Abstracts for the SAGP Annual Meeting at Christopher Newport University, October 20-21, 2018

Panel Abstracts
Audrey Anton Panel 1 (3B): “Aristotle on Psychopathy and the Macabre”: see abstracts of individual papers:
- Ashton McHatton. “Non-emotional: The Character Type of the Psychopath”
- Nicole Camargo. “Aristotle on the Unforgivable Psychopaths”
- Lindsey Dunn. “Cannibalism & Aristotle’s Vice: How Multiple Variations of Cannibalism Have Different Character Types”

Audrey Anton Panel 2 (4B): “Aristotelian Vices”: See abstracts of individual papers:
- Paige Richmond. “Natural Vices”
- Logan Taylor. “Primary Friendship and the Vicious”

Lee Franklin Panel (2B):
“Dialogues with Plato: A Twofold Experiment in Undergraduate Study of Plato”
This summer I will be working with Esmeralda Rodriguez and Priyanka Patil, students at Franklin & Marshall College, to pilot a website that aims to draw students into philosophical dialogue with Plato, and his interpreters. Rather than providing simplifying summaries of passages, the goal is to highlight the pressing interpretive and philosophical questions afforded by the text, and to introduce the interpretive resources (translation and other philological information; glosses from commentaries and critical editions; central controversies in scholarly literature) needed to engage meaningfully with those questions. The passage we will work on is Republic Bk. X, 595a-608b, the argument to banish imitative poets from the kallipolis.

We propose to present this pilot in a panel at the 2018 SAGP annual meeting. This presentation will have two main parts:

A. A new model for student-faculty collaboration in Ancient Greek philosophy: Participating in collaborative scholarship is widely recognized to be a high impact practice, and one that liberal arts colleges such as F&M offer as a signature opportunity for our students. However, a number of considerations lead faculty to conclude that such collaborations will be unproductive with all but the most talented and well prepared students. Few students have training in Greek. Readiness for scholarship typically requires broad exposure to ancient authors, and extensive grounding in philosophy. By aiming at a different outcome, this project avoids these hurdles, while also providing training of the sort that will make student participants more prepared, in the future, for independent or collaborative research. In 20-30 minutes, Lee Franklin will discuss the project design and implementation as a possible model for other collaborations.

B. A new tool for undergraduate study of Plato: Through their summer work, Priyanka Patil and Esmeralda Rodriguez will build a website that fosters deeper engagement with Plato, specifically Republic X, 595a-608a. In this presentation, Priyanka and Esmeralda will present their work in 20-30 minutes, describing how they chose to structure the website’s presentation; which questions to forward and how to introduce them to the reader; which interpretive resources to present, and how to do so in a way that invites the student into
deeper engagement, rather than overwhelming them with detail. The aim of the presentation is twofold: first, to share the website with those who teach Plato regularly as a potential tool for use in their classes, and to receive feedback on how to improve it; and second, to provide the student perspective on the collaborative process, and its results for their understanding and interest.

Marina Marren Panel “Truth and Account in Plotinus and Plato” (4A)
Chair: Marina Marren. American University in Cairo, marina.marren@aucegypt.edu.
Gary Gurtler, SJ. Boston College. gurtlerg@bc.edu. “Plotinus: The Image of the Cosmic Soul and Nature in Human Discourse Intellect.”
David Ellis. ellisdb@bc.edu. Boston College “Plotinus: The Image of Intellect and Being in Human Discourse”
Marina Marren. American University in Cairo, marina.marren@aucegypt.edu. “A Funny Truth: Aristophanes’ Comedy in Plato’s Republic IV-VII”
The papers on this panel explore the relationship between “truth” (aletheia, etymos, and orthos) and “account” (logos and muthos) as it is appears in the works of Plato and Plotinus. The authors present divergent views with the aim of generating new ideas or questions about the matter. The connections drawn between the papers reveal an aporetic tension in the source material. Marren’s paper on Plato, for example, examines the relationship between speeches and actions in Plato’s writing and claims that we ought to search for truth in view of the whole that these make up. To make the case that truth lies at the intersection of logos, muthoi, and dramata, Marren reads Plato’s Republic IV – VII through the lens of Aristophanic comedy. Ellis, using Plotinus’ notion that truth is the identity of thinking and being, proceeds to show what follows about discursive thought. Namely, that discursive thought, which includes logos and muthos, can only prepare for the possibility of experiencing truth. The sudden instant of noetic insight is never guaranteed and never reachable by any sort of discursive practice. Continuing the investigation of Plotinus, Gurtler argues that the relation of human beings to truth is one through image and likeness, so that, in the human being, there is an access to an image of the wider intellectual order in which truth inheres, but not an identity with it. The presentations, when juxtaposed, form a speculative fabric and dialectical tension that serves to point out the overlooked avenues for thinking about truth in view of philosophical and literary contexts.

Clerk Shaw Panel “Virtue and Pleasure in Epicureanism” (1C) See individual abstracts
Kelly Arenson. Duquesne. arensonk@duq.edu. “Pleasure in Old Age.”
Max Robitzsch. Sungkyunkwan University. jmrobitzsch@gmail.com. “Epicurean Virtue Ethics.”

Sophia Stone and Nicholas Baima Panel: (1B) “τὰ Μεταξύ in the Dialogues of Plato”
Chairs: Sophia Stone. Lynn University. ssstone@lynn.edu and Nicholas Baima. Florida Atlantic University. nbaima@fau.edu
Mateo Duque. “Socratic Mimesis as Intermediate Erotic Reproduction in the Symposium”
Naomi Reshotko. “What Doxa is About: Reconciling the Consolation of the Philodoxist and the Divided Line”
Lee Franklin. “Intermediates as Phantasmata.”
This panel on the intermediates in Plato continues the work presented at the conference, “Knowing where to draw the line, *Intermediates* and *Dianoia* in Plato,” held in Jupiter, FL on March 9th and 10th of this year. The organizers and hosts of the conference, Nicholas Baima from FAU Honors College and Sophia Stone from Lynn University are the organizers of the panel. Two of the invited panelists, Naomi Reshotko and Mateo Duque, attended the conference as guests. Lee Franklin, also an invited panelist, was invited to talk at the conference but because of circumstances beyond his control, was not able to present at the conference. This panel is a continuation of the work and ideas presented this spring. See also the abstracts of the individual papers, below.

Julie Ward Panel “Narrative Elements in Plato and Aristotle” (3A): See abstracts of individual papers, below.

Angela Curran. “Mitys’ Statue: Aristotle on Narrative Connection.”

Julie Ward. “Plato and Ring Composition”

Jean Clifford. “The Significance of Aristotle’s Track Analogy in *EN* 1.4.”
Individual Abstracts in Alphabetical Order of Speaker


Habit and habituation play important roles in Aristotle’s ethics. How Aristotle conceived of habituation to come about is a matter of controversy, since Aristotle never properly explains how he thinks we become habituated such that we retain responsibility. It is therefore unclear how Aristotle thinks we can be responsible for our habitual doings, if some of those doings result from natural processes we are subject to qua biological creatures. However, while there has been some discussion on how habituation might come about, less attention has been paid on what Aristotle thinks counts as habitual actions. This question will be the focus of my talk. The question about habitual action in Aristotle is made even more difficult given contemporary disagreements on what habits are, and how they should be thought of in relation to non-habitual actions. I begin with some general remarks on Aristotle and make some distinctions regarding habits and their place in theory of action which we might make today, in hope that by setting the stage for how we might think about habits, we will be in a better position to see to what extent Aristotle’s approach is similar to, or different from certain contemporary one’s. I then survey the broad range of cases Aristotle calls habitual” or customary (ethos); things we usually (ethein) or repeatedly (pollakis) do. I end by suggesting what common features Aristotle’s habitual actions have. One important difference between Aristotle’s approach and certain contemporary approaches is that Aristotle suggests, in Rhetoric I.11 1370a6-15, that habitual actions are “pleasant” by which he means they are unforced.

Audrey L. Anton. Western Kentucky University. audrey.anton@wku.edu “The Vicious and the Not-So-Bad: A Defense of Hoi Polloi in Aristotle’s Ethics” 4B

There is a long-standing debate concerning how to read Aristotle’s remarks about the vicious in Nicomachean Ethics Book 7 alongside what he says concerning vice in Book 9 (in particular, chapter 4). In Book 7, many find an account of the vicious character that suggests she enjoys psychic harmony between her reason and desires in a way similar to that of the virtuous person. In this portion of NE, the vicious is described as unconscious of her vice, having acted in accordance with her choice, and lacking remorse for her behavior. However, in Book 9, the vicious is seen as one who is at odds with herself, as she cannot be a friend even to herself. She is described as being full of regret (a questionable translation on its own) and therefore liable to flee even her own company. The internal strife that she suffers makes her utterly miserable (athlon). Scholars have tried to reconcile these two pictures in a number of ways. Some declare the discrepancies to be real and Aristotle’s account to be inconsistent (Roochnik, Annas, Bostock). Others consider the Book 7 account more complete and whereas the Book 9 comments support the earlier picture if understood correctly (Broadie, Rowe, Irwin). Some take the account in Book 7 to be the initial stage of vice and Book 9 to be its further-progressed, unraveled version (Brickhouse). More recently, scholars have begun to reconsider the validity of the Book 7 account, arguing that it can only be made sense of if Book 9’s comments are assumed first and read into Book 7’s (Müller). In this paper, I shall argue that none of these approaches is quite right, as none cleanly distinguishes the character state of vice (kakia) from the more colloquial description of people who are base (phaulos). Indeed, Aristotle indicates that the truly vicious person is rare. However, many of the comments relied upon from Book 9 describe the vices of
the many (hoi polloi). Aristotle declares that the majority of men are between the two extreme characters of virtue and vice, even if more of us lean towards incontinence than continence. Therefore, I argue, the scope of discussion in these passages is the majority of bad men (which includes anyone incontinent or worse), whereas the scope of the objects of discussion in Book 7 is narrower, focusing on the distinctions between “vice” the character state and incontinence (akrasia). What’s more, given Aristotle’s moral psychology, we must make sense of what it is like to have vices (common flaws) that, while not good, are distinct from the deeply rooted and mentally global character state of vice. In other words, while few of us are truly good, the majority of us aren’t that bad.

Jeffrey Arcand. University of Western Ontario. Jarcand3@uwo.ca. “Politike as Phronesis Beyond the Self” 1E

In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that even though the end goal both for the individual and the polis is the human good, the well-being of the polis is the greater and more complete (τελείοτερον) of the two (1094b6-12). He later explains that while politike and phronesis are the same disposition (ἔξις) their “essences are not the same” (1141b23). Unfortunately, he does not make it entirely clear what he means by that distinction or why he believes that the life of political action is more complete than the equally wise and well executed life of individual action. Since Aristotle is fairly clear that a life of contemplation is the best possible life for a human being, some scholars have attempted to solve this problem by extracting political calculus from the practical realm and bringing it closer to the realm of theory. Two such attempts include citing the relative complexity of thought required for political action compared to that of individual deliberation, and the potential use of universal moral facts in politics which are not found in individual deliberation. But Aristotle explicitly places politike in the practical realm (1095a6), and the completeness of any pursuit has little if anything to do with its complexity or involvement with universal facts.

This paper will argue that politike is more complete than individual-focused phronesis precisely because it reaches beyond the self, using Aristotle’s conception of justice in relation to virtues as a guide. In Book V, Aristotle conceives of justice as the complete (τελεία) form of virtue because its concerns reach beyond the self (1129b27), using strikingly similar language as he does in reference to politike and phronesis. The parallel relationships of politike to phronesis and justice to virtue, along with Aristotle’s claim that human beings are social by nature (1097b9), may explain how politike can be more complete than phronesis while sharing the same disposition.

Kelly Arenson. Duquesne. arensonk@duq.edu. “Is Epicurus an Ageist?” 1C

Although Epicurus claims that his philosophy is for people of all ages, he seems to believe that the young and the old suffer from life in different ways. This paper considers whether Epicureans believe one’s age affects how one responds to Epicurean philosophy, particularly its ethics. Is there an age at which achieving the Epicurean good life is easiest? Do the young struggle more than the old to achieve or maintain the Epicurean goal of the absence of pain? I come to the tentative conclusion that Epicureans are biased against both the young and the old: the young tend to be distracted by insatiable desires, and the old are more likely to fear death. In addition, the young have not yet learned to achieve the good life by means of their own choices rather than by chance, while the old struggle to be grateful for past goods. For Epicurus, then, the peak time for happiness might just be middle age.
Anne Ashbaugh. Towson University. aashbaugh@towson.edu. “Desiring Beautiful Things: Reading Meno 77b Keeping in Mind Symposium 203b-212e.” 2G

At Meno, 77b, Meno defines virtue erotically. Socrates’ discussion on how to define terms like shape and color by “seeking that which is the same in all cases” (Meno, 75a) reminds Meno about a poem, specifically, he remembers the phrase, “to delight in beautiful things and have power.” Out of that memory, Meno constructs a definition of virtue by introducing an important change in the poet’s terminology. That is, when he defines virtue, Meno does not retain the poet’s original use of χαίρω (rejoice, be glad) but uses instead ἐπιθυμέω (desire). Socrates resists the shift by turning to the presumed object of desire and exposing the problems of Meno’s broadly conceived claim. Yet, Socrates does not neglect to expose that an important shift in verbs commits them to a new understanding of virtue and he asks Meno, “What do you mean by desiring? Is it not to secure for oneself? – What else?” (Meno, 77c). That is precisely the question my paper asks, in reference to virtue, “what do we mean by desiring?” I would further add: why is desire an issue for virtue at all, particularly in what refers to what is beautiful. Since Plato’s Symposium offers an account, albeit complex, of what desiring entails, it is to that dialogue that I’ll turn to explain the matter. In particular, I compare the initiation into desiring that Socrates undergoes guided by Diotima to the process that Meno is undergoing under Socrates’ tutelage.

Sophia Avants. Claremont Graduate University. Sophia.avants@cgu.edu. “‘When one has sinned and realizes his guilt’: Ancient Jewish and Greek Responses to the Timeless Problem of Repairing Harm.” 4E

Charles Griswold sets out to create a paradigm definition for the concept of forgiveness: “it is a moral relation between two individuals, one of whom has wronged the other, and who (at least in the ideal) are capable of communicating with each other. In this ideal context, forgiveness requires reciprocity between injurer and injured.”¹ Michael Morgan further refines the parameters of modern discussions by suggesting that “reciprocity” is centered on the decision of the victim to forgive and how that expresses the dignity of both perpetrator and victim.² From this base, philosophers have read a range of ancient texts, both Greek and Hebrew. One problem that arises in these readings is the differences between how modern and ancient peoples understand the notion of the “self,” particularly when modern readers are accustomed to considering the personalities. Thus some commentators are eager to identify precursors to Kantian notions of the self, other scholars more reservedly identify a ‘character’ who acts in an upstanding fashion, or not, thus providing moral lessons for the reader.³ This paper proposes to review key terms in Greek and Hebrew texts in order to trace the complexity of intertextual meaning held by ancient readers, in order to gain some sense of how these communities thought through the very human problem of interpersonal dis-harmony. Concepts from Leviticus and Aristotle, such as “appeasement,” which appears in both literatures, take on additional valence in

works such as the rabbinic Mishnah Yoma and Plutarch’s Lives. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the situations discussed in all of these texts incorporate the communal effects of discord, raising the question of whether the resolution of interpersonal relations is a societal concern.

Nicholas Baima. Florida Atlantic University. nichbaima@gmail.com. “How to Understand the Worst Argument in Republic 1: Making Sense of the Non-Pleonecnic Argument (1.349a-350c).”

In Republic 1, Thrasymachus defends the radical claim that being just is “high-minded simplicity” and being unjust is “good judgment” (348c-e). Because injustice involves benefiting oneself, while justice involves benefitting others, the unjust are wise and good and the just are foolish and bad (348d-e). Socrates defends the value of justice against Thrasymachus’ attack by offering a number of counterarguments. The non-pleonecnic argument (349b-350c) attempts to show that the unjust person’s desire to outdo or have more than (pleon echein) everyone is a symptom of their ignorance. Many commentators have found the argument problematic, unclear, and even sophistical. The task of this paper is to unpack this subtle argument and to see what philosophical merit it has. Ultimately, I will argue that the non-pleonecnic argument—though it could have been stated more clearly—defends plausible deontological constraints on the nature of justice and rationality—constraints that we ought to take seriously.

Samuel Baker. University of South Alabama. soothlich@gmail.com. “Aristotle on the alienation of the producer from his product.”

According to Aristotle, a producer has a natural love for his product. This is because the producer loves himself and the product reveals in actuality the productive expertise inside of him. Every productive expertise or art (technē) is also essentially of a good end (e.g. health) and only accidentally of the opposite (e.g. disease), even though the art can produce both. Consequently, if a producer should use his expertise to produce a product that is not the proper end of his expertise, he will be alienated from that product.

David Bicknell. Stockton University (NJ). David7bicknell@gmail.com. “The Roles of Parmenides’ Goddess as Θέα and Δαιμόν”

Throughout the extant fragments, Parmenides uses two different terms to refer to his Goddess: he uses the term θέα once only at 1.22, and he uses the term δαίμον twice at 1.3 and 12.3, respectively. Most translators of Parmenides, such as McKirahan, Hermann, Gallop, and Tarán, translate both words as referring to the same entity: the “Goddess,” It is my contention that Parmenides intended a distinction in the role of his Goddess by the use of his terms.

While throughout the history of Greek literature the meaning of θέα has remained unchanged, δαίμον has a much more complex history. Homer’s meaning of δαίμον refers mainly to an unidentified divinity in an anthropomorphic form, while the θέα can be clearly identified as a specific divinity. For Hesiod, it is implied that there is a difference in rank and power in that the word θέα refers to gods of the rank of the Olympian gods, whereas the word δαίμον refers to divinities of a lesser power and status, such as the many named personified abstractions. In lyric poetry, the meaning of δαίμον seems to be either the driving force behind a man’s destiny or the destiny itself. However, this varied history of the meaning of δαίμον begs the question of which meaning Parmenides means when he refers to his Goddess. I suggest that he intended a meaning of δαίμον that intermingles some of the previously established uses of.
δαίμων. By using this mixed meaning of δαίμων, I also suggest that Parmenides distinguishes the Goddess as playing a role as a θέα, and a separate role as a δαίμων.

Through a close reading of each of the fragments where the Goddess is mentioned, her specific roles can be determined. As a θέα, Parmenides’ Goddess is the authority behind the pact made with the youth through their handclasp, while she plays the role normally attributed to a δαίμων by hosting the mortal youth. As a δαίμων, the Goddess fulfils both the role of guide for the youth along his path, and as a helmsman for all things that is the agent behind the youth’s destiny. Parmenides uses each of these terms where he intends to specify the role that the Goddess is playing at that particular part of the poem.

