Redan Battery and the Battle of Queenston Heights

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The Battle of Queenston Heights bears great significance for Canadian War of 1812 enthusiasts. This victory cemented Niagara Loyalists’ sympathy for the British cause and inspired militia units to stand against the American invasion of Upper Canada. When Major General Isaac Brock fell leading a desperate charge to retake Redan Battery, he gave Canadians an exemplary hero. Even today, the monument honoring Brock towers over the landscape, denoting the significance of the Battle of Queenston Heights in forging a new sense of Canadian identity. Throughout this historic engagement, Redan Battery played a pivotal role in the action for both American invaders and for British defenders and their allies. In 1975, Parks Canada archaeologist Elizabeth Snow excavated the battery to record the structural layout for restoration of the gun emplacement. Reviewing Snow’s archaeological site collection in preparation for the 200th anniversary of the battle, yielded unanticipated evidence of Brock’s fateful day, 13 October 1812.

La bataille de Queenston Heights aura été le premier geste militaire posé la première année de la Guerre de 1812. Cette victoire consolidera les sympathies des Loyalistes de la région de Niagara à la cause Britannique et inspirera des unités de milice à s’opposer à l’invasion du Haut-Canada par les Américains. Quand le Major Général Isaac Brock est mort au combat alors qu’il menait une charge désespérée sur la batterie Redan, il est devenu un héro exemplaire pour les Canadiens. Encore aujourd’hui, le monument érigé en l’honneur de Brock occupe une place imposante dans le paysage, reflétant le lien entre la bataille de Queenston Heights et le moment où est né un sentiment d’identité Canadienne. Tout au long de cet engagement historique, la batterie Redan jouera un rôle central pour les envahisseurs Américains et les Défenseurs Britanniques de même que leurs alliés. En 1975, l’archéologue de Parcs Canada Elizabeth Snow a effectué des fouilles sur la batterie et a documenté sa configuration structurale en vue de la restauration de l’emplacement du canon. C’est en revoyant la collection archéologique pour le 200ième anniversaire de la bataille que des informations inattendues à propos de ce jour fatidique du 13 octobre 1812 ont été dévoilées.

Introduction

On 18 June 1812, President Madison signed the Declaration of War against Britain. American public opinion, enraged by accusations of the Royal Navy’s disregard for U.S. sovereignty in relentlessly boarding American ships and impressing American seamen and British deserters, goaded its politicians into action. Since 1807, America had endured the consequences of the British Orders in Council permitting the British navy to seize, on the open sea, any ship sailing a course for Napoleonic ports. This legislation devastated the western and southern U.S. export trade and caused serious economic hardship (Latimer 2007: 24).

American war-hawk politicians in Kentucky, Ohio, and the territories also pressured loudly for war, arguing that British Indian agents fueled native unrest. Western expansionists spoke of driving the British out of North America, subduing native peoples, and opening the land for settlement. From their perspective, Canadian settlers’ destiny was liberation from British oppression (Berton 1980: 25; Taylor 2011: 137). Time for action had arrived. They would strike against the tyrant in Upper and Lower Canada while Britain’s attention remained focused on the Napoleonic Wars.

Major General Henry Dearborn, chosen to lead the northern campaign, laid out his strategy roughly based on a plan of attack suggested earlier by John Armstrong, military counselor to President Madison. Dearborn proposed a main thrust against Montreal to cut the St. Lawrence River supply line. To divide the attention of British regulars in Canada and to protect against native attacks on the western frontier, he also proposed a coordinated, multipronged invasion, sending U.S. forces supported by militia brigades, to cross the Detroit, Niagara, and upper St. Lawrence rivers (Malcomson 2003: 29; Turner 2011: 82).

At Quebec, Sir George Prevost, governor in Chief of British North America, was well aware of American disaffection with Britain’s ruthless actions. By December 1811, he acknowledged the increasingly apparent need to at least prepare the provinces against attack. The number of British regulars in the upper
province was almost doubled from 1808 levels to 1,150 men and officers. Much needed military stores began arriving on the frontier as well, and militia commanders began reviewing their lists of 11,650 men, aged 16 to 60, eligible for militia service. Still, the over 1,000 mi. (1609 km) border in Upper Canada alone stretched these few military resources and, with the ongoing war in Europe, expectation of further British troop reinforcements was slim (Latimer 2007: 37–45).

Prevost was determined to hold Quebec at all costs and retained his major defense force in Lower Canada. He adopted, and strongly insisted upon, a cautious nonaggression policy, hoping diplomacy would prevail over military action until Britain could turn its attention back to British North America (Taylor 2011: 150; Turner 2011: 103).

Perhaps Prevost’s most fortuitous choice was to appoint Isaac Brock to act as civil administrator for the province of Upper Canada (fig. 1). Brock had arrived in Canada in 1802 with the 49th Regiment. He rose rapidly through the ranks in the ten years prior to the war. Made a colonel in 1805, Brock had opportunity to command at various posts in Upper and Lower Canada and by 1807, as brigadier general, he had acted as commander in chief of forces. Soldiers respected and liked Brock, and his experience made him a familiar figure in civil society (Malcomson 2003: 34–37).

Hamstrung by Prevost’s nonaggression policy and the limited number of regulars at his disposal in Upper Canada, Brock had to make do with those resources available to him. In the early months of 1812, he made changes to the Militia Act, calling out volunteer flank companies in each militia regiment for training. The move proved popular, and the roster of volunteers swelled. In Loyalist Niagara, response was particularly enthusiastic, with five flank companies quickly filled and enough remaining to form the Niagara Light Dragoons, militia artillery, and a car brigade of artillery drivers (Malcomson 2003: 48). The local enthusiasm impressed Brock, but he remained doubtful of the militia’s determination to stand loyal against a seemingly overwhelming enemy force.

Brock also courted support from aboriginal peoples in both Upper Canada and in the territories of the western Great Lakes. The terror that native warriors inspired in any enemy made a military alliance more significant than the number of warriors they supplied. Certainly, Brock wanted natives allied to the British rather than against them. Although the Six Nations Mohawk, led by John Norton, preferred to remain neutral at this point, Brock strongly advocated preemptive strikes against Mackinac and Detroit to seal an alliance with Tecumseh and his northern confederacy. The U.S. infantry and militia strike at the November 1811 Battle of Tippecanoe had infuriated the tribes, who now swore vengeance against land-hungry Americans (Berton 1980: 69–77; Turner 2011: 60).

