The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

11-16-2019

SAGP Annual Meeting at Christopher Newport University, November 16 and 17 2019

Anthony Preus

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SCHEDULE FOR THE SAGP ANNUAL MEETING AT CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT UNIVERSITY, NOVEMBER 16 AND 17.
If you would like to chair a particular panel that does not have a chair yet, please let me know!

Saturday, November 16
9:30-11:30 Session 1
Room 1: Cicero’s Ethical Thought
Organizer and Chair, Thornton Lockwood
Eric Brown. Washington University in St. Louis. eabrown@wustl.edu. “Animality and Contingency in Cicero’s Critique of Epicurean Ethics”
John P.F. Wynne. University of Utah. john.wynne@utah.edu. “Cicero on parental love.”
Thornton Lockwood. Quinnipiac University. tlockwood@qu.edu. “Promise keeping in Cicero’s De Officiis: The peculiar case of Marcus Atilius Regulus.”

Room 2: The Religion of Socrates and Plato
Chair: Joyce Mullan. Stevens Institute of Technology
Beverly Hollberg. CNU. beverly.hollberg.17@cnu.edu. “Rationalizing Socrates’ Faith in his Daimonion.”
John Monelly. CNU. John.monelly.16@cnu.edu. “Socrates and Intellectual Moralism: Is Knowledge All It Takes to Produce Goodness?”
Daniel Larkin. Georgia Southern University. dllarkin@georgiasouthern.edu. “We Get by with a Little Help from the Gods: The Role of Divine Inspiration in Plato’s Laws.”

Room 3: Friendship and Love in Socrates and Plato
Chair: Eve Browning. University of Texas, San Antonio
Kevin Cales. Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. krcales@siu.edu. “Plato’s Symposium: Erotic Philosophy, Kairos, and the Crisis of the Soul.”

Room 4: Aristotle: Politics and the Good
J. J. Mulhern. University of Pennsylvania. johnjm@sas.upenn.edu/johnjm11@verizon.net. “Koinē/ on Sumpheron: Agreed Advantage Rather than Common Good in Aristotle’s Politics.”
Gwen Nally. University of Missouri, Kansas City. nallye@umkc.edu. “Aristotle’s Feast: Political Participation in Politics 3.11.”

Room 5: Recent Scholarship on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption 2.
Mary Krizan, Organizer and Chair
Naomi Ginsborg-Warren. Reed College. nagi@reed.edu. “Aristotle’s account of compound bodies in GC 2.7 (and the related GC 1.10)”
Mary Krizan. *University of Wisconsin, LaCrosse.* mkrizan@uwlax.edu. “Aristotle’s introduction of his four elements as an alternative to single-element accounts, especially in *GC 2.5.*”
Margaret Scharle. *Reed College.* scharlem@reed.edu. “Aristotle’s account of the elemental transformations in *GC 2.4*”

11:30-1 Lunch

1-3 Session 2
Room 1: **Cicero as Translator, Cicero as Interpreter.**
Michael Vazquez, Organizer and Chair
Andree Hahmann. *University of Pennsylvania.* ahahmann@sas.upenn.edu. “Cicero and Divination.” (*De Divinatione*)
Mark Shiffman. *Villanova University.* Mark.shiffman@villanova.edu. “Aristotle and Cicero on Aristocratic Friendship.” (*De Amicitia, De Re Publica*)
Michael Vazquez. *University of Pennsylvania.* vazm@sas.upenn.edu. “Cicero and Moral Duty.” (*De Officiis, De Finibus.*)

Room 2: **Socratic Paradox**
J. Clerk Shaw, Organizer and Chair
J. Clerk Shaw. *University of Tennessee.* jshaw15@utk.edu. “Motivational Conflict and the Moral Paradox in Plato’s *Protagoras*”
Nicholas Baima. *Florida Atlantic University.* nbaima@fau.edu. “Punishment, Justice, and Harm: Socratic Paradox in *Laws 9.*”
Anna Christensen. *Central College.* christensena@central.edu. “Socratic Involuntary Responsibility.”

Room 3: **The Psychology of Plato’s Socratic Dialogues**
Chair: Daniel Maher, *Assumption College*
Anne Ashbaugh. *Towson University.* aashbaugh@towson.edu. “Desiring Beautiful Things: Reading *Meno 77b,* Keeping in Mind *Symposium 203b-212e.*”
Jessica Deal. *Catholic University of America.* 12deal@cua.edu. “The Psychology of Learning as Recollection: A Closer Look at the Soul of Meno’s Boy (81a–86e).”
Douglass Reed. *University of Rhode Island.* douglassreed@uri.edu. “Social Virtue and Hedonism in *Protagoras and Phaedo.*”

Room 4: **Plato Timaeus**
Chair: John Mulhern. *University of Pennsylvania.*
Eric Morelli. *Point Loma Nazarene University.* emorelli@pointloma.edu. “‘To Begin at the Beginning’: *Timaeus 17a1-5* as Hermeneutic Key.”
Casey Hall. *CUNY Graduate Center.* Casey.hall.15@cnu.edu. “Evil and Moral Blame in Plato’s *Timaeus.*”
Betsy Jelinek. *CNU.* elizabeth.jelinek@cnu.edu. “Explanations of Evil in Plato’s *Timaeus.*”

Room 5: **Aristotle: Psychology**
Chair: Samuel Baker. *University of South Alabama.*
Octavian Gabor. *Methodist College*. ogabor@methodistcol.edu. “Aristotle’s Answer to a Non-Aristotelian Question: Individuation (DA).”

Mark A. Sentesy. *Pennsylvania State University*. sentesy@psu.edu. “Pathways of Movement in the Soul: Anamnesis in Aristotle.”


3-3:15 Coffee break
3:15-5:15 Session 3
Room 1: **Ronald M. Polansky Retirement Celebration Panel**
Organizer and Chair, Chelsea Harry. *University of Southern Connecticut*. harryc1@southernct.edu chelsea.harry@gast.uni-kassel.de


Evan Strevell. *Xavier University*. strevelle@xavier.edu. “Polansky on Aristotle’s De Anima.”


Room 2: **Consequences of Socratic Discussions with Sophists**
Chair: Simon Dutton. *University of South Florida*.


Room 3: **Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Aztecs**
Chair:


Room 4: **Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics; Poetics**
Chair: Thornton Lockwood. *Quinnipiac University*. thorntonlockwood@gmail.com.


Clinton Corcoran. *Highpoint University*. ccorcoran@highpoint.edu. “Distinguishing Completeness (τελείας) from Magnitude (μέγεθος) in Aristotle’s Definition of Tragedy in the Poetics (1449b 25-29)”

Angela Curran. *Kansas State University*. afcurran@k-state.edu. “Aristotle on the Ethical Dimension of Comedy.”

Room 5: **Hellenistic Philosophy and Beyond**
Chair: Colin Smith. *University of Colorado, Boulder*

Ryan E. McCoy. *University of Kentucky*. Ryan.mccoy@uky.edu. “Pyrrhonism as a Way of Life and the Problem of Modern Science.”


5:15-8 Dinner and free time (rooms will be available for discussion)

I develop a unified interpretation of phantasia, aisthēsis, and eikasia as, together, Plato's account of primitive, or pre-rational, cognition in the Republic.

Sunday
9-11: Session 4
Room 1: **Socrates and Other Citizens**
Chair: Bruce Payne. *Hunter College, CUNY.*
Eve Browning. *University of Texas, San Antonio*. Eve.browning@utsa.edu. “Xenophon on the Principles of Ethical Leadership.”
Chrysoula Gitsoulis. *College of Staten Island, CUNY*. cgitsoulis@gradcenter.cuny.edu. “The Individual vs. the State: A Study of Socrates and Antigone.” (Apology, Crito)

Room 2: **Plato: Critias, Sophist; Plotinus and Plato**
Chair: Eric Morelli. *Point Loma Nazarene University.*
George William Harvey. *Indiana University Southeast*. whgeorge@ius.edu. “Two Political Ideals in Plato’s Critias.”
Michael Wiitala. *Cleveland State University*. mwiitala@gmail.com. “Three Referents of “Non-Being” in the Sophist: The Nature of Non-Being, the Form Non-Being, and Things that Are Not.”
D.M. Hutchinson. *St. Olaf College*. dmunoz@stolaf.edu. “Plotinus on the Composition of Sensibles.”

Room 3: **Aristotle: Akrasia and Vice**
Chair:
Jay Elliott. *Bard College*. jelliott@bard.edu. “Akrasia as a State of Character (EN 7).”
Takashi Oki. *Nagoya University*. takashiokinew@gmail.com. “Necessitarianism and ‘What is up to us’ in Nicomachean Ethics III.”

Room 4: **Aristotle: Causation and Logic**
Chair: Andrey Darovskikh, *Binghamton University*
David Squires. *University of St. Thomas, Houston*. dsquires@nd.edu. “Nature as Final and Efficient Cause in *Physics B*.”

Ludmila Dostalova. *University of West Bohemia*. ldostal@kfi.zcu.cz. “Aristotelian Foundations of Modern Logic.”

Room 5: **Aristotle: Intellectual Virtues**
Chair: Ignacio De Ribera-Martin. *Catholic University of America*.


11-11:15: Coffee Break
11:15-1:15 Session 5
Room 1: **Early Greek Philosophy**

Mostafa Younesie. *Philadelphia*. Younesie7@yahoo.com. “Empedocles on Name and its Connected Features”

Joyce Mullan. *Stevens Institution of Technology*. jmullan@stevens.edu. “Hesiod’s Double Tale of Strife in his Works and Days.”

Room 2: **Plato’s Republic**
Chair: Daniel Larkin. *Georgia Southern University*.

Chad Wiener. *Old Dominion University*. chad.wiener@gmail.com. “A Reading of the First Book of the *Republic*: A Look to the Whole.”

Simon J. Dutton. *University of South Florida*. simond@mail.usf.edu. “Laws are Made Things: The Use of Dialectic in Coming to Know the Just (*Republic)*.”

Wen Xu. *University of Colorado*. Wen.xu@colorado.edu. “Plato on Arithmetic.”

Peter Moore. *University of Kentucky*. peter.moore@uky.edu. “Revisiting the Critique of Poetry in *Republic* X: A Hermeneutic for Engaging with Poetry?”

Room 3: **Aristotle: Reproduction**
Chair: D.M. Hutchinson. *St. Olaf College*.
Anna Cremaldi. *Appalachian State University*. cremaldiam@appstate.edu. “What is the Good of Reproduction?”


Thomas Olshewsky. *New College Florida*. tolshewsky@ncf.edu. “Aristotle on Women.”

Andrey Darovskikh. *Binghamton University*. Adarovs1@binghamton.edu. “Who is better off? Two types of conditional necessity in Aristotle’s biology.”

Room 4: **Aristotle: Metaphysics**
Chair: Mark Sentesy. *Pennsylvania State University*.
Cody Sandschafer. *Boston College*. sandscha@bc.edu. “Teaching Zeta”
Nicholas Westberg. *Boston College*. westbern@bc.edu. “*Metaphysics Zeta: Its Purpose and Argument.*”


Room 5: **Placing Platonic Dialogues**
Chair: Michael Wiitala. *Cleveland State University*
Bruce Payne. *Hunter College CUNY*. brucelloydpayne@gmail.com. “Clues and Provocations: Discovering the *Alcibiades I*.”

Colin C. Smith. *University of Colorado, Boulder*. Ccsm223@g.uky.edu. “The Case for the 399 BCE Dramatic Date of Plato’s *Cratylus*”

You will note that the panels are scheduled for 2 hours, with three speakers in most cases. We recommend that speakers limit their remarks to 20 minutes, to allow for plenty of discussion, and that Chairs stop speakers at 30 minutes. If that is done, that allows about 10 minutes of discussion for each paper.
This panel will celebrate the 40+ year career of Ronald M. Polansky, Chair of the Philosophy Department and Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University and founder/Editor of *Ancient Philosophy* and Mathesis Publications. Former doctoral students and friends will speak about his three book-length contributions to the discipline: Plato’s *Theaetetus*, Aristotle’s *De anima*, and Aristotle’s *Parva Naturalia*.

Panelists:
Kelsey Ward: Polansky on Aristotle’s *De anima* wardsk1@duq.edu
Evan Strevelle: Polansky on Aristotle’s *De Anima*. strevelle@xavier.edu
Topher Kurfess: Polansky on Aristotle’s *Parva Naturalia* topher.kurfess@gmail.com
Moderator: Chelsea Harry harryc1@southernct.edu chelsea.harry@gast.uni-kassel.de

Mary Krizan Panel: Recent Scholarship on Aristotle’s *On Generation and Corruption* 2 1-5
Proposed by: Mary Krizan, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse
Presenters: Naomi Ginsborg-Warren, Reed College, Mary Krizan, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse, and Margaret Scharle, Reed College

The second book of Aristotle’s *On Generation and Corruption* (GC) focuses on Aristotle’s account of the material elements. In this text, Aristotle examines the principles of the material elements and their changes into one another, contrasts his account with that of his predecessors, explains how the material elements form homogeneous compounds, and ends with an account of their relationship to regularity and necessity within the universe. Until recently, there has been little contemporary scholarship specifically on GC 2; where available, treatments of GC 2 tended to occur within the context of Aristotle’s more general account of matter, form, and substance. Interest in GC 2 has been growing in recent years; the purpose of this panel is to draw attention to a few of the main topics of philosophical interest in the text and situate them within broader interpretations of Aristotle’s thought.

More specifically, the panel will focus on three related topics that emerge in the course of GC 2.