Eve A. Browning. University of Texas at San Antonio. eve.browning@utsa.edu. “Hesiod and the Ethics of Work” 2A

“It will not always be summer. Build barns!” (Hesiod, Works and Days, line 503)

Hesiod’s Works and Days is widely regarded as a didactic poem ostensibly addressed to Hesiod’s or the narrator’s brother Perses or ‘Perses’, although the specific lesson it is designed to convey has been variously interpreted. In the ancient world, the lessons were understood as a set of propaedeutic myths (Pandora, the metals myth), followed by practical advice mostly about farming on a small freehold tract of land with meager resources (“Works”), but with additional advice for the small merchant sailor and some miscellaneous information about lucky and unlucky practices (“Days”). Understood in this way Hesiod was variously held in contempt or valued. Plutarch quotes the Spartan Cleomenes disparaging Hesiod as the “poet of helots” for his interest in farming how-to, in contrast to Homer who is “the delight of warriors” (Apol.Cleom.1). More recently scholars have offered interpretations of the work which emphasize its wider vision, that of a cosmos torn or balanced between Strife and Justice, overseen by a strong-armed Zeus, in which the burden of the Iron-borne human being is to “work with work upon work” (W&D 382) and earn the sweet rewards of prosperity and ease, “cool wine in the shade”, a harmonious family and a full barn.¹

Scholarly consensus occurs around the role of work in post-lapsarian human life according to Hesiod: we are under a harsh mandate from Zeus to work unceasingly, this is our doom; there was formerly an idyllic time or Golden Age in which this was not the case, but now there is no escaping harsh toil. In this paper I take a different view. I find in Hesiod’s text a cautiously optimistic view of the place of work in constituting human life and its significance; work understood as a divinely mandated but potentially redemptive human project takes on a definite moral value. In short I will argue that Hesiod offers the first genuine work ethic in the history of western thought.

Jonathan Buttaci. The Catholic University of America. buttaci@cua.edu. “Aristotle on Intellectual Identity, Actual and Potential: A Note on de Anima III.4 429b5-9.” 4G

Aristotle introduces and develops his account of intellect on an analogy with sense perception. When actively sensing or actively thinking, the receptive capacity (whether sensitive or intellective) is actually identical to its respective objects, the sensible and intelligible forms.¹

¹ See e.g. de An. II.12 424a17-25 and III.4 429a13-18.
For this reason Aristotle says the human soul is in a way all things, capable of becoming both
intelligible and sensible forms in virtue of these powers of the soul.\(^2\)

Taken in themselves and apart from these activities, however, receptive capacities are only
potentially identical with their respective objects.\(^3\) We must therefore distinguish between several
states—(1) before one has learned (e.g.) to speak Greek, (2) after one has learned but when one is
not presently speaking Greek, (3) when one is presently speaking Greek—just as we must
distinguish between someone who is actively seeing the Acropolis and someone who can but is
not presently beholding it.\(^4\) This set of distinctions in active and potential states, therefore, lies at
the heart of Aristotle’s account of cognition, both perceptual and intellectual.

This note explores the implications and limits of the analogy between sense and intellect
in view of these distinctions. In particular, one might apply the analogy straightforwardly,
concluding that intellectual and perceptual identity with their respective objects is principally
achieved when one is actively sensing and thinking.\(^5\) But Myles Burnyeat has argued that the
analogy breaks down precisely at this point: instead, intellectual identity is first achieved when we
have learned something, even before we are actively considering or using that knowledge (stage
(2)). On his view this is unlike perceptual identity, which is achieved only when we are actively
sensing (stage (3)). In support of this claim he cites a passage from Aristotle’s treatment of
intellect, what he calls a “proof text which shows unambiguously that” a straightforward
application of the analogy on this point “is wrong:”\(^6\)

> When the intellect becomes each thing in the way in which an actual
> knower does (which happens as soon as the knower can exercise
> their power of their own accord) even then it is still in one sense just
> a capacity: not, however, a capacity in the same sense as before it
> learned or discovered.\(^7\)

I concede to Burnyeat that interpreters taking the straightforward approach have overlooked the
significance of this passage for Aristotle’s account of intellectual identity, actual and potential. I
offer a different reading of the passage, however, calling into question its status as a “proof text”
in favor of Burnyeat’s interpretation.

My principal argument proceeds in three steps: (1) the text is grammatically
underdetermined, leaving open alternative and less unambiguous translations; (2) other passages
suggest that intellectual activity precedes and indeed causes the development of intellectual states
like knowledge; (3) still other passages suggest that the disanalogy between sense and intellect
should occur earlier in the “triple scheme” of act and potency.

What results is perhaps surprising: natural capacities like sense perception never exist in a
state analogous to the unlearned person, so that first potentiality (as it is called) only applies to
those capacities admitting of development. After all, sensitive capacities already possess the
sensible forms (e.g. colors) potentially as a developed capacity or logos in a way already analogous
to the possession of knowledge.\(^8\) I end by considering several implications of this realignment for
understanding the identity of knower and known.

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\(^2\) See de An. III.8 431b20-432a3.
\(^3\) See de An. III.2 426a8-27, III.4 429b6-10 and 30-32.
\(^4\) See de An. II.5 417a22-b2 and 417b17-28, as well as Meta. Θ.3 passim.
\(^5\) See e.g. Lear, J. Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge, 1988) Ch. 4.3.
\(^6\) Burnyeat, M.F., Aristotle’s Divine Intellect (Marquette, 2008) at 22.
\(^7\) De An. III.4 429b5-9, as translated in Burnyeat (2008) at 23 (emphasis his).
\(^8\) See de An. II.5 417b16-19 and II.12 424a26-b3.
Nicole Camargo. *Western Kentucky University.* nicole.camargo963@topper.wku.edu “Aristotle on the Unforgivable Psychopaths” 3B

In my paper, I will discuss how Aristotle would categorize psychopaths as being vicious individuals. I will also argue the ways in which they fit well into the vicious category and not in the commonly mistaken states of characters of being brutish or incontinent. Unlike the continent individual and the brutish person, the psychopath as a vicious person will possess the rationality to make decisions, but also, I will argue that the psychopath’s free will comes from different external factors and is also affected by a psychological disability that prevents the psychopath from having a full moral responsibility, and this will also affect the psychopath’s blameworthiness. Furthermore, although they may lack a moral responsibility, psychopaths such as serial killers or other psychopaths that have engaged in horrid crimes should still be held responsible for their actions. However, I will argue that their vicious state can still be improved, since the external factors that led to the psychopath’s vicious state could be acknowledged and then it can be understood why the psychopath evolved and develop into the vicious state of character.

Silvia Carli. *Skidmore.* scarli@skidmore.edu “Aristotle on Eutrapelia” 4F

In *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.6-8, Aristotle discusses three virtues pertaining to “our associations with one another (ὁμιλίαι), living together (συζήν) and sharing in speeches and actions (λόγων καὶ πράγματων κοινωνεῖν)” *(NE* 4.6.1126b11-12). One of these excellences, *eutrapelia* (wittiness), deals with the proper way of interacting with others during that part of human life that we spend in playful amusement (παιδιά).

This paper offers an interpretation of the nature, and underlying passion, of *eutrapelia.* It argues that the prevailing interpretations of this aretē (e.g. Fortenbaugh’s, Curzer’s) are incomplete or misleading because they either do not sufficiently emphasize or misinterpret the political or civic significance of this excellence.

As the life of the polis depends on the citizens’ active engagement, so *eutrapelia* requires that agents value, and contribute to, lighthearted playful interactions. Refusing to do so constitutes one of the two vices associate with this domain of human life. And as a just regime is based on equality, so those who pass the time together in amusement should both produce and be the recipients of tactful mockery and jokes. That is to say, their interactions should be modeled on relations among citizens, who possess equal agency because they in turn rule over, and are ruled by, one another. I therefore make the case that *eutrapelia,* which one may be tempted to regard as an insignificant virtue, plays an important role in fostering and strengthening political friendship, which Aristotle deems even more vital than justice for the life of city-states *(NE* 8.1.1155a25-27).

Jean Clifford. *Loyola Chicago.* Jclifford1@luc.edu “The Significance of Aristotle’s Track Analogy in EN 1.4.” 3A

In *EN* 1.4, Aristotle uses the image of a race track to illustrate a familiar epistemological point: in any inquiry, we must determine if we are starting from “what is known to us” or “what is known simpliciter.” In my paper, I examine what this image means for Aristotle’s moral epistemology.
Clinton Corcoran. Highpoint University. ccorcora@highpoint.edu. “Aristotle’s Distinction between the Affective Quality of Tragic Catharsis and Dramatic Action in the Poetics.”

While Jacob Bernays is right to associate the definition of tragedy in the Poetics (1449b 27-28) with the catharsis passage from the Politics (1342a 1-25), he takes the medical analogy too far when he claims that it is, “the man with a permanent disposition and a deep-rooted inclination to a certain emotion—in the case of tragedy, the piteous and fearful by disposition, not the man who is feeling pity and fear—who is to find in catharsis the means to indulge his inclinations in a ‘harmless’ manner.”\(^1\) Tragedy purges emotions natural to the human condition; it only accidentally cures those individuals pathologically predisposed to pity and fear. There is in Aristotle’s Poetics a distinction between the imitation of the actions in a plot and the quality of pleasure that imitation produces in an audience. The relationship is best expressed as that between a substance (the plot) and the natural qualities of that substance. This distinction is similar to the one discussed at length in book ten of the Nicomachean Ethics—that between activity and the resultant pleasure produced by an activity. In the Poetics, Aristotle claims that the compound of the six plot elements of tragedy give it its distinctive and proper quality (ποιά) (Poetics, 1450a 7-10). These formal elements ‘in act,’ understood in this case as dramatic performance, will produce a supervening quality that is similar to the contemporary notion of dramatic tone. Aristotle goes on to say that the most important of these elements, plot (mythos), can be further divided. At 1450a 33-34 in the Poetics he calls reversal and recognition the most emotionally affective parts of the plot; “in regard to the most important things with which tragedy enthralls us (ψυχαγωγεῖ), reversals and recognitions, these are parts of the plot.” Reversals and recognitions, as substantive alterations, act on the audience creating shifting affections (pathē) of the soul (See Categories 10a 6-7). Thus, the shifting affects reflect a qualitative tone created by the elements of the plot. They are not meant, as they are in the passage from the Politics, as a cure for the pre-existing disposition of the audience’s psyche.

Sean Costello. University of Oxford. sean.costello@bfriars.ox.ac.uk. “A New Approach to Aristotelian Elemental Transformation.”

The modern debate concerning Aristotle’s theory of elemental transformation has long been the locus of fierce controversy. Unfortunately, much of the discourse on this subject has become mired in a ‘war of passages’, where isolated quotations are presented either in support of, or as evidence against, the requirement of prime matter for elemental transformation. In this paper I wish to, instead, focus on Aristotle’s theory of elemental transformation in the context of the discussion of the monist and pluralist worries that he raises in the chapters surrounding the traditional sources concerning this theory, Physics I and De Generatione et Corruptione.

Therefore, I begin this paper by presenting the two relevant worries that Aristotle believes he must avoid – namely, (1) the Parmenidean concern about generation from, and corruption into, nothing simpliciter and (2) the dual-pronged worry of reducing generation and corruption to alteration either by positing (a) a single substratum, as the monists do, or (b) indestructible elements, as the pluralists do – and his solutions for avoiding these difficulties.

I then enter into the modern debate on Aristotle’s theory of elemental transformation through the lens of Frank A. Lewis’s recent (2008) argument for prime matter as a second-level functional property. I first explicate the intricacies of Lewis’s novel account of prime matter and

demonstrate that his position is motivated mainly by attempting to avoid concerns surrounding the first worry, which he, in turn, uses as a tool to dismantle the main competing theories of Aristotelian elemental transformation – such as Zeller’s (1897) traditional ‘bare substrate’ theory, Furth (1988) and Gill’s (1989) ‘constituent-continuity’ bundle theories (which have excised prime matter completely), and David Charles’s (2004) ‘property-continuity’ view (where prime matter is reduced to an abstract object) – leaving his position as apparently the only remaining viable view. However, I next show that Lewis’s preoccupation with the first worry leaves his conception of prime matter vulnerable to the second worry. By reifying his prime matter and making it indestructible, Lewis inadvertently collapses all into alteration while, at the same time, doing violence to Aristotle’s understanding of hylomorphism by denying that the hylomorphic compound is the unified and singular complex of the logical aspects of matter and form.

In light of this, I then present an alternative theory of elemental transformation – emphasizing the inextricably linked aspectual roles of matter as potentiality and form as actuality – where transformation occurs according to certain essential, second-potentiality ‘eduction conditions’ (conditions, grounded in the currently-existing hylomorphic element itself and expressed in its account, for a new element to be substantially educed from the currently-existing element), and is kept track of by a ‘hylomorphic history property’ (a property of the newly transformed element explaining that it was ‘actually educed from’ the previous element).

I then briefly defend my theory’s ability to stand up to the first worry – by suggesting that the realization of the essential second-potentiality eduction condition from the initial element in the new element provides sufficient persistence to avoid generation from and corruption into nothing simpliciter – and to the second worry – by contending that, because the realization of these eduction conditions result in an essential change by definition, my position cannot be said to reduce generation and corruption to mere alteration.

I conclude this paper by offering some speculations as to how my theory of Aristotelian elemental transformation can be scaled-up to account for substantial change in the macro-world, especially in light of ‘Ackrill’s problem’.

Anna Cremaldi. Appalachian State University. cremaldiam@appstate.edu. “Aristotle on Motherhood and Reproduction” 3E

Why reproduce?

This paper explores Aristotle's answer to this perennial question from a particular perspective: that of mothers. It asks: what good comes to mothers specifically from bearing offspring?

Drawing from Plato's Symposium and Aristotle’s De Anima, most readers assume that Aristotle agrees with Plato in suggesting that childbirth offers immortality for fathers and mothers alike. According to a standard view, immortality is achieved through the transmission of the parents’ species form. However, this position is complicated by Aristotle’s observations in the Generation of Animals about the mother’s distinctive biological role in reproduction. It is further complicated by the question whether mothers convey their individual forms through reproduction, and how. As I shall suggest, reproduction does not necessarily offer mothers an opportunity for immortality in the same way that it offers fathers such an opportunity.

When taken with the textual evidence that mothers suffer greatly in conceiving, bearing and raising children, reproduction presents a puzzle from the perspective of motherhood. Given the significant burden of bearing offspring and the tenuous connection between reproduction and
immortality, it would seem to be in a prospective mother’s best interest to avoid having children. Yet, motherhood is well-established fact of nature. But why would this be so, given the explanatory materials Aristotle offers us?

This paper aims to set out a puzzle about motherhood from the Aristotelian perspective, and to suggest in closing that attention to the role of mothers in a polis can help to solve that puzzle.

**Note: Dr. Myrna Gabbe and I are working on a co-authored paper about the significance of reproduction from the distinct perspectives of fathers and mothers in Aristotle’s biological and ethical works—hence, the overlap between our abstracts.**

Angela Curran. Kansas State University. Acurran123@gmail.com “Mitys’ Statue: Aristotle on Narrative Connection.” 3A

Why in the *Poetics* does Aristotle insist on the necessary or probable connection between the parts of tragedy? Central to Aristotle’s thinking is that the incidents in the plot happen because of what goes before them, not only after their antecedents (*Poetics* 11.1452a20-22). But just why Aristotle places this requirement on the connections between events in the plot is not clear. In this paper, I argue that a necessary or probable connection is central to the sort of emotional response that Aristotle thinks tragedy aims to evoke, pity and fear. In making this argument, I analyze the differences between the necessary connection in the parts of a play, on the one hand, and necessary connections in scientific explanation and in the use of persuasive speech to arouse emotion, on the other.

Andrey Darovskikh. Binghamton University. “Πεφυκός and συμβεβηκός in Aristotle’s teaching on deformity in GA IV.” 3E

Aristotle makes the distinction between what belongs to in itself and what belongs to it accidentally in many different contexts throughout his oeuvre. However, what is natural and what is accidental in the process of generation stays for Aristotle not as clear as it does it his physics of metaphysics. In his explanation of deformities in generation (*GA IV*) Aristotle mentions that per accident deformities are necessary, and origin of deformities is located in on the one hand purposive or final cause and on the other hand in some accidental necessity. Deviation or transgression with respect to physical development of an embryo, centers around the notion of departure from excellence in the sense of perfection and suitability for proper functioning. Even a cursory reading of *GA IV* reveals that Aristotle recognizes a number of causes for deformity. Often times, just material necessity explains deformity, e.g. if a weak child is constricted in the womb. Sometimes deformities are clearly connect to heredity, i.e. Aristotle was fully aware that some deformities can be inherited. Some deformities can result from sexual differentiation, or improper (excessive or scarce) female material contributions. In all these cases, the departure from excellence can be still within the natural agenda. Aristotle explicitly posits that nature reserves room for deformities, and they are natural in this sense. The papers seeks to analyze the role of πεφυκός and συμβεβηκός in the appearance of physical deviations in birth. At first sight, I might seem that for Aristotle, with his rigid focus on teleology in the process of generation, all instances of συμβεβηκός can comply with a broad notion of a natural process. Clearly, there can be a number of seemingly deviating results, which still stay within the limit. However, based on a premise that for Aristotle within the range of what naturally counts as fully functional some variations can be considered as better or worse I will argue that some
instances of embryogenesis turned out a way, which do not occur because of the direct and primary teleology.

Ignacio de Ribera Martin. *The Catholic University of America*. deriberamartin@cua.edu. “Aristotle and the Role of the Senses in the Configuration of our Moral Character.” 2D

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle explains how our repeated actions generate moral habits in the soul, good ones (virtues) or bad ones (vices). These habits make up our moral character, which in turn affects the way we act. Since in order to be happy we need to act well, and good actions depend on having good habits, education aims primarily at the generation of a good moral character. By moral action Aristotle understands an action (*praxis*) in the sphere of choice, in contrast to other activities such as contemplation (*theoria*) or production (*poiēsis*). We do not become good by making things or simply by attending lectures. We need to choose good actions, i.e. actually do them.

In this paper I explore the role played by the senses in the configuration of our moral character. Prima facie, it seems that what we see, hear, touch, etc. is not relevant for our moral character because to perceive is a passive activity in which we undergo a change rather than actively do something. Several passages in Aristotle point in this direction. For example, when Aristotle considers the different kinds of virtue in relation to different parts of the soul, he does not consider any “sensitive” part at all that could be perfected by a corresponding virtue. And he explicitly contrasts the acquisition of habits to the power of the senses: in the case of actions, we first act and then we acquire the power, while the reverse is true of the senses. It seems then that the senses play no role in the acquisition of habits: they are simply “on” or “off,” asleep or awake, depending on whether they are currently stimulated by their objects. As a result, they do not appear to be relevant for education.

However, also in Aristotle, there are passages indicating that it is an essential part of education to care about what we perceive. For example, the significant role played by the passions of fear and pity in tragedies in purifying the soul (*katharsis*) and stirring noble actions, as well as the effect of music on the soul, which is the basis of the legislator’s concern for which kind of music should be—and which kind should not be—listened by the youth. All this suggests that what we passively experience through the senses, and not just what we actively do when we act, is also relevant for our moral character. In this paper I explore how the soul is affected by the activity of the senses. I focus on the “con-formative” effect of the passions, on the unity of the external senses and the internal sense with its functions (memory and imagination), and on the role of imitation in acting and learning. While the scope of this topic is vast, and I can only offer an initial sketch of explanation, I hope to show that the senses too play a key role in the shaping of one’s moral character and hence we must take their education seriously.

Robert Duncan. *Loyola of Chicago*. rduncan1@luc.edu. “Against Absolute Goodness in Aristotle” 4F

In a recent paper, Samuel Baker argues, against Richard Kraut, that there are several passages in Aristotle that require us to attribute to him a belief in “absolute goodness.” In particular, he claims that Aristotle’s evaluative comparisons of different substances cannot plausibly be understood in terms of goodness-for or goodness *qua* member of a kind and, thus require an appeal to absolute goodness to be intelligible. I am sympathetic to Baker’s contention that deflationary readings of Aristotle’s cosmic axiological hierarchy are inadequate; however, I argue that Aristotle cannot believe in a property of absolute goodness because his commitment to
the transcendental homonymy of goodness precludes him from doing so. In the paper, I lay out the case against interpreting Aristotle as a proponent of absolute goodness and give some programmatic suggestions about two alternative interpretations which I think are more promising.

