12-1973

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ZENO AND STOIC CONSISTENCY

J.M. Rist (University of Toronto)

"Greek ethics is eudaimonistic", observed Max Pohlenz at the beginning of a description of the ethical theories of the Stoa;¹ and it is certainly true that in some sense, as Aristotle said,² εὖδαίμονισθαι is regularly thought by the Greeks to be the moral "end". But the Stoic attitude is rather more complicated, and although some of the complications of their theory of the telos and skopos of the moral life have been sorted out, in particular by Rieth³ and Long⁴, a number of problems remain, perhaps less in the work of Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus than among the earliest members of the school, indeed in Zeno himself. Part of the difficulty lies in the relation in the thought of Zeno between virtue and happiness, and an investigation of this relationship may conveniently begin with a passage concerned not with Zeno in particular, but with the Stoics in general. According to Stobaeus,⁵ the Stoics were in the habit of saying that the telos is being happy (τὸ τὸν ἀληθῶς). To be happy is something with which we are satisfied; we do not use happiness as a means to achieving something else. Such a state consists in (ὑπάρχειν) living virtuously, living consistently (ὡς ὑπάρχειν) and living naturally (κατὰ φύσιν). We are not told who specifically made these equations, though the impression we are left with is that all the Stoics would have accepted them. But the passage then goes on to say that Zeno defined happiness (not τὸ τὸν ἀληθῶς but τὸν ἀληθῶς) as a smooth flow of life (κατὰ βίον). Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and the rest accepted this definition,⁶ but, says Stobaeus, they called happiness the skopos, while identifying the telos with "achieving happiness" (τὸ τὸν τῆς εὖδαίμονισθαι). The passage suggests that Cleanthes and Chrysippus (κατὰ τὸν λέγουσαν) but not Zeno, distinguished between the ultimate target (skopos) of the moral life, and the end (telos). That this may be a more formal statement of the position then Zeno himself made is also suggested by the curious fact that we have no early evidence that the Stoics referred to εὖδαίμονισθαι, as distinct from εὖδαίμονισθαι, as the end. What we seem to have are descriptions of happiness (εὖδαίμονισθαι) and parallel to that discussions of virtue and its relation to happiness. Far more emphasis is placed on virtue, at least by the sources we have, than on happiness itself. It would be of interest if we could explain this anomaly and see what, if any, philosophical significance it has. Does it give us any clue as to what kind of moral system the Stoics offer us? There has been considerable interest in such matters recently.⁸

Perhaps the first step should be to try and determine what Zeno was getting at in his talk about εὖδαίμονισθαι. Happiness is a
smooth flow. Presumably the man who is happy is never taken aback, never has to recast his priorities. He is above all consistent; his intentions and motives can be viewed as forming a coherent whole. According to Stobaeus, Zeno also defined the end (telos) as living consistently, by which he meant living according to a single harmonious pattern. The reason he gave was that people who live otherwise, not consistently, but in conflict (μηχωμενως), are unhappy (κακο-διμονοντων). This looks like an empirical appeal. If you are inconsistent, you are unhappy - as anyone who looks can see. It is an empirical test of the kind of life which will bring happiness. Perhaps such empirical methods help the Stoics avoid giving the impression of founding their ethics on an unjustifiable shift from statements of fact to statements of value. A conflicting character brings unhappiness, as you can see! If you want to avoid unhappiness, the argument runs, make your behaviour consistent. There is no suggestion that you must do so, or that you ought to do so. If you want to be unhappy, then the Stoic will not attempt to change your belief. What he contents himself with doing is showing that, if you are inconsistent, you really will be unhappy. There is no absolute decree, you ought to behave consistently, virtuously, etc. Rather there is the proposition that whoever is happy will, as a matter of fact, be consistent, virtuous, etc. But to say with the Stoic that virtue entails happiness is not to say that the only reason - or indeed a necessary reason - for being virtuous is because it entails happiness. It seems that both happiness and virtue may in some sense be sought for their own sake.

In fact it seems that the Stoics were prepared to say two things:

1) It will in fact pay to be virtuous provided that you want to be happy; and
2) the good man will seek virtue for its own sake.

Some of the apparent difficulties in reconciling these propositions may be resolved by examining the notion of seeking virtue for its own sake. What then do the Stoics say that virtue is?

