Ahmed Alwishah. Pitzer College. Ahmed_Alwishah@pitzer.edu. “Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna on the Impossibility of Having Two Necessary Existents.” 5-1

Avicenna’s philosophical demonstration that there cannot be more than one “Necessary Existent” was challenged and critically advanced in post-Avicennian metaphysics, first by al-Ghazālī, and then significantly refined in the writings of Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna. The purpose of this paper is to show how Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna defended and developed Avicenna’s argument for the impossibility of having two necessary existents in light of al-Ghazālī’s critique. Focusing primarily on the analysis of key passages from Ibn Kammūna’s commentary on Suhrawardī’s al-Talwīḥāt al-lawḥiyya wa al-ʿarshiyya, I will show how Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna hold Avicenna’s argument to be indefensible unless one demonstrates (a) Avicenna’s claim that the “existence” of the Necessary Existent is His “essence,” and that (b) it is inconceivable for the human intellect to separate between the “essence” and the “existence” of the Necessary Existent. Before showing that, I will sketch out key aspects of Avicenna’s argument and Ghazālī’s critiques of it.


It is clear from several texts that Epicurean sages will not be interested in politics or public attention. Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus himself did not enter public life because of his excessive deference to others, and several of the Epicurean Principals indicate that security is best obtained by withdrawing from the many. Other texts suggest that Epicureans will not care much about praise from others, will not prattle on about their views, and will avoid showing off in public. However, there is other evidence that Epicureans will engage in many sorts of public activities and will not be particularly deferential toward others. According to Diogenes, Epicureans will sue people, give public speeches, found schools, write books, and be dogmatists, not skeptics. How can Epicureans justify such behavior and attitudes, given their distaste for politics and publicity? This paper argues that Epicureans will enter into public life and assert their own views if they believe their self-respect is at stake. Several sources suggest that Epicureans take pride in their characters and will not compromise their beliefs for the sake of assimilating into their culture. I argue that Epicureans may in fact be psychologically pained if they feel they are being misrepresented, slandered, or taken advantage of, and so there is good reason to believe they will act publically to defend themselves and relieve their suffering. Although Epicureans will always avoid fame, they do care enough about their reputations so as to avoid being slighted by others.

John Armstrong. Southern Virginia University. john.armstrong@svu.edu. “The Striving Parts of Plato’s Universe.” 1-3
In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger says that the universe’s parts, which include human beings, come to be and “strive” for the sake of the universe as a whole. This implies two kinds of holism: cosmic rational holism, the view that the ultimate justification of a part’s activity is its contribution to the good of the universe as a whole; and cosmic motivational holism, the view that the universe’s parts are motivated to contribute to the good of the universe as a whole. If Plato is a holist in these senses, then we should modify the common assumption that Plato is an egoist of either the rational or psychological sort. I argue that Plato is a cosmic holist in the Laws, that his holism arises from a teleological conception of the universe similar to Aristotle’s, and that it can ground egoistic and altruistic concerns.

Anne F. Ashbaugh. Towson University. AAshbaugh@towson.edu. “Desiring Beautiful Things: Reading Meno 77b Keeping in Mind Symposium 203b-212e.” 2-8

At Meno, 77b, Meno defines virtue erotically. Socrates’ discussion on how to define terms like shape and color by “seeking that which is the same in all cases” (Meno, 75a) reminds Meno about a poem, specifically, he remembers the phrase, “to delight in beautiful things and have power.” Out of that memory, Meno constructs a definition of virtue by introducing an important change in the poet’s terminology. That is, when he defines virtue, Meno does not retain the poet’s original use of χαίρειν (rejoice, be glad) but speaks instead of ‘desiring’ (ἐπιθυμεῖν) beautiful things. Socrates resists the shift by turning to the presumed object of desire and exposing the problems of Meno’s broadly conceived claim. Yet, he does not neglect to expose that an important shift in verbs commits them to a new understanding of virtue and he asks Meno, “What do you mean by desiring? Is it not to secure for oneself? – What else?” (Meno, 77c). That is precisely the question my paper asks, in reference to virtue, “what do we mean by desiring?” I would further add: why is desire an issue for virtue at all, particularly in what refers to what is beautiful. Since Plato’s Symposium offers an account, albeit complex, of what desiring entails, it is to that dialogue that I’ll turn to explain the matter. In particular, I want to juxtapose the initiation into desiring that Socrates undergoes guided by Diotima, with the process that Meno is undergoing under Socrates’ tutelage.

Emily Austin. Wake Forest University, austinea@wfu.edu. “Is the First Protreptic of Plato’s Euthydemus Self-Defeating?” Shaw panel. 2-4

In the first protreptic of the Euthydemus, Socrates argues that wisdom is the sole unconditional good, and that use of conditional goods without wisdom causes more harm than benefit. This argument is supposed to persuade its hearers to abandon other pursuits and to seek wisdom by taking up philosophy. However, if wisdom is the sole unconditional good, then philosophy must be only conditionally good (as Plato acknowledges elsewhere). That would seem to commit Socrates to the view that neither he nor anyone else should philosophize unless they are already wise. I consider and reject a variety of possible solutions to this conundrum. Ultimately, I conclude that the best response is to grant that pursuing wisdom may harm us, but that this is a risk worth taking.

Allan Bäck. Kutztown University, back@kutztown.edu. “Avicenna’s Use of Hypothetical Syllogisms” 1-2

Judging by the length and the complexity of his syllogistic (Al-Qīyās), Avicenna spent a lot of effort on the modal and on the hypothetical syllogistic. His focus on the modal syllogistic might be understood, given his fundamental metaphysical doctrine of possible and necessary being (even though it remains unclear if he ever uses the modal syllogistic in his metaphysics—
but that is another topic). But why does he bother at all with the hypothetical syllogistic? To be sure, there is the standard reply that Avicenna, rather like Boethius, just passively takes the materials handed to him from the Greek and earlier Islamic traditions and comments on them. But that does not explain facts like his rejection of much of the doctrine of Aristotle’s Categories and his radical rearrangement of materials in his metaphysics. So, instead, I propose the following: In his logic Avicenna has an explicit existential import assumption for affirmative categorical propositions. He also allows for possible beings that do not actually exist. For him a possible being has a quiddity that could come to be in re. If that being did exist in re, it would have certain attributes and not others. The hypothetical syllogistic gives Avicenna a way to talk about such beings, hypothetically, if they were to exist. The content of his hypothetical syllogistic supports such an interpretation.


This paper explores economic conditions as necessary foundations for democratic practice. The path I take into this question takes an insight drawn from Solon’s poetry and follows it into the work of Plato and Aristotle. I begin with a look at Solon’s poem – quoted in Aristotle’s The Athenian Constitution – in which he speaks of the Earth, and of stripping from her the markers of men’s enslavement through his Seisachtheia. From there, I will look at what Aristotle has to say about the economic conditions for justice and equality in the founding of a polis in The Athenian Constitution, and Book 8 of the Politics, in which the issue of the Earth plays a central role. With this context for the ancient question of land and economic equality established, I turn to Plato’s Republic. Obviously, the body and the Earth play a conspicuous role in that dialogue. The paper intends to raise some questions about the place of the body and of the Earth in the limitations that Plato subtly places upon the practical applicability of the ideal structures of the city in speech.

Geoff Batchelder. Montgomery College. gmbatch@verizon.net. “Stesichorus and the Origins of Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus.” 6-2

Socrates appeals to Stesichorus partway through the Phaedrus to justify recanting an embellished version of the Lysian Eroticus speech. In so doing, he anticipates imminent lessons on rhetoric and writing by alluding to literary traditions that would have resonated strongly with the educated readers of his day. Unpacking these references and comparing them with other passages in the dialogue provide valuable insights into classical views of the origins and essence of philosophy.

Francesco Benoni. University of Verona, Italy. francesco.benoni@univr.it. “The Return to the Cave and the Philosopher’s Education.” 1-7

The return to the cave in the Republic is problematic: Plato is charged with inconsistency, because forcing philosophers to go back there against their own interest seems to be unjust. I will suggest a change in perspective: the image of the cave, indeed, is mainly about education (514a1). I will argue that the return to the cave is an integral part of the philosopher’s education, and it is meant to test him through practical experience, by exploiting an analogy with education in book III.

Plato remarks throughout the Republic that education encompasses both theory and practice (e.g. 422c6; 484d6-7; 498e4-499a1). At the end of book III, Plato explains what can
make guardians lose the true opinion about what is best for the city, and which is the practical side of their education. There are five causes of loss of true opinion: the passage of time, deceiving arguments, pain, fear and pleasure (413b-c). There is a practical test to check the resistance to each of these: guardians are faced with situations where it is easy to forget their aim and be deceived (413c5-9); they are given pains, toils and trials (πόνοις, ἀλγηδόναις, ἀγώνας, 413d4); they are exposed to frightening situations (θορύβους, 413d9) and immediately after to pleasure. In this way they will be tested (βασανίζοντας) more than gold with fire (413e1-2).

The same image recurs in book VII. After being trained in dialectic, the philosopher is sent back to the cave and tested (βασανιστέοι, 540a1), so as not to lack practical experience (ἐμπειρίᾳ, 539e5). A careful reading of the image of the cave reveals that the tests the philosopher is set mirror the ones in book III. The return to the cave is the longest period in the philosopher’s education (fifteen years): it is meant to test the resistance to the passage of time. As for the deceiving power of arguments, the philosopher is faced with the arguments of the cave-dwellers who mistake the shadows for true realities (515c1-2). The cave, indeed, corresponds to the world of δόξα (517b): cave-dwellers are wrong in regarding δόξαι as true objects of knowledge, but the philosopher is able to resist to this mistake. As for pain, the philosopher must share the toils (πόνοι, 519d6, 520d7) of the prisoners. Moreover, the return to the cave itself is painful, and the philosopher is blinded at first (518a). The descent is frightening too: the philosopher is in a state of confusion (θορυβομένην, 518A5). Finally, the philosopher will share the honors and prizes (516c8-9, 519d6) of the cave-dwellers, but he will not take them seriously (520c-d), therefore displaying resistance to the pleasures that in book IX are said to be distinctive of the lower parts of the soul: honor and money.

The return to the cave, therefore, is a necessary step in the philosopher’s education, because it shows whether he is able to retain the principles of his education when faced with the powers that operate in the sensible world: the passage of time, misleading arguments, pains, fear and pleasures.

Joshua Blander. The King’s College. jblander@tkc.edu. “First Philosophy, First Substance.” 1-5

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle suggests that the episteme, or science, of first philosophy studies being qua being. This study seems to include, at least, study of the properties of being in its own right. However, there is a prima facie tension between first philosophy’s study of being qua being and the actual project of the Metaphysics, which focuses on just one type of being – substance – and arguably even just one being – the first mover. This tension can be resolved once we understand that the study of being qua being and the properties of being in its own right will emphasize notions that attach to all (or every) being, or at least to the most fundamental being(s). Furthermore, the topics that Aristotle discusses in the crucial passages of the Metaphysics, such as priority and posteriority, sameness and difference, dependence and independence, and similar notions, play central informative roles in how he structures his investigation. This recognition allows us to understand the role that substance plays in discussion, for example, of how one thing depends on another, or what makes something prior or posterior to another (different) thing. Understood as a full-fledged episteme, Aristotle’s project in the Metaphysics develops more fully the ideas earlier sketched in his Categories; the latter text focuses on the distinction between primary substances - the independent entities - and (a) the other nine categories (such as quality and quantity); and (b) species and genera - the dependent entities. What emerges in the Metaphysics is an account of ordering relations between different
types of entity. This account captures the inter-categorial hierarchical divisions suggested by the *Categories*, and develops these further; but his discussion also includes intra-categorial structure. In other words, Aristotle suggests not merely that entities in some categories are more fundamental than entities in other categories; but also that some entities within a category are some substances are more fundamental than others. (Fundamentality here involves at least the notions of priority and posteriority as well as dependence and independence.) Furthermore, by employing the notions discussed here, Aristotle suggests that there is something that is *most* fundamental, or at least offers a methodology for answering the question of whether there is something that is absolutely fundamental. This project of first philosophy just is the task of metaphysics.

My account of Aristotle’s first philosophy is inspired, at least in part, by Günther Patzig’s groundbreaking 1960 paper, “Theologie und ontologie in der „metaphysik” Des aristoteles”, in which he offers an account of first philosophy intended to resolve the *prima facie* tension mentioned above. Patzig’s proposal has not received the attention it deserves; and few have ventured to defend his account. According to the view I develop, Patzig’s reading of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is the most plausible account of Aristotle’s first philosophy. In doing so, I will argue against various contemporary interpreters of Aristotle, such as Christopher Shields; Shields argues that Aristotle’s interest is in the *logical* properties of being, such as non-contradiction. In response, I defend the claim that Aristotle’s project focuses primarily, and perhaps exclusively, on the *metaphysical* properties of being, especially those properties mentioned above (e.g., ordering features such as dependence and priority). Discussions of dependence and priority, and the relationships these notions have to broader questions of metaphysical ordering, are the *most* fundamental projects of metaphysics, and are the projects most consistent with Aristotle’s own approach to metaphysics.

**Giulia Bonasio.** Columbia University. gb2437@columbia.edu. “Natural Goods in the *Eudemian Ethics*.” 5-7

In the paper, I investigate how Aristotle’s conception of natural goods in the EE provides an unexplored resource for ethical naturalism. I focus on two reasons for understanding Aristotle’s ethics as a form of naturalism: for Aristotle, the notion of the highest good is connected to our nature and to our function, and there is no supernatural entity that provides a standard for evaluation of particular actions or states of affairs as good or bad. In section 1, I argue that natural goods are simpliciter-goods. In section 2, I provide an argument in favor of the idea that natural goods are a particular type of good-for: they are good for what I call the standard.

**Susan Brower-Toland.** Saint Louis University, browers@slu.edu. “Many Souls, Few Powers: Ockham on Powers of the Soul.” Cohoe Panel 4-2

**Claire Bubb.** New York University, Cc148@nyu.edu. “Blood Flow in Aristotle.” 5-3

Aristotle’s statement that “blood flows from the heart to the other parts of the body, it does not come to the heart from elsewhere” (PA 666a5-7) has been taken more or less at face value in the study of Aristotelian biology. Thus, Aristotle’s understanding of blood flow is typically classed, in contradistinction to the modern system of circulation, as a “one-way system” of blood flow from the heart to the various organs of the body. The situation, however, is far more complex, encompassing multi-directional flow of different substances within the blood.
vessels. Blood originates in the central chamber of the tri-partite heart and flows out from there to the rest of the body. However, in order to create this blood, nutriment, which has at this point been digested up to the level of a sort of proto-blood, must travel into the heart from the liver and spleen. Because of Aristotle’s emphasis on centrality and symmetricity, there are only two entrances to the middle chamber of the heart and each must be responsible for both influx and efflux, resulting in inevitable mixing of blood and proto-blood. Indeed, this comingling is made explicit in Aristotle’s description of the types of blood, ranging from more pristine to more full of the particulate matter of food. Thus Aristotle arrives at a system where the blood must revisit the heart repeatedly through the process of digestion before eventually making its way to its final destination. In this paper I examine multiple instances of this “backwards flow” to the heart and come to the conclusion that the statement with which I started this abstract describes the origin of the blood, not its subsequent travels, which, if not circulatory, are at very least circuitous.


There are two points that should invite one to a closer comparison between Aristophanes’ play Plutus and Aristophanes and his account of Eros in the Symposium, one quite obvious and the other more subtle. First in Plato's dialogue, Aristophanes’ Eros is the offspring of the deities of Poros and Penia, while in Plutus two principal deities there are Plutus and Penia. Clearly, Plato is signalling to the readers of his dialogue that his adaptation of Aristophanes' play is of significance, somehow. To my knowledge, no scholar of Plato or Aristophanes has published anything about this connection. The second point is more subtle and nonplussing. In Eryximachus' speech, he notes that medicine, whose goal is 'to instill Eros and unanimity', was created by Asklepios as 'these poets here say' (Symp. 186e), meaning Aristophanes and Agathon. It is easy to skip over this, especially if some translators have likewise skipped over the emphatic force of οἵδε, but precisely because it seems so out of place, it seems likely that Plato is, again, signalling something to us. We are at a clear disadvantage here with regard to the works of Agathon, because none of his works are extant. We do, however, have many plays surviving of Aristophanes and, as luck would have it, it is his Plutus that provides a clue. There Asklepios heals the eponymous deity near the end of the play, with vast implications for humanity, the gods themselves, and the interaction between the two. The plot of this play, in other words, is similar to the concern in Plato's Symposium. The goal of this paper will be to discuss what Plato takes and adapts from Aristophanes' play and what significance this will have for the interpretation of Aristophanes' speech.

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Eva Cadavid, Eva.cadavid@centre.edu. & Taylor Shofner, taylor.shofner@centre.edu, Centre College. “Reinterpreting Justice in Plato’s Kallipolis through an Ethics of Care.” 2-7

Plato’s account of the Kallipolis in the Republic, specifically in Books IV and V, raises questions about how the three parts of the city are meant to interact with each other in order to compose one organism. In this essay, we will incorporate an interpretation of the city based on C.D.C. Reeve’s Philosopher Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic, where each part understands how its competencies complement the needs of the other two parts and vice versa. In
fact, Justice is defined as each person in the society and each part of the city “doing one’s own work and not meddling with what is not one’s own (Republic IV 433a).” Although this may at first seem to align more with individual rights, Justice is instantiated in the city when the appropriate network of relationships is developed among the three parts. These relationships require: (1) the awareness and willingness to provide (food, shelter, protection, or guidance) to the other two parts; and (2) the willingness to accept gracefully what they in turn provide for one. We will argue that the parts of the Kallipolis exemplify an Ethics of Care that promotes recognizing the need for care as well as the competence for who can best provide the care needed. What Plato sees as harmony and social justice in the city involves its members engaging in the elements of care outlined by Joan Tronto in “An Ethic of Care”1: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness. We argue that Plato’s account of Justice in the Republic is more closely aligned to an Ethics of Care than any other contemporary account of Justice in its emphasis on connectedness and community rather than individual rights and lawfulness.

Silvia Carli. Skidmore College. scarli@skidmore.edu. “Partial truths and Aristotle’s first philosophy.” 2-5

Partial truths are statements that are partially true and partially false. The goal of this paper is to begin to explore the status and role of this sort of statements in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. It argues that, contrary to what some scholars have suggested, partial truths are not confined to reputable opinions (endoxa) and widely held beliefs that have not yet been clarified and disambiguated. Rather, they have a more central role in Aristotle’s investigation. Specifically, I propose that the fundamental question of being, namely, “What is substance?” is such that even our best attempts to answer it may never yield a full or complete truth. In addition, at least in some instances, Aristotle does not seem interested in disambiguating the assertions of previous thinkers to attain propositions that are fully true or fully false. Rather, he goes beyond their literal expression to uncover incipient truths that were striving to be expressed. Given that our capacity to gain insights into the nature of things is mediated by our reflections on previous theories and on the problems that they incur, I suggest that for Aristotle it may be desirable to retain some partial truths which, owing to their very ambiguity and obscurity, force us to interrogate the nature of things more deeply.

Mina Fei-Ting Chen. National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan. ftchen@mx.nthu.edu.tw. “A Non-Patient-Centered Account of Change: on Aristotle’s Physics III.3.” 4-7

In Physics III.1-2, change (kinēsis) is characterized solely from the patient perspective: “change is the actuality of the patient that is potentially F, as such.” The standard case is the process of teaching-learning, which involves two actions, i.e., the teacher’s teaching as well as the student’s learning. Edward Hussey and David Charles argue that the student’s learning should be construed to be identical with the process of change and therefore more fundamental to the teacher’s teaching. In this paper I argue that Phys. III.3 suggests a non-patient-centered account of change: change is something neutral between the teacher’s teaching and the student’s learning. The teacher’s teaching and the student’s learning, although different in definition, should be construed as the same change process in the sense that the substrate process that

underlies the teacher’s teaching is identical with the substrate process that underlies the student’s learning. And I argue that Aristotle’s discussion of how to determine the species of change in *Phys.* V.1-4 supports the above non-patient-centered account of change: (a) *Phys.* V.1-2 suggests that neither teaching nor learning is qualified as a change in its own right (*kath’ hauto*); (b) the account of the *track* (*en hōi*) of change in *Phys.* V.4, in virtue of which we determine the species and number of change, lends further support to construing change as a neutral substrate process that underlies the teacher’s teaching and the student’s learning.

**Rose Cherubin.** *George Mason University.* rcherubi@gmu.edu. “Difference and Not Being in Parmenides: Not a Negative Definition.” PLENARY SPEAKER 3-Atrium.

In her account of the road of inquiry she recommends, Parmenides’ goddess associates difference and change with not-being. She also notes that at least on this road, one cannot say or conceive that not-being is. I propose to explore how the goddess’s description of the opinions of mortals responds to the problems that this raises for accounts of a world of multiplicity and change.

In the goddess’s description of the opinions of mortals, differences among things are not presented simply as a matter of Light not having, or not being, something Night is or has, and vice versa. According to the opinions of mortals, whatever in things that is not Light is Night, and whatever in things that is not Night is Light. Light is what is present where and when Night is not, and vice versa. However, the characteristics of Light and Night are all described positively: Light is not defined or constituted by being the absence of Night or vice versa. Each is ascribed specific characteristics. While the qualities of Light are the opposites or contraries (*antia*) of those of Night, each pole of opposition is identified. No opposite is defined solely in terms of its opposite, or reduced to the negation of its opposite. This suggests that mortals’ opinions, or the best way to characterize their underpinnings, avoid defining differentia or identities in terms of not-being. This is not sufficient to overcome the goddess’s prohibitions against invoking not-being, but it has some noteworthy implications with regard to kinds of not-being and negation.