Lindsey Dunn. Western Kentucky University. lindsey.dunn697@topper.wku.edu. “Cannibalism & Aristotle’s Vice: How Multiple Variations of Cannibalism Have Different Character Types” 3B

Aristotle argues that cannibals have the character state of brutes, but he was only talking about those who cannibalized out of insanity (the mother who ate fetuses) and not any other types of cannibals. There are three types of cannibals – survivalist, ritualistic, and psychopathic – and all three have different character states other than “brutish” that are determined by their circumstances. In my paper, I will argue that survivalist cannibals belong to the morbid state because they possess reason but cannibalize because of a dire situation that would induce insanity; ritualistic cannibals belong to the vicious state because they are not part of a society that determines the good of the many, and instead belonged to tribes that were concerned with exerting dominance over other tribes; and psychopathic cannibals (specifically Jeffrey Dahmer) who was in the incontinent state because he still possessed reason and had his vicious hobbies before his first killing that were a product of his desires, and he regretted afterwards what he had done and used alcohol to try and numb himself to his other morbid desires.

Mateo Duque. CUNY Graduate Center. Mateo.duque@gmail.com. “Socratic Mimesis as Intermediate Erotic Reproduction in the Symposium” Stone Panel 1B

The word mimēsis/mimeisthai is never used in the Symposium, and yet it is a dialogue suffused with mimēsis. Plato does not tell us about mimēsis, rather he shows it to us by having his characters enact it. To teach the other symposiasts erotics, Socrates impersonates the priestess Diotima. In his portrayal of her, Socrates posits the category of the Intermediate to overcome the binary logic of either/or (e.g. either beautiful or ugly; either wise or ignorant; either mortal or god). I contend that Socrates’ imitation of Diotima is also an expression of the psychological state of desire (erōs). Like erōs, Socrates’ mimēsis is:

(i) intentional and directed at an absent object (it is about Diotima, who is not there);
(ii) in between full knowledge (that would involve Socrates actually being Diotima) and complete ignorance (that would involve Socrates having no knowledge of Diotima);
(iii) in between mortal and immortal (in representing someone we give life to them, so even for a moment we can even bring back the dead and make them deathless).

Finally, a dramatic mimetic reproduction is like the product of an erotic coupling: it is the offspring of the imitator-actor and the role of the beloved-being imitated. Thus, Socrates’ performance of Diotima is neither fully Socrates, nor fully Diotima, but some union of the two: Socrates/Diotima.

Mateo Duque. CUNY Graduate Center. Mateo.duque@gmail.com. “Imitation as the Cleverest Form of Criticism.” 3F

Although Socrates criticizes mimēsis in the Republic, he imitates Protagoras in his ‘Defense of Protagoras’ in the Theaetetus (166a-168c). I argue that the Defense is actually Plato’s cleverly-disguised criticism of Protagorean relativism, which claims that each person is the measure of his/her reality. The criticism is not in the content of the speech, but in its form. There are two consequences to the Protagorean theory:
(i) a single perceiver cannot have two simultaneous seemings; and
(ii) whenever an individual perceives something, it is real and true (or partakes of what-is). An individual perceiver can never perceive something that is fake and false (or partakes of what-is-not). Plato’s “Mimēsis Objection,” as I call it, attacks both consequences. Contra (i), a perceiver of a mimēsis experiences two simultaneous and conflicting perceptions. Socrates appears simultaneously both as Socrates and as not-Socrates—that is, as ‘Protagoras’, whom he represents. And contra (ii), mimēsis is the perceptual presentation of something that is false. Socrates represents the dead Protagoras come alive. Thus, Socrates’ impersonation of ‘Protagoras’ is a performative contradiction because the way in which Socrates defends Protagoras, through mimēsis, contradicts the very Protagorean theory he presents. The perception of a mimetic episode is a counterexample to the view that each person is the measure of his/her reality. Mimēsis undermines the identity of appearance and reality in Protagorean relativism.

Ariane Economos. Marymount University. arianeeconomos@gmail.com. “Cognitive Reflexes and Restrained Judgment: A Cross-Cultural Examination.” (Buridan vs. Tsongkhapa) 5C

In this paper, I use the work of philosophers from two very different philosophical and cultural traditions to argue for the value of a certain kind of epistemic restraint. The 14th century Parisian philosopher, John Buridan, and the 14th-15th century Tibetan philosopher, Tsongkhapa, each identify a “cognitive reflex” that leads the human mind to impose characteristics on the world. Buridan claims that it is a reflexive function of the human intellect to assent to the universality of the truth of a principle when it “repeatedly perceives something to be the case and cannot discover a counterexample.” (Economos 2009, 130) Tsongkhapa identifies “innate reification” as a cognitive reflex that leads to the perception of things as “permanent, independent, [and] substantially existent.” (Garfield 2015, 13) While for Buridan, this cognitive reflex may lead to errors in our judgment of, and response to, perceptual experiences in certain circumstances, for Tsongkhapa, the reflex will undoubtedly lead to such errors. For both philosophers, it is the operation of a capacity of the human mind that must be restrained if these errors are to be avoided, as opposed to, say, the need for further perceptual confirmation of the judgment in order to avoid error. The shared conclusion we ought to draw from these philosophers is that approaching our perceptual experiences by way of a path between reflexive acceptance and universal doubt ought to be deemed an epistemic virtue.

References:


In Metaphysics IX.8, Aristotle advances one of the central principles of his thought: that “actuality is prior to potentiality.” (1049b5) In recent years, scholars have taken an increasing interest in the fact that Aristotle appears, in the succeeding chapter, to make a striking exception to this principle in the case of the kakon (“bad” or “evil”). In Metaphysics IX.9, he claims that “in the case of what is kakon, the end and the actuality is worse than the potentiality” and that “the kakon is in its nature posterior to the potentiality.” (1051a15-19) These remarks seem to imply that in the case of the kakon, actuality is in fact posterior to potentiality. This claim is strange, both because it makes an exception to the principle of IX.8, and because it seems inconsistent with our expectations about paradigm examples of things that are kakon, for example vicious actions. Suppose that vicious actions actualize the potential for evil-doing embodied in vices:
e.g., unjust actions such as murder actualize the potential for injustice in the unjust person. If actuality is in general prior to potentiality, why would that relation not hold in this case as well? As a result of this problem, interpreters have struggled to make sense of how Aristotle’s argument in IX.9 is supposed to work, and more generally to explain how Aristotle situates evil within his metaphysics. Recently Jonathan Beere has proposed a novel interpretation of this passage, focused around the idea that we should understand the actualities at issue here not as vicious actions but rather as the vices themselves, which are actualizations of the potentiality to form one’s moral character in general. Beere’s proposal is promising, but he has not yet made clear why exactly vices should be thought of as distinctively “posterior” to this potentiality. In “Aristotle on the Metaphysics of Kakon,” I undertake to answer this question and to demonstrate how the resulting reading succeeds in bringing out the full depth and interest of Aristotle’s argument.

David Ellis. *Boston College*. ellisdb@bc.edu. “Plotinus: The Image of Intellect and Being in Human Discourse.” Marren Panel. 4A

In the Socratic-Platonic tradition, a fundamental goal of philosophy is self-knowledge. Plotinus, continuing in this tradition, examines and explicates an impasse related to this goal. On the one hand, self-knowledge is not reducible to knowing propositions about oneself or to any account of oneself. All such knowledge involves the mediating work of images (concepts or analogies, for instance): all of which are other than one’s actual being. The possibility of genuine self-knowledge requires direct apprehension—knower and known must be one in and one with the act of knowing. On the other hand, philosophical thought and dialogue depend on accounts. We must use concepts, analogies, and other forms of language in examining and coming to know ourselves. There is a gap between the truth of our being and the accounts we give, and yet we inextricably depend on accounts. The question, then, is this: can an account lead to an act of unmediated self-knowledge?

This paper explains how Plotinus argues for this possibility while stressing the limits of our accounts. For Plotinus, the movement from discursive thought (accounts) to non-discursive thought (truth) involves a twofold transition: (1) from approaching reality as exterior to approaching it as interior and (2) from a limited perspective to a comprehensive apprehension. To exhibit the details of this movement, this paper is divided into three parts: the first part discusses Plotinus’ description of how discursive thought operates and how it differs from non-discursive thought. The second part outlines the movement from discursive to non-discursive thought. The third part discusses the role of seriousness and play in this movement.


*Eudemus* is one of Aristotle’s lost dialogues, but one that we know existed through secondary sources such as al-Kindi, Philiponus and Olympiodorus (amongst others). Chroust dates the book to 353/52 BCE. Commentators have noted the similarity of Aristotle’s *Eudemus* to Plato’s *Phaedo*, noting not only similar arguments, but possibly a similar motivation. Jaeger and Chroust refer to it as a *consolatio mortis*, much the same as Plato refers to his *Phaedo* (when through the voice of Socrates he identifies death as a hobgoblin that must be soothed away, rather than argued). While commentators wonder whether the *Eudemus* is evidence that early Aristotle held a Platonic notion of the soul’s immortality, another question that arises is whether Plato held one either.
The arguments in the *Eudemus* are remarkably similar to those in the *Phaedo*, and so the question arises whether Aristotle in fact held a Platonic metaphysics at the time of writing the *Eudemus*. But it’s not clear, based on the *Phaedo*, that Plato held the theory of immortality meant by this “Platonic metaphysics”. The arguments for the immortality of the soul presented by Plato are (1) obviously faulty; and (2) interspersed with comments about how arguments tend to be faulty. If indeed Aristotle is saying the same thing in the *Eudemus* that Aristotle is in the *Phaedo*, we can’t therefore conclude that both believe in the conclusions of the *Phaedo*’s arguments. Keeping the non-naïve interpretation of Plato in mind (i.e., any interpretation that admits the possibility of Plato not expressing himself literally through the character of Socrates), the similarity of the *Eudemus* to the *Phaedo* should indicate to us that Plato’s and Aristotle’s views were aligned. To what they were aligned, though, requires that a non-naïve interpretation of the *Phaedo* undergirds our interpreting the *Eudemus* as well.

Ian McCready-Flora. *University of Virginia*. Icm5h@virgina.edu. “Aristotle’s Persuaded Animal (Pistis)” 1F

Aristotle compares human and beast in many ways, but perhaps most striking is that we form beliefs (*doxa*) and they cannot. Understanding this strange claim sheds light on how Aristotle conceives of rationality, whatever accounts for our cognitive difference with other animals. That he draws the line at belief entails that the answer must go beyond what distinguishes high-level perfections of reason such as demonstration, contemplation and practical wisdom. Belief is fumbling and fallible, yet still beyond the reach of any non-human. Knowing is divine, but believing makes us human.

The present study interprets the connection he draws between belief, *pistis*, and the capacity to be persuaded, which requires reason, or *logos*. *Pistis* is a mental state we would nowadays call “credence.” It is scalar: a person can give more or less *pistis* to some claim, while *doxa* is binary.

A survey of key passages proves that, on Aristotle’s view, one’s level of credence corresponds to how likely something is to be true. Creatures can furthermore be in some credential state only by means of persuasion. Speech-centric vocabulary notwithstanding, this process has nothing inherently to do with language or linguistic consciousness. I argue instead that persuasion just is the process by which a soul responds to representations under the guise of truth. To be persuaded is therefore to be affected by the world in a way quite distinct from how it affects animals through sense-perception and imagining. This process controls the person’s level of credence in the relevant content, and sufficient levels of credence result in belief. This picture coheres with other aspects of how Aristotle views belief, for instance its normative connection to the truth. Non-humans, in contrast, respond only to the vividness and persistence of their mental representations. Their mental life is pneumatic, not epistemic.

Further comparison to non-human cognition proves informative. Aristotle calls some animals intelligent (*phronimos*), and non-human intelligence comes down to a creature’s past experience (stored as memory and other images) to modulate how it responds to its present circumstances. Intelligent creatures have very subtle differential response, but the world never persuades them of anything because this response has nothing to do with calculations of truth and likelihood. That belongs to rational creatures alone. This picture squares with Aristotle’s view of empeiria and how animals can have a small share of it despite having no grasp of universals.

Regarding the ascent to the Form of Beauty in Socratic ladder of love, there is always a discussion about the value of beautiful individuals as the objects of love, in the uniqueness of their individuality: in the process called Eros, in which the summit is the Form of Beauty, and every lower step is taken up to grasp this summit, could beautiful individuals, the object of love in our ordinary experience, truly be loved for their own sake? There are two main views: the first suggests that Plato instrumentalizes beautiful individuals in this ascent, and misses something that is fundamental to our experience of love. However, the second declares that although Eros is ultimately directed at the Form of Beauty, it is also genuinely directed at earthly objects; In other words, the apprehension of the Form of Beauty needs contribution of a hierarchical process, and beautiful particulars compose different steps of this process. All of this occurs in the “ascent”.

The main purpose of this paper is to support the second view; but focusing on the “descent” from the Form of Beauty, on the basis of this Platonic idea: the Form of Beauty, as the summit of this ascent, is never grasped fully, directly, and adequately; it can only be glimpsed “on a sudden” ($\epsilon \xi \alpha i \varphi \nu \gamma \varsigma$), “obscurely”, “hardly” and “scarcely” ($\mu \acute{\omicron} \gamma \zeta$), and then the lover, after a partial elusive noetic insight, must go back to the sub-ordinate steps. This descent is what maintains love, even after the peak achievement, as a process, a journey, a path of constant discovery, an infinite hunger, a state of lack, an intermediate and in-between state ($\mu \epsilon \tau t \alpha z \omicron$), and a daimon ($\delta \alpha \mu \omicron \nu$).

This paper is organized in three parts. The first part looks at the two interpretations of beautiful particulars in the ascent. The second part focuses on the role of “$\epsilon \xi \alpha i \varphi \nu \gamma \varsigma$” in the peak achievement, which maintains the procession of Eros in the descent. The last part describes the similarities between the two endless path of Eros and philosophy, in which both lover and philosopher must go back to the lower steps and play the role of educator.

Lee Franklin Panel: “A Twofold Experiment in Undergraduate Study of Plato” 2B

Through an analogy to shadows and reflections, Plato implies that the objects of dianoia are phantasmata (510a, 516b4-5, cf. eidôla, 516a7). Read metaphorically, this suggests that the objects of mathematics do not enjoy mind-independent status; instead, like reflected images, they are items that appear to inquirers through their theoretical orientation. I have previously argued for a reading of this kind through investigation of Plato’s BK VII depiction of mathematical methodology. In this paper, I show that the classification of intermediates as phantasmata is not merely metaphorical, but is instead an application of a broader epistemological theory, specifically an account of phantasmata as conceptualized representational states. After outlining this account, which is developed in Republic Bk. X, I show that it explains how mathematicians come to speak and think about intermediates: perfect, immaterial mathematical particulars. Among other benefits, this reading illuminates Plato’s emphasis on the use of sensibles in mathematical procedure (510e13, cf. 510b4-5, 511a7-9), as well as the central role of mathematics in effecting a turn away from the sensible and towards the intelligible realm of Forms.

Dylan Futter. Dylan.futter@wits.ac.za, University of Witwatersrand. “The Socratic Fallacy Undone.” 3F

The “Socratic fallacy” refers to a principle of the priority of definitional knowledge: If one knows anything about F, one must know what F is, in the sense of being able to give a definition (PD). The standard objection to (PD) in the literature is that it is false on account of the obvious
possibility of knowing examples and attributes of, say, books, without being able to provide a
definition. But the standard objection fails to see or acknowledge that Socrates ascribes knowledge
of virtue to his interlocutor, and still less that this attribution is methodological in character, by
which I mean not open to question in the course of the conversation. When the attribution of
knowledge is taken into account, it becomes clear that commitment to (PD) does not constitute a
fallacy, but a bold statement of confidence in the interlocutor’s ability to give a satisfactory
definition. Socrates affirms the antecedent of a conditional expressing a sufficient condition: since
the interlocutor does know something about virtue, he is able to define it. Or, factoring in the
distinction between knowing and saying that is essential to the workings of the elenctic method,
Socrates does not argue from the interlocutor’s failure to define virtue to the conclusion that he
does not know instances and attributes. Rather, he uses the principle to move in exactly the
opposite direction, from the affirmation of the interlocutor’s knowledge of virtue as explanation
of his capacity to identify instances and attributes to the conclusion that he is able to articulate it
in a definition. When understood in this way, (PD) turns out to be, not a “style of mistaken
thinking”, but a profound affirmation of the possibility of philosophy. Objections to (PD) exhibit
inattention to the functioning of the principle in the dialogue, and, in particular, from the mistaken
opinion that Socrates uses the principle to show that the interlocutor does not know what he claims
to know.

Myrna Gabbe. *University of Dayton. Mgabbe1@udayton.edu.* “Reproduction and the Ethics and
Politics of Fatherhood (Plato and Aristotle).” 3E

Why reproduce? What benefits can an ambitious, intellectually-minded man obtain by
having a wife and children? It is common knowledge that Plato regards reproduction as a means
to immortality. However, work is needed to understand the historical significance of this thesis
(hereafter, the RI thesis) and the role it plays within Plato’s social, ethical, and political theories.
Therefore, this presentation aims to situate the RI thesis within a broader historical and Platonic
context.

The presentation has three parts. In the first, I describe Plato’s argument and evidence for
the RI thesis presented in the *Symposium* and, time permitting, the biological basis for this theory
articulated in the *Timaeus*. In the second, I situate the RI thesis within its historical context,
considering marriage and childrearing from the perspective of the urban, elite father. The interest
is not to minimize the woman’s experience, but to recognize that the experience of raising
children in ancient Athens differed along gender and class lines, and that Plato theorized from
the perspective of an elite male. The evidence suggests that male elites debated the merits of
traditional family life, and that these debates centered on the personal benefits or harms of
heading a household (*oikos*) and the men’s duty to the *polis* to maintain or abandon the
traditional household. In the third part of the presentation, I draw out the ethical and political use
to which Plato puts the RI thesis in the *Republic*. I argue that the RI thesis responds to these
debates and allows Plato to claim that the traditional family structure is good for some, but not
for the political elite—the guardians.

** Note: Dr. Anna Cremaldi and I are working on a co-authored paper about the significance of
reproduction from the distinct perspectives of fathers and mothers in Aristotle’s biological and
ethical works—hence, the overlap between our abstracts.
Marc Gasser-Wingate. *Boston U.* mgwl@bu.edu. “Perceptual Beginnings in Plato and Aristotle.” 5A

Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. Though our learning takes many forms, Aristotle tells us it will generally involve our coming to know something on the basis of some preexisting knowledge. And generally this preexisting knowledge will itself be based on some further preexisting knowledge. Where does the regress end? With perceptual knowledge—the only sort of knowledge that is not itself derived from anything prior. Perception is thus supposed to provide a basic foundation for the rest of our cognitive development, by supplying us with knowledge in a way that doesn’t depend on our already having some knowledge at our disposal.

In outline the view is clear enough. But I don’t think its significance has been properly appreciated. In particular, the sense in which perception is meant to be “basic” or serve as a “foundation” is typically left unexplained, or else understood in etiological terms, as an account of the ultimate causal origins of our knowledge. I’ll be arguing here that such interpretations are inadequate: Aristotle is not (or not primarily) concerned with the causal origins of our knowledge. As I see it, his emphasis on our perceptual beginnings reflects a judgment about the value of knowledge developed by non-rational, perceptual means. And the motivation for this judgment is best understood by paying close attention to the dialectical context in which Aristotle advances his account of our perceptual beginnings—and by considering in particular his invocation of these perceptual beginnings as an alternative to certain innatist views discussed in Plato’s middle dialogues. So understood, perception’s foundational epistemic role can be seen to follow from Aristotle’s views on our capacity for reliable perceptual discrimination, and thus to stem from broadly zoological considerations about the role perception plays in guiding animal behavior. Or so I will be arguing.

