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The World of the Greek Philosophers: A Reappraisal

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In this account of an encounter with the surviving traces of the world of the Greek philosophers, and my own discovery of their relevance to the ideas that originated and were tested there, I have three purposes in mind. The first is to start a discussion of ancient thought in its context; such topics as "the world" are somewhat out of style, and yet our more specialized studies presuppose such a world and can go wrong if the general presuppositions are mistaken. My second purpose is to persuade our Society that it is necessary for us to keep track of collateral information in other fields of research tangent to our own; my selection and classification of archaeological items serves here as case-study. The effect of increased specialization and precision has led to a decrease in the size of individual "items" considered important enough to publish separately; and this in turn has lead to an exponential increase in the amount of information one must somehow scan and appraise in order to keep track of material in other fields that is also relevant for us. The problem of storage of information, and access to it, is not limited to the natural sciences, where current attempts to use computers for this work are going on; perhaps it is time for the humanities, too, to give serious consideration to the technological devices we can use, before the rising tide of information flow inundates us all. My third purpose is to report on my own experience during a year in Greece which began with assurance that I knew about Greek philosophy and that archaeology was irrelevant to it, and ended in a discovery that, on both these counts, I had been wrong. In the course of finding that there are at least four types of relevance between idea and artifact, I also found myself with an uneasy feeling that the sum of my information was not adding up to an ancient world that matched any standard image of it—neither nineteenth century austerity, twentieth-century flamboyance, nor an eclectic conjunction of these which was my own.

Let me say at once that I am not setting myself up here as a specialist in archaeology; my ideas and examples are taken from a year in which I combined writing about philosophy with being a tourist in the tradition that runs from Pausanias through Mark Twain. The items I have selected, in spite of my rather formal classification into graded types, are not the result of any systematic or exhaustive search, but a sample selected more by luck, footwork, and general curiosity.

There is one undeniable sort of relevance that archaeology has for any student of Greek philosophy: it offers a vivid conviction that ancient Greece was real, and its philosophers were really there. Hume was right in his contrast between the force and vivacity of a first-hand impression as opposed to an idea; and the different feeling for the historical reality of the ancient world that results from being there and seeing actual sites and traces is, of itself, a justification for a visit to Greece by a philosopher, however convinced he is that environment and thought are independent of each other. For the philosopher on tour, some statues, inscriptions, and artifacts have special "human interest" because they are connected with earlier Greek philosophers: these are indexes fixing an exact place and time for the men whose thought we admire. But these items of atomic indication have only extrinsic and accidental relevance to philosophy itself; to keep track of a scheme of graded relevance I will call them items with relevance of grade one.

Even on this flat, precise level, we need to keep up with changing findings, which may result in new discoveries, and in new judgments as to what the precise facts are. John Burnet, for example, cited a fragment of a statue of Anaximander found at Miletus as an index locating this philosopher in history; and also as indicating that the story of his political activity had some confirmation here by fact. But new examination by an art historian has shown that the statue is that of a woman, and hence not of Anaximander after all. There is a loss to us here, but it is rather slight. Correspondingly,
there is some gain in noting the unchallenged fact that Gorgias was commemorated by at least two statues at Olympia. The base of the later one survives, with a dedicatory inscription, and also a defense of Gorgias for having, earlier, set up his own statue to himself. Well, this does clinch the fact that Gorgias was real. It may even be tangible confirmation of the public impact, wealth, and influence of the Sophists of the older generation. What importance we are to attach to the fact that Gorgias was criticized by someone for his undue sense of his own importance is not immediately evident; perhaps this depends on how closely we agree with his own appraisal.

Another example of a fact with this sort of human interest, and relevance of grade one, was found in the Athenian Agora. One of the stories told about Socrates was that he spent much time in the Agora in the shop of a cobbler named Simon. The American School archaeologists found, in the remains of a cobbler shop of the fifth century, the base of a cup, inscribed "Property of Simon," and on this basis it is believed that this was the shop of the friend of Socrates. This gives a vivid human touch, as we visit the spot and picture Socrates just here talking with his friend. It also suggests that we might look again at the titles of the "Socratic speeches" Simon is supposed to have written down; also, that all of Socrates' "talk of cobblers" likely rested on first-hand observation; and the find certainly tells against the flashy, but unlikely, thesis that Socrates was a social climber and a snob, who only favored influential people with his company.