First, Aristotle offers an account of his material elements—earth, air, fire, and water—in GC 2, and describes the ways in which they are composed out of the primary contraries (heat, cold, moisture, and dryness) and how they can transform into one another. How one understands Aristotle’s material elements has implications for how one is to understand the status of matter in Aristotle’s natural philosophy, more generally; depending upon the view that one takes of Aristotle’s material elements and their cyclical transformations, one may or may not find a commitment to prime matter in Aristotle.

Second, Aristotle offers his account of the material elements as an alternative to the accounts of (what he calls) matter and elements that he finds in his predecessors. In particular, the problems that he finds for single-element accounts, such as those of
Anaximander and Anaximenes, contribute to his insistence that there are four elements. In uncovering Aristotle’s arguments against his predecessors, one can begin to draw further conclusions regarding the nature of Aristotle’s own theory of matter and simple bodies.

Finally, Book 2 of *GC* contributes to our understanding of homoeomers, or composite materials, within Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Specifically, Aristotle’s account of the combination of homoeomers raises a question as to whether composite materials are substances, with a hylomorphic structure of their own, or disparate mixtures of elements that only have a function within a living thing.

The three panelists will each present on one of these topics, and in doing so, bring attention to the interpretative issues that emerge within the text of *GC* 2. Margaret Scharle will focus on Aristotle’s account of the elemental transformations in *GC* 2.4; Mary Krizan will focus on Aristotle’s introduction of his four elements as an alternative to single-element accounts, especially in *GC* 2.5, and Naomi Ginsborg-Warren will focus on Aristotle’s account of compound bodies in *GC* 2.7 (and the related *GC* 1.10). The three panelists have been in conversation with one another and are reacting to one another’s work on these topics, which will make for a fruitful discussion that highlights the issues for the text as well as the philosophical consequences of alternative interpretations.

Thornton Lockwood Panel: *Cicero’s Ethical Thought 1-1*

“Animality and Contingency in Cicero’s Critique of Epicurean Ethics”
Eric Brown, Washington University in St. Louis (eabrown@wustl.edu)
ABSTRACT. Cicero begins and ends his critique of Epicurean Ethics in De Finibus II with what I call the Animality Objection, the claim that humans should not have the same ultimate end as nonhuman animals. This is an ancient charge against ethical hedonism, but it rarely extends beyond classist and anthropocentric prejudices. An anti-hedonist might move past mere prejudice by offering principled reasons for two naturalist premises, that a being’s end must somehow express its nature and that human and nonhuman animals have significantly different natures. But I argue that Cicero has a different route. Instead of the premise that a being’s end must express its nature, Cicero's different route starts with the thought that some actions are non-contingently right (and others are non-contingently wrong). He then argues that Epicureans cannot account for such properties, and because he believes that reason is required both to do such actions and to recognize them, he expresses his argument by the Animality Objection. Cicero's Animality Objection raises interesting questions about the role of necessity in moral judgments, and about the influence of Cicero on Kant.

“Cicero on parental love”
John P.F. Wynne, University of Utah (john.wynne@utah.ed) 1-1
ABSTRACT: When he writes about certain theories of justice or friendship, Cicero often invites us to reflect first on how a parent loves his or her child. Cicero's use of the example seems philosophically (although not biographically) puzzling. Parental love stems from a unique, biological relation—can it illuminate other relationships? Or again, David Konstan has argued that in On friendship Cicero's use of parental love is in tension
with the work’s arguments, since the animal and unconditional nature of parental love is in tension with an ideal of friendship based on community of virtue. (‘Cicero’s two loves, Ciceroniana Online 1.2 (2017), 291-305) I argue that there are no such puzzles. Cicero does not think of parental love as a model for other relationships. Rather, he deploys it to prove a specific but controversial thesis, that it is possible naturally to wish another well just as one wishes oneself well. With this thesis in hand, he can then give the arguments for the impartialist views about justice and friendship he likes to explore, to which a traditional objection is that they make psychologically impossible demands.

“Promise keeping in Cicero’s De officiis: The peculiar case of Marcus Atlius Regulus.”
Thornton Lockwood, Quinnipiac University (tlockwood@qu.edu)
ABSTRACT: In On Duties (de officiis), Cicero identifies “keeping of faith” (fides) in what one has said and agreed as a positive duty of justice I.23). Nonetheless, reminiscent of Socrates’ critique of Cephalus in the Republic, Cicero also acknowledges that one must apply discretion to the application of one’s duties, since from time to time it is necessary not to keep a promise if the result of the promise will be harmful (such as returning a borrowed weapon to an unstable person) I.31-32). It is thus rather surprising that when Cicero considers the case of Marcus Atlius Regulus, a Roman consul whose promise keeping during wartime resulted in his own torture and execution by the Carthaginians, he appears to claim that promises made between combatants during armed conflict do not admit of discretion I.39, III.99-100). Indeed, Martha Nussbaum has recently argued that Cicero’s treatment of Regulus illustrates a deep incoherence in Cicero’s account of strict and permissive duties towards others. My paper explores Cicero’s treatment of promise keeping and argues that his account of Regulus is understandable within the framework of Cicero’s nascent ius in bello theory I.34-40).

Clerk Shaw Panel “Socratic Paradox.” Jshaw15@utk.edu. Clerk Shaw, Nick Baima, Anna Christensen. For abstracts, see individual presenters. 2-2

Michael Vazquez Panel “Cicero as Translator, Cicero as Interpreter.” 2-1
Cicero is one of our most important sources for Hellenistic philosophy. His philosophical works played a decisive role in the transmission of Greek philosophy into Rome, late antiquity, and the early modern period. Cicero was conscious of the importance of his efforts to “teach philosophy Latin” (Fin. 3.40), and his dramatic casting of Greek philosophy in a Roman mold often eschews ad verbum translation. We take his remarks at de Officiis 1.6 to be emblematic. There Cicero tells us that he is looking to his sources “not as an expositor (interpres), but...drawing from their fountains when and as it seems best, using [his] own judgment and discretion (iudicio arbitrioque).”
Many of the concepts and problems introduced by Cicero continue to be of interest to researchers today. It is remarkable, for example, that the distinction between catastrophic and kinetic pleasures, which looms large in the contemporary scholarly debate on Epicurean ethics, is based almost exclusively on Cicero's presentation. Just as influential for our understanding of Stoic philosophy is Cicero's discussion of oikéiosis/conciliatio, Stoic natural law, and the doctrine of duties (καθήκοντα/officia).
It has long been acknowledged that the animating questions of *quellenforschung* are impossible to answer with certainty. Rather than speculate about Cicero’s sources, we think it is worth asking how his *use* of sources is shaped by his own philosophical, literary, and rhetorical agenda. In this panel, it is our aim to pick out some of the most important examples of Cicero as a translator and as an interpreter, and to discuss how Cicero has shaped and continues to shape our understanding of Hellenistic philosophy. In contrast to approaches towards Cicero’s texts which treat them as a repository of (often misleading) information about the Hellenistic schools, we hope to highlight the originality and inventiveness of Cicero’s authorship throughout his *philosophica*.

1. Andree Hahmann. *University of Pennsylvania*. [ahahmann@sas.upenn.edu](mailto:ahahmann@sas.upenn.edu). “Cicero and Divination.” (De Divinatione) Vazquez panel 2-1
2. Mark Shiffman. *Villanova University*. [Mark.shiffman@villanova.edu](mailto:Mark.shiffman@villanova.edu). “Aristotle and Cicero on Aristocratic Friendship.” (De Amicitia, De Re Publica) Vazquez panel 2-1
3. Michael Vazquez. *University of Pennsylvania*. [vazm@sas.upenn.edu](mailto:vazm@sas.upenn.edu). “Cicero and Moral Duty.” (De Officiis, De Finibus.) Vazquez panel 2-1

**Individual abstracts, including those on organized panels**

-A-

Anne Ashbaugh. *Towson University*. [aashbaugh@towson.edu](mailto:aashbaugh@towson.edu). “Desiring Beautiful Things: Reading *Meno* 77b, Keeping in Mind *Symposium* 203b-212e.” Panel 2-3

At *Meno*, 77b, Meno defines virtue erotically. Socrates’ discussion on how to define terms like shape and color by “seeking that which is the same in all cases” (*Meno*, 75a) reminds Meno about a poet’s words (77b): ‘χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι.’ That is, Meno remembers the phrase, “to delight in beautiful things and have power.” The memory emboldens Meno to define virtue in what he takes to be the same terms used by the poem. However Meno’s definition introduces an important shift (77b):

καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἄρετίν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δύνατον εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.

In his eagerness to define virtue, Meno does not retain the poet’s original idea of ‘rejoicing or delighting’ in beautiful things’ but speaks, instead of ‘desiring.’ Socrates resists the shift by turning to the presumed object of desire and exposing the problems of Meno’s broadly conceived claim. Yet, Socrates does not neglect to expose that an important shift in verbs commits them to a new understanding of virtue and he asks Meno, “What do you mean by desiring? Is it not to secure for oneself? – What else?” (77c). That is precisely the question my paper asks, in reference to virtue, “what do we mean by desiring?” I would further add: why is desire an issue for virtue at all, particularly in what pertains to what is beautiful. In order to address this matter, I examine the uses of *epithumia* and *eros* in *Phaedrus* and Socrates’ education in erotics in *Symposium*.

-B-

Nicholas Baima. *Florida Atlantic University*. [nbaima@fau.edu](mailto:nbaima@fau.edu). “Punishment, Justice, and Harm: Socratic Paradox in *Laws* 9.” Shaw Panel 2-2
Plato faces a challenge in *Laws* 9: he aims to preserve the Socratic paradox that no one does injustice voluntarily, while distinguishing between psychological conditions that underlie wrong action. In an attempt to thread this needle, Plato distinguishes between injustice and harm, and wrong action done out of anger, pleasure, and ignorance. However, in explicating what he means by justice and injustice, Plato seems to indicate that some amount of ignorance is compatible with justice (863a-864a). Such an inclusion strikes many scholars as odd since it seems to undermine the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge and Plato has just stated that ignorance is a cause of wrongdoing. In this paper, I explain why such a position is not at odds with the text nor is it implausible.


In *Nicomachean Ethics* I 7, Aristotle defines the human good as an “activity of [the rational part of] the soul on the basis of virtue, and if there are more virtues than one, on the basis of the best and most perfect [teleios] virtue, and moreover in a complete [teleios] life” (1098a16-18). In this paper I focus on the last element in Aristotle’s definition: “in a complete life.” Why does Aristotle make this addition and what does it mean? Despite the attention that scholars have given to Aristotle’s definition of the human good in general, they have largely neglected the “in a complete life” requirement. I argue that Aristotle adds the requirement because continuity and perpetuity make an excellent activity even better (*NE* X 7, 1177a22; cf. *NE* IX 9, 1170a7). He says “in a complete life” and not “perpetually and continually” only because he is seeking the best achievable good and a perpetual activity is not achievable by humans. I then explain how my proposal is compatible with various related Aristotelian claims, e.g. that happiness is not improvable (*NE* I 7, 1097b16-21) or temporally extended (*Meta* Θ 6).


Cicero begins and ends his critique of Epicurean Ethics in De Finibus II with what I call the Animality Objection, the claim that humans should not have the same ultimate end as nonhuman animals. This is an ancient charge against ethical hedonism, but it rarely extends beyond classist and anthropocentric prejudices. An anti-hedonist might move past mere prejudice by offering principled reasons for two naturalist premises, that a being’s end must somehow express its nature and that human and nonhuman animals have significantly different natures. But I argue that Cicero has a different route. Instead of the premise that a being’s end must express its nature, Cicero’s different route starts with the thought that some actions are non-contingently right (and others are non-contingently wrong). He then argues that Epicureans cannot account for such properties, and because he believes that reason is required both to do such actions and to recognize them, he expresses his argument by the Animality Objection. Cicero's Animality Objection raises interesting questions about the role of necessity in moral judgments, and about the influence of Cicero on Kant.


In this paper, I argue that the Palinode’s introduction of a reasoning capacity in the soul serves two purposes: harmonizing the internal strife of the soul’s discordant motive forces and leading the whole soul to communion with its proper object. I focus on the second of these purposes
as the more important, for reason’s capacity to be led by its object is what allows the Palinode to develop an account of human nature that gets beyond the internal strife of powers to the soul’s orientation to being. The Palinode, I claim, discloses a conception of reason as fundamentally responsive to the true beings, and it is only in this responsiveness that reason can pursue its own activity.

Reason directs the soul to its proper object by being “led” to it. In this way, reason recognizes a fundamental moment of receptivity and posteriority to the activity of what “leads” it. Reason’s activity must presuppose the prior activity of something distinct from it, which directs reason to itself. Whereas desire and right opinion can drive the soul toward something, they cannot enter into communion—a relation of togetherness which preserves difference—with it. Undirected by reason, the desire for pleasure consumes its object and thus obliterates difference. Right opinion preserves the integrity of the object only by preventing itself from grasping at it; thus, it does not enter into communion. The Palinode, by contrast, depicts reason as a charioteer directing the two horses in such a way that the whole soul can move toward communion with its object without domination or unerotic restraint. With reason, the whole soul can enter into a communion with the true beings, which nevertheless remain abidingly transcendent.

But how does the soul come into such a communion? The answer to this question is in part anthropological and in part metaphysical. The soul’s fundamental activity is to be “led” and to “follow” that which leads to the true beings, which are, by nature, “radiant;” like the sun, they give themselves away in images. Communion occurs in the meeting of these two ecstatic activities. By attending to the language of “leading” (agein) and its semantic network, we can see how Plato depicts the soul’s ekstasis. Socrates reserves these terms in his speeches for describing the acts of the soul. In his first speech, Socrates exclusively uses “leading” to describe the functions of and contest between the two motive forces in the soul. In the Palinode, Socrates uses “leading” to account for the activity and directionality of the whole soul. The gods, especially Zeus, “the Great Leader,” lead the souls through the cosmic circuit toward the true beings.