If the proposals here are correct, they have several consequences worth noting. First, if the analysis here is correct, it appears that Parmenides distinguishes at least two kinds of not-being, and thus possibly two kinds of negation. Second, the attempt to avoid defining one or both of a set of contraries negatively shows that in Aristotle’s time resources already existed to challenge the terms of his account of sex differences. Third, Parmenides’ account of difference in the account of the opinions of mortals is a potentially helpful contribution to today’s discussions about rendering differences without subordination or presenting one side as a norm and the other as its negation. Finally, while the Light-Night framework is ultimately incompatible with what the goddess says we need to say and conceive on the road of inquiry she recommends, it does represent a kind of improvement over the kind of framework in which opposites are defined in terms of one another (which may confuse kinds of not-being); and its failures are instructive in our attempts to understand what Parmenides offers us in the fragments taken together.

**Suk G. Choi.** *Towson University.* suchoi@towson.edu. “Plato, Confucius, and Adorno on the Value of Music.” 4-8

Music’s role was a real space through which Plato, Confucius, and Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) developed their contemplations. All of them discuss the importance of music in terms of social and ethical function and effect. On the one hand, Plato devalues music along with
other arts because they, as a mere *techne*, are a source of sensory pleasure. On the other hand, he respects the possibility of music's being supreme wisdom (*sophia*) and a necessary aid in education. Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) further confers upon great "modern" music the role of enhancing human consciousness and social progress. However, Adorno's analysis also informs us of music's function today that "the role of music in the social process is exclusively that of a commodity; its value is that determined by the market." (1978, p.128) For this reason, the socially *critical* function of music is more emphasized by Adorno. I note gaps both between Plato's two different views of music and between Adorno's analyses of "social situation of music." I will be approaching and comparing these gaps with Confucius' perspective on music, from which he also understands that music has social/ethical value as an impact on both individuals and society. To him, music is an instrument through which one advances one's understanding of the Way (Dao) and thus "perfects oneself." (The *Analects*, 14:12) Music is a way of self-cultivation that, like philosophy, requires one's strenuous effort for a responsible and critical function.

Jean Clifford. *Loyola University Chicago, jclifford1@luc.edu*. “A Place for Incidental Perception in Aristotle’s Epistemology.” 4-6

Aristotle does not dedicate much text to incidental perception (κατὰ συμβεβηκὼς αἰσθάνεται), and thus the significance – and particularly its significance to epistemology – remains opaque. As the literature stands, I identify two clear schools of interpretation concerning incidental perception: the extensionalist and intensionalist readings. This paper serves to make explicit the importance of incidental perception in Aristotle’s epistemology by way of clarifying these schools of interpretation, considering their respective virtues, and providing a positive argument for the latter view.

The extensionalist position\(^2\) holds that incidental perception demarks cases where (1) some direct sensible, e.g. purple, is perceived, and (2) this purple is in fact the color of a plum; no awareness of the plum is required. The claim that I incidentally perceive the son of Diaries is an extensional claim about perceiving white – there is no additional cognitive content in incidental perception. Alternatively, the intensionalist view,\(^3\) argues that incidental perception indicates the occurrence of the perceiver’s awareness of some non-directly sensible object via a direct perception. The perceiver has a different perceptual awareness in incidental perception than in special/common.

This paper will provide a positive account of incidental perception where one perceives the complex of distinct special and common sensibles as a unified whole. Incidental perception is seeing white as this man, but even more fundamentally one sees white as a unified whole object. Before we know the concept ‘human’, or are familiar with *this* person, we nonetheless perceive the substantial particular. That is, the incidental perceptual intention will contain more than what directly affects the sense. I will try to show that the extensionalist position is mistaken, and advance an interpretation that opens analysis of incidental perception’s fundamental role in Aristotle’s epistemology.

Caleb Cohoe Panel “The Soul and its Powers in Aristotle and the Medieval.”

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Caleb Cohoe. *Metropolitan State University of Denver, calebcohoe@gmail.com*; “Can Anything Damage the Soul? Aristotle on the Powers of the Soul and their Relation to the Body” Panel Organizer and Chair 4-2
What, if anything, happens to the soul and its powers when the bodily organ of some power is damaged? I argue that the best way to harmonize Aristotle’s various claims about body and soul is to give a twofold answer. In one sense, a psychic power is changed by damage to its bodily organs, insofar as it is no longer prepared for activity, meaning that the body loses its developed capacity. There is, however, another sense in which the power is unaffected, insofar as Aristotle holds that there is no intrinsic change in the soul that accompanies this change to the body. This allows us to avoid difficulties about psychic unity: the soul’s powers are not destroyed and recreated even when some of its organs are. It is only the complete loss of any capacity for vital activities caused by the destruction of the whole living body that can make the soul cease to be. This also means that souls with capacities for non-bodily activities can persist without a body. If there is some activity that is not in any way bodily (e.g. understanding), the soul responsible for this activity can continue to be the capacity that it is without the body.

Gregory Convertito. *Boston College, convertg@bc.edu*; “The Minotaur in Plato’s Labyrinth: Beginning and Myth in the *Phaedo*” 4-5
In this paper, I compare the structure of Plato’s *Phaedo* with the myth of the minotaur which is invoked within it. Through a close reading of the *Phaedo*, centering on the opening line, the three main arguments—from contraries (70C–71D), from recollection (74B–E), from invisibility (79A–80B) — which seem insufficient, and Socrates’ discussion of “magic charms” after the myth of the true earth, I investigate the relation of *muthos* and *logos* in the dialogue. I also consider the way *muthos* and *logos* relate to one another in the beginning of the dialogue and in the way Socrates describes the beginning of philosophy to Simmias and Cebes, in which it appears that myth is cast as a necessary condition for embarking on philosophy.

Annie Corbitt. *Northwestern University, anncorbitt2020@u.northwestern.edu*; “Νοῦς in the *Ion*: Does Socrates’ Account of Divine Inspiration Amount to a Condemnation of Poetry?” 6-2
In the *Ion*, Socrates argues that poets and performers of poetry, insofar as they are good, compose, perform, and speak about their work, ὃ τέχνῃ…ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ; that is, they do so “not by way of possessing a craft, or body of knowledge, but rather through a divine gift” (*Ion* 534b8-c1). A good (ἀγαθός) poet is one who is divinely inspired (ἐνθεος), or possessed (κατεχόμενος) by a god (*Ion* 533e5-8). Through the work of the inspired poet, the god also inspires the rhapsode or actor performing the poetry, and through the performer, the audience (*Ion* 533e3-5). What is of particular interest for the inquiry of this paper is Socrates’ explanation of what is happening when a person is divinely inspired. He describes divine inspiration as an instance of a god removing the poet’s νοῦς and replacing it with the god’s own; he says repeatedly that a poet is unable to compose poetry “until…his intellect is no longer in him” (πρὶν ἂν…ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ) (*Ion* 534b5-6, 534b6-7, 534c7-8, 534d3). The composition, recitation, and appreciation of poetry, it seems, are activities in which a person’s νοῦς is not engaged.

The goal of this paper is to articulate a puzzle about how we are to understand poetic inspiration in the *Ion*, given the importance that the *Republic* places on the activity of the intellect. I ask the question whether or not, in arguing that poetry is divinely inspired and the
human intellect left out of the creative process, Socrates is condemning it as a hindrance to our moral lives. I argue that we need not read his account of divine inspiration as a condemnation of poetry. My argument is, at this stage, a sort of experimental one. I am “trying on” the idea, but I am not yet sure that there is enough evidence in Plato’s corpus to offer a sufficient defense. I put forth the idea that what is, itself, problematic for Plato about the non-engagement of the intellect can be remedied, given the non-ideal state of the world, only through events such as divine inspiration. Without prior understanding of what the Good is, we cannot investigate and reason our way to it. In order for the intellectual, investigative process to begin, we must first catch small “glimpses” of the Good, or the divine, in order to have some idea of what it is for which we are searching. Poetry does not always but can sometimes offer that glimpse.

Clinton Corcoran. High Point University. ccorcora@highpoint.edu. “Does Comic Plot have Magnitude? The Scope of Μέγεθος in Aristotle’s Poetics.” 4-1

Two recent reconstructions of Aristotle’s lost Second Book of the Poetics (Janko, 1986 & Watson, 2012) have argued that comic plot, in contrast with tragic plot, lacks magnitude. While it is true for Aristotle that some wholes (ὅλον) lack magnitude (Poetics, 1450b 25), any plot, whether it be tragic, comic, or epic, must possess some magnitude (Μέγεθος) in at least four senses. First, a dramatic action, whether comic or tragic, must represent some change of condition in the trend of actions or for the characters. Second, the dramatic arc of the movement of the plot, as marked in the movement between the complication, turning point, and resolution, will measure an overall scope or dimension of the change (Poetics, 1450b 24-32)—for how long and for how far does the action rise or fall? Third, this plot movement necessarily represents a change of the quality of the action—from good to bad, or bad to good, or for the character from happiness to wretchedness, etc. (Poetics,1452a 22-23 ;1452b 2-3) If magnitude is a function of the kind of action imitated, the quality of the magnitude will also vary according to the nature of the subjects imitated. The seriousness and dramatic sweep of the action thus provides a certain magnitude (Poetics, 1449b 25). Fourth, magnitude may comprehend the total number of plot parts a play contains; for instance whether it contains many or few complicating actions, or whether it is a simple or complex plot (1451a 10-11). Each of these four senses of magnitude would be as applicable to comic actions as they are to tragic. Generally, these considerations suggest that the quantity and quality of the magnitude of a play are functions, as one would expect with Aristotle, of the structure of the action. Magnitude would be created by the arrangement of the incidents, the range of movement between incidents, the number and kind of incidents represented (e.g. the number of complicating actions, or whether the play had recognition scenes), and the quality of the incidents imitated, whether they are serious or ridiculous.

David Cory. Catholic University of America, dcory2@nd.edu. “Grades of Being in Matter and Aquinas’s Soul Theory.” Cohoe Panel. 4-2

A frequent but puzzling remark which Thomas Aquinas makes about animal and vegetal souls is that they are not entirely immersed in matter. These remarks have received surprisingly little attention, perhaps because Aquinas does not gloss them very much (and thus it seems that there is no way to construe them authoritatively) and perhaps also because it is clear from other contexts that only the human soul is truly immaterial (giving the impression that whatever Aquinas intends by them is not very significant). I contend, however, that understanding what it
means for souls to be partially or fully immersed in matter is of crucial importance in understanding how Aquinas construes both materiality and the soul.

More specifically, this paper argues that the grades of materiality of souls track the roles of the active and passive elemental powers in different kinds of operations. This happens at the vegetal level when the elemental qualities are the instruments of vegetal operations, and at the sensory level where they do not contribute even instrumentally to sensation. This paper, therefore, explains the peculiar sense in which living organisms, for Aquinas, can be “less material” than inanimate substances.

Antonis Coumoundouros. Adrian College. acoumoundouros@adrian.edu. “Gymnastike in Plato’s Republic.” 1-7

We often hear that participating in physical training or sports builds character. This is a claim that suggests that such participation contributes to some kind of excellence. In Books II and III of the Republic, we find a long discussion of the guardians’ education. Socrates argues that the guardians ought to be educated in poetry and in physical training or gymnastike. While we find extensive commentary on poetry in the Republic, very few commentators discuss the role of gymnastike in the dialogue. Socrates places gymnastike in the service of the moral education of the guardians in an attempt to cultivate the spirited part of their soul (411 e). In other words, gymnastike is a means for the cultivation of virtue as Socrates understands it. Socrates also claims that people educated only in poetry become too soft, while those who emphasize physical training more than anything else become too savage and bad learners (407b, 410 c-d). In Book VII he assigns 2-3 years of compulsory exclusive physical training to the guardians (537 b). In this paper, I discuss some of the similarities and differences between what Plato meant by gymnastike and what we understand as physical training; trace how Socrates’ discussion of gymnastike marks a departure from Greek tradition and how he puts it the service of virtue as Socrates understands it; discuss the merit of Socrates’ argument that it is possible to use gymnastike to train the spirited part of the soul to obey the rational part; argue that Plato’s discussion of gymnastike has several important things to teach us about contemporary athletics and its relation to moral education.

Colleen Coyle. Centre College. colleen.coyle@centre.edu. “Examining Diotima’s Speech: Misappropriating Women’s Voices.” 2-7

Plato’s Symposium adopts the voice of Diotima to investigate the value of what can be birthed through physical reproduction versus the value of ideas birthed in intellectual/erotic masculine relationships. Plato first establishes that intellectual ideas can only be birthed between men and that it is a more valuable product than hetero relationships that produce children. Plato’s model, created using the voice of a woman, has impacted the ideologies surrounding how women ought to participate in intellectual, political, and social circles. This paper seeks to explore the ways in which Plato, through Diotima, conceptualized intellectual relationships which excluded female participation. Plato’s formulation and assessment echoes into modernity, serving as model that explains the continued exclusion of women at the highest levels of politics and academia.
Anna Cremaldi. Appalachian State University. cremaldiam@appstate.edu. “Aristotle on the Metaphysical Aspects of Friendship.” 6-7

Despite rejecting cosmic explanations of friendship in favor of those that focus on human character and emotion (NE 8.1, 1155b8-11), Aristotle is nevertheless drawn to explanations of friendship that go beyond the human. In NE 9.7, he accounts for one of the characteristic activities of friendship—benefitting one’s friends—by appealing to self-love. Contrary to the better-known NE 9.8 account of self-love as the rational being’s gratification of its nous, NE 9.7 equates self-love with the living being’s desire to exist and live. But this appeal to the self-love is curious because it suggests that friendship is grounded not in rational or non-rational desire associated with human and non-human animals, as we might expect. Instead, it seems that a complete account of friendship requires appeal to a desire for life that is shared by all living things. Yet what aspect of friendship does this desire explain? Drawing inspiration from related themes in the Symposium, I suggest that it explains the consistency and directionality of the human pursuit of friendship. This approach has the benefit of highlighting the continuity between the human and the natural worlds in Aristotelian friendship—a continuity that is interesting, but relatively unexplored.

Andrew Culbreth. Emory University, andrew.james.culbreth@emory.edu. “The Role of Hope in the Philosophical Psychologies of Plato and Aristotle.” 5-7

In this paper, I argue that Plato and Aristotle each presents a complex picture of hope, carefully distinguishing between different kinds of hope related to different kinds of moral attitudes.

I first show that both Plato and Aristotle go beyond the traditional Greek definition of hope as a single desire for future, possible goods. Instead, they carefully differentiate rational forms of hope from irrational ones. Unlike other Greek writers, such as Thucydides, who conclude that hope is an irrational desire that distorts deliberation, Plato and Aristotle describe varieties of hope that range from cowardly pessimism and naïve optimism to a kind of courageous hope in the face of uncertainty.

Throughout the rest of my paper I explore the ways in which Plato and Aristotle treat virtuous varieties of hope. I argue that both philosophers consider virtuous hope as a reason-giving basis for right action and good living.

For Plato, hope arises in situations where one faces uncertain outcomes that completely resist one’s ability to determine future possibilities. In Plato’s reinterpretation of the ancient concept of hope, a person can be foolishly hopeful in a dangerous way, or wisely hopeful in the Socratic way, an attitude that helps sustain philosophical inquiry. Across dialogues like the Apology and the Phaedo, Plato explores the expectations with which one confronts death. He contrasts the naïve optimism in the possibility of an afterlife with Socrates’ virtuous hope in the value of the philosophical life despite his mortal limitations.

Aristotle likewise offers an account of hope in the face of death. In book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics, hope is aligned with the virtue of courage: while one kind of hope works as the basis for courageous action, another vicious form of hope brings about mere optimism, or confidence in future outcomes. Conversely, Aristotle associates pessimism with cowardice. The key to understanding Aristotle’s account lies in the relationships between the virtue of courage, the objects of hope, and the nature of confidence. While confident people hope for a future reward, like security and profit, courageous people hope for a noble outcome to their actions, even in the face of uncertain prospects. The distinctions that Aristotle makes between future-
oriented expectations present a useful scheme for considering the differences between hope, optimism, and pessimism, and the corresponding moral evaluations that each attitude contains.

**Tylor Cunningham.** *University of Tennessee, Knoxville, cunninghamt14@gmail.com:* “Suicide as a Tenable Last Resort in Epicurean Therapy” Arenson Panel 1-4

While it seems that Epicurus takes a firm stance against the notion of suicide in various areas including the *Vatican Sayings, ad Menoeceus*, and Seneca’s *Letters on Ethics*, other Epicureans seem to promote the possibility for suicide as a tenable act to end current and future suffering. This paper will explore the seeming conflict between these texts by reinterpreting the meaning of the various passages in Epicurus that seem to speak against suicide. I will argue that these passages only condemn suicide conditionally. With this understanding it is possible to justify suicide for an Epicurean as a final resort when the therapy that Martha Nussbaum explicates has failed in all other instances.

This therapy will require a proper understanding of the nature of death, both physically and morally, and death’s hold on a subject moving through Epicurean therapy. I will address concerns that even with a proper understanding of the nature of death, annihilation can still be considered anxiety inducing in the subject, though the false beliefs about death have been remedied. I will move from this into a discussion about how death can be considered a benefit on an Epicurean account of hedonism in a way that is not possible due to constraints on the definition of a good life being “full and complete” in other ethical works. Suicide, or at least the possibility of it, will then allow for something, namely death, that is beneficial to the subject of the therapy. Since the subject has reached this point, then, suicide can be allowable for an Epicurean to pursue, if all therapy up to this point has failed, given the evidence in the texts mentioned above.

Angela Curran. *Kansas State University.* [afcurran@berkeley.edu] “Imagination, Belief, and the Emotions in Aristotle’s *Poetics.*” Levin Panel. 2-2

A scholarly debate has taken place as to whether or not emotions, in Aristotle’s philosophical psychology, involve belief or imagination (*phantasia*). This paper sheds light on this controversy by looking at Aristotle’s view of the role that imagination and belief play in the emotions evoked by poetic imitations.

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**Andrey Darovskikh.** *Binghamton University.* [adarovs1@binghamton.edu] “Aetiology of soul-body connection in late antique embryology.” 5-1

The question to be addressed in this paper is the problem of *ruling agency*, which is responsible for human being’s formation during soul/body connection. With this regard, I will focus on concepts of *providence* and *nature* as two possibly causes of soul-body connection explained in late antique literature. As a particular example, I will study the aetiology of soul-body connection in embryology of Nemesius of Emesa, a fourth century Christian thinker, who was a pagan philosophers before conversion and had excellent knowledge in ancient medicine and biology. Putting forward the main point of this paper, I argue that Nemesius exhibits a remarkable ambiguity of thought to have been blurred over by vagueness of the sources, which formed his intellectual background. This seems valuable for any historical study because it
allows seeing the complexity of a certain problem relevant for many authors and branches of knowledge in one particular treatise.

Daniel R. Davenport: Sacred Heart and Fairfield Universities. danielrdavenport@yahoo.com.


This paper will investigate Socrates’ contention from Book V of the Republic that women are as fit to rule in the city as men. The extent to which this suggestion can be regarded as an early feminist argument on behalf of the equality of women has been deservedly much discussed in the secondary literature. However, there has been no serious study of the way in which this step on Socrates’ part is a critique of the image of an ideal or flourishing life that has been put forward by Glauc on in Book II – specifically the ideal of a flourishing life that understands human beings as isolated individuals and hence as solely self-centered beings (rather than as political animals). That critique of the ideal life is what I propose to reveal.

Rev. Ignacio De Ribera-Martin. The Catholic University of America. deriberamartin@cua.edu.

“The Sailor and the Ship: Is Hylomorphism Compatible with Dualism?” 4-7

Plato’s dualism and Aristotle’s hylomorphism tend to be regarded as incompatible accounts of the soul. In the Phaedo, Plato insists in the separability of the soul as a form-itsel-by-itself as the basis for the belief in its immortality. In contrast, in the De anima, Aristotle defines the soul as the form-entelecheia-of-the-body, inseparable from it, except in the puzzling case of active nous. The incompatibility of dualism and hylomorphism is key to Nuyens’ claim that there is a development in Aristotle’s own psychology, from (1) an initial dualistic-platonic period (cf. Eudemus), through (2) an intermediate period in which the soul is in the body and uses it as an instrument, to (3) a mature hylomorphic period in which the soul is described as the entelecheia of the body, forming one composite substance (cf. De anima). Lefèvre convincingly showed that the instrumentality of the body and hylomorphism are compatible, undermining the basis for Nuyens distinction between an intermediate and a mature period in the development of Aristotle’s psychology. In this paper, I will argue that dualism and hylomorphism are also compatible, so that there is no need to claim that there is an evolution in Aristotle’s psychology nor, more importantly, an incompatibility between Plato’s account of the soul in the Phaedo and Aristotle’s in the De anima.

I will first show that the incompatibility of dualism and hylomorphism follows from the assumption that the soul is monodimensional, which is not justified. We do not know the soul directly, but through its effects in the body, that is, the activities of life. Whenever we move from an effect to its cause, we cannot claim that being the cause of such effect exhausts all that that, which we discover as the cause, is.

Next, I will focus on Aristotle’s metaphor of the sailor and the ship, drawing also from Philoponus, to illustrate the multidimensionality of that which we call the soul. Philoponus elaborates on Aristotle’s hint that there are two kinds of entelecheia: the entelecheia as perfection (teleiotês), form (eidos), and energeia of the body, which is inseparable from the body; and the entelecheia as substance (ousia), which is separable from the body. The sailor qua sailor is inseparable from the ship, but as a man he is separable from the ship.

In the light, I will finally show how hylomorphism and dualism are not incompatible. That the sailor is the sailor of the ship does not necessarily entail that the sailor is only the sailor of the ship. Similarly, that the soul is the form of the body does not entail that the soul is only the
form of the body. Aristotle’s hylomorphism thus leaves room for dualism, as Plato’s dualism leaves room for hylomorphism. These two accounts of the soul are not mutually exclusive. From this perspective, we can also see all the import of the question of what is the soul (τι ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ).

Ludmila Dostalova. University of West Bohemia, Czech Republic. ldostal@kfi.zcu.cz. “Aristotelian Logic: Extensional or Intensional?” 1-5

It is widely assumed, that Aristotle is the founder of logic as an independent scientific discipline. Being so, he is therefore regarded as the predecessor of modern classical logic. Hence Aristotelian logic is quite often regarded as being classical as well. Classical logic is every system of logic that fulfils two basic principles – the principle of extensionality and the principle of bivalence. When investigating traditional interpretation of Aristotelian logic both principles hold. However, when we check Aristotle’s writing De Interpretatione it appears that truth conditions of statements are not checked through extension of terms but through their intension. Hence, original Aristotelian logic is rather intensional and therefore not classical.