References

Mark Gatten. *University of Toronto.* m.gatten@mail.utoronto.ca. “Socrates’ Refutation of Polemarchus.” 2C

The discussions Socrates has with Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus in Bk. I of Plato’s Republic serve as a proimion to everything that follows (357a2). Yet, by the standards of Republic scholarship, the refutation of Polemarchus has, for some reason, consistently received little attention. When commentators approach the passage on its own, there is a tendency to treat Polemarchus as yet another uninteresting non-final or second interlocutor (like Charmides or Polus); he is passed over to get to the ‘substance’ of the dialogue (in Bk. I, Thrasymachus). And those who *do* discuss Polemarchus at some length often see him as an unintelligent, morally-complacent mouthpiece for a traditional notion of justice (that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies), a notion that is introduced only so that it can be refuted by four quick arguments in five Stephanus pages, once Socrates demonstrates that justice, properly understood, never causes harm. This interpretative trend, however, overlooks many significant features of the discussion.
Polemarchus is the embodiment of the noble-spirited guard dog, an exemplum of the guardian class from which the philosopher-kings are taken. The refutation, upon closer examination, turns out to be rich and complex, relevant for many topics of interest to Plato scholars, e.g. Socratic refutation, protreptic, the virtue-craft analogy, the nature of justice, etc.

I focus only on one thread that runs throughout the passage, namely, the employment of the virtue-craft analogy and the shifting understanding of craft that underpins the different stages of the refutation. Focusing on this thread will serve my ultimate aim: to show that the refutation, rather than endorsing the Socratic principle to 'do no harm' (DNH), calls this very principle into question.

Most commentators think that Socrates is able to refute Polemarchus by forcing Polemarchus to adopt the virtue-craft analogy, and that the refutation thereby functions to pose a problem for all such analogies. Indeed, in the later books of the Republic the justice-craft notion seems to be abandoned. I argue that, because the DNH principle is in fact grounded upon a uni-directional notion of justice as a craft, the one element of the refutation that commentators identify as being genuinely Socratic (i.e. the DNH principle), turns out to be ungrounded, misguided and, according to the later books of the Republic, unrealistic for a city that must exist in the world.

A distinction between friend and enemy must emerge, even for the ideal city. The city must be able to pursue its own good and defend itself from aggressors. Thus, the city and its rulers will have to justify both a preferential concern for what is one's own (one's city, fellow citizens, and allied cities) as well as the harming of others in warfare. It is fitting that Polemarchus (literally, 'warlord' in Greek) should broach the topic as early as Bk. 1. Though it seems Polemarchus, the 'morally complacent gentleman,' is refuted in a mere five Stephanus pages by Socrates, it turns out that, for Plato, that commonplace of Greek popular morality since the time of Homer is, in many ways, correct.

Robert Gervasini. The Catholic University of America. 07gervasini@cua.edu. “Aristotle’s Reply to Megaric and Protagorean Perceptual Relativism in Metaphysics Θ.3” 4G

In his discussion of δύναμις in Metaphysics Θ, Aristotle brings up a position of “certain people, for example, the Megarics” (Metaphysics Θ.3, 1046b29).1 According to Aristotle, this school maintains that something can (δύνεσθαι) do X if and only if it is actually at work doing (ἐνεργῇ) X (1046b29-30). On the Megaric view, then, a builder sitting in the bar enjoying a beer cannot build because he is not actually at work building; the builder does not have the capacity (δύναμις) to build unless he is at work building. With respect to naturally endowed capacities (e.g., αἰσθητικόν), the consequences of the Megaric view are twofold. First, with respect to the inanimate (ἄψυχος) perceptible object (αἴσθητόν), the capacity to affect perception in the perceiver is only present when there is perception. Second, with respect to the animate subject of perception (ἐμψυχος), its capacity to perceive (αἰσθητικόν) the αἴσθητον, like the capacity of the builder to build, is only present when it actually perceives. In response to these Megarics, Aristotle accuses them of holding the same view of Protagoras who is known to endorse relativism with his statement

1 I use the title “Megaric” to refer to someone who is a member of a particular philosophical school, and “Megarian” to refer to a person from Megara. This bears on the distinction between Μεγαρικός and Μεγαρεύς. On the distinction, see David Shedley, “Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 203 (1977): 74-120, especially see note 3. See Klaus Döring, Die Megariker: Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien (Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner N.V.). All translations are my own. I follow the Greek text established by W. Jaeger. All quotations are from Metaphysics Θ unless otherwise noted. Therefore, I shall henceforth only list the Bekker number in parenthesis.
that “Man is the measure of all things” (πάντων εἶναι χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον). But apart from calling the consequences of the Megaric view about αἴσθησις absurd (ἀτόπα), Aristotle does not give a detailed argument against Protagoras’ (and Megaric) perceptual relativism except for claiming that it is observe to maintain that there is a perceptual object only if there is a perceiver present. In this paper, therefore, I shall draw out how Aristotle’s notion of δύναμις in Metaphysics Θ.3 overcomes perceptual relativism.

This essay has three parts. First, I suggest a possible motivation behind the Megaric position. I propose that the Megarics do not deny δύναμις without qualification. Rather, the Megarics understand that something only has a δύναμις when that δύναμις is at work (ἐνεργῇ). It is because we witness the actualization of δύναμις that led the Megarics to conclude that something has the δύναμις to do X if and if is actually at work doing X.

Second, I examine how the Megaric view with respect to αἴσθησις becomes the same as Protagoras’ perceptual relativism. I suggest that the Megaric thesis (as I have reconstructed it) leads to perceptual relativism because the Megaric view arises if we privilege our view of things over the truth; only if we can see X doing Y can we say that X can do Y. In this way, I think the Megaric position leads to one similar to Protagoras.

Third, I suggest how Aristotle’s notion of δύναμις overcomes the perceptual relativism of Protagoras and the Megarics. I appeal to Aristotle’s De anima where Aristotle describes αἴσθησις in detail. I argue that Aristotle can overcome perceptual relativism by showing that the δύναμις of the perceiver to perceive and the δύναμις of the perceptual object to be perceived are independent of each other even though each δύναμις finds its ἐντελεχεία in the other. The way out of this perceptual relativism, I suggest, is to understand how Aristotle distinguishes δύναμις from ἐνέργεια. Aristotle shows how δύναμις is present in things even when they are not being actualized. In short, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are distinct; δύναμις is independent of ἐνέργεια as a distinct way of being. In this way, the δύναμις of the perceptible object is independent of its being perceived by the perceiver. Likewise, the δύναμις of the perceiver to perceive the perceptible object is independent of the δύναμις of the perceptible object even though the two δύναμεις are actualized at the same time. The problem with the Megaric thesis is that it fails to register potentiality (δύναμις) as an independent way of being from ἐνέργεια. Unless the δύναμις of the αἰσθητόν has being independent of its being perceived by the perceiver, then Aristotle cannot block Protagoras’ perceptual relativism.

Gary Gurtler, S.J. Boston College. gurtlerg@bc.edu. “Plotinus: The Image of the Cosmic Soul and Nature in Human Discourse.” Marren Panel 4A

Plotinus spends a considerable amount of effort in defining the difference between discursive reason in its human expression in knowledge from the non-discursive mode of the Cosmic Soul and Nature in producing the cosmos as a whole and the variety of life on earth. He first indicates that Nature and the Cosmic Soul engage in no planning or deliberation in their respective roles of forming living things on earth or the eternal motions of the heavens. They both work from within things, in contrast to the human soul which works from the outside on things already at hand that need study and planning to be formed into objects for human use. Additionally, our sciences capture the intelligibility of nature and the cosmos but only as images that necessarily remain incomplete since only an aspect of their full intelligibility is available to us as observing them externally.

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2 This Protagorean doctrine is discussed at length in Plato’s Theaetetus 151e-187a. The Theaetetus mentions two Megarics from Megara: Euclides (the most important member) and Terpsion.
Several 2nd century CE medical writers considered medicine of their time a stochastic art (stochastikē technē). By this they were referring to the nature of medical practice to aim (stochos) at proper treatment, and disregard success or failure in the assessment of the physician himself. More explicitly, so long as the physician in charge of one's care worked with good intentions and in accordance with the prevailing treatment appropriate for one's ailment one would not consider him a poor physician. This sentiment rings true for modern interpretations of medical practice as well, although one still desires that her physician be knowledgeable in what the “proper” treatment is. This relies on a mutually agreed-upon knowledge base that is characteristic of modern science. How then was one able to evaluate her medical care in ancient societies, such as Greece during the time of the Hippocratics (ca 5th century BCE), wherein such knowledge of proper treatment was less widely available to non-experts?

I contend that while the medicine of Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias (two of the aforementioned 2nd century writers in favor of a stochastic view) certainly worked at a stochastic level, such a view was both not prevalent and not viable in the Hippocratics. Rather, as rational medicine had begun a recent evolution due to its convergence with natural philosophy, patients and physicians alike were more concerned on the productive ends of a physician. For the patient this was simply the treatment of an ailment, whereas the onlooking (friendly or rival) physician viewed the treatment and consequential curing or lack thereof as indicative of the quality of the physician and whether his views of a particular disease are correspondingly correct or not. While this view paints with broad strokes concerning the class of all Hippocratic physicians at this time and our existing corpus of their literature is far from comprehensive I nonetheless believe I have identified a substantial trend throughout the corpus that differentiates it from the stochastic view held by later commentators.

In Nicomachean Ethics VII, one finds through an examination of the pleasant by nature that human nature is neither simple nor good. In fact, human nature is composed of a perishable element and a non-perishable element. These elements act in ways which contra-mand the good and the excellence of the other element, leaving human nature in conflict. This is a devastating discovery for Aristotle’s inquiry into human excellence. This paper argues that it is through his teaching on proper self-love that one can restore human nature to be, in a manner, simple and good. To establish Aristotle’s teaching on friendship, self-love and the proper order of loves in one’s soul, we will examine Book IX, chapters four through twelve and various other relevant texts in the Nicomachean Ethics.

If, as Plato is often taken to suppose, the Forms structure the world, shape our experience of it, and serve as the ultimate aim of philosophical inquiry, it’s natural to suppose that they will also play a pivotal role in Plato’s theory of language. Indeed, Plato scholars frequently ascribe him a view of language where eponymy plays a central role in explaining the semantics of terms. The thinking goes that if all things are categorized into classes on the basis of the Forms, and
these classes are the objects of our thought and the subjects of our discourse, surely we must be speaking about Forms when we speak. They provide the primary semantic values of the terms we use. This view—I will henceforth describe as being ‘Form-first’—holds that (i) words primarly refer to Forms as they are the primary constituents of the world and the focus of our mental activity. But (ii) the names we assign to Forms also pick out the ordinary objects that stand in a relation of participation to them secondarily. Thus, people can still talk about the world in which they are embedded, even though this process is more circuitous than it initially seems. This is a tidy story and the temptation to assign Plato this Form-first view is compelling for textual and theoretical reasons. However, despite this theory’s seeming plausibility, there are a number of other considerations that seem to tell against its adoption. Spelling out these concerns, and outlining a suitable alternative, is the aim of my paper.

Betsy Jelinek. Christopher Newport University. elizabeth.jelinek@cnu.edu. “Material Necessity in Plato’s Timaeus.” 3D

Is the demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus omnipotent? Of course, we know that the demiurge is not, strictly speaking, omnipotent, because he does not create or control the Forms. Within the realm of becoming, however, the demiurge could be interpreted as an all-powerful creator-god, or as a divinity whose power is limited by Necessity (a personification of the constraints of the material world). Sedley, a proponent of the former view, argues:

There are, I think, considerable difficulties in defending a reading according to which matter to some extent successfully resists the Demiurge’s persuasion. Would Plato’s theology really allow that the best thing in the universe, god, might on occasion be defeated by the lowliest thing, matter? This is such an un-Platonic thought that very clear evidence would be needed before the point could safely be conceded. I believe that there is none (Sedley 116).

Arguing on similar grounds, Broadie concludes that it is a “general foundational premise” that “this cosmos is through and through the product of divine reason” (Broadie 256).

If, as Sedley and Broadie claim, the demiurge is unrestricted by nature, it follows that he is the all-powerful creator of the world of becoming. In this paper, I argue against this view. While Sedley thinks it is “un-Platonic” to think that the demiurge is constrained by nature, I argue that it is anachronistic (or “un-Greek,” if you’d like) to think he is not. On my interpretation of the text, Necessity resists the demiurge’s persuasion and thus constrains his work. Unfortunately for Sedley, the demiurge is a craftsman who is limited by the materials he has to work with -- the demiurge is, indeed, “defeated by the lowliest thing, matter.”

David Jennings. University of California Merced. davidleejennings@gmail.com. “Human Wisdom in Plato’s Apology.” 2G

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the view of wisdom and philosophy that Socrates offers in the Apology. There, Socrates speaks of and, in fact, exemplifies what he calls, “human wisdom.” The adjective “human” serves to express his wisdom’s degree of perfection, to contrast it with the “divine” or “super human,” but perhaps not accidentally it also points to its subject matter. The Socrates of the Apology is uniquely, perhaps even unprecedentedly, concerned with human life, the city, and things good and evil. This is confirmed by Cicero, who says, "Socrates was the first who called philosophy down from the heaven, and placed it in the cities, and introduced it even in homes, and drove it to inquire about life and customs and things good and evil." (Tuscan Disputations V.10). I argue that for Socrates in that dialogue, wisdom
involves an awareness of his ignorance of human excellence and a commitment to certain ethical principles that, in turn, guide his conduct; and philosophy involves the pursuit of this missing knowledge, whose possession will make us good. While these conceptions of wisdom and philosophy are noble in their own right and highly defensible in light of our nature as agents and citizens, I shall argue they should be rejected for failing to do justice to our nature as beings that desire to understand.

Eric Jensen. University of Western Ontario. Ejense4@uwo.ca. “Clarifying ‘aei alēthēs’ Perception Claims in De Anima” 5A

In De Anima III.3, 427b11-12, Aristotle makes the surprisingly strong claim that perception of the objects of the special or proper senses (idia aisthēta) of hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch is “always true” (aei alēthēs). At 428b18-19, Aristotle remarks further that such perception “is true” (aesthesia tōn men idiōn alēthēs estin) or “admits the least possible falsehood” (hoti oligiston exousa to pseudos). Although Aristotle clarifies what he means by such perception being “not deceived” (ouk apatatai) somewhat in De Anima, his position nevertheless appears overstated. Specifically, Aristotle himself discusses several examples of the limitations of special/proper perception in De Anima, De Generatione Animalium, Metaphysics, and elsewhere that seriously complicate his assertions at DA III.3, 427b11-12 and 428b18-19. I argue that explicating Aristotle’s aei alēthēs qualification with the import of his common “always or for the most part” (aei hōs epi to polu) qualification resolves many difficulties associated with maintaining a strong reading of special perception as aei alēthēs. Further, I argue that such use of the hōs epi to polu qualification to explicate aei alēthēs here is appropriate. Aristotle’s use of the hōs epi to polu qualification to describe relations that come about by nature (GA 727b29-30; 777a19-21; PA 663b28-29; Metaphys. 1027a8-28) and to describe relations admitting chance and probability (APo 87b19-22; Rhet. 1357a35; Top. 112b10-11) is consistent with (1) Aristotle’s overall treatment of sense perception as part of certain natural systems telically organized towards an organism’s flourishing, and (2) his characterization of the senses as statistically reliable but susceptible to error.

Stephen Kershner. Austin Peay State University. kershners@psu.edu. “Grieving Philosophically in Statius’ Consolation Poems” 1G

The majority of scholarship on Statius’ six epiedia and consolationes (poems meant to diminish grief for a loved one in a friend) in the Silvae—2.1 (Glauicas Atedi Meliori delicatus), 5.1 (Epicedion in Priscillam Abascanti uxorem), 5.3 (Epicedion in patrem suum), 5.5 (Epicedion in puerum suum), 2.6 (Consolatio ad Flavium Ursum de Amissione pueri delicati) and 3.3 (Consolatio ad Claudium Etruscum)—has generally focused on socio-rhetorical and literary issues in the fraught relationships surrounding death (Asso 2010, Bernstein 2005, Markus 2004). But, this work either ignores the philosophical dimension of these poems or suggests that Statius overtly avoids the usual therapeutic philosophical argument that we see in other consolations, such as Seneca’s Consolatio ad Marciam, even suggesting that he “indirectly sublimes” it (Markus 2004). I believe that the view that Statius completely eschews philosophical therapeutic discussion in these poems of lament reads past, and thus misses, the subtler philosophical statements found in the poems. This paper will argue that underneath the socio-rhetorical and poetic elements in these poems there exists a distinct philosophical subtexture, dealing primarily with the philosophically problematic motif of the mors immatura (premature death). When we examine Silvae 2.1, 2.6, 5.5 — all dedicated to dead young slave or freed boys — we find a clear
philosophical therapeutic strategy at work. I will show that Statius uses a syncretic philosophical approach, blending the consolatory strategies of Stoics, Epicureans, Peripatetics and others as they are briefly shown in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputation* 3.76-79. I will then compare some of Statius' consolatory arguments against specific ones employed by ancient philosophers. Specifically, he utilizes such arguments as (1) the balance between "needing to get it out" (found in Epicurean sources like Philodemus' *De Morte*) and the "silliness" and irrationality of immoderate grief (found in Seneca's emotionally restrictive consolations); (2) the foolishness of fearing death and that death is not entirely evil (with an extended allusion to Lucretius *DRN* 3.1011-1023); (3) all things die and thus it is foolishness (*stultitia*) to weep (with Cyrenaic and Stoic presences, e.g., Seneca *ME* 77.11); and (4) the boys are fortunate as they now no longer have to deal with the hazards of life, echoing Epicurus' tenet of striving for *aponia* (painlessness) and similar sentiments in Seneca.

Selected Bibliography

George Latura. *Independent Scholar*. glbeke@me.com. “Was Plato a Bakkhos?” 2F

A recent work, *Philosophy and Salvation in Greek Religion* (Adluri, ed., De Gruyter, 2017), argues that ancient Greek philosophy and ancient Greek religion might not have been that far apart.

Supporting this thesis, we find Plato invoking Bacchic Mysteries in *Phaedo* (69c): “It is likely that those who established the mystic rites for us were not inferior persons but were speaking in riddles long ago… There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thrysus but the Bacchants are few.” (trans. Grube. In *Plato: Complete Works*, Cooper, ed., 1997, p. 60).

The thrysus is specific to the rites of Dionysos, and Plato next seems to declare that he is one of the Bacchic initiates: “These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way. I have in my life left nothing undone in order to be counted among these as far as possible…”

What did it entail to become a Bacchic initiate, a *Bakkhos*? Porphyry quotes from Euripides’ lost play *Cretans*, where an initiate confesses:

“...have led a pure life from the day
“I became an initiate of Zeus of Ida,
“fulfilling the thunder-rite of Zagreus Night-goer
“and the raw-meat feasts,
“holding up a torch for the mountain mother
“with the Kouretai I was called a bakkhos
“and sanctified.”
Elsewhere, in his *Life of Pythagoras*, Porphyry recounts how Pythagoras himself was initiated in Crete: “Going to Crete, Pythagoras besought initiation from the priests of Morgos, one of the Idaean Dactyls, by whom he was purified with the meteoric thunderstone… Descending into the Idaean cave… he stayed there twenty-seven days… he sacrificed to Zeus…”

According to Porphyry, Pythagoras was a Bacchic initiate, one of the few that, according to Plato, did not merely carry the thyrsus, but truly understood the Bacchic Mysteries. Since Plato’s writings have referenced Pythagorean themes (harm ony of the Planets, metempsychosis – *Republic*, 617b, 619b), it might seem that Plato was following in the Bacchic footsteps of Pythagoras, who purportedly had been initiated on Mt. Ida in Crete.

