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Plotinus considers himself to be the interpreter of ancient doctrines in that he says that “our doctrines are not new, and they are not new, they were set long ago, but not developed and we are today nothing less than the interpreters of these old doctrines whose antiquity is testified by the writings of Plato” (Enn. V, 1, 8, l.10-14). That his own thought is included in the tradition of Platonism implies a critical confrontation with other thinkers, especially Stoics, Epicureans, and Aristotelians. Particularly, what does he charge Aristotle with? His critics point out several errors in some central theses of Aristotle’s thought: about the Categories (VI, I-III); the doctrine of time (III, VII); the nature of contemplation that Plotinus extends to all beings (III, VIII). But the main criticism is on the thought of itself ascribed to the Good. This criticism is found in several treatises, but it is chiefly exposed and argued in V, III and V, VI. In Metaphysics XII, 9, Aristotle states the activity of the Prime Mover, identified with God and the Good of Plato, as a thinking on thinking. Now the One or the Good cannot think of, because if it thought, it would not be beyond the Intelligence, but it would be Intelligence. And if it was Intelligence, it would be a multiple being (V, III, 11, l.29-31). It is for the sake of the transcendence of the First Principle that Plotinus rejects the Aristotelian one. The critical confrontation of these two great philosophers can help us at best about their own form of thinking, because it highlights paradoxes and difficulties which might be hidden completely when we stay completely within just a single system. This method appears to be fruitful, since the thought of a philosopher is not born ex nihilo, but due to a conflict with other philosophers’. It is suitable for every exegetical perspective to identify the object of criticism of a philosopher, whether it is declared or not.
Plato in the *Gorgias* and through a criticism of former Athenian statesmen brings up his original meaning about the State and statesman. In the first place, the aim of this paper is to show this meaning as the foundation of Platonic project for his best State and in the second place, how he has designed his project and to what extent has changed his design. Therefore, the paper would begin with the *Gorgias* by a looking at the Platonic primary dialogues to clear his fundamental approach to the State. According to an evolution takes place in Plato’s thought, the Plato’s design for the best State is discussed in two stages. The first stage is related to the State as a system ruled by the best man or the philosopher-king, the second stage is about the ruling of law without partnership of such man. These two stages would clearly be seen in the two dialogues; the *Republic* and the *Law*, which Plato has founded in them two cities; Kallipolis and Magnesia. In these two stages, Plato not only has changed his design for the best State, but also varied his approach toward the language especially his primary idea of conflict between rhetoric and dialogue. So, the subject of paper is Plato’s intention of the best State as well as his attention to language and how he has applied these two aspects to accomplish his basic meaning of the State in the two stages of his thought.

Douglas Al-Maini, St. Francis Xavier University, dalmaini@stfx.ca
“Platonic Politics in the *Gorgias*”

The *Gorgias* has been interpreted as Plato’s justification of not taking up the public role for philosophers that Socrates establishes. As such, the *Gorgias* presents a turning point in Plato’s political thought: with the arguments of the *Gorgias* in hand, Plato can now distance himself from carrying on the Gadfly ethics of his mentor and move to the more utopian project of conceiving what a society based on reason would look like. This reading of the *Gorgias* results from arguments concerned with the ability of public speakers to persuade and even control their audience. Socrates in the dialogue seems to be arguing that if philosophers are to contribute meaningfully to public debate, then it must be at least possible for philosophers to persuade the many to act against bad or inappropriate desires. Unfortunately, much of the ensuing analysis is given over to showing that no philosopher (or any other public speaker, for that matter) is capable of persuading the many of acting against these bad desires; rather, in order to be successful at oratory, the Socrates of the *Gorgias* asserts that it is necessary to pander to these desires, something that no self-respecting philosopher would do.

Roman Altshuler, SUNY Stony Brook, raltshul@ic.sunysb.edu
“Repentance as Locus of Freedom in Medieval Jewish Philosophy”
As Michael Wyschogrod notes, repentance has a centrality in Jewish thought that far exceeds its role in Christianity; and it has historically been repeatedly, if somewhat mistakenly, marshaled in opposition to the Christian view of original sin. On the Christian view, the argument goes, Adam’s sin deprives us all of the ability to escape sin without God’s help. Whatever freedom we have in the face of sin is thus a sham; either our “freedom” consists merely in acting on the sinful urges we lack any genuine power to curtail, or it requires help from God to exercise in combating sin. In either case, the argument goes, the freedom in question is elusive. Jewish thinkers, by contrast, have consistently defended a strong, libertarian doctrine of freedom: the view that each individual is the originator of his own actions, capable of choosing between good and evil, and requiring no special assistance from God. Here I will work out some of the implications of this view by focusing on three of the most important Medieval Jewish philosophers: Saadia Gaon (882-942), Bahya ibn Pakuda (who lived in the first half of the 11th century), and Moses Maimonides (1135-1204). These three thinkers decisively shaped Jewish philosophy as well as doctrine. They are thus the central figures in which to seek the definitive early understanding of repentance.

In the first part of this paper, I argue that in these three thinkers repentance is the locus of freedom. By this I mean that, on one hand, repentance seems to be the most crucial use of our freedom and, on the other, that it involves the clearest guarantee that our freedom is unlimited. On the doctrine of repentance developed by these thinkers, repentance is entirely up to us; and if we sincerely repent, God’s forgiveness is guaranteed. Through repentance, we can not merely avoid future wrongdoing, but we actually wipe our past sin clean: as Saadia stresses, sin leaves blotches in the fine matter of the soul; repentance has the power to remove them. In fact, the penitent is presented in the Talmud as even higher in standing than the pious man who has never sinned, and this doctrine is worked out in interesting ways by each of our thinkers. But this view of repentance, as I argue in the second part of my paper, carries with it two difficulties. First, repentance has external conditions, including some that are beyond the power of any exercise of free will on our part, which is a result of the fact that sin is not, in Jewish thought, correlated with intention or consent; one can sin unknowingly, and one’s sin can continue to operate unabated without further intentional (or even unintentional) wrongdoing. Thus, erasing sin seems to require something more than the exercise of free will. Second, if repentance is to be more than simply a cessation of wrongdoing—if, in other words, it is to involve some further erasing of wrongdoing—then the goals of repentance seem to be self-defeating.

James Ambury, Sacred Heart University, jamesmambury@gmail.com
“Plato’s Conception of the Soul as a Self-Reflexive Activity”

In this paper I examine the ethical implications of the ontological conception of the Platonic soul as a self-moving mover. I argue that the soul thus conceived is essentially a self-reflexive indeterminate activity. Ontologically, this indeterminacy is overcome when the soul moves itself and thus establishes a subject/object distinction within itself that was not previously actual. The
subject soul moves the object soul. On the basis of this psychical ontology we find that for Plato, the ethical individual identifies himself with intelligence, thereby rendering the other aspects of the soul objective. Such an individual becomes object to himself. We find that the ethical task of the human soul is to determine or rule itself and thereby establish proper order within itself. Such determination, however, would not be possible without ontological reflexivity. Accordingly, ethical living is most properly understood as being-well.

Kelly Arenson, Duquesne University, arenson.k@gmail.com
“Plotinus and Porphyry on the Faculty of Attention”

In *On the Life of Plotinus*, Porphyry recalls that Plotinus had a remarkable capacity for what we today might call multi-tasking: “Even when he was in dialogue with someone and sustaining a conversation, his mind was on the inquiry, so that he simultaneously did what was necessary for the conversation and carried on thinking without interruption about the subjects of inquiry” (chapter 8). Plotinus could pay attention to his contemplative activity and also to the world around him; he was present with both simultaneously, as Porphyry tells us. What I shall argue in this paper is, first, that in *Ennead I.4.10*, in the context of his treatment of *eudaimonia*, Plotinus allows for the possibility that the philosopher can ‘multi-task,’ that is, he can exercise a double awareness (*antilepsis*). At the level of the descended soul he can be aware, by means of phantasai, of the existence of bodily phenomena such as pleasures and pains as well as noetic activity, while being simultaneously aware at the level of the undescended soul of the integration in *nous* of the undescended soul with the eudaimonic individual’s floating ego, or ‘we’. On this account, the philosopher engages in something akin to Plotinus’ multi-tasking: he pays attention (*prosochē*) to activity at both levels of his soul at once. I shall argue secondly that Plotinus’ description of the philosopher’s awareness in *Ennead I.4.10* differs from Porphyry’s view on attention in the last half of Book I of *De Abstinentia*. There Porphyry insists that attention cannot be paid to multiple objects at once, particularly to the intellect and the body, a claim he furthers in one of his arguments with Castricius in favor of vegetarianism. I aim to show that the singleness of attention in Book I of *De Abstinentia* is inconsistent with *Ennead I.4.10* and the account of Plotinus’ multi-tasking.

Anne Ashbaugh, Towson University and Rutgers University, ashbaugh@rci.rutgers.edu
“Ruling Passions”

Given Plato’s identification of the passions with pleasures and pains that are accompanied with beliefs (*Phil 37e*), it is not surprising that commentators argue for a cognitivist bent in Plato’s view of the emotions. Still, accounts dichotomizing passion and cognition abound and even among those that grant that at least some passions are fundamentally cognitive, they take the passions to be the causes of errors in judgments and the mistaken choices that follow. What interests me in the Platonic account of the passions is precisely the absence of that dichotomy.
Passions are affections of the soul and some, like fear and anger, are specifically affections not of the appetites but of Thumoeides or the spirited element of the soul. Thus, Thumoeides requires nothing like bodily hunger to experience desire since its own processes sustain it (Phil 47d-e). The soul’s own evaluative cognition gives rise to anger and fear. Contemporary studies have shown that fear and anger are intimately interrelated emotions directly connected with risk perception and as such with courage. Lerner and Kelter (in “Fear, Anger and Risk,” 2000, 147) found that “Whereas fearful people expressed pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices, angry people expressed optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices.” They also found in their study that “estimates of angry people more closely resembled those of happy people than those of fearful people.” I argue that this recent study concurs with the role given to these emotions in Plato’s dialogues and with the important role the dialogues assign to Thumoeides in the ruling of the soul.

If these passions are accompanied by belief (Phil 37e) and belief results from “a process of memory and perception inscribing words in the soul” (Phil 39a), then, Thumoeides as the seat of anger, fear, and the courage that tempers these, is intimately connected to Logistikon. If these passions, furthermore, can either arise from or guide the propositions derived from images, from the sort of pictures described in the Timaeus as reflections of logos in the liver (Tim 71a-d), then, Thumoeides is intimately connected with Epithumetikon. This connection of Thumoeides with both Logistikon and epithumetikon allows for a middle term or a means of communication between the ruling Logistikon and the ruled epithumetikon. To the degree that fear and anger result jointly with a judgment that something is the case, even in its extreme states, Thumoeides is never disconnected from Logistikon. To the degree that fear and anger arise with a pleasing image of us either heroically vanquishing an enemy or pleasantly escaping harm, Thumoeides remains bound to the Epithumetikon. It is primarily this link of the spirited portion of soul to the other loci of desire that primarily interests me in the analysis of fear and anger because through it we can see how a cognitive model of the emotions makes sense in every case. Thus, regardless of his denying the appetites the ability to form beliefs or the power of doxa, Plato allows for the rational education of the appetites by means of pleasurable impressions. I propose to show how this education takes place by utilizing the claims made in the Philebus and Socrates’ attempt to overcome the fear of death among his friends dramatized in the Phaedo.
Epicureans’ claim that reasonings and arguments are integral for freedom from mental distress. In this paper I defend the Epicureans’ claim that reasonings and arguments are indispensable if one wishes to attain mental tranquility. In doing so, I refute a potential threat suggested by Martha Nussbaum; that if there were a special drug that would cause a person to forget instantly all of his false beliefs, while retaining his true ones, we have no reason to think that Epicurus would not have used it. Finally, I argue that the Epicureans did not have a specifically “therapeutic” brand of argumentation; rather, all of their arguments are therapeutic.

Emily Austin, Wake Forest University, austinea@wfu.edu
“Corpses, Self-Defense, and Immortality: Callicles’ Fear of Death in the Gorgias”

Callicles is the obstreperous immoralist who dominates the second half of Plato’s Gorgias. Most commentators have focused on Callicles’ political ambition, hedonism, and hostility to Socratic argument. I contend, however, that Callicles’ central ethical commitments arise from and are reinforced by one thing—his fear of death. In addition, I argue that Callicles does not wholly resist Socrates’ attempts to convince him not to fear death and that Socrates is not (as is often believed) an “intellectualist” about fear. Instead, they both recognize that Callicles suffers from a fear that is belief-independent, motivationally efficacious, and contrary to his rationally endorsed belief that his fear makes him a coward.

Geoffrey Bagwell, Xavier University, bagwellg@xavier.edu
“Plato’s Cratylus on Belief”

Commentators of Plato’s Cratylus have long ignored Socrates’ etymologies. They have done so because the etymologies appear to be nothing more than an elaborate joke meant to parody the practice of etymology popular among sophists such as Prodicus in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Recently, however, several prominent commentators have devoted considerable attention to these etymologies. Yet, despite their other contributions, they more or less agree with the established view that the etymologies are meant to be a parody of the sophistic practice of etymology. They come to this conclusion because they believe that Socrates repudiates his etymologies at the end of the dialogue when he attacks the theory that underlies them, the Heraclitean thesis that nature is in flux. On my view, however, Socrates does no such thing. I argue that, instead of attacking the Heraclitean thesis, Socrates presents an alternative to make the pedagogical point that the dispute between Hermogenes and Cratylus over the correctness of names introduced at the beginning of the dialogue cannot be resolved without first determining whether nature is stable or in flux. This view, I believe, sheds light on the purpose of Socrates’ etymologies, which, I show, is to demonstrate that names do not signify things. Rather, they disclose only the beliefs about the natures of such things belonging to the makers of names.
Jesse Bailey, Sacred Heart University, jib122@psu.edu
“Does Socrates Turn From Phusis?”

In this paper I examine the grounds for the traditional claim that Socrates, in the *Phaedo*, advocates a turn away from investigating nature in his ‘second sailing.’ This dialogue has been held as a *locus classicus* of the opposition between the ‘human’ and the ‘natural’ world. However, I argue that there are currents within the Platonic corpus – and even within the *Phaedo* itself – which undercut this simple opposition. Specifically, I will show that any strict opposition between the human world and phusis cannot stand due to the obvious fact that we have a nature. I argue that it is not *phusis simpliciter*, but rather a certain mode of examining nature that Socrates turns from. Specifically, through a reading of the Socrates autobiography, I show that it is the materialism of “what is called” *phuseos historean* (96a) that Socrates claims is *huperphanos*, excessively bright, and thus threatens blindness. Socrates leaves open the possibility of another form of investigation of *phusis*; this alternate mode, by recognizing the mediation of *logos*, and by avoiding materialistic and reductive accounts of causation, is able to reveal the good of beings, and thus to avoid the soul-blinding he warns against. By looking at some references to *phusis* in the *Theaetetus*, I begin to sketch an interpretation of “nature” which shows that human nature does not simply “come naturally,” but rather must be achieved. To borrow Aristotle’s formulation in the Ethics, human virtue – our soul in its natural, harmonious state – does not come about by nature, nor contrary to nature, but rather in accord with nature (*kata phusein*).

Geoffrey Batchelder, University of Maryland University College, peitho@verizon.net
“The Argument against Love in the *Phaedrus*”

The first thirty pages of the *Phaedrus* are devoted mainly to presenting three speeches on erotic love, a topic rhetoric teachers of the classical age favored in their advertising. The first speech, attributed to the rhetorician Lysias, sets the agenda for the rest of the dialogue in two distinct but subtly related ways: by introducing the question of love, and by providing a written specimen of sophist rhetoric. The speech, the Eroticus, holds a prominent position near the beginning of the *Phaedrus*, launches two competing speeches on the same theme, and receives extensive formal criticism in the dialogue’s last twenty pages. It is a showpiece written ostensibly to exhibit its author’s ingenuity, but the conditions of its delivery suggest the further practical goal of soliciting real sexual favors. Phaedrus reports that Lysias wrote of seducing a fair youth, but judging from his efforts to memorize the speech, first begging Lysias to repeat it and then rehearsing it alone, Phaedrus was the one seduced. The speech says one should grant favors not to a man in love, but to one who is not, because lovers are out of their minds. It condemns love by enumerating the harms that befall those who yield to lovers and the benefits that accrue to those who favor non-lovers.
This paper analyzes the Eroticus and argues that Plato intended its thesis, that one should grant favors to a non-lover rather than a lover, to exemplify moral corruption. To construct a dialogue about the curative powers of philosophy, he needed a specimen of corruptive rhetoric so he could portray his philosophic protagonist Socrates combating it. With a sinister antagonist illuminating his views by contrast, he presents a moral dilemma, shows how the careful application of philosophic techniques can lead to a correct solution, and thus how philosophic education can improve life for individuals and communities. Meanwhile, he uses dramatic techniques to reinforce the lesson by presenting Phaedrus as a corrupted character, the Eroticus as the cause of his condition, and Socrates using philosophic techniques to attempt a cure. This dramatic scheme lends the dialogue a thematic unity it would lack without the Eroticus to exemplify the corruptive power of sophistic rhetoric. As Lysias represents the sophists, Phaedrus represents Everyman, the typical Athenian citizen, so one need not insist too firmly on the historicity of either character. The Eroticus has seduced Phaedrus and persuaded him that its thesis is true, that it really is better to favor non-lovers than lovers. After he reads it to Socrates, the dialogue chronicles the philosophic ascent of his soul from corruption towards the good.

**Michael Baur**, Fordham University, mbaur@fordham.edu

*“Epagoge and Emergence in Aristotle”*

Aristotle’s account of *epagoge*, especially as it is presented in the *Posterior Analytics*, has generated a great deal of scholarly attention, but little substantive agreement. The term *epagoge* is generally understood as referring to a kind of cognitive process whereby one is able to move from the “less universal” to the “more universal.” Some commentators, most likely influenced by post-Humean thinking about inductive reasoning, have understood Aristotle’s account (along with his analogy of the “rout in battle”) as if the “more universal” which emerges through *epagoge* were little more than a congeries of the “less universal” particulars from which it has emerged. But this would imply -- contrary to what Aristotle states elsewhere (e.g. *Metaphysics* VIII.6) -- that the emergent whole is a “mere heap” and not “something besides the parts” from which it has emerged. In this paper, I aim to offer what I regard as an historically more accurate, and philosophically more defensible, account of what Aristotle meant by *epagoge*.

**Martha Beck**, Lyon College, martha.beck@lyon.edu

*“Solving the Riddle of the Oracle at Delphi”*

This paper focuses on the archeological site at Delphi, the stories of its founding, both mythological and historical, its temples, altars, rites, and oracular messages.

Ever since Alexander the Great left home to conquer the world, Ancient Greek culture has been distorted and co-opted, either by those with tragic good intentions or by cynics who use the Ancient Greeks to hide their irrational ambitions. The Oracle at Delphi is known as the site of the
worship of Apollo, god of reason. However, the full story of the Oracle makes clear that this Apollo is not the Apollo of Greek myth. Rather, this Apollo acknowledges the powers of many of the other gods, including Gaia, Poseidon, Athena, Zeus, Hestia, Artemis, and Dionysius. The Apollo of Greek myth is out of balance, emotionally immature and willing to change from the Greek side to the Trojan side during the war because he is more concerned with which side is most unified and efficient than with which side has the more just cause.

The story of the site also exposes the false stereotype that it represents the conquest of patriarchy over matriarchy and the beginning of the Western tradition of male domination, with all of its violence, rape, and abuses of nature and of women. All the shrines honor women and represent a balance of male and females energies. The men chosen to be the original priests were from the merchant class in Crete. Crete was known to have an excellent system of law and to focus on peace and international relations rather than war. The merchants had traveled widely, gaining knowledge of the world’s cultural traditions in order to continually develop their own civilization.

Further, when suppliants arrived to get advice, the Oracle did not tell them what to do but delivered a riddle. The suppliant was responsible for his interpretation and for the choices he made based on his interpretation. The suppliant had to cleanse his body through a ritual bath and then he had to cleanse his soul by following the admonitions, ‘know thyself’ and ‘nothing in excess’ as preconditions for being able to interpret the riddle appropriately. The site includes a running track: a wise soul must have a sound mind in a sound body. The site also has an amphitheater for the performance of tragedy and recitations of Homer and other poets: the suppliant ought to heed the warnings of tragedy, Homer, Plato, and other texts of Greek education, so that in his interpretation of the riddle he will not become another tragic character.

Like the other texts of Greek culture, the Oracle tells suppliants that life is one long riddle, with no formula for virtue or happiness. Rather, we are continually solving the many riddles we confront each day. We need to purify ourselves the same ways the suppliants did in order to make the best choices under the circumstances, to live wisely.

Keith Bemer, University of Pittsburgh, keb57@pitt.edu
“Understanding Aristotle’s History of Animals”

Aristotle’s History of Animals is a massive treatise. At nearly 150 Bekker pages it is the longest in the corpus, occupying what should be the central position among the biological treatises, which themselves take up over a third of the corpus. However, outside of a handful of dedicated readers of Aristotle’s biology, it has suffered from relative neglect. This is no doubt in part due to its essentially non-explanatory nature. For many, it holds little of the interest or excitement that Aristotle’s two great explanatory biological treatises do: the Parts of Animals and Generation of Animals. But the complicated arrangement and organization of its material
suggests an underlying methodology whose function is not merely to document facts in need of later explanation, as one might expect from a “natural history.” Just what are the purposes and goals of the HA, and how does the treatise endeavor to accomplish them? In this paper I explore the content and structure of the HA and consider the theoretical background provided to it by Aristotle’s discussions of scientific investigation and explanation, primarily in the Analytics and PA I. I argue that the treatise is designed to provide the reader with the sort of experience (empeiria) that is crucial for scientific knowledge (epistêmê), and consider to what extent a written treatise can provide such experience.

Brad Berman, University of Pennsylvania, bradb@sas.upenn.edu

“Plato’s Giants and the “Secret Doctrine” of the Theaetetus”

The heart of the Theaetetus’ “secret doctrine” (or, the so-called doctrine of radical flux) is that “everything is really change, and there is nothing but change” (Tht. 156a5). Since it’s not especially clear what to make of such a principle, a number of recent commentators have turned to modern analyses of change for inspiration. The result is that processes and events, in all varieties of their current metaphysical trappings, have been insinuated into reconstructions of an ancient ontology—but at the expense of attending to Socrates’ own emphasis on dunamis (power or capacity) in developing the doctrine.

I suggest that one might more profitably look to the Sophist, the Theaetetus’ dramatic sequel, for interpretive guidance. In the talk, I present four points of contact between Plato’s presentations of the Theaetetus’ flux theorists and the Sophist’s giants, who “take it as a definition that the things-which-are are nothing other than dunamis” (Soph. 247e3-4). I show that [1] in both dialogues, two versions of the relevant view are described, the latter of which is in each case a refinement of the former; that [2] proponents of the unrefined version are described in remarkably similar terms; that [3] the same metaphors run through the relevant portions of each dialogue; and that [4] Plato uses a similar device to set up each discussion. These parallels, I argue, license one to draw from Sophist in reconstructing the Theaetetus’ secret doctrine. I close the talk by highlighting some of the potential fruits of that interpretive approach.

George Boger, Canisius College, boger@canisius.edu

“The Epistemic Value of Encountering Paradoxes in Ancient Philosophy”

Encountering and studying paradoxes has a long history in western philosophy dating back to at least the 6th century BCE. Indeed, the notion of paradox is much the same then as now. However, in contrast to modern times we seem to have precious few examples of paradoxes from ancient times, at least, that is, if we search the ancient authors for instances of their using paradoxon and adoxon, the Greek words usually translated by “paradox.” Yet, when we study how Aristotle considers a paradox and even find an example of what he himself calls a
paradoxon, we can easily find many other examples of such argumentation, usually in conjunction with their being called aporiai — and usually in the context of searching for objective knowledge. Aristotle regularly, although in his typically discursive manner, employs a Socratic dialectic when he sets up the problems encountered in a given matter, such as those relating to ethics or metaphysics and physics. Indeed, we might translate aporia, as used by Aristotle and even by Plato, by “paradox” where the usual practice has been to use “perplexity” or “impasse.” Once making this association, we then find a plethora of paradoxes among the ancient philosophers. This paper (1) examines the use of paradoxon in ancient philosophy by relating it to a modern notion of paradox, (2) shows that the ancient use of aporia signals encountering a paradox and cites other instances of paradoxes, and (3) raises a question about the genus of paradox as moderns (and even ancients) understand it. In this connection, this paper especially treats the epistemic importance that ancient and modern thinkers attribute to encountering paradoxes in the pursuit of objective knowledge.

Geoffrey Bowe, geoffrey.bowe@gmail.com
“Plotinus in the service of the 17th Century Mind Body Problem”

This paper attempts to understand the responses of Leibniz and Spinoza to Cartesian dualism through the lens of Plotinian emanation, psychology and what I elsewhere called the monadology of Nous. I want to suggest that responses to Descartes that deny dualism and will employ a Plotinian model of psychological and material necessity and intellectual adequation in so doing. I will examine Leibniz’s monads in terms of Plotinus’ forms and Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge as well as human freedom in terms of Plotinus’ metaphysics of hypostatic ascent. The upshot of such an examination shows that Leibniz and Spinoza remain far more traditional in their metaphysical accounts and approaches than is usually realised.

Luigi Bradizza, luigi.bradizza@salve.edu
“Desiring Rule and Ruling Desires in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia”

This paper argues that Cyrus achieves critical successes in his campaigns by adopting the private causes of his allies as his own. This aspect of Cyrus’s mode of conquest is seen in his reaction to the various demands and requests of Cyaxares, Gobryas, and Gadatas. Cyrus offers Cyaxares the honor the latter so clearly desires, in exchange for direction of his army. Cyrus takes revenge on behalf of Gobryas for the murder of his son. And to Gadatas, Cyrus provides both revenge for his castration and himself as a substitute son. Cyrus’s treatment of these allies demonstrates an important uniformity to his method, since this same sort of appeal to the private desires of others is found in Cyrus’s speeches to his troops. Cyrus is revealed as an empire builder capable of appealing to the private interests of both leaders and common men. Indeed, Cyrus achieves his political goals by focusing others on their private goals, and by this means he depoliticizes them.
As his empire grows, this depoliticization contributes to Cyrus’s image of god-like domination over his subjects.

Eva Cadavid, Centre College, eva.cadavid@centre.edu
“On Aristotle and Mathematical Matters”

In *Metaphysics* VII.10.1036a1-10, Aristotle distinguishes between sensible and intelligible matter, describing intelligible matter as “that which is present in sensible things not qua sensible, i.e. in the objects of mathematics.” However, it is only in connection with geometry that Aristotle discusses intelligible matter. Is Aristotle inconsistent introducing intelligible matter for geometry but having no comparable concept for arithmetic? The paper will focus on the distinction between intelligible matter for geometrical objects and the lack of such a thing for arithmetic. It will also consider whether Aristotle is committed to a literalist position about the existence of intelligible matter.

Anthony Carreras, Rice University, aec2@rice.edu
“Aristotle on Other-Selfhood and Reciprocal Shaping”

In *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.4, Aristotle claims that, “the characteristics of friendship seem to have come from those directed at oneself.” He then concludes: “Hence, because each of these belongs to a good person in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as he is to himself – for a friend is another self – friendship is thought to be one or other of these, and friends those to whom these things belong” (NE IX.4 1166a30-4). My paper concerns the role played by the claim that a friend is another self in this argument. Most commentators think that Aristotle is merely observing a similarity between friendship and self-love, according to which self-love provides the paradigm case of attitudes characteristic of friendship. On this view, I value my friend as I do myself. I argue, in contrast, that Aristotle is making a causal claim according to which the psychological origins of friendship grow out of a temporally prior self-love. On this view, I value my friend as myself. Problems for this view are that it seems inconsistent with Aristotle’s claim that we must value our friends for themselves, and that it is unattractively egoistic. I conclude by arguing that the reciprocal nature of other-selfhood (i.e. the fact that each friend is at once both self and other self, and that friends have made each other this way) can solve these problems.

Michelle Catlin, University of Kentucky, michelle.catlin@uky.edu
“Collaborative Dialectic: The Conditions for Philosophical Inquiry in the *Sophist*”
In the opening scene of the *Sophist*, Socrates asks the Eleatic Stranger a question about his preferred method of philosophical investigation: whether he generally chooses to explain his points by himself using speeches, or whether he uses questions in order to engage his listeners in discussion. The Stranger’s reply (and the subsequent process by which he leads Theaetetus through examination) suggests that philosophy is collaborative in nature, and as such, should be carried out among philosophers who are working in community with one another. Evidence supporting this claim appears throughout the dialogue as the interaction between Theaetetus and the Stranger is forwarded as a model of collaborative dialectic. As the dialogue makes clear, in order for philosophical inquiry to be productive, several conditions must first be met. This essay enumerates these conditions, noting in particular the relationship between what is required by dialogue and the precise ways in which the method is ideally suited not only to generate rigorous philosophical analysis, but to facilitate the goals of education as well.

Rose Cherubin, George Mason University, rcherubi@gmu.edu
“Parmenides’ Logical Song or Incommensurability and the Pythagorean Harmonic Mean? Record confusion”

The earliest surviving Greek example of deductive argument is Parmenides’ poem. For the most part, scholarship on the poem over the last half century has either focused on the arguments, ignoring or dismissing the poetic form and elements; or if it has looked at the poetic features, it has largely considered them individually (verbal echoes of Homer and Hesiod, mentions of goddesses, and so on). Recently another strain of scholarship has taken the poetic form as its starting point, and argued that no logical arguments are really present. The poem, these scholars argue, is an incantation. Its intent is not to convey arguments but to recall, and to bring the reader on, something like a shamanic journey.

This recent direction has drawn our attention back to the question of the nature of Parmenides’ surviving work. Its conclusions, however, have been called into question. Some scholars have presented strong evidence that Parmenides’ use of inferential connectives should indeed be understood to express inference. This will not meet the challenge of the “incantation” interpretation, however, without an account of how the poetic form and references work together with the inferences.

That is, we need to ask: What are logical inferences doing in the poem? What is the effect of presenting the inferences in a poetic rather than a prose medium? Until we understand these things, we have not interpreted Parmenides’ fragments as they have come down to us.

In so far as it is a poem, Parmenides’ work would be supposed to point beyond the references of its words. The poet’s journey was supposed to take him beyond the familiar human realm, to glimpse a reflection of the rest of what is (the divine realm), and so a reflection of both sides of what mortals take to be the whole of what is. Thus were poets supposed to have access to aletheia. Parmenides both invokes and investigates this process. By taking to its logical
conclusions the idea of aletheia, and so the familiar conceptions of the poetic and everyday worlds, Parmenides reveals the potentials and limitations of the language and thought through which a Greek would act, communicate, and learn.

In a twofold way, then, Parmenides shows that these starting assumptions are paradoxical. At the level of poetic transport, he shows how Dike, Ananke, and Moira enforce paradoxical requisites for inquiry, so that the results of inquiry become indeterminate or incomplete. The verse expresses the rhythm and force of the inference structure. On the level of logical argument, he shows how the fifth-century conception of aletheia is incommensurable with the worldview that gives rise to it. Thus the poetic form calls up the visible and the invisible, the divine and the mortal, the complementarities that Greek worldviews called upon in order to make sense and to comprehend experience. Only in logic-laced poetry can he communicate the potential for inquiry when given what we say is, what is cannot be as we say it is.

Angelo Corlett, San Diego State University, acorlett@mail.sdsu.edu
“How Not to Argue for the Mouthpiece Interpretation”

This paper argues that stylometry or other related methods of approaching Plato’s dialogues such as Stichometry do not pose problems for the Socratic Anti-Mouthpiece Interpretation of Plato’s works and also serve as poor support for the Mouthpiece Interpretation.

Carlos Cortissoz, SUNY at Binghamton, ccortis1@binghamton.edu
“Souls within a Soul. The City-Soul Analogy Revisited”

The paper revisits the controversy on the city-soul analogy and brings to the table the doctrine of the unity of the virtues as a key element to get rid of the paradoxes raised by Williams’ “whole-part” and “predominant-part” rules in his famous The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic. Along those lines, the paper argues against Ferrari’s alleged solution by, firstly, denying that Lear’s internalization/externalization falls prey of Williams’ paradoxes and, secondly, by exposing the problems of the total disruption of city and soul that his position represents. I suggest that late dialogues support an understanding of the so-called “City-Soul analogy” as the expression of a stronger thesis, namely, that city and soul are psychological structures of the same sort, operating at different levels, collective and individual, and equally partaking of the world-soul. We are souls within a soul and there are indeed complex psychological transactions between the city-soul and the individual souls. These are the subject matter of political science.