Prevost’s policy, prohibiting action that might incite war, tied Brock’s hands. Despite this, Brock anticipated likely border invasion points and parleyed with potential allies. His confidential correspondence with Robert Dickenson, an influential fur trader residing among the northwestern native bands, negotiated an alliance with the British. Months before the official war declaration, the warriors...
and Dickenson departed for the British post at Fort St. Joseph to await attack on the American outpost of Mackinac (Turner 2011: 95).

News of the declaration of war traveled quickly to the Canadian frontier via fur trade correspondence. Word reached Fort St. Joseph on 3 July, five days before a dispatch from Brock reached Captain Roberts, commanding officer at that frontier post. Brock merely alerted him of the beginning of hostilities. Four days later, another message arrived from Brock advising Roberts of Prevost’s instruction to take no aggressive action, hoping the Americans would not act unless provoked. A week later, Brock again wrote Captain Roberts, telling him to “adopt the most prudent measures either of offense or defense which circumstance might point out” (Berton 1980: 109; Turner 2011: 113).

With natives at his post restless for action, Roberts interpreted Brock’s instruction as permission to move against Mackinac (Fig. 2A). The next day, 16 July, he set off with his small force of regulars reinforced by Dickenson’s nearly 300 tribemen and a force of 180 volunteer voyageurs. They arrived at Mackinac before dawn and, with assistance from a local American fur trader, negotiated the complete capitulation of Fort Mackinac without a shot fired. Indeed, the fort captors informed Lieutenant Hanks, commanding officer at Mackinac, that war had commenced. He had received no news of the commencement of hostilities from his superiors (Taylor 2011: 153).

Fortunately for Brock and Roberts, Prevost could not construe this invasion of American territory as a flash point to war as, four days prior, Brigadier General William Hull had crossed the Detroit River and placidly seized the village of Sandwich on the British shore (Fig. 2B). From there, Hull issued a proclamationpressuring local settlers to remain neutral. He threatened severe consequences for anyone fighting on the side of the British and their native allies (Turner 2011: 115). The proclamation had considerable effect; over half the untrained militia deserted its posts. However, Hull had difficulty in retaining his long and vulnerable supply line and needed to provision his army. American raiding parties scoured the countryside, seizing farmers’ harvests and livestock, and burning and destroying crops and property. These acts turned local sentiment against the promised ideals of American liberty (Berton 1980: 136; Taylor 2011: 161). Discontent grew as Hull delayed at Sandwich awaiting artillery support before he would advance on the British fort at Amherstburg. Learning of the fall of Mackinac and advised that British reinforcements had arrived at Amherstburg, General Hull retreated across the river to Detroit, much to the consternation of his officers (Turner 2011: 123).

Meanwhile, Isaac Brock arrived at Amherstburg with a small force of regulars and loyal militia from Niagara. He called a council of his officers and, despite their reservations, he ordered them to support his plan to invade Detroit straightaway. He addressed the allied native tribes and met with Tecumseh and the older chiefs to explain his strategy. Brock also issued a general order to the local populace and militia cowed by Hull’s proclamation. In it he expressed his surprise at the number of local militia desertions, but suggested the cause was more likely anxiety to harvest crops, rather than any “predilection for the principles or government of the United States” (Berton 1980: 167). His cleverly phrased amnesty allowed the deserters to save face and united the local populace behind the British.

With militia, native allies, and regulars, Brock led about 1,300 men. Hull at Detroit commanded more than 2,000. Boldly, Brock sent a message to Hull asking for the complete surrender of Fort Detroit. Hull was uncertain of the number of British regulars Brock commanded, for 300 militiamen wore cast-off 41st Regiment uniforms. Brock had also tricked Hull into believing 5,000 warriors, en route from Mackinac, would soon arrive to support the invasion of Detroit (Latimer 2007: 67).

Brock commenced an artillery attack in the afternoon of 15 August. That evening the native allies crossed the Detroit River to support the British landing at dawn. The crossing was uncontested. Brock took up a position in a ravine out of firing range and watched as native warriors looped past Fort Detroit three times, screeching war cries and waving tomahawks in full view of the fort garrison. Confused by the charade, U.S. officers estimated the warriors’ number at three times their actual strength and believed the Detroit garrison heavily outnumbered (Taylor 2011: 164).

Hull witnessed the British artillery attack taking its gruesome toll within the fort. With
Canadians of the viability of resisting American invasion. Native tribes settled in the Grand River area that initially had preferred to remain neutral now rallied behind the victors. The Detroit cache of arms and artillery, a brig, many smaller craft, and the captured supply train of pack animals, cattle, and provisions filled the military coffers and proffered considerable prize money to build morale among the troops (Berton 1980: 186; Taylor 2011: 165).

Brock returned triumphant to Niagara, but there he learned of an armistice signed by Prevost and Major General Dearborn. The peace extended to 8 September, and Brock

350 men of the Detroit garrison absent to escort a supply train, General Hull surrendered, swayed by fear of a native massacre of both soldiers and the civilian population sheltered within the fort (Stagg 2012: 65). His officers were aghast. For capitulating without a fight, General Hull would be court martialed. Acquitted of the charge of treason, the 1814 court martial found him guilty of cowardice and sentenced Hull to be shot. President Madison finally pardoned Hull, who remained certain that he had followed the best course of action (Berton 1980: 188; Turner 2011: 147). The collapse of Hull’s army at Detroit enhanced Brock’s reputation and convinced many Upper

Figure 2. Early military actions in the first year of the War of 1812 showing (A) allied British forces from Fort St. Joseph take Mackinac July 17; (B) Hull invades Canada from Detroit taking village of Sandwich on July 12, and Hull’s surrender and allied British forces take Detroit August 16; (C) Niagara frontier. Detail of the Map of the Seat of War in North America. John Melish Publisher, Philadelphia. (Image courtesy of Library and Archives Canada, National Map Collection 6760.)
feared the Americans only signed to buy time to reinforce their positions. Across the Niagara River, he could see a second U.S. army massing under the command of Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer. Brock knew an attack must come soon, but was uncertain where along the 35 mi. (56 km) stretch of the Niagara River the invaders would strike (FIG. 2C) (Malcomson 2003).