The intrinsic relevance of a fact is, unfortunately no index of its importance. If there were greater certainty in attributing the design of Italian coinage to Pythagoras, these coins would be important, though not highly relevant to the history of ideas. A spectacular case of neglected information, where more of the facts are certain, illustrates this same point. In 1933, a fragment of a marble tablet was found at the site of Plato's Academy by a young Greek archaeologist, Aristophron. (This site is at the southwest corner of Plato and Tripoleos Streets, still an unfenced and unmarked excavation.) G. Karo published a description in 1934; he read the four lines as CHA... ARIS... AXI... CRITON Karo suggested that these were "names of disciples of Socrates," and the date fifth century. This fact seems to have entirely escaped the notice of philosophers.

In 1962, P. Stavropoulos, Ephor of this archaeological district in Athens, included his own drawing made from a copy of the tablet in a new article on Plato's Academy in the Megale Hellinike Enyklopaideia. His drawing reads the lines as: CHA... ARIS... MENEX... KRITON He suggests that the date of this is ca. 300 B.C., and the names are "titles of Platonic dialogues." Now, one of the major controversies concerning the history and reliability of our Plato text revolves around the question of whether the Academy already had given the dialogues some established tetralogical order, which Thrasyllus merely modified in his edition, or whether this ordering was solely Thrasyllus' own. Once the reading of the tablet is certain, it may have crucial evidential value on the point. But almost no one in our field knows about it.

Items of this kind convinced me that even such items of "slight" intrinsic relevance might be "important" enough to notice; and I soon found that I had to recognize a higher degree of relevance for some archaeological items. I was very pleased, as a tourist, by the Agora Museum, with its tools, plates, cups and coins; and particularly happy to recognize some items that philosophers had referred to as illustrations of
their concepts. I had already been surprised to find, when I was trying to understand Plato's reference to physical objects as "minted space," what a different connotation "physical object" took on when I compared it to coinage of the Athenian rather than the modern American mint. And the odd but functional shape of the classical pruning-hook is an eye-catching illustration of function dictating form. In such cases as these, actual items give us a way of attaching concrete referents to terms, and of verifying our own notions of intended meaning and reference; and I will assign them a graded relevance of type two. A volume treating Greek philosophers—particularly Plato—among the arts and crafts could be of some, if peripheral, importance for giving a more precise grasp of the meanings of some terms, concepts, and similes in their philosophies.

Without itemizing examples here, which could range from eel-traps to astronomical apparatus, I will only note one puzzling point that surprised me about this class of facts as a whole: the workmanship of useful objects was often wretched. The striking of coins, where some slave of the mint altered his die onto the silver anyhow—and sometimes nearly missed with it altogether—was not atypical. At least as surprising was the fact that dice were not even close to being cubes, in Athens or in Corinth. They had tapers and anomalies that no American game-player would trust for a single throw! This contrast of workmanship between the meticulous die and the casual coin, the precise applied geometry of the Parthenon and the unlikely failures of dice-makers, was unexpected, and I noted it as a puzzle for future cogitation.

But it was not only possible to fix meanings of terms better where archaeology supplied intended referents; sets of items sometimes had very suggestive relations to general propositions, both of and about Greek philosophers, particularly where they seemed likely to have been in the background as illustrating or confirming new—or old—hypotheses and assertions. This is a closer, but more problematic, grade of relevance than the two discussed already; if its existence is established, it should be called relevance of grade three.

The most striking example of the way in which large sets of small items can reverse interpretation of, or belief in, a philosophical generalization is the new appraisal of Aristotle's "we Greeks are men of moderation" in the twentieth century. The nineteenth century took the statement at its face value; it fit well with the austere, symmetrical structural remains that their archaeologists were studying and restoring. But new combinations of fact, from law cases to ostracism sherds, has convinced our own century that either "moderation" means what we would rather call "excess," or the statement is a lie. Edith Hamilton and Kitto have cited chapter and verse for their disbelief in Aristotle, and, carrying the pendulum swing from nineteenth to twentieth century to the ludicrous end of its possible arc, Life Magazine ("Greece: Part IV") identifies ancient Athens with striped Scythians and stage-sets from Wagner.