Sean D. Driscoll. Boston College. sean.driscoll@bc.edu. “Plato’s Cratylus on Words as Images.” 5-6

In the Cratylus, Plato has Socrates make the controversial suggestion that letters and syllables, through a mimesis of the very being (οὐσία) of things, can reveal what each thing is (δῆλοι ἐκαστὸν ὤ ἐστιν, 423e). And although everyone in the dialogue takes this view seriously, most readers and interpreters either avoid the idea or frame it as something that Socrates rejects through humor or irony. I propose that while there is much that is laughable in the dialogue, the position advanced in the Cratylus is nevertheless essentially mimetic. In this paper, I will try and make sense of mimesis as a viable theoretical basis for language’s relation to reality. To do this will require a radical re-conceptualization of mimesis as Plato uses it throughout his oeuvre and specifically in the Cratylus. I will try and distance the conversation from a Republic-centered understanding of mimesis (as a sort of copying) in order to take into account that concept’s fuller sense. For the copying that is characteristic of imitative artwork does not explain, e.g., imitating the virtue of elders or parents (Menexenus 326e, 248e), imitation of “the one correct form of government” (Statesman 297c), the demiurge’s imitation of eternity (Timaeus 29a), musical imitation (in various dialogues), or the imitation of being (Cratylus 423e). In short, the ontology of Platonic mimesis remains unclarified. I suggest that mimesis as a sort of copying is rejected in the Cratylus, but that an alternative model of mimesis (a figurative sort of mimesis) is advanced in its stead. Drawing from the discussion of mimesis in the Sophist, I argue that linguistic mimesis occurs not when being is somehow reproduced in (or copied by) words, but rather when it is seen through words—in other words, I argue that Plato maintains the basically mimetic position that language is an iconic vehicle to the world. This more profound sense of mimesis has far reaching consequences (the philosophical merit of mimesis, the truth-status of mimesis, the relation of images to forms, the division between knowledge and belief, and some longstanding interpretive questions in the Cratylus), which I explore for the remainder of the paper.

Robert Duncan. Loyola University Chicago. rduncan1@luc.edu. “Homonymy and the Comparability of Goods in Aristotle.” 1-6
Aristotle endorses an inconsistent triad of premises concerning homonymy, comparability, and goodness. First, he argues that the good is homonymous: there is no single characteristic, \textit{goodness}, which is shared by all good things. Rather, he argues that different kinds of good things require different accounts specifying what it is for them to be good. Second, he holds that homonyms are incomparable. If two things are homonymously \textit{F}, then we are not entitled to claim that one is more \textit{F} than the other, or that they are \textit{F} to an equal degree. The incomparability of homonyms entails, for example, that if two goods are homonymous, we cannot claim that that one is better than the other or that they are equally valuable. Finally, however, Aristotle holds that goods typically \textit{are} comparable. Indeed, several passages throughout corpus suggest that he thinks of the cosmos as an axiological hierarchy in which every being can be ranked on a single scale of better and worse.

This inconsistent triad constitutes a seldom recognized problem for Aristotle’s theory of the good which I call “the incomparability problem.” I argue that, among the relatively few commentators who have discussed the incomparability problem, none have provided a satisfactory solution to it. I claim that we can develop a more promising approach to the problem by drawing on a passage from the \textit{Protrepticus} in which Aristotle argues that there is an exception to the incomparability of homonyms. I suggest that this passage provides Aristotle with the resources he needs to render the incomparability problem tractable.

\textbf{Ariane Economos. Marymount University. arianeeconomos@gmail.com.} “Self-Envy and the Akratic Person.” 2-6

In this paper I use the concept of self-envy to explore the psychology of what Aristotle calls the akratic person. Since Aristotle himself doesn’t have a concept of self-envy, I begin by developing such a concept that is in line with his discussions of envy toward others (\textit{phthonos}). In particular, I use Book IV of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} and Book II of the \textit{Rhetoric} to develop this. In both of these texts, envy is described as “pain at the good fortune of others,” (NE 1108b4, Rhet 1387b22), but in the \textit{Rhetoric} Aristotle makes the further claim that, “we feel it towards our equals; not with the idea of getting something for ourselves, but because other people have it.” (Rhet 1387b23-25) Using Aristotle as a springboard, I develop a concept of self-envy as pain at the past or (potential) future good fortune of oneself.

I then argue that one way of understanding the actions of the akratic person is to see that person as governed by self-envy. The akratic person “[knows] what he does is bad, [but] does it as a result of passion, while the continent [person], knowing that his appetites are bad, does not follow them because of his reason.” (NE 1145b12-14) In particular, I argue that the notion of the akratic person as suffering from self-envy helps us to understand why he or she fails to act as the continent person does, despite knowing that an action is wrong. In sum, I argue that Aristotle’s descriptions of envy toward others provide us with the tools to develop a concept of self-envy, and that this concept in turn can help us better understand what motivates the akratic person to act.

\textbf{Jay Elliott. Bard College, jelliott@bard.edu.} “Aristotle on the Archai of Practical Thought.” 1-6, Chair 2-6

According to Aristotle, the \textit{archai} (“principles” or “starting-points”) of practical thought are the goals or conceptions of the good for the sake of which agents act. Readers of Aristotle
have carried on a long debate about how the content of an agent's practical *archai* is determined. According to one camp, the “Intellectualists”, agents acquire their *archai* at least in part through a process of reasoning about which goals they ought to pursue. This camp is opposed by the “Anti-intellectualists”, who contend that for Aristotle practical *archai* are determined solely by a process of habituation in the non-rational soul. I aim to intervene in this debate in two related ways. First, I press an objection against the Anti-intellectualist position whose full significance has not yet been appreciated. I argue that Anti-intellectualism faces serious difficulties in light of Aristotle's characterizations of *enkrateia* (“continence” or “self-control”) and *akrasia* (“incontinence” or “lack of control”). According to Aristotle, both of these states involve a correct *archē*. But he also characterizes them as correct in their reason and erring in the non-rational soul. I conclude that Aristotle must think enkratic and akratic agents get their correct *archai* from an exercise of reason, and that therefore Anti-intellectualism about the origin of practical *archai* cannot be correct. On the other hand, I also do not aim to defend Intellectualism. Rather – and this is my second intervention – I argue that neither camp accurately captures the full complexity of Aristotle's position. Aristotle simply does not have a single, general view about how practical *archai* are acquired: some agents acquire them by habituation, but others acquire them by an exercise of reason. I conclude by suggesting that both sides in the traditional debate have gone wrong in part because both have failed to appreciate the main point of Aristotle's comments on practical *archai*. His point is not primarily to provide a general psychological theory of goal acquisition, but instead to highlight a distinctive feature of the virtuous person: to the virtuous person the correct *archē* appears without need for any exercise of reason, and this accounts for the distinctive psychic harmony and integrity that the virtuous person exhibits.

**Charlene Elsby. Purdue Fort Wayne. celsby@gmail.com.** “Syncategorematica in Aristotle and Husserl.” 4-8

“Syncategorematica” is the term Husserl uses to refer to moments of meaning that have no independent significance but are understood as meaningful despite their incompleteness. (Words and phrases like “and”, “therefore” or “instead of” would count). The word comes from their distinction from the “categorematica”, the words of which Aristotle gives an account in his *Categories*. Husserl discusses the syncategorematica in Investigation IV of the *Logical Investigations*: “The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings and the idea of pure grammar”, and in section 7 of that investigation determines the essence of the syncategorematica. The significance of this distinction (between the categorematica and syncategorematica) is, according to Husserl, indicative of two different realms of meaning. He states, “The non-independence of meaning qua meaning thus defined determines, in our view, the essence of the syncategorematica. The bases this conception on his notion of meaning defined as an act rather than as the referent of a term. (If meanings were limited to term referents, then the syncategorematica would be excluded from having meaning. Instead, they do mean something, but nothing of itself.) Syncategorematica are realized and concretized in relation to other parts of an act of meaning, which taken together form a “meaningful whole”.

In attempting to locate the essence of the syncategorematica, Husserl builds upon the statements made by Aristotle. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle establishes a hierarchy of the parts of diction, the lowest of which is a letter and the highest of which is speech. The particular syncategorematica to which Husserl refers exist one step above syllables (which are parts of

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words, as opposed to parts of speech) but below names (which would be considered categorematica). Amongst the syncategorematica are conjunctions and articles, and Aristotle’s theory of them is given in only a few lines of text, which are highly corrupt in comparison to the rest of the corpus. Still, we can see a kind of theory of syncategorematica and their function.\(^5\)

In this paper I will point out the correlation between Aristotle’s use of “non-significant” in this context with Husserl’s use of “non-independent meaning”. Both usages negate the concept that the function of language is exclusively referential. Instead, the syncategorematica function as meaningful in the Husserlian sense—as that which intends but requires something else for its completion. While the referent of a categorematic term completes its meaning function, the syncategorematica are concretized in relation to other parts of language and reach completion in a unified act of meaning. Syncategorematica provide the schematized aspects of phrases, sentences and more complex meaning units by determining the relations between the words that mean independently. (They determine the form of presentation of represented objects.) In short, the Husserlian-Aristotelian theory of syncategorematica provides a phenomenology of logical and other linguistic operators that well extends the explanatory capacity of contemporary formal logic.

**Christos C. Evangelio.** Towson University, cevangeliou@towson.edu: “Man as the Most Mimetic Animal According to Aristotle.” 4-1

Throughout the Aristotelian corpus, the systematic philosopher seems to always look for ways to differentiate the human animal from other living beings which are placed lower or higher in the scale of nature. He characterizes it as: animal *dipoun* and *apteron*, *logon echon* and *logikon*, *politikon*, *orectikon*, *aporetikon*, and in his *Poetics* as animal *poetikon* and *mimetikon*, even the most imitative of animals. In light of Plato’s extensive critique of Homer in the Republic, it would be interesting to consider here what Aristotle had to say about Homer in his *Poetics*, and how he would defend the Poet from the Platonic and other critical charges against him. For Aristotle, just like Plato, refers to Homer extensively throughout the Aristotelian corpus but, unlike his teacher, he is always respectful of the great Poet, ready to praise him and protect him from unfriendly critiques. Although his main aim in the *Poetics* was to reach a definition of Tragedy as mimetic poetry par excellence, and to discuss and analyze the function of its parts and their contribution to the aesthetic outcome, Aristotle found ways to speak of the Homeric Epics, always in a positive tone. He saw them as competing with Tragedy for the first prize of poetic and artistic excellence. Epic and tragic poetry are at the top of the list of other kinds of imitative poetic arts, like comic and dithyrambic poetry, or even of flute-playing and lyre-playing, and their specific differences.

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**Joseph Forte.** Northeast Catholic College. joe.forte2@gmail.com, “Socratic Psychagogy in Socrates’ Second Speech in the *Phaedrus.*” 6-2

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\(^5\) Aristotle, *Poetics*, Bywater tr. 1456b38-1457a10: “A conjunction is a non-significant sound which, when one significant sound is formable out of several, neither hinders nor aids the union, and which naturally stands both at the end and in the middle but must not be inserted at the beginning; e.g., μέν or δέ. Or a non-significant sound which naturally makes one significant sound out of several significant sounds. An article is a non-significant sound marking the beginning, end, or dividing-point of a sentence, its natural place being either at the extremities or in the middle. E.g. ἀμφί, περί, etc. Or a non-significant sound which neither prevents nor makes a single significant sound out of several, and which is naturally placed both at the end and in the middle.”
This paper begins by explaining what is meant by Socratic “psychagogy” (ψυχαγωγία) in the *Phaedrus*. I establish that it is not only a winning or leading of souls (261a, 271d), but also a way of leading souls to the fully true by way of the partially true—and that this latter feature distinguishes it from common rhetoric. The bulk of the paper involves my explanation of the complex way in which Socrates’ second speech (244a-257d) employs such psychagogy, not only on Phaedrus, but on the reader. I argue essentially that it does so with imagery that simultaneously evokes various kinds of desire while stimulating dialectical thought. The paper concludes by explaining the dialogue’s rules about what constitutes good writing (277e-278d), and then by explaining that the palinode abides by these rules. As a result, we may consider the psychagogy as it is presented here as not only Socratic, but Platonic.

There are at least two lacunae in Plato scholarship that this study fills: (1) Scholarship on Platonic psychagogy is very sparse; (2) We seem to be lacking a study that explains the psychagogic effect of the second speech using the conception of psychagogy I lay out, which I argue is the correct one. The value of this study lies not only in filling these lacunae, but also in serving as a model for educators, orators, and writers—the psychagogues of today.

Michael Fournier. Dalhousie University. michael.fournier@dal.ca. “Epicurus on the prolepsis of the Abstract Form of Justice.” 4-4, Chair 6-2.

Epicurus denies that justice is anything in itself, and notes that the contract on which justice depends for its existence is not found in all human societies. He also suggests that laws enacted and enforced for the purpose of the contract, and perhaps even the contract itself, are not necessary for the sage or for a community of Epicurean friends. Yet Epicurus states that “the just life is the most free from disturbance” (*KD* 17), that “virtues are the natural adjuncts of the pleasant life and the pleasant life is inseparable (*achoriston*) from them” (*ad Men*. 132), and that there is a prolepsis of justice (*KD* 38). Thus, there must be more to justice than the attenuated existence derived from a contract to neither harm nor be harmed. As the condition of the possibility of a prolepsis, justice must have a more fundamental existence. One possibility is that Epicurus conceives of justice as a phenomenon that, although it emerges at the level of human interactions, has a basis in atomic interactions and in the nature of the atom. This abstract form of justice found in the atom and grasped by *physiologia* is made actual in the gods, and as a result the atomic basis of justice can be discerned in the prolepseis of atoms and gods.

Alexandra Fussi. *Università degli studi di Pisa*. alessandra.fussi@unipi.it. “Aristotle and Plutarch on Envy.” 6-7

In classic and contemporary classifications, envy belongs to the group of emotions directed at the fortunes of others. Within this group, Aristotle distinguishes envy from emulation without incurring serious difficulties. As I will show, this classification corresponds to the contemporary differentiation between malicious and benign envy. Much more complicated for Aristotle is the distinction between envy and indignation.

In the first part of the paper I will show that Aristotle creates two groups of antithetical emotions with respect to the goods of fortune because he wants to distinguish a virtuous way (indignation) and a vicious way (envy) to react negatively to the fortunes of others. Indignation is linked with pity, because both emotions take into due account the issue of merit. Opposite to indignation and pity are two emotions that take into no account the issue of merit: envy, and the pleasure in the misfortunes of others (*epicharekakia*). Such emotions are, according to Aristotle, typical of vulgar and vicious people.
As I will argue, the Aristotelian classification is problematic. I will analyze Aristotle’s examples of envy and indignation, and show that in certain cases the two emotions become indistinguishable. In fact, I will argue, indignation is described in such a way as to become the best mask for envy.

In the second part of the paper I will turn to Plutarch’s analysis of envy and hatred, and I will spell out the reasons why he holds that among many vices envy stands out almost alone as unmentionable.

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**Myrna Gabbe. University of Dayton. Mgabbe1@udayton.edu:** “The Tragedy of the Natural Philosophy: Towards a New Interpretation of the *Phaedo.*” 4-5

On the face of it, the cosmic and moral outlooks of early Greek philosophy and traditional Greek tragic mythology lie at polar ends. On one end, mythology appears to have the cosmos ruled by capricious, vengeful gods: gods who are the source of human action and tragedy. On the other, Greek natural philosophy appears to posit knowable, predictable principles of order: principles that lay the ground for freedom and optimism. But despite outward appearances, the general assumption among scholars is that philosophy and mythology have enough points in common to make sense of the emergence and traction of philosophy in the Mediterranean world. Thus we find Helmut Kuhn, Jenny Strauss Clay, Stuart Lawrence, Marina McCoy, to name a few, each endeavoring to illuminate the philosophical in the *muthos.* This present study continues this line of investigation. But in contrast to these other studies, what I propose to do is bring to light the *muthos* in the philosophy. And I shall do so through the lens of Plato. For Plato, I argue, sought in the *Phaedo* to expose the tragedy in the principles of natural philosophy.

In short, I argue that the premises of Socrates’s first argument for the immortality of the soul, “The Cycle of Opposites Argument,” are formulations of the most general principles guiding natural philosophy: principles regarding the nature of change and order in the cosmos. Plato, I contend, endeavors to show that these principles of change and order are the very dynamic, cosmic forces that give way to tragic consequences in traditional Greek drama. His goal is to discredit natural philosophy: to demonstrate that the enterprise rests on unproven, unsound principles, and to show that it is not the antidote to tragedy that at least some natural philosophers took it to be.

There is much debate about “The Cycle of Opposites Argument”: debate about what the premises of this argument are, and, relatedly, whether Socrates means to endorse the argument. Thus I propose to proceed as follows. In the first half of the presentation, I shall make the case that the premises of “The Cycle of Opposites Argument” lie at the foundations of natural philosophy. This will involve clarifying the premises of this argument, and exposing them in Socrates’ description of natural philosophy, given later in the *Phaedo.* In the second half of the presentation, I shall illuminate what is tragic in these principles as Plato saw it. Using *The Oresteia* by Aeschylus and *The Oedipus Trilogy* by Sophocles, I shall demonstrate that the tragedians embraced the same principles of change and order as the natural philosophers; that these assumptions about the dynamic forces at play in the cosmos lie at the very heart of the tragic narrative; and that Plato made efforts in the *Phaedo* to expose this holdover from tragedy to natural philosophy.
Robert Gervasini. *The Catholic University of America*. 07gervasini@cua.edu. “Understanding Hylomorphy through the Activity of ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ in Aristotle’s ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ.” 4-6

In *De anima* 2.1, Aristotle’s first definition of the soul is the form (εἶδος) of a natural body which has the capacity for life (412a19-21). In order to make such a definition make sense, Aristotle reiterates his account of the ontology of composite substances which is known as ‘hylomorphism.’ I think that Aristotle’s summation of hylomorphism in *DA* 2.1 can be reduced to these two principles:

1. There is no form without matter in composite substances (412a10-15).
2. A specific type of form can only inform a specific type of matter. (In the scholarship, this is known as the homonymy principle.) (412b20-23.)

In *DA* 2.12 Aristotle defines aisthesis in terms of hylomorphism. Aristotle writes, “Sense is that which is receptive of the sensible forms apart from their matter just as wax receives the impression of the ring without the iron or gold of which it is made” (424a17-19). This definition is problematic for our understanding of hylomorphism because aisthesis separates form from its matter. In particular, aisthesis causes a problem for the two principles of hylomorphism.

1. Aisthesis seems to suggest that a form can be without its matter.
2. Aisthesis seems to suggest that any form (i.e., sensible form) can inform the sense-organ.

This means that a sensible form can inform a different matter than its physical matter; red can inform both the physical surfaces of bodies and the sense-faculty of sight. This becomes a problem because Aristotle maintains both hylomorphism and ‘realism.’ By realism I mean that the form in the soul (the new state) is the *very same form* as the form in the world (the original state). This would opposed to a kind of representationalism. By ‘representationalism,’ I mean a position which maintains that the forms in the soul are copies of the original forms in the composite substances in the world and, therefore, are not the very same forms. The representationalist approach would not fall into this problem because the new state of the form and matter in the soul would be not the *very same form*. Thus a different form takes on different matter. This would not cause a problem for hylomorphism either. But Aristotle argues that the *very same form* informs both the sense-organ and the (physical) material in the world independent of the mind.

I shall argue that Aristotle does not destroy the principles of his ontology. Rather, these principles must be understood in a new way in light of the definition of aisthesis. The proposed solution is as follows. Taking the illustration of the wax as a point of departure, I shall argue that, in the activity of sensation, the sense-faculties are the ‘matter’ of the sensible forms. Matter is understood as ὑποκείμενον, (and not as a physical matter, as Richard Sorabji maintains). The wax is the ὑποκείμενον of the *very same form* of the ring as the gold or iron is for the form of the ring. Thus the first principle is preserved. But the second principle needs to be understood to mean that the same form informs different ‘matters.’ This means that our sense-faculties are just as much a suitable ‘matter’ for the sensible forms of composite things as are their physical material constituents.

Twyla Gibson. *University of Missouri*. gibsong@missouri.edu. & Stuart J. Murray. Carleton University, Ottawa. StuartMurray@CUNET.CARLETON.CA. “Care of the Self and Self-knowledge: Rhetoric, Self-reflection, and Ethics in Plato’s *Alcibiades I*.” 2-8

Plato’s *Alcibiades I* characterizes ethics as a self-self relation (auto to auto), and an ethical “care of the self” (epimeleia heautou) that concerns one’s soul (psyche). As Michel Foucault emphasizes in his reading of the dialogue, speech is a central metaphor, and voice is
foregrounded. The relation itself is primary, a relation of care (heauton), a care of the soul that is figured rhetorically in the Socratic texts as khrēsis. While this term, khrēsis, can be translated simply as “use” or “I use” khraōmai (an instrument, a tool), Foucault insists on its more extended and polyvalent signification: it represents an attitude, a know-how, a behavior, or even a being-in-the-world. Ethics, then, is relational. This is not a relation that privileges the subject-position of speaker in relation to the abstract propositional content of his or her speech; rather, it is ontologically prior to that, pointing to the rhetorical conditions (of possibility) in which anything at all can be said, heard, and understood. Foucault argues that the Alcibiades is a pivotal moment in the history of philosophy: a progressive “covering up” of the epimeleia heautou by the gnōthi seauton (knowledge of the self). Self-knowledge and the injunction to “know oneself” totally “covers over and occupies the entire space opened up by the obligation to ‘take care of yourself’” – with far-reaching implications for ethics. Our hypothesis, drawing on Foucault, is that the rhetorical form is the basis of ethical relationality. It is just this that our paper aims to examine by comparing these ideas in Alcibiades I, with selected readings of the Protagoras (342a–344b) and Sophist (265a–268d).