Unable to move against the enemy, Brock prepared his defenses. He gleans intelligence on the American forces and sent for reinforcements under his command in Upper Canada at Amherstburg and Kingston. He intensified training and drilling of militia units, issued strategic orders outlining a signal warning system, and established fallback positions should attack occur at various points along the river.

Only a few days before the Battle of Queenston Heights, Brock still expressed concern regarding the commitment of the militia to remain loyal should an invading force gain possession of the Upper Canadian shore along the Niagara River. He remarked: “The enemy would obtain an advantage ... over the feelings of the militia that might be productive of fatal consequences if allowed to spread, the disaffected will assume a tone and posture that cannot fail to operate in deterring the loyal from active exertion” (Brock 1920: 48). In the battle that would soon follow, Brock’s suspicion of Niagara settlers’ loyalty proved largely unfounded.

The Battle of Queenston Heights

Deserters and informants from the American side kept Brock abreast of conditions of the enemy force across the river. As fall arrived with rain and inclement weather, sickness from want of clothing and shelter ravaged the U.S. camp. Discontent from lack of pay and action demoralized militia forces. Moreover, American command seemed fragmented. Brigadier General Smyth, at Black Rock near Buffalo, initially refused to meet or act in concert with Major General Van Rensselaer at Lewiston who was planning the attack on Queenston (Stagg 2012: 71). Acting independently of Van Rensselaer, Smyth approved a naval plan to seize two British schooners anchored near Fort Erie. Seizure of the vessels occurred on the night of 8 October, with one captured and one lost. Winfield Scott of the 2nd U.S. Artillery had just arrived at Black Rock and assisted in the attack. The success of this action put further pressure on Van Rensselaer to act. On 10 October he ordered an assault on Queenston that night, but due to a mishap with the transport boats, the attack had to be postponed (Berton 1980: 228; Turner 2011: 169).

Warned of the failed mission by Captain Williams, stationed at Queenston Heights Cantonment, Brock arrived from Fort George near noon of the 11th to assess the situation. From a vantage point on the escarpment, Brock and his officers surveyed the setting, unaware that it would become a bloody battleground 34 hours later. At Queenston, the fast-flowing Niagara River was only 250 yd. (228.6 m) across. Brock could clearly see Lewiston nestled above the riverbank, just downstream from Queenston Village. Williams directed Brock’s attention to a ravine above Lewiston, where his sentries had noted an increased concentration of American troops. As he gauged the scene, Brock knew the enemy had recently fortified Fort Gray, a battery on Lewiston Heights. It boasted two 18-pounders and was situated upstream of Redan Battery.

Redan Battery stood on a ridge of the escarpment above Queenston Village and just below the cantonment on the heights. Named after the classic V-shape, (two faces forming a salient angle), it mounted an 18-pounder cannon and an 8 in. mortar. Below, by the village landing, stood an old stone blockhouse with a 9-pounder battery. About 2,000 yd. (1.8 km) downstream, across from Lewiston, stood Vrooman’s Battery, armed with a 12-pounder and a 18-pounder cannon. Vrooman’s guns would be beyond range during the engagement (Malcomson 2003: 123; Latimer 2007: 74).

Anticipating an attack soon, Brock returned to his Niagara headquarters at Government House, where he activated all available militia units. The next day he sent one of his senior officers, Major Evans, across the river to Lewiston to negotiate an exchange of prisoners taken during the action with Major General Van Rensselaer at Black Rock. Evans crossed at Queenston, but found his reception unusual. He reported being delayed at the landing and was then informed he would not be able to meet with the general until the next day. While waiting, Evans noted militia from Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee had strengthened the American forces. He also spied a line of bateaux
covered by brush on the shore (Malcomson 1970: 125). Expecting imminent attack, Evans returned to alert troops at Queenston to be vigilant, then rode to inform Brock of an impending invasion. Brock warned his officers and sent messages to militia commanders to prepare their men (Turner 2011: 172).

At Lewiston, Van Rensselaer felt pressure to act from his officers and ordered a second attempt on Queenston for before dawn of 13 October. This left many of his supporting regiments, drenched and exhausted from the previous attempt, no time to recover. The American force also lacked sufficient supplies and ammunition, while the 13 available bateaux provided scant space to move an invading force, let alone artillery, across the Niagara River. Regardless, at 4 AM the first wave of about 300 invaders pushed off from the American embarkation point just south of Lewiston and touched the Canadian shore at a point 500 yd. (457 m) upstream of Queenston landing (fig. 3A). In the dark, a British guard on the bank fired into the boats, killing and wounding several men, then fled to raise the alarm (Malcomson 2003: 131–133).

Captain Dennis of the 49th Regiment, supported by militia, fired on the invaders, but after a fierce musketry battle the Americans drove them back into Queenston Village (fig. 3B). There the artillery was directing case shot against the U.S. embarkation point, causing havoc amongst the second wave of invaders awaiting transport. Above, on the heights, the 18-pounder gun at Redan Battery harassed transport boats crossing the river. Several American officers, including Lieutenant Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, Stephen’s lead military advisor, suffered severe wounds in the initial exchange of musket fire (Malcomson 2003: 133–138). The other senior officer in the first wave, Lieutenant Colonel John Chrystie, did not arrive to take command. Chrystie’s bateau had returned to the American shore after it drifted downstream and came under fire from the British near Hamilton Cove at the north end of Queenston Village.

This tenuous situation left Solomon Van Rensselaer no option but to trust junior officers to carry the invasion forward until reinforcements could arrive. He ordered Captain John Wool and Captain Ogilvie of the 13th U.S. Infantry to lead a detachment of about 160 men and, following Lieutenant Gansevoort, who was somewhat familiar with the terrain, storm Redan Battery on the heights (Malcomson 2003: 142).

By this time, Brock, aroused from his sleep at Government House in Niagara, had ridden to Queenston to reconnoiter the situation. The American 18-pounders at Fort Grey had silenced the Queenston Village 9-pounder. This relieved the American embarkation point, and a new wave of invaders, led by Lieutenant Colonel Fenwick, set out in five bateaux that had returned from the Canadian shore. Piloting themselves across, the strong current caught and carried them downstream to approach the shore at Hamilton Cove. Either Brock or Captain Dennis ordered Captain Williams light company down from Queenston Heights to address this new menace to the village. Fenwick’s force was cut to shreds, with many captured, wounded, or killed in the action (fig. 3C). Meanwhile, with no guard left on the heights above, Wool’s force attained the summit without being perceived and charged down on the Redan Battery from the rear. Surprised and overwhelmed, the British gunners fled, and Americans colors unfurled at the gun position (Malcomson 2003: 148–152).