There are some less spectacular questions that I have in mind which show this third grade of relevance between idea and archaeology. I will cite three, which have a peculiar interest. In general, it is interesting to notice that suggestions and hypotheses which seem at first incorrigibly vague, almost meaningless, turn out to be capable of sharpening and testing against definite evidence; in particular, the three cases I have in mind result in the surprising finding that life in ancient Athens was much more like our own than one would expect.

In Greece as opposed to ancient India, the atomic theory was a popular and technical success. Why? One thing that has always struck me about this theory is that a practical world full of gadgetry gives it much more intuitive plausibility than it could have in an environment devoid of ingenious mechanism altogether. Could it be that there was more ready-to-hand confirmation of this sort in the West than in ancient India, and that this contributed to the different receptions of the suggestion that all nature is a
congeries of complex mechanisms? We still don't know about ancient India; but until twenty years ago, the part of this thesis that concerns the West would have been rejected as absurd. Who ever heard of gadgetry in the leisure-class, aristocratic ancient Athenian atmosphere? But here a set of facts confirms the generalization that gadgets were a recognized and well-established fact in Athenian life, and disproves the myth—which begins in the classical philosophers themselves—that there is no place in society for ingenious machinery.

Perhaps here a definition of gadget is in order: I mean by this a small mechanical device that, with a surprising ingenuity of mechanism, performs some action it surprises us to find capable of being mechanically performed. (A Florentine toy gold bird that flaps his wings and whistles is a good example; toys and gadgets are overlapping categories.) And from Minoan to modern times, the archaeology of Greece offers a collection of gadgets thus defined—culinary, theological, political—which some day deserves its own history.

My set of artifacts begins with a strange sixth-century jar found in the Athenian Agora. The outside has openings for hollow tubes that coil through the interior, like the water-heating coils of coal furnaces in my younger days. The purpose of these was, however, cooling rather than heating; immersed in cold water, this would flow through the coils and cool, without diluting, a jar full of wine. Over the next century and a half, we find (though two of these finds are not from the Agora itself) ceramic water-clocks set for three minutes and for six; the setting and accounts, if not yet the pieces of a wonderful oil lamp needing only one annual filling; molds for mass producing small clay figurines; the base of a public sundial with a new design; ingenious juror's ballots, pairs of wheels with a shaft, one shaft hollow, the other solid; a child's small potty-chair; a new design of sausage grill, where lugs prevent the skewered meat from rolling off or turning; one item I have not seen, but know from first-hand report, a bowl with an Amazon on the rim designed to spout wine or water from her single breast when the bowl was filled (this is an adaptation of a design frequent in Minoan pitchers), the relics of a lottery machine (the slotted backboard, metal tickets with names, a brass ball). With this evidence, we can now combine references in literature that are relevant. We already find Plato repeating a story about a crackpot inventor; Aristotle, in the Constitution of Athens meticulously itemizing the apparatus used for a day in court. (The latter equipment included hundreds of lettered acorns, twenty lottery-machines, name tickets, colored staves, a model of the chambers where cases were tried, the wheel-shaped ballots already mentioned, and a ballot-box I will return to later.) Perhaps we need more evidence for a conclusive demonstration that a feedback between atomism and Agora actually took place; but the impact of this set of small scale devices certainly confirms the notion that such a feedback was possible. My colleague, Mr. Falk, suggested that the case would be stronger if the pore-and-effluence model of atomism found any counterpart in machine design; in the devices I happen to know of, there is only one relevant item. That is the ballot-box described by Aristotle; this was fitted with a lid that had a shaped slot exactly right to allow one, and only one, juror's ballot to fall into the box at a time.