Howard Curzer, howard.curzer@ttu.edu
“Benevolent Government Now”

Mencius describes benevolent government for ancient China. What can we learn from Mencius about government? What would Mencian benevolent government look like for contemporary America? I shall identify Mencius’s principles of benevolent government, seeking for lessons applicable to today’s world. This abstract is a sample.

When King Hai takes famine to be a natural disaster to which he responds well, Mencius retorts that famine is a result of a natural disaster (e.g. drought) plus inadequate preparations, and he faults the King for merely responding to, rather than forestalling natural disasters (1A3.1). The general principle here is that governments should strive to anticipate natural disasters and take steps to avert or ameliorate their impact. This principle is currently uncontroversial with respect to disasters such as fires and floods, but contested with respect to disasters such as stock market crashes. While some blame crashes on “market forces” (i.e. consider them to be natural disasters), others take them to be results of market forces plus inadequate governmental preparation/regulation. Clearly, Mencius’s warning that people tend to blame nature for their problems rather than accept the social responsibility to take preventative measures is still pertinent.

After Mencius cautions against government policies that interfere with peoples’ lives, he tacks in the opposite direction by enjoining the King to prohibit extra-fine fishing nets and off-season logging (1A3.3). Of course, if only a few people fish or log inappropriately, they will gain extra food and fuel, and the overall bad consequences for society will be minimal. Problems arise only when such practices become widespread. Thus, the general principle here is that governments should restrict people’s choices in order to prevent a tragedy of the commons. Pollution prohibitions are current examples.

Mencius believes that impoverished people tend to turn to crime, and when they do so, they should not be punished (1A7.20, 3A3.3). Presumably, the reason is that governments are at least partially responsible for ensuring that people do not become destitute. To accomplish this, government must do more than merely prepare for disasters, and prevent tragedies of the commons; they must also ensure that crucial tasks get done right. Mencius mentions that governments should regulate and supervise plowing, planting, weeding, reaping, and animal husbandry – all important aspects of farming (1A3.4, 1A5.3, 1A7.21, 1B4.5). Benevolent government, therefore, is far from laissez faire government.

Perhaps the most surprising point about Mencian benevolent government is that it is democratic. Defending against Mencius’s accusation that he hires and fires public officials at whim, King Xuan rhetorically asks how the competence of a candidate may be determined. Mencius replies that office holders must meet two conditions; they must be recommended by the people and examined by the king (1B7). Elsewhere, Mencius observes that the king, himself, must have the peoples’ confidence (5A5.5-6). Mencius does not specify a method by which the people might endorse a candidate or king, but we use elections.
Overall, while Mencian benevolent government is not liberal democracy, it is not as different as one might initially expect.

Daniel Davenport, Tulane University, danielrdavenport@yahoo.com
“A Revealing Question: Considering the Opening of Plato’s Protagoras”

“pothen, ὅ Ὀσκρατες, φανέi” – “From where you have come, Socrates, would you bring that to light?” (309a) This question opens Plato’s Protagoras, and it proves to have both dramatic and philosophical resonance through the rest of the dialogue. In fact, the entirety of the Protagoras is, in some sense, an attempt by Socrates to answer just this initial question. There are, it seems, at least two reasons for emphasizing this particular wonder. The first is apologetic: the rarity of truly asking this question and the difficulty in answering it helps to explain how Socrates, a virtuous man, could be condemned to death by his own community. A second and more thematic reason, though, is this question’s philosophical import. The question that begins the Protagoras reminds us of how consequential it is to ask from where someone has come for both philosophical inquiry and philosophical life. Although only Socrates is asked precisely this question, some form of that same inquiry is directed to young Hippocrates and, at greater length, to the title character, Protagoras. Through depicting the intermingled beliefs and motivations that constitute the direction from which these different characters are coming, the Protagoras reveals what its opening question can demand beyond what it usually does demand, for it is not what this question asks that is unfamiliar; it is, rather, how far this question reaches that is unfamiliar. The Protagoras emphasizes how very much is asked by, and how difficult it is to answer, from where one has come.

LaChanda Davis, Loyola University Chicago, ldavis2@luc.edu
“Purification and the Legislator in Plato’s Laws”

Plato uses the metaphor of purification (katharsis/katharmos) in several dialogues. Upon textual analysis, the terms for purification appear to have more than one meaning. The objective of this paper is to delineate the process of purification (katharmos) and its connection to the role of the legislator in Plato’s Laws. In Book IX, the process of purification is directed to an individual who has acted unjustly, with particular emphasis on the case of homicide. There are several instances in which purification is granted or denied. I shall focus on two cases: 1) the individual who is set free from the stain of bloodshed after being purified by law (nomos) and 2) the individual who has the ability to purify himself. In each case, the guilty party must undergo the appropriate method of purification to be released from the stain of murder and to be held pure (katharos). Nonetheless, the legislator is responsible for employing the means (tropos) to make men hate injustice and love the nature of justice itself. I shall argue that the process of purification in the Laws is connected to the idea of justice (dikaios) and the practice of virtue.
(arete). For the stain of murder affects the inner being and moral disposition of the individual and the genuine legislator seeks to establish laws that rectify and purify the soul of the guilty party.

**Eli Diamond,** Dalhousie University, eli.diamond@dal.ca
“Aristotle’s Metaphysical Criticism of Plato’s Political Philosophy”

This paper argues that Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s political thought is intimately connected with his metaphysical criticisms of the way form and matter are related in Plato’s thought. His corrections of Plato all presuppose his own conception of ousia, and the unity of various parts according to the logic of the ordered series. I will show how Aristotle preserves and transforms the city-soul analogy from Republic according to his own psychology, where family, village and city are related to one another exactly as nutritive, sensitive and thinking soul are unified in *De Anima.*

**Paul DiRado,** University of Kentucky, paul.dirado@uky.edu
“Theaetetus 166a-168c: How Plato Makes Use of his Philosphic Past”

The turn in the late Platonic dialogues toward explicitly recognizing the past philosophical tradition and questioning the views of past individual philosophers raises important questions of philosophical methodology. The earlier dialogues are centered on present problems of philosophy, not past problems. Insofar as the doctrines of such past thinkers are brought up at all, as in the *Phaedo*’s brief discussion of Anaxagoras, they tend to be quickly put aside. The resulting impression from the early dialogues is thus that, for Plato, philosophy is primarily driven by particular “contemporary” topics and questions in a way that, while certainly not hostile to or ignorant of the past tradition of philosophy, does not seem to place any special emphasis upon rooting these present questions in the past debates and doctrines. Studying the history of philosophy in these earlier dialogues does not initially appear to serve any necessary role in the practice of philosophy.

Regardless of whether or not this initial impression is borne out by careful reading of the earlier dialogues, it is directly undermined by the late dialogues, particularly the *Theaetetus.* Here, the history of philosophy is directly introduced and considered, as Plato gives an exhaustive analysis of Protagoras’ thesis that “Man is the measure of all things” and of the Heraclitean doctrine that all is flux. It therefore serves as an excellent occasion for asking what role historical philosophical analysis does in fact play in the practice of philosophy for Plato.

This paper will argue that, in the *Theaetetus,* Socrates primarily undertakes his analysis of the history of philosophy as part of his larger project of serving as midwife to Theaetetus. Historical analysis is necessary here because the views of Theaetetus have been shaped by this
philosophical history, particularly the doctrines of Protagoras. By making these influences explicit to Theaetetus, he is then in a position to more clearly and distinctly reveal what he has taken from these past thinkers, thus helping give birth to his own position regarding knowledge. A strong challenge to this thesis is seemingly raised in the dialogue when Socrates, channeling Protagoras, critiques the treatment that his doctrine had thus far received. Here, Protagoras accuses Socrates of being unjust in his interpretation of his historical doctrine because Theaetetus has not answered Socrates’ questions as Protagoras would have answered them. This challenge could be read as suggesting that historical fidelity in philosophical exegesis plays a crucial role in how Plato uses the history of philosophy, a role independent of its use in Socratic midwifery. However, this reading of these passages is unwarranted. Indeed, the “injustice” that Protagoras accuses Socrates of is not best understood as a mischaracterization of his position, but rather as the adaptation of a problematic and contentious attitude toward argumentation. Even here, Socrates is serving as midwife to Theaetetus, by using a recreation of the historical thinker of Protagoras as an exemplary lesson to Theaetetus as to how philosophical arguments are best challenged and defended philosophically.

Daniel Dombrowski, Seattle University, ddombrow@seattleu.edu
“Coming to Be: On Process Enriched Thomism”

What does it mean for an individual (a one) to come to be? This question has been close to the center of attention throughout the history of metaphysics. St. Thomas Aquinas’ contributions to a defensible response to this question (in terms of esse) are well documented. Not as well known are the responses to this question offered in the past decade by two learned Jesuit Thomists who have also been heavily influenced by the process thought of Alfred North Whitehead: James Felt’s book Coming to Be and Norris Clarke’s revised edition of The Philosophical Approach to God. It will be the purpose of my presentation to examine carefully their responses to the above question. Many of the texts where Thomas most clearly indicates his response to the question that is the focus of this presentation are in Summa Contra Gentiles (e.g., I. 43; II. 6-7, 79, 94; III. 69, 113).

Marcus Dracos, Stony Brook University, marcusdracos@gmail.com
“Sophistical Improprieties: A Puzzle in Sophistical Refutations 11”

Aristotle in Sophistical Refutations 11 makes a distinction between two types of eristic. One type is merely apparent syllogistic, which I call “sophistical syllogizing” (SSs). The second type presents a genuine syllogism but is a bad logos, due to not being “in accord with the subject matter”, “not in accord with the techne”, or not arguing from “proper” or “peculiar principles”, which I’ll call “sophistical improprieties” (SIs). Aristotle also wants to distinguish (SIs) from unsound or false argumentation. Aristotle, then, claims that, not only is there formally/informally invalid argument and unsound argument, there is such a thing as, for example, “contentious-
geometrical-argument”. But how so? The purpose of this presentation is to discern what Aristotle means by (SIs) and discern how and in what way they are a form of eristic.

Answers don’t come quickly, especially in light of the account of sophistical refutations presented in SE 3-9. There, attempting to give a unified account of sophistical refutation as all reducing to the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, Aristotle claims that any every sophistical refutation commits an informal fallacy. Yet, (SIs) are said to be both (a) argumentatively valid and (b) eristical. If (a), then they don’t commit any of the informal fallacies and are, thus, not eristical (not-b). If (b), then they commit an informal fallacy, and thus are not syllogistically valid (not-a). Thus, (SIs) cannot both be both syllogistically valid and contentious.

This puzzle can be resolved in a simple way. Aristotle believes that any and every craft (be it dialectic or geometry) operates according to a particular syllogistic standard, which is the type of exposition appropriate to the subject matter in question. On this front, Aristotle’s argues that dialectic, given its syllogistic standard, is incapable of arguing to geometrical conclusions, given the syllogistic standard in geometry. An (SI) occurs when a sophist presents a valid dialectical argument as a geometrical argument, and such an argument can only gain the appearance of geometrical argument with the help of an informal fallacy. Thus, the argument, while valid, is contentious geometry and commits an informal fallacy. The presentation closes with exploring the implications of this position and raises questions about Aristotle’s approach.

Ian Drummond, University of Toronto, ian.drummond@utoronto.ca
“Duns Scotus on the Intellectual Virtues”

Duns Scotus argues in Ordinatio III, distinction 33 that the moral virtues should not be distributed among the various appetites of the human soul; rather, he holds that they all are habits of the will. One of his main arguments for this position is that the will is the only free power, which for Scotus means that unlike all other powers, the will not only moves itself to its acts, but also determines itself. From this it follows as well that the will is in itself radically indeterminate, and is thus in need of the determinate inclinations to good action that the habits of moral virtue provide. Scotus also holds, however, that powers other than the will can have habits; but since these powers are not free, and therefore are not indeterminate and are not in need of determination in the way that the will is, the question arises of whether habits can play any role in powers other than the will.

I will address this question with regard to the intellect and the intellectual virtues. For Scotus, the intellect, like all powers other than the will, is not a free power, but a merely natural one. This means that unlike the will, which is able either to will or not to will whatever is presented to it, the intellect is naturally determined to know, to the degree to which it is capable, whatever object is present to it; thus, any variation in how it acts is due not to the intellect in itself, but to the particular circumstances in which the act takes place. But then if the reason for positing the moral virtues as habits of the will is to provide determination where it does not follow directly
from the will’s nature, then there will be no place for habits in the intellect, which is naturally determined. Yet Scotus maintains that the intellect can indeed acquire habits, most notably the virtue of prudence, which is the habit of reasoning and judging well about matters of practical choice.

I will raise a doubt as to whether Scotus has an account of habituation that can be extended beyond the habits of the will to allow for virtues of the intellect. Scotus maintains that the intellect, though not a free power, is nonetheless not limited in itself to one judgment rather than its opposite, and is thus in need of habitual determination to be inclined to judging well. He also claims, however, that by giving the intellect determinate inclinations, the intellectual virtues render acts of intellection easier and more pleasant than they would be without any habituation; but, as I will argue, the circumstances of ease and pleasure (the latter in particular) pertain more properly to the acts of appetitive powers such as the will and the sensitive appetites than to those of a cognitive power such as the intellect.

Matthew Duncombe, University of Cambridge, mbduncombe@gmail.com

“Relativism and the Puzzles of Size and Number, Theaetetus 154c-d”

The relativism in Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine (152d-160c) is a relativism of observer dependence: a believes that x is F if, and only if, x is F for a. This means that conflicts between beliefs can be resolved by specifying the agent to whom the belief relates: the contradiction in ‘x is F and x is non-F’ can be resolved thus: x is F for a and x is non-F for b. This strategy, of resolving conflicts by relativisation, is introduced by the Puzzles of Size and Number (154b6-155d7). A conflict between ‘x is F and x is non-F’ is resolved because x is F relative to y and x is non-F relative to z, where x, y and z are non-identical. The solution to the Puzzles is to reject non-relational properties.

Commentators typically think that both the Secret Doctrine’s solution to the Puzzles and its solution to conflicting beliefs is to specify that we were using non-relational forms of statement, when we should be using only relational forms: we mention non-relational properties, when we should mention only relational properties. However, the two conflict resolution strategies have different structures. Relativism relates every belief to an observer; the solution to the Puzzles relates properties to another item in the world. The puzzles are solved by rejecting non-relational properties, not by introducing relativism. Thus, the solution to the Puzzles is consistent with the rejection of relativism, and vice versa. Therefore, the solution to the Puzzles does not seem to serve to introduce relativism.

This paper rejects the traditional reading of the solution to the Puzzles, and so does not face the problem of how the Puzzles are supposed to introduce relativism. On the basis of the text at 154b-155d, where the Puzzles are discussed, I argue that the Puzzles challenge us to reject the view that an item can have intrinsic properties, not the view that they can have relational
properties. Relational properties are identical to a two-place relation. As such they are incomplete, unless a qualifier is added. ‘is more’ is a relational property, because it is elliptical for ‘is more than some y’. Extrinsic properties are not identical to any relation, but x has an extrinsic property if x bears a relation to some appropriate y. Thus, statements mentioning extrinsic properties need not be completed with a qualifying phrase.

The realization that the *Puzzles* urge us to reject intrinsic properties has serious implications for reading the *Secret Doctrine*. The *Secret Doctrine* as a whole, is not concerned to reject non-relative properties and beliefs, but rather to reject intrinsic properties. I offer evidence that in the Introduction (152d-e), the Twin-offspring Theory (156a-157c) and the Concluding Reprise (160a-160c), the Secret Doctrine is aimed at the rejection of intrinsic properties, not relational ones. I conclude by considering the wider implications of this for relativism in the *Theaetetus*.

**Henry Dyson**, University of Michigan, hdyson@umich.edu

“Meno’s Paradox in Hellenistic Philosophy”

At *Meno* 80d Plato offers the following dilemma. For all inquiries and all objects of inquiry, either the inquirer knows the object or she does not. If she knows it, genuine inquiry is impossible since this involves knowledge acquisition. If she does not know the object, inquiry is also impossible: she does not know what she is looking for and would not recognize it even if she stumbled across it. Thus, all inquiry is impossible. Socrates’ investigation of the slave-boy suggests that we have tacit knowledge of objects that is sufficient to guarantee the success of an inquiry, if it is conducted rightly, but not to rule it out since our tacit knowledge must be transformed into true understanding. Plato suggests that this tacit knowledge arises from one’s prenatal acquaintance with transcendent forms.

Plutarch’s *Fr.* 215f tells us that each of the Hellenistic schools offered a solution to Meno’s Paradox. The standard opinion is that the Epicureans and Stoics offer essentially the same solution: prolepses or “natural conceptions” offer an intermediate cognitive state between complete ignorance and complete understanding. This cognitive state defines the conditions under which inquiry is both possible and necessary. I argue that this standard interpretation cannot be correct. In Plato’s version of the paradox the type of inquiry in question is definitional (i.e. attempts to answer Socrates’ *ti esti* question). Epicurus denies that such inquiries are legitimate since philosophy should be conducted according to the ordinary meanings of words. Philosophers should not attempt to overthrow and replace these established meanings with the products of dialectic. The possession of a prolepsis is sufficient to grasp the ordinary conception of something. If one has such a prolepsis, there is no need to inquire further into its definition. But if one lacks a prolepsis, that inquiry is impossible. Thus, Epicurus does not offer a solution to Plato’s version of the paradox. He accepts it as a club with which to beat proponents of dialectic. When Epicurus says that prolepsis makes inquiry possible, he has in mind non-definitional inquiries: “is that object a cow or a horse?”
It is clear that the Stoics could not have accepted these arguments. They are committed to asking and answering *ti esti* questions; and the definitions they offer are often at odds with our ordinary preconceptions. Their solution to the paradox is closer to Plato’s than the Epicureans’. I suggest that the Stoics offered prolepsis as a naturalized, “Socratic” alternative to Platonic recollection. Competent language users have a great deal of tacit knowledge about the object of their inquiries. This tacit knowledge takes the form of certain platitudes that anyone who possesses the prolepses will immediately grasp. These platitudes make inquiry possible by circumscribing the logical space in which the correct definition is to be found. They also offer a set of criteria by which the conclusions of this inquiry may be judged. However, this tacit knowledge does not come from prenatal acquaintance with transcendent forms; it develops naturally from one’s sense-perception and linguistic competence.

**David Ebrey**, Northwestern University, david.ebrey@gmail.com

“Forms and The Real Problem of Self-Predication”

The self-predications in Plato’s dialogues strike us very bizarre: claims like “justice is just” and “largeness is large.” Socrates, however, treats them as obvious. In order to understand why Socrates thinks they are obvious, I think we need to go back to the beginning and rethink what, for Plato, things like justice are. In this paper I explore the possibility that Plato’s basic conception of such abstract entities was quite different from our own, so that these claims really are as obvious as Socrates says they are. I argue that to understand self-predication we need to understand why Plato thinks that when I am F there is something (which Plato calls a form) that I have which is itself F and which makes me F. I propose that we can understand this structure if we think of a form as something like a true appearance. I briefly supply etymological evidence that this is a reasonable way for Plato to think of forms.

**Terry Echterling**, Michigan State University, echterl1@msu.edu


J. B. Kennedy’s 2010 argument (“Plato’s Forms, Pythagorean Mathematics, and Stichometry,” Apeiron 43:1, 1-31) for the presence of a Pythagorean-influenced code embedded in the structure of Plato’s dialogues includes the positing of an equally divided, twelve-part musical scale. The numbers that designate the scale’s parts are said to have certain musical and symbolic significances for the Pythagoreans that can be correlated with the content of each of Plato’s dialogues by first counting all the Greek letters and then performing a twelvefold division into equal segments. Although Kennedy produces empirical evidence pointing to interesting correlations, the difficulty of identifying a particular musical scale within the ancient literature that meets the necessary conditions raises a concern about that aspect of the overall thesis.
A possible solution to the difficulty lies in considering not a musical scale in the sense of a
twelve-part, equally divided sequence such as a modern scale with twelve semitones, but rather
an idea familiar to the Greeks: a mathematical schema connecting musical ratios that can be used
to determine a variety of musical scales. A candidate schema that would better represent the
nature of the ratios that constitute Plato’s embedded code is the mathematical construction
attributed to Thrasyllus by Theon of Smyrna (in Ptolemaeum) and related to the musical theory
outlined in Plato’s Timaeus. Kennedy (2010: 21) alludes to this construction but seems to
interpret it as referring to a musical scale of twelve regularly spaced notes. Thrasyllus’
construction appears rather to be an attempt to present a mathematical schema for the relation of
the ratios that define a multi-octave series of seven-tone diatonic scales that form the so-called
harmony of the spheres, but it does not privilege the number twelve and the intervals are not
equal. This schema functions as an abstract representation of a method for generating the ratios
that identify the desired tones and is similar to schemas of Euclid (Sectio Canonis) and Proclus
(in Platonis Timaeum commentarii). A possible source of confusion is that this schema can itself
lead to the identification of twelve tones that could be used to form an octave within Pythagorean
tuning theory but this differentiation of twelve tones was related to fixing invariant cycles of
fourths or fifths and the relevant ratio numbers do not directly correlate to the intervals of a
twelve note scale.

While my candidate schema does not address all the questions that could be raised concerning
Plato’s code, it could resolve the problem of identifying a specific musical scale that gives
special significance to some of the numbers. Given the complexity and ambiguity of
terminology, both ancient and modern, musically and mathematically, I leave considerable room
for interpretation of symbolic significance as well as for multiple levels of meaning.

Panos Eliopoulos, University of Athens, Greece, ksatriya@tri.forthnet.gr
“Seneca on Virtue as Psychological Therapy and the Causes of Passions”

For Seneca passions are not just bad judgments that need to be defeated. Even though he
generally agrees with Chrysippus on the matter of the ontology of passions, Seneca differentiates
mainly in his emphasis that passions are the reason why man leads an inauthentic, unhappy and
undignified life. Although Seneca is a very orthodox Stoic, in most of the cases where his stoic
credibility is challenged, he resorts to a therapy plan that exceeds the usual stoic strictness on the
absoluteness of the status of the sage. In this scheme, the Roman philosopher employs practical
techniques that refer to the ordinary man, the man who rationally desires to change his merely-
being into well-being. This shift of focus is partially explained through the social orientation of
the moral context: man is not alone while achieving his perfection of character; there are others
who need to be helped, so that the pursuit of wisdom becomes a pananthropic effort, not an act of
isolation. Since moral success is connected with the other person, it needs to start from within.
The role of individuality is particularly stressed, especially on the premises that man first needs
to make this constant and conscious effort to help himself, to cure his own soul, often with the
aid of others who share the same path, before he attempts to be engaged in the therapy of the passions of others. Under this prism, the therapy of passions leads to a culmination where man is not only bound to achieve his ontological excellence but also to relieve his soul from the traumas of passions and to connect himself with the moral and existential safety that the presence of recta ratio guarantees.

Seneca, in De Ira, defines passion as the result of an “impetus”, an horme, which lacks self control and is closed to reason and counsel. As such, a passion makes the soul unfit to know the right and the true. In such a condition, man loses contact with the firm cognitive criteria that would allow him this knowledge and would ensure a eudaimonistic living secundum naturam. Moreover, as everything is thought to be corporal in the Stoic philosophy, passion is not only a mental but also a bodily situation, one that affects and even manipulates the body in certain explicit ways. Although Seneca is convinced that the stoic teaching should address literally everyone in order to ameliorate one’s life and make it authentic and right, he upholds that it is better to totally exclude passions from the soul than try to control them. That gives certain gravity to the recognition that virtue, although it potentially belongs to every human being, is an absolute good, the only good that can be attained. But virtue, through this condition of emancipation from passion and correction, is not an idealistic situation. However absolute, virtue is necessary because only virtue can save man from leading an unhappy life, therefore only virtue can offer the psychological therapy which is the crucial prerequisite for the life of a rational and conscientious being.

Charlene Elsby, McMaster University, elsbyc@mcmaster.ca
“Nature and Convention: Defining Spoken Language in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione”

The first chapter of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione describes a relation between things, affections of the soul, and spoken and written sounds. According to this passage, affections in the soul (pathêmata tês psychês) resemble things (pragmata) (i.e., intelligible or sensible forms). These affections of the soul are symbolized in a spoken language by vocalizations (things in vocalized sound↓ ta en tê phônê), which are symbols (symbola) of those affections of the soul. Written marks are symbols of vocalizations. Aristotle states in this passage that the things (in nature), as well as the affections in the soul that they produce, are the same for all people. Vocal and written symbols of these things are not. I will be focusing on a small part of this very dense statement of the relation between nature, thought and language as represented in De Interpretatione. Specifically, I will focus on the problems of what constitutes a spoken language, and how words come to be symbols of affections of the soul. For this discussion I will take advantage of Aristotle’s statements concerning the difference between the types of sound produced by humans and animals, as for Aristotle only certain sounds qualify as part of a spoken language. Consistent with his statement that vocalizations are not the same for all people, Aristotle suggests that vocalizations become symbols of affections of the soul by convention. I will examine how far this notion of convention extends, and whether there are limits to the arbitrariness introduced by
labeling spoken language as conventional. I conclude that while there is no natural relationship between a particular word and what it symbolizes, it is natural for humans to communicate by speech, and also natural that we produce vocalizations, defined in a very specific sense. By adding the notion that vocalizations are the matter of a spoken language, we can identify this naturalistic element of Aristotle’s theory of language while maintaining that language is conventional; the differentia that defines spoken language, i.e., the ‘formal’ or ‘actual’ element of the definition of spoken language, is that it is significant, while affections of the soul become symbolized by particular, significant words by convention.

Christos Evangeliou, Towson University, cevangel@mail.towson.edu
“Thomas Jefferson: Christian and Epicurean?”

More specifically, this study will examine Jefferson’s claims that he was an Epicurean and a Christian at the same time. In the minds of most people, who are familiar with traditional Christianity and Epicurean philosophy, these two outlooks are as contrary to each other as fire and water ever were in Empedocles’ or Aristotle’s scheme of elementary opposition. It would be interesting to see how this smart man, who was neither a trained philosopher (though he liked to read philosophical books), nor a practicing Christian, in any serious sense of the word, managed to reconcile the inspired (or revealed) Gospel of Christ and the thoroughly materialistic doctrines of the Epicurean school of philosophy.

Heather Evans, SUNY Binghamton, hfowler1@binghamton.edu
“Aristotle and Łukasiewicz”

In the Categories 2a11-13, Aristotle asserts that the primary substance is the individual instance in the sensible world. Though the main aim of the work appears to be ontological, it begins with linguistic analysis, hinting at a systematic relationship between being and speech. But ‘word’ is ambiguous: it may refer to phonemes, or referents, or the relationship between the two. Porphyry entwines these three interpretations, reading Aristotle as making grammatical, ontological and psychological/logical claims in the work. The basis of these finds its support in Metaphysics Gamma’s Law of Non-Contradiction and Law of Excluded Middle. Jan Łukasiewicz’s 1910 paper critiques the structure of Aristotelian logic. He finds three different statements of the LNC in Metaphysics Gamma:

An ontological – “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time in the same way;” (1005b19-20)

A logical – “Most certain of all is that contradictory propositions are not both true;” (1011b13-14)
A psychological – “No one can believe that the same thing can at the same time be and not be” (1005b23-24).

This parallels the tri-part definition of a word in the Categories. But Łukasiewicz finds that none of the three claims stand as first principles. The psychological claim is improvable, while the other two assume a principle of identity to be able to do any work, undermining the assumed validity of the LNC/LEM structure. He celebrates the rise of predicate logic which divorces semantic meaning from valid formal arguments as a way of strengthening the foundations and increasing the power of logic. Yet it is precisely this separation that allows for the recursion of Gödel. The concentration on form allows for arguments to be plugged into themselves, whereas the implicit demand for existent subjects and the semantic aspect of Aristotle’s system protect it from the latent inconsistencies that Gödel predicts.

In light of the 1931 proof, I am not sure that Łukasiewicz’s enthusiasm is warranted. While the logical, ontological and psychological claims may not be supportable singularly, the treatment in the Categories suggests that they are not meant to be. For this paper I will examine the justification for the separation of the three claims, and show them to be mutually supporting. I will then apply this unification to the problem of inconsistency vs. incompleteness.

Gene Fendt, University of Nebraska-Kearney, fendtg@unk.edu
“The Third Remove from the King at Its Third Remove, or, How to Play the Platonic Flute”

There are a number of scholarly puzzles about Socrates’ reintroduction of the topic of mimesis at the beginning of Republic 10. The first is that he brings the mimetic arts back into the discussion with an image; given that the point with which the argument will conclude is that the image-maker is without knowledge, this is at least an ironic origin for a philosophical demonstration. The second puzzle is Socrates’ strikingly inexact memory. He says that “in many aspects of the city we were entirely right in our founding, but especially, I say, about poetry… in not admitting at all any that is mimetic” (595a). This remark is itself a puzzle for two reasons. First, Socrates had earlier won Adeimantus’ agreement to the unmixed mimesis of the good, as well as the mimesis of the unworthy when they are, briefly, doing good, “except if it is done in play” (396de). This is certainly not, in fact, outlawing the mimetic entirely. And considering the discussion at this point was precisely what the children are to be allowed, the allowance of mimesis of the bad in play seems not just to leave the barn door open and unlatched, but to take down the walls. Secondly, according to the argument Socrates had given earlier, it would be impossible for any city to outlaw the mimetic, since the education of children begins with music (in the broad Greek sense including all the arts of the muses) and in particular with false stories (376e).

A third puzzle about the re-introduction of the mimetic that has not been much noticed is that Socrates essentially repeats the “three removes” argument of Republic 10 three times, giving
three distinctly different examples: bed, bit and reins, flute. This paper will show that these are not at all repetitions. The last is especially problematic for the usual reading of Socrates’ critique, since in it the one who knows is a mimetic artist: the aulos player. Attention to the differences among these examples opens a defense of the arts, provides a solution to the earlier puzzles of book 10 including showing how book 10’s re-introduction of mimesis fits together with the discussion of books two and three, against the cavils of skeptics and unbelievers.

Patricio Fernandez, Harvard University, pfernand@fas.harvard.edu
“Reasoning and the Unity of Aristotle’s Account of Animal Motion”

Aristotle holds that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action and he explicitly states the thesis in the context of a general account of animal locomotion, which aspires to be applicable to all animals, and not only to those which have the capacity to reason. (cf. De Motu Animalium 7). This fact, as well as other related textual and methodological considerations, have led a number of interpreters—most recently Klaus Corcilius (2008a,b,c,d)—to read Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language in this context as an analogical device meant to signify an efficient-causal mechanism that would explain the local movement of any animal, say, in terms of its desire for something and its perception of some particular object represented as potentially satisfying that desire. On a view of this sort, the practical syllogism is read as a metaphor for a mechanism that is equally at work in rational and non-rational animals, and hence it offers one possible way of securing the unity of a general account of animal motion. One might call it “unity from below” or “additive unity”: the account of rational action will be an account of non-rational animal movement, which is common to all animals, plus the accidental addendum of reasoning. As a consequence, the claim that “the conclusion is an action” is not to be taken as a literal truth about a special kind of “reasoning.”