Brock’s own District General Order No. 7, prepared in early August, clearly stated that batteries should be defended “to the last extremity, but, in the event of any one being completely overpowered, the men defending such battery will fall back in a cool, regular manner” (Brock 1920: 19). Left unguarded when Brock or Dennis ordered Williams’s men down from Queenston Heights, Redan Battery was clearly not defended to the last extremity, and the gun crew’s retreat was probably neither cool nor regular.

A somewhat dubious account suggests Brock was at Redan Battery when it was overpowered. This version records that the gun crew barely managed to spike the cannon touchhole with a ramrod before retreating (Berton 1980: 239). Another account implies the gunners did not spike the vent before fleeing (Malcomson 2003: 156; Latimer 2007: 80).

Brock’s immediate and impulsive attempt to retake the battery attests to the strategic importance of this high ground. In the immediate situation, had the Americans turned the gun on Queenston Village defenses, American reinforcements could have crossed the Niagara...
unimpeded. Moreover, a consolidated American force on Queenston Heights would divide British forces and cut the supply line along the Portage Road. Without knowledge of the strength of the force at the battery, he acted immediately to right the situation.

Brock gathered a small force of about 50 men, including part of the 49th Regiment Light Company and members of the Lincoln and York militias, and led them in a desperate frontal counterattack on Redan Battery. Leading his force on foot up the slope, he presented an obvious target to an American infantryman who took aim and fatally shot him. Brock’s men carried his body back to the village, where they concealed it (FIG. 3D). Although the attack continued, the outnumbered defenders soon retreated, some to the village, while others followed Captain Williams to the west along the escarpment above the battery.

As British reinforcements arrived at Queenston, including Brock’s aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel John Macdonell, they joined Williams on the heights. With about 80 men, they advanced down on Wool’s ensconced force. The British advance was strong enough to drive the invaders to the edge of the cliff (FIG. 3E). Here, the contradictory account of the spiking of the gun relates that an American spiked the 18-pounder during this second counteroffensive, when it appeared they would lose the position (Malcomson 2003: 156; Latimer 2007: 80). Just as success appeared in their grasp, Macdonell fell mortally wounded, and Williams dropped, briefly knocked unconscious. The British offensive collapsed with some men captured and the remainder retreating to Queenston or west to the village of St. Davids. As U.S. reinforcements arrived, Wool ordered the gun drilled, but the invaders lost crucial time before it could be readied for service.

The defenders fell back from Queenston Village, leaving Brock’s body hidden in a house. This left American forces a few hours to consolidate and reinforce their position with no opposition. U.S. regulars, along with about a quarter of the militia, eagerly crossed the river to take up positions. They shipped a 6-pounder fieldpiece and accoutrements across the river and hauled it up the heights. As boats crossed with reinforcements, they returned carrying American dead and wounded within sight of the militiamen awaiting transport (Malcomson 2003: 164; Stagg 2012: 71).

Figure 3. The entire battle of Queenston Heights showing: (A) American invasion point above Queenston Village; (B) fierce musketry battle with the British driven back into Queenston; (C) Fenwick’s force floats downstream and are defeated at Hamilton Cove; (D) Brock leads a charge to retake Redan Battery and is killed; (E) Macdonell and Williams attempt to retake the battery; (F) American militia stand firm on American soil; (G) Sheaffe’s advance and the American retreat down the cliff. Detail of an oil painting by an unknown artist based on Major Dennis’s drawing of the battle, ca. 1815. (Courtesy of Riverbrink Museum, Queenston, Ontario 982.2).
As morning passed, the British 41st Light Company reoccupied Queenston Village, allowing the artillery commander from Fort George to establish gun positions. Once again, British guns began harassing any bateaux attempting to cross the river. About this same time, on the heights, Norton and the Grand River warriors advanced on the defensive lines established by Winfield Scott, who had arrived and taken command from the less-experienced militia commander William Wadsworth. Scott was successful in repelling the initial attack, but the warriors continued to fire on the American line. With the sounds of gunshot and war cries echoing across the river, nothing could now induce the militia to leave the safety of America soil for the invasion of a foreign shore. Of more than 3,000 militia present, only about 700 crossed in the assault (fig. 3F) (Malcomson 2003: 165).

By early afternoon, British forces, reinforced by troops and militia from strong points along the Niagara, assembled and moved toward Queenston Heights. Around 3 PM the combined British force of 900 regulars, militia, and native allies, led by Major General Sheaffe, Brock’s second in command, advanced with field artillery and fired a volley at the American line. The U.S. force had now shrunk to about 400, as men slipped away to hide below the cliff face. Those remaining fired a volley in return, then fell back in retreat, at first in an orderly fashion and then in frantic leaps down the cliff (fig. 3G). With no bateaux to effect an escape, some plunged into the fast-flowing river and drowned, or were shot while attempting to reach the far shore. Americans hoisted a surrender flag, but it went unnoticed until around 4 PM, when a repeated bugle call halted the fighting (Malcomson 2003: 181–191). British officers met to exchange congratulations at the battery, where Sheaffe received Brigadier General William Wadsworth’s sword, signifying the American surrender (Cruickshank 1902a: 7).

Accounts of American dead and wounded from the battle vary widely, from 160 casualties to 500 killed and drowned alone. The British clearly documented the number of American prisoners taken for later prisoner exchange: 436 regulars and 489 militia, 925 in total. British regulars, militia, and native allies sustained losses of 25 killed, 85 wounded and 22 captured, with an unknown figure of native wounded not tallied. The loss of Brock and his aide-de-camp Macdonell was deeply grieved. They lay in state at Government House in Niagara until October 16. A long and formal procession followed their coffins to graves dug in a bastion at Fort George, while American cannon fired a courtesy salute to the British commander from Fort Niagara (Malcomson 2003: 193–197).