All human souls follow the gods to the vision of the true beings; the partiality of their success is contingent on reason’s capacity to rightly order the soul internally so that it can be ordered to and “led” by what is higher into communion and nourishment. Being, in its radiance, “goes out of itself” to meet us where we are, and leads us back to itself. Reason harmonizes and redirects the soul so that it can be led back to being by pursuing its activity in accordance with the activity of being which precedes it. Being gives us iconic images of itself by which we are able to ascend to it. Thus, the Palinode shows us how the soul and being are ordered to each other. Each “ecstatically” goes out of itself to meet the other in communion.

Eve Browning. *University of Texas San Antonio*. Eve.browning@utsa.edu. “Xenophon on the Principles of Ethical Leadership.” 1-3

Much recent scholarship on Xenophon has concentrated on the theme of leadership, which is prominent in his *Cyropaideia* and *Agesilaus* but also runs through his depictions of Socrates in the *Memorabilia*. In fact it is even a theme in his horse training advice in *Peri Hippikos*, since it is there stressed that leading a horse to a desired behavior is not dissimilar to the leading of men; both require tact and demand the willing cooperation of the person or animal being led. In this paper I develop a concise description of the principles of ethical leadership which Xenophon foregrounds, and briefly contrast them with the leadership models which can be glimpsed in the works of Plato and Aristotle.

Eryximachus’ presence at Agathon’s symposium intends to bring to the reader’s mind the empirical methodology of Hippocratic medicine, i.e., its theory and practice, and thereby introduce the major philosophical problem in Plato’s *Symposium*. I argue that Plato’s concern for the care of the soul in the *Symposium* is illuminated by examination of the status of Hippocratic medicine as a *teknē*, its theoretical concepts of *crisis* and *kairos*, and its empirical method in practice. Plato’s casting of Socrates the philosopher alongside Eryximachus the physician juxtaposes philosophy with Hippocratic medicine to show the limits of a conception of human health and the good life based on an empirical methodology and to address the spiritual need of classical Greece with philosophy for the well-being of the soul as inseparable from the good life. The *Symposium* is a continuance of Plato’s reflections on philosophy as care for the soul.

Anna Christensen. *Central College*. christensena@central.edu. “Socratic Involuntary Responsibility.” Shaw Panel 2-2

Socrates says that no one does wrong voluntarily. All vicious actions must be the result of an intellectual mistake; the agent acts on a misapprehension of her desires, or chooses to do wrong in the mistaken belief that such action benefits herself (Grg. 466d-468b; Laws IX.860d ff.). However, even though the paradox must mean that an agent only commits a crime involuntarily, the agent is punishable for the crime (Grg. 472e; Laws IX.862e, 873a). So what exactly does this paradox mean for an account of responsibility? In this paper, I show how the paradox can illuminate responsible and intentional action in Socratic philosophy.


In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we find a textual puzzle concerning the relationship between character habituation and the emergence of *phronēsis*. Early in *EN* (e.g. I.13, II.2 and II.4), we read that habituating the affective part of the soul occurs without reason. But these claims appear inconsistent with later claims in VI.12-13 where we read that moral character and *phronēsis* are united. Take for example Aristotle’s claim in II.4 that for virtuous action “knowledge is of little or no importance” (1105b2). Compare this claim with the conclusion of the discussion on *phronēsis* in VI.13 where Aristotle says “virtue is not only a characteristic which is guided by right reason, but also a characteristic which is united with right reason; and right reason in moral matters is *phronēsis*” (1144b26-28).

This textual puzzle is the center of the debate between the intellectualist and non-intellectualist interpretations of character habituation. Simply put, intellectualists argue that moral habituation necessarily includes the development of rational powers else the emergence of *phronēsis* is mysterious and claims in book VI are unintelligible. Non-intellectualists argue that moral habituation is strictly non-rational, that it includes only the development of the perceptual and affective powers of the soul.

This debate, as it stands, concerns only the internal psychology of the moral learner; and as such is not resolvable. Each party can find textual support for their position. Instead, I expect a new focus will shed light on the relationship between habituation and *phronēsis*. Specifically, I
propose that we consider the role of external intellect in moral habituation, namely that of the
teacher or parent.

Clinton Corcoran. Highpoint University. ecorcoran@highpoint.edu. “Distinguishing
Completeness (τελείας) from Magnitude (μέγεθος) in Aristotle’s Definition of Tragedy in
the Poetics (1449b 25-29)” 3-4

For Aristotle the most effective and affective plots are constructed around one action
(περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν, Poetics, 1451a 28). But ‘one’ can be said in several senses. In Aristotle’s
definition of plot in the Poetics, he distinguishes the quantitative category of completeness
(τελείας) from the qualitative category of magnitude (μέγεθος). Completeness refers both (1) to
the requirement that plots have three parts, a beginning, middle, and an end (1450b 26-27, ὅλον
dὲ ἐστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχήν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν, the wholeness criteria) and (2) the requirement
that the parts do not leave out any actions that would demonstrate the probable and necessary
sequence of actions in the plot (1451a 29-35, the completeness criteria). That is, that each of
these parts must, as Aristotle argues, have a causal relation to one another (1451a 31-35). On
the other hand, magnitude is a quality created (1) through the range of movement between the
actions that constitute the good and bad fortune of the protagonist (1451a 11-15, the vertical
range), (2) the total number and complexity of incidents represented (e.g. the number of
complicating and resolving actions, or whether the play has compounding (πεπλεγμένοι) reversal
and recognition scenes (1452a 11-16), and (3) the proportionality and fit of the parts (1450b
33—1451a 3), and (4) finally the kind or quality of the incidents imitated (the affective
dimension), whether the actions are serious or ridiculous (1448b 23-27). Having proper dramatic
magnitude is dependent both on the two senses of completeness and each of the four senses of
μέγεθος. Therefore, completeness is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a plots having
proper dramatic magnitude. For instance, a drama could have all three casually well-connected
parts, but still lack proper magnitude. Thus, the two components of completeness and the four
components of magnitude must all be present to effect a dramatic unity that produces the proper
dramatic affect.

Anna Cremaldi. Appalachian State University. cremaldiam@appstate.edu. “What is the Good of
Reproduction?” 5-3

Aristotle claims that the good of reproduction is to produce ‘another such as itself’ (heteros
autos)(e.g. DA 2.4). In interpreting this claim, commentators assume that Aristotle has in mind
the good secured through immortality. On one view, the friendship between parents and children
is the mechanism for securing immortality, which operates as a kind of “moral continuance,” as
one commentator puts it. According to the most widespread interpretation, however, parents gain
immortality by passing on hereditary form, which is usually construed in terms of species-specific
form, but sometimes as individual form. Though disparate, all these views share the assumption
that the good of reproduction is immortality.

However, careful attention to the case of human reproduction—and in particular,
the female experience in reproduction—challenges the view that the good of reproduction is
immortality. For there is clear indication that human reproduction has goals beyond securing
immortality, as close reading of both Aristotle’s ethical and biological works shows. As I argue,
the good of reproducing for women lies not in immortality, but in the development and
actualization of a mother’s moral and intellectual dispositions. To defend this view, I draw on

Anna Cremaldi. Appalachian State University. cremaldiam@appstate.edu. “What is the Good of
Reproduction?” 5-3
Aristotle’s biology and ethics to discuss the moral and intellectual changes associated with motherhood, along with the biological changes that undergird them.

While the immediate goal of this study is to resist the view that the good of reproduction is immortality, its ultimate goal is to reflect on and amend commentary on Aristotle’s views vis a vis women.


In his concluding remarks on Plato’s Hippias Minor (HiMi), Paul Shorey states that the dialogue

“is plainly the source of [Aristotle’s] distinction between δύναμις and ἕξις, a faculty and a habit, on which Aristotle bases his definition of virtue, and with the aid of which he disposes many fallacies, including the Socratic analogy between the virtues and the arts”

(1933, 88-89).

In a way it is plain: At Met. V.29 1025a6-9, Aristotle criticizes a main argument of HiMi for reducing character to δύναμις alone, i.e. knowledge. Furthermore, in NE Aristotle makes quick work of the proposal that virtue is identical to a knowledge-δύναμις and he criticizes Socrates for identifying it as such. Aristotle’s assessment is confirmed in Shorey’s own reading of the dialogue, a reading that remains fairly standard in the literature. I will argue that while HiMi is the (or at least an important) source of Aristotle’s distinction, it is not as plain as Shorey and others make it out to be, and I will show this to be the case from the point of view of both HiMi and Aristotle’s works.

If all HiMi does is demonstrate the shortcoming of identifying virtue as a knowledge-δύναμις, then any other instance of Socratic intellectualism in the early dialogues could serve just as well as the source of Aristotle’s distinction. Furthermore, the dialogue’s argument that reduces character to a person’s δύναμις is made and rejected early on. So if this is the point of the entire dialogue, then much of its remainder is superfluous. A close look at the dialogue, however, shows that δύναμις is not knowledge alone. Rather, I argue, δύναμις is explored and developed in various ways, with the result that the dialogue attempts to absorb desire into what it is to have a δύναμις, effectively collapsing the distinction between δύναμις and ἕξις that Aristotle makes in NE. If this is what HiMi does, then it has a greater claim to being the source of Aristotle’s development of the distinction.

On my reading of HiMi, we needn’t conclude that Aristotle, too, has misunderstood the dialogue. For one thing, his remarks on the dialogue pertain to specific parts of it, parts that I argue do not represent its overall conclusion. Since I take the dialogue to offer a conception of virtue-as-δύναμις uncharacteristic of the Socratic intellectualism that Aristotle identifies and rejects, I suggest we treat Aristotle’s discussion of the dialogue as distinct from this rejection.

Then, I trace HiMi’s influence on Aristotle’s distinction between δύναμις and ἕξις in some of his earlier works. In Protrepticus, Magna Moralia, and Eudemian Ethics, for instance, Aristotle displays a greater preoccupation than his later works with the problem of the possible misuse of virtue, a problem that is at the heart of HiMi, and in his discussion of them, Aristotle uses examples strikingly similar to those found in HiMi.

Angela Curran. Kansas State University. afcurran@k-state.edu. “Aristotle on the Ethical Dimension of Comedy.” 3-4
Do the standards of behavior that apply in ethics, and to the virtuous person, also apply to comedy? Could the audience of comedy become morally better by watching comedy? This paper examines a central challenge in thinking this could be so, for Aristotle’s Poetics.

Comedy deliberately makes use of less-than-virtuous characters, since comedy aims to evoke laughter, and the laughable (geloion) is a species of what is disgraceful (Poetics 1449a33f). Further, while tragedy appeals to a better, morally superior audience, comedy appeals to an audience that is not as virtuous. Thus, it might seem that from an Aristotelian perspective a virtuous person must leave her ethical standards behinds when she goes to see comedy at the theater, and there is no sense in which one can say that the audience of comedy gains moral knowledge or becomes morally improved.

In this paper, I develop a way out of this problem for understanding the relevance of Aristotle’s ethics for comedy, while remaining true to the Aristotle’s view that the poetry does not have the same standards of correctness as politics (politikē, Poetics 25.1460b3-15).

-D-

Andrey Darovskikh. Binghamton University. Adarvos1@binghamton.edu. “Who is better off? Two types of conditional necessity in Aristotle’s biology.” 4-4

Aristotle’s essentialism differs from the classical modal characterization of the relationship between essential and accidental attributes because he argues about different types of necessity. Conditional or hypothetical necessity (τὰ ὑποθέσεως) for Aristotle is a relative necessity of means needed for the sake of some end. From that point of view steps of embryo’s development are hypothetically necessary; it exemplifies an essential condition for the sake of further development and the fulfilment of generation which results in the perfection of the form as a definition of a living and functioning individual. In this talk I will focus on the two-fold understanding of conditional necessity Aristotle exemplifies in Metaphysics and will show how much of a difference they make if we apply them separately to biological context.

The first type of conditional necessity (strong version) refers to some necessary attributes which constitute the essence in what it is. In the context of generation, it defines steps necessary for the preservation of an organism and its definition as a member of a species. It explains how that, or another aspect of physiology belongs to the essence of species. The weak version of conditional necessity talks whether an entity is better or worse off with or without that attribute. With regard to generation it refers to steps which are necessary for a better or worse life of the organism.

The crucial difference between versions reveals in a connection with other types of necessity, especially with the forced one. If accidental deviation in the course of gestation caused by some forced necessity interfere with conditionally necessary processes in the strong sense, it alters essential attributes which constitute an entity in what it is. This type of deviation leads to a complete monstrosity or even to the state of non-being (miscarriage). An incidental interference with the processes necessary in the weak sense leads to the formation of an entity with a number of accidental attributes which does not alter the essence in what it is. If we study this problem further, I think we should be able to argue that for Aristotle alteration of necessary in the weak sense processes can be understood in the negative and positive sense. Accidentals can be declining attributes, but they can be profitable ones as well. The argument that with some incidental attributes the entity can be either worse or better off turns us to the problem of how we can measure what is worse and what is better off. This concern brings us to the problem of
functionality and forays into the territory of ethics. I see the teaching about two types of conditional necessity as another point of Aristotle’s philosophy which bridges the gap between his biology and physics on the one hand and ethics on the other.