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Mary Elizabeth Halper. The Catholic University of America. mary.elizabeth.halper@gmail.com. “The Case of Polus.” 1-8

... Plate sin with gold, / And the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks. King Lear, Act IV, Scene 6

Polus, the brash young student of the rhetorician Gorgias in Plato's Gorgias, is unique among the interlocutors of Socrates, not for his brashness but, ironically, for being a sort of damsel in argumentative distress. He has inspired a number of chivalric responses from scholars who seek to save him from a supposed rhetorical and fallacious refutation levied by Socrates. This paper argues that Polus is indeed refuted, however, and fairly so. This paper defends the legitimacy of Socrates's refutation by showing how Polus's claims follow from a psychologically understandable though logically inconsistent narrative of justice and rhetoric. Polus commits himself to the power of rhetoric out of a sense of moral indignation instead of an amoral or immoral confusion. In Polus’s narrative, the power of rhetoric renders rational the success and seeming happiness of the tyrant—rhetoric and not the absurdity of justice accounts for the tyrant's power. So by Polus's lights to bind rhetoric to justice alone is to undermine justice itself. The paper makes the case that it is for the sake of preserving the rationality of justice that Polus defends the power of rhetoric and that this commitment frames and determines his responses to Socrates, particularly concerning beauty and pleasure. Polus is not the victim of fallacious logic but of his own morality.

Peter John Hartman. Loyola University Chicago, phartman@luc.edu. “Some Medieval Objections to Nativism” Cohoe Panel. 4-2

Thomas Aquinas does not hide his distaste for Plato's views on the mind and cognition in his Summa: almost every question in his treatise on human nature starts with a salvo at one aspect or another of Plato's philosophy. One area in particular found special attention: Plato's commitment to innate ideas. Indeed, Aquinas is not alone in this: for most medieval authors, nativism is the absurdum to which one reduces another's argument. In order for the intellect to think about the world, it must acquire or receive information from the world. One argument in particular was often raised in this context: if ideas were innate and not acquired, then the human
intelllect would be an infinite power. I will look at this argument as raised by Peter Auriol, John Duns Scotus, and Hervaeus Natalis.

**George Harvey.** *Indiana University Southeast, whgeorge@ius.edu:* “Virtue before Politics in Plato’s *Laws.*” 1-3

Book III of the *Laws* begins with an historical account of the origins of constitutions that includes a description of human life prior to the development of politics. Despite the primitive conditions that characterize this pre-political age, the Athenian holds the ethical characters of individuals living under them in rather high esteem, in that he states that they are more courageous, temperate, and “in all ways more just” than people who live in civilized times (679d-e). In this paper, I examine the conditions of the pre-political age and identify the factors that are responsible for these good characters. I consider some reasons for thinking that the good qualities of pre-political individuals are not genuine virtues, but then show that there are better reasons for seeing these qualities as genuine virtues and not inferior imitations. My claim is that the pre-political age is an age of divine rule, as all of its features, including those that are responsible for the ethical character of pre-political individuals, are the result of divine agency. Seen in this way, the pre-political age presents us with a familiar idea, one expressed by Socrates at the end of book IX of the *Republic:* that it is best for each individual to live a life ruled by divine reason, even if doing so requires one to become the slave of the “best” person, namely, one who has divine reason within himself (590c-d). By observing how many of the Cretan colony’s laws have the effect of recreating some of the conditions of pre-political life, I point out that the pre-political age can provide important guidance to the legislator seeking to instill virtue in citizens. I conclude by suggesting some of the ways in which the Athenian’s account of pre-political life may advance our understanding of many of Law’s ethical themes.

**Christopher Hauser.** *Rutgers University. christopher.m.hauser@gmail.com:* “Priority, Essence, and Ways of Being in Aristotle.” 1-5

Relations of ontological priority or dependence, often discussed by Aristotle in terms of what is “separable without qualification” (xōristos haplōs), what “can be without other things” (einai endechetai aueu allōn), or what is “prior in nature and substance” (proteros kata phusin kai ousian, proteros tē ousia), are central features of Aristotle’s ontology. Three prominent interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of ontological dependence have emerged in the recent literature: a modal-existentialist interpretation (e.g., Fine 1984), an essentialist interpretation (e.g., Peramatzis 2011, 2008), and an ontological status interpretation (Corkum 2016, 2013, 2008). In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s views on these matters and show why it is preferable to these alternative interpretations. The key to my novel interpretation is the idea that, on Aristotle’s view, relations of ontological priority and posteriority are to be explained in terms of the posterior entity’s way of being, just as relations of definitional priority and posteriority are to be explained in terms of the posterior entity’s essence. I conclude by showing how my account can be used to defuse the apparent conflict between the primacy attributed to composites like the individual human being or horse, etc. in the *Categories* and the primary attributed to the forms of such composites in *Metaphysics Zeta.*

**Christopher Heallow.** *UC Davis. cgheallow@ucdavis.edu:* “What's in a Name? Etymology in Plato's *Cratylus.*” 5-6
Some have thought that Plato’s effort to decode Greek terms in the etymological digression (Cratylus 391d-427d), along with his other remarks, show that Plato must have taken the enterprise of discovering etymologies quite seriously. Others argue that comedic elements in Plato’s etymologies may indicate he took a more dismissive stance regarding the value of such analyses. One thing that both camps agree on, however, is that determining Plato’s attitude toward etymologies would help settle whether his own view of language is more akin to Hermogenes’ conventionalism or Cratylus’ naturalism. But the question often asked—Does Plato take etymological analyses seriously?—elides multiple questions that need to be distinguished if we’re to get a fuller sense of what Plato believed. In what follows I detail four distinct forms of this question, offer Plato’s answers to these questions, and explain what implications this has for his philosophy of language more generally.

**Hyun Höchsmann. East China Normal University. hhochsmann@gmail.com:** “Recollection as an Activity of the Tripartite Soul in the *Meno* and the *Phaedo.*” 4-5

In the *Phaedo,* endorsing Socrates’ argument on the immortality of the soul, Cebes invokes ‘that theory which you have often described to us – that what we call learning is really just recollection. If that is true, then surely what we recollect now we must have learned at some time before which is impossible, unless our souls existed somewhere before they entered this human shape. So in that way too it seems likely that the soul is immortal’ (72e).

Simmias then asks to be reminded about the proofs of that theory’ of recollection ‘because at the moment I cannot quite remember’. Plato launches the discussion of recollection in the *Phaedo* with a recollection of the theory in the *Meno,* with Cebes duly supplying ‘one very god argument’ referring to how ‘when you confront people with a diagram’, they are able to recollect.

Socrates interjects that this argument might not be convincing since ‘it is ‘hard to understand what we call learning can be recollection’ (73b). In place of reiterating the geometry demonstration in the *Meno,* Socrates presents fresh instances of recollection, ranging from objects in the sensible realm to the forms. Musical instruments, clothing, or other objects of the beloved can remind us of their owner. In ‘seeing equal sticks or stones or other equal objects’ we are reminded of ‘absolute equality’ (74b).

Socrates’ observation that unlike things can be the cause of recollection and his elaboration of the occasions, distinct objects, causes, degrees, modes, and stages of recollection in the *Phaedo* might appear seemingly random. Socrates’ account can be given further coherence when recollection is explained as corresponding activities of the tripartite soul. Socrates’ examples of recollection ranging from objects in the sensible realm to forms can be interpreted as activating different parts of the soul (the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational).

The incorporation of tripartite soul in the explanation of recollection fits in with Plato’s view of knowledge and engages the different points of view regarding whether forms are prerequisites for recollection (Brisson) or not (Scott and Fine). If learning or knowledge is recollection of the forms, then clearly forms are prerequisites. Recollection of sensible objects can only yield belief or right opinion. Not all recollection but only the recollection of the forms by the rational part of the soul, as in the geometry demonstration in the *Meno,* is knowledge for Plato.

**J. Noel Hubler. Lebanon Valley College. hubler@lvc.edu:** “Pros Hen Analogy and the Unity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.” 2-5
Interpreters have long questioned the unity of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, wondering how it can treat both the logical status of substance and the nature of the Prime Mover in a single science. Although it is well known that Aristotle’s science of being qua being relies on the *pros hen* analogy (PHA) of being, commentators have not properly attended to the three major analogies of being at work in the *Metaphysics* and their relations to one another.

To help understand how PHA works in the *Metaphysics*, it is instructive to examine how Aristotle uses it to explain friendship in the *Eudoxan Ethics*. There, Aristotle posits perfect friendship as the core sense of friendship and friendships of utility and pleasure as derivative. Several features of PHA emerge: 1) lower levels of friendship imitate only some features of perfect friendship and imperfectly so; 2) characteristics of friendship can conflict at lower levels of friendship; 3) the conflicts are resolved at the core that unites all the characteristics of friendship.

The same features of PHA are each at work in the analogies of being in the *Metaphysics*. The three major analogies of being—substance, actuality, and truth—differ and can conflict in the material realm. For example, among material substances, the criterion of independent existence and the criterion of being an ultimate subject point toward different entities as primary substance. However, they are both one among separate substances. Further, the Prime Mover unifies all three analogies of being because its substance is both its actuality and its true thought. Thus, through PHA, Aristotle brings together the logical and theological analyses of the *Metaphysics*. One cannot understand the nature of material substance without reference to separate substances and ultimately the Prime Mover.

**John F. Humphrey. North Carolina Ag & Tech University. jhumphr@ncat.edu.** “The Paradigmatic Socrates (Apology).” 1-1

In a previous paper, I examined Socrates’ claim that “…the god is wise, and that in this oracle he is saying that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. And he appears to say this of Socrates and to have made use of my name in order to make me a pattern [paradoigma] as if he would say, “That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom” (Ap. 23a-b). In that paper I was especially interested in what Plato means by the word ‘paradoigma.’ In another paper, I examined the use of the word ‘paradoigma’ in Plato’s *Republic* where Socrates refers to the city in speech as a ‘paradoigma’ of the soul (*Republic* IX, 592a-b). There Socrates tells Glauccon that the *polis* in speech is not really meant to be an actuality; rather, it is a “pattern [paradoigma] … laid up for the man who wants to see and found a city within himself on the basis of what he sees. It doesn’t make any difference whether it is or will be somewhere. For he [the good man] would mind the things of this city alone, and of no other.” In yet another paper, I considered Plato’s use of the term, ‘paradigm’ [paradoigma] in the *Statesman* where the Eleatic Stranger discusses the way in which children learn the alphabet before learning to read to explain the paradigm of a paradigm to teach the young Socrates the proper use of paradigms. In still another paper, I examined the paradigm of weaving in the *Statesman* where the Eleatic Stranger employs this paradigm to provide an understanding of the statesman.

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In this paper, I will return to Plato’s *Apology of Socrates* to look once again at what Socrates means when he maintains that the god uses his name to make him a paradigm. Drawing on my previous research on paradigms in Plato’s *Apology*, *Republic*, and *Statesman*, I will turn to two passages from Aristotle dealing with paradigms. In the first (*Prior Analytics* 69a14), Aristotle distinguishes a ‘paradeigma’ from inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning. In the second, Aristotle instructs Alexander on the proper use of a ‘paradeigma’ to depict “actions that have taken place in the past” (*Rhetoric to Alexander*, 1429a21). Both passages contribute to our understanding of Socrates’ claim that the god is using his name paradigmatically. Some have argued that Socrates is paradigmatic because he refuses to compromise and will not discontinue his philosophical practice; instead he will stand on principle and continue his philosophical practice even if he is condemned to die. Consequently, I will argue that while this is an important part of understanding the paradigmatic Socrates, one must also attend to the complete portrait of this enigmatic philosopher painted by Plato to comprehend fully what Socrates means when he claims that the god is using his name paradigmatically. This requires a careful understanding of paradigmatic reasoning and the way in which Socrates’ past actions establish a pattern for the individual who pursues a philosophic life.

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Cristina Ionescu. *Catholic University of America, ionescu@cua.edu*; “Pleasure as *genesis* and *energeia*? Plato’s and Aristotle’s Conceptions of Pleasure in Dialogue with Each Other.” 5-7

Much has been made of what appears to be Aristotle’s rejection of Plato’s understanding of pleasure as process and his replacement of this with an understanding of pleasure as activity that is complete at every moment. According to one of the influential scholars who have written on this issue, Aristotle has at least three major criticisms directed against a Platonic understanding of pleasure: (a) that the definition of pleasure as *genesis* is too narrow, as it seems fit to account only for mixed pleasures, and not also for pure pleasures, and especially suited for mixed pleasures of the body, and little, if at all, for pleasures of the soul; (b) that pleasure cannot be unlimited since it is not excessive *per se*; and (c) that we need to reconsider the understanding of “purity” when talking about “pure pleasures”, and instead of taking it to mean mere lack of any admixture of pain, we should envision it to be determined by the ontological status of the object of pleasure (Gerd van Riel 2000, 128).

In this paper I attempt to throw some new light on what is at stake in this debate about the nature of pleasures. While recognizing the differences between the two conceptions, I argue that Aristotle’s objections cannot count as crushing criticisms of Plato’s understanding of pleasure as embedded in his complex metaphysical view. Or, to put it differently, that if we are to imagine a dialogue between the two thinkers, we come to see that Plato might learn a great deal from Aristotle and even adopt some of Aristotle’s insights regarding the experience of pleasure, while

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preserving nevertheless his own definition of pleasure as perceived replenishment of a lack and his understanding of it as a coming into being (genesis).

I start by first outlining some of the major tenets of Aristotle’s view of pleasure, and then discuss what is at stake in each of the three criticisms listed above and how Plato would probably reply to them.

-J-

Elizabeth Jelinek. Christopher Newport University. betsyjelinek@gmail.com. “An Alternative Interpretation of Plato’s Clever Aitia.” 4-5

I argue that Plato’s “clever” aitia in the Phaedo is a hybrid Formal-material explanation. While I do not claim that Plato invokes material causation in the same manner or to the same degree of sophistication that Aristotle does, my interpretation of the clever aitia attributes to Plato a more complex and nuanced understanding of material causation than previously thought.

The traditional interpretation, which I call the Form Entailment Interpretation, holds that the clever aitia accounts for phenomena in terms of connections between Forms. Shorey and Vlastos claim that, for Plato, physical facts are sufficiently explained by appeal to logical entailment relations among the Forms. “Fire is hot” is reducible to the statement, “The Form Fire entails the Form Hot.”

Here is Problem #1 for the Form Entailment Interpretation: Fire has the ability to make both a rock and a ball of snow hot. Of course, we know that fire will melt the snow more quickly than it will heat the rock. What is to account for this difference? Note that it is impossible to give a Form Entailment-style explanation of why fire heats some objects more quickly than others, since Form Entailment-style explanations cannot account for degrees of participation. Such explanations express necessary relations, not hypothetical or conditional statements. In other words, the Form Entailment Interpretation cannot explain why fire acts differently depending on the situation.

Here is Problem #2 for the Form Entailment Interpretation: Both a fire and a fevered person are hot because they participate in the Form Hot. But note that fire has the ability to make other things hot whereas the fevered person does not. There is nothing about participation in the Form Hot that can account for this difference in behaviors. In this paper, I show that we must explain this by appealing to material causation: Fire’s ability to make other things hot is due to a brute fact about its material nature and is not explainable in terms of Forms; otherwise, a fevered
person would have the ability to heat objects by mere dint of the fact that he participates in the Form Hot.

The clever aitia accounts for a material’s ability to affect other materials; thus, the material has explanatory power, not just the Form. In this way, the clever aitia is, as Plato calls it, “subtler;” it combines a Formal explanation (Fire is hot because it participates in the Form Hot) with a material explanation (fire can make other things hot because of the type of material it is).

Michelle Jenkins. Whitman College, jenkinmk@whitman.edu “Socrates and Other Philosophers in Plato’s Early Dialogues” Shaw panel 2-4

In this paper, I ask what we can learn about the philosopher in the early dialogues through studying the portrait of Socrates. My focus here is on the philosopher’s motivations. Scholars often attribute two motivations to Socrates – he wants to exhort others to virtue and he seeks wisdom. I argue in this paper that it is only the latter of these motivations – desiring and seeking wisdom – that is characteristic of the philosopher. Exhorting others to virtue is particular to Socrates and stems from an obligation given directly to him from the gods. Moreover, while Socrates and the philosopher both desire and seek knowledge, I argue that we may see the philosopher investigate topics that Socrates in the early dialogues does not typically pursue. These differences in motivation, I conclude, may well lead to differences in action.

David Jennings. UC Merced. davidleejennings@gmail.com: “Punishment in the Gorgias.” 1-8

In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates debates Gorgias and his admirers about whether one should practice oratory or philosophy. Oratory, the latter argue, provides the greatest good: it empowers one to persuade a jury or an assembly and thereby to escape punishment and bring it upon others. On Socrates’ view, practicing philosophy puts our souls into the best condition. It helps us to avoid doing injustice and, failing that, to accept just punishment, if we deserve it. So whether we ought to practice oratory or philosophy depends in part on whether just punishment is good for those who suffer it.

This paper seeks to explore the nature and value of punishment in the Gorgias. I argue that the orators’ case against suffering punishment can be strengthened by resources in the dialogue and that Socrates can meet the challenges it poses only because his view of punishment is more radical than his interlocutors, and perhaps many of his readers, suppose. All agree that punishment involves pain. For this reason, Polus and Callicles, who endorse a crude version of hedonism, think that it’s bad to suffer it and so one should avoid it. But Socrates argues that just punishment, though painful, is good for whoever deserves it, since justice is always beneficial. Accordingly, he concludes, we should seek out judges and accept whatever they prescribe, be it flogging, imprisonment, fines, exile, or execution (481D). Here Socrates seems to endorse conventional institutions of justice, and in his conversations with the orators he makes little or no distinction between what counts as justice in one’s city and what’s really just. But there’s a difference. And since the Athenians, who serve as jurymen, are corrupt, ignorant and liable to be tricked by orators, as Socrates’ himself acknowledges, the punishments they prescribe will likely be unjust. So the orators have good reason to think we should avoid them.

Even if conventional punishments were just, it’s unclear how one could benefit from suffering them. Socrates sees punishment as the bitter medicine needed to cure the soul of injustice. But how could being flogged or killed make anyone less unjust? Socrates doesn’t say.
And his analogy with medicine doesn’t help, since the painfulness of medical treatments is clearly accidental to their curing power, while the painfulness of conventional punishments seems essential to how they’re supposed to work. And it’s doubtful that Socrates could endorse these punishments because their painfulness serves as a deterrent. It wouldn’t square well with his rejection of hedonism nor explain why one should seek out his own punishment.

I argue that Socrates endorses neither conventional punishments nor any punishment of the body. For him, just punishment must improve the soul. Since ignorance, on his view, causes injustice and since only education removes ignorance, just punishment is a form of corrective education, or refutation. Being refuted is painful because, for the most part, it hurts to be confronted with the falsity of one’s convictions about how to live. The Gorgias shows Socrates meting out this type of punishment to Polus and Callicles, who deserve it but try to avoid suffering it.

Lawrence Jost. University of Cincinnati. jostlj@ucmail.uc.edu. “Eudemian Value Pluralism?” 2-6

One who is willing to contemplate value pluralism in Aristotle’s ethics might try to show that the notion of kalokagathia at the end of the EE embodies a way of joining together two different value concepts, the fine and the good, where the first involves virtuous action, the second the things that are good in addition to goods of the soul, viz. bodily goods and external goods, here, of course under the rubric of natural goods. See VIII.2.1248b16 ff.: "The good and the noble [to kalon k'agathon] are distinct not only in name but also in themselves. For of all goods, the ones which are worth choosing for their own sakes are goals, but of these, the fine (kala) are all those which are praiseworthy on their own account..." The virtues of justice and temperance and the actions they lead to are said to be praiseworthy but not health, nor its product (ergon), nor even strength. These latter goods are good but not praiseworthy. Aristotle goes on to stress that the natural goods (ta phusei agatha) - e.g. the ones we compete for such as honor, wealth, bodily excellences, good fortune and power - are indeed good for the good person but not for those who are "foolish or unjust or undisciplined" (1248b26-31). Back in the first book, the Platonists were urged to "start from agreed goods, such as health, strength and temperance, and show that what is fine (kalon) is found to an even greater degree in unchanging things..." whereas "starting from numbers, they show that justice is good and health is good" (1218a21-2, 18-19). Note that justice, temperance, health and strength all appear in both contexts, with the virtues being fine and praiseworthy on their own account, while health and strength, while good by nature, are not to be praised but welcomed as goods which help deck out a eudaimon life. Of course when they are used properly by a good or virtuous person they are, as it were, "transmogrified", i.e. "things become noble when people's motives in doing and choosing them are noble; and that is why to the noble person the natural goods are noble...but for the many there is not this harmony, for things that are good in the abstract (ta haplos agatha) are not good for them, as they are for the good man."

If we recall the attacks on Platonic Value Monism that target the Form of the Good back in I.8 and take due account of the fact that the EE critique,

10 This translation is that of Inwood and Woolf. Kenny's translation is even stronger in its formulation in that it posits an essential difference between to agathon and to kalon k'agathon: "The difference between being good and being noble is not merely nominal: they differ essentially. Among all goods, some are ends that are valuable (haireta) for their own sake, and among these, some are noble, namely those that are laudable for their own sakes..." It is noteworthy that both translations render 'kalon k'agathon' with the simple 'noble' rather than "fine-and-good" or some such complex expression, masking, it seems, the innovation at issue.

11 Kenny's translation of 1249a5-13, with omissions.
unlike that to be found in NE 1.6, does not even gesture toward a way of unifying the various senses of 'agathon' via focal meaning or analogy (cf. 1096b26-31) and seems content with having attacked its univocity full stop, this may well be because his Eudemian Ethics advances a pluralistic thesis about ethical value in general in the face of Platonic and Eudoxan monism. That such an account can avoid both relativism and subjectivism, as Isaiah Berlin and his fans claim for his 20th C. theory, is to be hoped, a view that I dub "objective individualism" and will sketch in my conclusion.