I would like to clear the way for a stronger reading of the thesis, while at the same time avoiding a commitment to an implausible divorce between a general account of animal movement and a special one for rational action. For this purpose, I argue that “additive unity” is not the only available kind of unity that the two accounts might bear. I argue that the unity of Aristotle’s explanation of animal motion is better read as a sort of “unity from above” or “subsumptive unity”: the account of animal motion is the genus under which the account of rational action falls as a species. The general account explains animal motion in terms of an ordered sequence of acts of an animal, which describes how a movement is performed by the animal on the basis of other acts. When specified to the case of a rational animal, the account describes a special case of such a sequence of acts—namely one in which the order of the sequence is represented as such by the subject of the acts that constitute it. Aristotle’s “practical syllogism” signifies this peculiar sort of sequence. If this is so, the use of the practical syllogism in a general explanation of animal movement, is a way of taking the species to stand for the genus. Such a view does better justice to the specificity of rational action as the conclusion of reasoning, while at the same time conceiving it as a kind of animal activity.
Although Chadwick characterizes it as “perhaps the most damaging and fatal charge” against him, Marenbon asserts that Boethius “is particularly brisk in dismissing the charge of magic” appended to that of treason, for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. If Boethius understood that, for the ignorant, sufficient proof of the charge of sacrilegium leveled against him could be found in his lifelong association with philosophy, why did he fill the Consolation with references to the Orphic, Pythagorean, Hermetic, erotic magical, daemonic, veneficic, psychagogic, vatic, necromantic, astrological, and theurgic elements of late ancient philosophy? These are precisely the aspects of late Platonism which make the practice of philosophy appear to be maleficium. I argue that Boethius does take the charges of sacrilegium and maleficium against him (and by association against Philosophy) seriously, and that the Consolation in fact contains as a sort of apologia a sustained reflection on the similarities and differences between philosophy and magic. Taking as his models the defense speeches of Socrates and Apuleius, Boethius defends Philosophy by distinguishing her activity and the activity of her followers from that of sagae and veneficae and the divine powers they attempt to compel and constrain. All of the suspect elements are placed within a Platonic framework and distinguished from their vulgar manifestations. Lady Philosophy’s remediae, first mild then stronger, are contrasted with the venena and blandimenta of the Muses, Fortune and Circe. Pythagorean science, not the arcane techne of the Greek Magical Papyri, is used to delve into the ‘secret causes of Nature.’ Philosophical self-knowledge is shown to be an apotropaic against Fortune, and a superior way of relating to this prodigy than the subordinate do ut des relation adopted by ‘the many.’ The incantations (carmina) and poisons (venena) of Circe are belittled as having power over the body but being powerless to affect the soul the way virtue does. The Orphic myth is purged of its necromantic associations and re-described as a Platonic ascent out of the cave. Demons or the stars might well administer Fate, but it is a Fate conditioned by Providence. A Neoplatonic logic is ascribed to the theurgic power behind Homeric verses used as incantations. Taken as part of a defense of Philosophy, the ‘magical’ elements of the ‘Consolation’ refute rather than confirm the misconceptions of ‘the many.’

Lee Franklin, Franklin & Marshall College, lee.franklin@fandm.edu
“Dialectical Expertise in Plato’s Sophist”

At Sophist 253b9-e5, the Eleatic Stranger gives an account of dialectical expertise. In virtue of understanding how kinds blend, the expert in dialectic can discern one kind from another in various ways (Sophist 253d5-e2). But it is not at all clear what sort of philosophical investigation is described here as dialectic. In particular, there is controversy over whether this passage describes the taxonomic inquiry of diairesis, or rather inquiry into Being and the
Greatest Kinds of the sort displayed in the middle of the dialogue. I propose that this is a false dichotomy: the Stranger’s account describes how the expert performance of diairesis is informed by understanding of the Greatest Kinds.

First, to clarify the role of the Greatest Kinds in diairesis, I take up the short argument at Sophist 250a8-c8 showing that Being is a third kind distinct from both Rest and Change. I argue that the Stranger’s line of reasoning applies to any genus, so as to explicate the way a genus is distinct from its species, and the way they, in turn, are included in it. The use of Being as a proxy for any genus captures the broader point that Being is the defining characteristic of the genuine kinds that are the method’s aim (Statesman 262a9-263b12, Phaedrus 265e1-c5). Similarly, the Same and the Different represent not just any sorts of similarity and otherness, but relations of nomological kinship and distinction by which kinds are correctly collected together or divided from one another. The Greatest Kinds may be regarded as theoretical norms governing the proper performance of diairesis. This is the role described by analogy to the way vowels mediate the blending of all other letters (Sophist 253a4-6, 253b9-c3).

Consequently, there is a two-fold connection between diairesis and inquiry into the Greatest Kinds. Being, the Same, and the Different are principles invoked implicitly in our diairetic classifications. It is by reflection on diairesis that we come to inquire into the Greatest Kinds directly; inquiry into the Greatest Kinds arises out of, and is obliquely about, diairesis. In return, having apprehended the Greatest Kinds, we are in position to perform diairesis expertly. This is best seen in aspects of diairesis that demand reference to general theoretical norms. For instance, at the bottom of a field, there is the problem of infimae species: how do we recognize when to stop dividing? Similarly, at the top, there is the problem of the uppermost genus: if it is not to be located under another genus above it, in what way can it be known and defined? Such problems, which concern the demarcation of fields from one another as wholes, require reference to general theoretical norms. The expert performance of diairesis is grounded in knowledge of the Greatest Kinds. In this way, diairesis and inquiry into the Greatest Kinds are a complementary pair, which together comprise the coherent methodological whole, dialectic.

Bernard Freydberg, Duquesne University, bdfphil@yahoo.com

“Comedy as Self-Forgetting: Implications for Sallis’ Reading of Plato’s Cratylus”

“Deuteros Plous: The Philosopher as Voyager,” takes its departure from this phrase from Plato’s Phaedo. Sallis provides sustained meditations on this phrase in various contexts in Being and Logos: The Way of Platonic Dialogue (1975), Double Truth (1995), Chorology (1999), and Force of Imagination (2000). His fundamental contribution to philosophy of imagination, which affirms a play of images such that an ultimate original proves inaccessible, receives impetus from his interpretation of this Platonic trope. I shall briefly exhibit its appearance and its meaning.
In this paper I suggest that a supplement to *deuteros plous* it is required: namely, one of the few ascriptions (if not the only one) by Socrates of “a method of my own,” namely *eikē phuro.* After a brief beginning regarding the translation *eikē phuro*, I shall consider it in terms both of Sallis’ Plato–interpretation and, more substantively, how *eikē phuro* might be seen as functioning methodologically in other dialogues.

**Dylan Futter**, University of the Witwatersrand, dylan.futter@wits.ac.za

“Interrogation, Irony, and *Elenchus*”

A theoretical model of the *elenchus* requires an account of Socrates’ conversational goals and his instrumental behaviour, that is, how he goes about achieving his conversational goals. The present essay offers an analysis of the *elenchus* as a method of ironic questioning. I proceed as follows. First, I offer some reasons for supposing that Socrates’ other-regarding goal in *elenchus* is philosophical protreptic. He aims to convert his interlocutor to the examined life. Secondly, I construct a theory of irony, and thirdly, apply this model in an effort to understand the significance of irony in the Socratic *elenchus*.

The main features of my account of irony may be presented as follows. First, irony depends on an incongruity between appearance and reality, and, therefore, the existence of norms. Secondly, the recognition of an irony involves three “thoughts”: a thought about an appearance or surface, a thought about a deeper reality, and a judgment that the surface does not “fit” the reality. I will maintain that irony is relevant to the elenchus at three different but related levels. One is a fundamental distinction between appearance and reality: in relation to Socrates, this appears particularly as a distinction between the appearance and reality of virtue. This distinction manifests itself in what I will call the intrinsic irony of certain core Socratic questions. The second level is a form of irony which I term “intra-psychic” irony, and, which is fundamental to the operation of *elenchus*. (A third level is Socrates’ use of ordinary verbal irony in the *elenchus*.

In at least some cases, Socrates’ verbal irony may be interestingly related to the other levels, but I will not be able to explore this thoroughly.)

The application of my theoretical model of irony to the elenchus involves an account of Socrates’ “ironic” questioning. I argue that Socrates’ interrogative and ironic method aims to get a respondent to recognise the ironies “contained” in his own mind. That is, Socrates wishes to carry the interlocutor from states of partial intra-psychic irony to states of full intra-psychic irony, recognising the discordance of his thoughts. The method of ironic questioning is intended to get the interlocutor to see below the surface, and so to a deeper reality, even if the deeper reality must always be taken as another surface. In this respect, Socrates uses ironic questions to bring out not only intra-psychic irony but the fundamental irony in the relationship between the appearance and reality of virtue. This fundamental irony, I shall argue, provides a key element in explaining how the Socratic Method is capable of achieving its protreptic goals.
**Octavian Gabor**, Bradley University, ogabor@bradley.edu

“Nous in Aristotle as the First Actuality of Psychē”

By looking primarily at the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1177-1178 and the *De Anima* III.3-5, I offer a view of Aristotle’s concept of *nous* that escapes the temptation of finding dualism in his texts. The main problem is that if *nous* is a divine entity, perhaps separable from the body, as it seems to be described in EN X, then dualism may be introduced. I claim that *nous* is not a separable entity, but rather that it is manifested as actuality of a human’s first actuality. In other words, *nous* is the first actuality of psychē. In this sense, the relation between psychē and *nous* is that between potentiality and first actuality respectively. Reaching the state of actualizing one’s *nous* a human lives as the divine, in the presence of immortal entities—the intelligibles—and as such has glimpses of immortality. *Nous* is completely separable from body, but this is in the sense that it is not the actuality of a body of any kind, but rather of a particular kind of being—that of a human.

This perspective suggests that it is possible for humans to live human lives without actually manifesting *nous*—a kind of life equivalent to the one a dampened psychē would lead according to Heraclitus. Nevertheless, being human beings, they must have the potentiality to *noein*, in the sense that they are the right kind of beings for manifesting *nous*. For perception, this capacity is sufficient. A human need not do anything special in order to perceive. Even more, it cannot stop the phenomenon of perception from occurring. Once alive, a human perceives. But it takes much effort to actually think.

Aristotle’s language supports this interpretation. He defines *nous* as that whereby the psychē thinks and judges. He does not say “that whereby a human thinks and judges,” for doing so may imply that *nous* is the first actuality of a human as psychē is. Instead, nous’s relation with psychē is described similarly here to the relation psychē has to a human, and so it implies that nous is the first actuality of a human’s form or soul. Psychē is dependent upon the body for it is the actuality of a body of a kind. Nous is separable from it being the actuality of something that is, in itself, already an actuality, psychē.

The claims above seem to imply that psychē is not fully psychē unless there is nous. In other words, if nous is the first actuality of psychē, then only a nousing psychē is a psychē. But think of it this way: on a first level, we have a natural body being in its fashion. Psychē is here the actuality of that natural body. Its being the kind of thing that it is constitutes its psychē. On a second level, and taking into consideration only humans (or, after all, any possible rational being), the actual being of such entities constitutes the possibility of *nous*, the possibility of a radically different animal.

**Robert Gallagher**, American University of Beirut, rg19@aub.edu.lb
“In Defense of Moral Economy”

Marx’s criticisms of Aristotle’s economic thought is based on a modernist idealism that recoils against Aristotle’s use of an inequality of exchangers in calculating the value of goods exchanged (cf. Capital, Ch. 1, Sec. 3A3, followed by Meikle, Becker, McCarthy). But as much as we wish away inequalities among persons, including such in a theory of value yields powerful social criticism absent from classical and neo-classical theories of political economy, including Marx’s. For Marx accepted Smith’s assumption that exchange is best understood when divorced from social relations among exchangers. So, in Marx’s expression of value in Capital, only commodities exchanged appear, i.e.,

(A) \( x \) commodity \( A = y \) commodity \( B \)

(with \( x, y \) quantities of commodities \( A, B \), respectively). But Aristotle, rejecting such homogenization of exchange, proposes:

(1) “As farmer is to shoemaker, so the ergon of the shoemaker is to that of the farmer” (EN 1133a32-3).

With algebraic symbols he assigns the terms of that proportion, we restate (1):

(B) \( \alpha/\beta = \delta/\gamma \),

for he says, “Let a farmer be \( \alpha \), nourishment \( \gamma \), a shoemaker \( \beta \), his ergon that is equalized \( \delta \)” (1133b4-5). Assignment of different terms to the parties involved in an exchange implies they are not equal in “merit” (cf. EN 1131a24, 1163b11-12). Factor \( \alpha/\beta \) renders any exchange represented by (B) unequal, i.e., not “fair,” for the ergon (i.e., the product) that each sharer receives from the other is determined not only by the relative value of the erga of the parties but also by their relative “merit,” for the ratio \( \alpha/\beta \) does not equal 1 because the sharers are not equal (contra Scaltsas). By including \( \alpha/\beta \) in (B), Aristotle sets down formal grounds for a certain social criticism, for when \( \alpha, \beta \) represent conventional Greek notions of merit (e.g, birth, virtue, wealth), matters external to the production of the erga determine the exchange, for each conventional measure expresses one or other Greek social system, i.e., oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. An estimation of worth based on any of these three, amounts to social status, which, as an externality, introduces arbitrariness into the exchange. A transformation of (B) illustrates this:

(C) \( \delta = (\alpha/\beta) \gamma \),

which states that the product \( \delta \) that Party \( \beta \) has to hand over to party \( \alpha \) must be greater in value than the product \( \gamma \) that party \( \alpha \) hands over to her/him, by the factor \( \alpha/\beta \). The result is that the price of the ergon of party \( \alpha \) is higher than its value by the factor \( \alpha/\beta \). Prices are skewed to the advantage of the sharer superior in whatever external respect is deemed important. Ratio \( \alpha/\beta \) states a reality through which to interpret all transactions: all exchange is overshadowed by social relations between the exchangers (also noted by Danzig). Surprisingly, Aristotle ends up as much a social critic as Marx. His theory of exchange may help us formulate a contemporary political economy to describe present-day economic processes overshadowed as they are by powerful international figures.

Darren Gardner, New School for Social Research, gardd396@newschool.edu
“Insight and Diaresis”
This paper explores the method and purchase of the practice of division in Plato’s *Sophist* and *Statesman*. It is, perhaps, misleading to consider that Plato’s *Sophist* and *Statesman* simply represent his “late” ontology, and as such, a revision of his theory of forms spelled out in terms of the relationship of being & non-being, or a grounding of the forms in language. These dialogues, indeed, can also be seen to disclose a teaching by means of division or *diairesis*. On the one hand the method clearly has mistakes, shortcomings and ambiguities, and therefore must be investigated for its veracity. On the other hand, its conditions are conspicuously similar to those that give rise to recollection, for example, as seen in the *Meno*. The process of division by bifurcation and collection requires a shared name and a common look, or description, to achieve its explication. That is, it requires insight and a common *logos*. The method prescribed therefore has the ability to validate or invalidate insight. This validation or negation of insight, however, is a critical practice necessary for the practice of philosophy, even if such practices cannot be considered as methodologically consistent, for part of the practice at hand is also a critique of practices as such.

**Jessica Gelber**, Syracuse University, jessicagelber@gmail.com
“*One-Way Touching*”

In *Generation and Corruption* I.6 and I.7, Aristotle speaks of a sense of “contact” that is, unlike the more usual cases, non-reciprocal: In some cases, the agent touches the patient, but the agent is not touched in return. According to what I call a “standard reading” of these passages, Aristotle is here making room for incorporeal agents, such as *technai* in the souls of artisans, or souls in bodies. This standard reading, however, saddles Aristotle with a view of agency that would appear to be subject to the sorts of criticisms that Aristotle makes of Platonic Forms as causes; these incorporeal agents would seem to be only metaphorically causes. As I argue, Aristotle’s treatment of a puzzle about embryonic development in *Generation of Animals* suggests that the distinction between reciprocal and non-reciprocal cases of contact is meant to accommodate agency by way of intermediate movers, rather than incorporeal agents.

**Andy German**, Boston University, agerman672@gmail.com
“*Absolute Idea and Idea tou Agathou*: Some Hegelian Themes in *Republic VI and VII*”

Hegel warns the student of Plato not to look for what “Plato’s point of view can never afford us, because in his time it was not there to give.” He means by this, of course, that there is no adequate analysis of self-consciousness and freedom in Plato, since he was not yet able to grasp concretely the philosophical primacy of subjectivity. By contrast, I hope to demonstrate that Plato is, in some respects, closer to Hegel than expected, while departing from him in ways relevant to our contemporary situation. This will be done by comparing the Sun and Line images with Hegel’s Absolute in the *Phenomenology* and the third section of the *Logic*. 
The Sun image shows that, for Socrates, it is impossible to discuss the idea of the Good in abstraction from man’s self-conscious desire not to be deceived about it (505d5-9). However, any account of self-consciousness requires that the Good, qua ground of the truth and value, be separated from and yet related to this consciousness in a curious way. In the image, thinking is likened to a triadic structure of nous, intelligibility and the Good and Socrates indicates that, in a sense, the Good cannot be the Good of the intelligible whole without the presence of nous. In this limited, but crucial way, Plato approaches Hegel’s central contentions that “The True is the Whole” and that everything turns on grasping this whole “not only as Substance but equally as Subject.”

For Hegel, the unity of substantiality and subjectivity means, finally, the identity between self-consciousness and the Absolute, i.e. the demonstration that the temporal progress of man’s coming to self-consciousness is identical with the manifestation, within history, of the Absolute Idea, the coping stone of the conceptual structure of reality. By identifying self-consciousness, temporality and logic, Hegel’s Absolute Idea renders the Platonic idea tou Agathou self-consciously alive, an “idea which thinks itself.”

Clearly, however, there is no corresponding unification of psuchê, time and the Good in Plato. Perhaps, we can understand why this is so by carefully noting Plato’s distinction between noêsis and dianoia in the Line image and in the discussion of dialectic. While noêsis is not described as non-discursive intuition, the identification of noêsis with “logos itself” (511b4) emphasizes that, while we have occasional access to the complete logos which articulates the total relationship between intelligible forms and the Good (or “archê of the whole”), we never see this logos entirely. If we did, our self-conscious personality would be obliterated.

In Plato, then, there is no Aufhebung of the difference between time and eternity. And indeed, this point was a critical factor in the disintegration of Hegel’s system and the general exhaustion with the philosophy of subjectivity. To the extent that we have come to doubt Hegelianism, our present situation compels a reconsideration of why Plato believed that the soul and the whole are best presented in poetic myth rather than discursive analysis and how human reason, while necessarily limited, could still be agathoeidês, or Good-like.

Jason Giannetti, Dean College, jasongiannetti@yahoo.com
“A Methodological Approach to Reading Plato”

In this paper I propose a liberation of Plato’s works from the traditional hold placed upon them by Western interpreters. In order to revive the text I introduce an Eastern methodological approach to reading Plato. Utilizing such modern interpreters of Buddhist literature as Masao Abe and Malcolm David Eckel, as well as traditional commentators and primary texts, I suggest
a literary approach to the Platonic corpus that radically challenges canonical interpretations of Plato as well as traditional assumptions about truth, being, and the Socratic Method.

Bernd Goehring, University of Notre Dame, bernd.goehring@nd.edu
“Henry of Ghent on Memory and Cognition”

In this paper I investigate the question whether a soul that is separated from a body can remember the things it knew when it was in that body. Assuming that the soul is the animating principle of a human being and that it depends on a body for actualizing cognitive capacities such as perceiving, remembering, and perhaps even thinking, can a separate soul have the same kind of cognitive operations as an embodied soul?

As Dominik Perler has pointed out, this ‘post mortem perspective’ allows medieval thinkers to put into sharper focus problematic aspects in their theories of cognition. In particular, I examine the analysis given by Henry of Ghent, a late thirteenth century secular master at the University of Paris (†1293), who discusses in his Quodlibet VI, question 8 (disputed in 1281), “whether the separate soul remembers the things that it knew when it was conjoined [to a body].”

The motivation for this question appears at least twofold – theological and philosophical. More specifically, the suggestion that the separate soul does remember the things it knew in an embodied state seems motivated, first, by the theological datum that Scripture suggests that there is memory after death. In the Gospel according to Luke, chapter 16, Christ tells the story of The rich man and Lazarus. In Luke 16:25 we read that Abraham, with Lazarus by his side in heaven, is telling the rich man tormented in hell: “Son, remember that in your lifetime you received your good things…” (“Fili, recordare…”). In his reply the rich man recalls that he has five brothers, and asks Abraham to send Lazarus to warn them so that they won’t have to go to the place of torment as well. The story ends with Abraham’s reply: “If they do not listen to Moses and the prophets, neither will they be convinced even if someone rises from the dead.”

Secondly, there is an intriguing philosophical issue, as noted by Henry; it seems that “if the separate soul could not remember through habitual dispositions acquired when it was embodied, these dispositions would be in it pointlessly.”

As I will show, the question concerning the separate soul’s memory helps to clarify the nature of cognitive acts, and especially the nature of intellectual cognition. Henry analyses the phenomenon of remembering as involving two levels of cognitive acts of the same kind. He is especially interested in our acquisition and actualization of (dispositional) cognitive content. Henry ultimately rejects the idea that the soul, when it is separated from the body, can remember the things that it knew in an embodied state, i.e. as the animating principle of the whole human being.
Rebecca Goldner, Villanova University, rebecca.goldner@villanova.edu
“Aristotle’s Greater Theory of the Mean”

This paper argues that there is an overlooked and undervalued consistency in Aristotle’s description of the mean (mesotes/meson); the introduction of the paper argues for the consistency of the neuter adjectival form “meson” (which can be used substantively) and the noun “mesotes”) running through texts including the Prior Analytics, the de Caelo, the de Anima, and the Nicomachean Ethics. While the so-called “doctrine of the mean” remains a critical component of the scholarship on the Nicomachean Ethics, far less attention has been given to a relationship between its use in the Organon, as the middle term in a syllogism, in Aristotle’s cosmology where it is both the central point of the universe as well as the mid-point between contraries, or in de Anima, where sensation (the very mark of animal life) depends on a principle of receiving form without matter, what Aristotle here calls a mean. While in part, the lack of greater scholarship on the mean might be attributable to concerns about the consistency and cohesiveness of Aristotle’s terminology across different works, particularly those in substantively different parts of the corpus, I follow Christopher Long’s suggestion that among Aristotle’s various uses of a word we find a “consonance”, though one that “remains elusive even as it lends itself to articulation” (Christopher P. Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) p. 12). Thus, I begin by investigating various articulations of mesotes/meson in order to uncover the relationship between texts and to draw out, if not an identity, a kind of resonance produced by use of the same term across the corpus.

Through this resonance is produced a theory of the mean that can, in turn, illuminate the various examinations in which the mean plays a part of the account, including logic, cosmology, the soul, and ethics. Consistently, the use of meson/mesones as middle/center/ratio/mean suggests that in physical, physiological, and ethical realms, life in its various forms (and inclusive of thought and communication) seeks a kind of harmony- a balance or equilibrium- in the encounter of one thing to another.

Ultimately, I draw most attention to how this mean is enacted or lived by the human subject and I contend that in our most basic life functions as well as our highest capacities as humans, we seek this very equilibrium in all of our experiences of the world, be they perceptual, practical, or social.

Khalil Habib, Salve Regina University, khalil.habib@salve.edu
“Aristophanes’ Plutos and the rise of the “Last Man””

The Plutos (wealth) is arguably the masterpiece of the greatest genius among the ancient Greek comic poets, but one of Aristophanes’ lesser-known works. Yet, Plutos embodies Aristophanes’ judgment of the perfectly just welfare state and its relationship to the human mind or wisdom.
Plutos, the god of wealth, is blind. Hence, good men are subject to poverty while bad men grow rich and prosperous. Miraculously, however, Plutos’ vision is restored. The good are now rich and, for a short time, the bad have become poor. It does not take the bad long, however, to learn how to feign being good and, therefore, become rich again. Everyone is now rich. Penia (goddess of poverty) has been successfully banished from Athens. The perfectly just regime, however, culminates in a city where only the body’s mundane needs are met. The arts and the branches of knowledge disappear, as the necessity for their existence is undermined. The result is a well-fed state of servile individuals – i.e., a state of Nietzsche’s Last Man. The play is set at a time when the old marathon fighters and Athens’ moral health and civilization were approaching their downfall, and a new popularization of philosophy during times of decay is on the rise under the aspect of two rival communities —the community centered on reason, as opposed to birth or tradition, and the perishing city of the political world and a citizens’ rootedness in the *polis* and its conventions.

**Robert Hahn**, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, hahnr@siu.edu

“Is Pythagoras Connected with the Famous Theorem?”

For millions of schoolchildren and the adults they became, the name “Pythagoras” immediately conjures a geometrical theorem that bears his name. The usual connection is that Pythagoras either “discovered” or “proved” the theorem about right-angled triangles, or both. But, since the time of the famous historian of mathematics Vander Waerden in the first half of the 20th century, that familiar connection has been undermined. It has been argued that Pythagoras could not have “discovered” the theorem since we have evidence some thousand years earlier showing that its principles were known; the evidence comes from Mesopotamia, a place that the well-traveled Pythagoras plausibly visited. Moreover, Pythagoras could not have “proved” the theorem either since we have no evidence in the 6th century B.C.E. of either the postulates or common-notions, the rules of derivation that are required for a “proof.” A proof offers a series of steps of reasoning, each of which is justified by appeal to an abstract rule, and so with no evidence for these abstract rules, it makes no sense to speak of anyone “proving” anything. So, for a long time now, historians of mathematics and philosophy have doubted whether Pythagoras had anything to do with the theorem concerning right-angled triangles. What I propose to do in this essay is to take different approach and try to construct a circumstantial case that Pythagoras believably had some connection to this theorem, and that came as a result of trying to solve a practical problem in Samos. The problem was to check the techniques that Eupalinos proposed for building the famous tunnel in Samos, mentioned by Herodotus.

**Chelsea Harry**, Duquesne University, harryc@duq.edu

“*Kinesis, Chronos, Energeia* and The Possibility for Non-linear Time in Aristotle”
Recent contributions to the growing literature on the “time section,” Book IV. 10-14, of Aristotle’s *Physics* (cf. Ursula Coope’s, *Time for Aristotle’s Physics IV.10-14* and Tony Roark’s forthcoming manuscript, *Aristotle on Time: A Study of the Physics*) have focused on the importance of considering this section in the context of the rest of the work. This paper aligns with this view and pushes it a bit farther, working to demonstrate that Aristotle’s time section is not just related, but entirely dependent on what he has to say about nature (*phusis*), movement (*kinesis*), and place (*topos*) in the same work.

This paper departs slightly from the literature, however, claiming that Aristotle’s performance in the *Physics* is not that of a philosopher concerned about time—in questions about time or in delimiting the being of time—but is that of a natural scientist interested in the being of natural things, whose ways of being demand a discussion of time. This is to say that Aristotle’s definition of time in the *Physics* Book IV. 11 (i.e. *chronos* is the number of *kinesis* with respect to before and after) is neither a definition of time *qua* time, nor an account of time for all beings in time. Thus, my paper argues that we can not read the time section of the *Physics* as proof that Aristotle privileged linear time (*chronos*) over proper time (*kairos*), as it has been read in the past. Instead, it is a highly contextualized definition of time, applicable only to the subject of Aristotle’s *Physics*, i.e. natural beings.

In an effort to defend this argument, my paper analyzes Aristotle’s definition of motion (*kinesis*) in the *Physics* Book III.1 alongside his discussion of motion and activity (*energeia*) in the *Metaphysics* Book IX. 6, contrasting the natural beings who Aristotle told us could be in motion with the types of beings who can be said to be in activity. This then aims to show that the types of beings who engage in activity cannot be held to Aristotle’s definition of time in the *Physics*, hence opening up a different way to think about these kinds of beings as beings in time.

**Peter Hartman**, University of Toronto, peter.hartman@utoronto.ca

“Are Intellectual Habits in the Intellect? Durand of St.-Pourçain and Peter of Palude on Intellectual Habits”

Once I have learned something, I acquire the ability to think about it whenever I want. As well, the more I carry out a given intellectual task the easier it gets. Most Latin philosophers in the High Middle Ages explained such facts by appeal to so-called intellectual habits (*habitus*), generated from cognitive acts and preserved in us after those cognitive acts have transpired. However, at the turn of the fourteenth century, a debate arose as to where, precisely, such habits are located. The common opinion on the matter was that intellectual habits exist in our immaterial intellects. Durand of St.-Pourçain defended the uncommon thesis that all habits, both intellectual and moral, while attributed to our intellects and wills, in fact exist in our physical bodies. On his view, everything that the postulation of a habit in the intellect was supposed to explain can be explained, more simply, through the postulation of certain physical dispositions added to whatever physical part of the body is responsible for presenting to our immaterial intellects the various objects we think about. In this talk, I aim to look at what, precisely, is at
stake in this debate. I will first go over Durand’s argumentation in defense of his reductivist thesis about intellectual habits and then turn to some of the objections that it received from his immediate contemporaries, such as Peter of Palude and Nicholas Medensis. While ontological parsimony is, to be sure, one motivation behind Durand’s view, I will argue that a more fundamental psychological intuition drives it: on Durand’s view, there can be no mental difference without a physical difference whereas on the alternative view there can.

George Harvey, Indiana University Southeast, whgeorge@ius.edu
“Happiness and the Age of Cronus in Plato’s Laws”

In book III of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger presents an account of the origins of political life. While his aim is to identify the reasons for why different constitutions succeed and why others fail, much of his account is concerned with the long periods of time during which human beings live outside of any clearly established political arrangement. During such periods, brought on by worldwide cataclysmic events that reduce the human population to a scattered few, human beings live in relative isolation for each other. Due to an abundance of raw materials and the possession of the most basic arts, human beings are individually self-sufficient in that they are able to provide themselves with goods necessary for survival without depending on others. The ethical character of those living in this pre-political age also marks an important point of contrast to those living under political constitutions. Such people possess what the Athenian Stranger calls a naïve goodness that consists in the absence of any ill feeling toward other people and a simplistic views about what the gods deem to be good and bad (679b-d). This character is a consequence of the conditions in which human beings live in the pre-political period and is set in contrast by the Stranger to the possibility of extreme vice and virtue that is possible in political life. Later, in book IV, the Athenian refers back to this pre-political era, relating it to the traditional myths of an age of Cronus (713c-714b). In this later passage, the Athenian strongly suggests that human beings living in this age are more fortunate than those who live under political constitutions of any kind. This is because human beings are incapable of governing their own affairs, and that even the best conceivable form of political life represents only a imitation of the kind of governance enjoyed under direct divine supervision.

Taking the Athenian’s remarks at face value has serious implications for how we understand human nature and the role of politics in the achievement of happiness. First, his portrayal of the ethical characters of those living in this era suggest that the tendency toward vice, driven by an excessive desire for non-necessary goods, is not an innate feature of the human soul, but rather has its origin in the environment in which human beings live. Second and more importantly, it suggests that human happiness might be truly attained in an era in which ethical virtue is not possible. Even a weaker reading that allows happiness to be attained in both political and pre-political periods implies that happiness is not to be identified with virtue, but that the latter represents only one way of achieving it. In this paper, I will argue that the Athenian is sincere in his remarks about the nature of pre-political life, and show that despite his aim throughout the
Laws to devise a constitution that offers the best opportunity for virtue (and therefore happiness) for its citizens, nothing that he says in the rest of the dialogue overturns the position expressed in these passages.

Susannah Hendrey, Franklin and Marshall College, s.hendrey@gmail.com
“Practical and Theoretical Dianoia in the Allegory of the Cave”

Shadows and reflections form an integral part of the system of metaphors that Plato employs in Books VI and VII of the Republic. Although he uses shadows and reflections to describe eikasia in the Divided Line (Republic 510a), and represents eikasia with shadows on the wall in the Cave Allegory (Republic 514-515), he only distinguishes between shadows and reflections when he is using them to represent dianoia in the Cave Allegory. After the prisoner escapes from the cave, Plato says, “at first, he’d see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water” (Republic 516a). By specifying that the prisoner will first be able to see the shadows and then the reflections, Plato clearly makes some distinction between them. Plato never explains what the difference between shadows and reflections is, nor does he explicitly say anything about dianoia that explains why he would use two clearly differentiated images to represent it in the allegory. I argue that shadows and reflections must represent two sub-stages of dianoia.

An explanation for these two kinds of dianoia can be found in the mathematical education of Book VII, where Plato repeatedly distinguishes between practical and theoretical mathematics. He emphasizes that the student of philosophy should be practicing theoretical and not practical mathematics, mathematics “for the sake of buying and selling,” and in doing so implies the existence of practical mathematics (Republic, 525b-c). Despite Plato’s admonishments against practical mathematics, I argue that both kinds of mathematics are still dianoetic, because they reason about things that can only be apprehended with the mind. The only difference is that the practical mathematician only inquires into questions that directly pertain to a practical application, whereas the theoretical mathematician inquires for the sake of knowledge, regardless of whether his findings are useful.