In Question 19 of his Quaestiones Disputatae De anima, Aquinas considers whether the sensitive powers of the soul remain in the separated soul (utrum potentiae sensitivae remaneant in anima separata) after death. Since the subject of these powers is not the soul, but rather the corrupted composite body, Aquinas answers the question in the negative. Nevertheless, he concedes that there is still a way in which the sensitive powers do remain in the separated soul, namely, “as in a principle” (sicut in principio) and “as in a root” (in radice). To say that the sensitive powers remain somehow in the separated soul appears baffling from the point of view of philosophy. Indeed, we are not considering the peculiar power of intellect, whose operation suggests that it might subsist separated from the body. Rather, the question focuses on the separability of sensitive powers, which are inseparable from the body as their subject and do not subsist in themselves. Furthermore, sensitive powers are natural powers, hence forms-in-matter. Proper organs belong to their being and definition. How, then, could these powers remain in a separated soul, separated from their subject and from their proper organic matter? A quick look at Aquinas’ objections and replies suffices to make plain how crucial this claim is for theology. Given its crucial theological implications and the philosophical perplexities involved, it is tempting to think that the retention of sensitive powers by the separated soul after death is simply an unfounded projection of religious beliefs into philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to consider the truth and the implications of this claim from a strictly philosophical point of view. I argue that the latent presence of sensitive powers in the soul of a body that lacks the capacity to exercise those powers (due to lack or defect of the proper organs) is not only philosophically sound, but also necessary to explain at least two natural phenomena: embryological development and the assimilation of transplanted organs.


Dominic Scott, siding with Norman Gulley and Myles Burnyeat, opens his book on the Meno by warning against reading passages of Plato simply as moments of “an unfolding psychological drama” without paying attention to the “philosophical pay-off” of the content.1 While Scott is right to point out the flaws in understanding Plato’s dialogues chiefly as dramas to the detriment of logoi, he also defends the thesis that the Meno is not merely about moral education. It is also an “exercise” in moral education.2 In this paper, I argue that such a claim should not only be made about Meno’s development; rather, adequately defending this thesis requires ample attention to Socrates’ comments about the soul, whether it be Meno’s soul, the slave boy’s soul, or the nature of soul in general.

Thus, I propose not to psychologize the Meno, but to show the link between philosophy of psychology and inquiry in the passage regarding recollection and its effects on Meno’s boy. Though it is true that the mathematical problem itself and judgments about whether the slave boy has opinion or knowledge constitute the primary content of the recollection passage, Socrates’

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1 Dominic Scott, Plato’s Meno (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5
2 Ibid., 5–6
remarks to Meno about the slave boy’s soul and soul’s immortal nature have not been given enough careful attention. Socrates’ asides are not only epistemological assertions about the boy’s progress through opinion towards knowledge. They are also remarks about how the boy responds emotionally to ignorance (84a–b), whether the realization of ignorance in fact “harms” him (84b), and how his zealous disposition after perplexity aids further inquiry (84b–c). Socrates here reveals the existence of a critical relationship between disposition of soul, its attending emotions and desires, and the choices resulting from the conjunction of the two. In short, his demonstration is about the soul and its education in entirety, namely, in end, process, and means. It concerns the question of how one’s character affects and is affected by philosophical inquiry.

To tease out the relationship between the slave boy’s character and learning as recollection, the paper looks at four stages of the passage. First, Socrates’ preliminary comments about recollection will be examined, as well as his criteria for choosing this particular boy (81a–82b). Second, the kinds of questions Socrates asks, as well as the kinds of answers the slave boy gives are considered; here, the aim is to show that Socrates’ questioning mode prevents him from directly providing answers to the boy, and the boy is actively and freely engaged with Socrates’ line of thought (82b–85c). Third, Socrates’ comments to Meno about the boy’s progress and his state of soul will be fleshed out alongside the boy’s achievements in inquiry; the boy’s own boldness and submission to self-examination are fundamental to “stirring up” his own true opinions (85c–86b). Fourth, the slave boy’s character will be briefly contrasted with Meno’s character during and directly after the demonstration—the slave boy is ironically “freer in soul” than his master (86b–86e). In conclusion, the demonstration of recollection does not merely elicit the epistemological distinction between knowledge and opinion—rather, the end of recollection, knowledge, and the forming of the soul’s character are Socrates’ necessarily intertwined rebuttals to Meno’s paradox.

Ludmila Dostalova. *University of West Bohemia.* ldostal@kfi.zcu.cz. “Aristotelian Foundations of Modern Logic.” 4-4

Modern logic was established and developed in opposition to traditional (Aristotelian) logic. Frege rejected the theory of terms (concepts) to be a part of logic [Begriffschrift §3]; Russell called theory of syllogism to be unimportant [History of Western Philosophy, Ch.XXII]. Modern (mathematical) logicians acknowledge Aristotle to be a founder of logic, meanwhile they treat Aristotelian logic to be just a “childhood” of logic. According to this position, Aristotelian logic is imperfect, while the modern (mathematical) logic is superior to it.

The claim of the superiority of modern logic to traditional one emphasizes mostly the inaccuracy of subject-predicative form of statements. Though elimination of subject-predicate form of statements is thought to be the main advantage of modern logic in comparison to traditional unifying semantic properties of subjects and predicates into mere predicates, in fact the semantic duality of attributive and referential use of terms (concepts) has been only postponed to lower level of functional application of predicates on terms (individuals). In fact, Aristotelian and Modern logic shares the same ontology – the Aristotelian conception of hylomorphism. Thus Modern logic has the same expressive limitations as Aristotelian logic though hidden on more subtle level of analysis.

Robert Duncan. *Loyola University Chicago.* Rduncan1@luc.edu. “Aristotle on Priority in Substance and the Superiority of the Heavens to the Earth.” 5-4

In *Metaphysics* IX, 8, Aristotle asserts that eternal things are prior in substance to perishable ones. However, it is not obvious that the account of substantial priority he gives in
that chapter, which takes as its paradigm case the priority of man to boy, can vindicate the priority of eternal substances. It is not obvious, for example, that the moon is prior to Socrates in the same way that a man is prior to a boy. I argue that this problem takes on new significance in light of a passage from the *Protrepticus* which, on my interpretation, suggests that substantial priority is of central importance in understanding Aristotle’s view of the universe as a hierarchy of value. For example, as I read the passage, Aristotle would think that a sublunary substance like Socrates is not as good as a celestial substance like the moon insofar as Socrates’ human goodness is substantially posterior to lunar goodness. Thus, a lacuna in Aristotle’s account of priority in substance would not merely be a technical puzzle in his metaphysics but would amount to an incoherence in his vision of the cosmos as a whole. What is required, therefore, is an interpretation of priority in substance that can subsume both the priority of man to boy and the priority of the eternal to the perishable. In the paper I set out the problem, highlight its significance in light of the *Protrepticus*, and suggest an interpretation of priority in substance that could resolve it.

Simon J. Dutton. *University of South Florida*. simond@mail.usf.edu. “Laws are Made Things: The Use of Dialectic in Coming to Know the Just (*Republic*).” 5-2

In the *Euthyphro*, it is demonstrated that knowledge of piety—that part of justice concerning the gods—is difficult (if not impossible) achieve. What remains, is a part of justice that mortals have some chance of coming to know. I suggest that the remainder of the just is identified in Book I of the *Republic* as the laws. Here the question of justice is revisited without the problematic appeal to divine authority, yet illicit claims to authority continue to cloud the investigation of justice. In this paper I discuss the power of the dialectic as Plato’s solution to this problem.

Thrasyphus and Euthyphro think knowledge of justice a trivial concern. Both believe that proper rules are derived from an understanding of justice, and they both attempt to provide an account of these rules without giving an account of justice. The authoritarian definition of justice in *Republic* I—suggesting that justice is the mysterious whim of the powerful—marks what it actually is as unknowable. People can follow the laws which represent justice, but knowing justice itself would require direct access to the thoughts of the ruler (a task which even the ruler, Thrasyphus agrees, might fail to accomplish). In the *Euthyphro*, the problem with coming to know justice through piety is that when it comes to the gods, we must be resigned to not knowing many things; but with humans we can know plenty of things simply by asking humans.

Laws are made things, and “for each thing there are these three crafts, one that uses it, one that makes it, and one that imitates it” (*Rep.* X 601d). If a lawmaker is to act justly, it is right that she should mind her own business. The lawmaker, one hopes, would be an “expert concerning the just and unjust things” (*Crito* 48a). The imitator, on the other hand, is one who “has neither knowledge nor right opinion about whether the things he makes are fine or bad” (*Rep.* X 602a). The imitator lacks this knowledge because he makes laws for his subjects to follow and does not follow them himself. The imitator does not look to the idea of justice in making the law, because he believes himself to be the origin of justice.

If the lawmaker hopes to make good laws, she must look to the idea of justice, but she should know that it will never be fully visible to her. And she will come to better know the beauty of justice first by talking to those for whom the product of her craft is made (cf. *Rep.* X 601c-e). For the lawmaker, minding her own business requires asking the subjects of the law
how well the laws benefit them. For the general public, minding their own business requires
telling the lawmakers how well the laws benefit them. In the broadest sense, and in practice, laws
are never just, and justice is the dialectic.

-E-

Jay Elliott. Bard College. jelliott@bard.edu. “Akrasia as a State of Character (EN 7).” 4-3

In Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle formally introduces akrasia
(“incontinence” or “weakness of will”) as one of the “three kinds of character to be avoided,” the
other two being vice and brutishness. He goes on to distinguish akrasia not only from these two
characters, but also from virtue and from enkrateia (“continence” or “self-control”). Aristotle’s
careful dissection of these different forms of character illustrates the richness and complexity of
his ethical project. On the one hand, Aristotle engages in ethics as a normative enterprise
designed to present the life of virtue as an ethical ideal. On the other hand, he also puts
considerable effort, within this normative framework, toward understanding and explaining non-
ideal ethical life, and in particular the non-ideal character states of akrasia, enkrateia, and vice.
The care and attention that Aristotle brings to the non-ideal distinguishes his work fundamentally
from many modern ethical theories, and also from certain other ancient ethical traditions,
especially those that Aristotle associates with the intellectual legacy of Socrates. Philosophers
interested in Aristotle’s moral psychology have often looked primarily to his account of virtue,
on the assumption that this account contains his fundamental ethical insights and can be
straightforwardly extended so as to describe all human agents. But this approach risks missing
the true complexity and value of Aristotle’s treatment of character. Aristotle takes virtue to
transform the lives of those who acquire it in very specific ways, including making them
psychically well-integrated and highly consistent in their actions. These are important features of
what it is to have a virtue, but they are not typical of all the forms of human character. Other
kinds of character, such as akrasia, are marked precisely by a certain lack of integration and a
certain inconsistency in action. The best way we can get this difference into view and thus arrive
at a proper understanding of the full complexity of Aristotle’s moral psychology is by delving
into his accounts of non-virtuous character. In “Akrasia as a State of Character,” I motivate this
approach by looking in detail at the psychological structure of one of Aristotle’s non-virtuous
states. Careful consideration of this example shows how the structure of a character state can
differ significantly from that of virtue. Attending to Aristotle’s non-ideal characters will be
profitable for both historical work that seeks to interpret Aristotle’s texts and work in
contemporary ethics that seeks to assess the enduring relevance of Aristotle’s achievement. I
argue that sustained attention to this aspect of Aristotle’s thinking supports a novel interpretive
approach I call “character pluralism,” according to which Aristotle does not recognize a single
determinate moral psychology for all human beings and instead sees different states of character
as involving substantially different patterns of moral development and motivation.

-F-

Lee Franklin. Franklin & Marshall College. Lee.franklin@fandm.edu “Thought before
reason: phantasia, aisthësis, and eikasia in Plato's Republic.” Plenary

I develop a unified interpretation of phantasia, aisthësis, and eikasia as, together, Plato's
account of primitive, or pre-rational, cognition in the Republic.
Myrna Gabbe. *University of Dayton. mgabbe1@udayton.edu.* “Do Women Exist for the Sake of Children and Men? Aristotle and the Defects of Women’s Bodies.” 5-3

Gareth Mathews’ claim in “Gender and Essence in Aristotle” (1986) that Aristotle offers no philosophical reasons for insisting that the male exemplifies the norm of the species, the female the defective counterpart has met with little resistance.1 Similar claims appear frequently in the secondary literature, and are treated nearly as fact.2 This paper challenges this assumption, arguing that Aristotle believes the production of menses to be the source of female animal’s serious physical impairments. Therefore, because he believes women to produce more menses than any other animal, Aristotle also believes women’s physical condition are far worse than other female animal in comparison to their male counterparts. Specifically, I show that Aristotle believes that women suffer more than any other animal during their pregnancy and labor; that they gestate and birth at risk to their lives; that their reproductive capacities significantly curtail their lifespan relative to men’s; and that their reproductive capacities expose them to a variety of life-threatening diseases.

My reason to study Aristotle’s conception of women’s bodies is not to rescue him from the charge that he imposed gender-norms onto his biological theories. Aristotle may have evidentiary and biological reasons for thinking that women are the weaker, disadvantaged sex. But because his perception of women’s health and bodies is influenced by cultural gender-norms, he cannot avoid Deslaurier’s charge of “constructing a sex difference plainly tainted by male bias”.3

My interest, rather, regards the place of women in Aristotle’s teleological scheme. Specifically, I ask whether Aristotle’s construal of women is consistent with the principle that soul functions exist for the sake of the possessor. For if there is significant disparity in terms of the consequences of the reproductive soul function on the parent’s health, and if women are saddled with this debilitating capacity in order to protect the male principle (*GA ii 1*), we ought to ask whether Aristotle meant his teleological principles to apply uniformly across the sexes. That is, we ought to ask whether, in the eyes of Aristotle, women existed for the sake of children and men.

Octavian Gabor. *Methodist College. ogabor@methodistcol.edu.* “Aristotle’s Answer to a Non-Aristotelian Question: Individuation (DA).” 2-5

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1 After demonstrating the philosophical reasons Aristotle had for holding “Norm-Defect Theory,” Matthews concludes: “That, as it turns out, males are supposed to be successes, and females failures, is, I think, better explained by psychological and sociological factors, than by philosophical ones”.