-K-

**Kevin M. Kambo. The Catholic University of American. kkambo3@gmail.com.** “Practical Imagination as Moral Performance in Plato’s Philebus.” 1-3

In this paper I shall analyse the two craftsmen of the soul that Socrates describes in Plato’s Philebus. Two questions are particularly important: why does Socrates have two craftsmen, the writer and the painter, respectively fulfilling the roles of judgement and imagination? and how is the work of the imagination relevant to the problem of false anticipatory pleasures?

To answer these questions I situate the work of judgement and imagination in the context of the fourfold ontology of the Philebus, which places different entities into the fundamental classes of being: limit, the unlimited, mixture, and cause of mixture. I argue that the act of practical imagining is a productive activity, where the imagining subject forms a simulated view of himself in action and/or in enjoyment, based on the parameters or limit provided by his judgement. As such, imagination creates versions of the self that are dependent on one’s belief(s) about the human good (and one’s own good). And the reliance of imagination on belief also helps explain why false anticipatory pleasures are most significant when the subject has false beliefs about the human good, rather than when the subject merely fails to predict future events, as some scholars argue.

**M. Dan Kemp. Georgia State University. mkemp8@student.gsu.edu.** “Annas on Aristotle’s Appeal to Nature and the Internal Point of View.” 6-7

Aristotle appeals to nature to support his ethical claims in the Nicomachean Ethics. The human good takes the shape it does because human beings are kind of creatures they are by nature. Julia Annas interprets Aristotle’s appeal to nature as compatible with the rejection of nature’s potential to determine for each individual human how they ought to live. Rather, Annas claims, ethics begins with considerations from the individual’s point of view rather than the imposing alien values on the individual from the external point of view. Annas distinguishes between “full nature,” which refers to the self-moving and autonomous nature of the individual organism, and “mere nature,” which refers to states of affairs external to the point of view of the individual, and argues that only the former has direct normative implications. Moreover, because the distinction between full nature and mere nature tracks the difference between the internal and external point of view, it follows from Annas’s interpretation that Aristotle’s appeal to human nature grounds ethics in the subjective content of the individual’s point of view. In this paper, I develop Aristotle’s understanding of natural normativity and conclude that the distinction between normative and non-normative descriptions of the natural world do not track the distinction between the internal and external points of view. Annas’s distinction between nature and mere nature fails to represent Aristotle’s view of Aristotle does not ground ethics in the
Subjective content of the individual’s desires and commitments. Instead, the theoretical background of the *ergon* argument suggests that Aristotle grounds ethics in the objective content of everyone’s desires and commitments. Moreover, the *ergon* is relevant to any organism that falls under the description “human.”

**Radim Kočandrle. University of West Bohemia in Pilzen, rkocandr@kfi.zcu.cz; “Anaximander and the Origins of a Conception of Earth’s Stability Due to Symmetry.” 5-4**

In his *De caelo*, Aristotle ascribes to Anaximander of Miletus a conception according to which the Earth remains at its place in the universe only thanks to the symmetry of its position. Simplicius, however, in his commentary on this passage from Aristotle, notes that such a formulation can also be found in Plato. Aetius, meanwhile, ascribes this entire argument to Parmenides and Democritus. Plato, however, in all likelihood believed the Earth to be flat – a feature typical of Ionian cosmology. Given that a belief in a spherical shape of the universe and the Earth can be demonstrated in the Pythagorean school and is hinted upon in Parmenides, we could assume that this conception originated in the Italian branch of philosophy. And since we do not have enough texts to satisfactorily reconstruct Pythagorean thoughts and have to rely on much later reports by Philolaus, one could assume that the whole argument about the stability of the Earth due to equilibrium and symmetry is based on Parmenides’s thoughts.

-L-

**Francis Lacroix. Université Laval, francis.lacroix.2@ulaval.ca, “Plotinus’ writings in the pre-Porphyrion period: an analysis for a Gnostic background before his arrival to Rome.” Narbonne Panel 2-3**

Plotinus undoubtedly maintained a polemical dialogue with the Gnostics, who nurtured his own thought and the content of his treatises, at least during the famous sequence from 30 to 33 (III 8; V 5; V 8 and II 9), which concludes with a critique against the Gnostics in good standing. However, this quarrel probably happened even before this so-called tetralogy, since we can legitimately think that these very treatises express a culminating point of a serious issue between Plotinus and the Gnostics (an evidence of this hypothesis occurs in Porphyry’s *Vita Plotini*, 16, 12-14, where we learn that Amelius wrote not least than forty treatises to refute some specific gnostic theses). And yet, we can trace back a controversial dialogue between the two protagonists during the pre-Porporhry period of Plotinus writings, that is, through his roughly first ten years he spent at Rome, while he wrote, according to Porphyry, 21 treatises (in Enneads IV 7 [2] and IV 8 [6], *inter alia*). One can then wonder if Plotinus acquainted the gnostic thought even before his arrival to Rome while he was attending Ammonius classes, a hypothesis that can hardly be proven due to the lack of historical evidences. But despite this problem, it is possible to state that Plotinus was actually aware of the gnostic *milieu* during his first years at Rome, inasmuch as the treatises he wrote reflect this aspect in certain ways. Our paper will try to determine to what extent the gnostic contribution in these first treatises plays a significant role. Indeed, even though some specific treatises certainly manifest a Gnostic influence, some others (III 1 [3]; IV 1 [21]; IV 2 [4]; V 9 [5]) don’t suggest such an interpretation at first glimpse, and so we need to pay a peculiar attention in order to really understand the Gnostic position with regard to Plotinus’ own early thought.
Tony Leyh. *Emory University*, tony.leyh@emory.edu. “Friendship in Plato’s *Gorgias*.” 1-8
This paper explores the role friendship (*philia*) plays in Plato’s *Gorgias*. I argue that Socrates, especially in his discussion with Callicles, invokes friendship as a standard that undermines conceptions of justice offered throughout the dialogue by his interlocutors. Specifically, my contention is that a linchpin of Socrates’ sundry arguments against Callicles’ position comprises how Calliclean justice leaves no room for friendship (e.g. 507e; 510b-d; 513b-c). I further show how this theoretical argument is amplified in the gradually weakening friendship displayed between Socrates and Callicles throughout *Gorgias*. I conclude by suggesting that this prominent role given to *philia* throughout the *Gorgias* implies that friendship might not only be a product or consequence of justice, but something necessary for the attainment and understanding of it.

As St. Thomas Aquinas was powerfully aware, stripping off limits on our own human faculties such that we could glean what existence was like for a being native to an ontological plane above ours is fundamentally impossible. Aquinas discerns more clearly than transhumanists what follows from the fact that our grasp of anything must fully conform to our way of knowing. Transhumanists’ failure truly to appreciate our experiential and epistemological limits helps to explain a key difference between them and Aquinas regarding the sort of ideal that the divine is taken to be.

Thornton Lockwood. *Quinnipiac University*, tlockwood@qu.edu. “Defining Friendship in Cicero’s *De Amicitia*.“ 4-4
Scholars have disagreed on the extent to which Cicero's friendship essay is philosophical or popular. One aspect of the debate turns on how rigorously Cicero defines friendship (and whether his definition reflects philosophical eclecticism). In my paper I argue that Cicero returns to the problem of defining friendship in all three of Laelius' speeches in a fashion that suggests a rigorous, philosophical definition of friendship worthy of contrast with those found in the Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean traditions.

-M-

Deepa Majumdar. *Purdue University North Northwest*, dmajumda@pnw.edu: “Plotinus’ Mysticism in *Ennead* VI.9 and the *Upaniṣads* – a Comparison.” 2-3
A. H. Armstrong describes Plotinus’ early treatise *Ennead* VI.9(9) in two ways:
1) As the “first clear presentation by Plotinus of the One as the ultimate principle and of union with it as the goal of the philosophic or spiritual life.”
2) And as “… the first and one of the clearest and most powerful of his great ascents of the mind, in which he both uses philosophic reason as far as it will go to show the way and urges his readers to go on beyond any thinkable reality to the union which he does not presume to describe.”

*Ennead* VI.9 is significant to Plotinian mysticism for at least four reasons:
1) Because in it (VI.9.3), Plotinus exhorts us to ascend *beyond* and *through* the second hypostasis, Intellect, all the way to the One – unlike many Platonists, who, as Armstrong
points out, wished to stop at Intellect. This corroborates Plotinus’ point in VI.7.36, that the ascending soul is thrust by the “surge of the wave of Intellect” (or eternal self-transcendence of Intellect) to a unitive vision of the One.

2) Because in it (VI.9.4) Plotinus tells us that we are aware of the One by a presence superior to knowledge – with teaching and reasoning as prior steps. This supra-rational (therefore trans-discursive) awareness is perhaps a point of profound parallelism between Plotinus’ mysticism and that in the Upaniṣads – and a point in defense of Bréhier, who contended that Plotinus infused something new (supra-rational), from India, into the western tradition of philosophy.

3) Because in it (VI.9.10) Plotinus expresses perhaps his most radical non-dual mysticism – in a vision that is union with no consciousness of duality – something of utmost significance to any comparison with Advaitic mysticism in the Upaniṣads.

4) Finally, Ennead VI.9 matters because notwithstanding the seemingly perfect character of this union-in-vision, it is nevertheless temporary. In VI.9.11 Plotinus speaks of how we fall from this union with the One but rise to it again. Comparing the temporary nature of this union with the fullest unio in the Upaniṣads should be telling.

In this paper I will first explore the details of Plotinus’ mysticism in Ennead VI.9(9), then compare it with mysticism in a few of the Upaniṣads – paying special attention to the modus operandi of the ascent, the nature of the unio, and its duration.

Anne Mamary. Monmouth College. ANNEM@monmouthcollege.edu, “A Daimonic Joy: Plato’s Socrates on Virtue (Meno).” 2-8

I am writing in memory of my late friend, Plato scholar and Morris Dancer, John Bremer (1927-2015), who helped me to see the fluid, shifting foundations of an oral culture of mousike in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. In The Muses Learn to Write, Eric Havelock explains that the verb “to be” means something different in a literate consciousness than in an oral one. He says that in a literate mind “to be” “links [a person] as a ‘subject’ to a series of predicates connoting something fixed, something that is an object of thought: the predicate describes a class or a property, not an action. In the idiom suitable for this purpose, the verb ‘to be’ is used to signify not a ‘presence’ or a ‘forceful existence’ (its common use in oralism) but a mere linkage required by a conceptual operation” (105).

While Plato sometimes employs the literate’s “to be,” he also conjures presence after presence, gives his auditors and readers story after allegory, requiring of us critical interpretation and a practice of living. The conversations have the power to transform the participants who are not only considering propositions from a remove but who are also trying on those ideas for size as practices of living.

Professor Bremer, in his unpublished study on the Meno, helped me to understand anamnesis as something both profoundly human and profoundly joyful, while, at the same time, perhaps, being beyond ordinary human capacities of description. Bremer reminded me that anamnesis is better translated as a “calling forth to mind” rather than simply as “remembering.” When Socrates and the young man find the square on the diameter, they persevere in the face of the aporia, using the very same moment of paralysis as a springboard to remember something of the soul’s power of creativity and solving the problem into the bargain. It is a moment of daimonic joy, this calling forth to mind the mind’s own powers.

Similarly, virtue becomes something joyful for Socrates and the young man, while for Meno it is something entirely joyless, even though Meno and his slave have the very same
The definition of virtue. For Meno, desiring beautiful things and having the power to acquire them reflects a tyrannical acquisitiveness enabled by brute strength and the power of words to persuade other who are enamored of avarice and power. For the young man, it is a beautiful thing to call forth to mind the forceful existence of the soul’s power to acquire its creative capacities, its virtue.

Joel Mann. St Norbert College. joel.mann@snc.edu. “A discourse on method: the skepticism of περὶ φύσιος ἄνθρώπου.” 5-3, Chair 4-6

The Hippocratic treatise conventionally referred to as Nature of man attempts to refute anyone who claims that the human body is "just one thing." For centuries, it was considered the foundational articulation of "Hippocratic" philosophy, science, and medicine, but in the past few decades, scholarly--and especially philosophical--interest in the treatise has waned, due at least in part to two prevailing judgments about the text. First, it has been taken as an unimaginative retread of Empedoclean physics in medical terms. Second, its criticisms of "philosophical medicine" have been cast as poor imitations of more sophisticated arguments about the empiricist constraints on science available elsewhere in the Hippocratic Corpus, namely, in the treatise Ancient medicine. In this paper, I argue that the author’s central project has long been misunderstood. His main concern is not to question the empiricism of monists as such; instead, he utilizes the argument from disagreement found in Xenophanes to motivate skepticism about the methodology common to monist metaphysicians and medical practitioners.

Blaze Marpet. Northwestern University. blaze@u.northwestern.edu. “Plato and Moore on Pleasure and the Good.” 4-8

In just a few quick lines of the Republic, Plato argues that the good cannot be defined as pleasure on the grounds that there are bad pleasures (505c). But this is a deceptively simple argument, one that raises many questions. What precisely is Plato’s objection supposed to amount to? Is Plato appealing to the compresence of opposites? By virtue of what are certain pleasures bad? Is Plato opposed to the identity of the good and pleasure, or just the definition of one in terms of the other? How does this argument relate to his argument that the good cannot be defined as knowledge (also at 505c)? Most of all, the argument against pleasure as the good is brief and elliptic, and we should wonder what Plato’s driving considerations are. After Plato himself, G. E. Moore may be the prime exemplar of what is called Platonism about the good. Like Plato in the Republic, Moore maintains in the Principia Ethica that “good” denotes an objective, indefinable, non-natural property. Accordingly, with his famous open-question argument, Moore holds that pleasure cannot be the good, since pleasure is a natural property. In this paper, I provide an interpretation of Plato’s argument against pleasure as the good by appealing to Moore’s open-question argument. I argue that there are two central considerations driving Plato’s argument. First, and most obviously, pleasure and goodness are not even co-extensive; there are instances of pleasure that are not instances of goodness. Second, and more importantly, even if pleasure and goodness were co-extensive, there would nevertheless remain an explanatory gap. Pleasure cannot explain why good things are good, but any definition of goodness must do this. Moore’s open question argument is crucial for establishing this second point. In order to understand Plato’s argument in the Republic, I also explore connections to the treatment of pleasure in the Philebus.
Brian Marrin. *Universidad de las Andes (Bogota)*. brianmarrin@gmail.com. “The Use of Justice in Plato’s Republic.” 5-5

This paper attempts to analyze part of Polemarchus’ definition of justice and some of the consequences of Thrasymachus’ *akribologia* about art or *tekhnê*. The crux of the issue, which I think is decisive for our reading of the *Republic* as a whole, is whether and in what sense justice itself can be considered to be an art. And if it is an art, what is it an art of? What I will argue here is that the question of *tekhnê* is intimately connected to the question of *use*. Following a common Platonic definition, every art is that art of using something. While Socrates does take advantage of Thrasymachus’ identification of justice with *tekhnê* in order to refute him, the conception of justice that is developed over the course of the *Republic* cannot ultimately be identified with *tekhnê* in the usual sense because we do not “use” justice in the same way that we use or employ the arts. We use the other arts in order to make products of various kinds in accordance with the rules or techniques of the art, but the use of justice has no product beyond itself. The just man is the one who “performs his function,” or more literally, “does the things of himself” (*ta hautou prattêi*, 441e1). Justice, then, can appear useless, but, as Socrates will suggest, is in fact the condition of our successful use of anything at all.


It is a well-known Aristotelian thesis that kingship, the form of government where one man rules freely over the πόλις aiming at the common benefit, is the best possible regime, or at least the best regime under some specific, ideal, circumstances.

This thesis can be found all through the *Politics*, both in books thought of by many as being “early” as in books considered “late”, and even in a treatise commonly conceived of as being more “recent” than the *Politics* as a whole, the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

This thesis is, however, a bit puzzling considering Aristotle’s beliefs, stated emphatically in the *Politics*, that rule by law should prevail over rule by men, or that, in general, the authority exerted by many is preferable to, and more to be trusted than, the authority exerted by one single man. Moreover, Aristotle acknowledges that “kingships no longer arise nowadays” and candidly admits that democracy and oligarchy, along with some intermediate mixed forms of both, are, in actual fact, the only political systems that could be found in his days. Finally, he seems to sometimes show an unmistakable preference for milder, more human and down-to-earth kind of regimes, namely for the one that “is called by the name common to all constitutions, *politeia*”, which, in the chapters where he analyzes it, gives the impression of being much closer to what he would like to endorse as the best possible regime in most practical circumstances.

And the fact is that despite his efforts to explain, in the passages where he supports the thesis, why kingship is the best regime, one cannot help feeling that something is missing in his explanation, something without which the whole explanation lacks strength and persuasiveness.

In order to untie this theoretical knot, I think we should set aside the *Politics* for a moment and look elsewhere.

In fact, in a lost work by Aristotle, the dialogue *On Good Birth*, we can find, I submit, a key-element that allows to complete and reinforce the argument Aristotle gives in the *Politics* in support of his thesis that kingship is the best of all correct regimes. I do not claim that this element is all that it takes to turn it into a satisfactory, let alone flawless, argument; but I do think it enhances it and, by doing so, helps to clear up why Aristotle would think as he does about kingship, and especially about hereditary kingship.
This element is the definition of good birth as “excellence of stock” (ἀρετὴ γένους) in the special way this definition is justified and upheld in the dialogue. In fact, although the same definition occurs in other passages of Aristotle’s work, specifically in the Rhetoric and in the Politics itself, the preserved fragments of the On Good Birth are the only extant texts where we can see it developed, argued for and justified. Now, it is precisely this context that makes the difference in this regard and provides the clues for clarifying Aristotle’s allegation that kingship is the best regime.

To argue for this is my main goal in this paper.

In order to state my case, I will adopt the following method. First, I will summarize Aristotle’s discussion on the best regime in Politics III and IV. Then I will say a few words on the Περὶ εὐγενείας and highlight its theses and main argument. Finally, I will try to show why and how those theses and argument supplement and strengthen Aristotle’s contention for kingship in the Politics.

Mark Moes. Grand Valley State University. moesm@gvsu.edu. “Beyond Ousia: The Form of the Good in Light of the Digression on Being in the Sophist.” 4-3

At Republic 509b7-8, Socrates says that “existence and being [τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὰν οὐσιαν]” is “added [προσεῖναι]” to the Forms by the Good though the Good “is not being [ousias] but still stands above and beyond being [εἶτα ἐπεκείνα τὰς οὐσίας...ὑπερεχόντας]” in dignity and power.” Then at 517c Socrates says “the idea of the Good must be reckoned...to have produced [τεκοῦσα]” in the visible world both light and the Sun, while in the intelligible world it is itself the lord and master (αὐτὴ κυρία) which furnishes and provides (παρασκομένη) truth and intelligence.”

Christopher Shields provides a reading of these texts that supports his Gerasimos-Santas-style interpretation of the Form of the Good in Republic 6. According to Shields, the Form of the Good is an abstract entity, a “Form alongside other Forms.” It is “beyond ousia in dignity and power” only in the sense that its explanatory role as a formal cause of the ideal attributes of all other Forms marks it as a particular Form “importantly distinct from [the Form of] ousia.” Shields maintains that we should resist the thesis of some Platonists from antiquity that the Form of the Good should be understood in monotheistic fashion as a generative or causal principle which is in any sense a productive cause of the other Forms and through them of the sensible world. This paper, to the contrary, argues for a monotheistic interpretation of the Form of the Good, according to which Plato does not (or not only) mean it to be understood only as a formal cause--one abstract Form among others-- and does mean it to be indistinguishable from Being-quə-ultimate-normative-power, as elucidated by the Stranger in the Sophist.

On Michael Wiitala’s persuasive interpretation of the Stranger’s digression on Being and Non-Being in the Sophist, the Form of Being is in one sense a countable Kind (or Form) and is in another (analogous) sense an ultimate normative power that transcends cardinality and finitude. In the latter sense, Being is the power that makes the cosmic whole of parts the whole that it is. This paper argues that the Stranger’s account of Being is at the same time an account of the Good, which should also be understood in two senses. It supposes that, because he thinks of the Good along the lines of the Stranger’s conception of Being, Plato’s Socrates in Republic 6-7 Socrates sometimes speaks of the Good as just another abstract Form or Idea and sometimes speaks of it as a transcendent divine entity, an ultimate power. Socrates demurs from disambiguating the two analogous senses of the Good because of the intellectual deficiencies of his interlocutors, because of the limitations of time in an already over-long conversation about justice, and because Plato wants to set a puzzle for this readers to solve.
Shields asserts that the conception of the Form of the Good as an ultimate power is *incoherent*, because it implies that the Form of the Good exists as nothing but a “baseless disposition” that does not “belong to anything.” In reply, this paper argues that if the Form of the Good is identical to the ultimate Being the Stranger describes in the *Sophist*, then like ultimate Being it is not a countable Form or thing but rather is *unbounded* existence and goodness. It is one name of what later Thomistic Aristotelians called the limit case instance of the pure perfections. As such, it is not a bounded or finite instance of existence or goodness. It is not an instance of them in the way in which discrete Forms or things are instances of them. It is an “instance” only in an analogous sense. Being and Goodness, as divine attributes, are not “baseless dispositions” that “do not belong to anything.” They belong to God but not in the way in which attributes belong to finite subjects. Moreover, unbounded goodness and being are not abstract Forms but utterly concrete aspects of God, and as such can be *productive causes* of Forms and things.