We are not short of definitions, although no definition is associated with Zeno alone. Normally virtue appears either as a "consistent disposition" or more generally as some kind of condition of the ruling part of the soul (ηυροικυοντος). No one would dispute that the consistency in question, whether or not it was always consistency with "nature" in the sense of external nature, is consistency within oneself. Plutarch attributes to the Stoics generally an account of virtue both as a disposition and power produced by reason, and as a consistent and steadfast reason itself, and Cleanthes, in a poem, gives δυσλογοστονων as one of a list of predicates of "the good" which would certainly include the notion of the good for man.
this point there is no need to enter the discussion of whether Zeno actually used the phrase ὅπως ὁμοιομόρφως ζῇ φύσι, or whether, as
Stobaeus suggests, the specific reference to nature was added by Clean-
thes.\(^{15}\) Whether Zeno sometimes added a reference to nature or not,
there is no reason to deny that, as the sources tell us, he often spoke
simply of a consistent life or a consistent disposition. Such consist-
ency in ourselves is a goal (whether or not it is interpreted by ref-
erence to external nature). Presumably Zeno thought that if our acts
are consistent, we shall then in fact enjoy a smoothly flowing life
and be undisturbed. So when a Stoic says that we should regard virtue
as the end, it is perhaps clearer to think of this virtue as self-
consistency. Clearly such an end not only generates mental peace, but
it answers the claims of reason. A consistent life and a consistent
disposition is a life that follows a pattern - and patterns are rational
structures or logoi. Zeno presumably thought that insofar as we are
prepared to use the reason to recognize the end for man, we assume that
the end itself is rational - or it cannot be comprehended. Thus we
have the equation: virtue is consistent behaviour and consistent beha-
viour is rational behaviour. Consistency is the pivot. For it is
often hard to be certain whether one’s behaviour is rational: empirical
tests do not help, for we, ourselves even if irrational, have to per-
fom the tests for rationality. But consistency is a feature of
behaviour which can be more effectively observed.

Let us go back to the passage of Stobaeus with which we began.\(^ {16}\)
After identifying being happy as the end, Stobaeus tells us that the
Stoics said that this "consists in" ( ὅπως ὁμοιομόρφως ζῇ ) living virtuously,
living consistently, and living naturally. We notice that they did not
identify virtue with happiness. But how are we to understand this
concept of "consisting in'? Several other texts will help us out.
Diogenes Laertius has the same sort of language, only with ἀρέσκεια ἐν
instead of ὅπως ὁμοιομόρφως ζῇ : Happiness is in virtue.\(^ {17}\) According to
Plutarch, Chrysippus expressed the relationship somewhat differently,
though his formulation need not imply a different doctrine. Vice is the
ῥήσις , the "substance" of unhappiness\(^ {18}\) - and presumably therefore
virtue is the substance of happiness. This does not seem to be a
technical use of ῥήσις or to point us to the Stoic doctrine of categ-
ories: probably all that Chrysippus wanted to say is that wherever you
get vice, you get unhappiness, and therefore wherever you get virtue
( = consistent behaviour) you get happiness. So when we read that for
the Stoics virtues complete ( ἰδιὸς ἄρεσκεία ) happiness\(^ {19}\), or that
virtues produce happiness ( ἰδιὸς ὂρνήσεια )\(^ {20}\) and compose it ( ὁ ὃσικ
τολῆρος ), since they are its parts, we need only conclude that
nothing needs to be added, if virtue is present, for the achievement of
happiness. Hence it is virtue and virtuous acts which are the necessary
and sufficient conditions for happiness.\textsuperscript{21}

So the Stoics are saying that virtue (consistency) always entails happiness but that the words "virtue" and "happiness" are not interchangeable. The doctrine was apparently unclear in antiquity. Lactantius misreads its implications in an interesting passage.\textsuperscript{22} He comments rightly that without virtue no one can be happy. He concludes from this, again rightly, that a happy life is the reward of virtue. He further concludes, wrongly, that it is not the case that virtue is to be pursued for its own sake. But the conclusion does not follow. Apparently the Stoics thought that although virtue entails happiness, yet it is always virtue which has to be pursued. Happiness is elusive. Although it is a reward and a desideratum, it cannot be achieved if pursued deliberately. It is virtue that is to be pursued, and for its own sake.