But my confirmation of the proposition that there were Greek gadgets is particularly interesting because the facts go counter both to the standard nineteenth-century image of the Greek world (in this view, the Greeks are too serious and aloof to have any time for such novelties) and to the twentieth century image (which finds the Greeks at once too dominated by a leisure-class mentality and too flamboyantly engaged in using their leisure time for politics to divert their energy to such minor technological matters.)

A second, overlapping, set of items in the Agora Museum also has the sort of relevance I have called grade three to the scientists and their contemporaries. Throughout
the nomos-physis controversy, there was always immediate evidence in the Agora itself to illustrate and support the claim that society's standards of value, and even its public world, rest on arbitrary enactment and convention. There have been found sets of standard weights and measures, marked "Official"; seals of inspectors; the headquarters of the Market Police who did all they could to give the operation of enacted custom the inexorability of laws of nature. Currency (represented by some tools and bars from the ancient mint), metric standards, justice in jury trials (the elaborate artifices to secure honesty in court), all represented a multiplicity of arbitrary definition and regulation. Indeed, the Agora enclosure itself had been marked off arbitrarily by planting inscribed boundary stones, one of which still stands, reading

HOROSEMI

rather like our own

PLAN AH

signs. There appears no doubt that there was a whole structure of commonly recognized facts that the Sophists could presuppose, facts that would make their dictum intelligible and plausible to the ordinary Athenian, however contrary to his prejudices this new exaltation of "convention" might be. I had held quite a different notion of the balance between free enterprise and public regulation; Plato's comment that landlords should be supervised to cut down on the murders of travellers came closer to my original idea. And philosophically, it is not irrelevant to find that the new conventionalism did not have to rely on extrapolation from travellers' accounts about odd actions of remote barbarians, but had an immediate local plausibility. The role of metric standards in creating "agreement" about a "public world" appears as a familiar fact in the Euthyphro of Plato.

I was surprised to find these groups of items pointing toward a much greater likeness between Athens and modern New Haven than I had expected. But I could not, somehow, fit this fact together with the other things I had seen as a tourist: Delphi, the Athenian Acropolis, Olympia, Epidaurus—where sculpture, architecture, choice of site showed exactly the "classical" sensitivity to form, precision of technique, and absolute pitch for right size scale, that the nineteenth century had tried to generalize into the determining qualities of the culture as a whole.

Perhaps, I thought, my trouble in seeing how these sides of life had fitted together came from thinking about ancient life with a modern sense of time. There has been a good deal written about the arbitrary tyranny of mechanical time, as it displaces the "life time" or "work time" of an earlier way of life; it might well be, I thought, that a society without any mechanical clocks could be much more loosely articulated, somehow,
in the way its component classes and parts interacted and held together. For life on some Greek islands, at present as well as in the past, I am sure this difference in time-sense holds, and that it does really involve a different feeling from my own about causality, sequence, and the degree of regularity one can expect in society or nature. The Postämter of the one island I knew well, for example, had a budget of hypotheses to explain why a message phoned from his office to Athens radio had not reached the S.S. United States at sea. The ship could well have changed course to pick up last-minute cargo; might, naturally, have decided not to sail at all; or might have shut down its radio for the voyage because the operator was drinking. I don’t feel qualified to decide which world is better, the one where boats have personality and creativity, or the one where they have exact, efficient schedules. But I can say that the former world simply cannot have the kind of precise prediction, advance planning, or tight synchronisation by watch and calendar that we expect in our own.