**Eric Morelli. Independent Scholar. morelliej@gmail.com, “Plato’s Puppeteers in a New Light.”** 5-6

Plato devotes a significant portion of the Allegory of the Cave to a description of a group of cave-dwellers he has Socrates liken to *thaumatapoioi*, “wonder-workers” or “puppeteers.” Plato presents these people as distinct from the Cave’s prisoners; but, while he has Socrates explain that the prisoners represent ordinary people like “us,” he does not clearly indicate who, if anyone, the puppeteers represent. Traditionally, commentators have regarded the puppeteers negatively, as deceptive manipulators complicit in the prisoners’ imprisonment—e.g., corrupt legislators, corrupt politicians, sophists, orators, and artists. Such interpretations are in keeping with the traditional, predominantly negative view of the Cave as a whole, and they all have some basis. However, further reflection reveals them to be less tenable than they first seem. A careful reconsideration of the puppeteers in context casts them and the Cave in a subtler, far more positive light. The allegory appears profoundly cosmological; the worldview it presents seems closer in spirit to the *Timaeus*, the *Laws*, and Aristotle’s *Physics* than to the *Phaedo* and the *Gorgias*; and the puppeteers appear divine.

**John Mulhern. University of Pennsylvania. johnjm11@verizon.net. “Timēma in Aristotle’s Politics.”** 2-6, Chair 4-1

*Timēma* is used in the *Politics* to explain the conditions under which citizens might share in certain offices. Translations sometimes suggest that Aristotle intends by this word merely an amount of property to qualify for office. But Aristotle himself says, “It is not possible to say simply the amount of the defined *timēma*, that it is necessary to be such (1297b2-3);” and then he goes on to suggest a procedure.

While there is controversy over whether the Athenians had an expression for ownership and thus property, it is clear that, where translators regularly give ‘property’, Aristotle regularly uses the language of acquisition and possession. Further, Aristotle repeatedly mentions changes in the citizens’ economic condition that would put them in pools for different offices. In agriculture, such a change could occur if one’s annual output had risen or fallen; in trade, by a rise in income or the loss of, perhaps, a ship with its cargo. The change could become known by annual or less frequent assessment—an old Greek practice. As Aristotle says, “In some cities they are assessed *(timōntai, cognate with *timēma*) annually and on this period of time, in other larger ones every three years or five years (1308a39-41).”
Thus the *timēma* appears to be the result of a procedure—an assessment—which sometimes prompts adjustment in the pool for offices rather than merely an amount of property.

**Joyce Mullan.** *Stevens Institute of Technology.* “Thinking about what you are doing: Cleon’s argument in the Mytilenian debates.” 6-3

In Thucydides’ account of the Mytilenian Debates, the Athenian Assembly decided to revisit their decision to mass murder their revolting allies, the Mytilenians. Cleon, a famous general, was furious that the topic had come up again, and blamed the Democracy for being incapable of governing others. By talking the matter to death, Democracies appear irresolute and may invite distrust among other allies and subject colonies. Yet, Cleon contradicted himself when he said that states are better ruled by the ‘man in the street’ than by intellectuals. Hannah Arendt later said that when thought parted company from action is when the Athenian Democracy began to lose its way. This debate provides an important example of the first step the Athenians took in losing their founding values as well as eventually their beloved way of life.

**Dana Munteanu.** *Ohio State University.* [Munteanu.3@osu.edu](mailto:Munteanu.3@osu.edu). “Dismantling Current Prejudices against Aristotle’s *Poetics*.” 4-1

Despite great commentaries and translations of the *Poetics*, many classicists and philosophers maintain certain prejudices against the treatise. In this essay, I propose to review some of these false assumptions and misunderstandings and to suggest ways to correct our approach. A first modern objection to the *Poetics* is that it fails to defend poetry against Platonic accusations. Contextualization can help us put matters in perspective, by finding a parallel in Plato’s critique of rhetoric and, subsequently, Aristotle’s treatment of the same subject. According to Plato’s *Gorgias*, for example, rhetoric has no concern for the truth and, therefore, no real substance. Practitioners of rhetoric charm their audience, leading them into false beliefs, no less than tragedians do. How does Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* reply to Plato’s views? He defines the subject and explores the methods most conducive to persuasive speech, with little interest in morally defending oratory. This is quite comparable to the *Poetics*, in which Aristotle demarcates the topic of investigation and analyzes the elements essential for successful tragedies. Yet, our modern views on Aristotle’s approach to each subject appear to be quite dissimilar. A second contemporary criticism is that the *Poetics* ignores the political aspects and performance details of tragedy. Obviously, Aristotle does not need to legitimize any of our interests in classical subjects, and, vice-versa, our historically based focus cannot be imposed on the philosopher. Some of our areas of research may have seemed self-evident to him (e.g., the link between tragedy and democratic Athenian institutions), or outside the scope of his investigation. Other subjects, which modern scholars find fascinating, such as the gender dynamics in Greek tragedy, stem from our new philosophical angles (e.g., feminist theory) or become possible only because of our detached historic-sociological perspective. Thirdly, misunderstandings occur from oversimplifications of the text of the *Poetics* that has inherited numerous lacunae, corruptions, and other philological problems. For example, Aristotle’s classification of four species (*eidê*) of tragedy includes (*Po. 18.1455b32-1456a3*): the complex, the suffering-oriented, the character-centered and, a fourth, -- but the text is corrupt here -- *[oēs]*, with two different emendations proposed: *haplēs* (simple) or *opsis* (spectacle). Depending on the reading, scholars reach very different conclusions on the meaning that Aristotle ascribes to visual effects in theater, but they rarely acknowledge the textual uncertainty and, therefore, the speculative nature of their viewpoint.

An unnoticed quaternio terminorum problematizes Aquinas’ first and second demonstrations of God’s existence. Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues to a First Mover/Cause, which he identifies as God. Although the First Mover/Cause shares no natural kind with any substance that it moves or causes, Aristotle’s system of classification seems to demand that it be in a genus of movers or causes—for what is not in the genus F is not F. Aquinas will go on, however, to argue that God is not in any genus, since His essence and His existence are identical. If the First Mover/Cause is in a genus or species, then not all that is true of it will be true of God. Aquinas’ cosmological arguments will not go through.

Aquinas’ most promising replies would be to deny that: 1) there is a genus of movers/causes; 2) the First Mover/Cause is in such a genus; 3) “mover/cause” is predicated univocally of the First Mover/Cause. I do not think these defenses will work.

The case for 1): Aristotle speaks of genera/species of motions in the category of Relations, but nowhere does he name a genus/species of movers, the mode of being of which is different. Against 1), however: a) Aristotle admits genera/species of causes (Phys 195a26, Meta. 996a19, 1013b28). b) Three movers correspond to three kinds of motion (Phys. 243a37-38), and in an animal, desiderative functions are many in number but are one mover in species (or form, An. 433b10-13, cf. Simplicius In Cat. vol. VIII, p. 321). c) Like his teacher, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas accepts a genus/species of movers (Sent. 3, dist. 17, q. 1, art. 3, q. 1, c. 2), interprets Aristotle so (CP 7, lect. 3, 898; CM 12, lect. 4, 2474), and puts human movers into a genus of causes (ST 1a, Q. 52, art. 3). d) Aquinas locates the First Mover/Cause in the order of agents (ST 1a q. 19, art. 4), and an ordo entails genus or species (cf. CAnPo 2, lect. 12, no. 3).

The case for 2): Aquinas withholding genus or species from God because God’s essence and existence are identical. As with the universal cause of a species, which is not univocal with the species it causes, God can be the subject only analogically, not univocally, of predicates that are also predicated of creatures (ST 1a, Q. 13, art. 5 ad 1). In the same way, as principle of all, the First Mover/Cause transcends nature (Meta. Α.1) and its kinds, and the ἀρχή of a series is not a member of the series. Against 2), however: a) Aquinas accepts that Aristotle’s First Mover is in a genus of movers. b) Aquinas states that God is first cause, entailing that God is in the species of cause. c) Since there is a species of causes, the First Cause is in a species. d) Since a mover is a cause, the First Mover is in a species of cause. e) Although the First Mover is not in any kind of things that are caused, that does not entail that it is not in a genus of movers or causes, and an ἀρχή is a cause.

The case for 3): the medieval doctrine that predications are made of God analogically amounts to Aristotle’s πρός ἐν predication. If Mover/Cause is predicated of the First analogically, it can do the causative work that Thomas needs of it without being in a genus. Against 3): a) Either the First is a mover/cause or it is not. Thomas has no adequate defense against Aristotle’s position that πρός ἐν predication collapses into equivocation, so that his Ways are not demonstrations. b) It would beg the question for Thomas to deploy analogical predication before he has proved that the First Mover/Cause is God.

If my analysis is right, either Aquinas’ Ways are not demonstrations or he cannot have essence and existence identical in God. It is worth asking whether this incompatibility between the First Mover’s status as mover and as pure act already infects Aristotle’s theology.
Jean-Marc Narbonne. Université Laval, jean-marc.narbonne@fp.ulaval.ca. “Plotinus’ philosophical way of life and the Gnostics.” Panel Organizer and Chair 2-3

In Plotinus’ treatise 33 (II 9) Against the Gnostics, Plotinus insists as nowhere before in all his writings upon his special way of both approaching philosophy and practising philosophy as opposed to his adversaries.

One can summarized the situation by saying that, in his opinion, the Gnostics, are faulty in five aspects:
1. They don’t argue in a philosophical way.
2. They don’t practice or teach virtue.
3. They are not careful enough but rather arrogant and pretentious.
4. They don’t pay to the Gods the respect they deserve and even insult them.
5. They don’t recognize their debt to the Ancients and believe accordingly they are allowed to innovate.

In my presentation, I will try to assess those evaluations or judgments and come to some sort on conclusion about the respective merits and disadvantages of both metaphysical enterprises.

Takashi Oki. Kyoto University. takashiokinew@gmail.com. “Aristotle’s Uses of ‘ἐνεκά τού’ and ‘οὗ ἐνεκα’.” 4-7

In this paper, I consider how Aristotle employs ‘ἐνεκά τού’ and ‘οὗ ἐνεκα’ in passages on chance and chance events from the Physics, and on ignorance in action from the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. I argue that ‘ἐνεκά τού’ does not mean ‘actually attaining something’, and that ‘οὗ ἐνεκα’ in the texts means a ‘goal’ and not just a ‘result’, while criticizing Ross’s (1936) interpretation of the two terms, ‘ἐνεκά τού’ and ‘οὗ ἐνεκα’.

In doing so, I seek to clarify that Aristotle’s uses of the two terms in the Physics and in the Ethics are in harmony with each other, but not in the way previously thought.

First, I defend my interpretation of ‘ἐνεκά τού’ and ‘οὗ ἐνεκα’, while criticizing Ross’s arguments for the view that ‘ἐνεκά τού’ in this context means ‘actually attaining something which either was, or might naturally have been, taken as an end’, and that correspondingly ‘οὗ ἐνεκα’ means a ‘result’: (i) Ross misguidedly claims that this interpretation is supported by Aristotle’s explanation in Physics B5 (196b21). I argue that Ross overlooks the fact that neither ‘X’s being done with the thought of attaining Y’ nor ‘X’s being what might be done with the thought of attaining Y’ entails ‘Y’s being actually attained by doing X’, even though ‘X’s actually attaining Y’ entails ‘Y’s being actually attained by X’. (ii) He also refers to as pieces of evidence the ‘ignorance’ passages from the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. But Ross is wrong in thinking that the ‘οὗ ἐνεκα’ in the texts corresponds to ‘killing’ and ‘wounding’, while accordingly taking ‘the οὗ ἐνεκα’ to be the ‘result’. I argue that it is more
reasonable to take ‘the οὗ ἑνεκα’ in the texts to be ‘saving’ and ‘spurring’. (iii) Ross thinks that his interpretation of ‘ἑνεκά του’ goes well with the ‘de facto’ teleology that he ascribes to Aristotle. But there is no good reason to attribute such a ‘de facto’ teleology to him. Rather, 196b21-22 suggests that, in Aristotle’s view, teleology in nature is parallel to teleology in action.

Second, I show that Lorenz’s view on ‘οὗ ἑνεκα’ is also implausible, even though he takes the ‘οὗ ἑνεκα’ in the texts to mean a ‘goal’ and not a ‘result’.

**Thomas Olshewsky. New College of Florida. tolsheisky@verizon.net.** “Motives for Motion in Ensouled Beings (Phys. 2, De An. 2)” 4-7

Aristotle sets forth in Physics 2.1 an initial list of things that exist “by nature” and asserts that “each of them has within itself [a, the] principle of motion and of stationariness. In 2.7 he tells us that the two principles of motion are matter and form, the latter being the essence of the thing, and having a principle of motion in itself. In On the Soul 2.1, he tells us that the soul is the form of the ensouled being. “It is the source of movement, it is the end, it is the essence of the whole living body.” In Physics 8.4, he delineates ensouled beings as natural and as causing their own motion, but distinguishes there the unsouled beings as things “that are not moved by itself, but it contains within the source of motion as not of moving something or of causing motion, but of suffering it. So, only ensouled beings are here conceived as self-movers.

In his accounts of the psychological movements of the faculties of the soul, he seems led into the same mover/undergoer distinction that he had concluded for unsouled beings. In perception, the organism is the aesthetikon that undergoes motion relative to the aestheton as the unmoved mover. In imagination much the same account takes place. The object of phantasia is the activator of the phantasy; the organism, the undergoer. Even in locomotion, this same pattern holds for the organism as undergoing the motive of the object of appetite to produce the actualized appetite that leads immediately to motion. So, it appears in the end that the ensouled being can no longer by regarded as a self-mover any more than the unsouled being can.

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**Christopher C. Paone. Sacred Heart University / Western Connecticut State University.** cpaone@gmail.com, “Political Life without Politics? The Epicureans on Law and the Common Good.” 4-4

Along with Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates in Republic 2, Epicurus’ theory of justice is among the first contract theories in Western philosophy (359a; KD 32–33). Whereas Glaucon presented the practice of justice as second best, only desirable because the consequences of suffering injustice are too severe, Epicurus portrayed justice as a positive personal and political virtue. Living pleasantly—that is, successfully and happily in Epicurus’ evaluation—is the same as living prudently, well, and justly (Ep. Men. 132, KD 5). Accordingly, justice is a necessary condition for living a pleasant and successful life. Unlike the sophists several generations before him, Epicurus denied that one would practice injustice if one had the power necessary to act with impunity. The knowledge of having gotten away with practicing injustice, he argued, would be a heavy burden, and the fear of being found out and subsequently punished would deeply disturb whatever pleasure one had attempted to gain by practicing injustice (KD 34–35; cf. SV 70). Consequently, Epicurus argued that a prudent person would live justly because in practicing justice the prudent person would avoid the mental disturbances that he considered the worst impediments to living a pleasant and successful life (KD 14; cf. KD 6–7). Living justly for
Epicurus, however, did not entail participating in the political life of the city. Instead, he recommended withdrawal into the security of a close circle of friends and abandoning ambitions for political power (D.L. 10.119; Plu. An recte 1129b–d; Lucr. DRN 5.1120–1134).

This recommendation may pose a problem. On the one hand, Epicurus acknowledged that one might reasonably fear punishments for breaking the contract of mutual advantage that is the nature of justice. Suffering such fears would outweigh any individual profit from committing injustice. On the other hand, he also acknowledged the prudent person benefits from legal protections from suffering injustice (fr. 530 Us.). This raises a question: If the Epicurean would be subject to the mental disturbances of breaking laws, would she/he also be subject to the mental disturbances of living under unjust laws? In other words, would the Epicurean reasonably fear that poorly crafted laws would eventually impinge upon the life of withdrawal and would suffering such fears motivate the Epicurean to participate in political life? The thesis of this paper offers a possible Epicurean reply to this question, drawn from the resources of Epicurus’ students and later Epicureans, including Hermarchus, Philodemus, and Diogenes of Oenoanda. Briefly, a prudent Epicurean may be required to reform the laws of the city, but such reforms may be accomplished by several means, including practicing politics. Hermarchus’ view stems from the Epicurean theory of social progress: Legislation crafted with general utility as its aim shapes the character of those unamenable to rational persuasion. Philodemus suggests that practicing politics is not incompatible with the Epicurean good life provided that peace and conciliation are part of its aims. Diogenes of Oenoanda’s inscription offers a politics by way of exemplum through a portrait of an Epicurean millennium.

Caterina Pellò. University of Cambridge. cp542@cam.ac.uk. “Plato’s Republic and Pythagoreanism.” 5-5, Chair 2-7

This paper focuses on the relation between Plato’s treatment of women, their social role and education in the fifth book of the Republic and the prominence of women in Pythagoreanism.

The Pythagoreans are traditionally identified as one of Plato’s sources for the Republic. Jowett lists the Spartan city-state and the Pythagorean league among Plato’s socio-political ancestors. According to Barker, Plato’s political philosophy is influenced by the practical bent of the Socratic and the Pythagorean thought. Finally, according to Hare, what Plato inherits from the Pythagoreans is the goal of establishing a communal way of living for all members of the society. However, as Burkert and Zhmud both notice, in the Republic Plato never admits his debt to Pythagoreanism. The issue at stake, therefore, is the following: although the communistic society Plato establishes may remind us of Pythagoreanism, the resulting Platonic and Pythagorean communities do not fully overlap. Interestingly, one of the primary differences between these two styles of society lies in the very role held by women, for Plato famously allows women to be guardians and eliminates private families, whereas Pythagoras’ female disciples did not hold public offices nor were family relations ever abolished.

In this paper, I shall investigate how much of Plato’s social, political and philosophical agenda from the Republic, particularly relating to the role of women in the community, is to be traced back to a Pythagorean influence. I will first reconstruct Plato’s arguments about the role of the female gender in his ideal city (Rep. 450c-471c). Second, I will compare and contrast this project with the status of women in Pythagoreanism. Finally, I will suggest a reason why both the Pythagoreans and Plato felt the need to open the doors of their communities to the female gender and include women in their social and intellectual programmes, as well as why the women in the Pythagorean communities and those from Plato’s Kallipolis are ultimately treated
differently. I shall argue that what Plato envisions is a state in which all citizens, male as well as female, do the job for which they are suited, are educated accordingly and live in concord. Conversely, the Pythagoreans did not found cities, but rather communities within the pre-existing cities. The Pythagoreans, therefore, were neither eager nor possibly able to overthrow the status quo as Plato did by introducing female guardians or the communism of wives and children. Rather, instead of abolishing them, they relied on marriage and family life to promote the Pythagorean customs, values and beliefs. The overall purpose of this paper is thus to broaden our understanding of Plato’s community by studying its Pythagorean roots and shed light on what kind of philosophical society they founded – whether in practice, as the 5th century BCE Pythagoreans from Southern Italy did, or in words as Plato does.


**Eric D. Perl. Loyola Marymount University. [Eric.Perl@lmu.edu]**. “‘All men by nature desire to know’: The Classical Background of Aquinas on Beauty and Truth.” 1-2

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes the meaning of ‘beautiful’ from ‘good’ by observing that while ‘good’ signifies simply ‘desirable’ or ‘satisfying the appetite,’ ‘beautiful’ “adds…some order to a cognitive power,” so that the beautiful is that which satisfies by being apprehended (*Summa theologiae* I-II, 27, 1, ad 3; cf. I, 5, 4, ad 1). Jan Aertsen remarks, “What is new in medieval thought on beauty, compared with Greek thought, is this emphasis on the relation of the beautiful to knowledge (*cognitio, apprehensio*).” But in fact this is nothing new. Plato closely associates beauty with truth in the sense of intelligibility, and describes beauty as the “most manifest” of the forms (*Phaedrus* 250d7). In the *Philebus*, he articulates the good in a compound as “beauty and proportion and truth,” taken as one, indicating that what makes the compound good is the unification of its elements into a whole by proportion, rendering it at once beautiful and true, that is, intelligible (65a1-5). Aristotle characterizes form in general as “divine and good and desirable” (*Physica* I 9, 192a17), identifying the “primary intelligible” and the “primary desirable” and referring to this as the beautiful, which “moves as loved” (*Metaphysics* XII 7, 1072a26-b4). The opening words of his *Metaphysics*, “All men by nature desire to know” (1 1, 980a22) indicate that being, precisely as knowable, is desirable and satisfying to the cognitive soul. In this line we may see, proleptically, the scholastic intertwining of will and intellect, love and knowledge, the good and the true, which is implied in Aquinas’ treatment of the beautiful. The association of beauty with knowledge and truth becomes fully explicit in Plotinus’ identification of beauty as form and hence as being *qua* intelligible. Thus, *contra* Aertsen, the medieval understanding of beauty, as expressed by Aquinas, is in continuity with a long and well-established tradition of Greek philosophy.

**Carissa Phillips-Garrett. Rice University. [cp17@rice.edu]**. “Judgment and Sanction in Aristotle’s Account of Blame.” 1-6

Aristotle famously begins *Nicomachean Ethics* Book III by claiming that praise and blame are connected to the voluntary, to excuse, and to pity, but despite the importance blame plays throughout his account of action, he does not define what blame is or what practices

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constitute blame. This has often been overlooked in the copious discussions about moral responsibility, but recently, Javier Echeñique has argued that passages in *Rhetoric* I.9 (1367b27-28, 1367b36-1368a9) and *Eudemian Ethics* II.1 (1219b16) show that blame and praise are types of speech acts that describe an individual as virtuous or vicious, with no accompanying feelings or reactive attitudes. On Echeñique’s interpretation, giving praise or blame is limited to a speech act that contains laudatory or pejorative meanings in response to an agent’s virtuous or vicious action since there is no connection between blame and morally reactive attitudes such as resentment or indignation. Additionally, since some of the virtues that are praiseworthy for Aristotle (specifically, magnanimity and magnificence) are self-regarding, not other-regarding, virtues, holding responsible cannot be a function of blame for Aristotle.

I will argue, however, that blame consists in some form of sanction, coupled with a judgment of blameworthiness. To see why blame must be more than just a speech act that has a pejorative meaning, I examine the relationship between anger and blame as developed in *Rhetoric* II.2-3 (1378a30-1380b18; cf. *NE* 1126a4-8 and *Rhet*. 1367a24-25). I argue that Aristotle’s account of anger is a type of negative reaction attitude that necessarily ought to accompany a judgment of blameworthiness, and thus is itself part of what constitutes blame. Additionally, I argue that holding responsible is precisely a function of blame for Aristotle and respond to Echeñique’s self-regarding virtue argument. This shows that Aristotelian blame is not merely a conative theory of blame but does involve sanction and holding responsible.