Excavation of the Redan Battery Structural Layout and Building Hardware

The Battle of Queenston Heights played a decisive role in the first year of the War of 1812. Inspired by their allied role in this victory and by the example of Isaac Brock, most Niagara settlers rallied behind the British cause and committed themselves to defending their homes against American invasion. Militia veterans, native allies, and their descendants celebrated their role in the defense and marked important battle places with monuments memorializing the triumph and its heroes. Indeed, Alexander Muir’s 1867 lyrics of “The Maple Leaf Forever,” praising the defenders at Queenston, became an unofficial anthem sung by Ontario schoolchildren well into the next century. The central role of Redan Battery in this historic event ensured it would be a focal point in the commemoration of the Battle of Queenston Heights.

In the mid-20th century, the battery was a station in a walking trail designed for tourists to highlight the course of the battle. In 1975, Parks Canada proposed an upgrade to replace the then-current abstract marker with a more historically accurate one. With consent of the Niagara Parks Commission, which owned the property, Parks conducted research on the position and acquired an 18-pounder cannon for Redan Battery (Haldorson 1975).

Prior to reconstruction, archaeologist Elizabeth Snow of Parks Canada excavated and recorded the battery site (fig. 4). Her 1975 report, “Salvage Archaeology at the Redan Battery, Queenston Heights”, details the structural layout of the gun position. Snow excavated the trace of the stone-revetted interior faces of the earth embankments and projected the configuration of the 18-pounder cannon emplacement platform based on pine sleeper remnants resting on a clay and gravel base (fig. 5).

Snow noted that all artifact material lay outside the platform footprint. The platform created a shadow effect, with artifact deposition
found at the perimeter of the clay and gravel leveling fill. This fill defined the platform extent in areas where sleepers had been removed (Snow 1975: 13). Excavated bent and broken wrought spikes, and the lack of any trace of decking planks suggest the military dismantled the gun platform for salvage of reusable materials sometime after the war.

Considering a number of wrought 2.75 in. (7 cm) to 3 in. (8 cm) nails, too small for use in a gun platform, Snow surmised the presence of another structure at the battery; possibly a field magazine (Snow 1975: 8). A quantity of wrought, 1.5 in. (3.5 to 4 cm) shingle/lathe nails in the assemblage, an excavated, large wrought-iron key, and a latch bar guide lend support to the presence of a subsidiary structure. Snow actually found the key secreted between the stones in the revetted battery wall, “obviously shoved into the crack for safe-keeping” (Snow 1975: 16). The hidden locale suggests the key unlocked the door of a nearby structure, possibly the expense magazine or, perhaps, a limber padlock (FIG. 6).

Parks Canada historians recovered an 1818 plan of the Position of Queenston, by Captain
Figure 5. Compilation of Figures 1 to 3 of Elizabeth Snow’s (1975) report showing: (A) projected configuration of the cannon platform, (B) excavation unit plan and features. (C) shows the remains of a platform sleeper supported on a stone slab in unit 22H2A. (Photo by Elizabeth Snow, 1975; courtesy of Parks Canada.)

Figure 6. Broken spikes from dismantling the cannon platform on left, nails too small for use in the platform on upper right and the wrought iron key found in a crack between the stones of the revetment. (Photo by author, 2013.)
Vavasour of the Royal Engineers, after Snow completed her report. The plan shows a small structure immediately behind the crescent shape of the battery (Fig. 7). A barrack and two structures, possibly a stable and privy, appear above the battery at the top of a path leading past a fuel yard. These structures, located in the current roadway lookout, decidedly postdate the Battle of Queenston Heights.

Brock’s general orders, dated 8 October, five days before the U.S. invasion, direct “Captain Williams, of the 49th Regiment, with the light company under his command, will march from Chippawa to-morrow morning at daylight for the camp at Queenston” (Brock 1920: 31). That Williams’s men were encamped on the heights implies that the barrack shown on the 1818 plan postdates the action. Another 1812 account also notes 90 grenadiers of the 49th Regiment housed in the stone barrack at Queenston Landing on the river shore below on the eve of the battle (Malcomson 2003: 123).

The small structure behind Redan Battery (possibly indicating a traverse or an expense magazine to service the 18-pounder gun at this isolated position) may have been built when
the emplacement was first constructed or may also have been a post-battle addition.

The Queenston Battery was one of the new positions Brock noted as recently completed in his July 1812 correspondence with Prevost. Brock described the battery as “strong, built of stone and will probably mount two or three pieces” (Malcomson 2003: 55). He does not mention a magazine, although the omission does not entirely discount its presence at that time. Still, at the time of the battle, munitions may simply have been stored in limbers behind the platform.

Snow’s 1975 excavation affirmed the strength of the stone battery, but as her project focus was confined to establishing the line of the north and east faces, she did not test beyond that area. She did note a crescent-shaped earthen berm “oriented in the same direction as the Redan Battery itself,” but did not test the feature (Snow 1975: 8). This mound, recorded on a 2011 plan, may represent a traverse to protect munition limbers, or a magazine sited near the base of the ridge to the southeast. It may also be a later site alteration (FIG. 8). Lossing’s 19th-century accounts of the War of 1812 note that “we passed a burying-ground which marks the site of the redan battery” (Lossing 1869: 413). The mound might relate to burials or to a later, 20th-century disturbance.

1812-Era Insignia

Aside from recording the battery features and associated structural artifacts, Snow reported the recovery of 1812-era military insignia, munitions, food-related glass and ceramics, and miscellaneous artifacts. The presence of fragments of human bone, recently identified among her excavated faunal material (Berg 2012), is a somber reminder of the carnage of war and of the sacred nature of battlegrounds.

Perhaps the most evocative War of 1812-era artifact is a distorted, 41st Regiment uniform button. Along with his own 49th Regiment, Brock relied heavily on the steadiness of the veteran 41st soldiers and assigned its noncommissioned officers the role of instructing inexperienced men of the militia units (Brock 1920: 39). In the summer and fall of 1812, Brock had detachments of the 41st Regiment spread along the Niagara River within four established divisions: First Division, Fort Erie and dependencies; Second Division, Chippawa and dependencies; Third Division, Queenston; and Fourth Division, Fort George and dependencies (FIG. 9).