We have looked at the distinction between an end (\textit{telos}) and a goal (\textit{skopos}). Rieth drew attention to the relation between this distinction and that between what is \textit{λόγος τῆς ἀρετῆς} and what is \textit{λόγος τῆς ἀρετῆς}. We notice that the \textit{τῶν} forms of Greek verbs are used by the Stoics to express the obligation. Stobaeus again spells out the doctrine, which is presumably in a form elaborated by Chrysippus.\textsuperscript{24} The distinction is between what is choiceworthy and what \textit{ought} to be chosen. What ought to be chosen is "every beneficial action". Obviously happiness is not a beneficial action; it is activities which are virtues which are so to be described. Virtuous behaviour "ought to be chosen". Here again we are talking about the end (\textit{telos}). The Stoics are not prepared to say that we ought to be happy; they are prepared to say, "We ought (given a desire for happiness) to act consistently."

We illuminate the problem further if we examine the distinction made by at least some of the Stoics, though not necessarily Zeno himself, between a \textit{τίλακτικόν \ πλήθος} and a \textit{τίλακτικόν \ χάρις \ τόσον}. Strictly speaking the Stoics prefer only to call virtue a good (and vice an evil), but they often accept more normal sorts of language — only maintaining the caveat that they would limit the term "good" to virtue in any contexts where there is a danger of philosophical misunderstandings.\textsuperscript{26} A passage where the wider use of "good" appears lists such things as "joy" and "sensibly walking about" as \textit{τίλακτικόν \ για \\rhoοσκότοιδια}. The point is that they are good for their own sake. On the other hand a friend or a sensible man is a "productive"good, that is he is the means for goods to be secured. The virtues, in contrast to both of these, are both "productive" and "final" goods, that is, they are both ends in themselves and they are productive of something else, i.e. happiness. The passage goes on to say, as I have already observed, that the virtues generate happiness since they are its parts. Thus when all the virtues are present, happiness is present. The
converse applies with vice and unhappiness.

The account of Diogenes Laertius adds a further subtlety. He lists "actions in accordance with virtue" as τέλικον and distinguishes them from virtue itself, which is τέλικον καὶ τοιητικόν, as in Stobaeus. We should also notice that nowhere is happiness listed as a τέλικον ἡγίασμα; this helps to confirm our view that happiness, though desirable in itself, is not to be sought as an end in itself. We may now revert to the question of what such a distinction implies for Stoic moral theory in general.

One of the effects of the Stoic position is to separate the issues of obligation and of self-interest. But it separates them in rather a strange way. We have already seen that the Stoic "imperative" is hypothetical. It is within the framework of a man's wishing for happiness that the Stoic says, "Be virtuous, be consistent". That is, the Stoic is not talking to someone who would reject for himself the "smoothly flowing life". But for a would-be happy man, virtue must be pursued for its own sake. The Stoic position is a curious one - and it looks at first sight as though they are trying to have it both ways: virtue is advantageous - if you think that happiness is an advantage - but it should not be pursued for that reason. Although it is productive (τοιητικόν) of happiness, it should not be sought for the sake of happiness.

A recent critic, A.A. Long, seems to think that the Stoics rejected (or at least would not have accepted) Aristotle's view that self-interest is the primary or only moral motive. It is not entirely clear what is meant in this context by a moral motive - we need to know whether a moral system should be defined in terms of its form or its content - though if Long means that the Stoics would reject the view that one should act well only, or largely, out of self-interest, he is correct, but misleadingly so. It is only to the man who recognizes where his genuine self-interest lies, that is, in a consistent flow of life, that the Stoic is talking. To him he says, Do good deeds for their own sake, not with the thought that they will make you happy.