Was Plato himself a *Bakkhos*?

Jeong-In Lee. *Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea*. epimess@gmail.com. “Aristotle’s Voluntary and Involuntary Revisited (EN 3 and 5)” 2D

While the voluntary (*to hekousion*) and the involuntary (*to akousion*) in Aristotle’s thought is mainly discussed in regard to *Nicomachean Ethics* III, in the contribution of Aristotle’s ideas in *NE* V.8 to the topic are relatively neglected. Indeed, Aristotle’s remarks in V.8 are either only selectively considered (Sorabji, 1980; Meyer, 2011) or even deemed irreconcilable with those in book III (Kenny, 1979; Broadie, 1991). In this paper, by offering a new reading of V.8., I show that the ideas of this chapter are compatible with what Aristotle says in book III. This sheds new light on Aristotle’s classification of the voluntary and the involuntary.

To this end, I begin by focusing on the three kinds of harms, which are mentioned in V.8. (1135b13-1135b26) and which I take are clues to solve key interpretive issues in regard Aristotle’s conception of voluntariness. These harms, which are not explicitly identified by Aristotle, are discussed by a few commentators who provide divergent answers on what they are (Rackham, 1934; Ross, 2009). I point out weaknesses of these preceding interpretations and suggest a new reading, according to which the three harms respectively correspond to depictions of voluntary and involuntary actions in the beginning of the same chapter.

Second, I connect my reading of V.8 to what Aristotle says in III.1. In this book, voluntary actions are divided into two kinds, that is, those ‘by force’ (*bia*) and those ‘because of ignorance’ (*di’ agnoian*) (1110a1), and, likewise, involuntary actions are distinguished into two kinds, that is, those ‘by ignorance of the universal due to the depravity’ (1110b32) and those ‘by feeling (*pathos*)’ (1111a24). This way of division is similar to the three harms discussed in V.8 in terms of the style of the description and the word choice.

Finally, I turn to a potential problem for my argument concerning Aristotle’s technical terms: In V.8 Aristotle employs the term ‘in ignorance’ (*agnoomenon*, 1135a32-33) to refer to the involuntary, while in III.1 he distinguishes actions done ‘in ignorance’ from those done ‘because of ignorance’ (*di’ agnoian*) and attributes involuntariness only to the latter. Some scholars point out this disparity as a proof that book III and book V are incompatible (e.g. Broadie, 1991). Given that book V is part of the common books that *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Eudemian Ethics* share, however, I take this different usage as a clue that indicates the development of Aristotle’s thought.
Cecilia Li. University of Western Ontario. Cecilia.z.li289@gmail.com. “Who is Plato’s Technikos?” 2F

Plato often emphasizes the importance of technē as a specialized class of knowledge that is distinct from divine power or gift (Ion 533d2, 536c4) and the guessing and memory based practice of knack (emperia) (Gorgias, 501b). Whether Socrates is examining the reputed disciplines of rhapsodes and orators or some definition of virtue proposed by his interlocutors, the requirements of what qualifies as a technē are often demanding. Furthermore, the ways in which one can successfully demonstrate his mastery of a technē are seldom easy. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role that the craftsman (technikos) plays in Plato’s understanding of technē. I ask three questions in my paper: 1) Who is the ideal candidate for practicing a technē? 2) What kind of character traits should the ideal craftsman possess? 3) What is the relationship between the craftsman and the technē that he practices?

We learn from the Gorgias that technē must be able to provide an account (logos) and cause (aitia) of the nature of its subject while aiming for the best (465a-b). Technē must have a function (Ion 537c-d), seek the welfare of its subject (Rep. I 342e) and be teachable. What is evident from these texts is the primary role given to technē as an independent body of knowledge over the virtues of any individual craftsman. For Plato, the emphasis is not on who practices a technē as long as what he practices meets the necessary conditions of a technē. Nonetheless, Plato recognizes that technē cannot implement itself and must be practiced by someone. Therefore, I argue that it is important to inquire into the craftsman as someone who can successfully implement the strict standards of a given technē. Drawing from key passages in the Ion, Charmides and Republic I, I argue that the ideal craftsman is someone who personifies technical knowledge. For Plato, technical knowledge, when it is present in the craftsman, is a special ability (dunamis) that allows one to act within a specified domain. Strictly speaking, one is only ever a craftsman when one exercises that special dunamis.

Robert Luzecky. Purdue University Fort Wayne. luzeckyr@pfw.edu. “Aristotle, Ingarden, and the Ontology of Literary Works of Art” 5C

One fruitful area of research is the investigation of Ancient Greek influences on contemporary philosophical discussions. In the present paper, I elaborate on Aristotle’s influence on Roman Ingarden’s ontology of the literary work of art. In Aristotle’s Poetics, we find an inexact analog to Ingarden’s proposition that the literary work of art is an ontologically stratiform entity. Further, Aristotle offers a means to distinguish between the literary work of art, and non-artistic literary work, and this approach is echoed by Ingarden. Finally, I critically assess Ingarden’s concern that no correlate of the stratum of schematized aspects (in which literary objects – e.g. Oedipus, Achilles, a goat-stag, etc. – subsist as existents that are discrete from real world entities) may be found in Aristotle’s Poetics. I suggest that the dramatic reversals of the lyric poem are analogs to Ingarden’s stratum of schematized aspects. These analyses yield the two-fold conclusion that: 1) the literary work of art, as Aristotle describes it in Poetics, contains analogous elements of the Ingarden’s conception of it as an ontologically stratiform entity, and; 2) to this extent we can safely assert that Aristotle’s poetics provide a much needed answer the contemporary question concerning the exact nature of a literary work of art.

Daniel Maher. Assumption College. dmaher@assumption.edu. “What Law Wishes to Be (Plato Minos and Laws)” 1E
In Plato’s *Minos*, Socrates suggests that law wishes to be the discovery of what is. In other words, law issues commands and assertions in such a manner as to preempt questions and efforts to discover with one’s own eyes what is. Socrates’s unnamed partner in conversation responds as if Socrates had said law is the discovery of what is, thereby illustrating the human appetite for answers that remove the need to question and to think. This distortion of Socrates’s suggestion leads the conversation to the view that a permanent divine law may be the only genuine law. Insofar as law in this sense shuts down inquiry into what is before it can begin, law would preclude philosophical questioning.

In Plato’s *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger’s suggestion that their laws should have preludes intended to persuade the governed to accept the laws thus appears as the introduction of a path to philosophy within the regime governed by law. That is, although the preludes urge acceptance of the law, they simultaneously invite anyone inclined to think the argument through to question the law. The preludes mitigate the antagonism between law and philosophy.


In the *Ion*’s challenge to weave anew the fabric of culture and in the *Meno*’s demonstration of the *daimonic* power of human creativity, we see Plato living in *mousike*. These two issues—the weave of the *polis* and of the person—guide the *Politeia*’s discussion of justice as well. From the start, the *Politeia* is mimetic; it is an enactment of the very ideas it addresses and which Socrates recounts like a rhapsode. By its end, Socrates says the mimetic poets must be expelled from the city; from its start, when his friends reject the healthy City of Artisans which is defined by human need and not by greed, it seems as if justice must be expelled, too, at least as the little company of men define it. While it might seem outrageous from a contemporary perspective to think of expelling the poets (maybe because we do not appreciate the power of poetry as fully as Plato did), the idea of purging justice from the dialogue might seem even more so. Yet, Plato is a trickster. He invites the poets back if someone can show that poetry is both delightful and beneficial. He tries to convince his characters that justice belongs to this same class of goods. Justice and poetry either rise together or sink together, depending on the constitutions of the individuals and their society, and I think Plato hopes for the first, seeing the two as both “joined at the head” and both delightful and beneficial.

Marina Marren. *American University in Cairo*, marina.marren@aucegypt.edu, Panel Organizer


This paper sets out to prove that truth (*aletheia*, *etymos*, and *orthos*)—especially as ancient Greek philosophy conceives of it—can only be reached, if we aim at the whole. What does this holistic approach mean? I argue that truth, which extends further than our certainty that some “x” is the case or that some “x” corresponds to some “y,” encompasses not only our theoretical speculation, but also the practical world of action. In short, the Socratic take on truth, pursues it by considering the whole of words and deeds, with an eye on the context of a particular situation. However, it is not a “situational” or a “pragmatic” interest in the truth that drives the arguments in this essay, but rather, my interest lies in articulating how truth depends on our attentiveness to the tensions that arise from the interplay of words and actions in Plato’s writing as well as in our own lives. To wit, the “words,” here, take on a broad range of meaning of both *logoi* (arguments and heuristic speeches) and *muthoi* (stories, poetic, and mythic
accounts). The “actions” designate the *dramata*, as these shape both the common path of life and its theatrical projection. To focus this account of truth, I turn to Plato’s *Republic* IV – VII and Aristophanes’ *Ekklesiazusae*, *Knights*, and *Birds*. I explain how these Aristophanic comedies in particular animate both the *logoi* and the *muthoi* in Plato’s *Republic*, where the dialogue turns to the consideration of the optimal political arrangement, the just life, and the highest truth. The conversation between comedy and philosophy, which I argue is afoot in the *Republic*, draws on Aristophanes’ political satire. I invite you to hear the Aristophanic laughter, even in Plato’s writing. If we do, we stand to realize that our reading of Plato’s dialogues is all-too-tragic, unless we pursue the double, that is, the theoretically rigorous (i.e., serious) as well as the theatrically playful (i.e., artful), character of Plato’s thought, which is timeless, precisely, because it is true to all the drama of life.

Robert Mayhew. *Seton Hall University. robert.mayhew@shu.edu*. “Aristotle on Helios’ ‘Omniscience’ in *Iliad* 3 and *Odyssey* 12” (schol. B* *Iliad* 3.277a [fol. 47r] ≈ fr. 173.1 Heitz/149 Rose3/373 Gigon) 2A

In *Iliad* 3, as part of his oath affirming that the Greeks will abide by the outcome of the duel between Menelaus and Paris, Agamemnon swears first to Zeus, and then to Helios (the Sun), “who (over)sees all things and (over)hears all things” (*Ἠέλιος θ’, ὃς πάντ’ ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ’ ἐπακούεις*) (277). In *Odyssey* 12, however, while Odysseus is describing his adventures, and specifically the killing of the Cattle of Helios by his comrades, he says: “Swift to Hyperion Helios came a messenger, | Lampetia of the long robe, [proclaiming] that we killed his cattle” (อนาคต δ’ Ηέλιοι Ὑπερίον ἄργελος ἡλθε | Λαμπέτιη τανύπεπλος, ὃι βόας ἔκταμεν ἡμείς) (374-375). One or more ancient scholar or critic of Homer suspected a contradiction here, which gave rise to a Homeric *problêma*: Why would a god who sees all need a messenger? Among the Homeric *scholia* is evidence that Aristotle offered three solutions to this problem. My aim in this paper is to take a fresh look at the *scholium* that serves as the basis for this fragment from Aristotle’s *Homeric Problems*—namely *schol.* B* II. 3.277a* (fol. 47r)—and offer an improved interpretation of it.

Ashton McHatton. *Western Kentucky University. ashton.mchatton@hotmail.com*. “Non-emotional: The Character Type of the Psychopath” Anton Panel 3B

Psychopathy presents itself in vastly different ways given that there are successful psychopaths and there are criminal psychopaths. However, even though these two types live vastly different lives they fall into the same character type as they display the same abusive behaviors. The criminal psychopath may be obviously abusive, but the successful psychopath is one who uses their charm and manipulation to mask their abuses. There is not a preexisting character type as distinguished by Aristotle that encompasses the character of the psychopath, and I explain why the psychopath could not be considered godly, virtuous, continent, incontinent, vicious or brutish. I introduce a new character type that does describe the psychopath: “non-emotional,” and this is the best term for the character of the psychopath for its derivation from Aristotle’s non-voluntary. Furthermore, I will argue that this new character type is the only truly fixed character type since there is no possibility to change from this type as there is a possibility to improve from viciousness and to decrease from virtuousness.

Catherine McKeen. *Mass. College of Liberal Arts. cam3@williams.edu*. “Ruling Reluctantly in Plato’s *Republic.*” 3C
At Republic 471c4-474c6, Socrates asserts that “there will be no end to evils” in cities unless philosophers rule or rulers become sufficiently philosophical. Philosophical rule, that is, is necessary for civic happiness.

But philosophical rule involves numerous problems. One significant problem is that philosophers dislike ruling and are quite reluctant to take on this task (521b). Moreover, the philosophers’ antipathy towards ruling seems quite reasonable. Contemplation and intellectual activity are objectively the most valuable human activities. Philosophers are in the best epistemic position to make accurate evaluative judgments, so their preferences can be expected to accurately track what is the case. When philosophers express antipathy to ruling, they are indicating the true superiority of the philosophical life, as compared with all other lives.

Thirdly, the Republic indicates that philosophers must be “compelled” to rule (499b, 500d, 519e, 521b, 540b). Some kind of compulsion is needed, plausibly, because philosophers accurately judge that the political life is inferior to the life of philosophical activity. However, a central thesis of the Republic is that “justice pays” – that justice benefits the just agent. The reluctance of philosophers to rule and the fact that they rule only under some kind of compulsion thus seems to fly in the face of the Republic’s eudaimonist project.

Glauccon sums up the difficulties with this challenge: “So, won’t we be treating [philosophers] unjustly when we cause them to live a worse life, when they are capable of living a better one?” (519d8-9).

To answer Glauccon’s challenge, my paper closely examines the philosopher’s development in the Republic. I argue that ruling does not seriously threaten the happiness of philosophers in the kallipolis. Developed philosophers – philosophers who have made the successful ascent to the Form of the Good – will lead the happiest lives that it is possible for embodied human beings to live. These individuals will spend the majority of their time in contemplation and intellectual activity, with occasional forays into the world of politics. Less-developed philosophers, I hold, will be moderately happy. However, it is important on my view to show how individual ambitions must be conditioned by abilities in the kallipolis. A life of full-time intellectual activity is out of bounds for philosophers prior to age 55, and so such a life cannot make them happy.

Finally, I argue that philosophers’ attitude towards ruling indicates their reasonable attitude towards human life in an embodied condition. Philosopher-rulers recognize that there is a better life for them, the life of full-time contemplation and intellectual activity. But this life is only possible once their souls are freed from embodiment by death. The attitude that developed philosophers have towards ruling, on my view, is thus akin to the attitude that enlightened souls take towards necessary bodily desires (558a3-c). As such, philosophical reluctance to ruling should be expected to be long-standing and deeply-rooted. The view I propose allows that philosophers can be reluctant to rule, compatible with the Republic’s eudaimonist project.


In cognitive science and the philosophy of mind there is a debate about whether consciousness is multisensory or unisensory. Because the debate concerns the structure of consciousness and the role of our sensory modalities in consciousness, it involves a broad range of questions and investigations by diverse disciplines. This paper confines itself to one aspect of the debate which I define as follows. If human consciousness is multisensory, humans can have at the same time conscious experience derived from two or more sensory modalities, for example
visual and auditory, or auditory and tactile. If human consciousness is unisensory, humans cannot have conscious experience derived from more than one sensory modality at one time. Our common introspective position on this debate is decidedly in favor of the multisensory view (MSV). However, there does not seem to be conclusive scientific evidence for MSV. It may be that the unisensory view (USV) better represents conscious sensory experience. From Plato onwards, ancient philosophy has endorsed MSV, and the most explicit arguments for MSV are found in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s *De Anima* and in various treatises by Plotinus. I examine these arguments. I then explain the purpose these arguments serve for Alexander and Plotinus and inquire whether the arguments are conclusive. Finally, I examine what consequences would follow for these authors if USV were shown to be true.

Freya Mobus. *Cornell University*. [Fmm59@cornell.edu](mailto:Fmm59@cornell.edu), “Can Flogging Make Us Smarter? Socrates on Reformatory Punishment.” 3F

Most interpreters have argued that Socrates in the early, pre-*Republic* dialogues cannot approve of reformatory punishment, i.e., punishment for the sake of the improvement of the wrongdoer. Yet, there are numerous passages in which he seems to enthusiastically endorse it. The standard move is to try to explain those passages away. I, however, think we can take them at face value. Socrates does approve of reformatory punishment in certain circumstances, and I offer a novel explanation of how Socratic moral psychology is compatible with his approval of punishment. Painful punishment can, I will propose, epistemically improve wrongdoers by communicating a moral message that in certain cases cannot be communicated effectively through philosophical dialogue.

John Mulhern. *University of Pennsylvania*. [Johnjm11@verizon.net](mailto:Johnjm11@verizon.net), “Aristotle’s τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας (*Pol.* 1292b41-1293a10): History and Analysis.” 1E

Aristotle has been understood to say explicitly that in the fourth democracy, all participate (μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς πολιτείας, 1293a3-4). One might expect that this statement would be true for Athens, since Athens was the most prominent Athenian democracy. Recent historical studies have suggested, however, that, contrary to an earlier view, there never was a gathering of all the Athenian citizens for governmental purposes, since, even if they had been willing and able to attend, there was not enough room at the Pnyx or in the Theater of Dionysus to accommodate them. In the present paper I shall suggest how Aristotle’s statement might be understood to be consistent with the historical evidence even for Athens.

James Shelton Nalley. *Georgetown U*. [jsn35@georgetown.edu](mailto:jsn35@georgetown.edu), “Philia, Harmonia, and the Philosopher King in the Ismaili Political Philosophy of Nasir al-Din Tusi.” 4E

Plato’s *Republic* and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* are arguably the most pivotal text in the area of Islamic Political Philosophy, determining its shape, direction, and character. Their influences can be seen explicitly, or felt implicitly, in the various writings of Al-Kindī, Al-Fārābī, Ibn Sinā, and Ibn Rushd, all well-known, and well-studied (though not exhaustively) names in the Western Academy. Slightly less known in the West, but no less influential, is Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, for whom both of these works play a significant role in his early treatise, *Al-Akhlāq al-Nāṣirī* (*The Nasirean Ethics*). The third part of the *Nasirean Ethics* deals with the division of practical philosophy known as politics, and is concerned with how perfection is obtained both individually and collectively, i.e., how both the citizens and the city are perfected. This paper contributes to the growing body of scholarship on Post-Ghazālī Islamic Philosophy, which has
been largely under examined by the Academy in Europe and North America, by tracing the uses of *Philia* (*mahabba*) and *Homonoia* (*tāʾlīf*) in the *Nasirean Ethics*. I show how these concepts function in Ṭūsī’s Ismāʿīlī philosophy to bind, hierarchically, the individuals and the “city” (understood broadly) to the Imām – who assumes a function similar to the philosopher king – and, through the Imām, to God. This binding, by means of *philia* and *homonoia*, to God, through the Imām, brings the individual, the society, and ultimately all creation, to its ultimate end in a quasi-union with God.

Rich Neels. *McMaster University. neelsr@mcmaster.ca* “Heraclitus on the Nature of Goodness.”