Practical and theoretical mathematics fit the imagery of shadows and reflections well. The shadow of an object provides less information about it than its reflection does, in the same way that a practical mathematician will learn less about a given topic than a theoretical mathematician, because he is only concerned with the aspects of the topic relevant to his practical application. Reflections change depending on perspective, while shadows appear the same from all perspectives. This fits well with the theoretical mathematician who investigates the same rules and shapes in many different instances, and by doing so learns more about the features they always have in common, versus the practical mathematician who only investigates those aspects of a question that directly relate to the practical application. Examining Plato’s discussion of mathematics in light of this distinction reveals that he considered practical
mathematics not as a misstep, but as a lower form of dianoia, and a necessary stage in the progression towards dialectic.

John Hendrix, University of Lincoln, jhendrix@lincoln.ac.uk
“Neoplatonism in the Liber Naturalis and Shifa: De anima or Metaphysica of Avicenna (Ibn Sina)”

Though Plotinus may not have been known by name to Avicenna (Ibn Sina) in the eleventh century in Persia, Plotinian thought would have been known to him through the Theology of Aristotle and other texts. Platonic and Neoplatonic concepts can be seen to be interwoven with the basic Aristotelian model of intellect which Avicenna develops in his Liber Naturalis and Metaphysica. Material intellect and active intellect can be seen to be roughly equivalent to the reason principle and intellectual principle of Plotinus. As dialectic in necessary to ascend to intellection for Plotinus, cogitative reason in intellectus in habitu is necessary to ascend from material intellect to actual intellect for Avicenna. The retention of the objects of sense perception in memory is a source of cogitative activities for both Plotinus and Avicenna. Intelligibles related to sensible forms are differentiated in the imaginative faculty for both thinkers. Plotinus describes the sensible form, as it is preserved in memory, transformed into a representation, or intelligible form. For Avicenna this process is activated by active intellect, as for Plotinus principles of intellection are provided by the intellectual principle. In both Plotinus and Avicenna, verbal expression in discursive reason can only “mirror” intelligibles in the intellectual or active intellect. There can be no immediate sense perception of an object without the mediation of the mirror image of an intelligible form. The source of the intelligible form is outside of intellect. While intelligible forms can be represented in the sensible, the soul must be freed from the body in order to experience the intelligible.

Hyun Höchsmann, New Jersey City University, hhochsmann@njcu.edu
“The Possibility of Friendship in the Lysis”

From my earliest childhood, I had a particular fancy; everyone has. One longs for horses, another for dogs, a third for money, and fourth for office… I would far sooner acquire a friend and a companion, than all the gold of Darius… So fond am I of friendship (212 a).

Socrates begins his conversation with Lysis by exclaiming the utmost importance of friendship and declares that he is lost in wonder upon seeing youthful Lysis and Menexenus in their happy friendship: “…while I am so far from acquiring a friend that I do not even know how one man becomes a friend of another…”(212 a).

Socrates then proceeds to launch a vigorous elechus with the two friends, elevating them as experts who might enlighten him. If with Socrates those who fancy friendship more than horses,
dogs, gold and office had hoped to discover the true nature of friendship within the short span of a dialogue in the palaestra, he plunges them into despondency – that is, if we were to follow the standard reading of the dialogue. Hastily calling out to the parting friends at the end of the Lysis, Socrates concludes that they have not been able to discover what a friend is: “O, Menexenus and Lysis, how ridiculous that you … and I … should imagine ourselves to be friends. This is what the by-standers will go away and say: as yet we have not been able to discover what a friend is!” (223)

These “few words said at parting” by Socrates to Lysis and Menexenus seem to have established the conventional reading of the Lysis: that Socrates does not arrive at an explanation of friendship. However, the tendency of taking the confessions of Socratic aporia literally might have led us to bypass what has been achieved in the Lysis towards confirming the possibility of friendship in the Lysis.

Earlier in the dialogue, Socrates puts forward the necessary conditions of friendship as knowledge and goodness. Having elicited an admission from Lysis that he is “ruled” by his “governor”, school masters and parents because he does not have sufficient knowledge and therefore, is dominated by them, Socrates moves swiftly to make the connection between the possession of knowledge and friendship: “If… you acquire knowledge, all men will be friendly to you, all men will be attached to you, for you will be useful and good. If not, you will have no friend or anyone, not even your father or mother or any of your own family”(210d).

But how does this fit in with Socrates’ last words of the dialogue reiterating his initial aporia? Confirming that knowledge and goodness are prerequisites for friendship does not explain how one man becomes a friend of another (even though Socrates gives astute advice on what one must not do in pursuit of friendship). Furthermore, if Socrates were to claim that he had defined friendship for Lysis and Menexenus (implying that he knew more than they do) then he would not be their friends, for Socrates and Lysis had established that friends do not dominate one another but are equal. In protesting that he does not know what a friend is, Socrates beckons the two youthful friends even as they are ordered to come away from the discussion by the governor, to seek further into the nature of friendship

Hyun Höchsmann, New Jersey City University, hhochsmann@njcu.edu
“Freedom, Equality and Development of True Nature in Zhuangzi”

Zhuangzi presents freedom as the ability to perceive, think and act in accordance with one’s choice, and also as the absence of constraints from conventional moral codes and tyrannical government. As a defender of individual freedom against the imposition of authority and tradition, Zhuangzi is unparalleled. Zhuangzi values freedom, “abiding alone” and “enjoying oneself in the illimitable,” more highly than honour, political power or wealth.
The variety of freedom Zhuangzi defends can be initially characterized as a negative conception of liberty – the absence of external obstacles or impediments, a subject of significant debate in contemporary political thought. In defending freedom of thought and action, Zhuangzi articulates a positive conception of freedom vital for authentic existence and self-development.

Zhuangzi affirms the equality of all life. How is equality established? By regarding things from plural perspectives and recognizing the interconnections among them. For Zhuangzi equality is not a remote ideal but an actuality which has been obscured in our preoccupation with individual differences. Eliminating distinctions is the first step in paving the way to equality. This view of equality is given not from the point of view of each thing itself but from a perspective which brings individual differences together in a comprehensive whole.

Zhuangzi celebrates the life of freedom and equality of all. But unless we have good reasons to have unshakable confidence in the principle of pre-established harmony, we must concede that individuals frequently clash in their exercise of freedom. Can the conflict between freedom and equality be resolved? Zhuangzi defends freedom not as a natural right but on grounds of the common flourishing of all. Freedom and equality are not in conflict once we discover the perspective from which individual well-being is not distinct from common flourishing. General well-being is more likely to be achieved when individuals have the possibility of self-realization. Zhuangzi emphasizes that each entity has its own nature. By following one’s given nature Zhuangzi does not mean following individual inclinations and disregarding all else. By preserving the true nature of individual beings Zhuangzi does not mean freedom in the sense of atomistic individualism but engaging in common activity. Letting all things follow their given nature leads to full development of individuality, authentic existence and the progress of knowledge. Zhuangzi seeks to show how authentic existence and self-development lead to the ethical perspective of the equality of all and the unity of the dao of the individual, the dao of nature, and the dao of heaven.

Travis Holloway, SUNY-Stony Brook/NYU, traviswholloway@yahoo.com
“ Sovereignty of the Legislator: Politics in Aristotle’s Ethics”

This essay considers the role of the legislator in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. It shows that the legislator is not only a central figure in Aristotle’s Politics but is equally significant in being prior and posterior to Aristotle’s Ethics. Namely, the legislator is the sovereign figure who has the knowhow to define the method of inquiry in the Ethics, and, moreover, is the figure who can best accomplish its task of educating the citizens in virtue. In the following essay we will discuss the legislator as a figure who begins and ends Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, traverses the distinction between the ethical and the political, and consider why the ethical and the political should be defined by a sovereign figure.
It is well known that Aristotle opens and closes the work of the *Nicomachean Ethics* with comments on the political role of ethics. Indeed, the “inquiry” of the *Ethics* itself is described as “a sort of political science” (*NE* 1094b13). Yet it is the figure of the legislator who has “put more effort into virtue than anyone else” through his method of “political science,” and it is for this reason that “political science” was chosen as the method of inquiry for the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE* 1102a14). Thus the legislator precedes the *Nicomachean Ethics* as the figure who has both theoretical and practical knowhow of virtue and therefore the authority to define its method of inquiry accordingly (*NE* 1102a14, cf. Book VI).

However, one discovers in Book X that the legislator is also the figure to whom the *Ethics* is addressed. It is a work that can be taken up and extended to the greatest extent only by the legislator himself. Aristotle concludes in Book X by saying that only laws—the work of the legislator—have the “power to prevail and compel” (*NE* 1180a18) us in virtue and therefore the legislator “must...urge people toward virtue and exhort them to aim at the fine” (*NE* 1180a7-8). Laws must be given to the community by the legislator for the right “upbringing” or “education” of the youth (*NE* 1180a30-1180b8).

Given its curious and significant role in the *Ethics*, the notion of the legislator—the sovereign figure who became paramount for Rousseau’s thinking on democracy in the 18th century and has reemerged in very recent political discussions on the Continent—calls upon readers of Aristotle to inquire into what it knows about the relationship between the good of the individual and the good of the city. This essay will consider three primary points in this regard: the need for a legislator to make laws regarding education; the relationship between the character of individuals and the character of the city; and the unique kind of knowledge that would allow the legislator to legislate both the individual and the city well.

Robert Howton, University of Toronto, robert.howton@utoronto.ca

“The Object of Thought Argument: Plato and Aristotle on the Role of Particulars in Cognition”

In *Metaphysics* I.9 Aristotle mentions several arguments that he says aim but fail to prove the existence of separate Forms. One of these arguments evidently concerns the relation between Forms and thought; Aristotle remarks that “according to the ‘thinking of something that has perished’ <argument, there will be Ideas> of perishable things, since there is an image of these” (990b14-15). In his commentary on *Metaphysics* (81.25-82.7), Alexander of Aphrodisias relates this argument and Aristotle’s objections to it, citing the now-lost treatise *Peri ideōn* as his source. Alexander’s exposition of the argument, which has come to be known as the ‘Object of Thought Argument’, has recently been the subject of scholarly attention largely for the light it sheds on the considerations that led the early Platonists, and perhaps Plato himself, to posit separate Forms. There is, however, one striking feature common to both Aristotle’s remark in *Metaphysics* and Alexander’s exposition that has perhaps been underemphasized in discussions of these texts. This feature is the allusion to images and, in Alexander’s exposition, *phantasia*, which notions are central to the theory of cognition Aristotle develops principally in *De anima*.
III. In this paper, I suggest that these allusions are crucial to understanding, not only the considerations motivating Aristotle’s objections to the Object of Thought Argument, but also the connection between the argument itself and Plato’s thought about the relationship between Forms and cognition. I argue that the Object of Thought Argument relates to a dispute between Aristotle and the Platonists that revolves around two questions: first, what is the relationship between the objects of perception and the objects of thought, and second, what role, if any, do sensible particulars play in higher-order cognition? I argue further that Aristotle’s account of phantasia as a purely representational faculty of cognition plays a significant role in his objections to the Object of Thought Argument precisely because it provides the basis for his rejection of the Platonic response to both of these questions.

On the interpretation presented in this paper, the Object of Thought Argument reflects the Platonic commitment to the radical separation of the objects of thought and perception. While Aristotle agrees with the Platonists that the objects of thought are distinct from the objects of perception, he denies that the former must be radically separate from the latter. What enables Aristotle recognize a role for sensible particulars in higher-order cognition is his novel account of phantasia as a purely representational faculty of cognition that arises in perception and provides the thinking soul with the objects of thought. I argue that it is by appeal to this role of phantasia that Aristotle is able to mount his objections to the Object of Thought Argument and insist that his account of immanent forms fits with the thesis that the objects of thought are distinct from sensible particulars, the only claim he thinks the argument validly deduces.

J. Noel Hubler, Lebanon Valley College, hubler@lvc.edu
“Cognition as Psychic Motion in Plato’s Late Dialogues”

Throughout his writing career, Plato understands cognition as alio-relative. Knowledge stands in relation to and is defined by its object. True knowledge takes as its object true being, i.e. eternal, unchanging forms, while the changing nature of sense objects renders cognition of them mere opinion. But the alio-relativity of knowledge presents epistemological problems that Plato explores in the critique of the Parmenides, raising the question of how humans can come into a knowledge relationship with eternal verities. In the late dialogues, Plato develops a description of knowledge and other forms of cognition as types of motion that can explain human knowledge of the forms. Motion is not merely a metaphor for cognition, rather it is a philosophical and scientific analysis that Plato finds quite productive and which he applies broadly.

The chief hindrance to understanding Plato’s theory of cognition as a type of motion is the tendency to think of motion as locomotion, but Plato distinguishes ten types of motion, of which locomotion is only one. The motion proper to the soul is not locomotion, but an ungenerated, active, immaterial motion that explains both the soul’s desiderative and cognitive states.
Plato’s motion theory of cognition offers several explanatory advantages that Plato exploits in his late dialogues. First, through circular motion, Plato explains that cognition can be both alio-relative and self-referential. Second, Plato then finds evidence for the intelligence in the heavenly bodies due to their regular motions and such regular motions then serve as models for human cognition. Third, psychic motions can come into harmony with their objects, giving Plato a standard for true knowledge. Finally, the theory gives him a much more integrated theory of cognition than found in the middle dialogues, which emphasize the gulf between sense-perception and understanding, because in the late dialogues, Plato explains both sense-perception and understanding as types of psychic motion.

John Humphrey, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, jhumphr@ncat.edu
“Plato’s Paradigms”

In Plato’s Apology of Socrates, Socrates tells the jury that when Chaerephon went to the Oracle at Delphi to ask whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates, the Pythia responded that there was no one wiser. Socrates explains that since he knew he was not wise – “either much or little” (Ap. 21b), he attempted to disprove the oracle. He describes how he tested the divination by going to those presumed to be wise – the politician, the poets, and the manual artisans. While he does not consider himself wise, after questioning the politician he realizes that although neither he nor the politician knew “anything noble and good” (Ap. 21d), the politician believed that he knew when he did not know; hence, Socrates concludes, he is a little wiser than this man because he does not suppose that he knows when he does not know.

After the politician, he next went to the poets. To demonstrate that there are others wiser than he was, Socrates studied their poems and questioned them thoroughly about the meaning of their work. However, he is disappointed to discover that “almost everyone present … would have spoken better than the poets did about the poetry that they themselves had made” (Ap. 22b). The poets “do not make what they make by wisdom, but by some sort of nature and while inspired (phusei tini kai enthousiazontes), like the diviners and those who deliver oracles. For they too say many noble things, but they know nothing of what they speak” (Ap. 22b-c). Furthermore, because of their poetry, the poets believe themselves to be wise in other subjects, but they were not. Thus, from his encounters with the poets Socrates draws a similar conclusion as the one he drew from his experience with the politician – he was wiser than the poets because he did not claim to know what he did not know. Finally, Socrates explains, he went to the manual artisans believing “that they, at least, had knowledge of many noble things” (Ap. 22d). Even though each artisan has a techne and is defined by this techne, they are no different than the poets; they suppose that because they are able to perform their particular techne, they must be wise “in other things, the greatest things” (Ap. 22d). Hence, Socrates concludes that he is better off being as he is – admitting that he does not know when he does not know, than being like the artisans, who have a techne, but who believe that because of this knowledge they have wisdom, i.e., knowledge of the greatest things.
From these experiences, Socrates gives an interpretation of his own wisdom. “It is probable,” Socrates claims, “that really the god is wise, and that in this oracle he is saying that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. And he appears to say this of Socrates and to have made use of my name in order to make a pattern (paradeigma), as if he would say, “That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom” (Ap. 23a-b). Similarly, in Plato’s Republic (Book IX, 592a-b) Socrates tells Glaucon that the polis in speech is not really meant to be an actuality; rather, it is a “pattern (paradeigma) … laid up for the man who wants to see and found a city within himself on the basis of what he sees. It doesn’t make any difference whether it is or will be somewhere. For he [the good man] would mind the things of this city alone, and of no other.”

In this paper, I examine the nature of the paradigms that Socrates employs in these two claims: 1) that he himself is a paradigm of the wisest man because he admits that he does not know when he does not know and 2) that the polis is a paradigm to which one might look if one desires to see and found a city within oneself. I will argue that for Plato’s Socrates, a paradigm is not a form (eidos). Additionally, I shall argue that in Plato’s Republic a paradigm, according to Socrates, is absent in the life of the evil person, but that in the life of the good person it is a pattern according to which he or she may model his or her life. Focusing on paradigms raises questions about their ontological and epistemic status and about our understanding of Socrates and the philosophic task. Indeed, we must consider the possibility that the Apology of Socrates is not really Socrates’ attempt to defend himself from the charges brought against him, but a defense of the life devoted to philosophy, i.e., a defense of philosophy. And that the Republic is not intended to found an ‘ideal polis’ as so many have claimed, but an attempt to defend the life devoted to justice.

Tim Hyde, Stony Brook University, timhyde@compuserve.com
“Justice in Hogtown”

This paper revisits the Republic to examine the precise origin and nature of Platonic justice and freedom. And it does so from a surprising perspective, namely, from the perspective of the traders and producers.

The psychic isomorphism of the Kallipolis is not a premise of Plato’s argument, nor is it a hypothesis which Plato confirms, but a result that the Kallipolis must exhibit to purge injustice. Plato is using a distributive model of reasonable behavior in which practical reason is a matter of co-operative action not only between individuals but stretching right through the appetitive parts of their souls. Such cooperation is the only condition under which mutual freedom is possible.

What Socrates actually says about justice is, on the one hand, rather thin and, on the other, rather surprising. Justices’ micro-macro isomorphism is as surprising as Socrates’ definition of justice
as minding your own business is thin. What Socrates says about the origin of justice is equally murky and disputed. And he says almost nothing about freedom in a Platonic sense at all, since he has ceded the use of that term to the democrats and so it designates a childish freedom that results in tyranny. However, since the Kallipolis is supposed to purge the injustice that develops in the Febrile City, if we better understand the one, we can better understand the other.

Most analyses of the origin of injustice focus on the City of Sows and its transformation into the Febrile City. On these readings, injustice is caused by generalized pleonexia. However, there are in fact three ur-poleis. The original political association is the City of Utmost Necessity, and it is the concept of necessity that is key to understanding justice. Plato’s discussion of necessary desires in the degenerate poleis teaches us that there are two aspects to them, absolutely necessary desires and strictly speaking unnecessary but beneficial ones. It is these second sort of desires—not found in the City of Utmost Necessity—that the City of Sows exhibits in magical harmony—that the Kallipolis needs to positively regulate, on top of the unnecessary and non-beneficial desires—exhibited in the Febrile City—that the Kallipolis needs to eradicate. It is these second sort of “necessary” desires that make both injustice and freedom possible and thus form an essential part of what it means to be a human properly speaking, namely, political and potentially free. This analysis is confirmed by looking back to Socrates’ discussion of pleonexia with Thrasydamus. There is another form of pleonexia even more important to Plato’s political project than generalized pleonexia, namely, pleonexia between communal partners in a polis where one ‘wins’ and the other loses with respect to the unnecessary but beneficial desires. This pleonexia is avoided by everyone’s desires being reflected in the way we moderate our communal cooperation. Thus justice and mutual freedom depends on the macro moderation in the Kallipolis being reflected in the micro moderation of each trader and producer. The guardians feature in this interpretation as merely the institutional political structures that know, implement and guarantee such general equilibrium—precisely the mechanism that was, of course, missing from the City of Sows.

Höchsmann Hyun, New Jersey City University, hhochsmann@njcu.edu
“Universal Love as Non-violence in Mozi and Gandhi”

What is the way of universal love and mutual benefit? It is to regard other people’s countries as one’s own, to regard other people’s families as one’s own, and to regard other people’s person as one’s own. Consequently, when feudal lords love one another, they will not fight in the fields.”

Surveying the world filled with calamities, Mozi (fl. 479 - 438 BCE) declares the underlying cause for all conflicts to be lack of universal love: “When heads of families love one another, they will not usurp one another. When individuals love one another, they will not injure one another. When ruler and minister love each other, they will be kind and loyal. When father and son love each other, they will be affectionate and filial.”
Mozi envisaged universal love to end strife and conflict among states and individuals. All people are to be loved without distinctions: “When brothers love each other, they will be peaceful and harmonious. When all the people in the world love one another, the strong will not overcome the weak, the many will not oppress the few, the rich will not insult the poor, the honoured will not despise the humble, and the cunning will not deceive the ignorant.”

By universal love Mozi means good will, altruism, and equal consideration of the needs of all people. Universal love and opposition to war were promoted as political goals in China before Mozi. But it was Mozi’s systematic treatise and practical action which synthesized these values and established a comprehensive philosophical perspective on universal love and non-violence.

500 years after Mozi, Gandhi wrote: “Ruled by love, the world goes on. If ill-will was the chief motive-force, the world would have been destroyed long ago… We are alive today solely because of love. We are ourselves proof of this.”

Gandhi’s conception of non-violence as universal love was inspired by his reading of the Bhagavad-Gita and Tolstoy. “Love has no boundaries. My nationalism includes the love of all nations of the earth irrespective of creed. Non-violence is … in its active form, good will towards all life. It is pure love. I read it in the Hindu scripture, in the Bible, in the Koran.”

Gandhi would have found in Mozi a kindred spirit. Mozi set the goals of all actions as “the promotion of benefits for the world and the removal of harm from the world.” Drawing a parallel between Mozi’s and Gandhi’s active pursuit of universal love may provide support for non-violence as a means to achieve peace.

Cristina Ionescu, The Catholic University of America, ionescu@cua.edu
“Division and the Communion of Kinds: A Reading of Sophist 253b10-e2”

The description of dialectic offered at Sophist 253d-e has been subject of debate among scholars. In particular, scholars disagree on whether to regard this passage as an illustration of the method of division as applied in the Stranger’s successive attempts to reach a definition of sophistry or as an illustration of the communion of the very great kinds. The traditional interpretation, advanced first by Stenzel, and followed by Cornford and Bluck among others, has been that this passage illustrates the formal interconnections discovered through various stages of division and is thus a theoretical commentary on the application of the method of division as used by the Stranger since the beginning of the dialogue. On the other hand, scholars like Gomez-Lobo and Notomi have argued that the passage here under consideration does not illustrate the method of division, but is rather looking forward to the combination of kinds. They argue that the references throughout this passage to one form unifying many and the many being entirely separated from each other is meant to illustrate the distinction between all-pervasive and non-all-pervasive forms
and also between forms that are responsible for the unification and forms responsible for the separation of kinds.

The present paper takes a fresh look at this passage and argues that, rather than reading the passage as referring exclusively to division or to the combination of kinds, we are to read it as including considerations of both. I argue that this passage reflects the network of formal relations that guarantees the correctness of the dialectician’s divisions.

The reading here proposed recognizes division at stake in our passage, yet unlike the proposal of Stenzel and his followers, it does not envision this passage as a reflection of what the Stranger has done so far in his search for the sophist, but rather as an indication of how divisions are to be approached in order to lead us to knowledge, namely by taking their lead from and finding their ultimate justification in the way forms combine with one another. The combination of kinds is thus also reflected in this passage, though not as reduced to signaling the presence of Being and of Non-Being permeating other forms, the way that Notomi and Gomez-Lobo argued. Rather, the combination of kinds is reflected insofar as the text outlines several levels at which forms of higher and lower generality connect with other forms and the more specific forms are connected as one through the many particulars.

On the interpretation here proposed, Sophist 253d-e emerges as the key to understanding the unity of the dialogue, since it gives us a hint to understanding of both why the Stranger’s definitions fail to capture the essence of the sophist and also what it takes to reach a successful definition.

Jolanta Jaskolwska, Lexington College, jolaj@att.net
“Aristotle on the Semantics of the Statement (logos)”

Chapter 4 of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione is the historical origin of the distinction between assertoric statements (logoi apophantikoi) and non-assertoric statements. Assertoric statements, as Aristotle tells us in chapter 4, are the object of study (theorias) in the remainder of the De Interpretatione, while the non-assertoric are examined (skepsis) in the works on rhetoric and poetics (17a7-8). The remainder of De Interpretatione is clearly directed towards the proper (non-sophistic) formation of the assertoric statements used in logical argumentation, an understanding of De Interpretatione that goes back as far the Greek commentators in antiquity.

This distinction between assertoric and non-assertoric statements is often simply glossed by interpreters as a truism: the basis for this distinction in the De Interpretatione and Aristotle’s other works is not elaborated upon. In addition, despite this distinction, Aristotle applies his notion of logical reasoning to practical decision making in the form of the practical and rhetorical syllogisms. How are we to understand Aristotle’s application of the classifications of logical reasoning (for example, terms such as “universal” and “particular”) to statements that
seem excluded in chapter 4 of *De Interpretatione*? Is the application of the notion of the syllogism to practical reasoning by Aristotle only metaphorical? Or is it in some analogous? And if so, how?

I argue that Aristotle’s application of his logic to practical reasoning is justified on the basis of his understanding of the semantics of the statement. As the *De Interpretatione* makes clear, Aristotle understands semantics in terms of composition and division: there are monadic units that combine to yield new types in both the phonetic and semantic senses. Letters are phonetic monads in relation to syllables, and syllables are phonetic monads in relation to words. Nouns and verbs are semantic monads relative to each other: each term (ideally) has a single, distinct meaning. Compound nouns have a monadic meaning distinct from their elements. Verbs are semantic composites in relation to nouns in the sense that a time aspect is added. As the linguist Pierre Swiggers points out, Aristotle’s use of this method of analysis implies that a statement (*logos*) is distinct because its semantics is inherently complex: a *logos* is divisible (implicitly or explicitly) into a combination of nominal and verbal meanings. But this complexity is not simply a matter of putting together different terms: it can either combine two terms or exclude such a combination. Any sentence is either an affirmation or negation as such, and is such on a semantic level prior to the distinction between non-assertoric and assertoric statements. The application of “true” and “false” to assertoric statements is only the application of yet another level of complexity in relation to which the assertoric statement by itself is a semantic monad. However, for Aristotle, non-assertoric statements are also semantically complex as affirmations or negations, and it is this complexity that allows them to have a logical content (in terms of being universal or particular) and so to form the contrary and contradictory pairs used as elements of syllogistic reasoning.

**Erick Jimenez, The New School for Social Research, jimee285@newschool.edu**

“DA III.4, 429a13–429b9: A Dialectical Argument”

Although hesitations are often voiced by commentators about the extent and limits of the analogizing of mind to sensation at the beginning of *DA III.4* (429a13–429b9), they have not, this essay contends, grasped the orientation and central upshot of the analogy. For in the first place the premises of the argument, including the mind-sensation analogy, are not his own but all borrowed from Aristotle’s predecessors’ views; and secondly the conclusions drawn from these premises are directly at odds with Aristotle’s own views—to begin with, the view articulated in the passage immediately to follow (429b9f.), which claims potentialities for thinking and sensing are fundamentally different. Employing Aristotle’s distinction between dialectical argument and demonstration in Topics, I argue that the opening passage of *DA III.4* is a dialectical argument, intended not to expound Aristotelian views but to outline important shortcomings of the views on mind of Aristotle’s predecessors. I distinguish what premises, specifically, are Anaxagorean, and what Democritean, in those passages; I show how the passage as a whole depends on these premises, and where Aristotle himself disagrees with them. My thesis regarding points of
disagreement is that for Aristotle, in contrast to the Anaxagorean and Democritean models, there is no potentiality for thinking that precedes actual learning or discovery; that thinking is not an innate faculty for the reception of correlative objects, as sensation is of sensibles. Given that orientation, I suggest in conclusion that the argument of DA III.5 rides in part on a distinction between the potentiality that precedes learning and discovery, which in fact is not a potentiality for mind or for thinking at all, and the potentiality that follows learning and discovery, which—and only which—is a potentiality for thinking proper. According to the upshot of the failed mind-sensation analogy, mind is not a natural capacity, then, but a habit earned through practice and instruction.

**Jay Kennedy.** University of Manchester, jay.kennedy@manchester.ac.uk

“Exploiting Plato’s Musical Structure to Resolve Long-Standing Interpretive Issues: The Case of the Unfinished Dialogues”

Recent research on the narrative structure of Plato’s dialogues (Kennedy, 2010; Kennedy, 2011) has argued that symbolic passages at regular intervals mark out the locations of musical notes in a well-known Greek scale. Musicologists have clarified the nature of the scale, and Kennedy(2011) shows in detail how the same scale is used to organize each of the dialogues. The presence of this symbolic structure has consequences for some long-standing disputes in Plato studies. Here, the modern debates over two of Plato’s short, ‘unfinished’ dialogues are reviewed. According to Slings(1999), most modern commentators regard the Cleitophon as unfinished because Socrates does not respond to the attacks made on him. Similarly, since the Critias ends in mid-sentence, it has been widely regarded as an incomplete fragment or postscript to the Timaeus (Nesselrath, 2006; Roochnik, 2004). In both cases, however, a minority of interpreters has advanced arguments for regarding the dialogues both as genuine and as finished wholes. It will be shown here that, surprisingly, both the Cleitophon and Critias contain the same, complete musical structure found in the other genuine dialogues. This is strong evidence that these dialogues are complete, and serves as a methodological test-case for bringing Plato’s musical structure to bear on long-standing interpretive issues.


Rodmon King, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, king@hws.edu
“Intelligible Matter, Intelligible Forms, and Signification”

Traditionally, Aristotle’s account(s) of intelligible matter as found in the Physics IV, Metaphysics V and De Anima I are viewed as inconsistent. In two of these passages the accounts of intelligible matter are compatible while the account in the third passage is considered to be radically different. Various positions have been argued for in the literature. Some have argued that these accounts can be reconciled while others have argued that Aristotle’s thought on this matter is fundamentally flawed. This paper argues that the seemingly inconsistent accounts of ‘intelligible matter’ can be resolved when viewed in connection with Aristotle’s account of mental representation (in De Anima) and signification (in De Interpretatione). In doing so I argue that many of the current accounts of signification are not up to this task.

Chimene La Roche, University of South Carolina, chimene.laroche@gmail.com
“Plato, The Knowledge Coach: The Epistemology of The Forms”

Gregory Vlastos, like many Plato scholars, understands Plato’s idea of the Forms in terms of realism. This paper challenges such an interpretation, arguing that the Forms are a vehicle to explore the process of knowledge, through hypothesis and dialectic, rather than ontological entities themselves. Even though Plato’s Socrates stresses the need for universal definitions, I do not think he should be read so literally. Instead I take him to be aiming for a sustainable method of knowledge, or logic, to examine our beliefs and their necessary consequences. The Forms, through their connection to hypothesis and dialectic, serve as an example to practice this investigation because even when Socrates and the interlocutors fail to discover universal definitions, particularly in Parmenides, they agree that the search for such is needed to support dialectic. In fact, the dialogues themselves serve as a tool of knowledge as their structure performs (for the readers) what Socrates seeks to do within the dialogues.

To further support my argument that the dialogues are produced for epistemological purposes and are not intended as a detailed analysis of the Forms themselves, I examine the Republic, Parmenides and Phaedrus, in which it is evident that the role of the Forms is a discussion about an exploration for knowledge. In these dialogues Plato never offers a robust theory of the Forms, in fact, in the Phaedrus Socrates argues against absolutes and instead encourages the interlocutors and readers to become aware of their own beliefs and assumptions and test the logic of such. This endeavor is consistent throughout these dialogues and wherever the Forms are directly mentioned or merely referenced, they are accompanied with a method of hypothesis or dialectic. In addition, even when the Forms are not present, the investigation of knowledge is paramount. This substantial continuity with regard to hypothesis and dialectic, which is more pervasive than the Forms, coupled with the absence of a robust theory of the Forms, suggests that the Forms are posited for epistemological value rather than metaphysical.
Daniele Labriola, University of St Andrews, dl293@st-andrews.ac.uk
“Plato v. Status Quo: On the Motivation for Socrates’ Digression (Theaetetus 166a-177d)”

Socrates’ digression in the Theaetetus (172c-177d) is directly motivated intra-dialogue by certain connected moral claims: (I) moral judgments are city-relative in that what people hold collectively to be, say, just, is just for that (particular) collective; (I*) that no city looks for an expert for assistance in improving (or overturning) its moral views, e.g., views about justice simply as views about justice; (II) that no moral concept has a nature of its own, which entails that no moral concept is objectively true. Central to my thesis is the claim that (I), (I*) and (II) are defended by a widely held position, what I call the ‘common view’, distinct from the highlighted Protagorean position also addressed in the dialogue. Accordingly, Socrates’ digression should be seen as a dramatic rebuttal, prompted by what is depicted as a widely held position that defends (I), (I*) and (II).