The Stoics say that virtue is sufficient for happiness (αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὰς ἔνδοξον), but it is not happiness we strive for; it is a virtuous, that is, a consistent life. A conscious striving for happiness could be ineffective for two related reasons: it might inhibit the performance of those virtuous acts which are the only road to happiness, and it might be productive of a kind of behaviour which is in conflict with the development of our natural impulses. Originally these impulses are, as every student of Stoicism knows, associated with our recognition of what is "first acceptable" (ὁικτικόν) to every animal, namely its own nature. As has recently been pointed
out, the term "first" probably refers to temporal rather than logical priority. Now we find different things "acceptable" as we grow; our "first" impulses, however, are directed towards the preservation of the state we are in when we first acquire any kind of awareness of the external world, that is, at birth. Presumably at this moment we are in some sort of "right" condition. Obviously in the strict Stoic sense we are neither virtuous nor happy. We are for the first time, however, presented with a hostile environment and we react accordingly, satisfying so far as we may our instinct for self-preservation. Although as we grow our range of oikeiosis expands, and indeed, if we become wise, a desire for self-preservation will cease to be of overwhelming importance - the wise man may choose to sacrifice his own life - yet presumably the Stoics would have held that no "developed" impulses (i.e. impulses not present at birth, but developed as we grow towards maturity, physical and moral) should be given priority over earlier ones without good reason. Clearly in such a view of man the notion of consistent behaviour is maintained. A man will not abandon his life (supported by the instinct for self-preservation) unless a good reason is available. New sound impulses and reactions are built on old, and we have to learn to harmonize the old with the new. Presumably in an ideal world such harmonization would be simple and we should all develop into sages. Yet in fact from the very beginning there is the new factor of the external world. in the sense of external nature impinges on our own , our individual nature, which ceteris paribus would develop via the "rationalizing" of the impulses to virtue and via the virtues to happiness. Before trying to understand, therefore, how that external world can be reconciled with our own world, with the world governed by the instinct of self-preservation which we are given at birth, we therefore have to determine the form in which the external world impinges on us and causes us trouble. And the first form in which this occurs is the form of pleasure and pain. Diogenes Laertius has a passage in which the situation of the new-born human being is well summarized. Nature, he says, gives non-perverted points of departure ( ). The rational animal is perverted either by the persuasiveness of external pursuits or by the communications of his companions. The image of perversion is worth scrutiny. The Stoics seem to have compared bringing the soul from vice to virtue to straightening a bent stick. Thus if a man lived aright from birth, he would start off right, as we all do, and maintain a consistent and straight path of virtue. He would therefore react to external stimuli in a consistent and coherent way. How does this work out in practice?
When Chrysippus - and it presumably is Chrysippus in the passage of Diogenes Laertius - says that we do not start perverted, he must mean that it is somehow right or sound for us to develop from our first οικείωσις, and to act in accordance with our instinct for self-preservation. In what sense is this right, unperverted, sound, or whatever? Nature gives us these starting points, we read, and this cannot refer to our own human nature, for it is a set of circumstances granted by "nature" whereby we are enabled to have a chance of survival in the world. Thus, at any rate for Chrysippus, our human first beginnings are in accordance with some sort of plan or design of nature - of the "designing fire" (τινών οίκείωσις). So when we are newborn, it must be assumed that our behaviour patterns are in accordance with the law-like operations of nature as a whole, and are consistent with them. Now when we develop, if we are to be virtuous and consistent, our actions must flow smoothly from our unperverted first beginnings - which means that our actions will themselves have to be consistent with the nature which gave us these first beginnings. So we can see why Cleanthes and Chrysippus argued that the telos - formula should be that we must live consistently with Nature, not merely that our lives should be internally consistent. What about Zeno? Is the reference to Nature necessary if the original Stoic formula is to have any philosophical value?

Let us look at the evidence, which affords us a simple contradiction. Diogenes Laertius not only tells us that Zeno referred to "living consistently with nature" but he gives us the source of this information, a book entitled On The Nature of Man. Cicero, for what it is worth, agrees with this. On the other hand Stobaeus gives what seems to be a fairly circumstantial but different view. According to him Zeno had originally only spoken of internal consistency, but later thinkers, believing that "consistent" was an incomplete term and that we should be told with what we should be consistent, added that we should be consistent with nature. Cleanthes is specifically named as the first to have taken this step.

There has been a tendency to dismiss the reference to nature in Zeno, on the grounds that Diogenes is merely transferring a school commonplace to the founder. But the reference to the book On The Nature of Man makes it clear that Diogenes, or his source, had a specific text in mind. On the other hand the statement of Stobaeus that Cleanthes found the term "consistent" in some way incomplete has also to be taken seriously. The only solution which does justice to both sources is that Zeno spoke both of consistency with nature and of consistency with self, while Cleanthes thought that the second of these
formulations was unnecessary, or imprecise, or misleading. Diogenes gives us the further information that Cleanthes thought that the nature in accordance with which we should live must be understood only as "universal nature" (κόσμου φύσις), and this can be understood as implying that our first impulses to self-preservation, those starting points on the road to virtue and happiness, are a gift of a power i.e. Nature, which subsumes and indeed engenders the specifically human sphere.