During the Queenston engagement, the main body of the 41st Regiment served in the Second and Fourth Divisions, at Chippawa, Millers, and Navy Island, and at Fort George, respectively. Officers’ returns of casualties note, however: “Private Thomas Haynes 41st Regt. ... was kill’d in the Battery” (Smith 1812: 115). Day orders and accounts indicate Haynes was part of a detail of 10 members of the 41st employed in the service of the royal engineer at Queenston. The face of the coat closure button from a 41st Regiment uniform is concave as though hit by shot, and the button shank is heavily encrusted (FIG. 10A).

Haynes was the only specific member of the 41st known to have been killed at Redan Battery. The dislodged button might well signal Haynes final moment, although the regimental return of killed and wounded during the action records Haynes’s shared his fate with Sergeant Merryweather and David Jones, both of whom died of wounds through the body during the engagement. Nine other soldiers of the 41st received various nonfatal wounds to the abdomen, head, thigh, and leg during the action (Smith 1812: 125). For their part at Queenston Heights, both the 41st Foot and 49th Regiments received battle honors, adding “Queenstown” to their colors (Malcomson 2003: 213).

On the day of the attack, Captain James Dennis of the 49th Regiment commanded Queenston Division. His troops incorporated 184 men of the 49th Regiment, six Royal Artillery, plus the 10 members of the 41st. Completing the Queenston Division were 200 militia, comprised of the 5th Lincoln Militia, the Lincoln Artillery, and the 2nd York Militia (Malcomson 2003: 272).

An unmarked, pewter button of late 18th-early 19th-century vintage recovered at the battery is likely associated with militia clothing (FIG. 10B). Militia on both the British and U.S. sides often wore unmarked uniform buttons or civilian clothing. In the case of Private Thomas Smith of the 3rd York Militia, rushing to battle in unmarked civilian clothes had fatal consequences. In the heat of Sheaffe’s counteroffensive, Norton’s warriors mistook him for an American militiaman and struck him down on Queenston Heights before his comrades could intervene (Malcomson 2003: 189). In the smoke and
Figure 8. Recent plan of the battery site showing an unidentified berm south of the platform. (Plan by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
Figure 9. Benjamin Lossing’s Map of the Niagara Frontier highlighting Brock’s four army divisions in Niagara on the eve of the Battle of Queenston Heights: First Division Fort Erie, Second Division Chippawa, Third Division Queenston and Fourth Division Fort George (Lossing 1869: 382.).
confusion of battle, a uniform, even if only an arm band, symbolized allegiance and served the vital role of distinguishing friend from foe. A 1st Regiment, Royal Scots coat button was also recovered at the Redan Battery (FIG. 10C). The Royal Scots did not arrive on the Niagara frontier until 1813, but participated in later engagements with distinction. The regiment won the battle honor “Niagara” for exemplary service in the battles of Chippawa, Lundy’s Lane, and at Fort Erie (Parkyn 1987: 69). During their tenure at Niagara, the Queenston and Redan batteries moved back and forth between American and British hands several times, with the Royal Scots garrisoning Redan Battery intermittently during this period (Cruickshank 1908). Ironically, an American account notes that on the first anniversary of the battle of Queenston Heights, with the British withdrawn to Burlington, “a small American militia force took possession of the ground without opposition” (Cruickshank 1907: 47).

1812-Era Munitions

The military ammunition Snow retrieved during the battery excavation included two canister shot and two musket balls. Canister shot, consisting of a tin canister filled with cast-iron balls (or sand shot), is an antipersonnel device employed by ordnance firing at close range (McConnell 1988: 319). After exiting the gun muzzle, the canister disintegrates, releasing a rapidly expanding cone of shot. Canister wreaks havoc among/against massed troops, but is only effective at close range, losing force beyond 300 yd. (274 m).

The small size of the two shot (0.88 and 1.11 in. diameter, or approximately 1½ and 2 oz., respectively) implies use in a 3-pounder to 6-pounder garrison-gun canister or a 3- to 12-pounder field-gun canister (fig. 11) (McConnell 1988: 502). The 18-pounder Redan Battery garrison gun would have loaded canister packed with 62, 4 oz. shot or 82, 3 oz. shot, both appreciably larger than the examples recovered.

Though it was fired against American troops embarked on the river, U.S. forces may never have employed the captured Redan gun against the British. Regardless of whether the British gun crew spiked it before retreating, or if an American put it out of commission during Macdonell and William’s counteroffensive, Wool did not order his men to drill the gun and bring it to bear on the village until after the second attempt to retake the battery. Wool then retired to the American shore to have his wounds tended as Chrystie arrived to take command (Cruickshank 1902a: 155). Drilling a vent hole is time consuming. As no mention is made of U.S. fire on the village from the battery, they may not have completed

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Figure 10. Military buttons recovered at Redan Battery include; (A) 41st Regiment soldier’s coat button struck concave, (B) unmarked pewter button typical of that worn by militia on both sides of the engagement; and (C) 1st Regiment Royal Scots coat button. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada)
the task before the British counteroffensive that afternoon.

As the invaders watched Sheaffe’s force approach, John Lovett of the U.S. Artillery rode to Fort Gray on the American shore opposite Queenston. Hoping to fire on the British column 500 yd. away, he ordered his 18-pounder guns loaded with grape- and solid shot. Before they came into range, however, the British passed behind the cliff, thwarting his attempt to provide artillery support to isolated U.S. forces on the heights. Lovett watched helplessly as both sides opened with “fixed cannon, flying artillery and the roll of musketry.” He recounted: “The mountain seemed to shake beneath the stride of death” (Cruickshank 1902a: 87).

British forces advanced with two, 3-pounder field guns. As they forced the invaders back to the cliff edge, they encountered the American 6-pounder field gun that had been transported across the river and hauled up the heights that morning. In the smoke of battle, it stood abandoned with all its accoutrements and ammunition wagon containing 4 rounds of fixed shot and 14 rounds of canister (Cruickshank 1902a: 75).

U.S. artillery munitions conformed to the British caliber system of 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-, and 18-pounder guns (Graves 1984: x). Either the American 6-pounder or the British 3-pounder field guns could fire the size of the canister shot found by Snow. However, the battle action and in situ War of 1812–context imply that they issued from a British muzzle as Sheaffe’s force advanced on the American position at Redan Battery.

Musket balls retrieved during the excavation represent both sides of the engagement (fig. 12). One is a .75-caliber British ball, the other a .69-caliber American ball for the French caliber muskets carried by American forces. U.S. cartridges contained either buckshot or a ball surmounted by three buckshot.