Anna Lännström, Stonehill College, alannstrom@stonehill.edu
“Socrates’ Moral Impiety: A Reading of Euthyphro 6a”

Socrates was tried and convicted of impiety, more specifically, of “corrupting the youth and not acknowledging the gods in which the city believes [theous hous hé polis nomizei ou nomizonta], but in other new spiritual things [hetera de daimonia kaina]” (Apology 24b). Scholars who agree that the charges indeed had to do with religion and were not just a cover for political concerns disagree about why people considered Socrates impious. Did he perhaps not believe in the gods at all; did he believe in the wrong gods; was it about his daimonion; did he fail to sacrifice to the gods; was it his belief that the gods are moral? In this paper, I will focus on the last option, asking whether Socrates’ moral theology could have been a contributing factor to the trial. Could the belief that the gods are good or the implications of that belief have been so incendiary that it led to the trial? My focus is not on whether this belief actually did motivate the trial – I believe that question is unanswerable. Rather, I am asking whether it was problematic enough that it could have lead to the trial, either by itself or as a significant contributing factor. In section 1, I will argue that the straightforward version of this view, i.e., that Socrates was put on trial simply he thought the gods were moral is untenable, despite Socrates’ comment at Euthyphro 6a which seems to suggest just that. In section 2, I will review other attempts to connect Socrates’ moral theology to the trial, arguing that they too ultimately are not persuasive. However, the view that the problem was connected to Socrates’ moral theology remains plausible. In section 3, I will propose a tentative solution of my own.

Eric LaRock, Oakland University, larock.consciousness@gmail.com
“An Aristotelian Approach to Mental Causation”
The debate over whether mind is causally efficacious is an old one. Aristotle, for example, did not regard the mind as epiphenomenal, but maintained that mind has causal power to affect matter (De Anima I.4, 407b34- 408a5). Explanatory power is predicated upon causal potency. If the mind is not causal, it is not explanatory. By contrast, it has become almost orthodoxy these days to regard the mind as an impotent by-product of the brain (e.g., see Wegner 2002). With no intrinsic causal power, mind just rides on the fray of neural activity, much like froth rides on a wave. In this paper, I utilize recent findings in neuroscience to motivate an Aristotelian approach to mental causation as an alternative to epiphenomenalism. I conclude that Aristotle’s claim about the causal power of mind is still plausible.

Marilynn Lawrence, Independent, pronoia12@gmail.com
“The Status of Astrology in Late Greek Neoplatonism”

Astrology’s popularity in late antiquity is well attested, and it could even be said to have provided a philosophy of fate that rivaled, complemented, and clashed with other philosophy schools of the time. Astrology was even important (or intellectually dangerous) enough for renowned skeptic Sextus Empiricus to include a book, Against the Astrologers, in his Adversus mathematicos. When Babylonian astrology was imported to the Greek-speaking world of the Hellenistic period, it was transformed into a systematic practice using the Empedoclean elements, Pythagorean symmetries, and the astral causality of Aristotle’s cosmology. Its relationship to Platonic philosophy is rather complex. In middle Platonism, astrology is made possible (or acceptable) through the celestial helpers (the young gods of Timeaus 40b ff) who administer sublunary fate as a product of the demiurge’s providence. Plotinus’s position on astrology has been well-discussed—he criticizes the vocabulary of astrological practice, but allows for the stars as the best and brightest signs [for astral divination]. Porphry had a clear interest in astrology, given his questions posed to Anebo (Iamblichus) on finding the personal daimon through astrology, as well as his copying of astrologer Antiochus of Athens’ work, which possible includes a bit of astrological material of his own (preserved as Porphuriou Philosophou Eisagôgê eis tên Apotelesmatikên tou Ptolemaïou).[2] Iamblichus’ position on astrology, similar to Plotinus, is to criticize the lower practice of astrological prediction derived from calculations, while accepting a higher astral divination and contemplation as useful for theurgy.

Given this background, where does astrology stand for the later Neoplatonists? Proclus didn’t directly write about astrology, but his position can be teased out by studying his positions on fate and providence. Hierocles, however, takes a strong stance against astrology, which he sees as founded on a strict determinism. Probably the most interesting and nuanced view (exempting Iamblichus) is that of Simplicius. For Simplicius, astrology works by inference from the instrument (the body as the soul’s organon), much in the way a doctor detects disease from symptoms. Taken together, these views demonstrate that astrology’s efficacy is consistent with neoplatonic philosophy, though relegated to affecting only the body and/or lower part of the soul.
This leaves the question, is astrology worth the bother for a Platonist who aims to imitate the upward looking stance of the demiurge toward the Forms? This question will be primarily addressed through Simplicius’ comments on astrology.


[2] David Pingree identified which chapters of Porphyry’s Introduction to Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos were copied or paraphrased from Antiochus in “Antiochus and Rhetorius,” Classical Philology, 72.3 (1977) 203-223.

Susan Levin, Smith College, slevin@smith.edu

“Medicine and Politics in Plato’s Statesman”

Plato’s rivalries with sophistry, poetry, and medicine for authority on thriving and his defenses of philosophy’s preeminence are integral elements of a single project. As I argue elsewhere, in the Laws, his rivalry with medicine alone relents; this is a marked shift from the Republic, where, far from endorsing medicine’s own grand claims to preeminence, Plato is committed, by implication, to retract its very standing as a technê.

Explaining this shift regarding medicine between the Republic and Laws necessitates attention to the Statesman, whose exploration of political authority deploys a medical analogy. I have previously maintained that the Laws’ adjustments to governance stemming from Plato’s recognition that no one is incorruptible are key to medicine’s attaining its highest standing in Plato’s final dialogue. When addressing the Statesman’s view of medicine, therefore, it will be essential that one consider at the same time its treatment of political expertise and the basis of political authority.

On the persuasive account of John Cooper (1999, 165-91), as the Statesman unfolds, statesmanship is increasingly detached from a squarely autocratic model of governance. Thus, for instance, political oratory, close ally of statesmanship, illumines why what the latter envisions is best (303e-304a). Yet the contrast between technê and nomos in the Statesman’s handling of best practice (e.g., 295c-297b) suggests that its construction of political expertise and authority, though intermediate between the Republic and Laws, is closer to the former.

While the Statesman’s treatment of political authority illustrates both tendencies without a clear tilting of the balance between them, the Statesman’s medical analogy, used to illumine the contrast between technê- and law-based governance, evinces greater continuity with the Laws; for instance, unlike doctors in Kallipolis, the good physician of the Statesman is properly equipped to make authoritative medical pronouncements without supervision. Though the Statesman’s account is a long way from the Laws’ view of how sound medical practice is
embedded in a just community, its handling of political expertise and medicine sheds light on the reflective process that culminates in Plato’s putting the agôn with medicine to rest in the Laws even as his rivalries with poetry and sophistry continue unabated.

David Levy, SUNY Geneseo, levy@geneseo.edu
“Socrates’ Diagnoses of Callicles: Geometry and Love”

Plato’s Gorgias offers a model of Socratic philosophy by means of an analogy with medicine. The medical craft proceeds via several unpleasant therapies (surgery, cauterization, restrictive diet) as it seeks to restore health to a sick body. These unpleasant therapies are set in stark contrast with the pleasing practices of the pastry-baker. Whereas the latter gratifies appetites, the former necessarily frustrates appetites.

In an excellent article, Jessica Moss explores the medical analogy—in particular on the point of the restricting of diet—and argues that the Gorgias confirms the claim, suggested by the analogy, that rhetoric proceeds by gratifying a certain set of appetites, whereas Socratic philosophy proceeds by frustrating those very appetites. As Moss puts it, the appetites in question “are appetites to be confirmed in one’s values.”

Although Moss focuses much of her attention on Callicles, she stops short of probing the explicit “diagnoses” Socrates offers of what ails Callicles’ soul. On the one hand, Socrates asserts that Callicles’ problematic moral attitudes can be accounted for by his “neglect[ing] geometry” (508a). On the other hand, Socrates asserts that Callicles is not persuaded by Socrates’ arguments because of the “love of the dêmos” in his soul (513c).

The aims of this paper are (1) to examine Socrates’ twin diagnoses of Callicles, (2) to determine the extent to which they are compatible with the medical analogy, and (3) to map out the moral psychological elements necessary to make sense of them.

Donald Lindenmuth, The Pennsylvania State University, dcl1@psu.edu
“Alcibiades’ Speech in Plato’s Symposium: The Impossibility of Philosophy”

Alcibiades’ Speech in Plato’s Symposium appears as both the speech of a scorned’ lover and the most powerful critique of Socratic philosophizing by one of his associates. Alcibiades possesses both the brilliance of mind and the strength of character to present a significant alternative to the Socratic life of philosophizing. Both attributes are on display in his understanding of the uniqueness of Socrates and in his willingness to admit that he can’t understand Socrates. The manner in which Alcibiades holds both positions simultaneously reveals the impossibility of philosophy and politics being united in one person. Plato uses Alcibiades’ speech to explain the essential need of the philosopher to understand the political as completely as possible and the
impossibility of the philosopher being fully political, as well as the reasons for the political man rejecting the philosophical life. These positions are only revealed in concreto: by studying as carefully as possible the exact wording of Alcibiades’ speech. In doing so, it also becomes apparent that the key to understanding all the speeches in the Symposium is this speech of Alcibiades and the perennial opposition of philosophy and politics that it vividly portrays both tragically and comically.

Patrick Macfarlane, Providence College, pmacfarl@providence.edu
“Religious Phenomena in Aristotle’s Biological Works”

It is commonly known that throughout his works, Aristotle sometimes challenges the mythological/religious background of ancient Greek thought by rationalizing these traditional stories (see, e.g., On the Heavens i 3.270b1-25, ii 1.284a11-284b5; Meteorology ii 3.356b9-357a4; Metaphysics i 2.982b29-983a11 and xii 10.1076a4; and cf. the perceptive discussion of Bodéüs 2000). Little attention has been paid (with the exception of Preus 1975, 34-36), however, to the remarks that Aristotle makes about ‘religious’ matters in his biological works, particularly regarding animals and animal sacrifice, that mainstay of ancient religious practice. These passages, though few, provide us with some intriguing insight into Aristotle’s knowledge of animal sacrifice (Parts of Animals iii 4.667b1-14), its possible efficacy (History of Animals i 17.496b21-28), and may have suggested models for some of his own thinking about the biological structure of animals (Parts of Animals iii 7.670a23-26). Connected with this theme is Aristotle’s short treatise Divination in Sleep, where again, we find him treating a typically religious notion (prophecy) in a largely biological context (cf. History of Animals iv 10); it is in this treatise also that we find Aristotle’s remarkable statement about the “daemonic” aspect of nature (hê gar phusis daimonia; Divination in Sleep 2.463b14). Accordingly, in my paper, I collect these passages and discuss them in order to draw attention to the neglected theme of religious phenomena within Aristotle’s biological works.

Magus Magnus, unaffiliated - independent writer, magusmagnus1@gmail.com

“Anger and Fear: From Emotion and Psychology to Society and World”

A creative, immersive approach to the subjects of Anger and Fear opens the possibility of understanding them not only as primal elements of human emotion, as passions, but as constituents of human experience, on the level of individual drives and instinct certainly, yet also in terms of psychology and character. Beyond this elemental coloring of the nature of the individual, an understanding of Anger and Fear in terms of social dynamics, as elements of the nature of society itself, can be extended further to become aware of them as part of the make-up of the world generally, in philosophical, ontological, and spiritual-religious terms (for example, in connection to ancient perspectives, in the dual-edged human fear of the gods’ wrath).

Accordingly, by setting this inquiry amidst inspirations from ancient Greek culture, an exploration of the form of Theocritus’ “Idyll” – the character-driven poetic monologue meant for performance, interpreted within the traditions of “mime” traced back to Sophron (fl. 430 B.C.) about 150 years earlier – provides revealing description and demonstration. Possible live performances during the panel include: “A Sorceress Casts a Spell on her Faithless Lover,” based on one of the original urban mime idylls from Theocritus, with motivations of the character clearly steeped in both fear and anger (Virgil’s version of the same piece reveals how refinement of the art mutes the reality of the emotion, to be discussed); “Antigone Buries her Brother’s Body against Orders of the King” is an Idyll devised as essential compression, based on Sophocles, with fear and anger embedded at every level abovementioned, from person to society and state, to gods and universe; a third Idyll depicts a modern character, yet remains steeped in the ancient form and techne with regard both to poetics and performance, towards an outburst of embodied hate, “A Bandit Plots a Murder by the Road.”

Following depictions of Fear and Anger through the form of the Idyll (the intersection of poetry and theater), as forces and concepts these two themes can be found to be ontological – world-constitutive and constructive – in early Greek thinking: this, specifically oriented towards Heraclitus’ account (where poetry and philosophy intersect in the fragments), in an inquiry into his doctrine of Strife… Eris, as primal dynamic in the world, also as goddess and fundamental Greek word/name.

Magus Magnus enters into this panel’s discussion with reference to his books, *Idylls for a Bare Stage* (2011) and *Heraclitean Pride* (2010).

Daniel Maher, Assumption College, dmaher@assumption.edu

“Aristotle on Teaching Philosophy”

In *Nicomachean Ethics* book IX, chapter 1, Aristotle discusses the relation between teachers and students. There seem to be three cases considered: (1) the sophists and their students, (2) Protagoras and his students, and (3) those who share philosophy as teacher and student. At first,
it appears that all three are instances of the sort of friendships Aristotle examines in this chapter: “non-uniform friends” (sometimes called “dissimilar friends” or friends “not the same in form” or even “hybrid friends”). These friends exchange goods that differ in kind, such as when one friend provides something useful, and the other provides pleasure. Aristotle presents these friendships as founded essentially in the needs of the friends, and we are invited to consider the possibility that someone might trade philosophical understanding for some other good, such as money or honor. In this way, the teaching of philosophy might seem to manifest the insufficiency of philosophy to meet the needs of a human being. In this paper I argue that Aristotle distinguishes the teaching of philosophy from these other friendships founded in need. He does not deny that the one capable of teaching philosophy has other needs, but he does make it clear that the teaching of philosophy is not essentially an exchange of something high for something low.

The philosophical teacher is not related to his pupil as he would be to a contemplative friend who is an equal. They are not in the relevant respect “good people alike in virtue” (VIII.3.1156b7–8). The teacher enjoys a decisive superiority over his pupil, but Aristotle distances the philosophical teacher from the others, all of who are driven by need. The philosophical teacher chooses to benefit another as a morally virtuous human being would.

This quasi-friendship does not fit neatly into any of the categories Aristotle has discussed. It is possible to understand this relationship in light of Aristotle’s God. Aristotle’s God is not engaged in active benevolence or providential care for human beings, and yet by being accessible to our understanding through the intelligible order of nature, his God may be described as contributing to human happiness. Human beings can become aware of God’s perfection, and this intelligibility to us amounts to a kind of benevolence. God is available to us for imitation, and, similarly, the philosophical teacher is available to students, although not as if his happiness depends upon their success in learning. Like God and without loss to his own happiness, the philosophical teacher is able to give students access to the best human life. In this way a teacher is not an ordinary benefactor or craftsman, each of whom is intent upon seeing his power made actual in some other person or thing. Perhaps some teachers are eager to generate disciples and epigones, but Aristotle’s philosophical teachers seem to be simultaneously more generous and less interested in their students. We might say his philosophical teachers benefit students almost accidentally.

Deepa Majumdar, Purdue University North Central, dmajumda@pnc.edu

“Numinous Politics in Plotinus”

In this current paper, I explore the Enneads of Plotinus in search of an ideal, but implicit politics, which expresses a logic converse to that of Plato in the Allegory of the Cave. Unlike the Allegory, where the numinous enables the highest, most ideal politics, the Enneads appear to imply a politics that bears the numinous, instead of drawing from it, such that it leads to the state
of unio mystica, rather than being caused by it. Such a charitable politics is the natural corollary of Plotinus’ overarching “henological politics” drawn from a noetically circumscribed source of truth, anchored in the Plotinian First Principle, the One. Plotinus reveals this type of an implicit politics in at least two contexts: (1) in his metaphysically pleasing, but politically provocative delineation of the phenomenal world as a stage on which we play roles (quotations 1-5) and (2) in his depiction of the lower civic virtues.

In this paper I first articulate briefly Plotinus’ brushes with the Realpolitik of his day, making a central distinction between the virtue of imperviousness, and the vice of callous indifference, to demonstrate the political virtues concealed in the ideal Plotinian spectator. Second, I explore the Enneads for passages that enjoin ‘imperviousness for their deeper meaning. This includes Plotinus’ own omnivision (or heightened objectivity derived from metaphysical wisdom), as one might put it, of the vicissitudes of Realpolitik, his enjoining of the ideal attitude of the spectator, and his exhortation of the ideal virtue of forbearance. Undoubtedly anathema to the political activist of the twenty-first century, this seemingly passive picture of the spectator watching the tumult of history with detachment and forbearance, is in accord with Plotinus’ emphasis on the virtues. I thus study On Virtues (I.2(19)), with special attention on the civic virtues, so as to draw out the logical corollaries of Plotinus’ overarching “henological politics”—first, an implicit ideal, noetic polis and second, the implicit charitable politics that corresponds to this polis. Both corroborate Hadot’s point that Plotinus wants us to “consent to the order of the world and the laws of the universe, since they emanate from divine Thought, and, ultimately, from the Good.”

I conclude that the “callousness” is only seeming, not only because it is, in truth, detachment born out of wisdom—not reprehensible aloofness—but also because Plotinus’ implicit henological politics is a most powerful elixir—a source of empowerment far more potent than the iconographic ideal of a political cause. It empowers that ultimate Plotinian protestant, the detached spectator, far more assuredly than a political cause ever could. This paper is divided into three parts: (1) Realpolitik, the sphere of the political, anti-political sentiments, and Plotinus’ explanations, (2) Civic virtues and “charitable politics,” (3) Henological Politics, Charity, and Union Mystica, and (4) Conclusion.

Anne Mamary, Monmouth College, annem@monm.edu

“Plato’s Song and Dance”

Each person should spend the greatest and best part of his or her life in peace. One should live out one’s days playing at certain games—sacrificing, singing, dancing” (Laws 803d). Already in the Republic’s (or Politea’s) opening words, Plato’s hearers and readers are prepared for a journey into something at once ancient and new. When Socrates says, “I went down to Piraeus” (327a), he immediately conjures Homer’s Odysseus, who also “went down” on a journey of his own. When Socrates is waylaid on his return to Athens, having gone to the festival of the newly-introduced Thracian moon goddess, Bendis, the stage is set for a journey of
homecoming that has the potential to reweave the souls and (and in) the cultural, social and political contexts of those who make the journey.

This is a journey through the night, the night in which the soul can be overcome or paralyzed by shadow fears, or in which anything is possible—like a stage before the curtain is raised. In the night’s darkness (and in its kindling sparks), is already the memory and muscle memory of the dialogue’s ending (or is it another beginning?) in the tale of Er. The Republic’s auditors are always on a circling journey of descent and ascent—below the earth and into the cosmos—that rings with Pythagorean overtones and dances a round dance along a straight line. We witness, and, with luck, participate in the drama, which even from the opening walk down to Pireaus presages (or reminds of) the mysteries of tyranny, the terrors and laughter of the three waves, the divided line, the cave, Er—and their manifold displays of the worlds we, with the sirens and the fates, with choice and Necessity, inhabit, create and critique with dancing feet and kindled soul. So, when Socrates and Glaucos are waylaid on their return to Athens, they and the young men who detain them embark on a journey of descent into their own acquisitive, honor-loving souls, souls of high-born men who will likely have or aspire to political power. Yet politics in the sense of ruling is but one concern of the dialogue and perhaps not its central one. As Sallis, Brann and others suggest, Politeia, might best be translated constitution, in the sense of the make up of the polis and its citizens’ souls. Although the Greek word politeia does not have a specific etymological connection to music, mousike (the arts of the Muses)—epic, mathematics, astronomy, myth, theater, music and dancing—is evoked and invoked from the start. Plato invites us to recall the music of the spheres sounding closer to home and enacted in our human lives. Justice becomes not a contract for avoiding harm in exchange for not harming others nor a means of exacting revenge; instead, it becomes a practice of living musically, a composition of an erotically wise (and practically-wise), courageous, and moderate self and/in society patterned on the dancing rhythms and musically-mathematical intervals of the heavens—planets—gods.

Joel Mann, St. Norbert College, joel.mann@snc.edu
“Antiphon’s Third Tetralogy and Double Effect”

Pursuant to recent scholarship that attempts to rehabilitate the Athenian logographer Antiphon, this essay will endeavor to revise the philosophical history of the so-called doctrine of double effect (henceforth, DDE), according to which it is permissible for a person to perform an action with both morally good and morally bad effects if 1) the action itself is moral (or at least morally neutral); 2) the bad effect is foreseen but not intended; 3) the bad effect is a consequence or by-product of, not a means to, the act itself; and 4) the bad effect meets a proportionality requirement such that the gravity of the bad effect does not outweigh the goodness of the act itself. It is generally assumed that the first clear articulation and application of the DDE is found in the Summa Theologiae, specifically at Ia-IIae Q. 64, art. 7, where Aquinas discusses the permissibility of homicidal self-defense. I will argue that, in fact, the first clear discussion and application of the DDE occurs in Antiphon’s third tetralogy, in which the defendant stands
accused of killing a man while fending off an attack on his person. I will argue first that Antiphon has in view all four of the criteria enumerated above. Second, I will argue that the particular legal context in which the discussion occurs compels Antiphon to think of the DDE not just as a moral or ethical question in a narrow sense, but as one that touches on deeper problems of action and responsibility in the philosophy of law. Indeed, these are precisely the problems occupy contemporary advocates of the DDE, and I will read Antiphon as outlining a clear and coherent position that bears a striking resemblance to agency accounts of the DDE proposed by philosophers such as Warren Quinn.

Brian Marrin, Boston University, bmarrin@bu.edu
“The Law of Nature in Plato’s Gorgias”

In Plato’s dialogue on rhetoric, Callicles states the opposition, prevalent among the sophists, between nomos and phusis, only to most strikingly overcome this opposition with the seemingly oxymoronic coinage of a nomos tēs phuseōs, or law of nature, which he identifies with the natural right of the stronger. I propose with this paper to examine the logic of Callicles’ argument for the naturalness of his law and then to argue that Socrates’ appropriation of the structure of this argument, even as he refutes the content of Callicles’ position, suggests a way of reading the dialogue as a challenge to the conventionalism of the sophists and as a defense of Socrates’ rational inquiry into, and critique of, political practice. In doing so the paper considers Plato’s political philosophy as posing the problem of natural law in a way recognizable to the later tradition.

Catherine McKeen, Skidmore College, cam3@williams.edu
“Three Kinds of Civic Unity in Plato’s Republic”

The kallipolis of Plato’s Republic is characterized by a high degree of civic unity. The kallipolis, for one, is more strongly civically-unified than other poleis. Being civically unified is a good-making feature of a polis, and being highly civically-unified is one of the kallipolis’ primary strengths over other poleis. Plato further judges civic unity to be essential to the complete goodness of the kallipolis.

But what accounts for civic unity in the kallipolis? I hold that there are three distinct kinds of civic unity at work in the Republic. One type of civic unity is provided by adherence to the Principle of Specialization, the principle that each citizen does the particular work for which he or she is best naturally suited (374b-c, 423d, 441d, 443c-d, etc.) The type of civic unity provided by PS is a functional unity. This kind of unity is produced when the parts of the whole act, not strictly towards their own goods, but towards the good of the whole. This kind of unity does not require that the parts in question (or the parts of these parts) share beliefs about the good towards which their activity is directed, but only that their activity does in fact conduce towards the good of the whole. (An individual’s liver does not choose to act for the good of the whole organism, although its good functioning does contribute to this good.) Plato finds, perhaps surprisingly, that
this sort of functional unity provides the foundation for civic justice in the *kallipolis*. Indeed, this kind of civic unity seems to be constitutive of civic justice (433b).

But such functional unity is not sufficient for the complete goodness of the polis. As Plato notes in Book IV, a *polis* is completely good if (and only if) it possesses all of the civic virtues – civic analogues of the individual virtues of courage, wisdom, justice and *sophrosunê*. Civic *sophrosunê* is founded on substantial agreement among the three occupational classes of the *kallipolis* concerning fundamentals of their association (e.g., about who should govern in the *kallipolis*) (430d–432b). Civic sophrosunê thus involves a distinct kind of civic unity, one that is doxastically-based. Unlike the civic unity secured by PS, this form of civic unity requires some sharing of beliefs among citizens of different classes in the polis. This requirement, further, presents a difficulty for Plato’s view. It is difficult, in particular, to see how Producers, Auxiliaries, and Guardians can share the kinds of epistemic grounds which would most plausibly support such agreement.

One other type of civic unity is evident in the *Republic*, and this is the unity provided by the sharing of affective states. Thus, Plato holds that citizens in the *kallipolis* will share pleasures and pains, and will be pleased and displeased concerning the same things (462b–c). This affectively-based civic unity can be expected to be distinct both from the functional unity secured by PS, as well as the doxastically-based civic unity required for civic *sophrosunê*. My aim in this paper is to trace out these three kinds of civic unity, to show how they are distinct, and to consider how each of these distinct forms of civic unity figures into Plato’s overall project in the Republic.

**Mohamed Mehdi**, Oakton Community College, mmehdi@oakton.edu
“Laozi and Plato on Staying out of Politics”

The morality of political engagement and withdrawal is an important topic in the classical philosophical traditions of both Ancient Greece and China. Philosophical approaches to quietism emerge in the two traditions against a widely shared cultural and ethical presumption that political ambition and virtue are goals of the highest order. Two foundational texts that develop this theme are Plato’s *Apology* and the *Daodejing*. There are several parallels between the two texts. Each one, for example, notes the dangers posed to personal survival by involvement in politics. More intriguingly, both texts seem to present similar attitudes towards achieving the goals of political rule: it is only by staying out of the contest for political power that we can be effective in bringing about a well-governed, morally virtuous and happy populace. We therefore find in these texts a critique of power and its effects, both for the individual who holds it and for his subjects. As part of these critiques, Plato and Laozi also offer alternative conceptions of power as exercised by the sage or philosopher.
However, there are also striking contrasts between the views of political rule developed in each text. While Laozi suggests that the good ruler will keep the people ignorant, Socrates fashions himself as a gadfly who seeks to reveal our ignorance and opposes the orator’s attempts to benefit from public ignorance. Socrates’ fearlessness in the face of death, which animates the Apology’s affective appeal, suggests that he will disobey the rulers when they are acting unjustly. In the Daodejing, the tone is at times fearful, oriented towards the avoidance of contention and the prolongation of life. The sage seeks individual tranquility even at the expense of the common good. There are several ways in which this tension can be explained. On the one hand, we can point to the very different ways in which power is conceived by Plato in the Apology and in the Daodejing. For in the latter text, the ultimate goal is the cultivation and freeing of a personal efficacy of a kind that is often denied to the philosopher as depicted by Plato. On the other hand, we can point to the different contexts in which each writer is working; the critique of democratic rule concerns Plato in a way that could not, of course, have mattered to Laozi. In this paper, I will argue that despite these apparent tensions and differences both texts suggest a philosophical pessimism not only about the exercise of political power in the context of a morally corrupt polity, but also about the moral capacity of the many. This leads to a conception of philosophy or sagehood as existing on the margins of society that may seem apolitical, but is in fact a response to a deeply political problem: how to engage virtuously in the context of political and moral decline.

Robert Metcalf, University of Colorado Denver, robert.metcalf@ucdenver.edu

“The Elemental Sallis: On Wonder and Philosophy’s ‘Beginning’”

“One will never be able to interrogate wonder philosophically except by way of a questioning that the operation of wonder will already have determined.”—John Sallis

Among scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, John Sallis is best known for his interpretive work on Plato’s dialogues, particularly in his books, Being and Logos, Chorology and Platonic Legacies. Yet, to devote one’s attention to Plato’s texts is necessarily also to take up those thinkers who are known collectively as the “Presocratics,” whether it be the Heracliteans lurking in the background of Plato’s Theaetetus and Cratylus, Parmenides and Zeno in Plato’s Parmenides, the Pythagoreans who participate in Plato’s Phaedo, and so on. Accordingly, in his writings on Plato, from Being and Logos to Chorology and beyond, John Sallis has subjected Presocratic thinking to the rigorous interpretative work for which he is famous—and often he has done this in order to think through why it is that, as first announced in Plato’s Theaetetus (155d), philosophy is said to begin in wonder [to thaumazein...archê philosophias]. Sallis’ thinking through wonder is guided by his reading of Plato and the Presocratics and, furthermore, it makes possible a reengagement with Greek philosophy. This paper shows, first, what Sallis understands by wonder as the archê of philosophy, and second, how his own “rememorative” thinking of this archê—especially by way of what he calls “the elemental”—remains attentive to the wondrous in such a way as to return us to the insights of Plato and the Presocratics. This
examination of Sallis’ distinctive interpretation of the “elemental” in Plato and the Presocratics leads, finally, to a discussion of Aristotle’s claim that “myth is composed of wonders”—for, as Sallis has shown across his writings on Greek philosophy, myth is indeed composed of wonders in the sense that myth is the form of discourse proper to letting the wondrous remain wondrous.

Mark Moes, Grand Valley State University, moesm@gvsu.edu


This paper draws attention to an interesting parallelism of content between Socrates’ discussion of erotic love in his refutation of Agathon in the Symposium and in his discussion of the place of bodily Eros in the lives of the guardians in Republic 5. In both contexts, Socrates draws attention to different ways of possessing goods. In his response to Agathon’s Speech about Eros in the Symposium, Socrates draws attention to an equivocation between two different senses in which a lover can possess the goods that he loves and longs for. In Republic 5 (449a-466d) Socrates again brings into focus an equivocation on the notion of possessing goods, this time in the course of his discussion of the roles of men and women in the feverish polis, a discussion concerned with the right interpretation of the Greek proverb “the possessions of friends should be held in common” (449c). This paper provides brief readings of both discussions, arguing that Socrates is teaching the same lesson to Agathon and Glaucon, but in ways rhetorically adapted to their different characters and interests. Agathon gets a lesson—couched in Diotima’s account of “spiritual pregnancy”—that unmasks his flawed understanding of erotic relationships. Glaucon gets a lesson that unmasks his deficient understandings of good paideia, of the relation between the family and the polis, and of the most important political goods. But on a deeper level the two lessons are the same lesson: a lesson about the difference between mere external goods, on the one hand, and goods internal to shared practices (such as arts, sciences, ethical and political practices)—goods held in common by practitioners, goods of mind, spirit, and consciousness—on the other. Lastly, in both dialogues, the lesson is a prelude to a mystical or “theological” account of the highest values—the Ascent of Eros in the Symposium and the Account of the Sun and the Good in the Republic. The paper concludes by raising some questions about the relations between these theological accounts and the Myth of the Craftsman God in the Timaeus.

Patrick Mooney, John Carroll University, pmooney@jcu.edu

“Science and Testing Hypotheses about Virtue in Plato’s Socratic Dialogues

This paper argues that certain features (or apparent features) of Plato’s “Socratic” dialogues—that most of them are ‘aporetic,’ or end inconclusively about the dialogue’s main question; that many of their arguments are ad hominem; and that their philosophical hero seems to be a most unusual, quirky, enigmatic character who has adopted some peculiar life-mission (someone, anyway, who is mostly not at all like anyone else)—are each to be explained (or “explained
away”) by how Socrates conceives of science and about how to test hypotheses, particularly when those hypotheses have to do with what he thinks of as the science of the good, viz., virtue. As a result, students of Socrates needn’t suppose that these dialogues are philosophically unproductive to the extent that they are aporetic (let alone that they are therefore philosophical failures); nor that many of their arguments are relatively unfruitful, if not simply fallacious, to the extent that they are ad hominem; nor that the Socrates featured in them needs to be regarded as, say, an ironist, a gadfly or that he is of some other peculiar character in order to properly understand his role in the dialogues. Each of these ideas about how to read the Socratic dialogues has been defended by different scholars at one time or another. To one extent or another, these ideas continue to permeate some contemporary scholarship as well as much of non-professional discussion of Socrates. Each of them also tends to obscure, if not to entirely misconstrue, Socrates’ theory of virtue and how he defends it in these dialogues.