1E

In this paper I hope to show that Heraclitus is concerned with a subject matter which today we might call “value theory.” Value theory, as I see it, is concerned with questions concerning goodness: what does it mean for a thing to be good? What does it mean for a thing to be good for someone? Is anything good *simpliciter*? That is, is there any good thing whose goodness exists independently of any respondent? In this paper I argue that Heraclitus was interested in such questions and had his own views concerning the nature of value and goodness. On my view, the fragments of Heraclitus support the following claims: i) the same object can have opposing values. This is evident in the world (e.g. sea-water is both pure and polluted), and is a philosophical problem in need of explanation. His explanation is that ii) the things we normally take as good or bad are only good for (or bad for) certain respondents, which means that iii) the things we normally think of as good are not good *simpliciter*. Good things, for Heraclitus, are good for some other thing(s). But, I will argue, iv) the orderliness of the cosmos as well as our comprehension of that order (i.e. wisdom (σοφότα)) are good *simpliciter*, and that they are the only things that are good *simpliciter*. But there is an issue: if some things are both good and bad, how can we know what is good *simpliciter*? Heraclitus, I believe, has an interesting view concerning a standard of goodness which can answer this question. I argue that for Heraclitus v) God’s response to goodness is the standard whereby we can measure the goodness of all things. Finally, I argue that vi) wisdom holds a special place in Heraclitus’ value theory since it alone is both good for its possessor and good *simpliciter*. An important result is that Heraclitus’ views on value contain an opposites thesis: *it is possible for one and the same object to have opposing values* (i.e. to be both objectively good and objectively bad). This is so since what is good is always good for a kind of respondent, and what is good for one kind of respondent is possibly not good for another kind of respondent. The only exceptions to this are the orderliness of the cosmos and our apprehension of it.

Thomas Olshewsky. *New College of Florida. tolshe@ncf.edu.* “This, That, & That-en.”

4D

In the *Timaeus*, Plato entertains the question of what is some thing which is made of gold. He draws the conclusion that "By far the safest and truest answer is, 'That is gold'." (50b) He would treat individuals as alterations of properties in the ground of the receptacle. That ground is properly "alone to be called by the name 'this' or 'that'," denying to anything admitting of contrary properties such a denomination (49e). This clearly runs contrary to Aristotle’s *Categories*, in which he expresses the conviction that the simple subject to which the contrary properties are predicated is the primary being. He has complained in *Metaphysics* A-9 that "we" [that is, we Platonists] have failed to account for individuals and for motion. It is in the early -- agreeing with Ross, Solmsen, Lang, and others -- *Physics* H-3 that we find the nub of his counter to the *Timaeus* claims.
Aristotle contends there that the "from-which" is not properly referred to as "that" or "those", but as that-en, bronzen, waxen, wooden. Thus, we no longer call that which has become a σχῆμα by its material. Further, it is the material that is properly subject to alteration (wax becoming soft or hard), not the thing that is coming into being. So, Plato is wrong to maintain that perceptible things come into being by alteration.

It is clear that by the time of the Timaeus, Plato has on the basis of the Sophist analysis moved away from a subject-ontology (e.g., the bed in Republic X) to a predicate-ontology, with the reality of the perceptual object being merely a composite of its attributes, analyzable in turn to their mathematical and formal roots. Aristotle's opposition in Physics VII-3 makes his point without any indication of a hylomorphic basis. Yet, here are the roots for regarding τὸ εἰδός καὶ τὴν μορφὴν as determining the nature of the individual.

Priyanka Patil. Franklin & Marshall, Franklin Panel ppatil@fandm.edu. See the panel description for Franklin, Dialogues with Plato. 2B


What can the myth of Er be saying about the possibility of the new city? Will the reincarnated Homeric heroes be seen as such and available to govern? The question calls for differentiating two ways that the myth shows vision to fail, therefore two relations between eyesight and insight. Some souls choose their next life in a cursory way, failing to see because not looking closely. The unjust souls among the freshly dead carry the judgment of their lives on their backs, where they can’t see it.

Elsewhere in the Republic too, vision sometimes fails by inattention, when it is the right approach to knowledge but needs to be taken further; sometimes because eyesight can’t approach objects of knowledge but rather aims in the wrong direction. The discussion of women at the gymnasium displays both attitudes at once.

What seeing shows informs how we read the scene of souls’ choosing new lives. The heroes of the Trojan War are returning; on the other hand they return as animals or unknown private people, and imagining them in the new city is a laughable scenario.

If philosophy takes perception and perfects it, we can understand today’s philosophers as an avant-garde, finding the heroic talent being born into the world and making it the guardian class of the new city. But if philosophical thinking points in a direction opposite to ordinary thinking, the vision of a new city and heaven on earth might exist only for philosophers.

Anthony Preus. Binghamton University. apreus@binghamton.edu. “Food in Three Early Greek Philosophers: Empedocles, Anaxagoras, On Diet 1.” 2A

Empedocles is best known for telling us what we should NOT eat, and why. Anaxagoras places nutrition at the very center of his ontology, although that aspect of his philosophy does not always get the attention it deserves. On Diet (On Regimen), a Hippocratic Text probably dating from not long after Empedocles and Anaxagoras, aims to provide useful dietetic advice, based on what the author takes to be the best theoretical foundation available in his time.

These three represent three distinct approaches to the philosophy of food:

a) The application of premises taken from outside the realm of nutrition to provide non-nutritional guides to a person’s consumption (or non-consumption) of various foods.
b) The use of insights gained from the study of nutrition in areas well beyond nutrition itself.

c) The application of theory (scientifically supported or not) to the improvement of nutrition.

I teach a course, “Philosophy of Food.” This talk is based on the first part of my introductory lecture to the part of the course devoted the “History of the Philosophy of Food.”

Sebastian Purcell, SUNY Cortland. L.sebastian.purcell@gmail.com, “Essence and Order: Aristotle and the Aztecs on Metaphysics.”

In the “Western” tradition of philosophy, the basic question of metaphysics may be asked in just three English words: what is there? Aristotle’s answer is single word, substance (ousia). This answer is a good one, he argues, because it satisfies two criteria which the basic question would seem to require in response, namely that the answer explain what something is, and that the something under discussion ought to be a basic subject, and not a derived entity. The Aztec tradition of philosophy challenges both of the basic criteria which Aristotle thinks a good answer should have. More fundamentally, it challenges even the characterization of the basic question of metaphysics as it has been asked in the “West.” Since Nahuatl, the Aztec language, has no word for “being” either semantically or syntactically, their philosophers (tlamatiniñe) conceived of reality as a fundamental process, teotl, in an organizing form, ometeotl. This organizing process, moreover, admits of no basic subjects in a sense similar to Aristotle’s, and neither does it conceive of the what of an entity in similarly strong way. Rather, subject and essence are thought to be a napanotl process. The essay is a first in any modern language to compare Aristotle and the Aztecs on these notions. It aims to explain just in what these Aztec concepts consist, in dialogue with Aristotle’s metaphysics, and defends the Aztec account as prima facie coherent.

Santiago Ramos, santiago.xavier.ramos@gmail.com, Boston College, “The Teleology of Reproduction in Aristotle’s De Anima.”

“Man knows and thinks this tragic ambivalence which the animal and plant merely undergo.” — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity

In this paper I will attempt to elucidate an obscure passage in De Anima Book II Chapter 4 (415a26-b7), using concepts and themes found elsewhere in that work and in the Aristotelian corpus. The elucidation will bring to light some two interesting elements of this passage: a unique instance of “motion,” as Aristotle understands it, and a unique type of final cause.

“It was all going well,” an Aristotle scholar once remarked, “until Aristotle claimed that broccoli wants to live forever.” The commentator Ronald Polansky admits that the passage in question “may sound flamboyant.” Victor Caston calls it one of Aristotle’s “more lyrical moments.”

It is work to beget offspring as well as to use food, since the most natural thing for a living thing to do, if it is full-grown and not defective, and does not have spontaneous generation, is to make an animal and a plant to make a plant, in order to have a share in what always is and is divine, in a way that it is able to. For all things yearn for that, and

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2 Dr. William Wians, teaching a course on De Anima at Boston College, Spring 2010.
for the sake of it do everything that they do by nature. (That for the sake of which is
twofold, referring to the one to which the activity belongs, but also to the one for which
it is done.) So since it is impossible for them to share continuously in what always is
and is divine, since no destructible thing admits of remaining one and the same number,
each of them does share in it in whatever way it can have a share, one sort more and
another less, enduring not as itself but as one like itself, that is with it not in number, but
in kind. 56

Aristotle’s claim can be summarized as follows: the purpose of reproduction in plants and
animals is for the sake of imitating the divine, which “always is.” Aristotle presents a similar
claim in his discussion of reproduction in Book II of De Generatione Animalium,7 and the claim
is already found in Plato’s Symposium: “The same argument holds good in the animal world as in
the human, and mortal nature seeks, as far as may be, to perpetuate itself and become immortal.
The only way in which it can achieve this is by procreation, which secures the perpetual
replacement of an old member of the race by a new” (208b). 8 Plato’s statement, however, sounds
less “flamboyant” because it comes in the context of a dramatized study of eros, in a speech
related by Socrates but attributed to the prophetess Diotima. Aristotle’s formulation of the claim,
on the other hand, comes in sober and scientific contexts. As such, the claim cannot be dismissed
as lyrical excess and must be analyzed in light of the metaphysical concepts which make up of
Aristotle’s understanding of the soul.

Before we delve into those concepts, it will be useful to make a close reading of the
passage in order to discern whether broccoli actually wants to live forever—that is, what
Aristotle means by sharing in “that which always is and is divine.” After such an explication, we
can discuss three metaphysical concepts which will clarify the logical claims within our passage:
motion, nature, and unity. Finally, this elucidation will hopefully clarify Aristotle’s
understanding of the telos of reproduction, and bring to the fore certain implications of the
unique nature of this telos. By the end of this paper, our passage should no longer be perceived
as a curious, lyrical anomaly within an otherwise technical work of philosophy written by a
usually sober thinker.

Glenn Rawson. Rhode Island College. grawson@ric.edu. “Heraclitus and his Self-Increasing
Logos.” 1A

Heraclitus B115 DK is especially pithy and suggestive: “The soul has a self-increasing
logos” (psuchêstilogos heauton auxôn). Prominent interpretations of this famous line have
been widely divergent, including the formation of the soul by exhalations of heated vapors; the
self-reinforcing power of language in learning; and a potentially infinite regress of self-
consciousness. This alleged fragment is also particularly disputed. Some editors and
commentators reject it for a number of reasons, in good part because our text of Stobaeus
attaches the name of Socrates to it, albeit immediately after seven undisputed fragments of
Heraclitus. Others accept it with reservations. A few defend its authenticity on grounds of
vocabulary and style. I argue in this paper that B115 is not only genuine, but also a vital
expression of a central concern in Heraclitus’ philosophy.

5 Aristotle. Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, Joe Sachs trans. (Santa Fe: Green Lion Press,
6). All quotations from De Anima in this paper come from Sachs’ translation.

7 See Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I (with passages from II.1-3). D.M. Balme

After reviewing the main reasons that have been given for and against accepting this line, I’ll offer a new argument that the allegedly suspicious phrase *heauton auxôn* is in fact a good indication of authenticity. The idea that the logos in the soul is self-increasing — in other words, that it *grows* there, rather than being perceived or intuited or constructed — suits a broad range of Heraclitus’ distinctive claims about knowledge and virtue, and nature and elemental fire. My argument indicates that, for all that can be said about the empiricist flavor of some Heraclitean fragments, it is more important to recognize Heraclitus as a pioneering rationalist, since he shares a basic notion of human understanding with paradigmatic rationalists from Plato to Chomsky.

Douglass Reed. *University of Rhode Island*. douglassreed@uri.edu, “Happiness is Not Good in the *Republic.*” 3D

In *Republic* II Glaucion, with the approval of Socrates, identifies three kinds of goods: things that are good for their own sake, things that are good only for their consequences, and things that are good for both themselves and their consequences. The question that motivates the *Republic* is what kind of good is justice. The question that motivates my paper, though, is what kind of good is happiness.

Based on the descriptions, one would expect happiness to belong to the first category of goods, things good in themselves. After all, Plato surely thinks that we pursue happiness for itself. Yet, this answer is doubtful. For, in setting out these categories, Glaucion offers paradigm examples of each kind of good and the only example he gives of this first kind of good is “harmless pleasures” (*αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὑσαι ἀβλαβεῖς*). Moreover, the value of harmless pleasures is quite different from the value of happiness. Similarly, happiness is not mentioned among the third type of good, which again suggests that it does not belong to this group. So, it seems, happiness is not good in the *Republic*.

One might deflect the force of this conclusion by arguing that even if happiness is not good, in the *Republic* Plato sets it out as a meta-good. That is, happiness is not, strictly speaking, a good because things are good insofar as they contribute to happiness (see Irwin 1995, 190, cf. 358a1). On this view, then, happiness governs or determines what is (or is not) good. However, I argue that this move is blocked by the metaphysics of the middle books of the *Republic*. As we see there, the presence of the Good alone makes things good. Hence, the contribution to happiness cannot be what makes something good in the *Republic*, which means that happiness cannot play the role of a meta-good in the dialogue. Accordingly, I argue that either happiness is not good in the *Republic* or there is a serious tension between the early and middle books of the dialogue.

Naomi Reshotko. *University of Denver*. nreshotk@du.edu, “What Doxa is About: Reconciling the Consolation of the Philodoxist and the Divided Line” Stone Panel 1B

Scholars often use the tripartite distinction between knowledge, *doxa* (belief or opinion), and ignorance at Rp. 475e4-479d5 and what each is ‘set over’ (*epi*) as a guide for understanding Plato’s epistemology and his object of knowledge in all of the dialogues. Just as often, they turn to the divided line at Rp. 509c9-511d5 for such a template. These two apparent templates for Plato’s epistemology are different in at least one striking way: while the tripartite distinction isolates and labors over ignorance as a separate epistemological category that is uniquely set over nothing at all, the divided line is divided into two super segments that are exhausted by knowledge and *doxa* (which are each further subdivided). As a result, the tripartite distinction seems to recognize those in the worst epistemic state as not even having *doxa*, while the line
assigns them *doxa*. I will show that once we are sufficiently sensitive to the context of the tripartite distinction (it is designed to console the *philodoxist*) we can isolate any separation between ignorance and *doxa* to that passage. In general, throughout the dialogues, Plato treats ignorance as he does in the divided line: it entertains *doxa*.

Paige Richmond. *Western Kentucky University*. paige.richmond585@topper.wku.edu. “Natural Vices” 4B

In *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter, *EN*) Aristotle makes the conjecture that some vices are more natural than others. The vices that Aristotle refers to as being the most natural in Book III of *EN* are cowardice and self-indulgence. Both of these vices are present in children, before a complete rational character state is formed. Aristotle believes that children are not rational beings and therefore possess the same basic logic as a beast. Children, however, unlike beasts possess potential. Children have the ability to change and adapt over time, growing more logical and rational as they age. The two most natural vices, cowardice and self-indulgence, are developed very early in life. It is perfectly normal for most children to be afraid of things or want too much candy, but as their character grows these desires and fears usually become less prominent in their lives. Aristotle believed that a respectable adult with a fully functional rationale cannot develop without the help of a proper polis. This means that society itself helps to shape the character of a proper and virtuous man, and without civilization a child cannot develop properly. I will discuss what Aristotle believes constitutes a proper civilization and what he believes is no better than being raised by wolves. The presence of a proper and good polis is absolutely necessary in the development of character. This stunt in child’s character development could hinder the formation of virtues like courage and temperance. The vices of cowardice and self-indulgence would then be completely natural and unprovoked by something that the person has chosen; the less-natural vices like unfriendliness are completely voluntary and chosen. I will argue that while the natural vices may be considered understandable, Aristotle would not at all be sympathetic to the individuals that possess these vices. Aristotle would argue that the individuals should have enough resources to avoid becoming vicious, and that they should make the effort to better themselves.

Max Robitzsch. *Sungkyunkwan University*. jmrobitzsch@gmail.com. “Epicurean Virtue Ethics.” Shaw panel 1C

The Epicureans famously contend that the best life is a life of pleasure. However, they also claim an agent may achieve a pleasurable life only if she lives virtuously, thereby stressing the importance of virtue for the good life and defending a version of virtue ethics distinct from their main philosophical rivals, the Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics. This Epicurean version of virtue ethics as a whole is the topic of this paper: It investigates what the virtues are for the Epicureans, how they are acquired, and what it means for an Epicurean agent to be virtuous (in contrast to, say, a Platonic, Aristotelian, or Stoic agent). Furthermore, the paper discusses in what way the Epicureans can be said to defend their own version of the thesis of the unity of the virtues and how the Epicureans appropriate the Aristotelian intellectual virtues practical wisdom (*phronesis*) and contemplation (*theoria*) and integrate them into their theory of the virtues. While the focus of the discussion lies on Epicurus and his extant writings, the paper also draws on select passages from later Epicureans such as Philodemus and Diogenes of Oenoanda to complement the discussion as well as to show how the Epicurean theory of the virtues is one of
the areas of philosophy, in which the followers of Epicurus could – and in fact did – develop the ideas of the School’s founder.

Esmeralda Rodríguez. Franklin & Marshall. erodrig2@fandm.edu. Franklin Panel. See the description of the Franklin panel, above. 2B

Victor Saenz. Rice University. Victor.saenz@gmail.com. “Aristotle on Appetite: Desiring and Transcending Life.” 1D

In this paper I argue that, for Aristotle, not just temperance (sôphrosunê), but also the wealth-related virtues of generosity (eleutheria) and magnificence (megaloprepeia) necessarily involve the training of appetitive desire (epithumia). In so doing, my account gives us serious reason to doubt a standard reading of the Nicomachean Ethics. On this standard reading, when Aristotle gives us his list of moral virtues—courage, temperance, and so on—he is either merely reporting qualities of character admired by Greeks of his day, or at best is proceeding haphazardly, without any philosophical principles of selection. In contrast, my argument begins to show that part of what is guiding Aristotle’s selection of the moral virtues is his account of non-rational desire (orexis).

At its root, I argue, appetite is desire for the pleasant as that which helps keep the organism and the species alive. It is a pleasure-based desire for ‘bare life,’ which we share with other organisms, even if we experience it in distinctively human form: food and drink to keep us nourished, sexual activity to keep the species alive, and wealth and property as the means to provide for more of these and for basic shelter. These relations between appetite, bare life, and wealth have not, in my view, received the attention they deserve. I first argue that appetite is primarily desire for what I call its ‘core objects’—the tactile pleasures of food, drink, and sexual activity. However, various passages show that Aristotle also sees wealth, (chrêmata), property (ousia), and money (nomisma) as inherently attractive to appetitive desire, insofar as these serve as means toward the core objects, and more generally, as means toward staying alive.

With this picture in place, we will be in a position to see how not just temperance, but also the wealth-related virtues of generosity and magnificence are virtues of appetitive desire. To manifest the virtues is not only to exercise control over one’s appetitive desires. It is also to recognize, in practice, that there are values higher than bare living, both for oneself and one’s community.

Given Aristotle’s broader intellectual context, this picture is precisely what we should expect. As Malcolm Schofield has documented, Plato’s psychological analysis in terms of epithumia is picking up a broader theme in Greek writers of the 3rd and 4th centuries of the dangers of insatiable desires for wealth, and their corrupting influence in society (see, e.g. Republic IX, 580d-581a). Thus, not only is Aristotle’s account of moral virtue generally more systematic than is often assumed; his account of appetite’s place in these money-related virtues is also his own contribution to this broader tradition.

