal”

In Hermeias’ commentary (Moreschini p. 135-138) on Phdr. 246b, “how is it that some living creatures are called moral and some immortal”, Hermias gives an explanation of the soul’s descent into a vehicle and its relationship to the lower gods. This explanation is largely dependent upon a reading of Plato’s Timaeus 42A-CD, one which reflects both Iamblichus’ interpretation of this passage as found in De Mysteriis V.15 and writings on De Anima section 29, as well as Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus, particularly sections reliant upon Syrianus’ teachings on Timaeus 41C-E. Hermias, as might be expected, concentrates his commentary on the soul’s vehicle, as Phdr. 247B is typically the Platonist proof-text for the vehicle of the soul, as is Tim. 41D, where the demiurge places the rational souls of humans into the stars as vehicles. By observing a small section of Hermias’ commentary on the Phaedrus, one gets a feel for how Hermias approaches the soul as immortal. Moreover, by looking at Proclus and Syrianus on these passages of the Phaedrus and Timaeus, one can see how Hermias’ writings fit in the history of Platonist thought.

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4E ***IN HONOR OF JOHN ANTON***
“The Outlandish, Wonderful, Perplexing Philosophy of Aristotle”
This paper elucidates Aristotle’s understanding of the phenomena of the outlandish (ἄτοπον), wonder (θαύμα), and perplexity (ἀπορία) with respect to philosophy. Taking its bearing from the genetic account of the science of wisdom presented in Metaphysics A, 1–2, it attempts to unearth the corresponding genetic structure of philosophy. Beginning by wondering at things that immediately appear contrary to our commonly held opinions, we gradually and teleologically ascend to the eternally perplexing question of beingness itself. Besides clarifying this ascent, of scholarly interest in itself, the paper also goes some way towards arguing that Aristotle’s “teleology” is not metaphysically dogmatic (“strong teleology”), but rather fully open to what Heidegger calls the fundamental question: Why are there beings rather than nothing? (“soft teleology”).

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5J “Aquinas and Scotus on Aristotle on Why Being is Not a Genus”

In this paper, I examine Aquinas and Scotus’s differing reconstructions of an understudied argument in Aristotle’s Metaphysics III. Aquinas’s presentation of the argument turns on a logical principle, arising from Porphyry’s reading of the Categories. Scotus, even early in his career before he endorses the univocity of being, rejects that principle and, consequently, reconstructs the argument a different way.

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2J “Tajikistan’s role in the Development of Humanities and the Sciences in Asia and Europe”

This investigation focuses on the philosophical and scientific heritage of Modern Europe and Asian with respect to the original ideas in the works of three major figures The Philosopher Ibn Sina (980-1037), The Scientist-Historian Abu Rayhan al- Biruni (973-1048), and The Mathematician al-Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi (c. 750-850).

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5I Round Table Symposium: Adaptation of Medieval Islamic Theology to the 21st Century Central Asian Secular State

Original Islamic Theology –analogous to its Judaic and Christian traditions- embeds a number of directives in economics suited for the medieval period. However, through the concept of ijtihad Islam also allows adaption of its praxis to actual contemporary arena. To that end, a number of predominately Muslim nations, opt for a secular type state-and not an Islamic Republic based on the so-called fundamentalists principle. The participants in this symposium discuss both the philosophical foundation of Islamic Theology- especially in context of Suras revealed prior to 1622 (Hijra) and adaptability of Islamic economic to contemporary 21st Century global village.

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4J “The Peculiar Nature of Leaders in Plato’s Republic”
One of the central themes in the *Republic* is how rarely one finds a leader among their fellow citizens. Plato has Socrates contend that good leaders are seldom found because their nature is so peculiar. In particular, Plato’s Socrates maintains that the rare nature of a good leader combines qualities that “mostly grow in separation and are rarely found in the same person” (503b). Plato’s leaders are the ones who can pull off counterintuitive feats, being living paradoxes, so to speak.

When Socrates first discusses who will “guard” the city, he initiates Plato’s emphasis on the seemingly impossible nature of those who should lead the community. He says, “Where are we to find a character that is both gentle and high-spirited at the same time? After all, a gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one… If someone lacks either gentleness or spirit, he can’t be a good guardian. Yet it seems impossible to combine them. It follows that a good guardian cannot exist” (375c-d). Guardians whose nature is at once both of two opposing qualities, gentle and fierce, is the first instance in the *Republic* of Socrates and his interlocutors discussing the peculiar cases of opposing qualities being found in one and the same rare person. The second is at 503b-c where we learn that philosophers are quick-witted but stable rather than mercurial.27 These passages indicate that good leaders can combine two qualities that are typically impossible to find in the same person.

However, at 485d-e it appears that Plato has Socrates say philosophers are thought not to engage in both the pleasures of body and of soul. I will focus my presentation on a critical interpretation of this conception of philosophers that comes out of 485d-e, asking why Plato should think it would be impossible for philosophers to desire physical pleasures as part of the lifestyle that so enjoys intellectual pleasures. Perhaps they have the soul ordered properly enough for them to experience physical pleasures without attaching any importance to them.28

Part of what it means to examine Plato’s conception of philosophy is to acknowledge his admiration for Socrates as the exemplar par excellence of the unusual philosophical nature. How could Plato be suggesting that the philosopher does not experience physical pleasures when Socrates clearly did? I argue against this, contending instead that Plato’s philosophers, exemplified by Socrates, prioritize the rational/intellectual life over that of physical pleasure, while still possibly participating in the enjoyment of physical pleasure. It should not be considered impossible for philosophers to desire physical pleasures as part of the lifestyle that so enjoys intellectual pleasures.

27 A third passage is more implicit and indirect. At 523b-525a Plato describes philosophers as those who respond with puzzlement to “summoners,” that is, “those [entities] that strike the relevant sense at the same time as their opposites” (524d), or entities that cause conflicting sense perceptions. With such an experience the philosopher’s nature is at once confused but seeking to understand (524e), which can be understood as opposing states.
28 Cf. R. 595b.