The paper begins by identifying the “Socratic” dialogues. It next identifies some of the evidence which is often taken to show that the dialogues are aporetic, that some of their arguments are ad hominem and that their Socrates is (let’s say) of a “special character”. It then defends the view that Socrates has particular views about the sciences that he brings to bear upon his discussions with others, and that these include ideas about the “hierarchy” of the sciences and about how some sciences require an unusual testing procedure (unusual from a modern point of view, at any rate). It then argues that the resulting Socratic philosophy of science renders some of the features of the dialogues inconsequential to their philosophical merit (aporia) and shows that other “features” are merely apparent (ad hominem arguments and Socrates’ special character).

The paper’s conclusion is that the Socrates of Plato’s Socratic dialogues is routinely invested in a rigorous testing of his (“intellectualist”) theory of virtue and that the Socratic dialogues are best regarded as being the material with which to conduct the tests for ourselves.

Christopher Moore, Skidmore College, moor0553@umn.edu
“Persuasion and Teaching in the Gorgias”

The Gorgias relates persuasion and teaching in two very puzzling ways: Gorgias accepts that all teaching involves persuasion (453d9-11), and that teaching is a kind of persuasion (454e3-5). Socrates and Gorgias’ belief about these relationships (which have not received scholarly comment) tells strongly against the common view that Plato always opposes persuasion and teaching. It also tells against the view that Plato always treats the epistemic products of these modes of communication, belief and knowledge respectively, as moral antagonists. According to the Gorgias, teaching could not exist without persuasion. I explain how this could be. This will require showing that persuasion is a good-producing, reason-giving, decision-causing activity and that knowledge is the ability to make correct decisions in any situation. The form of persuasion that does not cause knowledge aims to get the listener to choose the right thing now;
the knowledge-causing form, called teaching, aims to get the listener to be able to choose the right thing anytime.

I start by giving the context for Gorgias’ agreements about the relationship between persuasion and teaching. I come up with a few ways to explain this strange relationship, and then eliminate the non-starters. I then turn to Plato’s other dialogues—specifically Tim. 51e, Thet. 201a-c, Phdr. 277e, Symp. 212b, La. 181d, and Rep. 399a—to see how they treat the relationship between persuasion and teaching. This investigation supports the explanation that knowledge-free persuasion differs from knowledge-laden persuasion most importantly in when the decisions they are allowing the audience to make are to be made. This explanation allows us to explain why Gorgias so readily accepts Socrates’ suggestions at 453d-454e.

Appreciating the relationship between persuasion and teaching may help us appreciate Socrates’ cross-corpus avowals of persuading and disavowals of teaching. It may also help resolve some ongoing interpretative difficulties in the Gorgias. The central one is Gorgias’ nonchalant blurring of the line between his role as teacher of his students and as persuader of audiences.

Holly Moore, Luther College, hollymoore@luther.edu

“Figuring Incommensurability”

The precise source of the discovery of the incommensurability of the side and diagonal of the square is still somewhat contested, but the evidence appears to point toward Pythagoras as the first to grapple with the difficulty, if only at the level of the incommensurability of the two by two square. Using the evidence of the Theaetetus, the prevailing view, as represented by Myles Burnyeat, is that while the Pythagoreans were dealing with the incommensurability of two, Theodorus advanced up to 17, and not until Theaetetus was the abstract nature of the problem theorized. I would like to argue, however, that the Pythagorean preoccupation with the incommensurability of the two-unit square is itself already operating at a more abstract level than has been considered.

The following paper aims to be an exploration of the conceptual principles at work in the incommensurability problem—how this problem bears on the conceptual relations between part and whole, one and two (or many), odd and even, etc. In particular, I hope to shed light on the way that the geometrical figures that demonstrate both the incommensurability problem and its solution also figure these other, more abstract conceptual relationships and argue that this mathematical problem must not be divorced from those fundamental philosophical problems. One of the primary benefits of this view will be to shed light on the coherence of Pythagorean thought as well as to adumbrate the impact of this Pythagorean legacy on later thinkers, notably Plato.
J.J. Mulhern, University of Pennsylvania, johnjm@sas.upenn.edu
“The Mouthpiece Question and Ancient Authorial Practice: A Reply”

David Murphy has canvassed Greek writers of the Classical period who apparently attribute statements by protagonists in fictional works not to the protagonists themselves but to the authors of the works. Murphy has gone on to suggest that the occurrence of this idiom is inconsistent with the view identified since 1971 with the Plato’s Mouthpiece Fallacy—the view that it is fallacious to argue from the proposition that the Stranger from Elea says p, for example, to the proposition that Plato says p, on the grounds that the Stranger is Plato’s mouthpiece, which itself requires support. Based on Murphy’s 2010 paper and on his new abstract, I shall try to show in the present paper that these are not inconsistent after all.

The situation may be clarified by extending the earlier discussion of the Plato’s Mouthpiece Fallacy to address equivocations on ‘says’ explicitly. As originally presented, the Plato’s Mouthpiece Fallacy addressed the case in which ‘says’ has the same sense when said of the protagonist, who actually says p in the dialogue, as when said of the author, who actually does not say p in the dialogue. Sometimes, however, those who appear to be committing the Plato’s Mouthpiece Fallacy may be attempting something more ambitious. They may be attempting to argue that the author means or asserts or is prepared to defend what the protagonist says. This would be a fallacy of a different kind, since it would involve an equivocation on ‘says’ as one moves from a statement about the protagonist to a statement about the author.

Joyce Mullan, Stevens Institute of Technology, jmullan@stevens.edu
“Power and Justice in Euripides’ Hecuba”

Though most people see Euripides’ Trojan Women as his most powerful antiwar play, Euripides has much to say about power and brute force in his Hecuba, as well. In Euripides’ Hecuba, Agamemnon tells Hecuba he cannot help her revenge herself on Polymestor for killing her son. The army is too numerous for him and he doesn’t want to antagonize them. He asks how can she, a weak woman, prevail over the King of Thrace, Polymestor? She says that she and her women will be too numerous for him and his children. Through sheer numbers and desperation and guile, they will prevail. This play seems to meditate on the true nature of power and the consequences if the link between power and justice is severed.

Dana Munteanu, Ohio State University, munteanu.3@osu.edu
“The Uniqueness of Poetic Speech in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen”

The well-known description of Logos in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen (8) as personified Speech able to accomplish extraordinary deeds, despite its small body, continues to receive careful
scholarly consideration (e.g. Ford 2002, 176-7; McComiskey 2002, 38-47, Valiavitcharska 2006). Usually, the subsequent account of poetry (Hel. 9), defined as speech having meter, is considered to be an extension of this primary Logos. However, this paper argues that poetry alone, as a species of Speech, Logos, does not prove its power through contrary effects: joy in opposition to sadness, or soothing in opposition to stirring agitation in the soul listeners.

Generally, the power (dynamis) of speech over the condition of the soul resembles that of power of drugs over the condition of the bodies (Hel. 12): just as different drugs dispel different secretions of the body, some bringing an end to disease, others to life, some words can bring sadness (elypesan), others joy (eterpsan), some terrify us, while others embolden us. This emphasizes a recurrent idea in the Encomium, present in two other contexts, (Hel. 8) and (Hel. 10), and reiterated later (Hel.14), namely the ability of Logos, or of its species, to cause opposite emotions and reactions, such as pain and pleasure. Other Sophists may have used this idea of magic speech as well. Antiphon, for example, was reported to be able to dispel the troubles of the mind in a manner similar to doctors who provide remedies for the illnesses of the body (pseudo-Plutarch, Lives of Ten Orators; cf. Romilly 1992, 207-12). But this is not the theme of the passage on poetry (Hel. 9). In fact, poetry, as a type of Speech, possesses a feature that distinguishes it from all the other forms of discourse: it does not appear to cause delight and sorrow separately and it does not seem to prove its power through contrary effects. Only in this particular case, pity and fear are stirred together and become associated with the mysterious notion of “longing” (Hel. 9), which may denote some kind of painful delight rather than the customary opposition (pleasure or pain).

David Murphy. The Nightingale-Bamford School, david.murphy20@verizon.net
“A Certain Socrates Swinging Around There and Claiming...’ Characters’ Utterances and Authors’ Views in Plato’s Practice”

It is often argued that because Plato’s dialogues are fictional, statements of characters—and views they express—should not be attributed to the author, who does not speak in propria persona. Characters in Plato, however, frequently attribute utterances of epic or dramatic characters, and doctrines they imply, directly to the poet; in effect, they commit what John Mulhern calls the “Plato Says” fallacy. Plato’s practice presupposes that mimetic poetry operates simultaneously on what I call the fictional and the rhetorical registers. On the latter register, the author conveys ideology. Plato’s model of reading raises the problem, how well modern assumptions about authorial voice illuminate Plato’s dialogical project.

Summarizing my earlier work on passages where interlocutors attribute a character’s words in epic or drama directly to the author, I go on to passages where they extract the author’s views from the fiction by inference. For example, in Apology, Socrates infers Aristophanes’ speech—accusation against himself—directly from Clouds. He rebuts it on the grounds, not that comedy is not the author’s speech, but that in this case it is the author’s false speech. In the proto-doxography of Theaetetus, Socrates distills views of poets from characters’ speech.
In *Republic*, Socrates distinguishes between poet’s and characters’ voices and attributes all speech in mimetic poetry to the poet. His analysis presumes that mimetic poetry operates simultaneously within the realm of the story and that of the poet’s expression of views on reality, values, and norms. Plato anticipates Dauer’s distinction between referential predicates of fictional characters (in the fictional world) and formal predicates (in construction of the work).

Fourth-century writers attribute utterances of characters to the poet. Isocrates distinguishes between a fictional and a rhetorical register in his own work. Isocrates, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Cephisodorus and Theopompus take statements of characters in Socratic dialogues as assertions of the author. The fourth century treats fiction as conveying logos, an assertoric element, for the truth or falsity of which the author is responsible (cf. Halliwell). No one denied that fictional characters can convey the author’s views. The model of reading that Plato depicts presumes that they do. It is likely, therefore, that Plato applied this assumption to his own dialogues, for it was one of the conventions at work in contemporary reception of that genre. The assumption that the dialogue form excludes the author’s views is neither empirical nor analytic.

We cannot justify conclusions about Plato’s views from a premise that in all his/her utterances, a character in a dialogue functions as the “author’s mouthpiece.” Because not all utterances of Socrates vel al. can plausibly be taken to convey Plato’s views, we need other criteria to attempt to reach those. Literary critics who invoke “mouthpieces” know this, however, and apply a range of strategies to texts that they interpret. No interpreter is free of assumptions. I sketch a method that rests on a coherence theory of truth and involves assumptions about privileged interlocutors, consistency, ideology, charity to the author, external evidence, and dramatic differential within the corpus (Wolfsdorf).

**John Murungi**, Towson University, jmurungi@towson.edu

“Socratic Dreaming”

Today, the study of dreams has largely been confined to parapsychologists of all kinds. Other than the study of dreams as a feature of brain activity, modern psychology pays little attention to dreams as a legitimate subject matter for scientific inquiry. When Freud took over dreaming as a genuine subject for scientific inquiry, he was not taken seriously as scientist. In academic psychology, psychoanalysis, a field that Freud developed, in part, to help us in the interpretation of dreams, has lost whatever respect it had. Empirical psychology has become the centerpiece of academic psychology. Philosophers themselves, on the main, do not appear to show serious interest in dreams as legitimate subject matter for philosophical investigation. To the extent that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology, more specifically, to empirical epistemology, little room has been left for the study of dreams as a significance source of knowledge and truth. The real, the empirical real, has become the only meaningful sense of the real, and to the extent that dreams tend to be nourished by the unreal, they have been ignored or taken a diversion to the
quest for truth. In this paper, I seek to contribute to the reversal of this trend, at least, on the philosophical level. I argue that dream is not only the origin of philosophy but also, it is what sustains and guides philosophy. Without it there is no philosophy. I present and explore this claim in the light of Socrates understanding of philosophy. In his final days of his life, a period when Socrates seizes the opportunity to reflect on the philosophical life he has lead, he has a conversation with Cebes in which he claims that a dream has guided him all along warning him when he runs the risk of deviating from the philosophical path. This conversation takes place in Phaedo. I will argue that this is not the only dialogue where an appeal is made to dreams to provide legitimacy to philosophical life. The paper, ultimately, is a call for friends of philosophy to reassert their friendship by upholding the Socratic loyalty to dream.

Ramona Naddaff, The University of California, Berkeley, naddaff@berkeley.edu
“Beyond Truth and Falsehood: Philosophical Paradoxes in the Dissoi Logoi”

The Dissoi Logoi has been canonically interpreted as one of the models of the relativistic thinking whose uses by sophists and rhetoricians alike Plato will later condemn in such dialogues as the Protagoras and the Gorgias. This paper seeks to elaborate and complicate the form and function of the Dissoi Logoi’s mode of proto-philosophical argumentation. In the first instance, I will argue that the Dissoi Logoi must be understood seriously as oral pedagogical exercises, composed, as Thomas Cole notes, for “practice and demonstration.”

As speech acts that perform antithetical arguments, these “model pieces” cannot be judged as either felicitous or infelicitous; rather they are value-neutral propositions, which neither obtain the conditions of truth or falsehood nor oppose truth and falsehood. The question then becomes: What then is the effect of these persuasive acts of performativity? While clearly they demonstrate the power of double-edged logoi to challenge the validity of both relativistic and anti-relativistic arguments, they also enact another, but nonetheless related, epistemological quandary. The second part of this paper proposes to study how the series of couplets composing the Dissoi Logoi engender irresolvable paradoxes about the discursive limits of rhetorico-sophistic speeches. Once attention is paid to the paradoxes that emerge in these “logoi,” then the type of reasoning assumed in these speeches can be rethought as philosophically-provocative linguistic experiences, akin to but different from the effect of the socratic aporia.
Debra Nails, Michigan State University, nails@msu.edu
“The Structures of Plato’s Dialogues”

It is a commonplace to note that a work’s structure may have an important influence on how it should be interpreted, but the principles by which Plato’s dialogues were structured, as well as how disagreements between form and content, or form and argument, ought to be adjudicated, have remained contentious issues. I consider a variety of approaches to structure—with illustrations of Republic, Phaedrus, Symposium, Theaetetus, Crito and Phaedo, arguing that, although there are complementary aspects of the various contending structural theories that provide useful ancillary means of interpreting and teaching the dialogues, the Greek texts as we have inherited them inveigh against too fine-grained a structural theory.

A number of Plato’s dialogues are constructed in a way familiar in the literature of his time: ring composition or pedimental structure. The two are now sometimes treated as identical, sometimes as distinct. Holger Thesleff, Platonic Patterns, provides the history of scholarship on pedimental structure in Plato. Mary Douglas, Thinking in Circles: An Essay on Ring Composition, describes ring composition in literature more generally, taking pedimental structure as one of its species. Straussians have long held that the center of the dialogue is particularly important. Most recently, J. B. Kennedy has argued in “Plato’s Forms, Pythagorean Mathematics, and Stichometry” that each dialogue has the structure of a musical scale; when a dialogue is divided into twelve equal sections, consonances or positive philosophical doctrines appear in sections corresponding to the harmonious notes 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9, and negative doctrines at dissonant notes (5, 7, 10, and 11). I argue that Kennedy’s more exhaustive work on Symposium <http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/jay.kennedy/Symp%20Mus%20Book%20pp1-53.271-8.pdf> admirably proves the limits of structural analysis.
Lawrence Nannery, St. Francis College (Emeritus), lejn42@aol.com
“Plato’s Critique of Modern Capitalism: An answer to Locke”

In Section V of Locke’s much lauded work, Second Treatise on Government, the origin of property through labor is asserted and this theory is used as a justification of property rights. A labor theory of value might legitimate property rights, but only if the person who actually did the labor gets the property, which in capitalism is not generally true. Locke used this theory to legitimate the property of the mercantile class of his day, who actually did not work, but speculated on or ran monopolies created by the government. The aristocratic class, who controlled most of the property, could not use labor as a justification, since they did not, by definition, work. Since the theory benefits only one segment of society it is inherently ideological. Even worse, Locke places no upper limit on just amounts of wealth by the dubious trick of alluding to coinage, which does not spoil, but which also does not have anything directly to do with labor.

Plato rejects any such type of analysis. There are many texts in his oeuvre that address the topic of wealth. In Plato, every mention of wealth is followed by a distinction between physical wealth and spiritual wealth, and the only the latter is accorded the title of true wealth.

In Book VIII of the Republic, in the examination of the bad forms of oligarchic types of constitutions, Plato argues against the lust for money on the bases that it is not the practice of virtue, and indeed weakens the state. Again, in the Laws in Books IV and V, Plato argues that lust for wealth is the primary cause of class strife, and in a Solonic moment he proposes a weaving together of the classes in order to encourage moderation and possibly put an end to class warfare.

My paper puts most emphasis on Plato’s moral argument against the lust for wealth, specifically the arguments against Callicles in the Gorgias and against Thrasymachus in the Republic. The two refutations are similar but not the same, and hinge on the self-contradiction that characterize lives that reach out for total power and wealth, which are inherently Faustian. In the Republic Plato’s argument reaches all the way through Book IX, with the crown of the argument showing that the tyrant is the perfect example of pleonexia, morally censurable and psychologically miserable.

By extension Locke’s theory of property is Faustian, an example of pleonexia, a formless and infinite overreaching, and absurd because it identifies money with the good.

Jean-Marc Narbonne, Laval University, Jean-Marc.Narbonne@fp.ulaval.ca
“The Role of Narration in Plotinus’ Mystic”
In this paper, I would like to explain the essential function of narration in the description of Plotinus’ mystical experience. Just because he experiences something, the mystic must relate the punctual events to his own subjectivity and feeling, he must speak in the first person and tell us how he benefits from this peripete. This type of description, before Plotinus, can be found only in gnostic literature, and I will try to show that Plotinus inherits not only from the platonic tradition (Symposium, Phaedrus, etc.), but directly from some Sethian treatise such as the Allogenes or the Zostrianus.

Jonathan Nelson, Saint Louis University, nelsjonathan@gmail.com
“The Ontological Status of the Human Soul in Plato: Phaedo’s Affinity Argument”

According to most accounts, Plato’s Being/Becoming distinction is an exhaustive ontological distinction between incorporeal and unchanging entities on the one hand and corporeal and changing entities on the other hand. And according to most accounts, on Plato’s psychology the soul is an incorporeal but changeable entity. Hence, it is unclear where soul fits into Plato’s ontology. There are, however, only three main possibilities: the soul could belong to Being, to Becoming, or to some third category. Each of these possibilities requires modification to the common understanding of either the Being/Becoming distinction or the soul. There are three possible ways of modifying the former. The first is to concede that the distinction does not capture all existents (i.e., that it is non-exhaustive), thus allowing for the existence of a third category to which soul could belong. Second, Being could be loosened so as to allow for at least some changeable entities, thus allowing soul admittance. Finally, Becoming could be loosened so as to allow at least some incorporeal entities like soul. On the other hand, there are two possible ways of amending the common understanding of the soul such that it has a clear ontological home. The first is denying that soul (or at least some part of it) is changeable and thereby allowing it into the category of Being. The second is denying or significantly redefining the incorporeality of soul so as to permit soul’s admittance into Becoming.

Plato was well aware of the tension between his Being/Becoming distinction and his metaphysics of soul and examined at least three different resolutions in the Phaedo, the Sophist, and the Timaeus, respectively. In this paper I examine the Affinity Argument for soul’s immortality in the Phaedo. I argue that therein Plato offers a serious and conclusive argument explicitly rejecting both the possibility that soul is a Being and the possibility that it is a Becomer. Hence, there must be a third kind to which soul belongs.

I will first situate the Affinity Argument within the dramatic and philosophical context of the Phaedo, arguing that that argument is an important part of Socrates’ defense of the possibility and choiceworthiness of the life of philosophy. This is an important thesis considering that most Plato scholars see the Affinity Argument as an unsuccessful attempt at unphilosophical persuasion. As will be shown, the explicit objective of the Affinity Argument is to show that souls do not disperse and cease to exist when they are separated from bodies. To do so Plato
distinguishes two basic kinds of existents and shows that human souls—on account of their metaphysics, their cognitive activity, and their practical activity—do not belong to the dispersing kind. Yet Plato conspicuously fails to conclude that soul is a Being. He does so, as I will show, because the same activities of soul which preclude its admittance into Becoming preclude its admittance into Being as well. Hence, soul belongs to a third category, which is necessary if philosophy is practice for death and dying.

Kevin Olbrys, University at Albany, kolbrys@albany.edu
“Thought and Knowledge in the Euthydemus”

I argue in this paper that the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus present a coherent and more challenging theoretical position than previous commentators give them credit for. I carefully examine the brothers’ elenchoi and uncover a number of linguistic, epistemological, metaphysical and cognitive theses to which they must be committed. I then argue that they are not relativists, but epistemological infallibilists. Finally, I conclude that their position is stronger than Socrates’, and that if Plato wishes to replace their eristic with philosophical dialectic, he must engage their philosophical commitments more directly than Socrates has in the Euthydemus.

Michelle Panchuk, University of South Carolina, quallsm@email.sc.edu
“Induction, Justification and Explanation”

In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle presents an account of understanding as gained through scientific, deductive arguments. He points out that every deductive argument must proceed from primitives that cannot themselves derive from deductive arguments on pain of an infinite regress. It must be possible to gain understanding of these primitive concepts in another way: namely, through inductive inferences. Thus, all understanding of the world outside of the inquirer—all a posteriori knowledge—is fundamentally dependant on the success of inductive inference—the very kind of inference that has been undermined in the modern era. Indeed, the work of Hume in the eighteenth century and Goodman in the twentieth has cast doubt on the very possibility of justifying inductive reasoning. One might wonder if Aristotle simply failed to see the gap between experience of particulars and knowledge of universals. However, Aristotle’s model of perception as described in On the Soul so grounds his inductive inferences that such a gap never forms and, as a result, an Aristotelian account of induction may withstand the criticism prevalent in the modern era.

The first section of this paper will begin with an overview of Goodman’s version of the problem of induction. In this section, I will also briefly describe Godfrey-Smith’s response to Goodman, which appeals to the existence of natural kinds and show that, in the absence of an account of the mechanism by which the inquirer may gain epistemic access to those kinds, this approach fails.
In the second section, I will suggest that an Aristotelian approach to perception may provide the mechanism that Godfrey-Smith’s account lacks. I will begin by analyzing Aristotle’s account of concept formation through induction in the Posterior Analytics, followed by an explanation of how his model of perception in On the Soul renders this “stand” coherent. I will end the second section by explaining how the Aristotelian approach previously sketched provides a rigorous response to Goodman’s new problem of induction. In the last section, I acknowledge that Aristotelian epistemology as described in the previous section does not defeat the broader Humean brand of skepticism, but suggest that it may provide us with tools for avoiding, if not solving, skeptical arguments in contemporary philosophy. More specifically, I will ask if justification of inductive inference is the right kind of project in which to engage. Perhaps we may, along with Aristotle, explain how it is that we arrive at knowledge of the world without providing justification, as such, for believing we have done so. Perhaps this is all our rationality demands.

Michelle Panchuk, University of South Carolina, quallsm@email.sc.edu
“Divine Ideas for Metaphysical Realism”

Metaphysical realism, championed in the later half of the 20th century by philosophers such as Loux, Donagan, and Strawson, among others, suggests that particular entities in the world derive their identity from the relation in which they stand to universals. According to this position, these universals have a very real, though incorporeal, existence outside of the human mind. However, for philosophers of a theistic persuasion, this raises a significant question—a question that was the source of significant debate throughout the medieval period. What is the relationship, if any, between these universals and God? Are universals eternal ideas in the mind of God as Augustine suggests, or do they exist necessarily and independently of God as the possibilities according to which he created particulars? In this paper, I will suggest that the neo-platonic formulation of universals as ideas in the divine mind is the best way in which to understand that relationship. This perspective is both legitimate and even desirable for the theistic, contemporary metaphysical realist for the following three reasons. First, it avoids an overabundance of entities in the realist’s ontology. Second, it succeeds in avoiding the regress problems facing metaphysical realism in a more satisfying way than the standard realist position. Third, it provides a coherent framework of predication which maps onto the traditional understanding of the nature of God.

I will begin with a brief description of the metaphysical realist position and the criticism that it currently faces. I will then present three figures from the neo-platonic tradition of the ancient and medieval period who have made significant contributions to the transformation of Plato’s forms into ideas in the mind of God. In the fourth section, I suggest a modern formulation of the neo-platonic theory and describing how the said theory is both trim enough to escape Ockham’s razor and so grounded as to avoid any infinite regresses. Finally, in the conclusion I will propose
that theists may have good reason to accept this formulation of realism above and beyond the standard account.

Rachel Parsons, Princeton, parsonsr@princeton.edu
“Pleasure as Restoration in Plato’s Philebus”

In this paper I argue that Plato’s theory of pleasure in the Philebus is a general theory of pleasure as restoration. While many commentators have endorsed this view, they face difficulties in defending the view when it comes to the account of anticipatory pleasures and pure pleasures in the Philebus. I argue that a theory of pleasure as restoration is more defensible if we take the harmony that Plato describes at the beginning of the account of pleasure, and towards which he claims that (at least some) pleasure restores us, to be a harmony of the soul rather than, as most have assumed, the harmony of the body. Although Plato proceeds after introducing pleasure as the restoration of the harmony of living things to discuss bodily restorations in particular, this should not be taken to imply that the harmony referred to in the general characterization of pleasure is bodily. Rather, bodily restorations are a subset of psychic restorations, in that they relieve the soul of its concern with the body, thereby restoring the proper harmony of the soul. In order to further understand what Plato has in mind by the harmony of the soul, I refer to Republic IV, where Plato argues that the proper and natural ordering of the soul is one where the soul parts do their own work and where reason has authority over the other parts. After presenting this new approach to understanding the harmony of living things discussed in the Philebus, I proceed to demonstrate how it helps in establishing and defending an interpretation of Plato’s theory of pleasure as one of restoration. I also draw out some implications for the overall project in the Philebus of discovering what makes the good human life good.

Eric Perl, Loyola Marymount University, eperl@lmu.edu
“Plotinus on the Analogy of Temporality”

Eternity is often regarded today as the negation of time, and as such is dismissed with epithets such as “static,” “lifeless,” “frozen.” But such a view of the timelessness of intelligible being was already rejected by Plato (Sophist 248e-249a). For Plotinus, whose treatment of eternity and time draws not only on the Timaeus’ account of time as the image of eternity (37de) but also on this passage of the Sophist, eternity is the “other” to time not as its negation but as its paradigm. As such it is not “frozen,” but retains, in a higher, analogous way, all the multiplicity, difference, motion, activity, and life that are characteristic of time. Time, according to Plotinus, is “the life of soul in a transitive motion.” As soul passes from one thought-content to another, always looking ahead to what it does not yet have and leaving behind what it does have, it “temporalizes itself.” Time is thus defined by diastasis, the extendedness or “spreading out of life.” Time, therefore, is not sheer multiplicity, but is rather the unification of a multiplicity of contents into
the continuity of a single consciousness. It is precisely as a mode of unification that time is an extended image of eternity, which is the higher unification of the multiplicity of forms as the contents of intellectual apprehension. Eternity is the unextended life of intelligible being, that is, the activity of intellection, its thinking all the many distinct intelligibles. Plotinus’ account of eternity in III.7 must therefore be understood in terms of his discussions of the motion and life of intelligible reality in VI.2, VI.7, and elsewhere. In this way we can see that eternity is analogous to time as an activity of moving through a multiplicity of contents, but this motion is always already complete and so involves no “not yet,” and hence none of the extendedness that constitutes time as distinct from eternity. Eternity is therefore not the elimination but the concentration of time, preserving, at a higher level, all the active, vital features of time as the life of soul.

John Phillips, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, john-phillips@utc.edu

“Platonists on the Creator as Craftsman”

Plato’s depiction of the creator of the universe as a craftsman in the Timaeus became the subject of debate among his commentators in the Middle and Neo-Platonic eras. While theories of the attributes and functions of the Demiurge became increasingly complex, proponents and opponents of the craftsman analogy tended to take clear-cut positions at the extremes. Among the former, the second-century Platonist Atticus is perhaps the strongest representative. Atticus takes the unabashed stance that God as creator acts just as a builder or craftsman in fashioning the universe in bringing into existence what did not exist previously and maintaining his creation to prevent it from falling into ‘disrepair’ (Fr. 4, p. 53, 71-88 des Places). Examination of Atticus’ arguments and those of like-minded thinkers (e.g. Philo of Alexandria) shows that their adoption of this analogy was justified in various ways: (1) it promotes the concept of a provident God, (2) it allows for a proper conception of God as a creating agent, (3) it was thought to be a necessary outcome of a literal interpretation of the Timaeus, and (4) it serves to place acceptable limits on God’s transcendence. However, it would appear that he great majority of Platonists took pains to distance themselves from the analogy. Even Plutarch, who shared with Atticus a literal interpretation of the Timaeus, accepted only a strongly conditional version of the analogy. And the Neoplatonists took aim at it with polemical attacks. We find Porphyry and Proclus in particular leveling a number of criticisms at Atticus and his followers: (1) even Plato had reservations about treating God literally as a craftsman or builder, as we see in Republic 596a-597d, where he distinguishes God from a builder (τέκτων). Only the builder is he willing to call a craftsman (δημιουργός); God, on the other hand, in his creation of forms in nature, is a ‘begetter’ (φυτουργός). This distinction is exploited by Plutarch, and modified by Porphyry and Proclus; (2) appropriating Aristotle’s own craftsman analogies, which he employs predominantly to explain his idea of nature, these Neoplatonists turn the analogy against Atticus Plutarch to show that generation does not take place in time, but is eternal; and (3) as Platonism moves increasingly toward the view that God’s creative activity is an almost exclusively internal rather than external dynamic, the craftsman analogy becomes in the eyes of many Platonists obsolete.
and misleading. All of these issues are at the forefront of later Platonist debate, and indicate the importance that Platonists attached to the question of whether or not God is a craftsman.

Alan Pichanick, Villanova University, apichanick@yahoo.com
“Knowing Oneself Through Others in Plato’s First Alcibiades”

In Plato’s First Alcibiades, Socrates makes two important claims about the nature of the human soul. First, it is identical with intellect. Second, it is known only through the reflection of an other. Commentary on the dialogue has usefully focussed on the second claim, especially the light it sheds on ancient Greek conceptions of self-knowledge and identity in comparison to early modern conceptions. However, the first claim has often been rejected by commentators as leading to an anti-individualistic intellectual monism that does not capture the vagaries of human personhood. In this paper I hope to put this discussion in its proper context (Socrates’ education and love of Alcibiades), and by putting this dialogue about the soul in its dramatic context, I hope to shed light on the commentary on the two claims so stated. I will argue that when we see the the claims against this dramatic context, the commentary upon the first claim is not supported, but the commentary on the second claim is supported even more strongly.

Tiberiu Popa, Butler University, tpopa@butler.edu
“Hints at a Corpuscular Theory of Matter in Aristotle”

A number of passages in Aristotle (in Generation and Corruption, Meteorology, Generation of Animals etc.) argue for a view of matter that might appear to be decidedly un-Aristotelian, especially in view of his sustained attack on various brands of atomism. Instead of insisting on infinite divisibility, a notion that often accompanies his accounts of continua, Aristotle occasionally speaks of particles of matter that seem to be indivisible. Among other things, several dispositional properties such as the combustibility of wood are explained in terms of poroi or invisible channels of different types (arranged according to specific patterns in solid homoeomers), and of particles that can or cannot enter such poroi.