**Tiberiu Popa. Butler University. tpopa@butler.edu.** “Time and the Timeless (*Theaetetus*).” 4-3

This paper explores the functions of temporal categories in the *Theaetetus*, especially in a somewhat ‘eccentric’ passage, though paradoxically placed in the center of the dialogue: the Digression. Much has been made of the Protagorean relativism looming in the background of this section of the *Theaetetus*. On the other hand, relatively little attention has been given (e.g. in Burnyeat’s otherwise excellent 1990 study) to time as a recurrent motif there and as a way of connecting the earlier and the subsequent critiques of the Heracliteans and of their rejection of duration.

The emphasis on the empirical world in the *Theaetetus* squares with Plato’s attempt, in other relatively late dialogues, to reconcile the intelligible with the perceptible. Except for 171d-177c, in the *Theaetetus* the physical world is not contrasted with an otherworldly conception of being and is not spoken of as a sort of second-degree reality.

If so, how should we interpret the fact that the Digression, apparently quite contemptuous of temporal existence, occurs in the middle of a text in which Plato tries to demonstrate the reality and necessity of duration, and to attenuate the tension between being and becoming? The temporal concepts mobilized in the Digression constitute in part a metaphor for our human nature *sub specie aeternitatis atque temporis*. We are in time of necessity, but we can use it in many ways, just as we can dispose of our capacity of reasoning variously: it can lead us to a god-like condition – or quite on the contrary. The Digression suggests a way to escape the tyranny of the immediate present and to acquire freedom by grasping what is permanent and accessible to mind alone (with all the actual or apparent contradictions which are entailed by that). The overall sense of the Digression, then, in the context of the refuted Heraclitean-Protagorean theory, is likely that duration is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for knowledge. Duration makes judgements possible, and that in itself is an important claim. But our intellect should avail of this precisely to go further and escape the constraints of the ‘water clock’.
Anthony Preus. Binghamton University. apreus@binghamton.edu: “The Rivals: Diogenes Laertius 2.46” 4-1

I am working on a project of trying to identify all the people mentioned by Aristotle, including in the “fragments.” Diogenes Laertius 2.46 (f74R3) presents significant problems.

Τούτῳ τις, καθά φησιν Αριστοτέλης εν τρίτῳ Περὶ ποιητικῆς, ἐφιλονείκει Αντίλοχος Λήμνιος καὶ Αντιφῶν ὁ τερατοσκόπος, ὡς Πυθαγόρα Κύλων Κροτωνιάτης: καὶ Σύαγρος Ὀμήρῳ θόντι, ἀποθανόντι δὲ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος: καὶ Κέρκωψ Ἡσιόδῳ θόντι, τελευτάσαντι δὲ ὁ προειρημένος Ξενοφάνης: καὶ Πινδάρῳ Ἀμφιμένης ὁ Κώς; Θάλητι δὲ Φερεκύδης καὶ Βίαντι Σάλαρος Πριηνεύς: Πιττακῷ Αντιμενίδας καὶ Αλκαῖος, Ἀναξαγόρᾳ Σωσίβιος, καὶ Σιμωνίδῃ Τιμοκρέων.

“He (Socrates) was sharply criticized, according to Aristotle in his third book of On Poetry, by a certain Antilochus of Lemnos, and by Antiphon the soothsayer, just as Pythagoras was by Cylon of Croton, or as Homer was assailed in his lifetime by Syagus, and after his death by Xenophanes of Colophon. So too Hesiod was criticized in his lifetime by Cercops, and after his death by the aforesaid Xenophanes; Pindar by Amphimenes of Cos; Thales by Pherecydes; Bias by Salarus of Priene; Pittacus by Antimenidas and Alcaeus; Anaxagoras by Sosibius; and Simonides by Timocreon.”

I walk through this passage step by step, commenting on these bits:

1. “In the third book of ‘Peri Poietikes’.”
2. ἐφιλονείκει.
3. Antilochus of Lemnos critic of Socrates.
4. Antiphon the Soothsayer critic of Socrates.
5. Cylon of Croton critic of Pythagoras.
7. Syagus critic of Homer.
8. Xenophanes of Colophon critic of Homer and Hesiod.
10. Amphimenes of Cos critic of Pindar.
12. Salarus of Priene critic of Bias.
15. Sosibius critic of Anaxagoras.
16. Timocreon critic of Simonides.
17. Concluding remarks.

Douglass Reed. University of Rhode Island. douglassreed@uri.edu. “Overstraining Human Nature in the Nicomachean Ethics.” 6-7

In book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics, as part of his discussion of voluntary actions, Aristotle claims that some situations stretch or overstrain human nature (ἂ τὴν ἄνθρωπινήν φύσιν ὑπερτείνει, 1110a25). Although he returns to this notion of overstraining later in the NE (e.g., 1116a16), he never elaborates on what it is for our human nature to be so stretched. In this paper I investigate this interpretive issue. I argue that in these passages Aristotle is operating with an
implicit contrast between human nature, or the human/mortal part of our soul, and our divine
nature, or the divine part of our soul (book 10, ch. 7). Recognizing this contrast opens up the
possibility that Aristotle thinks that some people can overcome their human nature by acting in
accord with the divine part of their soul. Indeed, at the end of book 9 Aristotle indicates that
people who identify with their most controlling part, that is, their divine part (cf. 1178a3), are
most eager to perform just and temperate actions (1168b24-33). If this is correct, then while it
sheds light on Aristotle’s ethics, it also presents us with a puzzle. According to the discussion in
book 10, the divine part of us relates to the theoretical life, not the practical life. Yet, it seems
that the more we live in accordance with this divine element, the better we will be as practical
agents. I resolve this puzzle by arguing that we must draw nearer Aristotle’s conceptions of
practical and the theoretical activity.

Brian Reese. University of Pennsylvania. bree@upenn.edu. “The Principle of Non-
Contradiction: What Aristotle Saw and Sextus Missed.” 5-1

Sextus Empiricus famously defined skepticism as the ability to “set out oppositions
among things that appear and are thought of in any way at all.”13 This ability is utilized by the
skeptic in order to induce equipollence: when one is faced with opposing, but equally forceful
arguments or appearances, the recognition of their equal strength will naturally lead to the
suspension of judgment. The suspension of judgment is what ultimately effects tranquility—the
stated goal of the skeptic.14 Yet, as I will argue, the Pyrrhonist’s ability to set out oppositions
requires that they make use of the Principle of Non-Contradiction. I proceed as follows: after
outlining the skeptical ability as treated by Sextus in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I will turn to a
discussion of Aristotle’s treatment of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in Metaphysics IV. I
will then relate Aristotle’s treatment of the Principle of Non-Contradiction to the Pyrrhonian
skeptical ability. In doing so, I will show that the skeptic cannot remain skeptical about the
Principle of Non-Contradiction. Finally, I will raise and respond to some possible worries
regarding my application of the Principle of Non-Contradiction to the skeptical ability, making
particular use of the Five Modes of Agrippa. Since the skeptical ability necessitates the use of the
Principle of Non-Contradiction, and the Pyrrhonian skeptic is discovered to be incapable of
(coherently) setting out any sort of opposition to this principle, Pyrrhonian skepticism fails.

Chiara Ricciardone. UC Berkeley, thyme@berkeley.edu. “Disease as the Expression of
Difference in Plato’s Timaeus.” 4-3

Plato’s Timaeus is one of his most influential dialogues, but its closing catalogue of
diseases is poorly understood. Typically, this section is dismissed as derivative of some other
medical writer, as extraneous or philosophically unimportant. In this paper, I seek to establish the
metaphysical significance of Timaeus’ theory of disease—which in turn reveals its ethical
import. The primary argument is that Difference is the unseen principle underlying Timaeus’
aetiology and classification of diseases; in tandem, Sameness is the principle of health. As two of
the primary components from which the Demiurge constructs the universe (the third is Being),
Timaeus’ theory of disease and health is essential to understanding the way in which these
abstractions compose and act in the universe. This account improves on older physicalist
interpretations and metaphysical interpretations that import anachronistic, extrinsic categories.
The consequences of recognizing the link between difference and disease is a new understanding

13 Sextus, PH I.8
14 Cf. Sextus, PH I.12, I.18, I.25, I.30
of how ethical life is designed to bring us into harmony with the macrocosm: by establishing the proportionality of sameness and difference in lived experience.

**Jan Maximilian Robitzsch.** Sungkyunkwan University, maximilian@robitzsch.eu: “The Epicurean Cradle Argument.” Arenson Panel. 1-4

In the *Letter to Menoeceus*, a concise summary of the ethical teachings of Epicurus, the importance of pleasure is said to be two-fold. First, Epicurus maintains that ethics is teleological in being directed towards pleasure as the goal (*telos*) or good (*agathon*). On this view, pleasure becomes the standard in regard to which all choices and avoidances should be referred. Second, Epicurus also claims that pleasure is the source or origin (*archē*), the first and connatural good, the first and natural good, as well as congenial to nature. This claim is not necessarily normative like the previous one, but can also be understood as descriptive: It attempts to ground Epicurean pleasure in certain observations about what is natural, that is, it stresses that human beings have a natural tendency to experience pleasure.

Given these different aspects of Epicurean pleasure, it is surprising that the key passage that draws out a connection between the two ideas just mentioned has been relatively neglected by scholars: the so-called “cradle argument”. It constitutes an Epicurean “proof that pleasure is the goal [ἀποδείξει [...] τοῦ τέλος ἐίναι τὴν ἱδονήν]” (DL X.137) by appealing to the original dispositions of living beings. In other words, the cradle argument seems to bridge the gap between descriptive and normative elements in Epicurus’ hedonism. What this ‘argument’ is, however, is far from clear, given that the Epicureans themselves do not even mention it in full in any extant texts. Instead, the name derives from a single source, Cicero, whose Antiochean spokesperson Piso observes at *On Ends* V.55 that all ancient schools in the Hellenistic period appealed to young children in the cradle in order to gage which behavior is natural for human beings.

In this paper, I will discuss the Epicurean cradle argument. I will begin by presenting the argument in the way that it is presented in *On Ends*, focusing on the charge of inconsistency that Cicero raises against it. I will then present a solution to address the inconsistency charge, which will then lead me to comment on the distinction between the so-called kinetic and katastematic pleasures. Finally, I will end with a short discussion of the kind of naturalism that the Epicureans can be said to defend in advancing the cradle argument.

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**Christopher Sauder.** Dominican University, Canada, Christopher.sauder@dominicanu.ca, “The Dilemma of Evil: Proclus’ Critique of Plotinus.” Narbonne panel 2-3

In *De Malorum Subsistentia* chapter 31, Proclus attempts to fork Plotinus on the following dilemma: either 1) Plotinus must admit two first principals, one of good and one of evil, and hence fall into dualism or 2) Evil must have been generated by the first principle and thus evil will be found among the higher realities. Opsomer, Steel and Phillips have argued strongly that Proclus’ dilemma constitutes a definitive refutation of Plotinus’ theory of evil in *Ennead* I.8 and even those such as O’Meara and Schäfer who seek to defend Plotinus admit the legitimacy of this dilemma. In opposition to these approaches, this presentation will develop a suggestion made by Jean-Marc Narbonne, to the effect that Proclus himself, with his notion of two opposing types of privation, encounters the same difficulties he diagnosed in Plotinus’ theory.
Mark Sentesy. *Penn State, sentesy@psu.edu,* “Aristotle’s *Physis* in the World of Empedocles.” 5-4

Is everything that the universe could be already implied in what it is, or do new capacities come to be? When scholars talk of nature in Aristotle, they often assume that causes pre-exist events, and more broadly, that explanation involves tracing back events to pre-existing inherent properties, on the assumption that such properties are natures. This reflects our modern sense that the cause and its context determines changes in advance. I shall argue that this view of nature and causality is a misguided interpretation of Aristotle, by analyzing two of his claims in *Met.* V.4: 1) that Empedocles was right that natures do not pre-exist changes, but are preceded by mixture and remixture, and 2) that despite this, as outcomes of changes they are ontologically and causally robust. Nature, according to Aristotle, is a coalescence of a certain kind, namely one that is metabolizing, a dynamic, self-stabilizing form or structure. This is remarkably close to contemporary theoretical descriptions of change. Aristotle’s acceptance of spontaneous generation provides a practical motivation for such an unusual view, but the flexibility of the theory is attractive for a theory of change in contemporary philosophy of science.

Clerk Shaw. *University of Tennessee, jshaw15@utk.edu:* “Epicurean Philosophy and Its Parts.” Panel organizer and Chair 2-4

The standard Stoic division of philosophy (or: philosophical discourse) has attracted significant scholarly attention. Less well-studied is the Epicurean division of philosophy. One ancient puzzle about their view concerns the relationship between “canonic” and physics: Epicurean presentations of canonic were sometimes folded into physical treatises, leading some to suppose that Epicureans actually made canonic part of physics. I focus on another aspect of the Epicurean conception of philosophy: the relationship between ethics and physics. Three different texts (*KD* 11; *Lucr. DRN* I.62-135; *Cic. De Fin.* I.63-64) seem to offer quite different views of this relationship. I study these texts (alongside others) and conclude that orthodox Epicureanism actually treats ethics as part of physics.

David Squires. *Notre Dame, dsquires@nd.edu.* “Aristotle’s Doctrine of Nature in Light of the Meaning of ‘Archē’.” 2-5

To state Aristotle’s doctrine of nature—viz. that natural things have an internal source of motion—is easy enough, but contemporary scholars of Aristotle are sometimes puzzled as to the exact meaning of this assertion. In “Aristotle’s Definition of Nature,” for instance, Sean Kelsey seeks “what this doctrine really amounts to.”15 His answer is that it amounts to the claim that natural things, though not artifacts, are the subjects of their own motions—viz. they are that in which and for which certain motions occur. The thesis that natural things, but not artifacts, are the subjects of their own motions is an interesting and quite possibly true thesis, but it seems to me that it is quite impossible that this be the meaning of Aristotle’s doctrine of nature. This paper investigates and criticizes Kelsey’s claim by interrogating the definition of source (archē) in the philosophy of Aristotle, and then offers an alternative understanding of the doctrine of nature.

The paper has two parts. In the first part, I lay out Kelsey’s claim about the meaning of Aristotle’s doctrine of nature and show that his interpretation transpose the idea of an internal

principle of motion into terms which suggest nothing about *internality* or *source*—concepts linked closely to two important Aristotelian technical terms, “in” (en) and “source” (archē).

In the second part, I criticize Kelsey’s claim about the meaning of the doctrine of nature by investigating the meaning of the term “source” in the philosophy of Aristotle. This investigation focuses primarily on Aristotle’s engagement with Parmenides, who he says denies the principles (archai) of the science of nature, and on the definitions of “source” given in the Delta V dictionary. I conclude that Aristotle’s notion of source always implies *multiplicity* and *dependence*. Multiplicity is implied on account of the *difference* between a sourced thing and its source; dependence is implied on account of some kind of existential need of a source by a sourced thing, though not always the same kind of need in every case. This multiplicity and dependence I call *Aristotle’s Source Doctrine*. I argue that Kelsey’s interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of nature ignores Aristotle’s Source Doctrine, and that while a certain kind of multiplicity and dependence might be implied in his interpretation, it is not the right kind of multiplicity and dependence required. I, then, present an interpretation of the doctrine of nature that abides by the Source Doctrine.

This project is both critical and constructive. It is critical of Kelsey’s interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of nature, but it constructive in that it seeks to discover a detailed and accurate notion of “source” in the philosophy of Aristotle, which can then be applied to the definition of nature as well as to many other aspects of Aristotelian philosophy.

**Hallvard M. Stette. Uppsala University, hallvard.stette@filosofi.uu.se.** “Myth and Play in Plato’s *Phaedrus*” Trivigno panel 2-1

After his second speech in the *Phaedrus*, containing a mythic depiction of the soul and its powers, Socrates says that apart from the fact that the features of dialectical method were expressed in the speech, “the rest really was playfully done, by way of amusement” (265c), implying that it is not to be taken too seriously. Later in the dialogue, Socrates comes back to the dichotomy between play and seriousness, this time in connection with a discussion of written words, which Socrates claims should be thought of as play in comparison with the seriousness of live philosophical conversation. (276a–278b) Although it might initially seem neat and clear cut, a strict dichotomy between the serious and valuable and the playful and dispensable cannot be upheld. Two observations will serve to make this clear: i) Socrates’ aforementioned speech is filled with substantial philosophy: about the soul, Forms, human cognition etc.; and ii) the fact that the conversation is Plato’s written creation constitutes a performative refutation of a too literal and coarse reading of Socrates’ claim. In my talk I will investigate the role that Plato assigns to play in philosophical activity by looking specifically at the use of myth in the *Phaedrus*. I will argue that Plato uses myth playfully in that it, firstly, serves as an engaging way to introduce new ideas, functioning as a bridge from the familiar and mundane to the unfamiliar and novel, and secondly, that it serves as a means for non-committal but truth-directed conceptual exploration. The outcome of this is that you can’t really be serious in philosophy without playing. But this play is not just for sports.

**Pavle Stojanovic. Miami University of Ohio. stojanp@miamioh.edu.** “The Problem of Epistemic Luck in Stoicism.” 4-4

Plato is widely credited as one of the first philosophers who recognized the problem of epistemic luck. He argued in *Theaetetus* (200d-201c) that knowledge cannot be equated with mere true belief (ἀλήθης δόξα) because one could acquire a true belief through a method which
does not lead to knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). For example, a juror in a trial could be persuaded by a skillful lawyer to adopt a belief about some fact of the case which can only be known by an eyewitness. Although Plato himself didn’t actually use the word, modern epistemologists would say that the truth of such belief is the result of luck or chance, and they mostly agree with Plato that it falls short of genuine knowledge.

The aim of this essay is to argue that the following passage in Sextus’ report of the Stoic classification of different kinds of impressions suggests that they were also aware of the problem of epistemic luck:

Among true [impressions] some are apprehensive and some are not; the not apprehensive ones are those that strike people in [a state of] affection. For many phrenitics and melancholics draw an impression that is true, yet not apprehensive but occurring in this way externally and by chance, hence they are often not confident about it and do not assent to it. (M 7.247)

The essay proceeds in three main steps. First, I argue that the true non-apprehensive impression entertained by the melancholics and phrenitics mentioned by Sextus is what the Stoics called an “empty impression” (διάκενος φαντασία) or “imagination” (φανταστικὸν) that is true externally and by chance (ἐξωθεν και ἐκ τύχης), and not an impression which happens to be caused by something external but which is not apprehensive due to being distorted (e.g. through being rendered faint, ἀμυδρὰ) by the subject’s state of mental derangement, as suggested by contemporary interpretations.

Second, I offer a reconstruction of the possible meaning of ἐξωθεν in SE M 7.247. Based on the use of this expression in combination with ἀπὸ τύχης in Aristotelian theory of chance and with ἐκ τύχης and κατὰ τύχην in a number of medical texts, I propose that ἐξωθεν in SE M 7.247 implies that the truth of the impression in question is the result of a cause external to the nature of imagination as a representational state whose cognitive role according to the Stoics is not the discovery of truth. Cicero’s discussion in On divination suggests that for the Stoics this external cause is the influence of gods and spirits on our soul which occurs in prophecies entertained in divinely inspired states of mental derangement.

Finally, I argue that the expression ἐκ τύχης in reference to the truth of imagination should be understood along the lines of the Stoic notion of chance defined as “the cause obscure (ἀδηλον) to human reasoning.” The Stoics thought that normally an impression acquires the property of being true through causal interaction between our soul and an external corporeal object. Furthermore, they thought that impression which is caused in this way reveals (ἐνδείκνυται) the object that caused it. On the other hand, since imagination is an “empty impression”—i.e. representational state which is not caused by an external object—it does not reveal its actual cause but leaves it obscure (ἀδηλον). Thus, when imaginations sometimes turn out true, they do so ἐκ τύχης because they do not reveal their causes.

Evan Strevell. Xavier University. strevelle@xavier.edu. “Aristotle’s Accounts of the Causal Processes on which Phantasia Depends.” 4-6

Aristotle supplies his most sustained thematic treatments of phantasia in De anima iii 3. Curiously, Aristotle says very little in DA iii 3 about the causal process in virtue of which phantasia arises or how it works. The emphasis in DA iii 3 is taxonomical and mostly focused on articulating what phantasia is, but not, however, on how phantasia works.

Aristotle’s fullest account of the causal processes that enter the generation and operation of phantasia appears in De insomniis (DI) ii-iii and, to a lesser extent, in De memoria (DM). Given the widespread recognition of the crucial role that phantasia plays in Aristotle’s cognitive
philosophy, too little attention has been paid to Aristotle’s account in *DI* of the causal processes that enter *phantasia*.

My paper is devoted to securing an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the causes in virtue of which *phantasia* arises and operates, taking my bearings primarily from *DI* and *DM*. I limit myself to three goals.

First, I present an account of how *phantasia* is set up by the activity of sense perception. Against Everson (1997) and Bolton (2005), I take *phantasia* to be a motion (*kinêsis*) produced by and distinct from the action of the sensible object on the sensory system (*aisthêma*) that persists dispositionally in the sense organs and blood of the soul-body composite. When these motions are actuated and act on the heart (the primary organ of sense), the animal becomes aware of a *phantasma* appearance. We are to see that *phantasmata* appearances supervene on *phantasiai* motions with which the central organ is moved. Any change in the motion results in a corresponding change in the *phantasma* appearance the animal experiences. Hence, *phantasia* is equivocal between (1) the class of motions that gives rise to the awareness of *phantasmata* appearances and (2) a cognitive activity of being aware of a *phantasma* appearance.

Second, I use evidence from *DM* to establish the features in virtue of which *phantasiai* motions can produce a *phantasma* appearance that resembles sense perception. Aristotle argues that *phantasiai* motions are proportionate (*analogon*, 452b12) to the sensory motions from which they are derived. The tracing of perceptual activity by *phantasia* is effected by perceptual activity setting up a motion in the perceptual system that retains in proportion the proper and common features of sensible objects perceived.