3 Deslauriers (1998), 154
I offer an account of form by focusing on Aristotle’s distinction between first and second actuality. By emphasizing the meaning of *entelecheia* as the complete being of a natural body, I also show that the distinction between first and second actualities gives an answer to the problem of individuation, even if such a problem is not Aristotelian.

I take it that Aristotle is not concerned with the problem of individuation, that is, what makes particulars of the same species distinct. On the one hand, he is a man of science who is not interested in what makes a natural body be this particular natural body, but rather what makes it be a particular of a kind. On the other hand, he is a metaphysician, and from this perspective he is interested in the unity and the being of particular. None of these approaches has anything to do with the problem of individuation. But my purpose here is not to defend the claim that Aristotle is not interested in individuation—I take this for granted. Instead, I want to describe Aristotle’s answer to this problem even if he himself does not ask it.

When we study Socrates and Callias, we study their first actualities—what makes them be the kind of things that they are. The first actuality of any kind of natural body is knowable and it does not change through time, while the second actualities always change and account for the development of particulars—Aristotle’s answer to the “problem” of individuation. With each moment lived, a natural being develops its second actuality. It is the way in which natural beings become different while remaining the same.

Naomi Ginsborg-Warren. Reed College. naoginsbo@reed.edu. “Aristotle’s account of compound bodies in *GC* 2.7 (and the related *GC* 1.10)” Krizan Panel. For abstract, see panel description above. 1-5

Chrysoula Gitsoulis. College of Staten Island, CUNY. egitsoulis@gradcenter.cuny.edu. “The Individual vs the State: A Study of Socrates and Antigone.” 4-1

The conflict (*agon*) between the wishes of the individual and the demands of the State (*polis*) is a theme that is central to Sophocles' play, *Antigone*, and Plato's philosophical works, *The Apology* and *The Crito*, which recount the trial and death of Socrates. This essay will be devoted to exploring the way in which this conflict surfaces in these works. I will begin by examining some apparent differences between Socrates and Antigone – with regard to their attitudes over their duties to the State, to their families, and to the burial rights of the dead – which have led some to believe that Socrates has more in common with Creon than Antigone, and indeed, that if Socrates were confronted with Antigone’s dilemma, he would have refrained from burying Polynices. In my essay, I will explore said differences and argue – using textual evidence – that they are more apparent than real. I will then turn to highlighting the deep similarities between Socrates and Antigone. They are both rebels, threats to the status quo, to the socio-political order, and to the sources of power in their respective societies. They are both models of free inquiry and expression, who force those around them to rethink their values and their manner of living. Both have deep faith in the discerning power of their individual conscience. And both are prepared to sacrifice their lives for their principles: they value what is honorable and just more than they fear death. A discussion of these and other similarities will form the main focus of my paper.

-H-
Plato’s moral philosophy is often characterized, at least in part, by a recurring motif that man does not do evil willingly, but rather does so due to his failure to apprehend what is good and subsequently pursue similarly good ends. In this paper I explore how the *Timaeus* complicates this notion by emphasizing the role that moral responsibility, and moral blame more specifically, plays in Plato’s moral philosophy. I begin by outlining a Platonic theory of evil as disorderliness, paying special notion to the *Timaeus*’ own theory of diseases as disorderliness as well as corroborating passages from elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. I introduce Harold Cherniss’ interpretation of these passages as indicative of a dichotomous theory of “negative” (ontological inferiority to the Forms) and “positive” evil (moral evil), however I critique Cherniss’ lack of differentiating the various sub-types of positive evil. These sub-types become relevant when one wishes to consider Plato’s understanding of blame.

In the second part of my paper I discuss this understanding of blame and the inability to ascribe blame to divinities on account of their inherent goodness and despite their ontological inferiority as “negative” evils. On the contrary, Plato does allow us to ascribe blame to other humans, although it is not for their becoming evil. Instead, Plato does allow us to blame others for not improving themselves from an evil state. This often-overlooked distinction is in line with an intuitive attitude toward blame. We can only ascribe responsibility to someone who is to some extent in control of her circumstances. Such is why Timaeus frequently describes the Demiurge and younger gods’ activity as good, as it is in reflection of an inherently good cosmic model of which they have an unimpeded ascertaining. By contrast, man is limited in his ascertaining of the cosmic model and thus lacks a knowledge of what is good and requires education. Returning to Cherniss’ divisions I conclude that both the divinities and man are negatively evil, but are not morally responsible for such evil; and, man is responsible for his failure to improve his lack of knowledge, yet not the evil actions that result from such ignorance.

George William Harvey. *Indiana University Southeast.* whgeorge@ius.edu. “Two Political Ideals in Plato’s *Critias.*” 4-2

When the *Critias* receives attention, much of it is focused on its most distinctive feature, its incompleteness. My aim in this paper is instead to examine what I think is an important teaching that can be derived from the text as we have it. My proposal is that we consider the descriptions of Athens and Atlantis (prior to its decline) as offering contrasting models of self-governance and virtue. Critias’ account presents us with two well-ordered cities, both of whose rulers value virtue above all else and themselves possess virtuous characters. Each set of rulers can attribute their good characters and the manner of rule that stems from them to the share in the divine provided by each of their respective gods. In one case, the gods gift them with knowledge that enabled human beings to govern themselves, in the other, the god produced offspring that served as a dynasty of kings for generations. Athens is presented as a city that embodies the features envisioned in Socrates’ ideal city, but it is also the case that Atlantis represents a
possible model of self-governance. Evidence for this can be found in the features it shares political ideals described in the *Laws*. What the *Critias* teaches us is that both models are possible forms of political life, but what determines which model represents the best practical goal in a given historical context are factors beyond human control. In this way the *Critias* illustrates an important point articulated in the *Laws*, namely, that no human being truly legislates (IV, 790a).


In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argues for a natural unity of good and pleasure: the very best activities will be the most pleasant, while less complete activities are less pleasant. One obvious difficulty for this union of the good and pleasure is vicious pleasures; pleasure is not simply what we find in the best activities proper to human flourishing, but it is also the main explanation of why people do bad things. Aristotle's solution to the problem of how vicious pleasures can be pleasant even though they contravene the natural, metaphysical unity of pleasure and the good, is to discount certain experiences of pleasure as mere appearances of pleasure. Vicious pleasures seem pleasant to the agent experiencing them, but this appearance of pleasure is a mistake revelatory of the agent's misunderstanding of what is truly good and worth pursuing as an end-in-itself. To explain how a person can be swayed by mere appearances of pleasure even though what is enjoyed is not genuinely pleasant, he likens the deluded agent to someone who is sick: just as honey tastes bitter to the sick man, vicious pleasure tastes pleasant to the vicious person. For Aristotle, “if the things that disgust [the good person] appear pleasant to a given person, there is nothing surprising in that, since there are many forms of corruption (φθοραί) and damage (λῆμαί) to which human beings are subject; pleasant the things in question are not, though they are for these types (τούτοις), and for people in this condition (οὕτω διακειμένοις)” (X.5 1176a20-23).

This explanation of the appeal of vicious pleasures is convincing enough, at least for those who have habituated themselves to vice. However, it does not account for why someone who is not yet corrupted would initially pursue a vicious pleasure, and then revisit it repeatedly in first beginning the path to corruption. If there is indeed no pleasure in vicious pleasures, what first makes these pleasures seem appealing and what sustains a person's earliest engagements with them? I will argue that we must posit some good that sustains engagement in this sort of action. The habituating pull of vicious pleasures shows that even mere appearances of pleasure cannot be completely, fully separate from any good whatsoever, as this would undermine Aristotle's argument for a real connection between pleasure and the good. I suggest that often, the good we find in vicious pleasures is friendship, or at least, some connection to others. Whether it be in rivalry, in doing things together, and just in the imagined similarity of oneself to others, e.g., to other women when guiltyly eating too much chocolate ice cream by oneself at night, vicious pleasures make us feel connected to others.

Moreover, despite Aristotle's claim that the “depraved” person is in flight from himself, vicious pleasures can provide coherence within a vicious life; this possibility for a coherent, vicious life rests upon the sociality of what counts as pleasant. Aristotle’s account of how we become vicious, which involves the pursuit of merely apparent pleasures, commits Aristotle to the claim that the vicious person need not feel regret and need not suffer from internal inconsistencies, for there are distinctive ways in which vicious lives hang together, arising from our social training into these vicious pleasures. The social practices of vicious pleasures take
predictable, somewhat stable, repeatable shapes because of the parasitic relation of vicious actions to the actual goods vicious actions and vicious ways of living are trying to obtain, but in defective ways. The interdependence of pleasure and judgment explains how the vicious person can suffer both from mistaken evaluation of how well things are going and from an inability to survey her life as a whole, thus allowing for a sort of stability to emerge from some ways of being vicious.

Beverly Hollberg. CNU. beverly.hollberg.17@cnu.edu. “Rationalizing Socrates’ Faith in his Daimonion.” 1-2

In the Crito (46b4-6), Socrates claims “I am not just now but in fact I've always been the sort of person who is persuaded by nothing but the reason that appears to me to be best when I've considered it.” But in the Euthydemus (272el-4), “Socrates is sitting by himself in the dressing room of the palaestra, got up, intending to leave, when he experienced his 'familiar divine sign' and sat down again.” The ‘familiar divine sign’ is what Socrates refers to as his daimonion. Socrates’ daimonion is a divine voice in his head that orders him simply to ‘stop’. As shown in the Euthydemus, Socrates does not apply reason to the daimonion's orders. He simply obeys without question. Socrates’ blind faith in the divine voice in his head, along with his claim to be a man of reason, creates a tension between faith and reason. Reeve, Brickhouse and Smith, Lanstromm and Vlastos offer separate theories of varying success which attempt to render consistent Socrates’ trust in his daimonion and his commitment to reason. However, as I shall argue in this paper, none of these theories successfully save Socrates rationality. I show that ultimately, Socrates is irrational based on his own conception of rationality and his immediate compliance to his daimonion’s commands.

D.M. Hutchinson. St. Olaf College. dmunoz@stolaf.edu. “Plotinus on the Composition of Sensibles.” 4-2

The departure for Plotinus’ view on sensibles is Timaeus 49d-e, where Timaeus claims that only the receptacle can be called a “this” (touto) or a “that” (tode) but a thing that enters and leaves the receptacle, such as a physical body or compound formed from physical bodies, is a “what is such” (toiouton). However, Plotinus develops Plato’s view by critically engaging with the Stoics and the Aristotelians and reinterpreting it in the scheme of his hierarchical metaphysics. For Plotinus, a sensible is a bundle of qualities plus matter. Each of the qualities (the lower soul included) are non-substantial. The whole itself that is constituted by the bundle of qualities plus matter is also non-substantial. It is an image of true substance, a mere picture drawn on a shadow. The substance of a sensible is its logos, which is both a definition that discloses what it is and a formative principle that makes it what it is. Echoing Timaeus 49d-e, Plotinus claims that a logos is a something (ti) and the sensible is a something like (poion). Sensibles are produced by composition. Bodies are perceptible sizes and masses, the parts of which are different from each other and the whole of which they are parts. Bodies are one by continuity, and they retain their unity provided they are not broken up. Examples of bodies are house, ship, plants, and animals. Importantly, sensibles are not only spatially extended but they are also temporally bounded. They come into being at a time, proceed through temporal stages, and they end at a time. As such, they never exist as complete wholes. What it is for them to be always involves acquiring being and always being deficient with respect to being what they are going to be. It holds generally for things that come into being and exist in time that they, too, are one by continuity. Sensibles, then, are non-substantial wholes that are composed of parts and are one by continuity. This is in contrast to Forms, which are substantial wholes that are one in number, always remain in the same state, and possess the fullness of their being all at once (IV.3.8.24-30). A Form is a genuine individual (to tode).
In this paper I show how sensibles are formed from the imposition of qualities onto matter and I examine what nature, if any, sensibles possess.

-Betsy Jelinek. CNU. elizabeth.jelinek@cnu.edu, “Explanations of Evil in Plato’s Timaeus.” 2-4

In the Timaeus, we learn that initially, the process of embodiment will “mutilate and disfigure” the motions of our soul (43b-e). Moral evil is defined as our failure to use reason to overcome this disruption and restore order in our souls (42b-d). Why must humans suffer this evil disturbance in the first place? Timaeus tells us it is “by virtue of Necessity” that human souls are implanted in bodies, and the subsequent turbulence embodiment brings about is “a result [that] necessarily follows” (42a). In other words, on a literal reading of this passage, the evil that arises as a result of embodiment is attributed to Necessity. Generally, the literal reading of the Timaeus holds that Necessity is a causal force capable of constraining the demiurge.

But there are many who argue that Timaeus’s accounts of Necessity are not to be taken literally. On their view, the demiurge has the power to override Necessity completely; he is thus the all-powerful creator god of everything that has come to be. If the demiurge is ultimately responsible for everything in becoming, he must also be responsible for phenomena that appear to be evil—including the evil brought about by embodiment. This gives rise to a familiar problem: given the demiurge’s power and goodness, why would he allow for any kind of evil to exist in the cosmos?

In the case of evil caused by embodiment, the non-literal reading claims that the demiurge purposely allowed for this particular evil to exist, because without initial disorder in a man’s soul, man would not have the freedom or opportunity to exercise moral choice. Thus, while the disruption resulting from our embodiment seems evil to us, on a global level it contributes to the greater good.

In this paper, I argue that the non-literalists’ attempt to show that such an evil is somehow “good” fails. As such, it is absurd to claim that the demiurge is ultimately responsible for it. I conclude that this gives us reason to doubt the tenability of the non-literal reading, and offers us sufficient grounds for rejecting the thesis that the demiurge is the all-powerful creator of everything that has come to be.