In my presentation I examine several relevant passages and I suggest that this paradox could be explained, at least partly, by distinguishing between theoretical indivisibility and de facto physical indivisibility (a notion based on Aristotle’s observations and rather rudimentary experiments). I will also consider a few passages from ancient commentators. Olympiodorus, for example, seems to imply an unnecessarily corpuscular or granular view of matter in Aristotle’s natural philosophy; this impression of flagrant misinterpretation is mitigated, however, if we consider Aristotle’s own rather curious references to minuscule masses (ogkoi) and his use of terms like leptomeres. Finally, I discuss several significant common points between Aristotelian texts that use such concepts and Theophrastus’ theory of matter (especially but not only in De igne) and I evaluate the significance of those similarities.
Nathan Powers, SUNY (Albany), npowers@albany.edu
“Plato’s Demiurge as Precursor to the Stoic Providential God”

Scholars of Hellenistic philosophy have long suspected that Plato’s *Timaeus* exercised a formative influence on the physical theory of the early Stoics. Attention has been focused especially on the Stoics’ choice and characterization of the world’s ultimate constituents: a rational principle (strongly reminiscent of Plato’s World-Soul) that pervades and controls a material principle (reminiscent, though somewhat less strongly, of Plato’s Receptacle). In this paper I make a suggestion about how the Stoics, as readers of the dialogue, may have approached *Timaeus*’ speech about the world’s origins: by largely disregarding the formal “prelude” (*prooimion*) to *Timaeus*’ speech and by concentrating their attention on the opening section of the speech proper (29d6 ff.), they would have arrived at a picture of the Demiurge as causing the physical world to come into being in accordance with his reasoning (*logismos*) about the best way for the world to be disposed. This suggestion, if correct, makes it appear probable that the basic philosophical appeal of the *Timaeus* for the Stoics—and perhaps indeed the reason it attracted their interest in the first place—lay not primarily (or at least not exclusively) in the dialogue’s claims about the Receptacle and World-Soul, but rather in its portrayal of the Demiurge as a providential planner.

Tony Preus, Binghamton University, apreus@binghamton.edu
“Teleological Nuances in Theophrastus and Aristotle”

Theophrastus’ *Metaphysics (On First Principles)* raises problems about certain kinds of teleological explanations. Several scholars have argued that this work was written during the lifetime of Aristotle, and suggest that it may be possible to trace subtle changes in the ways that Aristotle presents his natural teleology before and after Theophrastus wrote this work. This essay tests that hypothesis by trying to place particular works of Aristotle “before” and “after” the intervention by Theophrastus.

Eve Rabinoff, Boston College, rabinoff@bc.edu
“The Relationship of the Parts of the Soul in Aristotle’s *De Anima*”

Aristotle distinguishes kinds of soul by the capacities each has: the plant soul has the power of nutrition and reproduction alone, the animal soul has in addition to these the power of perception, and finally some rare souls have the power of reason, too. This paper addresses this issue of the complexity of the soul, seeking to understand the nature of its parts and correlatively the nature of its unity. Focusing on the plant and animals souls, it argues that the parts of the
soul are distinct only in speech, as Aristotle would say; in other words, the whole soul is implicated in each act of soul. As a result, the lower-order capacities of soul, when they are parts of a more complex soul, cannot be understood independently of the higher-order capacities, as it is, for example, in the plant soul. Put simply, the plant soul is not a part of the animal soul; rather, the nutritive capacity in the animal soul is reshaped by its thorough integration with the powers of perception. Such an understanding of the parts of the soul reveals that the soul is a cohesive whole, an ousia that is at the same time simple and complex.

Alessandro Raffi, Independent scholar, alesraffi@teletu.it
“The Struggle against Materialism in Plato and Aristotle”

One of the most relevant similarities which associates Plato’s philosophy to Aristotle’s philosophy is the fact they both struggled hard against their contemporaries’ materialistic doctrines. The aim of this work is to point out the analogies and differences among the strategies used by the two philosophers through a comparison between book X of Plato’s Laws and book VII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In book X of Laws, Plato states the materialists’ main mistake consists in denying the existence of a divine plan as the basis of the cosmic order. According to these philosophers “everything is produced by nature (physis), by chance (thyche) or by human art (techne). Theophrastus Metaphysics (On First Principles) raises problems about certain kinds of teleological explanations. Several scholars have argued that this work was written during the lifetime of Aristotle, and suggest that it may be possible to trace subtle changes in the ways that Aristotle presents his natural teleology before and after Theophrastus wrote this work. This essay tests that hypothesis by trying to place particular works of Aristotle “before” and “after” the intervention by Theophrastus. (laws 888e). Plato states the spread of these doctrines in the Greek world has caused a very dangerous effect: in fact he who doesn’t believe in the cosmos sacredness can’t therefore believe in the sacredness of laws and justice. From a point of view Aristotle maintains the world is eternal and that it wasn’t created by a divine Maker, as Plato states; from another point of view Aristotle agrees on the fact that natural processes can’t be explained just in terms of mechanical causes, but they must be understood in accordance with final causes. In book VII of Metaphysics we read: “Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature (physis), some by art (techne), some spontaneously (automaton)” (Metaphysics VII, 7 1032a), according to a model taken up in Physics, too. The criticism to materialism results therefore in two different upshots: in the Laws Plato sets the ontological supremacy of the matter against the ontological supremacy of the cosmic soul, seen as the connecting element between the world of the intelligible and the world of the tangible; Aristotle, in Metaphysics, sets the supremacy of the matter and of the efficient causes against the supremacy of the form and of the final causes.

Jean-Philippe Ranger, St. Thomas University, jpranger@stu.ca
“Is Hedonism Immoral or Inconsistent? Cicero’s Critical Response to Epicurean Ethics”
In this text, I examine Cicero’s criticism of Epicurean ethics in *De finibus II* to argue that we should pay attention to his intended audience to understand the different layers of criticism. Ultimately, I show that the most philosophically effective strategy Cicero adopts is to claim that Epicurean hedonism is incoherent. To claim it is immoral would be philosophically unsound on his part.

**Benjamin Rider**, University of Central Arkansas, brider@uca.edu

“Socratic Philosophy for Beginners? On Teaching Philosophy with Plato’s *Lysis*”

Plato’s *Lysis* is an intriguing dialogue—philosophically rich and suggestive, yet often frustratingly abstract and inconclusive. Much good work has been done in recent years exploring the philosophical arguments of the dialogue. But less positive has been given to the fact that its participants, other than Socrates, are all very young—Lysis and Menexenus, Socrates’ main discussion partners, are only about 13, while the other named characters, Hippothales and Ctesippus, are not much older. That Plato chooses to show Socrates in discussion with such young characters suggests (perhaps provisionally) that at least one intended audience for the dialogue is philosophical novices. Could it be that Plato wrote the *Lysis* in part to introduce philosophy to beginners? I explore this suggestion, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the *Lysis* from this perspective, drawing on my own experiences using the dialogue in introductory classes.

In many ways, the *Lysis* seems a poor candidate for introducing philosophy. Most philosophical novices (and more advanced philosophers, for that matter) prefer concrete examples and scenarios that they can use to make sense of abstract philosophical questions, but, remarkably, considering its apparent topic, the *Lysis* is very abstract and schematic. Moreover, Socrates presents his ideas and arguments very quickly, taking little time to develop each idea before refuting it and moving on to the next, making for a baffling read. How could a teacher expect philosophical novices, even relatively bright ones, to follow such arguments? Indeed, the internal evidence of the dialogue seems to confirm that Socrates’ arguments are either too advanced or abstractly expressed for such an audience—by the end, none of his young interlocutors seems entirely to have followed his conclusions!

However, as Socrates himself indicates, the ostensible topic of the dialogue—friendship, or, more precisely, how one person becomes philos to another—would seem to make an excellent subject for introducing philosophy, not only because most everyone, even children, has a good deal of personal experience with it, but also because it is something we don’t have to be persuaded to care about. Having had friends, we easily recognize the value our friends have in our lives and how they contribute to our happiness. But despite its centrality in our lives, friendship turns out to give rise to many tricky philosophical puzzles, as the dialogue illustrates. Beginning from common sense ideas about friendship, Socrates is able to create a series of
interesting puzzles for his young interlocutors to ponder. Therefore, even though the boys don’t fully grasp everything Socrates says (a not uncommon situation), they are nevertheless encouraged to engage with philosophical problems and to practice philosophical methods of thinking, and they gain something from the exercise. In my experience, if the teacher provides students with a framework for understanding of the theories and arguments of the *Lysis* and, in particular, for making its ideas concrete, it can be a valuable text for introducing philosophy to novices.

**Gregory Salmieri**, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, GSALMIERI@GMAIL.COM

“Alexander and the Choice to Think”

Alexander of Aphrodisias is a significant figure in the history of thought about free will—or, as the Greeks up it, what is “up to us.” His *De Fato* is a major source for the Stoics’ compatibilism, which he criticizes, and he is the earliest thinker we know of to explicitly endorse the incompatibilist position that an action is not free unless the agent could have done otherwise. These points are well recognized in the secondary literature, but there has been almost no discussion of the details of Alexander’s own account of what is up to us. This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by laying out the view of what is up to us that emerges from the *De Fato* and allied texts (the most important of which being *Quaestio* III.13).

Alexander’s position as I interpret in the paper can be summarized as follows: Each kind of entity has an essence which is expressed in certain causal powers. Thus the power to heat is essential to fire, and the power to roll is essential to balls. Essential to animals is the power of impulse—i.e., of acting on appearances. Each entity’s actions actions are caused by it, in the sense of being exercises of their own powers. However, as human beings we cause our actions in a unique way. The powers by which other entities act are all such that they are either always active or else activated by “causes that surround [them] from the outside.” Thus a ball’s power to role is activated by its being in a certain position, and an animal’s power of impulse is activated by various external stimuli. Because of this, these entities are not the principles of their own actions. Human beings, by contrast, are. As animals we have the power of impulse, but unlike animals we do not automatically assent to and act on the impulses triggered by external stimuli. Essential to us is the power of reason and deliberation, by which we can reject or modify impulses. This power is unique in that it is neither always active (sometimes we fail to deliberate and simply act on impulse) nor is its activity triggered by anything. Part of our essence is that it is up to us in each moment whether to deliberate, with our choice being the sole cause of our doing so. Deliberating is the only thing that is up to us in this primary way. But because whether we deliberate affects which impulses we assent to, everything we do qua animal is up to us in a derivative way. What is directly up to us in any moment is simply whether to be rational, our specific conclusions and actions then qualify as up to us insofar as they are either rational or irrational.
The paper elaborates and Alexander’s position, and argues that his view has significant advantages over other incompatibilist positions.

**Thanassiss Samaras**, George Washington University, samaras@gwu.edu  
“The Concept of “Polity” in Aristotle’s Politics”

In this paper I argue for two theses:

First, I suggest that the term *politeia* (in the sense of a specific constitution, often translated as “polity”) is a generic term which includes four different constitutions which Aristotle discusses in Books III and IV of the *Politics*.

Second, I propose that both the “mixed” and the “middle” constitutions of Books III–IV share common principles which are embodied in the concept of “polity”. Essentially, every “middle” constitution is mixed and “mixed” constitutions will, in practice, look very much like “middle” ones.

According to my interpretation, there are four distinct versions of polity: the democracy aiming at the common good of 1279a37-39; the “mixed” regime of IV 8 and 9; the constitution with the large middle class of IV 11; and the “first kind of democracy” of 1291b30–38 and 1292b23–34. This interpretation has certain implications for the widely debated question of what really is Aristotle’s “best” constitution. I argue that a satisfactory solution to this problem may be reached if we accept two premises:

In the middle Books of the *Politics* Aristotle follows, implicitly but most clearly, the constitutional typology of Plato’s *Politicus* 302b ff. In this mapping, “polity” corresponds to Plato’s right kind of democracy, the weakest of “good” constitutions.

In addition, although “polity” cannot be the best regime absolutely (pace e.g. Bluhm and Nichols), it can still be best under certain circumstances. Technically, and because of Aristotle’s dependence on the ranking of the *Politicus*, monarchy (*pambasileia*: as I have argued elsewhere, a concept which can be plausibly interpreted as rule by philosopher-rulers or by Macedonian kings) is the best regime, followed by aristocracy (the “city of our prayers” of Books VII and VIII), while “polity” would be a poor third. Nevertheless, if different constitutional forms are best under different social and political conditions (a position supported by Mulhern’s reading of *mia monon pantachou kata physin he ariste* in *Nichomachean Ethics* 1135a5), a more appealing solution to the “best constitution” emerges. Monarchy can be better for Macedonia or a city ruled by a virtuous tyrant. Aristocracy can be established and work well in areas where a fully leisured Greek citizen body may subdue and put to work a local barbaric population; this is what the Macedonian conquest of Asia Minor could make possible for some Greeks. But in the cities of old Greece, south of Macedonia, none of these solution can apply, and thus a constitution
combining oligarchic and democratic principles (and thus “mixed”) and/or dominated by a middle class (curtailling the power of the rich, but disenfranchising the propertyless) may be the best these cities can hope for.

**Eric Sanday**, University of Kentucky, eric.sanday@uky.edu
"The Meaning of ‘Life’: The Disanalogy between City and Soul in Plato’s Republic"

In the *Politics*, Aristotle famously criticizes the *polis* of Plato’s *Republic* for being too unified. This paper argues that the dispute between them turns on the different ways Plato and Aristotle understand ‘life.’ Aristotle assumes that they have in mind the same object of analysis, but Plato’s object of inquiry is not the *polis*; rather, it is the good life, which is subject to greater unity of parts than a *polis* (regardless of whether we conceive of *polis* in terms of its individuals, families, offices, or classes). Of course, we might wonder why Plato uses the *polis* as a model for understanding the good life. I argue that not that Plato believed a *polis* to have the same type of unity as the soul but that the difference between the unity of soul and *polis* is instrumental to Socrates in the context of educating Glaucon and Adeimantus. Socrates uses the model of a unity of separate individuals to understand many things, e.g. the tripartition of soul, virtue, *polis*, in order to draw out the preconceptions being made by Adeimantus and Glaucon, to reveal an important but necessary guiding error according to which they live and think, and ultimately to help Glaucon and Adeimantus turn toward the good life. I conclude by asking a question of Aristotle. How does Aristotle understand virtue if it is the case that a multiplicity of autonomous persons can sometimes manifest greater virtue than a single person, or a single life? Given that, for Plato, the model of agent-like interaction between different, autonomous, parts is inappropriate for understanding virtue, how might Aristotle respond to the objection we can imagine Plato making to Aristotle’s conception of virtue? In order to answer this question, I propose that it would help us to understand the difference between what Plato and Aristotle mean by ‘life’.

**Kirk Sanders**, University of Illinois, ksanders@illinois.edu
"The Shifting Sense of ‘Self-Sufficiency’ in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*"

In this paper, I examine a family of arguments employed by Aristotle in his efforts to specify in what happiness (*eudaimonia*) consists. I focus in particular on the distinct, and potentially incompatible, senses of self–sufficiency (*autarkeia*) at play in those arguments. In NE 1.7, Aristotle introduces two formal criteria that any candidate for the *summum bonum* must satisfy. The first of these is completeness, about which Aristotle has the following to say: “We call that which is pursued as an end in itself more complete that that which is pursued for the sake of something else; and what is never chosen as a means to something else we call more complete than that which is chosen both as an end in itself and as a means to something else. What is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is called
complete in an unqualified sense” (NE 1.7, 1097a30–4). The second criterion is self–sufficiency, for which Aristotle’s definition is as follows: “[W]e define as ‘self–sufficient’ that which taken by itself makes life something desirable and deficient in nothing” (NE 1.7, 1097b14–16). Both criteria figure importantly into Aristotle’s claims throughout NE 1 regarding the nature of happiness.

When Aristotle returns to the subject of the nature of happiness in NE 10, however, he makes the following claim in support of his identification of the highest form of happiness with contemplation: “Moreover, what is usually called ‘self–sufficiency’ will be found in the highest degree in the activity which is concerned with theoretical knowledge. Like a just man and any other virtuous man, a wise man requires the necessities of life; once these have been adequately provided, a just man still needs people toward whom and in company with whom to act justly, and the same is true of the self–controlled man, a courageous man, and all the rest. But a wise man is able to study even by himself, and the wiser he is, the more is he able to do so.” (NE 10.7, 1177a27–34)

I suggest that Aristotle’s arguments concerning happiness in NE Books 1 and 10 conflate two distinct senses of self–sufficiency: that of an end itself, and that of an agent with respect to some end. It is of the former that Aristotle offers a definition in NE 1.7: an end is self–sufficient if it “lacks nothing” and by itself makes life desirable. But Aristotle’s remarks in NE 10.7, for example, appeal to the latter sense: the less need an agent has for anything beyond his own resources to attain a given end, the more self–sufficient the agent is with respect to the end in question.

Unfortunately, there is no antecedent reason for supposing that these two kinds of self–sufficiency will coincide in such a way that agents will be (entirely, or even mostly) self–sufficient in the relevant sense with respect to ends that are self–sufficient in their relevant sense. Indeed, in light of comments on human nature that Aristotle himself makes in both NE and Pol., I wish to suggest further that any plausible formulation of a self-sufficient end — i.e., one what makes a human life desirable — would not afford agents the level of self–sufficiency that is central to Aristotle’s argument in NE 10.7. This conclusion highlights what I contend is an irreconcilable tension between the conception of happiness in Books 1 and 10 of the NE.

Denise Schaeffer, College of the Holy Cross, dschaeff@holycross.edu
“The Theory and Practice of Politike in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”

A precise understanding of what Aristotle means by politike seems called for by the fact that “a wide range of social theorists...claim to have found in Aristotle’s discourse of politike the correct foundation, or at least proper point of departure, for a new and more satisfying kind of ethical and political thought.” (Wallach 1992, 613) When we turn to the Nicomachean Ethics, however, we notice ambiguities in the concept of politike that make it difficult to define clearly.
Most importantly, it seems to undergo a shift in meaning between the first and second times Aristotle discusses it. When \textit{politike} is first introduced in Book I, Aristotle uses the term to refer to his own activity—the pursuit of knowledge of the highest good for human beings—which he calls “a kind of \textit{politike}” (1094b10-11). After Book I, \textit{politike} is not mentioned again until Book VI, where Pericles rather than Aristotle—the statesman rather than the political philosopher—is presented as the model of \textit{politike}. Here, the practical side rather than the theoretical side of \textit{politike} is emphasized, which is striking in light of the fact that this occurs in the context of a discussion of intellectual virtue. This leads us to wonder about Aristotle’s view of the relationship between practical statesmanship and political science.

What further complicates the status of \textit{politike} in the \textit{Ethics} is its ambiguous relationship to \textit{phronesis}. The distinction between the two, which is clouded in Book VI, must be sorted out in order to better understand the relationship between politike as statesmanship and politike as a theoretical pursuit (or between Pericles and Aristotle). In VI.8 Aristotle states that \textit{politike} and \textit{phronesis} are the same disposition or characteristic (\textit{hexis}) but differ in being. What does this mean, and what does it tell us about Aristotle’s view of politics and political philosophy?

Scholars offer various perspectives on the question of the relationship between \textit{phronesis} and \textit{politike}. I shall emphasize the degree to which their relationship can be understood in terms of their relationship to \textit{techne}. Insofar as one purpose of \textit{politike} is to make citizens good or virtuous, it must be concerned with making or producing, which makes it a \textit{techne}. And \textit{phronesis}, Aristotle states explicitly, is definitely not an art. (1140b24) This is consistent with the way \textit{politike} is represented in Book VI; however, if \textit{politike} is (simply) an art, we must ask, how does the term apply to Aristotle’s own activity in writing the \textit{Ethics}? I will argue that while the architectonic quality of \textit{politike} seems on the surface to drop out as the \textit{Ethics} progresses, it is always implicit as a necessary addition to \textit{phronesis}, which cannot reproduce itself in another.

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\textbf{Krisanna Scheiter}, University of Pennsylvania, scheiter@sas.upenn.edu
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“Aristotle on the Faculty of Phantasia”

\textit{Phantasia} is one of the most important faculties in Aristotle’s psychology and perhaps the most difficult to decipher. In this paper I focus on the role of \textit{phantasia} in judgment (\textit{hupolepsis}), which has been either overlooked or misunderstood. For Aristotle \textit{phantasia} explains how our perceptions and thoughts are sometimes in error; however, \textit{phantasia} itself is not the kind of thing that is capable of being true or false. I argue that \textit{phantasia} is just the capacity (\textit{dunamis}) to retain, store and recall sense perceptions, which is necessary for a long list of other psychological capacities, namely, memory, recollection, dreaming, thinking, understanding, desiring, locomotion, perceiving incidental and common objects, emotion and making judgments. Understanding the role of \textit{phantasia} in judgment is crucial for understanding the faculty of \textit{phantasia} in general and how it functions to bring about other psychological capacities.
I begin the paper by laying out the context in which Aristotle discusses *phantasia* in *De Anima*, which I think is key to understanding his remarks on *phantasia*. There has been little attention to the context of his discussion. Many commentators read *De Anima* III.3 as a chapter on *phantasia* when in actuality the chapter is primarily about how it is possible for our perceptions and thoughts to be in error.

Aristotle adopts what he calls the “ancient view” of perception and thought, namely, that “like is understood and perceived by like” (427a26-28). On this view, we perceive an object, like an oak tree, because that object really exists in the world and is interacting with our eye in some way. On the ancient account, we cannot perceive an oak tree unless there really is an oak tree affecting our sense organ. A telephone pole cannot cause us to see an oak tree, since the telephone pole is unlike the oak tree. Yet Aristotle observes that our perceptions and thoughts are often in error. Sometimes we do mistake the telephone pole for a tree. Aristotle wants to maintain the ancient principle, like causes like, while still accounting for error. Thus, he must add something, namely *phantasia*, to perception and thought in order to explain how it is that we are sometimes in error. Many commentators read *phantasia* as the kind of thing capable of being true or false, but this is an incorrect interpretation. *Phantasia* is just a capacity to recall past sense perception and these images are not themselves true or false. Aristotle claims that whenever there is “falsehood and truth there is some combination of thought” (430a26-28), but an image (*phantasmata*) is not a combination of thought. It is simply a past sense perception.

The fact that *phantasia* is only the capacity to retain and recall past sense perceptions should in no way diminish the importance of *phantasia*. Without the ability to recall previous sense perceptions and manipulate them in various ways all other cognitive capacities, such as thought, desire, locomotion, emotion, and judgment would be impossible, according to Aristotle.

Anne-Marie Schultz, Baylor University, Anne_Marie_Schultz@baylor.edu

“This dialogue offers a challenging call for philosophers to take on a more prominent role in the public sphere.”

Unfortunately, the *Protagoras* is often overshadowed by the hegemony of the *Republic* and the *Apology* in interdisciplinary humanities programs, traditional introduction to philosophy courses, and surveys of ancient philosophy as well. This omission is particularly unfortunate because the dialogue as a whole, and the various character portraits it contains, are valuable resources in our ongoing endeavors to engage students through interdisciplinary education. The dialogue engages a number of important themes that are helpful to consider in the overall context of contemporary higher education: the value of education in and of itself, what we hope to become with the education we receive, the role of education in the cultivation of good citizenship. As I see it, this dialogue offers a challenging call for philosophers to take on a more prominent role in the public sphere.”
I will focus on two small parts of the *Protagoras*, namely, its two prologues: the opening exchange between Socrates and the unnamed auditor of the dialogue (309a-310a) and the Socrates-Hippocrates exchange (310b-314c). Though I am focusing on a text and canonical figure of the philosophical tradition, I see Socrates and his pedagogical endeavors throughout the dialogues as a symbol of the liberal arts educator regardless of the particular disciplinary specialization. Thinkers like Plato and Socrates lived and worked before there were strong distinctions between the disciplines as we know them. In this way, they can serve as powerful models for interdisciplinary liberal educators in their endeavors to reach a broader student base. Their legacy to us is a call to live and work beyond the bounds of our disciplinary perspectives.

Mark Sentesy, Boston College, sentesy@bc.edu
“The Terms of the Definition of Movement”

It is widely believed the potency and actuality are opposites in Aristotle. This essay examines three forms of this opposition hypothesis—the Actualization, Privation, and Modal hypotheses—and argues that they are untenable, and that instead, it is necessary to argue for the compatibility of *dynamis* and *energeia*. This argument is supported first by critical examination of the texts taken to support the Opposition Hypotheses, and then, by a discussion of Aristotle’s argument against the Megarians in *Metaphysics* IX, which shows that if potency and actuality are incompatible, movement is self-contradictory and therefore impossible. The discussion closes by asking whether it is circular of Aristotle to define movement through *dynamis* and *energeia*, and then in *Metaphysics* IX, to work out what *dynamis* and *energeia* are starting from movement.

J. Clerk Shaw, University of Tennessee, jshaw15@utkux.utcc.utk.edu
“Shame and Plato’s Political Philosophy”

Plato defines shame as a species of fear. Fear he defines as an anticipation of something bad (e.g. Pr. 358d, La. 198b, [Def.] 415e). Shame has as its differentia the particular bad thing feared; it is fear of a bad reputation (Eu. 12b, [Def.] 416). But this account contains multitudes.

First, as with fear generally, the object of shame (bad reputation) can be feared either finally or for the sake of something else. That is, X might fear Y’s thinking badly of her for its own sake, or X might fear Y’s thinking badly of her because she thinks it may have consequences that X considers bad for her—or, of course, she may fear Y’s thinking badly of her for both reasons. Plato draws this contrast; when he discusses how the attitudes of others shape our souls, he distinguishes between their doing so directly and their doing so indirectly, through fear of punishment (R. 490e-496e).

Second, which of these varieties of shame a given person experiences varies according to whose opinion of her is at issue. X might fear Y’s thinking badly of her finally, but Z’s thinking badly
of her instrumentally. In particular, certain elites might fear their peers’ opinions finally, but fear majority opinion instrumentally. I choose this example because here too I think Plato thematizes this distinction (esp. *Symp.* 194b-d). (The distinction among difference “audiences” of shame suggests the special case of shame in one’s own eyes, or fear of thinking badly of oneself; this sort of shame is a condition on the possibility of “internalized shame”—shame felt even when relevant external audiences are absent.)

Third and finally, when it comes to discussing the dramatic role of shame in Plato’s dialogues, we will want to distinguish two relevant kinds: dramatic shame (the actual occurrence of shame in the events of the dialogue) and the residue of antecedent shame (the ways in which characters’ souls, actions, and emotions can or must be understood as having been shaped by shame felt before the events of the dialogue).

Having drawn these distinctions, I discuss the following important species of shame in Plato’s dialogues: the residue in the souls of elites left by antecedent shame before the masses felt instrumentally—for the sake of punishment and reward. I explore this variety using Callicles as an example.

**Danesh Singh**, Binghamton University (SUNY), danesh.singh@gmail.com

“The Role of Perspectivism in the Normative Visions of Nietzsche and Zhuangzi”

Perspectives play an important role in the thought of Nietzsche and Zhuangzi precisely because both believe their normative visions are facilitated by a change in perspective. We have good reason to understand the greater aims of both thinkers to be concerned with facilitating a cognitive transformation that awakens us to more authentic forms of life.

The structural similarities in their respective ethical views can be largely explained by the similarities in their epistemological views, which make use of a version of perspectivism, the view that normative judgments are made within a particular perspective. Nietzsche and Zhuangzi have a conception of truth in which judgments are always made in accordance with our human perspective, but they are not made true by that perspective.

The perspectives that Zhuangzi and Nietzsche endorse are best understood in the context of the structure of transformation. Transformation generally assumes that humans are somehow deficient and require the realization of a different way of life. I understand transformation in both thinkers to be therapeutic in nature, in that there is a move from an unfulfilled state to a fulfilled one which coincides with a return to certain more authentic modes of living in the world. This movement from an unfulfilled to fulfilled state can be mapped onto what I take to be critical or negative, and constructive or positive, aspects to both thinkers’ overall normative visions. On the negative side, Nietzsche and Zhuangzi believe that most people live deeply dissatisfying lives. It is due to the fact that people have misguided views that they lead lives that are in some
way deficient. These misguided views result from social forces; the aim is to correct these mistaken judgments, and on the positive side, to replace them with others that more truly represent who we are. In place of Christian morality, Nietzsche puts forth a naturalized philosophy in which we give primacy to the value of life. Zhuangzi calls for a return to alternative sources of guidance that originate in our spontaneous intuitions. The goal is to unlearn social convention in order to allow these intuitions to emerge so as to live in accordance to them.

**Charles Snyder**, New School for Social Research, snydc357@newschool.edu

“Paradigmatic Possibility in Plato’s *Republic*”

Talk about how a city or regime ought to be governed if it is to be the best city or regime is a special sort of talk about possibility, my remarks will claim. Understanding why Socrates claims his response to the third wave is paradoxical depends on identifying a primary sense of possibility, or the ‘most of all possible’ (472e), as distinct in kind from the kind of ordinary or practicable possibility Glaucon demands. My paper, on this basis, will attempt an understanding of Socrates’ paradoxical argument for philosophers reigning or kings genuinely and adequately philosophizing.

**Richard Sorabji**, Wolfson College, Oxford, richard.sorabji@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

“Non-violence as Universal Love: Origins and Gandhi’s supplements to Tolstoy”

Gandhi was converted to non-violence by Tolstoy, but what was Tolstoy’s conception? What did Gandhi add to it and what subtract? What killing did Gandhi accept as non-violent? Why did he countenance some violent killing, while still thinking it wrong, and how did he differ from pacifists? Can we benefit either from his idea of non-violence or from his idea of non-violent resistance?

**Sophia Stone**, Purdue University, sstone@purdue.edu

“Plato’s Metaphysics of Soul”

What is Plato’s metaphysics of soul? The answer to this question is elusive. Scholars have written on Plato’s account of soul and Plato’s ethics, but none (to my knowledge) have written specifically what Plato’s metaphysics of soul is. Even Plato himself admits, “to describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account,” indeed, he claims that it is, “altogether a task for a god in every way.” (*Phaedrus*, 245a2-3) When we read Plato’s dialogues, especially what are taken to be the middle and late dialogues, we see various attempts by Plato to give an account of soul. From an ethical view, soul is important for a happy and just life. (*Republic*, 545a) From
an epistemological view, soul is that instrument by which we come to know values, comprehend mathematics and the forms. *(Republic, 518 c-d)* Yet when we come to Plato’s metaphysical claims about the soul we see an account that is very much in progress. In the *Phaedo*, for instance, “soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself,” (80b) and soul is not divided. In the *Phaedrus* and in the *Republic*, we get different tripartite divisions of soul though it is unclear whether these divisions are made for explanatory purposes for Plato’s psychological account or whether the divisions are due to metaphysical principles. When we get to the *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, we get fuller metaphysical accounts of the world and of beings. In the *Timaeus*, from a disordered chaos of various stuffs, god ordered and constructed the *kosmos*, “a single living thing that contains within itself all living things, mortal and immortal.” (69c2-3) Raphael Demos called these the three creative factors and the other the created factor. First, for Plato, the creative factors are: the maker (god), the receptacle (matrix of creation) and Form (pattern of creation). For the created factor, we have the creature, the sensible and temporal world. In the *Philebus*, Plato has Socrates enumerate four metaphysical principles that structure the world: *apeiron*, the unlimited; *peiron*, the limit; *summeixis*, the mixture; and *aitia*, the cause. (27c) These are the metaphysical concepts and principles of Plato’s later dialogues. Embedded somewhere is Plato’s metaphysics of soul. This paper seeks to show that Plato’s metaphysics of soul, whatever that is, is always connected with a life.

**Carrie Swanson**, Indiana University (Bloomington), nous@eden.rutgers.edu

“Threading the Labyrinth in *Euthydemus* 288d5-292e5”

In the Epilogue of the *Euthydemus*, Socrates advances a curious argument (305e5-306d1) for the rank ordering of the arts on display in the dialogue: philosophy and the art of politics, speechwriting and eristic argumentation, and (by implication) Socratic dialectic. A crucial premise in Socrates’ argument is the claim that while both philosophy and politics are good, each is related to something different (*ei men oûn hê philosophia agathon estin kai hê politîkê praxis, pros allo de hekatera*, 306b2-3). I offer an interpretation of this statement and explain its philosophical motivation. It will emerge that its meaning lies hidden in the ‘labyrinth’ (*laburinthon*, 291b7)—as Socrates calls it— that constitutes the aporia of Socrates’ second protreptic interview with Cleinias (288d5-292e5). I provide an analysis of the aporia and demonstrate that the *Euthydemus* contains the conceptual resources needed for its solution. In particular, I show that Socrates’ assertion in the Epilogue that philosophy and politics are both good but are both *pros allo* provides a crucially important clue that points the way out of the labyrinth: dialectic and politics are directed at ‘different things’ insofar as the former is a ‘using’ art, the latter a ‘producing’ art. It follows that, contrary to solutions current in the literature on the dialogue, it is dialectic, and not the statesman’s art alone, that is properly said to be the superordinate art that, combining using and making, completes human happiness. My solution to the aporia of the second protreptic episode also reveals the motivation behind the odd contrivance of Cleinias’ ‘disappearance’ and Socrates’ ‘ventriloquism’ at 290e1-291a7. Cleinias
drops out of the conversation just at the point that Socrates’ search for a superordinate art that will complete human happiness takes a wrong turn. Cleinias’ temporary submergence is a device that is intended to draw our attention to this fact: as an absolute beginner in dialectic, Cleinias is not able to grasp the relation between the philosopher’s knowledge of the theory of forms and his productive capacity as statesman to impose the blueprint of the Kallipolis on the material world.