Eric Sanday. University of Kentucky. Eric.sanday@uky.edu. “Heraclitus and Hesiod on Day and Night” 1A

I begin by noting the strangeness of Heraclitus’s claim that Hesiod does not understand the unity of Night and Day. I review the several types of unity I find essential to Hesiod’s Theogony, particularly the unity of interchange between Night and Day. I then introduce Anaximander as a transitional figure from Hesiod to Heraclitus. I argue that Heraclitus
means his claim as a provocation to think differently about what it means to be “one”, i.e. to go beyond the unity of interchange in which Hesiod situates Night and Day. I review Heraclitus’s own account of interchange and his conception of fire-ever-living. I compare this to Heraclitus’s account of the oneness appropriate to divinity, making reference to the relationship between divine and mortal justice.


There is a broad consensus that Aristotle introduced the concept of matter in order to develop a consistent account of substantial change. According to the traditional interpretation, matter makes substantial change possible by persisting as the same entity while taking on or losing a substantial form. In my paper, I will reject this interpretation by drawing on Aristotle’s embryology in *Gen. an.* II, esp. 3-5. According to his theory, the pre-existing matter for animals is the menstrual fluid. However, the menstrual fluid does not persist while taking on the substantial form (i.e. the soul). Instead, it is transformed into a new entity, i.e. a functional living body, the very moment a soul is present in it. On this basis I will argue that Aristotelian matter generally does not contribute to substantial change by persisting as the same entity. Instead, the pre-existing matter is capable of transforming into the material component of the newly generated substance. This process requires that the pre-existing matter loses its initial identity and name, and is re-identified relatively to the substantial form from which it now ontologically depends. According to my interpretation, Aristotelian matter is a continuant in substantial changes, but does not satisfy the common criteria of persistence that apply to individual substances.

Guy Schuh. *Emerson College*. guyschuh@gmail.com. “Was Eudaimonism Ancient Greek Common Sense?” 4F

That Eudaimonism was part of the fabric of Ancient Greek common sense is widely called on to explain why Ancient Greek philosophers embraced Eudaimonism—the idea being that they did so because they heeded the ethical common sense of their day. 1 I argue, to the contrary, that the Ancient Greeks did not commonsensically accept Eudaimonism, and I draw two consequences from this conclusion. (1) The prevalent explanation that Ancient Greek Philosophers accepted Eudaimonism because it was common sense in their day must be abandoned; (2) we should be open to the possibility that some Ancient Greek philosophers may not have accepted Eudaimonism.

My case that the Ancient Greeks did not commonsensically accept Eudaimonism centers on popular views about virtue. I begin by dividing Eudaimonism into psychological and normative varieties. Psychological Eudaimonism centers around the claim that the ultimate aim of our action is our own eudaimonia; Normative Eudaimonism centers around the claim that we should do whatever will bring us closest to our own eudaimonia. I then argue that popular views attested to in Greek literature imply the rejection of Psychological and Normative Eudaimonism.

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To show that there were popular views that rejected Psychological Eudaimonism, I first stipulate a definition for selfless action, namely that one is not aiming ultimate at one’s own good or eudaimonia when one acts—or that, if one is so aiming, that one would still perform the same action even if it didn’t contribute to one’s own good or eudaimonia. I then show that Aristotle, Plato, Sophocles, and Isocrates all testify to the existence of popular views that link virtue with selflessness so defined.

To show that there were popular views that rejected Normative Eudaimonism, I stipulate a definition of self-sacrificial action—namely, that one is acting self-sacrificially if they knowingly choose a course of action that is worse for themselves, or takes them farther from their own eudaimonia, in order to accomplish a further goal. I then show that many of the passages I discussed in the previous section, along with an additional passage from Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1358b38-1359a5) attribute self-sacrificial action to virtuous people.

Finally, I conclude my case by confirming the existence in Ancient Greek popular opinion of an important consequence of the popular rejection of Normative Eudaimonism—that there are other areas of value that sometimes come into conflict with the value of one’s own good or eudaimonia. As evidence that this was a popular view, I point to the following inscription on Leto’s temple at Delphi, testified to by Aristotle: “Most noble is what is most just; most profitable is health; and most pleasant by nature is acquiring whatever one’s heart desires.” (Nicomachean Ethics 1099a27-8; compare Eudemian Ethics 1214a5-6). I argue that this inscription means that there are at least three separate areas of value, only one of which is one’s own good or eudaimonia as well as that, on the strength of various considerations, this inscription reflects a popular view.

Gregory Scott. NYU. Gs30@nyu.edu. “Rhuthmos as ‘dance’ not ‘rhythm’ in Plato’s Republic III.” 2C

Along with Emile Benveniste and Christopher Marchetti, I have examined the tradition of rhuthmos until Plato and Aristotle but have demonstrated in print that rhuthmos is even more equivocal than these modern scholars concluded. Rhuthmos can take on different, unproblematic meanings as fast as “play” can for us even in one sentence, based, e.g., on the direct object of the verb: “John is playing Polonius tonight in Shakespeare’s play Hamlet, but I can’t attend because I’m playing my tennis match, nor can my wife because she is playing violin in her concert.” For Democritus, rhuthmos was the shape of the elementary particle of matter; for Aeschylus the pattern of a ceiling decoration; for Aristophanes the gait of a man, and Xenophon applied it to music. Plato employs it in various ways, including “the balanced state (between opulence and poverty)”; the “measure” or “scale” pertaining to chattel in Laws V; and as a verb “to form a young favorite.” For Aristoxenus, Aristotle’s pupil who was apparently in competition to take over the leadership of the Lyceum, rhuthmos has “many natures,” although the only surviving texts has Aristoxenus focusing primarily on “temporal order.” Aristoxenus’ primary (but, again, not sole) sense has been the one that became so prevalent that translators and music and dance historians too often think that “temporal ordering” is the one and only meaning of rhuthmos.

In previous talks and publications, I gave the evidence that for Plato rhuthmos must mean “dance” at Laws II 665a, that is, “the name of ordered (body) movement” in the context of choreia, choral art in the theater; similarly, at Gorgias 502c. I have also published why it must mean “dance” for Aristotle in Dramatics (aka Poetics) 1, 4 and 6 and in the Politics VIII 5 and 7.
For both Greeks, the order is primarily a spatial order, say, pertaining to posture and “look,” and, in the case of Plato, only rarely to order of time (as at Laws II 673).

Hence, in a particular discussion in Plato, rhuthmos could have any one of the handful of meanings, if not more. In the final installment of my ongoing series, I extend in this talk my findings to Socrates’ discussion in Republic III that starts at 392c and goes to 400a. It is a discussion in which Socrates says he has finished examining the content of stories (logos) and wishes to cover the “style” or “form.” All translators to my knowledge render rhuthmos in that whole discussion as “rhythm” when it appears to have the same meaning as at Laws II 665a, as dance qua “ordered body movement.” By taking rhuthmos accordingly we can almost always, if not always, make better sense of this relevant section in Republic III.

Clerk Shaw. University of Tennessee Knoxville. Jshaw15@utk.edu, Panel organizer: Virtue and Pleasure in Epicureanism.” Presents: “How Virtue Produces Pleasure” 1C

The Epicureans have often been thought to endorse an untenable combination of claims about the relationship between virtue and pleasure. They maintain that virtue is necessary for living pleasantly. However, they also say that virtue is valuable solely as an instrument to pleasure, and insist that virtuous actions are not pleasant in themselves. I argue that the seeming tensions among these claims stem from the dubious assumption that the Epicureans conceive of virtue as producing pleasure indirectly: virtue produces virtuous actions, which produce pleasure. I argue that they envision a different causal chain: virtuous action causes virtue, which produces maximal mental pleasure without mediation. Like Plato (and unlike Aristotle), the Epicureans maintain that we act virtuously for the sake of developing, sustaining, and increasing our virtue, rather than vice versa.

Colin Smith. University of Kentucky. Ccs223@g.uky.edu. “Diairesis and Koinōnia in Sophist 253d1–e3.” 4D

My goal in this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the ways in which the ontology informing the diairetic methods at play in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman is worked out and clarified through the discussions of communion and the great kinds in the central digression in the Sophist. To do this I will focus on the notoriously vexing description of the dialectician’s discernment at Sophist 253 d 1 – e 3. My argument is that a broad view of division in both bifurcatory (Sophist and Statesman) and non-bifurcatory (Statesman beginning at 287b) forms helps us to understand the Eleatic Stranger’s account of what the dialectician discerns. By my reading, the Stranger here describes the disclosure via division of elemental kinds and forms in own nature, their co-constitutive nature as defined by others like them in kind, and their fittingness to commune with others like them in kind.

The passage was generally understood by 20th century commentators in one of two ways, either as (I) a description of collection and division, or (II) an account of the dialectician’s discernment of the fittingness of certain ‘vowel’ forms for blending with the other ‘consonant’ forms. Following clues in the larger context of the Sophist’s position in the trilogy that includes

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1 Following Cornford’s early and influential advancement of this interpretation in Francis Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935), perhaps the most thorough and persuasive articulation of this view is in Kenneth Sayre, Plato’s Analytic Method (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), Chapter III.6.

2 This approach was first suggested in Alfonso Gómez-Lobo, ‘Plato’s Description of Dialectic in Sophist 253d1–e2,’ Phronesis 26 (1977): 29-47, and it remains influential among commentators (e.g., in Noburu Notomi, The Unity of Plato’s Sophist [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999].)
the *Theaetetus* and *Statesman*, recent revisions of (I) that I will here call (Ia) have helped to show that *Sophist* 253 d 1 – e 3 concerns not merely the bifurcatory division practiced in the *Sophist*, but also non-bifurcatory division, as exemplified by the account of care for the human community articulated in the final diairetic exercise in the *Statesman*. What remains to be worked out, and what I seek to describe in this paper, is the senses in which (Ia) allows us also to read into the *Sophist* passage the important insights into Platonic ontology entailed in (II). In other words, interpreting the passage on the dialectician’s discernment of the communion of kinds with reference to the broader conception of diairesis helps us to see the ways in which division entails the types of analysis of the nature of elemental kinds and forms that proponents of (II) rightly recognize in this passage and in neighboring sections of the *Sophist*. If my interpretation is on the right track, it is a means via hybridity of helping to resolve this longstanding conflict in Platonic research.


The focus of the paper is the dispute between the Academic Arcesilaus of Pitane (*ca.* 316–240 BCE) and the philosophy of the first generation Stoa. The core argument is that Arcesilaus’ attack on Zeno’s doctrine of the *phantasia katalêptikê* (“cognitive impression”) is a practical application of the formal criticism Polemo (Fr. 100, 101 M. Gigante ed. 1976 = *Acad. hist. col. XIV* 3–6, D.L. IV 18) earlier issued against the kind of ethical project pioneered by Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoic teaching.

Arcesilaus’ teacher for more than two decades, Polemo directed the Academy from 314 to 270/69 BCE. Arcesilaus is appointed director of the Academy a few years later (*ca.* 265 BCE) and revolutionizes Academic teaching by strengthening his predecessor’s criticism of Stoic ethics. In support of Polemo’s criticism, Arcesilaus uses the dialectical context of question and answer as a means to oppose the Stoic ground of ethical eudaimonism. Unlike Polemo’s non-dialectical objection against a certain type of ethical theory, Arcesilaus takes his attack directly to those interlocutors who seek to ground eudaimonistic theory by means of a purported positive science of dialectic. The latter’s *ad hominem* opposition negates not only the dogmas and prescriptions of Stoic theory, but it aims to effect a conversion in the relation the (Stoic) interlocutor has to the prescriptions of action he attempts to defend in question and answer.

The principal aim of Arcesilaus’ dialectical attack is thus too narrowly interpreted by scholars as a theoretical attack on Stoic “epistemology.” His appropriation of a *negative* dialectic aims at transforming the interlocutor by liberating dogmatic adherents from the doctrines and precepts of a master who prescribes a eudaimonist philosophy, the teaching that happiness (*eudaimônia*) or tranquility (*ataraxia*) is the purpose or goal of life. Arcesilaus strives to provoke in the interlocutor the exercise of a non-teleological mode of thinking and judging for the conduct of life, free from the precepts of ethical eudaimonism.

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3 An explicit articulation of a version of this view appears in Mitchell Miller, ‘What the Dialectician Discerns: A New Reading of *Sophist* 253d-e,’ *Ancient Philosophy* 36 (2016): 321-352. To develop this view Miller draws upon his previous work on the *Theaetetus* and *Statesman*, as well as that of Cristina Ionescu, notably Cristina Ionescu, ‘Dialectic in Plato’s *Sophist*: Division and the Communion of Kinds,’ *Arethusa* 46 (2013): 41-64.

4 I follow Ionescu (2013) in interpreting the object of diairesis to vary in correspondence to the levels represented in the Divided Line analogy.
Curtis Sommerlatte. Union College. curtis.sommerlatte@gmail.com. “Socrates’ Ironic Lesson for Meno: On the Relation between Meno’s Character and Divine Inspiration of True Opinions” 2G

There exists much scholarly discussion of two features of Plato’s Meno: its portrayal of Meno’s character and Socrates’ suggestion that some people become virtuous via divinely inspired good opinions. In this paper, I consider these two features together to shed light on both. Namely, I argue that Socrates’ proposal of divine inspiration as a source of good opinions is ad hominem insofar as it is offered in response to Meno’s resistance to searching for a definition of virtue. As such, Plato has Socrates ironically argue that true beliefs about virtue come from divine inspiration. Given Meno’s stubbornly anti-philosophical character, the purport of Socrates’ argument is that it would take a miracle—viz., divine inspiration—to make someone with such a character virtuous in any way. Acceptance of this account, i.e., that divine inspiration is the source of virtue, is beneficial only for people like Meno (and Anytus). But the lesson of the dialogue for those who are courageous enough to philosophize—and who have truly learned the lesson of the slave-boy demonstration—is that virtue arises through active inquiry that turns preexisting true beliefs into knowledge.

The first stage of my argument offers textual evidence to flesh out Dale Jacquette’s suggestion that, despite Socrates’ refusal to offer an explicit image of Meno in response to the latter’s depiction of him as a torpedo fish, Socrates’ questioning results in an implicit image of Meno’s character as slavish. For Meno never takes to heart one of the central lessons of the slave-boy demonstration, namely that knowledge comes from active questioning and inquiry. Instead of being “more manly and less lazy” in searching with Socrates for a definition of virtue, Meno prefers “hearing about” whether virtue is teachable (86b-c). I further defend this interpretation by assessing Dominic Scott’s purported evidence that Meno has become more inquisitive by the end of the dialogue.

The second stage of my argument provides grounds for taking Socrates’ conclusion about divine inspiration to be ironic, particularly in light of what has been shown about Meno’s character. Above all, Socrates himself notes that his conclusion is to be accepted on the condition that his discussion with Meno has been a good search (99e), and he remarks that only a fuller inquiry into the definition of virtue will establish how virtue is acquired (100b). Meno, however, has shown himself to be resistant to such an inquiry, and he has thereby contributed to the failure of achieving a good search. For Meno prefers some external source for acquiring virtue: first Gorgias, then Socrates, then the politicians Socrates offers as models of virtue. This makes the belief in a divine origin for virtue particularly fitting for Meno. Given that none of these potential external sources of virtue have provided Meno with an easy path to virtue, Meno is ripe to accept an external source with respect to which he has no control: the gods. Although the belief in such an external source for virtue fails to be grounded on a definition of virtue, it is still a fitting and even beneficial belief for someone like Meno. For such an account can make someone such as Anytus “a gentler person”, which would be beneficial to Athenian society (100b). I shall conclude by considering some reasons why Anytus’ acceptance of such an account would be beneficial.

Eric Steinhart. William Paterson University. esteinhart1@nyc.rr.com. “Transhumanism as Theurgy.” 1G

Transhumanism is often said to be a modernized version of ancient Gnosticism. Yet transhumanists are not soul-body dualists, seeking escape into an immaterial world. It is
precisely because they value embodiment that transhumanists seek to transcend the limits of human bodies. Far from being Gnostics, transhumanists are much closer to the ancient Neoplatonic theurgists. Johnston portrays theurgy as ἡ τελεστικὴ τεχνή, the art of self-perfection. Dillon represents it as an early scientific approach to the materiality of embodiment. Shaw argues that theurgy aimed at the transfiguration of the body. It aimed to make the body divine. Transhumanists also seek to transfigure their bodies. Shaw argues that numerical and other mathematical concepts played crucial roles in theurgy: theurgists inspired by Iamblichus aimed to reveal and optimize the numbers of the body. Theurgists used diets, rituals, plant substances, incantations, and so on, to divinize the body. Transhumanists pursue similar methods for similar ends. Old magical strategies reappear in biohacking and other hacker methodologies. When transhumanists cast their spells, they cast them in the esoteric languages of genetics and computer codes. Sympathetic magic reappears in the correspondences between ligands and receptors. Even the old theurgic practice of the animation of statues plays a role in transhumanism: the statues are computers to be animated by our uploaded minds. And, like Plotinus, transhumanists think of their own bodies as statues to be shaped. But Neoplatonism can be used to criticize transhumanism. Levin correctly argues that ancient practices were embedded in ethical frameworks that kept them oriented towards the Good. While many transhumanists seem to pursue only self-power, a theurgic critique indicates that transhumanists should be more attentive to the ideals of flourishing developed by the Neoplatonists.

David Squires. Notre Dame. dsquires@nd.edu. “In Defense of a Hylomorphic Solution to the Problem of the Many.” 5D

In this paper, I argue that hylomorphic theory provides a solution to Peter Unger’s Problem of the Many, a problem of material constitution that generates multiple material objects where we intuit that there is only one. I situate my account against the backdrop of a prominent metaphysician’s claim that hylomorphism cannot solve Unger’s problem, and then draw from Aristotle and Aquinas to show that a hylomorphic theory that endorses the simplicity, unicity, and esse-causal status of substantial form abolishes Unger’s problem.


The Stoics understood apprehension (κατάληψις) as assent to a special kind of impression, “apprehensive impression” (φαντασία καταληπτική) which, when the assent is firm and unchangeable, becomes knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). According to the official Stoic definition (SE M 7.248, 402, 410, 426; PH 2.4; DL 7.50; Cic. Acad. 2.18), an impression must satisfy the following three conditions in order to be apprehensive: (C1) it must be from something present (ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος)—i.e. caused by an external object that is present—(C2) it must be in accordance with that present thing itself, and (C3) it must be ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, which is standardly interpreted as saying that the apprehensive impression is such that it could not come from what is not present. Our sources suggest that Zeno added C3 to the definition in response to the objection raised by the Academics that if an impression which is caused by a present object and in accordance with that object would causally originate in something else, then the impression is not apprehensive. Apparently, the intuition behind the objection shared by both sides was that the apprehensive impression should somehow guarantee
that it is caused by the object that it represents not only in the actual situation in which it is produced, but also in a range of possible situations. It seems that the Stoics thought that this guarantee lies in the representational properties of being “clear,” “distinct” or “thoroughly imprinted,” “strong,” “plain,” “striking,” and “persuasive,” in respect to which they held the apprehensive impression to be superior to non-apprehensive impressions. According to the standard interpretation, the point of C3 was thus to establish that an impression which represents some object $O$ clearly, distinctly, strikingly, etc. could not causally originate in something that is not $O$, thereby guaranteeing that the impression indeed causally originates in $O$. In other words, C3 claims that it is impossible for an impression that is not caused by $O$ to represent $O$ with the same kind of clarity, distinctness, strength, etc. as an impression which is caused by $O$ and which accurately represents $O$.