This island example is not irrelevant to my main theme, since it confirms my generalization that difference in time-sense does give rise to differences in articulation and interaction. But I am pretty sure that the time sense of an ancient Athenian was already sensitized to mechanical time and not drastically different from my own. In cities and palaces, there is already an ancestor of the mechanical clock in the Minoan libation jars, many of which were found at Knossos. These are jars which pour a constant fine stream of oil or wine, and empty and have to be refilled with exact mechanical regularity; their considerable number already must have put clock-time into operation for the religious officials attending them. By the first century A.D., the Tower of the Winds made its appearance as an important feature of the Roman addition to the Athenian Agora. This handsome octagonal tower was a display-piece, combining eight external sundials, an inner weather-vane, and an elaborate water-driven clock—which could be consulted by the public at any hour of night or day. That mechanical clock, setting the pace of the city with its arbitrary, analytical divisions of each day, was not just a sudden innovation. In 433 B.C., the astronomer Hecataeus had put up a new public sundial where the Assembly met on the Pnyx. By about 350, a very impressive large-scale water-operated clock was in operation near a northern entrance of the Agora. The small, six-minute water clock found near the old courthouses by the American School is of about the same date and part of the same picture. Putting these items together with literary references, indicating that courtroom speeches and cases, theatrical competitions, assembly meeting times all were regulated by sundial and klepsydra, it appeared that the fourth century in Athens was already running on modern time. The harassed lawyer of Plato’s Theaetetus, running to keep up with the clock as his time “ran out,” has much the look of a modern American. And the fact that “fractions of a day” were defined by a “standard day” meant that mechanical time-keepers were displacing the more natural, but more variable, risings and settings of the sun. This set of items, given more impact as my guide book recorded mechanical clocks of this period elsewhere in Greece, completely contradicted my hypothesis of a different sense of time.

If archaeological facts can be relevant to the study of philosophy as indexes fixing exact persons and events, as artifacts helping to make terms and concepts clear by providing concrete referents, as sets of items capable of verifying or discrediting propositions about and in Greek philosophy, there may be still another order of relevance. Where the archaeologist has been able to completely recreate an ancient site, in its detail, this may give us a way of understanding and confirming philosophic systems which purport to explain and reflect the whole world. Such concrete reconstructions of whole segments can be said to have a relevance of grade four. Notice that, as items become more relevant, they form larger and more complex sets; their importance for us is greater, but their use is much harder, and they tend to invite vagueness and subjective free association. I think I can summarize the conclusions I have drawn so far with some precision. That indexes and referents of illustrations may be important, and are in any
case interesting, for the extent of Greek philosophy, is not vague, nor surprising
that there existed, in ancient Athens, enough familiar mechanical devices to give the
atomic theory immediate intelligibility, is surprising, but until one tries to pinpoint
the exact extent of interaction not vague. The same is true of the finding that arti-
cficial convention permeated the whole legal and economic structure to a degree that must
have given the Sophistic stress to custom immediate comprehensibility and a claim to be
taken seriously. Even that enigmatic thing, "a sense of time," proves to be capable
of confrontation with facts of fact which indicate that it was already beginning to be
very like our own.

My final excursion is more tentative, more important, and less clear. In looking
at the models reconstructing Olympia and the Acropolis, and spending some time identi-
fying details at Delphi, I had an uneasy feeling that the sense of order here was not
my own, that the relation of surface and substance was much more external than I had
expected. This would mean, if it proved true, that the crucial ordering relations in
ancient philosophy were presupposing, as the definition and illustration of their sys-
tematic theses, a considerably different meaning from the one I had assumed.

I am sure that ancient Olympia would have seemed to us a shattering center of dis-
order. A beautiful setting had been cluttered up with miscellaneous items and trophies
of every description, from a stone inscribed "BULLUS LIFTED ME OVER HIS HEAD WITH ONE
HAND" to the statues of Zeus, the Zeas, payments of fines for cheating in the Games.
With its ubiquitous busts of foreign potentates, of heralds, of politicians, of Gorgias,
it must have been as unpredictable and confusing as an Oriental garden.31) (What would
Segal have done with this information? Would he have had to give up his contrast be-
tween the "scientific" Western and the "dream-like" Oriental mind?) Apart from two main
avenues, I had the impression that any path anyone followed would pass around, by,
and through a succession of things forming no coherent order or sequence: a tourist hotel
with bath, a rotunda in honor of Phillip of Macedon, an athletic commissioner in effigy,
perhaps a small likeness of the noisiest herald of, say, 360 B.C. There was a planning
commission, and perhaps they had some radial plan; but lines of sight and travel are
straight, not circular, and it should have been easy to tell that their approved plan
would produce vistas of incongruities. Nor is Olympia alone in this effect. At Delphi,
to take another example, a pilgrim climbing the Sacred Way and pausing in the shadow of
the Temple of Apollo must have found himself in a veritable warehouse of second-hand
ammunition and miscellaneous statuary.32) Matching ancient accounts against the square
cuttings still visible in the stone floor, I got a picture of benches piled high with
dented helmets, boat oars, old shields; repeating in artifacts the collected jumble of
trivial decrees immortalized in four hundred odd inscriptions on the wall lower down
the Way. And this is not an idiosyncracy of sites where many city-states were each de-
determined and entitled to get their own buildings and heroes into the act. For the
detailed reconstructions of the Athenian Acropolis, identifying the tablet, statue, or
bench once mounted in each of the cuttings that occur every few feet in the rock, show
the same baffling lack of order.33) But there were officers in charge of building and
decoration, and they were satisfied.