David Jennings. UC Merced. davidleejennings@gmail.com, “Friendship in Epicurus.” 3-5

The goal of my paper is to explain and evaluate Epicurus’ account of friendship.

In the first section, I explain the central role friendship plays in his ethical thinking—for he says, “Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one’s whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship” (Maxims, XXVIII). In particular, I try to understand how friendship might substantially contribute to “health of the body and freedom of the soul from disturbance” (Letter to Meneocceus, 128).

In the second section, I compare Epicurus’ understanding of the value of friendship and that of justice. They are similar in that both involve relations between persons who have no natural duties to one another yet still have reason to benefit or refrain from harming one another. Though Epicurus thinks that both justice and friendship are instrumentally valuable, he thinks that only one of them has intrinsic value: “Every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits [it confers on us]” (Vatican Sayings 23). I seek to explain in what sense might he might think friendship is “worth choosing for its own sake”.


In the third section, I develop and consider some lines of objection to Epicurus’ view based in Aristotle and Cicero’s accounts of friendship. Aristotle argues that friendships of pleasure are deficient, both because they are short-lived and because, in them, friends fail to love each other for who they really are (Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3). And Cicero argues that seeking pleasure and avoiding pain and disturbance are inconsistent with the duties and good will appropriate to friendship (De Amicitia, XII.44-47).

In the fourth section, I defend Epicurus’ views against these objections and argue that it remains plausible because it’s broadly consistent with our considered judgments about the goals of friendship and about which friendships to maintain and which ones to reject.

-K-

G rkocandr@kfi.zcu.cz. “The Shared Starting Point of Archaic Ionian Cosmologies.” 5-1

Archaic Ionian cosmologies were characterised above all by their meteorological nature and by the assumption that celestial bodies move only around a flat earth. One can, however, argue that their initial starting point was the idea that the earth constitutes the lower dimension of the universe. In these conceptions, there was no space under the earth and the universe thus stretched only between the earth and the heaven. This is also why celestial bodies were explained in terms of evaporations and why they could move only around the earth. Although Aristotle seems to implicitly take for granted that all Presocratics believed there is space under the earth where the earth could fall, it can be argued that Archaic Ionian cosmologies did not make this assumption. The need to explain earth’s stability in the universe and the notion of celestial bodies as solid objects that can move also under the earth could arise only with the arrival of a conception of a spherical earth and a spherical universe in the Italian school of philosophy. This fundamental shift in the concept of space was, however, anticipated already by Anaximander.

Mary Krizan. University of Wisconsin, LaCrosse. mkrizan@uwlax.edu. Panel Organizer and Chair, and presenting “Aristotle’s introduction of his four elements as an alternative to single-element accounts, especially in GC 2.5.” 1-5

Topher Kurfess. Westminster, Md. topher.kurfess@gmail.com. “Polansky on Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia.” Harry Polansky Panel 3-1

-L-


Throughout Plato’s dialogues we find consistent reference to instances of divine inspiration, e.g., the bouts of divine madness spurring Socrates to deliver his speeches in the Phaedrus, not to mention the consistent reliance upon the apotreptic advice provided by his daimonion. And, while many scholars contest the sincerity with which we ought to take these claims, it is my view that Plato takes divine inspiration quite seriously, and, in fact, holds it in particularly high esteem. Yet, while the role of divine inspiration, especially in the case of

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1 Martha Nussbaum (1985), for one, suggests that all such references to the divine ought to be taken as ironic gestures. However, I find the counter arguments provided by Mark McPherran (1996), as well Brickhouse and Smith (1994), to be overwhelmingly compelling.
Socrates, is quite common in the early and middle periods of Plato’s work, as we enter into the late period, the references to divine inspiration, and the role it plays with regard to reason, are not as obviously apparent. This is particularly notable in Plato’s final work, the Laws, a dialogue that seems to jettison the more mystical aspects of Plato’s earlier work entirely, in favor of a more rigid, logical approach. However, despite appearances, I would suggest that not only does Plato take the role of divine inspiration seriously throughout the Laws, but further, indicates that such divine assistance is a potentially essential requirement for membership to the Nocturnal Council, the governing body of the polis.

To explain, we find at the close of Plato’s Laws, in the final account as to the requisite qualifications of the members of the Nocturnal Council, the Athenian Stranger notes that not only must the council members be well versed in the virtues, as well as the application thereof, but further, they must also possess knowledge of the basic theological principles discussed throughout the Laws. And, while the demand for possession of theological knowledge is not itself altogether striking, especially given the import attributed to religion throughout the Laws, the passage in question ends with a curious additional requirement. We read at Laws 967d-968a:

He should see what is common to these things, and those that concern the muse, and should apply this understanding in a harmonious way to the practices and customs that pertain to the ethical dispositions; and he should be able to give the rational account for as many of these as have a rational account.

Within this final description, I find two points to be of particular interest: (1) The members of the council must have an understanding of “that which concerns the muses,” and (2) they should be able to provide a rational account for such things that “have a rational account.” And, it is the coupling of these two points that I find to be of particular interest, as, it would indicate that Plato still, even in his late work, recognizes the importance of divine assistance, especially in regard to the individuals of the governing body. Thus, in my paper, I will argue that, despite the more rigid nature of the Laws, Plato still sincerely believes in the importance of divine inspiration as it pertains to the acquisition of truth, an essential prerequisite for the truly good ruler.

L. K. Gustin Law. University of Pittsburgh. gus.law@pitt.edu. “What makes aitiai aitiai for Aristotle?” 4-4

Aitia (“cause”) is clearly important in Aristotle’s epistemology: to have epistêmê of something, one must know its cause. However, in his extant works, Aristotle does not say what makes causes causes. He comes close when he appeals to the idea that to grasp a why about a thing is to grasp its first cause, and yet, he counts what something is as one of his canonical

2 ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις νοῦν τῶν ὄντων τά τε πρὸ τούτων ἄναγκαια μαθήματα λάβῃ, τά τε κατά τινα τοῦτος τῆς κοινωνίας συνθεσίσμενος, χρήσηται πρὸς τά τῶν ἱδέων ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμιμα συναρμοττότων, διὰ τῶν λόγων ἐξει, τούτων δυνατοῖς ἡ δοῦσιν τῶν λόγων: Translation from Robert Mayhew (2010)

3 Interestingly, in most translations, this clause is either left out entirely, with no mention at all of “muse” (e.g., the 1970 Penguin Classics translation by Trevor Saunders), or, the word, mousan, is translated as “musical” (as is seen on the Perseus.tufts.edu translation, amongst others). Granted, the word musical is derived from muse, however, to translate it in such a way in this case is problematic.

4 Such a belief on Plato’s part is not unprecedented, especially in his late period works, a point made most clearly in the other political work of the late period, The Statesman. In the description of the true Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger seems to suggest that the ability of the true Statesman is beyond that of normal men. See Pol. 309c4-d5.
causes. The unclear relationship between what- and why-questions, the disparity of the causal kinds Aristotle distinguishes, and the examples he gives for each kind pose a major interpretative difficulty. It has recently been suggested (Stein 2011) that Aristotle actually calls different things “aitiai” in virtue of different logoi of “aitiai,” i.e. homonymously. I think that a more unified, non-homonymous reading is still a promising option. I argue that each kind of aitia conceived to be genuine by Aristotle in fact satisfies, even in abstraction from its difference from the other genuine kinds, one same criterion that corresponds to the applicability of “aitiai.” I propose what that criterion is.


My aim is to reconstruct the function argument of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. The argument proceeds, I argue, through the method of division; Aristotle starts with the genus of humanly achievable goods, and introduces a series of exhaustive divisions, arguing that one of the two divided classes is better than the other, until he reaches the lowest species. Though the text says that the goods of the soul are four (capacities, states, activities, processes), previous reconstructions of the argument have simplified this step to say that there are only two goods of the soul (states, activities). I show that this simplification prevents us from seeing some of the moves and distinctions Aristotle makes within the argument, as well as the overall structure of the argument which reveals that division is Aristotle’s method here. I show how the argument can be validly reconstructed taking the fourfold division of goods instead. Next, I consider some of the philosophical consequences of taking Aristotle’s method here to be that of division; I argue that the ethical picture that arises as a consequence of this method shows that Aristotle has a different understanding of how universals can be used in ethical theory than many prevalent neo-Aristotelian views suppose. I end by contrasting the picture that arises from the Eudemian function argument with Philippa Foot’s neo-Aristotelian account of ethical naturalism.

Thornton Lockwood. Quinnipiac University. tlockwood@qu.edu. “Promise keeping in Cicero’s De officiis: The peculiar case of Marcus Atilius Regulus.” 1-1

In On Duties (de officiis), Cicero identifies “keeping of faith” (fides) in what one has said and agreed as a positive duty of justice (I.23). Nonetheless, reminiscent of Socrates’ critique of Cephalus in the Republic, Cicero also acknowledges that one must apply discretion to the application of one’s duties, since from time to time it is necessary not to keep a promise if the result of the promise will be harmful (such as returning a borrowed weapon to an unstable person) (I.31-32). It is thus rather surprising that when Cicero considers the case of Marcus Atilius Regulus, a Roman consul whose promise keeping during wartime resulted in his own torture and execution by the Carthaginians, he appears to claim that promises made between combatants during armed conflict do not admit of discretion (I.39, III.99-100). Indeed, Martha Nussbaum has recently argued that Cicero’s treatment of Regulus illustrates a deep incoherence in Cicero’s account of strict and permissive duties towards others. My paper explores Cicero’s treatment of promise keeping and argues that his account of Regulus is understandable within the framework of Cicero’s nascent ius in bello theory (I. 34-40).

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In this paper I explore the meaning of Aristotle’s famous formulation—a friend is “another self”—by showing that his understanding of self is different from the contemporary use of that term in significant ways. First, he means by it the whole human being, as opposed to some inner analogue to soul. Second, he understands the human being or self to be ordered to completion by nature, rather than simply open to pursuing various desires. I argue also that Plato’s dialogue Lysis shares or at least suggests this same understanding, although it presents it in a decidedly indirect fashion. Finally, I turn to Aquinas very briefly to show how the Christian context puts pressure on Aristotle’s understanding. Aquinas affirms a certain primacy of self-love, and yet he holds that, on the basis of that self-love, we end up, when perfected, loving God above ourselves.


Transhumanism is the contemporary view that people should enhance themselves beyond the physical and intellectual parameters of being human so as to become “posthuman”. Interestingly (or oddly) enough, the ancients have been thrust into this seemingly modern debate. This has occurred because many transhumanists see their respective movement as being rooted in ancient ethical thought (see Khushf 2007, 307; Moravec 1999, 196-7; Kurzweil 1999, 57-8; Bostrom 2005, 6, 2014, 41; Vita-More 2013, 74-8). On the surface, these two intellectual movements may seem like strange bedfellows: much of the contemporary transhumanist literature revolves around radical enhancement via advanced technology and artificial intelligence—things the ancients could not have even imagined, nonetheless discussed—while ancient ethical theory is concerned with human virtue. Unsurprisingly, then, this alleged connection between the contemporary transhumanist doctrine and the ethical theory of antiquity has come under attack: Susan Levin (2017), for example, has challenged this historical narrative, arguing that it is misleading and mistaken. However, there are some importation similarities between the two intellectual traditions. Plato and Aristotle both held that we should aspire to be as “god-like as possible” and this mystical idea is reflected in key features of their respective ethical theories. This aspect of Plato and Aristotle is then emphasized by the scholarship of the Neo-Platonists (and Middle Platonists) and their work has a great influence on Judeo-Christian theology and philosophy—and it has some important commonalities with the general claim that humans should seek to enhance themselves in a transformative way. In this paper, I will illustrate the similarities between contemporary transhumanism and a strand of thought found in the ancients that we will refer to as “assimilationism.” I argue that both transhumanists and assimilationists are committed to a similar general thesis that I will call the Radical Transformation Thesis: in order for human beings to become their best selves, we must radically transform ourselves.

Ryan E. McCoy. University of Kentucky. Ryan.mccoy@uky.edu. “Pyrrhonism as a Way of Life and the Problem of Modern Science.” 3-5

In the final chapter of his recent book How to Be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Richard Bett discusses the possibility of living as a Pyrrhonian skeptic today. Chief among his concerns is the scope of the skeptic’s suspension of judgment and whether or not the skeptic could maintain suspension of judgment in light of the
results of modern science. For example, how might the skeptic sustain suspension of judgment in light of overwhelming evidence for climate change? Or even atomic theory? Ultimately, Bett concludes that such claims within the natural sciences preclude the would-be skeptic’s suspension of judgment—entailing that “universal suspension of judgment is no longer open to us” (Bett 2019: 243).

Although many commentators have focused on the scope of the skeptic’s suspension of judgment, few have engaged directly with the skeptic’s relationship to the natural sciences. While Bett’s brief engagement is singular in this regard, it deserves, I believe, a more sustained account. In the following paper I aim to provide such an account, as well as an argument against the claim that particular theories in modern science pose a problem for living as a skeptic today.

The paper is divided into two main sections. In the first section I reconstruct Bett’s argument that modern scientific theories pose a problem for producing equipollent arguments and in turn suspension of judgment. In the course of doing so, I examine the relevant similarities and dissimilarities between modern and ancient science, and focus in particular on ancient and modern theories of matter. In the second section, following Bett’s examples, I discuss how equipollence and suspension of judgment are possible in regard to atomic theory and climate change. I argue that suspension of judgment is still viable in response to internal debates in the sciences and through the skeptic’s use of pessimistic induction. In discussing the latter, I introduce a new form of pessimistic induction at the skeptic’s disposal, what P. Kyle Stanford calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. I do so in order to show how it is possible for the Pyrrhonian skeptic to suspend judgment on certain well-confirmed scientific theories, why the skeptic is compelled to do so in accordance with rational norms, and in turn, that Pyrrhonian skepticism is still possible as a way of life today.