The return of captured American long arms at Queenston included 435 French carbine muskets, 380 bayonets, 141 bayonet scabbards, 325 ammunition pouches, and a cache of nearly 6,000 musket cartridges, nearly half with ball and buckshot, and the remainder with buckshot only (Cruickshank 1902a: 75). Eyewitness accounts of the height of battle describe a hail of bullets. Lieutenant Ridout of the 3rd York Militia wrote: “[T]he discharge of small arms, the whizzing of the balls and yells that issued from all quarters, exceed description” (Malcomson 2003: 189).

An eerie association exists between the U.S. ball shot recovered at the battery and the

Figure 11. Cast iron canister shot of 2 and 1 ½ ounce gauge. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
Figure 12. Lead British .75 caliber shot and U.S. .69 caliber shot from buck and ball cartridge. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)

Figure 13. U.S. .69 caliber shot exactly fits the contorted face of the 41st Regiment button. (Photo by author, 2012; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
distorted 41st Regiment button (Fig. 13). Excavators found both button and ball in the same context. After conservation treatment, a clearly delineated facet on the shot surface matched the indentation in the contorted button face. The effect of forceful impact shaping these two objects must have been transmitted to the soldier who wore the 41st Regiment uniform, very probably Private Thomas Haynes, who died at the battery as Wool’s force swept down on the gun crew.

1812-Era Human Remains

Human remains identified during 2012 faunal analysis include two fragments from a left tibia (probably from the same bone), and two fragments of fibula, one from near the distal end of a left fibula and the other from the proximal end of a right fibula (Fig. 14). They probably represent one individual (Berg 2012: 2), but confirmation would require DNA analysis. All the lower-leg bones came from excavation unit 22H2A, an area previously disturbed by installation of the Parks Canada trail monument and Niagara Parks Commission survey marker. Given the battlefield context, it is likely the bones represent shattering of limbs in action with further breakage by surface trampling. Disturbance of a shallow burial is a possibility, though lack of other skeletal elements argues against this. Still, Snow did note a possible stone feature disturbed by 20th-century intrusions, and Lossing’s account does mention burials marking the location of the battery (Lossing 1869: 413; Snow 1975: 13).

Whether the four fragments of human bone found among the battery debris represent a British regular, native warrior, local militia, an American casualty, or several individuals remains unknown. The battlefield context supports the assumption that the leg bones represent casualties, and horrific carnage on War of 1812 sites is well-documented (Litt, Williamson, and Whitehorne 1993).

Figure 14. Human leg bones recovered at Redan Battery include fragments of left and right fibula and two fragments of tibia ranging in length from 4.7cm to 6.7cm. (Photo by author, 2012; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
Accounts of the Battle of Queenston Heights aftermath tell of the dead lying on the battlefield overnight. The next day, when General Van Rensselaer wrote to request the return of the American dead to their shore, he learned the British had already interred the remains at Queenston. At dawn, a detail of soldiers of the 49th had collected bodies for burial and grimly reported many stripped of clothing and equipment, and some scalped. In the grisly setting, one might easily overlook small fragments of humanity trampled among the battlefield debris. An American rifleman who survived the ordeal expressed the feelings of many of his comrades when he wrote: “Thanks be to God, that my bones are not now bleaching on the awful Heights of Queenston” (Malcomson 2003: 195).

1812-Era Food-Preparation/Service Material

Domestic artifacts are exceedingly sparse in the battery assemblage. Five small ceramic sherds represent only one painted pearlware tea vessel and a creamware plate. A fragment of a lead-glass tumbler base is the only other formal 1812-vintage tableware recovered (FIG. 15A). Men may have received their rations at the cantonment on the heights above, although the presence of faunal debris suggests men posted at the battery ate there. Tinware may have been more common than ceramics at this posting. Snow did recover two fragments of a large, early 19th-century tin pan with a rolled-wire rim typical of the 1812 era (FIG. 15B). She also recovered an nondiagnostic base fragment of a cast-iron pot or kettle. Prepared rations may have been carried in these containers to men on duty.

1812-Era Miscellaneous Material

A fragment of a brass jaw harp and a few nondescript white-clay pipe-stem fragments hint at less-eventful moments during military
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service at Redan Battery (fig. 15C). Finally, two wrought-iron artifacts, originally identified by Snow as spikes, are tools. One is a small firmer chisel and the other an unidentified tool-handle tang (fig. 15D).

1812-Era Faunal Assemblage

Snow retrieved an assemblage of food-related bone, accounting for over a third of the Redan Battery assemblage. The presence of the faunal debris implies that men on duty ate at the emplacement. Once the military built barracks on the ridge above, men may have received their rations there, hence the bone debris is likely associated with the war era.

Faunal analysts interpreting British military contexts have built upon the seminal work of Wilson and Southwood (1976) at Fort George. Questions raised by Wilson about identifying the source of meat, and, in particular, the issue of fresh- vs. salt-meat provisions, found potential answers in Burns’s (1983) listing of statutes from Upper and Lower Canada and the Maritime Legislatures. These rules on bulk packaging date from 1758 to 1867 and describe the type of barrel, inspection requirements, labeling, and content quality for various grades of produce. The 1805 statute from Upper Canada and the similar 1804 statute for Lower Canada are frequently cited for War of 1812 faunal studies (Berg 2010, 2012; Rick 1993).

Quality levels for pickled beef specify animals aged three years or more, and divide the 12 to 4 lb. portion requirement into “mess beef,” “prime beef,” and “cargo beef.” Graduated amounts of less desirable portions, such as the neck, appear in descending grade order. No heads or hocks are to be included in any grade of salt beef. Pickled pork is also divided into mess, prime, and cargo pork. Prime includes only ribs of “good fat hogs” of 100 lb. or more, while cargo allows for “not more than two heads weighing a maximum of 25 lb. with ears snout brain and bloody grizzle removed.” No grade of pork allowed legs. The long list of commodities transported in barrels does not include mutton, which was not suitable for salting (Burns 1983: 4–7; Rick 1993: 32).

In the battery assemblage, over half the 162 food-related bones could be cross-mended, with their breakage largely attributed to trampling after discard. One third exhibited cleaver or ax marks from processing, with no saw or knife-cut marks (Berg 2012: 4).