Let us try to develop this theory of the roles of Zeno and Cleanthes. Why may Zeno have spoken now of living consistently with Nature, now simply of living consistently? Such accounts of the end, though not mutually exclusive, could well be given as answers to different kinds of philosophical questions. Talk about an internally consistent life could arise as a result of an ethical question; "consistency with Nature" should involve us with the grounds of ethics, or metaethics, Looking at this in another way, we might say that any questions about the end to which the answer "self-consistency" could be meaningfully given entail a further question about the kind of consistency required - to which the answer "consistency with Nature" might be given. We start off with the assumption that happiness is in some sense the goal. We are faced with trying to determine how such a goal may become a reality. What would be the natural way of looking at such a problem? In the first instance everyone would tend to look at it as a strictly ethical problem. And anyone thinking philosophically at the time when Zeno was first active would presumably look first to the kind of ethical answers available. According to Diogenes Laertius, whose testimony there is no reason to reject on such a point, Zeno was in some sense a pupil of the Cynic Crates. And there is abundant evidence, particularly in his Republic, that the Cynic influence on his early thought was deep and persistent. Zeno, of course, later broke with the Cynics on a number of issues, and one of the most important of these was his insistence that it is necessary for the wise man to know something of physics and logic as well as of ethics. In his early days, Zeno was certainly writing with a more strongly Cynic flavour than he later thought desirable; his Republic is said by Diogenes to have been written when he was still a pupil of Crates. So at a time when he had no use for physics we can well imagine Zeno defining the end as "living consistently" (that is, with no reference to nature - where a reference to nature would imply some kind of knowledge by the wise man of the laws of physics or of "natural philosophy"). Of course the Cynics themselves frequently talk of nature, but the context is the old Sophistic antithesis between nature and convention, and has no significant connection with the use of the term by the Stoics to refer to natural philosophy.
Thus for Zeno, when still largely in a Cynic context and thinking of ethics as the only necessary realm of thought for the wise man, to define the end as living in accordance with nature would be to point not to the factor of consistency with a more than moral Power in the universe, but to "living naturally" rather than "living conventionally." (Of course, it might well be the case that the consistent (Stoic) life would be unconventional, but in talking of consistency that is not the principal point a Stoic would want to make.)

Zeno's point in defining the end as a consistent life and in saying that a consistent life is a virtuous life and leads to happiness would be made within a purely ethical frame. It is the assumption of those working inside such a frame that happiness is the goal and that the content of virtue can be understood by right reason. Right reason, of course, must be consistent, for inconsistent reasoning can hardly be "right". It is the assumption of such a search for consistency that the original impulses of each man are sound and intelligible in themselves, and therefore that consistency with them in later thought and action will be sufficient for virtue. There is probably an echo of this attitude - together with its built-in ambiguities - in the remark of Cleanthes that all men have the starting points for virtue given by nature, though he is using "nature" here in a way which (Stoically) does not make an obvious reference to the antithesis with convention.

It was, of course, the very issue of whether the ethical end could be determined by "ethical" reflection alone that seems to have been one of the causes of the antagonism to Zeno developed by his former pupil Aristo. But Zeno had clearly seen further than the Cynics. Let us assume that he did define virtue, at some stage, as Diogenes says, as a consistent or harmonious life. The obvious question is, Consistent with what? In other words, is the predicate really defective, as Cleanthes seems to have thought. There seems no reason to doubt that Zeno's answer to this must have been "consistent with the natural behaviour to which our first impulses guide us." And this would put him right into a contemporary debate about what natural impulses are. In fact the best interpretation of why Zeno took up the study of "nature", of "natural philosophy" in the traditional pre-Socratic sense, would seem to be that he wished to find content for the formula that virtue is a consistent life. For one might admit that formula to be acceptable while disagreeing with Zeno about the nature of the consistency, if one took (for example) an Epicurean view of one's first natural impulses. In other words I should like to argue that Zeno was probably drawn to find a metaethical justification for his brand of ethics by those who could have accepted the importance of...
a consistent life. Such opponents might even have included Epicurus. Epicurus could easily agree with the Cynics in distinguishing nature from convention, while still proposing a different account of "natural" behaviour. According to him pleasure is the first good we recognize when we are newly born: it is the beginning and end of the happy life. Now it is generally agreed, and I would not want to dispute the view, that the majority of the evidence that refers to direct conflict between Stoics and Epicureans dates from a period later than the times of Zeno and Epicurus, but although these two may not have engaged in direct conflict, they certainly may have been dealing with the same issues—and coming up with conflicting answers. If one of the issues was, What is the nature of the first natural impulse?, the answer to such a question would obviously predetermine the kind of consistent life a philosopher would come to advocate for adult human beings. And we have already observed that the question of the nature of natural things is raised by implication by the Cynics.