John Monelly. CNU. John.monelly.16@cnu.edu. “Socrates and Intellectual Moralism: Is Knowledge All It Takes to Produce Goodness?” 1-2

Socrates is responsible for many great advances in our understanding of logic and philosophy, however there are still some theses he held to that many would turn their noses up at. One such thesis of his was that people with knowledge will always choose the good (Protagoras 352a2-358d4, Euthyphro 6d9-e6). At first this statement seems ridiculous to many modern thinkers, after all there are numerous examples of people making bad decisions that they clearly knew were wrong. Even Aristotle recognized the problem of akrasia for human virtue. In this paper, I examine Socrates’ claims in light of a current major influencer of Western thought, Christianity. By doing this I attempt to establish that Socrates’ ideas regarding moral intellectualism are in agreement with Christianity’s and that these ideas could be considered plausible even in today’s world.

Peter Moore. University of Kentucky. peter.moore@uky.edu. “Revisiting the Critique of Poetry in Republic X: A Hermeneutic for Engaging with Poetry?” 5-2

In Republic 10, Plato offers a renewed critique of poetry by situating mimesis in general within an ontological framework that differentiates Forms, imitations of the Forms in crafts, and imitations of crafts in images. This critique has puzzled scholars for a variety of reasons, but most agree that the essence of Plato’s argument boils down to the claims (1) that poetry, qua practice of mimesis, harms the soul by encouraging vice in some way, and (2) the renewed
critique diagnoses the cause of this harm as somehow inherent to mimesis as such. While I agree with these claims, I take issue with the failure of most commentators to notice the proper object of the poet’s imitation, viz., “idols [εἴσωλα] of virtue” (600e3-5) and, more specifically, “people acting voluntarily or under compulsion, (and) considering themselves either well-off or to have done badly as a result of their acting, and feeling pleasure or pain in all these situations” (603c3-6). Commentators by and large neglect the fact that the “originals” that poets imitate are heroes (605d1)—hence idols of virtue, or representatives of virtues who are taken as culturally authoritative. Neglect of this detail leads to the placement of too much emphasis on the effect of poetry as the essence of Plato’s argument—vice in the soul of those who engage with it—rather than on unique cause of the deception that poetry creates about virtue. I argue that the unique cause of deception is apparent in Plato’s use of an analogy between mimetic painting and mimetic poetry, in which Plato emphasizes the power that distorting properties of these media have to bypass reason and thereby produce false opinions about the resemblance between the imitation and the thing imitated. Connected with this analogy is Plato’s use of the example of perceptual illusion to show how reason (τὸ λογιστικόν, 602c4) corrects perceptual illusions that would otherwise leave us with false opinions (602c4-d4). Our engagement with mimetic poetry is akin to these perceptual illusions because we take pleasure in the mimetic representation of behavior in culturally authoritative representatives of virtue, which we would otherwise be ashamed of committing ourselves, and thereby endorse that behavior as virtuous. Poetry, in other words, presents vice in the guise of virtue. However, rather than taking this analysis of the deceptiveness of poetry not as an insurmountable argument for banishing all poetry, I suggest using it as a hermeneutic for engaging with poetry. I argue for this position by emphasizing the corrective power of reason in Plato’s analysis of the deceptiveness of perceptual illusions and, by extension, of mimesis. Since heroes and authoritative representatives of virtue imitate in turn the form of virtue—a Form that Socrates articulates in Book 4, we may engage with poetic images of virtue for the sake of exercising our power to correct those images in light of the conclusions we reach about virtue by means of dialectic. I conclude by suggesting that this position is corroborated by Republic 8 and 9, in virtue of the fact that the portraits of degenerate lives there function as a sort of philosophically-sanctioned poetry, with which we may engage for the purpose of dispelling the illusory attractiveness of those lives.

Representative Bibliography


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7 Ferrari is an exception to this tendency, though he strangely overlooks the passage I have quoted here. See G.R.F. Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry” in Plato on Art and Beauty, 132-134.


Eric Morelli. *Point Loma Nazarene University*. emorelli@pointloma.edu. “‘To Begin at the Beginning’: *Timaeus* 17a1-5 as Hermeneutic Key.” 2-4

On the question of the meaning of the *Timaeus-Critias’s* first lines, otherwise divergent ancient and modern approaches to Plato remarkably converge. The beginning’s strangeness and mysteriousness have prompted usually more critical modern readers to speculate while its opacity compelled Proclus, arguably the greatest and most speculative of Plato’s ancient readers, to maintain what Cornford subsequently would praise as an uncharacteristically critical position on one of their central mysteries, the identity of the absent fourth. By endorsing Proclus’ position, Cornford established a formidable consensus on the question of the identity of the absent fourth and, more generally, on what sorts of things are and are not worth investigating in the *Timaeus-Critias*’ first lines and what sorts of interpretations of them would and would not be reasonable.

In light of these and more contemporary readings, I will take a fresh look at the beginning of the *Timaeus-Critias* to attempt to uncover the roots of its strangeness and mysteriousness and to comprehend the extent of its possible meaning. I will argue that the Proclus-Cornford consensus is less critical than it may seem, that an even more critical position is possible, and that, paradoxically, this more critical position suggests Plato may intend for us to grapple with the mystery of the absent fourth on a higher, apparently more speculative level.

At *Timaeus* 29b, Timaeus asserts that it is most important “to begin at the beginning.” Ultimately, I will argue that the *Timaeus-Critias’s* beginning seems to function as a paradigm and microcosm of the *Timaeus-Critias;* that it seems to exhibit a similar array of aspects, themes, and levels; that it seems to organize them all according to the same overarching form; and that it seems to invite and, to similarly varying degrees, support a similar array of interpretations. Thus, I will argue that the beginning of the *Timaeus-Critias* seems to function as a hermeneutic key and to do so in two senses. It seems to be a clue both to the meaning of the *Timaeus-Critias* and to the nature, adequacy, and diversity of the methods that would interpret it.

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“*Koinēi/on Sumpheron: Agreed Advantage Rather than Common Good in Aristotle’s Politics*” 1-4
It is not unusual to find casual statements in academic literature about the common good in Aristotle. If the common good actually were an important feature of Aristotle’s discussion, one would expect to find koinon agathon frequently in the Politics. In fact, however, koinon agathon occurs only twice in the Politics. More frequent in the Politics, with seven occurrences, is the conjunction of koinos with sumpheron—advantage or benefit—or with the cognate verb. In five of these cases, koinos is inflected not to agree with sumpheron but as a feminine dative singular—in common or by common consent (LSJ). Thus, it would appear that the greater challenge in Aristotle is to identify what he means by the koinē/on sumpheron. I attempt to do so in this paper.

Joyce Mullan. *Stevens Institution of Technology*. jmullan@stevens.edu. “Hesiod’s Double Tale of Strife in his Works and Days.” 5-1

Many scholars in recent years have honed in the specifically Greek concept of Agon as contest or struggle and its role in preserving democracy (see Hannah Arendt’s *Human Condition*, and more recently, in general *Law and Agonistic Politics*, and in particular in that work, Andreas Kalyvas’s “The Democratic Narcissus: The Agonism of the Ancients compared to that of the (Post)Moderns.”) I would like to trace the complex influence of the earlier work of Hesiod and then its legacy in the evolving Aristocratic and later Democratic Ethos of Greek poets and philosophers. I will end up arguing, following Hesiod, that there are two kinds of strife or contest (eris/agon), one good and one evil. One constructive and supportive of excellence (Arête) and the Common Good, the other destructive, hegemonic, and annihilating. I will begin, however, with a close analysis with what Hesiod meant by it and its legacy in the domestic and international thought and politics of Ancient Greece.

-Gwen Nally. *University of Missouri, Kansas City*. nallye@umkc.edu. “Aristotle’s Feast: Political Participation in Politics 3.11.” 1-4

*Politics* 3.11 advances the following argument for why it is preferable for the many to rule:

For the many, of whom each individual is not a good man, when they meet together may be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse.1 (1281b1-4) “The feast”, as it is known, argues that rule by the many is better than rule by one or a few good people, just as a collective feast (τὰ συμφορητὰ δὲ ἑπικα) is better than a meal provided at the expense of one person (1281b3). Scholars have puzzled over the feast since it is unclear how it establishes “the collective superiority of the many” (Waldron 1995, 564). It is unclear why, if each individual is not good, the many are supposed to be collectively better than either one or a few excellent individuals.

The literature contains roughly two responses to this worry. The first response argues that the many have more collective knowledge or practical wisdom; just as a potluck dinner provides a variety of dishes, the many possess a variety of unique perspectives which makes for better deliberation and leads to better overall results (Waldron 1995 and Ober 2013). The second response argues that the many are superior ethically, rather than epistemically. Together the

1 Trans. following Barnes (1984).
2 All Greek is Rackham (1944 [1957]).
many have more arete than the few, because participating in politics causes all to behave with shame and humility (Cammack 2013). These responses differ about whether the many are epistemically or ethically superior; yet both think the feast concerns a collective trait or feature which makes the many better rulers. For this reason, in what follows, I refer to these arguments as “collection interpretations.”

This paper introduces a problem for collection interpretations, before introducing an alternative. This problem can be put roughly as follows: Aristotle frequently worries about a populace composed of individuals who are not good (cf. 1281b1, 1282a25-6). At one extreme, such a populace could be completely devoid of individual assets, possessing no claim to virtue whatsoever (1281b24-25). Inferior populaces pose a problem for the collection interpretation, since a citizenry with few or no individual assets will not have any good traits which could make them collectively superior to the one or few excellent individuals. So, if the feast is a collection argument, it faces a glaring objection: just as a meal prepared by many bad or mediocre cooks will not surpass a meal prepared by one or a few of the best chefs, rule by many bad or inferior individuals might not lead to better overall results.

For this reason, this paper sets out another possible interpretation of the feast, according to which it is not about collecting or synthesizing the many’s individual traits. Instead, rule by the many is preferable, since restricting political power to one or a few leads to jealousy and enmity. Thus, rule by the many is like a feast to which many contribute because it appeases the most people. In support of this reading, it is notable that Aristotle returns to the feast image when discussing political office and claims: “impure food when mixed with what is pure (τῆς καθαρᾶς) sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the pure would be” (1281b37-9). If the many were collectively superior, then it would make sense that they would be like food that is purer overall. But this is not the claim. Instead, rule by the many is like pure and impure food that is mixed, so as to make all of it more wholesome. It seems, therefore, that broad political participation has a neutralizing effect on a populace—the opinions of the wisest individuals, like pure food at a large feast, travel further if the rest of society are their collaborators rather than their enemies. Empowering the many is necessary, then, not because the many have more wisdom or virtue, but because good ideas only have a chance of taking hold if a society is not jealous or factious towards its wisest and most virtuous members.

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-O-

Takashi Oki. Nagoya University. takashikine@gmail.com. “Necessitarianism and ‘What is up to us’ in Nicomachean Ethics III.” 4-3

Aristotle says that ‘when acting is up to us, so is not acting, and when no is up to us, so is yes’ (1113b7-8). His conception of ‘what is up to us’ has been discussed in relation to the
compatibility/incompatibility between moral responsibility and necessitarianism. I argue that it is more reasonable to take Aristotle to be a moral responsibility incompatibilist and an indeterminist (I also look at another alternative view that Aristotle is a moral responsibility compatibilist and an indeterminist, since he does not so explicitly argue for moral responsibility incompatibilism as for deliberation incompatibilism), while at the same time clarifying in what ways the supporters of ‘indeterministic’ interpretations have misused the textual evidence. For example, when arguing that moral responsibility in Aristotle is deterministic, Everson (1990) thinks that his ‘deterministic’ interpretation stands in harmony with Sorabji’s (1980) view (which I think is misguided) that Aristotle accepts in Metaphysics E3 that ‘whatever is caused is necessitated’. On the other hand, Destrée (2011) provides insufficient arguments for his ‘non-deterministic’ interpretation when he mainly uses Nicomachean Ethics III, in which Aristotle is not concerned with necessitarianism. I seek to show that Aristotle does not consider voluntary/involuntary actions in relation to necessitarianism in Nicomachean Ethics III, but that his rejection of necessitarianism in De Interpretatione 9 and in Metaphysics E3, when understood correctly, commits Aristotle to moral responsibility incompatibilism.

Thomas Olshewsky. New College Florida. tolshevik@yahoo.com, “Aristotle on Women.” 5-3

Aristotle's political and biological views about women have been widely explored, but seldom with attention to their evident development relative to his underlying views about physics and metaphysics. Early accounts in PA reveal no clear form/matter attachment to the male and female discriminations. Both sperma and kathemenia are residues, but the semen as seed is implanted in the womb, for which the female provides only the nourishment for growth (PA 655b24-28). Here, males are taken to have warm blood, but only to differentiate their superior strength. In GA, 736a1, pneuma is introduced as “soul heat” (characterized in De Motu 10 as necessary for animal motion). Semen is a combination of pneuma and water, giving it motive force. The menstrual blood is hot enough only for generational motion (as with plants, providing nutrition). This makes the female characterizable as an incomplete male, not capable of whole generation, as the male is (GA 766a31). He develops his notions of pneuma in the psychological works, but it is only in G&C and HA and Problems that he fully explores its relation to sperma.

Aristotle opens GA 1.1 with outlining the four causes, and by GA 2.1 he has developed his contrast between men and women as between form and matter, with the male as the first principle of movement and the female as the matter undergoing the becoming. He has asserted in GA 1.2 that they differ in definition, but in 2.1, that they are the same in species. This prima facie presents him with a conceptual crisis that he addresses in Metaphysics 10.9. His resolution is that the contrariety lies in the matter rather than the form, but since he has claimed difference in definition, this seems an inadequate answer. It is in the explorations of the pneuma/sperma relation in HA that he attempts to give a biological resolution to his metaphysical perplexities.