Combinations of sawn and chopped processing are often characteristic of British military rations. The commissary often purchased fresh and barreled meat sawn into quarters by suppliers. Quartermasters reduced meat further by chopping into mess issue for about 12 men, while splitting into rations (of approximately 1 lb. of meat per man) with further cutting for stewing resulted in smaller

Figure 16. Food-related faunal material recovered from Redan Battery includes; (A) beef leg and rib bone, (B) sheep/goat, (C) young pig scapula, and (D) white-tailed deer bone. (Photo by author, 2012; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
The situation at Niagara was unlike isolated Fort St. Joseph, where salt pork and peas dominated the diet. Here fresh meat was easily accessible from the burgeoning settlements and via water transport. Seasonality and wartime necessity would diminish availability of fresh supply, and quantities of salt pork and beef are listed among stores captured at Fort George in 1813 (Wilson and Southwood 1976: 123; Cumbaa 1979: 19).

Analysts conclude that animal species, age, presence/absence of certain portions, and a combination of sawn and cut processing can be suggestive of fresh vs. salt meat. Among identified species found at Redan Battery, cattle bones are predominant, followed by pig, then sheep/goat, and one deer (fig. 16). Two of the cattle fragments are from lower-leg bones (normally not packed in salt beef), suggesting the Queenston Division enjoyed at least some fresh beef. The pig dentary bones in the sample do not have their anterior ends chopped off, as would be expected in the removal of the snout for barrel provision; and a scapula from a piglet too young for salt preservation also suggests fresh pork (Berg 2012: 5).

The sheep/goat in the assemblage is frequently found in military contexts and likely represents a local source, while the white-tailed deer bone suggests hunting or perhaps purchase of venison. The piglet less than three months in age may reflect illicit scavenging of nearby settlers’ livestock, an activity frequently documented during the
Canadian of planting the bomb in revenge for the death of a relative killed during the 1837 Rebellion in Upper Canada. The act outraged the community, and a committee began raising funds by subscription for a new monument. By 1853, they raised enough money to erect an even more impressive 185 ft. (56 m) high monument built west of the old column, which was then demolished. Again, the battle anniversary, 13 October, marked the date of the official ceremony to reinter Brock and Macdonell. A crowd of 12,000–15,000 attended, and, once again, patriotic speeches honored veterans of the battle and of the War of 1812 (fig. 18).

Despite the nearby encroachment on military reserve lands by the Erie and Ontario Railway indicated on the 1850 plan, the installation of interpretive markers, and visitation to the site by tourists following the course of the battle, surprisingly little mid-19th- to 20th-century debris was recovered (Plousos 2012). Following Snow’s 1975 excavation, Parks Canada removed the abstract monument and installed the reconstructed platform and 18-pounder cannon (fig. 19). Under agreement with the Niagara Parks Commission (the property owner), staff of Parks Canada, Niagara National Historic Sites, maintains the cannon emplacement as a significant place commemorating the Battle of Queenston Heights.

Redan Battery in the Post–War of 1812 Era

As Elizabeth Snow surmised, the lack of decking and the broken spikes in the assemblage indicate that the military dismantled Redan Battery sometime after the War of 1812. The battery is no longer present on a detailed 1850 plan of the Queenston military reserve. Only the old barrack above the battery location is still extant at mid-century (fig. 17). Royal Engineer Henry Vavasour prepared both this plan and the earlier 1818 map, indicating on both the place where Brock fell. By 1850, Vavasour was a lieutenant colonel, having returned to Canada after a long absence (Woodward 2011).

Vavasour’s second plan locates the original monument honoring Brock and Macdonell, whose bodies had been reinterred on Queenston Heights with all due ceremony on 11 October 1824. A large crowd, including many veterans of the war, turned out for the occasion. The monument, a 135 ft. (41.2 m) tall column with an observation platform at the summit, was bombed in 1840. Authorities suspected an Irish

Figure 18. Brock Monuments showing (A) the original 1824 monument in an engraved print drawn by W. H. Bartlett circa 1840 (National Art Gallery No. 39303) and (B) a 20th-century photograph of the 1853 Brock Monument (Courtesy of the Department of the Interior, Canada, and Library and Archives Canada, PA 048140).
Figure 19. Redan Battery showing (A) the pre-1975 abstract sculpture marking point 5 of the Queenston walking tour (Parks Canada). (Photo by Elizabeth Snow, 1975; courtesy of Parks Canada.) (B) is a recent site image showing the current 18-pounder cannon emplacement. (Photo by Joseph Last, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.).

Conclusions

The British success in the first year of the War of 1812 was, in part, an expression of poor communication and botched incursions by the invaders. As the war began, the American military lacked organization, and political rivalries between commanders resulted in lack of coordinated effort with disastrous results. They quickly learned from these errors. The British regular force in Upper Canada was sparse and spread along a vast border. The brilliant commander, Isaac Brock, inspired and trained local militia units, forged alliances with native allies, and achieved considerable success by bold action. In so doing, he convinced local inhabitants, particularly those in the Niagara region, that invasion could be successfully resisted.

The Battle at Queenston Heights was a proving ground for British regulars, militia, and native allies, who fought together to resist the invading force. Their concerted effort and participation in the victory established a new sense of national pride. Brock’s death leading a charge to retake Redan Battery gave locals a hero to emulate and memorialize in speeches, monuments, anthems, and historic lore.

Elizabeth Snow’s detailed 1975 excavation report on the Redan Battery and associated strata provided firm data for reconstruction of the cannon platform for the Queenston battle walking tour. Though the archaeological collection she recovered is small, relics from the War of 1812–era truly elicit a sense of the height of a battle fought and won at Queenston Heights. Viewing these artifacts within the battle context enhances their meaning, for they are truly evocative of a place where guns roared and heroes fell.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Parks Canada and extends special appreciation to Elizabeth Snow for her excellent research and enthusiasm for archaeology. Bob Garcia, a Parks Canada Historian, assisted greatly with advice regarding historic documents related to Redan Battery and the Battle of Queenston Heights. Rachel Brooks, Barbara Leskovec, and Joseph Last, all current or previous employees of Parks Canada provided archaeological assistance and access to collection resources. Special thanks to Joe for his constant support and photographic expertise, and to Susan Maguire, for her editorial work and fortitude in ensuring this War of 1812 volume made it to press.
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