We know from a number of sources that Zeno was some kind of pupil of the Academic Polemo, but Cicero provides us with the invaluable evidence that Zeno accepted Polemo's account of the "first-principles of nature". This can only mean that it was Polemo who taught that the first natural instinct is to self-preservation, the theory which provided a basis for the Stoic account of oikeioménon, and which gave Zeno his opportunity to break with the Cynic view of nature. Perhaps Polemo was not the only person who held this theory—perhaps even Cicero's account is mistaken—but what really matters is that somewhere or other Zeno came across an account of nature which enabled him to develop his own particular version of the consistent life. For, as I have already indicated, to talk of consistency alone is to approach ethics in the way of a formalist: and no ancient theorist is a formalist. But when looking for a content for nature, Zeno desperately needed a context. The Cynics failed him almost completely here. Whatever they may have intended, we have ample evidence that for the Cynics the term "nature" is largely devoid of positive force. Natural behaviour seems consistently to be regarded as behaviour freed from conventional restraints. There are no specific and immediate goals in the Cynic freedom, the Cynic life according to nature; if a Cynic ethic had ever managed to exhibit consistency, it could only have been a consistent freedom from the constraints of society. There is no evidence that the Cynics added up their various freedoms from to amount to any kind of freedom to.

We have ample evidence that Zeno broke with the Cynic road of "morality alone"; his talk of "appropriate things" (καθέναν καλόν καθήκοντα) joins with his uncynic approach to "natural impulses" to point to what
Aristotle abhorred the wise man's study of physics. Physics not merely enabled Zeno to argue formally that consistency is necessary for virtue, and will bring happiness, but to show the nature of that consistency. In our terminology Zeno invoked extra-ethical factors to justify an approach to ethics, though, to avoid anachronism, we have to add that he was not conscious that this was what he was doing. In other words Zeno did not ask, How can I give point to the pursuit of consistency as an ethical end by the use of criteria not drawn from my own ethical system? Rather he seems to have asked, What is the nature of the first impulse with which my later life must be in harmony? This question is a non-ethical one in that it is value-free. It is simply a matter of finding the means to describe what nature has managed to give us.

The conclusion of all this must be that if Zeno did not speak precisely both of "living consistently" and "living consistently with nature", he must have described his ethical end in two different ways to which these different phrases could be properly applied - and therefore that since Diogenes Laertius attributes the second phrase to him there is no good reason to reject it.

The only other question which should be treated briefly here is what it might mean for us to develop, to pass from infancy to manhood, while still living consistently with our first natural impulses. It is clear that from the time of Chrysippus the Stoics were in the habit of talking about different oikeioseis; from the oikeiosis to oneself at birth, there develop oikeioseis with different conditions in later life. As Kerferd puts it, "an organism seeks to preserve the constitution in which it is at the moment." But our oikeiosis not only reconciles us with ourselves; it helps to associate each man with his fellows. According to Hierocles, there is an oikeiosis with one's relations; and there is no doubt that later Stoics extended oikeiosis to the human race in general. Furthermore, as Porphyry puts it, "the followers of Zeno make oikeiosis the beginning of justice"; and this statement is confirmed by Plutarch who remarks more precisely that the parental instinct is "incomplete and not adequate" as a basis for justice. Apparently Chrysippus expressly treated of the matter in his book On Justice.