There are, however, some reasons to doubt that Zeno and his immediate followers understood C3 as implying this strong modal claim. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that they accepted that some false impressions can be persuasive, for example the impression that a straight oar under water is bent, or that a parallel colonnade is narrowing in the distance (S.E. M 7.243-4; DL 7.75). Further, it seems that they also allowed that certain strong impressions can be false, like the impression that the stars are not moving, or that one figure in a painting is closer than another (Alex. De an. 71.5-21). Finally, the Stoics admitted the possibility that, at least in some cases of perceiving distinct but extremely similar objects, a true and apprehensive impression can be representationally indistinguishable from a false and non-apprehensive one (Cic. Acad. 2.57-8; SE M 7.416). These all seem to be instances of possible perceptual situations in which an impression that plainly, clearly, strongly, persuasively, etc. represents some object $O$ causally originates in what is not $O$. This suggests that Zeno and his followers took the modal strength of (3) to be weaker than what the standard interpretation holds, and that the force of the negated potential optative οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο in (3) is better captured by the English “wouldn’t come about” then by “couldn’t come about.” Two important implications follow if this conclusion is correct. First, for the Stoics clarity, plainness, strength, persuasiveness, etc. that characterize the apprehensive impression are not meant to serve as reliable indicators of its appropriate causal origin in all possible perceptual situations, but only in a range of normal situations which excludes impressions formed in abnormal mental states like dreams and madness, impressions that are the result of perceptual illusions, and cases of perceiving extremely similar objects. This means that the Stoic understanding of the apprehensive impression’s reliability was closer to contemporary safety-based rather than to sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge. Second, the above conclusion suggests that at the center of the protracted dispute between the Stoics and the Academics over the apprehensive impression was a disagreement over the reliability of representational properties of impressions like clarity, distinctness, persuasiveness, etc., and that the modal ambiguity of the Greek negated potential optative οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο may have contributed to the length of the exchange by allowing each side to think that they are—at least in some sense—right.

Sophia Stone. Lynn University. sstone@lynn.edu. Organizer, Stone Panel “τὰ Μεταξύ in the Dialogues of Plato” 1B

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Sophia Stone. *Lynn University*. sstone@lynn.edu. “Μονάς, Odd Numbers and Ψυχή in Plato’s *Phaedo*.” 2F

I present my interpretation of how ψυχή and μονάς relate analogously in the *Phaedo* with the Greek understanding of ἀριθμός (number), περιττός (odd), ἀρτίος (even) and the deduction in the final proof. Just as there is nothing intrinsic to body that makes it alive, there is nothing intrinsic to a number that makes it a collection of equal units, for every number contains such a collection. The difference is the unit, μονάς. Just as μονάς is a sign that a number is odd, ψυχή is a sign that a body is alive. The left over monad in an odd-numbered collection then is analogous to the life bearing soul that makes a composite body and soul alive. The analogy transfers to the final proof: just as the presence of the monad precludes a number from being even, so too the presence of life in the soul precludes it from death.

Takashi Oki. *Nagoya University*. takashi.oki.new@gmail.com. “Aristotle on Deliberation and Necessitarianism (*Int* 9)” 1F

The problem of compatibility or incompatibility between the meaningfulness of deliberation and necessitarianism (the view that everything happens of necessity) has long been a topic of discussion, and it is well known that Aristotle is concerned with the problem in *De Interpretatione* 9. Considering Aristotle’s view on this through an examination of some differing, sometimes contradicting, interpretations of it may help understand new aspects of the relation between deliberation and necessitarianism.

Aristotle thinks that if ‘everything is and comes to be of necessity’ (18b30-31), then ‘there would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble (thinking that if we do this, this will happen, but if we do not, it will not)’ (18b31-33). In this paper, I argue that Aristotle is a deliberation incompatibilist, and consider why it is reasonable for him to endorse this position.

When considering the incompatibility between deliberation and necessitarianism in *De Interpretatione* 9, two points must be kept in mind: first, it is more reasonable to take it that Aristotle here gives a reductio, and to supply some implicit premises to the necessitarian argument (18a34-18b16) in such a way that it validly concludes that everything happens of necessity, rather than to interpret it as a fallacious inference (*pace* Bobzien 2011; Nielsen 2011). In my view, the problem of incompatibility between deliberation and necessitarianism should be considered while taking into account the way in which the necessitarian conclusion is inferred. I seek to show that Aristotle thinks of deliberation as meaningless if the future is necessary (in the sense of being fixed) just as the past and the present are.

Second, necessitarianism in *De Interpretatione* 9 is not causal determinism (*pace* M. J. White 1981). The compatibility or incompatibility between deliberation and necessitarianism is sometimes taken to be that between deliberation and causal determinism (the view that everything is causally necessitated by antecedent conditions), as in discussions about the Lazy Argument. However, if it is reasonable to take necessitarianism in the text not to be causal, while deliberation and action have been at issue as components of causal chains in discussions on the compatibility or incompatibility between causal determinism and deliberation, a different approach to the problem of incompatibility in *De Interpretatione* 9 will be needed.

Logan Taylor. *Western Kentucky University*. logan.taylor318@topper.wku.edu. “Primary Friendship and the Vicious” 4B

In both *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle offers a detailed account of friendship. Within his account, he defines three kinds of friendship: that of utility, of pleasure,
and primary friendship. In this essay I will focus on primary friendship, explaining the criteria for primary friendship. Aristotle held this to be the truest form of friendship in that it is established because of individuals’ virtuous characters. I argue that while, strictly speaking, it seems that only the virtuous or virtuous-like can engage in primary friendship, the vicious may have something like primary friendship. While this friendship for the vicious will look different than that of the virtuous, I contend that the vicious may have friends that are not of pleasure or utility but are friends because of similarity in character, thus this friendship is similar to primary friendship. I argue that this friendship based in character allows for the vicious to have something like primary friendship. The vicious may engage in friendship with other vicious characters insofar as they see the other vicious character as someone with similar beliefs of what is good, though these beliefs are mistaken and false. While the vicious may not have the type of character to engage in true primary friendship, I argue that the vicious may still have friends that serve a similar role in their lives based in the similarity of character between the two vicious individuals.

Kevin Tracy. Christendom College. krtracy@gmail.com. “Logos as Process of Reasoning in Stoic Logic.” 2E

A central aim of both Stoic and Aristotelian logic was knowledge about the activity of making demonstrations, such as the ones that had been produced by mathematicians in their time. The Stoics studied logos (normally translated “arguments”) in pursuit of that aim. As they themselves put it, “logoi are its [sc. logic’s] subject matter; but knowledge of demonstrative methods is its aim, for all else [sc. in logic] contributes to this, to constructing scientific demonstrations” (Ammonius in APr. 9.26–9).

Citing a Stoic “definition” found in both Sextus Empiricus (PH 2.135, cf. M 8.301) and Diogenes Laërtius (7.45), we currently define a logos of Stoic logic as a premise-conclusion argument—i.e., just a premise-set and a conclusion (see Mates 1953, 58; Barnes 1980, 165). But we also hear from Sextus Empiricus that a demonstration (apodeixis) is a logos, and it is absurd to say that a demonstration is a premise-conclusion argument. A demonstration of geometry is not just a set of axioms and a theorem. It is an argumentation—i.e., a process of reasoning—by which one establishes that the set of axioms implies the theorem. The Stoic “definition” of apodeixis is one of several contexts where defining a logos as a premise-conclusion argument seems not to work.

I argue that the meaning of logos is context-dependent roughly in the way that the meaning of sullogismos is in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Sometimes a sullogismos is just a valid premise-conclusion argument—for example, a sullogismos that is “imperfect”, or “incomplete”. Sometimes it is a deductive argumentation—for example, a sullogismos “to the impossible”, which is an indirect deduction. Similarly, a logos is sometimes just a premise-conclusion argument, sometimes an argumentation. The difference is important. In the former sense, a logos is uniquely determined by its premises and conclusion. In the latter sense, it is not: there are different “routes” from the same premises to the same conclusion. In some cases an interpreter, ancient or modern, has distorted Stoic ideas by taking logos in the wrong sense. Sextus Empiricus often bears the blame—for example, in his treatments of the four “fallacies” (PH 2.146-150, M 8.429–434) and the logos of Aenesidemus (PH 2.223–238). By restoring the correct sense to the word in these cases, we clear distortions and gather clues about the Stoic theory of deduction.

Aristotle writes that separation (chorizo) is the cause of the problems that arise concerning Platonic forms. (Met. 1086b6-7) Many scholars, notably Gail Fine, argue that separation is the capacity for independent existence. If that is correct, then Aristotle's problem with Plato's forms is that they can exist independently. I argue, instead, that separation is unrelated to independent existence, and I raise problems for Fine’s arguments that separation is the capacity for independent existence. In addition, I propose an alternate account of separation that is not susceptible to the problems raised for Fine’s view. The alternate account has Aristotle aiming at a different target than forms' capacity for independent existence, which will elucidate Aristotle's critique of Plato’s theory of forms.

Mashura Vazirova. Academy of Sciences, Tajikistan. mashura.vazirova@gmail.com. “The Aristotelian Spirit in Medieval Islamic Logic.” 5C

When we are talking about Aristotle, the greatest ancient Greek philosopher and logician, it is an undisputed fact that his titanic spirit prevailed in the legacy of medieval thinkers of the Muslim world. This is evidenced by the tradition, starting with activities at Nisibis and the Gundishapur Academy in the V-VI centuries BC, and up until today. The staff of these research centers were the first to get acquainted with the works of Aristotle, and paved the way to explore its rich heritage.

After the Arab conquest, Sassanian Iran began to organize research centers. One of these centers was the "House of wisdom" founded by Caliph Mamun in Baghdad. It should be noted that in the Academy of Gundishapur a number of Greek, Indian and Iranian scientists enjoyed great prestige, studying such Sciences as medicine, astronomy and mathematics. They also translated the "Organon" of Aristotle, the writings of Galen, and the "Isagoge" of Porphyry. Especially popular was Aristotle’s "On interpretation." The most prominent leaders of the Academy were Mar Aba and Pavela Farce, who, following Aristotle, proposed a complete classification of the parts of philosophy. According to Pavela Farce, the founder of logical science distinguished truth from falsehood using different types of evidence.

George Walter. The Catholic University of America. 82walter@cua.edu. “The Perception of Opposites in Republic VII.” 3C

In Republic VII, we find that more education is needed to bring a soul out of the world of becoming and into the world of being. Socrates admits, in Rep. 521-22, that the previous gymnastic training and physical education of the guardians is involved with becoming and, therefore, is insufficient to bring the guardians to understanding being. An education in number and calculation, on the other hand, insofar as it is common to every craft and knowledge, leads the soul up to being. Calculation has this role, as Socrates argues in Rep. 523-24, because perception encounters features of objects that it cannot perceive adequately. Perception sometimes sees both a feature and its opposite. Sight can see that fingers are fingers easily enough; but sight also sees bigness and smallness as features of the same fingers and cannot definitively settle on one or the other feature. This is the same with other pairs of opposites in perception: the soft and the hard, the heavy and the light, etc. These cases push the soul out of the visible and into the intelligible by summoning the soul to use calculation to resolve the tension. “This, then, is what I was trying to express before, when I said that some things summon thought, while others don’t. Those that strike the relevant sense at the same time as their opposites I call summoners, those that don’t do this do not awaken understanding. (noēsis)” (Rep. 524d)
In my paper, I will examine the argument that the perception of opposites at the lowest level of the line, imaging (eikasia), summons the soul to understanding (noēsis). First, I will analyze how the argument from Rep. 521-24 presents the perception of opposite features and the role of calculation. Second, I will show how this argument reflects the more basic problem of going from becoming to being. Third, I will suggest how this argument brings together Plato’s thought on education with the metaphysics and epistemology of Republic VI and VII. Rather than treating imaging as something distant from truth and to be avoided, certain sorts of imaging push one’s intellectual education towards being. It is the aporia of the opposites of perception which makes the soul restless and in need of calculation; without such confusing cases of imaging, the soul would be content with mere perception.

There are two major benefits from this analysis. First, it displays the psychology of philosophical education: the guardians do not seek understanding directly; rather, it is the aporia of their senses in the world of becoming that encourages the guardians to seek for the world of being. Second, it provides a more general account of Republic VI and VII. The analogies of the Sun, the Divided Line, and Cave are at use throughout this argument. Plato’s solution provides a deeper grasp of his concepts of the intelligible and the visible, the imaging and the understanding sections of the Divided Line, and the worlds of being and becoming.

Julie Ward. Loyola Chicago. jward@luc.edu. Panel Organizer: “Narrative Elements in Plato and Aristotle.” Presents: “Plato and Ring Composition.” 3A

The stylistic form known as “chiasmus,” or “ring composition,” is familiar to many ancient writers and poets; Plato is no exception. The central feature of the form, that the closing section repeats the image or wording of the opening section, throws the middle part of the ring into high relief for dramatic and poetic effect. Plato employs the ring form in various dialogues, but nowhere to greater effect than in Republic, where, in conjunction with theoria, it plays a pivotal role in describing the epistemic path of the nascent philosopher.

Michael Wiitala. Cleveland State University. nwiitala@gmail.com. “Being as Dunamis and Being an Entity: Sophist 247d8-e4.” 3D

In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger concludes his critique of the materialists by defining being (on) as the power (dunamis) to affect (poiein) and be affected (pathein). As Fiona Leigh and others have convincingly argued, this characterization of being is central to the Stranger’s ontology. After all, the hallmark of his ontology is that forms or kinds have the power to affect and be affected by their participation in one another (see esp. 251d5 ff.). Recent commentators, however, have not sufficiently explained why the Stranger formulates the definition of being as power in two different and seemingly incompatible ways at the end of his critique of the materialists. According to the first formulation, “that which possesses any sort of power either by nature to affect anything else whatsoever or to be affected . . . really is (ontōs einaı)” (247d8-e3). According to the second, which immediately follows, “the things that are (ta onta) . . . are nothing other than power (dunamis)” (247e4). These two ways of characterizing being seem incompatible with one another in that according to the first, beings are something that possess the power to affect or be affected; while according to the second, beings simply are that power.

In this paper, I will argue that in these two formulations of the definition of being, the Stranger is making a distinction between what it is to be an entity, on the one hand, and the nature of being, on the other. While all entities participate in the nature of being, being an entity
also requires participation in the nature of same and the nature of different. Hence the nature of being—what it is to be—interestingly turns out to be different from what it is to be an entity. What it is to be is nothing other than the power to affect or be affected, whereas what it is to be an entity is to be a participant in the nature of being, same, and different. The following consequences result for the ontology of the *Sophist*. First, while entities are individual objects—self-identical and different from others—the nature of being is not an object. Instead it is a power or capacity by which individual objects can affect or be affected by one another. Second, each form is an entity because each participates in the nature of being, same, and different. Yet the being of each form is the unique power it possesses to affect its participants and be affected by the forms in which it participates.

The interpretation of the Stranger’s account of being I defend in this paper is key to making sense to the Stranger’s two formulations of his definition of being as power. Furthermore, it is vital to properly understanding his discussion of the five greatest kinds. It explains why in order to be counted as two kinds in addition to being, motion and rest must also participate in same and different. In order to be countable, motion and rest must each be self-identical and different from others. Since what it is to be is not identical to what it is to be self-identical and what it is to be different from others, the self-identity and difference from others that belong to motion and rest cannot be explained by participation in being alone, but rather by participation in being together with same and different (254d4-256d10).

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“*Hypokeimenon* vs. Substance in Aristotle’s *Categories* and *Posterior Analytics.*” 3G

In his *Categories* Aristotle famously discusses what it is to be a substance. That Aristotle does not give a full exposition of what it is to be substance in *Categories* is also well known, for in discussing substance Aristotle is participating in a debate about in which the stipulated meaning of *substance* is already established. In general, to be a substance is to be the sort of thing which is such that everything else in one’s ontology exists by depending on or being in some way related to a substance. Even with this established, a theory of substance is needed, one which will give criteria for being a substance that will explain how something which fulfills these criteria can do the work of being a substance. Scholars generally agree that in *Categories* Aristotle presents the criterion for something being a substance as its being a *hypokeimenon*, thus laying great importance on Aristotle’s notion of *hypokeimenon*. Yet the question of what it is to be a *hypokeimenon* for Aristotle tends to be under-studied.

There is not, after all, a similar background of philosophical debate for Aristotle’s notion of the term *hypokeimenon* as for the concept of substance. *Hypokeimenon* a term whose use is developed and stipulated by Aristotle. In *Categories* he gives some discussion of the theoretical framework of which it is a part, detailing some of the rules of the predication relations it underlies. Yet he provides no theory of or criteria for being a *hypokeimenon*. He does present examples of things he claims are and others which are not, subjects in the relevant sense. He also suggests that there is a distinctive relationship between being a substance and being a *hypokeimenon*. From this it is inferred that the latter is the criterion for the former.

In this essay I argue that *hypokeimenon* is not presented as the criterion for substancehood in *Categories*, for it is not the case that in *Categories* Aristotle proposes that all and only substances are subjects. As I will show, Aristotle presents many examples of non-substances which are *hypokeimena*. He also never claims that all substances are subjects, and, further, it does not follow from anything he says that all substance are subjects. I also present
some mixed evidence from elsewhere in his corpus that he is willing to admit as a substance something which is not a subject. This compels us to ask anew what being a hypokeimenon is meant to tell us about being a substance, thus calling into question some entrenched views both about what it is to be substance and what it is to be a hypokeimenon for Aristotle.

It also puts into sharper relief the question of the criteria for being a hypokeimenon. I argue that in Categories Aristotle provides few clues about his theory of subjecthood, beyond generally laying out the framework of ontological predication in which it functions. But Categories does contain an overlooked pointer to the discussion of strict and accidental predication in Posterior Analytics A.22. I argue that we can extract from this discussion Aristotle’s criterion for being a hypokeimenon. On my reading, the text in An. Po. A.22 shows that Aristotle’s criterion for being a hypokeimenon is for something to be the grounds for an ontological predicate by being hoper ti what it is. I argue that being hoper ti in the sense in Aristotle has in mind does not require being an essential or kath’ auto being. In other words, the criterion of being hoper ti for subjecthood does not require something to be a substance in order for it to be a subject. This supports my reading of Categories. I argue that it also provides a new perspective on why Aristotle thought it was informative to characterize substance in terms of hypokeimenon in Categories.

Sister Anna Wray OP. The Catholic University of America. 07wray@cua.edu. “Distinguishing Truth’s Absences: Aristotle on Falsity, Error, and Ignorance.” 5A

Aristotle employs the conjunction “truth and falsity” (τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος) with great frequency throughout his works. With far less frequency, he describes the absence of truth as ignorance (ἀγνοέω), mistake (ἁμαρτάω), deception (ἀπατάω), and falling short of a mark (ἀποτυγχάω). An examination of the passages in which Aristotle describes truth’s absence in each of these uncommon ways shows his terminology to be far from haphazard; by employing one term rather than another, he signifies not only that truth is absent, but also why it is so. The task of this paper, to explicate the differences among what Aristotle presents as opposed to truth, is accordingly of no small assistance to understanding his account of truth in its own right.


One of the treatises that is attributed to al-Farabi is tafsir asma al-hukama that has a place among the writings of al-Farabi in Brockelmann’s GAL supplement I 377 (Franz Rosenthal 1942, 73). Without entering into authenticity of this attribution, this treatise shows the positive tendency and interest of its author in the interplay of philology and philosophy - a theme that we can see its first outstanding appearance in Plato’s Politeia Book IX, 582e, 8, though, such an issue is not explored by Platonic scholars (J.K. Newman 2002-2003, 197. In this noteworthy diachronic paper, we can read the transformation of the friendly relation of these two spheres of knowledge into an opposition in Plotinus).

I want to examine this one-page text which contains a shorthand inventory of fourteen Greek proper names. The result of such an exploration will be a Maxima in minimis or a hologram in a very imperfect scale (Zuckermann 2006, 238).