Just here may be the point: our notion that a beautiful natural scene, an elegant
frieze, or a graceful temple logically requires a compatible, not a distracting, fore-
ground was apparently not ancient Greek at all. Our minds would never tolerate Jefferson
niches with only a quarter of the portrait stamped on; our dice players would throw,
as far away as they could, the pairs of classical non-cubic dice which upset our assumed
 equivalence of a priori probability and relative frequency. Our admirers of modern
furniture cheer the passing of de luxe overstuffed, with lion's feet and extraneous
golden tassels. But I suspect that an ancient Athenian would not react in these ways
at all. The purity of marble that we admire in the Elgin Marbles is marked with

...
settle, harness and root of statues, mechanical details of figures. Traces of pigment on other friezes reveal that the Greeks added bright arynes, paint, and gilding to their finest statuary, friezes, column capitals. The foreground of their most important shrines, symbols of eternity, were filled with chauvinistic epigrams and tasteless heaps of trophies.

We should not dismiss this as some sort of unexpected barbaric energy. There is nothing barbaric about the sites and temples, statues and reliefs, to which this color and clutter was juxtaposed. Somehow a different sense of metaphysical distance from our own is at work here. There is a "distance" between surface and substance so great that the two are almost externally related to each other. And other feelings for distance than our own seem to be reflected in the closer sense of relevance of the ideal to the actual, the greater tolerance for poor approximation. The Athenian coin, with the elegant goddess lacking her nose, provoked no recorded execution of employees or overseers at the mint. Why should it? Everyone saw what the design ideally would be, and accepted the fact that the artist's die was an ideal very remote from the concrete silver surface of a coin. Apparently the thickets of small statuary didn't interfere with a comprehension of the Parthenon, nor the brass fittings seem out of place flashing against the clear lines of its frieze.

This final observation of mine is in need of a good deal of checking. Perhaps it is idiosyncratic; perhaps it will fade when there are more concrete sites or when the present ones are confronted longer, in more detail. But if it is right, let me indicate what bearing I think it has on Greek philosophy. The fact may be, that Plato and Aristotle in handing over the order and direction of the world to forms or final causes are paying these entities less of a metaphysical compliment than we assume they are. Is the form really omnipotent in relation to the natural world it gives direction and value? Does it set a target that pinpoints aim, with no tolerance for deviation? This notion would go counter to all of the examples we have seen of the variability in approximation of instance to form, the indifference of symmetrical structure to what passes before its facade, or glistens on its surface. We would do better to envisage the role of forms or final causes on the model of ancient Athens, not a modern assembly line. And in ancient Athens, the Acropolis, which gave the city its unity and rose above it as center of identity and ideal, did hold together Theater, Academy, Agora, Assembly. But it did not cast a shadow of eternity over the city that unified it, as the nineteenth century thought, in frozen moderation. Neither was it irrelevant, as some less reverent twentieth-century scholars suggest, that the Acropolis was there above the frantic bargainers, orators, and comedians. When we recapture the concrete texture that related the parts of ancient Athens to the shared ideal, without taking away from each its autonomy and color, we may be in a better position to appreciate the exact meaning of the role of form in classical philosophy.