We may take it as certain that justice was derived from oikeiosis in the Stoa at least from the time of Chrysippus. To translate the first impulse to self-preservation into a deliberate intention to promote justice, of course, requires the use of the will and reason. The Stoics spoke of the intervention of logos as a craftsman. The first oikeiosis is transformed by reason into an oikeiosis hair etike, Porphyry says that the "followers of Zeno" regard oikeiosis as the beginning of justice. Certainly Chrysippus seems to have done so,
but the "followers of Zeno" could be a general term for Stoics and need not imply any real knowledge of whether Zeno himself thought along these lines. If the doctrine of oikeiosis grew up in the way we have suggested, in association with Zeno's liberation from the Cynics and indebtedness to Polemo, it would not originally have needed such wide ramifications. A feeling of endearment to oneself at different stages of one's life, and for one's family and friends might be adequate - and even more than adequate - for Zeno's purpose of providing the individual with a wider frame of reference and of associating human nature with Nature. Of course, as a man grows, his needs will change. Hence his consistent life must be determined in the light of the fact that men are not static beings, and that reason should more and more come to characterize them. However it is not the same to say that oikeiosis will be extended beyond the self and its immediate surroundings, and that oikeiosis, as it widens rationally, will entail any kind of affection, let alone sense of justice, towards the whole human race. The Cynics think constantly of freeing oneself from conventional ties and the bond of society; the doctrine of oikeiosis is an attempt to understand the empirically observable instincts for self-preservation and the love for one's parents, and to use them to support a theory of natural bonds as distinct from bonds of convention. The question is how far did Zeno himself extend the ramifications of oikeiosis. And this entails the further question, With whom does the wise man feel akin? In his Cynic days, in the days of his Republic, Zeno would probably have said "Only with the wise". But he was breaking with the Cynics and might have extended this. There is no answer in the sources. We simply do not know Zeno's attitude about the origin of a sense of justice towards those who are not to be counted among the wise. However, although Zeno's doctrine of oikeiosis may have been narrower than Chrysippus' (and possibly expansion took place even after Chrysippus), oikeiosis is necessary for Zeno, and it cannot therefore be only a doctrine in embryo in the founder of Stoicism. The really fundamental principles of Stoicism cannot be stated without recourse to it.

The summary of this latter part of the paper is clear: any Cynic could advocate a consistent life, for the description is purely formal. But one consistent life might be set against another, and Zeno's appeal to natural consistency prevents this, as well as showing exactly why virtue pays. The question could, of course, have been tackled in another way. Is there in fact more than one kind of consistent life? Zeno would certainly have agreed that there is not, but though he thought that in all but the wise inconsistency leads to conflict and misery, he did not ask such a necessary question as: Is an injury to someone else also an injury to myself? Why did he not? In part because by separating the goal (happiness) from the end (virtue) he underestimated the importance of eudaemonism in preaching a moral system to the unconverted. Or if he did not underestimate it, he kept implying that he did and that one should.
NOTES

1. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa³ (Gottingen 1964) 111.
5. Stob., Ecl. II 77, 16 (= SVF III 16).
6. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. 11.22 (SVF III 73); 11.30 (SVF I 554).
10. For a similar Stoic attitude to the concept of "good" (as useful) see Graeser, "Zirkel oder Deduktion", 219, n. 17, correcting Long, "The Logical Basis", 98.
21. Stob., Ecl. II 77, 6 (SVF III 113).
22. Lact., Div. Instit. 5.17 (SVF III 47).
23. Rieth, op.cit. 25.
30. I still prefer σωφρόνος in this passage (D.L. 7.85 = SVF III 82) despite the comments of H.S. Long, A.J.P.92 (1971) 749. Long seems to me to miss the point that the harder σωφρόνος is too easily emended into σωφρόνες. The sense does not require the change.
Cf. D.L. 7.85 (SVF III 178) and other references supplied by Kerferd.
34. D.L. 7.89 (SVF III 228).
37. Cic., De Fin. 4.14.
38. Stob., Ecl. II 134, 75ff.
40. D.L. 7. 2-3 (SVF I 1).
42. Rist, *op. cit.* 71-76.
43. D.L. 7.4 (SVF I 2).
44. D.L. 7.38; 7.71.
45. Stob., Ecl. II 65, 7 (SVF I 566).
47. Ep. ad Men. 128-129.
49. Cic., De Fin. 4.45 (SVF I 198).
50. D.L. 7.2 (SVF I 1).
52. Hierocles, *op.cit.* Col. 9.3-4; Cf. Anon. *Comm. on Theaet.* (P.9782), *Berliner Klassikertexte* 2, ed. Diels and Schubart (Berlin 1905) Cols. 7.28; 8.5-6.
53. Cic., De Fin. 3.63 (SVF III 340).
56. Plut., *SR* 1038B (SVF II 724).
57. D.L. 7.86 (SVF III 43).