Third and finally, I present an account of the causes in virtue of which an animal becomes aware of *phantasmata* appearances. In *DA* ii 5, Aristotle remarks that what is unlike becomes like what acts on it (417a20; 418a5-6) and that the sense power is in potency what sort the perceptual object already is in actuality (418a3-5). When moved by a *phantasia* motion, the sense power takes on that activity and becomes what sort the *phantasia* motion is, thereby becoming aware of the sense-like features of which the *phantasia* motion is a trace.

**Philip Sutherland**, *Marquette University*, sutherland.philip@gmail.com. “The Many Senses of Justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics.*” 6-3, Chair 5-7

Early in Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle lays out a taxonomy in which he uses justice “in more than one sense,” though the precise relationships between the senses of justice remain ambiguous in the text. A close reading of the text reveals that the relationship between general and particular justice is an example of associated homonymy because both senses of justice share a common orientation of the just man toward the political community. The kinds of particular justice are synonymous concepts because they all seek the fair distribution of goods within the *polis*. This analysis provides a more unified reading of book V than has traditionally been acknowledged, including the concept of justice as a critical bridging concept between the individual virtuous life of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the politically-oriented life of the *Politics*.

**David Talcott**, *The Kings’s College*, dtalcott@tkc.edu. “Resolving the Puzzle of *Euthyphro* 10a-10c.” 1-1
*Euthyphro* 10a-10c presents interpretive difficulties. Socrates is clearly presenting what he takes to be an important distinction, one he relies upon to refute the idea that piety is “what is loved by all the gods.” But, what this distinction is, how it functions in the overall argument, and what broader significance it has for Socratic or Platonic thought remain puzzling. Peter Geach, in a memorable paper on the *Euthyphro*, thought all attempts to make sense of out the passage was mere “whistling in the dark.” A survey of recent analyses of this passage illuminate the interpretive difficulties. In this paper I clarify the meaning and significance of this passage.

To accomplish this I will make several arguments. First, to understand this passage we must explain the function of this section in the overall argument of 9a-11b. Through a careful analysis I will show that the immediate purpose of this argument is to establish at 10c that “if something is god-loved, it is god-loved because it is loved by the gods.” Second, the way Socrates reaches this conclusion is by establishing a general principle of causation, namely that if something has an accidental property, it has it because it has been acted on in some way. Third, I will argue that the view of causation implicit in this passage is not only Platonic, but thoroughly *Socratic*, and can be found in other early dialogues such as the *Gorgias* (476b) and *Lysis* (221c).

Franco V. Trivigno. *University of Oslo*. franco.trivigno@ifikk.uio.no. “Is the *Phaedo* a “True Tragedy”?” Panel Organizer and Chair. 2-1

Plato’s *Phaedo* has, one might say, some of the marks of a traditional tragedy: the drama’s hero, having suffered a great injustice, awaits his death; his friends and supporters weep and lament his fate; but he himself is steadfast and noble in the face of death. In rough outline, one might compare the plot to Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus*. Yet, there are many grounds in the dialogue for resisting this way of reading the dialogue, not least of which is the fact that Socrates repeatedly tells his interlocutors not to lament his death and gives a series of arguments showing death not to be an evil at all. If death is not an evil, it is hard to see how it could be the central dramatic action in a tragedy. Seen this way, the dialogue seems rather to be anti-tragic, in precisely offering up and then rejecting the tragic model. In this paper, I explore this question against the background of the claim in Plato’s *Laws* that the ‘true tragedy’ is an imitation of the best kind of life (817b). I argue that, insofar as the dialogue represents Socrates spending his last day in philosophical conversation, it is indeed a true tragedy and an intentional rejection of traditional tragedy, but that, insofar as the dialogue shows Socrates to have largely failed to convince his interlocutors to follow his lead, it retains some marks of traditional tragedy’s pessimism.

-V-

Michael Vazquez. *University of Pennsylvania*. vazm@sas.upenn.edu. “The Normative Hippocratic Doctor.” 5-3, Chair 4-4

In the Hippocratic text *Decorum*, the author declares, “a physician who is a lover of wisdom is equal to a god” (Ἰητρός γάρ φιλόσοφος ἰσόθεος). In this context ‘wisdom’ has a distinctly practical character, expressing a normative ideal of action, not theory. Such post-Aristotelian undertones have led scholars to conclude that many of the Hippocratic “deontological” works, such as *Decorum, Law, Precepts* and *Physician*, are beyond the ken of Classical Hippocratic medicine. Yet there is scholarly consensus that even ‘late’ texts in the Hippocratic corpus bear the mark of their Classical predecessors, and therefore provide insight into the intellectual milieu of the Classical period. I will take this approach in thinking about how
the Hippocratic authors conceived of the normative doctor, i.e. the doctor who does the right thing in the right way for the right reasons. My paper focuses on the ‘right reasons’ dimension of the normative doctor, and reconstructs the picture of the normative doctor provided in Decorum and Physician. I argue on the basis of this picture that there is a deep tension in the normative doctor’s motivational set. The tension is between the normative doctor’s motivation to secure good reputation (εὐδοξία) and his motivation to cultivate decorum (εὐσχημοσύνη). I argue that further reflection on this tension leads to a forceful dilemma for our understanding of Hippocratic medicine. I conclude the paper by proposing a novel way of avoiding the dilemma altogether.

Hilde Vinje. University of Oslo. hilde.vinje@ifikk.uio.no. “Hamartia in Aristotle's Poetics.” Trivigno panel 2-1

The best kind of tragedy concerns a person who is neither morally outstanding nor wicked, according to Aristotle in the Poetics. Tragedy should rather imitate a person who falls between these two extremes, and who comes to ruin through some kind of “failure” – in Greek: hamartia. It is clear that hamartia is the cause of the downfall of the tragic hero. However, Aristotle does not explain what he means by “hamartia”, and important questions about the tragic plot remain unanswered. What kind of “failure” is Aristotle referring to? Can the tragic hero be held morally responsible for his downfall? Or is it only a mishap that he cannot affect? In short: how are we to understand hamartia? Most contemporary philologists and philosophers hold that hamartia is brought about by a lack of important information, so that the failure is better explained as an “error of judgment”. By contrast, several earlier commentators understand hamartia as a “flaw of character”, and consider hamartia a moral shortcoming. In this talk, I both defend the latter interpretation and reform it by emphasizing the intellectual aspects of hamartia. I argue (1) that the tragic hero comes to ruin due to a weakness of character (akrasia) connected to one’s temper (thumos), and (2) that this weakness is connected with the protagonist’s rationality by revealing that he lacks practical wisdom (phronēsis).

-W-

George Walter. The Catholic University of America. 82walter@cua.edu. “Psychology of Tripartition: Plato's Explanatory Goal in Dividing the Soul in Republic IV.” 5-5

In book four of the Republic, Plato divides the soul into three parts. The tripartition of the soul has many non-psychological applications within the overall argumentative structure of the Republic in coming to understand justice. The theory also has its own psychological merit. Plato, however, is not talking about psychology with the same aims and methods as we do now. Therefore, I will present what Plato understands as the aim of his psychological theory: what about human personality and motivation does tripartition seek to explain?

Akrasia is often raised, notably by Christopher Bobonich, as the answer to this question. A Socratic understanding of the soul denies akrasia—all weakness is just ignorance. Tripartition, then, is intended as a step past this understanding. One does what one does not think best when the lower parts of the soul are stronger than the higher part, leading them to act out from their own particular activity and. thereby. gaining an inappropriate rule in the soul. Akrasia, thus, is imbalance, not ignorance. Nevertheless, although a possible explanation of akrasia might come out of tripartition, I do not see explaining akrasia as Plato’s goal in tripartition.
I take Plato’s psychological goal to be to explain the diversity of human desires in light of educability: how certain sets of desires are generally related and reinforce each other, while other sets of desires are generally irreducible and discourage each other. Plato has been criticized for not being clear in defining the parts of the soul by a single feature, for example, the Spirited Part deals with a wide array of activities and emotions, e.g. anger, honor, fear, and physical training, but it is unclear which should be taken as primary. Scholars such as Angela Hobbs and Rachel Singpurwalla have advanced theories to give a unified reading of the Spirited Part as found in a single activity. However, I take this to be overstepping Plato’s goal. He is not trying to describe how a specific love, activity, or faculty leads to other particular psychological states; that is, raising a single psychological activity as the primary cause over others of generally the same type. Instead, each part is a collection of activities, desires, and loves, which are not singular as to what they are, but are unified insofar as they are prone to existing together, reinforcing each other, and as being educable as one. Plato is describing a general landscape of which desires are necessarily near each other and which desires can be separated from others for the sake of education. I take the psychological explanatory goal of tripartition to be like this:

- It is possible, though perhaps difficult, to educate a human to love honor and hate bodily pleasure and money. However, it is not possible to educate a human to love bodily pleasure and hate money, or love honor and hate physical training. Educating a person to love learning, love honor, or love bodily pleasures implies loving in each a whole network of things, but loving one of the three need not imply much at all about the desires found in the networks of the other two.

This understanding situates tripartition within the context of education and the virtues discussed in book four, while backing away from a strong faculty understanding of each of the parts. The virtues, especially justice understood in book four as “doing one’s own work and not meddling with what isn’t one’s own,” (433a) are general dispositions over and above a range of different particular desires and activities. Similarly, I will argue that the parts of the soul are intended at this level of generality—not as a faculty with a definite activity that governs subordinate actions that flow out of it, but as a general proclivity or disposition for sets of particular actions. Thus, a just soul keeps a balance of the parts to maintain the energy a person needs for all the different particular activities of a virtuous life.

**Julie Ward.** Loyola University Chicago, jward@luc.edu. “For Aristotle, What is Theoria theoria of?” Levin panel. 2-2

While theoria clearly signifies the activity of a highly abstract, intellectual faculty for Aristotle, its nature, and more specifically, its objects, remain debated in secondary literature. This paper will focus on the question whether theoria as such has a single kind of object or multiple kinds that the faculty apprehends in the same way. In so doing, it considers the extent to which theoria involves phantasia, or its products, phantasmata, in its operation.

**William Wians.** Merrimack College. wiansw@merrimack.edu. “Xenophanes the Sophist?” 5-4

Xenophanes of Colophon is probably the earliest of those thinkers born in Ionia who set themselves up explicitly as critics and rivals of Homer and Hesiod. Yet going back at least as far as Aristotle, Xenophanes has been subject to neglect or outright dismissal as a significant thinker. So, for instance, in his little book on the pre-Socratics, Friedrich Nietzsche dismisses Xenophanes as a philosopher, calling him a religious mystic, a rhapsodic “teacher of ethics,” and a forerunner of the Sophists.
In this paper, I want to offer a fresh look at the thought and activities of Xenophanes, taking very seriously the variety of topics and forms apparent in his activities as a poet. Xenophanes wrote on a far wider range of topics than any other Ionian thinker, addressing many non-philosophical topics—symposia, conventional moral exhortations, and so on—and did so using epic but also non-epic meters rather than the Ionian innovation of prose writing. I begin by asking the crucial but neglected question, for whom did Xenophanes write his poetry? Answering this question will bring us back to Nietzsche’s cryptic remark that Xenophanes was a forerunner of the Sophists. To choose to write poetry was to place oneself in a tradition of performance, traveling from city to city in search of aristocratic patrons and an educated elite. My paper will argue that Xenophanes is best understood not as the one poetically inclined member among Ionian natural philosophers, but as a forerunner of a quite different but equally important intellectual tradition, that of the traveling polymath Greek Sophists. Xenophanes might be better viewed as the forerunner not of Parmenides but of Protagoras.

Chad Wiener. Old Dominion University. cwiener@odu.edu. “Socratic Ignorance as Wisdom and Virtue: An Interpretative Argument for Separate Forms in the Apology.” 1-1

Socrates argues that he is virtuous in the Apology yet claims that he lacks knowledge of human virtue and implies that virtue is knowledge. I argue that no paradox is generated here if we accept that Socrates’ ignorance is a kind of wisdom, as he states, and knowledge of virtue would be of a separate Form. I begin from Socrates’ own statements that his ignorance is a certain sort of wisdom (20d). Wisdom for Socrates has at least three conditions: it is knowledge of an object, normally of the what-is, it is a capacity (dunamis) to produce something, here, human virtue, and it aims at what is best for the thing. The last two conditions are met by Socrates’ arguments in the Apology that he has each of the traditional virtues, albeit, second-best: courage (29a-b), moderation (29d-30b), wisdom (23a-b), piety (22a-23b, cf. 30d-e), and justice (32a-e). But the arguments in the Apology only show that Socrates is virtuous. How is his virtue possible? How is Socrates’ knowledge of his own ignorance of virtue possible? The best interpretation is that Socrates holds that virtue is a separate rather than immanent Form. My interpretation handles how Socrates’ ignorance can be a certain sort of wisdom despite not knowing the what-is of virtue, thus, meeting the first condition. What he does know is something pertaining to the what-is, a kind of formal constraint, that it must be one. So, what Socrates knows is that he cannot formulate the what-is of virtue as one thing, which also serves as a regulative principle governing his elenchus. I end by addressing some objections to this view.

Sr. Anna Wray. The Catholic University of America. 07wray@cua.edu. “Aristotle on Knowing as Touching.” 4-6

In Metaphysics Θ.10, Aristotle distinguishes between the thinking of what is combined and separated in being (τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκείσθαι ἢ διίππησθαι) with the thinking of what is incomposite (ἀσύνθετα): while what is combined can exist in the intellect either truly, as combined, or falsely, as separated, incompesites exist in the intellect only truly or not at all. Aristotle expresses the infallibility of this latter kind of thinking in the language of touch: concerning the incompesites, it is possible only to touch them (θίγειν) or not (μὴ imiterάνειν) (1051b24-25).

This paper draws upon Aristotle’s remarks on touch (θίγειν, ἀπτεῖσθαι) in the Physics and the De Anima in order to address two questions regarding Metaphysics Θ.10’s characterization of
knowing as touching. The first question concerns the extent to which the analogy with touch may be applied to the activity of thinking: is the analogy exhausted by the function it serves in the *Metaphysics* passage, namely, to illustrate the fact that the thinking of incomposites is infallible? or does it, rather, reveal something of the nature of this kind of thinking, as over against the thinking of what is combined and separated? and does it further reveal something of the nature of thinking in general? I argue that the analogy with touch has both a narrow application to the thinking of incomposites, as evidenced by Aristotle’s frequent association between touch (ἁπτεσθαι) and indivisibles (ἀδιαίρετα), as well as a broad application to thinking in general: like sensation, all intellection is a way of being affected by objects.

The second question raised in the paper concerns the contribution that the specific nature of touch lends to the analogy: what is gained by likening knowing to touch, rather than to sight (*De Anima* I II.6 430b29, *Metaphysics* A.1 980a24-27) or to sensation in general (*De Anima* III.4 429a12-17)? I argue that the distinctive nature of touch, in which the medium itself is perceived, is crucial to the analogy’s fruitful application on any level.

-Y-

Roger Young. *Cleveland State University*. rogeryoung2015@gmail.com. “Unknowing and Unnerved: An Interpretation of Plato’s Philosophy from a Perspective of Existential Psychology.” 4-8

In the 1970’s, Harvard Professor of Psychology Irvin Yalom developed and put forth a theory of existential psychology, which states that certain philosophic concerns are necessary and foundational to the human condition, such that the development of an individual’s personality is at least in part contingent upon his or her navigation of these concerns. Akin to Sartre’s ‘nausea’, Yalom argues that confronting philosophic concerns such as death, meaninglessness, isolation, and freedom engender a degree of what he calls ‘existential anxiety’. To ameliorate this anxiety, Yalom believes individuals engage in patterns of healthy and unhealthy defense mechanisms. Interestingly, a reading through Plato’s republic reveals especially overt examples of the kinds of defense mechanisms Yalom predicted. As Plato wrestles with philosophic concerns of death, meaninglessness, isolation, and freedom, he touches on many of the points which are central to Yalom’s theory. The arguments Plato puts forth on these fronts neatly coincide with many of the ‘healthy’ defense mechanisms outlined by Yalom. After substantiating Yalom’s theory via a review of recent empirical studies, this paper walks Yalom and Plato hand-in-hand through a demonstration of how philosophic dialogue can indeed provide a viable inoculator for existential anxiety.

-Z-

Claudia Zatta. *University of Siena*. czatta1@gmail.com. “Between Blood and Brain: Thought, Sensation, and the Body in Early Greek Philosophy.” 5-2, Chair 4-5

When in *Phaedo* Socrates asks the question of what is the instrument of thinking, whether it is blood, air, fire or the brain, he has the Presocratics in mind (96a-b). As Lesher clarifies, Socrates is referring specifically to Empedocles, Anaximenes and Diogenes, to Heraclitus, and Alcmaeon (and perhaps also to Anaxagoras) (1994, 1). On the other hand, in *On the Soul* Aristotle claims that his predecessors attributed to the soul two main functions, movement and sensation (1 403b25). Elsewhere in the same treatise he also reveals that
sensation and thought were for his predecessors identical (3 427a21-22). How do we reconcile this doxographical information? For while it testifies to the different angles of inquiry adopted by Socrates and Aristotle (the first looking for the instrument of thought, the second for the functions of the soul), it reveals that the early Greek philosophers understood the process of thought in materialistic/bodily terms and in close association with sensation. Further, it also suggests that the switch between the blood or the elements, on the one hand, and the brain, on the other, constituted an attempt to articulate the relationship between thought and sensation in a way that kept them rigorously separate “marginalizing” the body from the process of thinking. How do we account for the relationship between thought and sensation in early Greek philosophy? And what impact do the centrality of the body or its “marginalization” have on the Presocratics’ understanding of living beings and life? In this paper I grapple with these questions through an analysis of the extant evidence pertaining to Empedocles, Heraclitus, Diogenes, and Alcmaeon, among others. I interpret the proximity of thought and sensation in terms of living beings’ shared capacity to live in, and “naturally” understand, the world, and argue that, in marking the separation of thought and sensation, the election of the brain as the organ for thinking lays the ground for the establishment of a disembodied, and ultimately intellectual, notion of thought that breaks the continuity among forms of life.


Here I will raise the question of whether the equality of education and opportunity for guardians that Plato has Socrates endorse in Republic V extends to the women of the producer class. Many commentators assume that Plato’s proposal applies only to the women with potential to become Philosopher-Queens.16 There is a divide among these scholars between those who are bothered by Plato’s exclusion of working-class women and those who do not express such a concern.17 I agree that if Plato thinks equal education and opportunity are only applicable to guardian women, then we ought to be troubled by his elitism. However, I will show that Plato’s Socrates commits himself variously to the notion that women across social class should have education and professional opportunity equal to their male peers, according to the nature of the individual. Republic 455e–456a is a passage that merits greater attention. Although it clearly demonstrates Plato’s Socrates envisioning women in artisan occupations, it has been ignored by commentators who assume Plato’s feminism extends only to guardians.18 In addition to examining this passage, I will show that the logic Plato has Socrates use to defend the need for women to be guardians alongside men must apply to all other occupations as well.

The principles he uses to defend his position include the postulate of specialized natures (R. 370a-b), the principle of specialization (R. 369b-370c), and the principle that reproductive differences are irrelevant to non-reproductive occupations (R. 454a-e). Plato cannot intend for equality of education and opportunity to apply only to elite women and remain committed to

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16 Annas (1976, 315); Okin (1977, 359-60); Smith (1980, 8-9); Darling (1986, 123); Bluestone (1987, 18, 40, 72, 85, 107); Weinstein (2009, 448). See also Rankin (1964).
17 Bluestone (1987, 72) is critical of scholars who believe equality of education and opportunity are open only to elite women and who express “no concern that Plato spoke of equality only for an elite group.” Similarly, Chadwick (1990, 106) rightly contends that if Plato only wants equality of opportunity for guardian women, he too would be guilty like many present-day feminists of only being concerned with women of one class.
18 Martin (1982, 286), Santas (2005), and Harry and Polansky (2016, 271) are exceptions.
these principles. A reader can hardly link these aspects of the *Republic* together and safely conclude that their author would limit equal education and training only to guardians. Plato may have assumed if his readers were paying attention, they could easily draw out the implications and deduce the conclusion that it is best for the *polis* if all women have equal education and professional opportunity as their male peers.

It is true, however, that Plato could have made his commitment to equal education and professional opportunity for all women across social class more explicit in the *Republic*. Given that women were already involved in trades and professions, including medicine, Plato may have thought it was not necessary to be clearer about the professional status of artisan women. It was already more typical to see artisan women outside the home, as they were less segregated than elite women. So, perhaps Plato assumed he should direct his attention toward equality of education and opportunity for women who would be community leaders instead, given what a foreign concept that was to his audience.

And we should not be surprised to find Plato committed to the empowerment of working-class women, given his comments in the *Laws* about all children imitating Athena, who turns out to be a patroness for all the classes depicted in the *Republic*. Furthermore, Plato’s brief summary of the *Republic*’s conversation (set dramatically on the prior day) in the *Timaeus*, although not at all thorough, takes it as an obvious conclusion of their discussion that all occupations, which certainly includes those in the artisan class, would be open to both men and women. In light of all this textual support, it is fair to conclude that, while he did not make it explicit in the *Republic*, Plato must believe that his proposals about equal education and professional training ought to be applied to women of the artisan class as well.

Furthermore, I examine the principle in the myth of metals that children are not necessarily of the same ‘metal’ as their parents (*R.* 415a-c). Plato has Socrates take this principle seriously, and doing so obliges him to regard professional childcare and education for children among the producers as beneficial for the city, although he does not make this explicit, for at least three reasons: (1) It establishes a methodical process for identifying all children with guardian potential, especially the girls born to producers; (2) It enables all individuals with artisan potential to be properly matched with the craft for which their nature is suited; and (3) it protects the city from being denied the specialized contribution of half the community’s adults, usually women.

Given his belief that women could have talents for pursuits from which they were barred and his belief that childcare should be shared by men and women (*R.* 460b), Plato was a feminist visionary.20

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19 Bluestone (1987, 105). See also n. 6. Patterson (2007, 166) also mentions female metics.
20 See also Santas (2005, 32, 34).