And so I come, by what Mark Twain would call a natural and easy transition, to three conclusions. The first is that we would lose something if we were to stop talking about such broad, nonspecialized notions as "the world": we need these broad-spectrum ideas to reinfuse romance, color, and wider relevance into specialized analyses of high precision. The second conclusion is, that there are at least four grades of relevance that hold between the findings of classical archaeology and the study of classical philosophy. The same thing applies, I am sure, to what is being discovered, discussed, and decided in other fields tangent to our own. This being so, it will be necessary for us to keep track of what these other specialists are up to. My third conclusion is, that we can use information about the Greek world to pinpoint events, fix meanings of terms and sylloges, test general hypotheses and see how their setting did or did not give them intuitive plausibility, and even, perhaps, be able to supply the models of reality that classical philosophic systems presupposed. Both confrontation and gradual approach have
made me feel that those models were a world with slightly different distances and textures from our own. I wonder, for example, whether the systematic relation of reality sending directives to appearance might not have evoked the same interpretation in an ancient Athenian that my Postmaster in modern Greece supplied for his abstract idea of Athens radioing messages to the S.S. United States at sea?

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4. See the "Life of Simon" in Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions..., II, ch. 13.


6. A. Winspeir, and T. Silverberg, Who was Socrates?


10. This is the theme of the controversy between E. Bickel and G. Jachmann.

11. For example, if the second line could actually read ERIS... i.e., ERISTIKOS, the sequence is suggestively close to Thrasyllos' sequence:
CHARMIDES (V2) -- LACHES --LYSIS -- (V1) EUTHYDEMOS--PROTAGORAS--GORGIAS--MENO-- (VII 1) [Hippias Minor] -- [Hippias Major] -- [ION] -- MENEXENUS.
The Crito, however, if that is clearly the last line, does not correspond to Thrasyllos' arrangement at all.

12. Timaeus, 503: typheute; cp. the schematika plasas ek chrysou, 50A, and ektytomatos, 500.

13. Presumably why Plato used this example in Republic 1. 333C, 353D.

14. A brief list of some of these illustrations from arts and crafts in my "Plato and the History of Science," Studium Generale, IX (1961), 521-22. It may be that Plato used the four-level scheme of his divided line as a criterion for completeness of explanation; in that case, we would expect technai to have a place in at least all of the middle and late dialogues. That this would make philosophical sense is shown, I think, in the "Platonic philosophy of education" presented in R. C. Burkhaug and N. M. Lawrence, Philosophers on Education, (Boston, 1963), Chap. II.
15. The Pneumática of Heron of Alexandria (2nd or 3rd century B.C.), which is the first written classical work on engineering and technology, finds steam-power making its debut in the West as a way to make toy birds move and whistle; a perfect illustration of my point.

16. Athenian Agora, p. 152; see also p. 173.

17. Sausage grill, Agora 174; for this and wine-coolers and ovens, see Brian A. Sparkes and Lucy Talcott, Pots and Pans of Classical Athens, Athenian Agora Picture Books, #1 (1958). The Amazon was described to me by Prof. Henry S. Robinson; the Minian "mother-goddess" pitchers are a frequent design. The oil lamp was in a temple on the Acropolis. For the statue-molds, see D. B. Thompson, Miniature Sculpture from the Athenian Agora, Athenian Agora Picture Books, #3.


20. For the Mint, The Agora, pp. 24, 96 f., 172; measures, see note 21, above; justice, see n. 19, above.

21. The Agora, p. 35, 57-8; Plate IVa, p. 49.


23. See, for example, "kython," in the Hachette Greece (Paris, 1955), 553-5.


26. Athenian Agora, 107, 108-10, Fig. 23 p. 109.


29. Aristotle, op. cit., ch. 67 (p. 145); the meaning here is evident in spite of the lacuna.

30. For example, the "twin" of the Agora clepsydra at Oropus, Athenian Agora, 108.

31. A good compilation from many sources in Hachette Guide to Greece (Paris, 1955), pp. 360-8, Map pp. 364-5; read through rapidly, this description gives the "Oriental garden" impression; and, at least for me, detailed study and leisurely visiting does not change it.


33. Ibid., 154-210; see also N. Perfetos, The Ancient Agora and Acropolis of Athens (Athens, 1961).