Sonja Tanner, University of Colorado, stanner@uccs.edu
“Comedy as Self-Forgetting: Implications for Sallis’ Reading of Plato’s Cratylus”

John Sallis’ Being and Logos was first published several decades ago, but its significance for how we interpret Plato remains salient. Specifically, Sallis not only reads Plato’s Cratylus comedically, he attributes to such comedy a philosophical function. Rather than directly defending Sallis’ interpretation, namely that the Cratylus and its etymologies should be read as comedy, this paper asks what the philosophical implications are of taking Platonic comedy seriously, as Sallis does, and attempts an answer by exploring a joke repeatedly returned to in the Cratylus—that as to the veracity of Hermogenes’ name. The joke exposes a surprising point of identity amongst Hermogenes’ radical conventionalism on the status of names (onoma) and Cratylus’ naturalistic position. The identity of such seemingly disparate positions consists in the lack of measure (metron) made evident by the incongruity between both speakers’ expressly stated positions, and their actions in the dialogue itself. This incongruity between speakers’ words and deeds is brought to light in the little joke as to Hermogenes’ true name. Tied to the question of self-knowledge, comedy in Platonic dialogues, I argue, exposes ignorance of one’s own ignorance, a lack of true self-identity, and the hubristic pretensions to exceed oneself. Positively, comedy presents the possibility of “getting the joke” and thus of a greater fulfillment of the Delphic imperative. This positive function, however, relies upon the ability to recognize comedy in its “peculiar seriousness,” and for this, Sallis’ interpretation of the Cratylus is crucial.

R. Gregory Taylor, New Jersey City University, rgtaylor@acm.org
“Stoic Semantic Theory and the Principle of Substitutivity”

Surviving accounts of the semantic theory of the Stoics attest their affirmation of the principle of substitutivity of coreferential expressions. However, there is no evidence that the Stoics recognized the possibility of contexts, for example, those engendered by belief reports, to which said principle might fail to apply in a straightforward way. This has been regarded as a deficiency of Stoic semantics when compared with the semantics of Frege and his English-speaking followers; we wish to challenge this view.

Modern writers on the Stoics have wrongly assimilated the indirect discourse constructions of Attic Greek, specifically, those involved in rendering belief reports, to those of modern German and English. Our review of relevant aspects of Greek usage, giving special attention to the
manner in which Greek writers regularly apply transparency-promoting focus to the subjects of belief reports, suggests that belief reports, as routinely rendered in Attic Greek, never constitute clear instances of contexts in which the principle of substitutivity fails.

John Thorp Thorp, University of Western Ontario, jthorp@uwo.ca
“The Symphytic Air-Envelope: a Curious Aristotelian Thought-Experiment”

This paper is about a curious thought-experiment that Aristotle elaborates in *De Anima* II, 11, his chapter on the sense of touch. He sees that the sense of touch is unlike the other senses in at least two important ways: first, it does not require a medium between the organ and the object, and second, it would appear to have more than one proper sensible: the texture, the hard and the soft (penetrability), temperature, and perhaps more. This leads him to float the radical idea that the sense of touch might in fact not be one sense at all, but a conflation of several – a texture sense, a penetrability sense, a temperature sense, etc. And in this case the flesh would not be the organ of these senses, but rather the medium; the different organs would lie beneath the flesh, deeper in the body. Such a view would be intellectually tidy, for it would bring the touch senses into line with with other senses: all would require a medium, and each would have only one proper sensible. But why is it, then, that we unreflectively take touch to be a single sense?

Aristotle investigates this question by developing a thought-experiment, a thought-experiment whose implications have never, in my view, been adequately explored by the commentators. He imagines a web or envelope made of air, which covers the body, indeed which is organically united to the body because it grows over it (*symphyei*). He says that if we had such a web growing onto us, we would take sight and hearing and smell and taste to be a single sense – much in the way that we now take temperature, texture, and penetrability to be the province of single sense of touch. Each of us, one might say, would be like Xenophanes’ god: the whole of him sees, the whole of him hears….

This is a brilliantly imaginative idea of course, but what does it imply? What does it tell us about Aristotle’s presuppositions in this whole discussion of sensation? If you think it through carefully, it would imply that the living body is not aware of sensory stimuli at the organs that they stimulate, unless those organs happen to be at the surface of the body. Rather, the living body is (or would be) aware of sensory stimuli at the point on the surface of the body where they strike. And if the whole of the surface of the body – i.e. the outer surface of the air-envelope – were indifferently receptive to light and sound and smell and taste, then we would take sight and hearing and smell and taste to be a single sense.

And what this in turn would seem to show is that Aristotle is working with an undeclared idea that the animal body is primitively aware of the state of the surface of its body: Aristotelian bodies have body-sense, have proprioception.
This paper investigates the profound implications of the foregoing for Aristotle’s philosophy of mind.

Hugo Tiburtino, University of São Paulo, hugotiburtino@gmail.com
“The Origin of Instrumentality of Logic”

All nowadays scholars agree that Aristotle himself didn’t set that his logical writings are an instrument, an Organon. They do not agree, however, on who started this tradition: some say that it comes from Andronicus of Rhodes, at I BC., others, from the first peripatetics, at III BC. I’m going to argue that the late antique commentators started it, i.e., Alexander of Aphrodisias and his master. I shall rely on two things: 1) we have no report of the instrumentality of logic before the II century AD, even when we should expect one and 2) the references of these commentators to the ancient peripatetic is explained by the fact that they did believe that Aristotle thought so.

Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, Antioch College, lewcassity@hotmail.com
“The Role of Property Classes in Plato’s Laws”

While Glenn Morrow (1960) has minimized the oligarchic tendencies of Magnesia, noting that relatively few offices are restricted to members of the highest property classes (timēmata), Strauss (1975) has emphasized that the organization of boulē along with other aspects of the regime give a substantial political advantage to the wealthy (cf. Politics 2.6.1266a6-7). In this paper I investigate why Plato gives the wealthy the influence that he does, especially as the Laws states in one passage that no offices should be assigned on the basis of wealth (ploutos) (4.714b7-8).

The organization of the Magnesian boulē can be variously explained in terms of oligarchic ideology (cf. Ostwald 2000, Politics 4.81293b36), concessions to the irremediable beliefs of the citizens (5.746a), pragmatic attempts to promote civic philia, or the attempt to supervise and control the economic life of the polis. My analysis seeks to emphasize Plato’s uncomfortable relationship with the role of wealth in the polis. Because Plato acknowledges “sharp-sighted wealth” (1.631c4-5) as a good for human beings and property taxes (eisphorai) (5.744b6) as contributing to the well-being of the polis, property qualifications do play a role in Magnesia. The “evil praising of wealth (ploutos)” practiced by nearly all Greeks and barbarians (9.870b7), however, is to be replaced by the teaching that “children should left an abundance of awe (aidōs) rather than gold” (5.729b1-2). The teaching of the Laws, I will argue, is in keeping with Socrates’ prayer at the end of the Phaedrus: while only the wise person is truly rich, members of Plato’s 4th century polis are permitted to hope for as much wealth as a moderate person can bear (279b9-c3).
Daryl Tress, tress@fordham.edu
“Theory and History in Plato’s Timaeus”

A key tenet of Plato’s physics and metaphysics is that matter is unstable. The *Timaeus* gives the most detailed account of the genesis of matter and the flux of the material world. The explanation fits well within the comprehensive cosmogony Timaeus presents. But what is it that initially prompts Plato’s idea of the instability of matter and material things, a counter-intuitive view that Plato takes further than do most other philosophers? In this paper I offer a hypothesis stemming from the *Timaeus*’ introductory conversation. There, Critias speaks at length of what he heard about history as a boy but had forgotten until he listened to Socrates speak the day before about an ideal city. Human history, specifically its far greater depth in past time than Hellenic culture had recognized, can shed important light on Plato’s outlook on matter and material things. I suggest that Plato’s acquaintance with proposals about history’s extent and patterns of repeated destruction – like the one Solon recounted – factor into his theory of matter. There were compelling reasons to endorse such proposals. So, a connection emerges between subject areas, namely history and physical theory, which normally seem quite distinct. Additionally, this connection strengthens the dialogue’s unity by showing a relation between its introduction and Timaeus’ presentation.

Franco Trivigno, Marquette University, franco.trivigno@mu.edu
“The Life of an Action in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”

In this paper, I argue that the appropriate normative description of an action in Aristotle is often underdetermined well after the action can reasonably be said to be completed. This is because whether an action counts as virtuous or vicious, continent or incontinent, depends at least to some degree both on the agent’s history with respect to such actions and her future. This explains, in part, why Aristotle insists that we cannot call someone happy until after he has lived “a complete life” (*NE* 1098a17-9), a point which is later discussed in detail (1100a10ff.). An action has a life, then, in the sense that its ethical significance can often only be determined by investigating the course of the agent’s life both leading up to the action and subsequent to it. In this paper, I propose to focus on the way that the future affects the action in order to show that, for Aristotle, actions have a kind of built-in indeterminacy or instability. In what follows, I examine three different examples in which the normative description of an action cannot be determined until well after the action is completed. The first concerns actions undertaken in ignorance of the particulars, in which the future presence or absence of regret determines whether or not the ignorance is excusing. The second concerns the actions of young people, whose actions require a future in order to properly evaluate. The last concerns virtuous actions, which require a ‘firm and unchanging state’—a state which can only be decisively established by a future life of similarly virtuous actions. Since actions have lives in that their significance is tied to the life of the agent, I claim, they simply cannot play the role in virtue ethics that some contemporary neo-Aristotelians would have them play. In short, I mean to cast doubt on the
extent to which a theory of right action can be formulated on virtue ethics’ behalf. Instead, I suggest, virtue ethics can formulate a theory of good action, whereby an action is good to the extent that it is constitutive of a flourishing life.

Tomás Troster, USP (University of São Paulo), ttroster@gmail.com
“Aristotle’s Deductions: Concept and Reductions”

Aristotle says: “It is possible to lead all the deductions back (anagagein pantas tous sullogismous) into the universal deductions (katholou sullogismous) in the first figure” (Prior Analytics, I, 7, 29 b 1-2 – Translated by Robin Smith). After considering what is Aristotle’s sullogismos, and what he means with “leading back” / “reducing” (anagagein) them, I present a way to lead back even these two deductions into only one. It is possible to do this using the same methods Aristotle used to lead back deductions (Pr. An., I, 2-7), and considering that except for particular negative deductions, all deductions always deduce several things (Pr. An., II, 1).

Rosemary Twomey, CUNY-Graduate Center, rosemary.twomey@gmail.com
“Hulê Noêtê and Its Role in the Perception of Noêta”

At EN 1169a31-1170b1, Aristotle asserts that we perceive that we think (noein). This claim is initially problematic, for thinking is distinguished from perception partly in terms of their respective objects (voêta and aisthêta) (cf. DA 429a15-19). If thought is perceptible, however, the strength of this contrast comes under scrutiny: the distinction seems to suggest that though many objects will have both types of form (as I may both perceive and understand a rabbit), the object of perception (the sensible form of the rabbit) is different from the object of thought (the intelligible form of the rabbit). Nonetheless, Aristotle’s empiricism requires that noêta be perceptible, a claim he explicitly commits himself to DA 432a3-6. In this paper, I will focus on the case of abstract thought, and will explore the role that intelligible matter can play both in rendering it possible that such thought be perceptible and in maintaining the distinction between (abstract) noêta and aisthêta.

Elmar Unnsteinsson, CUNY Graduate Center, elmar.geir@gmail.com
“Aristotle on Natural Virtue”

It is very difficult to see how the notion of a ‘natural virtue’ can fit into Aristotle’s overall ethical theory. But understanding this notion is essential to a full account of his ethics. In this paper, I argue that philosophers have misunderstood the place of natural virtue in Aristotle and, therefore, not recognized its importance.
First, I show how the impossibility of naturally virtuous agents is directly implied by Aristotle’s account of moral development as a process of habituation. Secondly, I propose an unorthodox interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of natural virtue in *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.13. The orthodoxy claims that natural virtues have only instrumental value but, on closer inspection, it turns out that they have a much larger role: natural virtue is non-instrumental in that it always aims at the right goal. This is argued for on independent and exegetical grounds. Crucially, it is shown that the author of the *Magna Moralia* supports this interpretation by defining natural virtue as “an impulse towards the noble (kalon).” This gives us new insight into the relationship between the *MM* and the *NE*. In the *NE* Aristotle has dropped the assumption that the natural impulse or virtue is a necessary condition of complete virtue. This makes his notorious analogy between natural virtue and cleverness in *NE* 6.13 easier to understand: it simply fits the *MM* view better than the theory in the *NE*.

Thirdly, on the basis of remarks in *NE* 7.8, I argue that Aristotle thought natural virtue can, in some cases, have the same role in moral development as ‘habituated’ virtue. Both types of virtue can cause agents to have correct beliefs about moral principles. This contention is based on the distinction Aristotle makes in *NE* 10.9 between upbringing and habituation. Strictly speaking, good upbringing can never provide an agent with complete virtue and practical wisdom. This is simply because upbringing is reserved for the early part of the habituation process. Thus we can explain why natural virtue and the degree of virtue brought about by upbringing can amount to the same thing. But Aristotle’s position on habituation remains the same, namely that it produces practical wisdom in one.

Finally, I argue that the new interpretation of natural virtue necessitates a revision in our conception of Aristotelian habituation. The principle of habituation is usually understood as saying that in order to become good one must, repeatedly, do good things. But Aristotle also formulates the principle negatively (*NE* 2.4): it is impossible to become good from failing to do good things when the situation requires one to do the good thing. If the argument of the paper is correct, naturally virtuous agents do not need habituation. They are only lacking in understanding (*nous*). Thus they will usually need teaching and argument to reach the state of practical wisdom, rather than habituation. Therefore, the weaker formulation of the principle of habituation provides us with a better overall account of Aristotle’s theory of moral development.

**Fabian Van Onzen**, University of Houston, vanonf@stthom.edu

“Plato’s Struggle Against Misogyny”

In this paper, I argue that Plato was not a misogynist and show that he had a high opinion of women. The paper outlines a way of reading Plato that focuses not only on the content of Plato’s dialogues, but also their form. This method of reading Plato lead me to argue for the thesis that Plato only puts forth his own views when he speaks through the mouth of Socrates, though he might agree with the other characters in his dialogues. By means of the dialogue form, Plato is
able to critique the prevailing ideology of ancient Greek society. I then use this method of reading Plato to present what I consider to be Plato’s views on women, and the ideological norms that he was criticizing. Finally, I give a long textual analysis of the Timaeus, in order to analyze Timaeus’s misogynistic comments on women. I argue that Plato does not share the views of Timaeus and that the Timaeus dialogue is Plato’s most sustained critique of misogyny. I reach the conclusion that though Plato had a high opinion of women, he was not a feminist because he did not take into account sexual difference.

Daniel Vazquez, King’s College London, sergio_daniel.vazquez@kcl.ac.uk
“The Gigantomachia: Sophist 245e-249d”

The Sophist 245e-249e is one of the most refined and influential passages of Plato’s late philosophy. It combines sophisticated dialectical method, historical fictions, and a comparison with a Greek myth. In it, Plato develops an imaginary discussion with two antagonistic positions: idealism and materialism. The dispute between them is so severe that he compares it with the combat of the Olympic Gods against the giants, sons of the goddess Earth. Many scholars have analyzed the passage but there is no agreement about who says what, which idea belongs to whom, or how relevant is this part of the dialogue for our understanding of the Sophist. The previous studies focus on the historical aspect, the formalization of the arguments, the methodological innovations of this dialogue, or if the passage modifies Plato’s early metaphysics. However, all of them give little attention to the myth and how it relates with the arguments. My main thesis is that a closer attention to the mythological element can clarify the reading of the passage and our understanding of the whole dialogue. In the mythological battle, the gods received an oracle: they will not defeat the giants, unless a mortal aid them. Luckily, they manage the victory with the help of the demigod Heracles. Although Heracles is not mentioned in the Sophist, I will argue that the role of the main character of the dialogue, the Stranger, must be understood as a symbolic representation of him. Nevertheless, this comparison needs to be qualified. While in the Greek myth, Heracles’s participation gives the victory to the Olympic gods, in the Sophist, the mediation of the Stranger will build a bridge between idealism and materialism, giving criticism to both views. Then, the similarity between Heracles and the Stranger is about their inner nature. On one hand, the demigod represents the conjunction between the Olympic gods and the sublunary world; on the other hand, the Stranger’s criticism against idealists and materialists will imply that the world is composed by corporeal and incorporeal beings. My paper is divided in three sections. First, I explain the context and the elements involved in the passage. Then, I analyze each argument of the dialogue, and I give the reasons in favor of my reading. Finally, I show how this interpretation gives new light to understand the place of the battle of the giants in the Sophist.

Máté Veres, Central European University, Budapest, mateveres@gmail.com
“Sextus Empiricus on Gods: Suspension of Judgment, Concept Formation, and Theological Aphasia”
In this paper, I attempt to make the case for a coherent interpretation of what Sextus Empiricus says about the issue of gods, and particularly about the concept of god, in two of his works, namely, the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (PH III. 2-12) and the *Against the Physicists* (M IX. 4-194). In these passages, Sextus presents arguments for and against the existence of gods, arguing for the suspension of judgment about their existence, and he also considers the question of how one comes to have a concept of god in the first place. Nevertheless, he notoriously insists that the outcome of such an inquiry does not present any obstacle to the Pyrrhonists’ participation in religious observances. What is more, he contends that the Pyrrhonist will be found in a ‘safer’ position than those who assent to any of the dogmatic views concerning gods.

In the first part of my paper, I criticize two recent attempts to make sense of the Pyrrhonist position. First, according to Julia Annas, there is nothing peculiar to the Pyrrhonist: ancient pagan religion did not invite commitment to cross-cultural theological beliefs, but only to certain culturally specific religious beliefs. However, I wish to argue that this account does not do justice to the intended peculiarity of the Pyrrhonist position, as in Sextus not only dogmatic theologians but also ordinary people are sometimes listed among the dogmatists. Taking a different line, Richard Bett argues that we cannot make sense of the religious activities of the Pyrrhonist as an outcome of following appearances. Therefore, he concludes that Sextus does not have an acceptable story to tell in this respect. In my view, this conclusion is precipitate.

In the second part of my paper, I aim to offer a more charitable interpretation. I reconstruct the Pyrrhonist strategy as consisting in the following steps. First, by setting up cases of *diaphōnia*, and also by arguing against individual dogmatic theories, Sextus argues for the suspension of judgment about the existence of gods. However, by introducing a distinction between stronger and weaker senses of *katalēpsis*, Sextus can maintain that one can possess sufficient conceptual resources to engage in religious activities while insisting on the suspension of judgment. What is more, Sextus argues that assent to any dogmatic theory necessarily leads to contradictory claims and thus blasphemy; therefore it is safer to withhold assent and refrain accordingly from dogmatic commitment. Last but not least, the Pyrrhonist can participate in any given cult by way of making non-assertive utterances.

In my view, this general strategy is in accordance with the general outlines of a Pyrrhonist way of life, and its examination will contribute to the understanding of key issues in Sextus Empiricus, such as the possibility of inquiry, the possibility of action, and whether the Pyrrhonist can hold any beliefs.

Justin Vlasits, University of California, Berkeley, vlasits@gmail.com

“Investigation and Intellectual Seemings in Sextus Empiricus”

Sextus Empiricus claims that the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s paradigm activity is investigation. However, many of his interlocutors, both ancient and contemporary, have either denied that he is
able to investigate or else have argued that his investigation is not meaningful because he is committed to suspending judgment on all matters of belief (or, on another interpretation, on matters related to science). R.J. Hankinson, to cite but one example, calls skeptical investigation “a gentle sort of pottering about comparing and contrasting things”. Still others, such as Gisela Striker, claim that Pyrrhonian investigation as Sextus presents it is a kind of sham—the skeptic makes no such attempt to investigate. The question that I want to address here is: how does the skeptic investigate in spite of his other epistemic commitments? I want to take seriously Sextus’s desire to investigate and see in what way he could even be said to do so rationally.

In order to do this, I am going to push against the dominant trend in recent writing on ancient skepticism, which aims to explain inquiry via an explanation of belief. This is a natural temptation because Sextus’s position on belief seems to be so radical (even in the most “urbane” interpretations) that it would seem to pose a problem for all kinds of actions, including investigation. If the skeptic refuses to believe, it would seem that almost all manners of inquiry—which seem to suppose certain kinds of beliefs—are out of his reach. In light of this, the exegetical task might be seen as the following: given the constraints imposed on the skeptics because of their position on belief, can we find a notion of investigation that is possible for them? This route, in my view, gets the matter backwards. In many of the crucial passages where Sextus describes his position on belief, he invokes investigation in a way that has been widely misinterpreted. Once we have a satisfactory conception of inquiry in hand, we can explain much of Sextus’s unique position on matters of belief.

I will begin with both a historically and philosophically defensible analysis of investigation by looking both at Sextus’s method and other ancient and contemporary accounts of investigation. The rest of my argument will to show that Sextus is able to partake in the activity so described. The argument from there will proceed in two stages. First, I will argue that there is a subdoxastic state that is sufficient for investigation by invoking the concept of “intellectual seemings” from recent work on intuitions. By introducing this technical vocabulary, I intend to skirt the thorny question of whether the Pyrrhonian can have beliefs by instead focusing on the rich cognitive states that are available to him. The final section of the argument will show that the skeptic is able to make use of intellectual seemings as substitutes for beliefs in the many kinds of activities that together make up investigation.

**Simona Vucu**, University of Toronto, Centre for Medieval Studies, simona.vucu@utoronto.ca

“Sin and Intellectual Error after the Condemnation of 1277”

One of the most frequent experiences we have as human beings is that of our own errors. Modern psychologists offer long lists of errors that we typically make: we overestimate our control over external situations; we overemphasize negative over positive information; we miscalculate our chances of achieving our goals etc. The medieval discussion of intellectual error took place in the context of ethics. The reason for this surprising context is that medieval authors were interested
in the question whether we can commit sins without the intellect committing any error, that is, whether the will can act against the dictate of right reason. It is this question that led to a philosophical inquiry into the role of the will and the intellect in causing errors, not only moral errors, but also intellectual ones.

Although most of these authors recognized that the will might play a role in causing errors, their explanations of how this would happen differed. In this paper, my focus will be on two explanations of errors. Some philosophers, such as Thomas of Sutton, were inclined to emphasize the supremacy of the intellect over the will and argued that there are three causes of error: ignorance, desires and will. Others, such as Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, thought that the will can act on the intellect in two ways: positively, the will can cause the intellect to acquire habits of thought such as prudence or folly (*stultitia* or *imprudentia*); negatively, the will can intervene and turn the intellect away from the consideration of some facts to the consideration of other facts, and in so doing can cause error in the intellect. Scotus recognized the second way as especially relevant for explaining intellectual errors.

Both these explanations can be further analyzed in relation to two questions. The first concerns what these different explanations tell us about the medieval views about our mental architecture and more importantly about the functioning of our intellect; the second concerns how these explanations fare when they have to explain what we nowadays call cognitive biases. Cognitive biases, in contrast to simple errors, are systematic and difficult to avoid; they seem not to involve any influence of the will (since we exhibit them even when we do not have any interests at stake or sometimes despite our desires to judge accurately); they cannot be explained in terms of ignorance (since both scientists and simple people are prone to them); nor can they be explained by the influence of emotions (since there is no phenomenological experience of such influence). However, all cognitive biases, being systematic, are analyzed in terms of mental habits. In this context, Scotus’ remark about the positive way in which the will can affect our intellectual activity becomes relevant.

**Suresh Vythylingam**, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, forgivenandjustified@yahoo.com
“Love in Plato’s The Symposium Contrasted With The Christian Concept of Love”

Martha Nussbaum in her insightful book on the intelligence of emotions compares love in three different traditions, the Platonic, Christian and Romantic traditions. While her analysis of these traditions is perceptive, it is somewhat inconsistent from a Christian perspective.

Chiefly, her purpose is to investigate the nature of emotions in general, and love being in her view very ambivalent and intense, is the most difficult to analyze. Nevertheless, love needs to be examined to prove her point with regard to the nature of the emotions.
In addition, her conclusions on the nature of Christian love and the prominence she gives to Romantic love are both unsatisfactory and somewhat shallow from a Christian perspective. However, her work is still a catalyst for one to investigate the nature and differences between the Platonic view of love and the Christian or NT view of love and in doing so to reach a more balanced perspective of love, than the one that she has achieved.

One of the parameters for this paper is that Romantic love which was an important component of Nussbaum’s book will not be considered. It is also vital to realize why the Christian faith and not other faiths is being utilized in this paper. While others like the Buddhist and Hindu faiths contain what may be called sound moral teachings, there is no emphasis in them as there is in Christianity (and/or the NT) on the concept of love.

This is not to categorically state that every person who claims the Christian faith may necessarily exhibit love at all times or even most of the time. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that of all the various faiths that exist, Christianity has the most intimate connection with love; moreover, the God of Christianity has love as one of His most prominent and essential attributes.

This paper will discuss Plato’s view of love in The Symposium, in particular the arguments presented by the Diotima character, but not neglecting all the other views of love presented therein. I will attempt to show that Platonic love is very different from the Christian concept of love.

Matthew Walker, Rutgers University, mdwalker@rci.rutgers.edu
“Aristotle, Contemplation, and Pluralism”

In his various ethical works, Aristotle argues that the happiest life is the contemplative life—a way of life organized around the exercise of philosophical theôria. Yet the view that the contemplative life is happiest strikes many modern critics as narrow, parochial, and so, untenable. In particular, this view faces resistance among pluralists, who maintain that (i) there exists a plurality of (potentially) happiest lives and that (ii) there is no single way of life that is best for all people, given their varying talents, circumstances, etc.

In this paper, I examine the extent to which one can reconcile Aristotle’s claims for the superior happiness of the contemplative life with modern pluralistic intuitions about the happy life. I show that, on one interpretation, Aristotle’s basic claim, viz., that the contemplative life is happiest for human beings, does not necessarily conflict with modern pluralist intuitions, at least on one interpretation of these intuitions. Hence, a refinement of Aristotle’s central thesis can avoid modern pluralist worries.

Julie Ward, Loyola University, jward9778@sbcglobal.net
"Aristotle on Two Kinds of \textit{Theoria}"

If asked to identify a central passage where Aristotle discusses \textit{\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\lambda\alpha} – the kind of thinking usually translated as “contemplation” — most scholars would mention the well-known account in EN X 7 where Aristotle describes \textit{\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\lambda\alpha} as better than excellent moral activity, according it the highest kind of happiness. As Aristotle has it, the superlative nature of this thinking derives both from the elevated nature of its objects as well as from the self-sufficient, complete, pleasant nature of the activity itself. Yet this account in EN X 7 does not coincide with a host of other references to \textit{\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\lambda\alpha} and \textit{\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\varepsilon\nu} across Aristotle’s other works. In fact, the vast majority of passages mentioning \textit{\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\lambda\alpha} and \textit{\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\varepsilon\nu} lie outside EN X 7 and reflect very different characteristics than those mentioned within it. In brief, the secondary passages (those lying outside EN X 7) describe an investigative process or line of reasoning that takes time, has parts, and often employs \textit{phantasmata}, or images. Yet the finding that \textit{\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\varepsilon\nu} and \textit{\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\lambda\alpha} lack univocity across their range of application is surely inadequate. Instead, the aim will be to consider ways of finding internal relationships among the kinds of \textit{theoria}, beginning with the familiar distinction between \textit{κινήσεις}, or motions, and \textit{ἐνέργειαι}, or activities discussed in \textit{Met. Theta} 6 (1048b18-35). Finally, the paper questions whether the account given in EN X 7 should be considered the primary, or definitive, account of \textit{theoria} or better seen as indicating a special, but derived, case that relies on the wider account of the activity.

\textbf{Alex Weis}, USMA, West Point, Alexandre.Weis@usma.edu

“\textit{The Incomprehensibility of God in Calvin and Aquinas’s Interpretation of the Divine Quid Est}”

In John Calvin’s \textit{Ideas}, Paul Helm argues that one of Calvin’s ideas is that the human mind cannot know the divine \textit{quid est}. Helm reconstructs Calvin’s argument (scattered throughout the Institutes of the Christian Religion and biblical commentaries), and articulately defends Calvin’s position by explaining why Calvin believes the way he does and by showing that Calvin’s idea is not an innovation but builds on the tradition of Thomas Aquinas. I do four things in my paper. First, I present Helm’s interpretation of John Calvin on the topic of the divine \textit{quid est}. Second, I briefly assess his claim that Calvin’s idea corresponds to Thomas Aquinas’s in light of the broader contemporary discussion of influences on Calvin. Third, I find Aquinas’s explanation, however, to be philosophically and theologically fuller than Calvin’s. Finally, I build on Helm’s work by proposing that Calvin’s distinction of God \textit{in Se} and God \textit{Quoad Nos} is shorthand for Aquinas’s, and I propose that Calvin provides illuminating precedents to motivate contemporary Reformed philosophers and theologians to re-engage the Schoolman’s metaphysics.

\textbf{Michael Wiitala}, University of Kentucky, mwiitala@gmail.com

“\textit{The Ability to Divide \textit{Kat’ Eidē}: Statesman 285d-287a and the Value of the Method of Division}”
Throughout much of the Sophist and the first part of the Statesman, the Eleatic stranger makes extensive use of the method of division. During the middle of the Statesman, however, the method of division seems to break down, and the stranger turns to various methods that Plato typically has Socrates employ throughout the dialogues, such as the method of hypothesis (e.g., 284c) and the use of examples or paradeigmata (e.g., 277d). Although the stranger does not give up the method of division completely during the second half of the Statesman, its use seems to be far less prevalent. In fact, in contrast to the final definition of the sophist in the eponymous dialogue, the final definition of the statesman is not obtained through division, but rather through a comparison between statesmanship and weaving. Yet in the middle of the Statesman, at 286d-e, as the method of division seems to be breaking down, the stranger praises the method and claims that its practice, as opposed to finding the definition of the statesman or anything else, is the primary goal of the whole inquiry. This raises two questions: (1) Why does the stranger give the method of division such priority? (2) What is the primary goal of the method of division itself?

Something the stranger says a little earlier, at 286a, provides an answer to the first question. He claims that the greatest and most noble things cannot be adequately displayed in an image or example, but only through logos, through the practice of “being able to give and receive an account (logos) of each thing” (286a). The practice of the method of division, then, seems to be given priority because it is integral to the ability to give and receive an account. If this is the case, however, then, as I show in this paper, the primary goal of the method of division is not to find a definition, but rather to impart to the one who practices it the ability “to give and receive an account of each thing.” Given that finding a definition is not the primary goal of the method of division, the stranger’s use of hypotheses and examples need not be seen as a departure from the method, but rather a certain application of it. Likewise, the fact that the final definition of the statesman is not achieved explicitly through the method of division, in the way the definition of the sophist was, need not be seen as a failure of the method. In the first part of the paper I attempt to clarify what the method of division is and some of the roles that hypotheses and examples play in relation to that method. Then in the second part of the paper, I articulate the goal of the method of division in light of the stranger’s discussion of the two kinds of measurement.

John Wolfe, University of South Florida, jrwolfe@gmail.com
“Aristotle’s Topics and Platonic Dialectic”

Aristotle’s Topics is an invaluable store of information concerning the art of dialectic, as it was practiced in the Fourth Century. As such, one would expect that it can shed light on the methods depicted in Plato’s dialogues. In this paper I use the Topics as a framework for the analysis of certain aspects of Plato’s Gorgias. I will show how the techniques described by Aristotle are variously deployed in Socrates’ conversations with Polus, Gorgias, and Callicles. In doing this I pay particular attention to the ways that Socrates tailors his approach depending on the ethos of
the interlocutor. Further, when the dialogues are analyzed in this light, it can be seen that much of what is called “Socratic irony” is actually endorsed as legitimate dialectical technique, that in some circumstances it is permissible to trick one’s interlocutors into correct beliefs.