-P-

Bruce Payne. Hunter College CUNY. brucelloydpayne@gmail.com, “Clues and Provocations: Discovering the Alcibiades I.” 5-5

Despite competitive triumphs and notable military success, Alcibiades was his generation's prime example of strategic misjudgment and civic disloyalty. How was it that he and many other sons of admired Athenian leaders were so deeply lacking in civic virtue?
Alcibiades I, judged simplistic and spurious by many modern scholars, unexpectedly offers answers.

Camouflaged, ironic, or even seemingly offhand, more than a dozen literary and historical allusions create in this dialogue a series of challenging puzzles. Oddly chosen words and awkward phrasings serve as clues to others. Solved and then pondered, these puzzles yield insights about the roots of civic failure in post-Periclean Athens, offering critiques of prevailing Athenian attitudes and practices, among them:

- Leaving the early education of the Athenian elite to women and slaves, individuals with little experience of leadership, politics, democracy, or freedom;
- Failing to learn lessons from Homer, the tragedians, and Herodotus about women, justice, the pursuit of renown, the hazards of war, and the value of freedom;
- Refusing to heed warnings by both Aeschylus and Socrates about greed and the lure of tyranny.

Further explorations of the Alcibiades I expose an elegant mathematical puzzle, the solution to which exemplifies the uses of bewilderment in reading the dialogues. Finally, an argument is advanced that building a strengthened Socratic pedagogy was very likely to have been one of Plato's central purposes in fashioning the Academy.

This new evidence makes a strong case for Plato's authorship of the dialogue. More broadly, it urges a reexamination of Plato's often-puzzling involvements with his predecessors among the poets and historians.

Ron Polansky. Duquesne University. polansky@duq.edu. Respondent on the Harry/Polansky panel. 3-1

Anthony Preus. Binghamton University. apreus@binghamton.edu. “The Citizenship of Socrates in the Light of Modern Citizenship Studies.” 4-1

Aristotle famously claims that the essence of citizenship is participation in “administration of justice, and in offices” (Pol 3.1, 1275a22-23, cf. 1275b19-21). Of course, Socrates was (not very enthusiastically) a citizen of Athens in Aristotle’s paradigmatic sense, but how does Socrates exemplify citizenship according to modern citizenship studies? An analysis of that kind may take us well beyond the texts of Plato and Xenophon, since they do not explicitly explore the concept of citizenship, even to the extent that Aristotle does in Politics 3. In another sense, the character of Socrates, as described by Plato and Xenophon, has had an important influence on the historical development of the idea of citizenship, and both exemplifies and challenges parameters described by recent theoreticians.

Short Bibliography:
Plato Dialogues, Xenophon Memorabilia, Aristotle Politics.

Sebastian Purcell. SUNY Cortland. L.sebastian.purcell@gmail.com. “Virtues of Shared Agency: Aristotle and the Aztecs on Habits and Rituals.” 3-3
Aristotle and the Aztecs shared a common virtue ethical program which aimed at articulating a conception of the good life (*eudaimonia, neltiztli*), achieved by excellence (*aretē, in qualli in yectli*). Yet the Aztecs also thought character agency and habituation insufficient for the good life. Ever mindful of the fragility of human circumstances, they also held that virtues of shared agency were needed to supplement character deficiencies. These constitute a special class of what we now recognize as ritual activity, though they would not have called them such. The essay is the first to compare these opposed views in any modern language. It argues further that the Aztec view enjoys a relative advantage over the eudaemonist view because it fares better in the face of contemporary challenges to character traits and reflective agency from the social sciences.

-R-

Douglass Reed. *University of Rhode Island.* douglassreed@uri.edu, “Social Virtue and Hedonism in *Protagoras* and *Phaedo*.” 2-3

Scholars have observed that the hedonic calculus that Socrates attributes to non-philosophers in the *Phaedo* seems to correspond to the art of measurement that he discusses (and appears to endorse) at the end of the *Protagoras* (e.g., Gosling and Taylor 1982 and Weiss 1989). But as far as I am aware, scholars have never investigated the similarities between ‘popular and social virtue’ that Socrates mentions at *Phaedo* 82a-b and the conception of virtue Protagoras sets out in his great speech. Yet, as I show in this paper, comparing these passages along with the discussions of hedonism sheds light on the non-philosophical views of virtue in both dialogues. In particular, I make the case that social virtue in the *Phaedo* and Protagoras’ conception of virtue, which I argue is reflective of common morality at the time, both emphasize action but neglect the motivations for action. Moreover, I argue that the moral education that Protagoras recommends in his speech is implicit in the non-philosophical views of virtue in the *Phaedo*. Finally, I use these insights to argue against the interpretation that in the *Protagoras*, Socrates does not ascribe hedonism to the many or to Protagoras himself (e.g., Storey 2018, cf. Moss 2014).

Julian Rome. *University of Memphis.* Julianrome97@gmail.com, “The Five Attempts at an Account of φιλία in Plato’s *Lysis*” 1-3

Plato’s *Lysis* contains several potential accounts of φιλία put forth and refuted by Socrates and his interlocutors, Lysis and Menexenus. This plurality of accounts poses a problem for interpreters, especially given that the dialogue is aporetic; indeed, its concluding lines include a remark by Socrates that they have not yet discovered what a friend is. Given these uncertainties, contemporary commentators have argued a range of interpretations concerning which account of φιλία, if any, Plato is endorsing in the dialogue. Furthermore, many interpretations of the dialogue position Plato’s *Lysis* in relation to Plato’s *Symposium* or Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, arguing that it brings up problems that are solved in these later works and fails to solve these problems on its own. Yet, we will find that Plato’s *Lysis* does itself adequately respond to the problems that it raises, presenting a clear endorsement of the final account of φιλία put forth in the dialogue, the account of φιλία as kinship or belonging. In my reading of Plato’s *Lysis*, I examine the five individual attempts, each of which is clearly marked by a shift in both the primary interlocutor and the driving question that Socrates poses to
this interlocutor. By looking at the Lysis in this way, it becomes clear that Plato is endorsing the fifth and final account of φιλία, which argues that the friend is that which is oικείος, kin or belonging. I come to this conclusion through the following: (1) comparing the argumentation in each account, (2) examining the ways in which the literary context interacts with the argumentation, (3) examining the ways in which each prior attempt provides a basis for the argument in the fifth attempt, and (4) examining the philosophical purpose of the turn from the fifth account to the aporetic ending. With respect to (1), we find that the fifth account is, indeed, a coherent position within the context of the dialogue. With respect to (2), I argue that there are interpersonal demonstrations of φιλία presented throughout the dialogue that endorse the fifth account. In (3), I find that each attempt serves a distinct purpose, in so far as it anticipates or puts forth key premises for the final attempt. Finally, through (4), I argue that the aporetic ending does not undermine the final account of φιλία, as it serves to make a different, related point regarding philosophical education. Given the remarkable ways in which each of these three criteria demonstrates support for the fifth account of φιλία, then, I argue that this is the position that Plato is endorsing in the Lysis.

-S-

Victor Saenz. Rice University, Houston Institute. victorsaenz@gmail.com. “Aristotle on Right Action: Justice, Community, and the Moral Virtues.” 1-4

Several commentators have recently stressed the way in which Aristotle is not a virtue ethicist: he does not think that right action is metaphysically constituted by what the virtuous agent would do (see, e.g. Vasiliou, 2011, Hirji, 2018). This seems to me correct. However, this reading raises an important question: how, according to Aristotle, should we determine right action? My aim in this paper is to begin to answer to this question. I argue that the rightness of an action—whether or not this action counts as temperate, courageous, magnanimous, or the like—is largely determined by norms of justice (dikaios) that arise out of a community (koinōnia). In addition to providing a necessary step to addressing the question of right action, my paper argues in favor of a highly neglected reading of the relationship between the account of justice in book V and the account of the moral virtues in III-IV. We should read the account of the moral virtues in light of the account of justice.

First, I look to EN VIII.9 and beyond to articulate the relationship between friendship, norms of justice and community, focusing on the ways in norms arise out of communities. Second, by focusing on the account of general justice in EN V and other texts, I argue that there are both textual and philosophical grounds for reading the accounts of the particular moral virtues in light of the account of community. Finally, I briefly look at how this account helps us to think about right action in particular moral virtues.

Cody Sandschafer. Boston College. sandscha@bc.edu. “Teaching Zeta” 5-4

In book Zeta of the Metaphysics, Aristotle analyzes substance by dissecting the logical-linguistic structures that articulate the perceptual substances and the mathematical. Aristotle takes up this task by considering four terms that are already in his and others’ philosophical parlance, working through each one to see if it leads the intellect to a causal grasp of a first principle. These are the essence, universal, genus, and underlying subject (Metaph. 1028b 34-35). Through understanding the implications of the preceding argumentation that takes place in E.4, one can conclude prior to the analysis that the analysis in Zeta will not take us beyond the
perceptual substances that are considered. This paper argues that Zeta’s task is pedagogical: one way of reading Zeta is as a performative exercise in which Aristotle is explicating the various false ways of reasoning towards primary being. The evidence for this position is the following: first, propositional understanding is necessary for fully grasping perceptual substances and the mathematical; second, E.4 explicitly states that the truth of knowledge gained through propositional understanding is not adequate for the being that is treated in the Metaphysics (1027b30-1028a2). The connection between these two points lies in perceptual substances having matter and existing in a state of becoming. This becomes evident upon reading De Anima III.4 and III.6.

Margaret Scharle. Reed College. scharlem@reed.edu. “Aristotle’s account of the elemental transformations in GC 2.4” Krizan Panel 1-5


In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that knowledge is strong and cannot be ruled by pleasure (352a-357e). Near the end of this argument, he states a famous paradox—in one formulation, “no one goes willingly toward the bad” (358c-d). Earlier, while discussing Simonides, he makes a similar-sounding claim: no one does wrong willingly (345d-e). The poem seems to imply that some wrongdoing is willing, but Socrates reads it against itself so that it coheres with the contrary view. Scholars often say that this is the same paradox Socrates later argues for. However, Simonides and the many hold different views; when Socrates rejects their views, then, he too expresses different views. In particular, Simonides and the many both assume the possibility of motivational conflicts, but different ones. So, when Socrates rejects their views, he denies the possibility of two different motivational conflicts. In particular, in responding to the many he denies the possibility of conflict between our desire for pleasure and our desire for the good, but in responding to Simonides he denies the possibility of conflict between our desire for the good and our desire for the fine. If I am right, this suggests a new account of the “moral” and “prudential” Socratic paradoxes, the relationship between them, and their connection to larger themes in Plato.

Mark Shiffman. Villanova University. Mark.shiffman@villanova.edu. “Aristotle and Cicero on Aristocratic Friendship.” (De Amicitia, De Re Publica) Vazquez panel 2-1

Mark A. Sentesy. Pennsylvania State University. sentesy@psu.edu. “Pathways of Movement in the Soul: Anamnesis in Aristotle.” 2-5

Can remembering lead to new knowledge? In this paper I aim to correct three misconceptions about Aristotle’s account of anamnesis: first, that it only concerns the memories of previous experience, second, that it is not an activity but a state (as Bloch has it), and third, that recollection is an accurate translation of the word. Anamnesis is, I aim to show, a form of inquiry (zētēsis), a deliberation (bouleusis) and a sort of deduction (sullogismos). It occurs because the world moves us by perceiving it, and because motions follow one another either naturally or by habit. Unlike learning, which is a change brought about by the activity of an external teacher, anamnesis is a change that occurs when a motion is either already within my body or currently happening to me, and which leads me up to (ana-) something, as when a current experience carries someone back to a past delight or trauma.
But it is not necessary that it carry us up to a phantasm of the past. In its image-based deliberative and inferential capacities, it resembles Aristotle’s description of imagination. Moreover, unlike memory, anamnesis can be part of primary experience. It should not, therefore, be translated as ‘recollection.’

In this account, Aristotle is echoing the concept of anamnesis in the Meno. There, Socrates appears to endorse the opinion that we acquired all knowledge in a past life. But his actual position appears to be more subtle, namely that if we use the right method, previous knowledge can generate learning, that is, knowledge that is new to us.

Colin C. Smith. University of Colorado, Boulder. Ccsm223@uky.edu. “The Case for the 399 BCE Dramatic Date of Plato’s Cratylus” 5-4

The Cratylus contains almost no clues suggesting the date of its dramatic setting. Perhaps the only clue is Socrates' passing reference to Hermogenes’ father’s estate (391c). But this has been interpreted either to imply that his father is still alive, suggesting that the dialogue is set before about 421 BCE, or that his father is dead, suggesting that it is set after 421 BCE. Furthermore, Socrates’ passing references to a conversation with the prophet Euthyphro suggest the possibility that the Cratylus is set shortly after the Euthyphro, and hence on the same day at the Theaetetus and the day before the Sophist and Statesman. Although I do not think that the matter cannot be settled with absolute certainty, in this paper I make what I take to be the strongest argument possible for the 399 BCE dramatic date. I do this with reference to the dramatic arc of the dialogues that concludes in the ‘purging’ of the implicit assumptions guiding the methods of inquiry beginning with the maieutic method of the Theaetetus and ending with a confrontation of the ontology of names in Cratylus that allows for the inquiry into the structure of the named entities inherent in the division exercises in the Sophist and Statesman.

David Squires. University of St. Thomas, Houston. dsquires@nd.edu. “Nature as Final and Efficient Cause in Physics B.” 4-4

This paper looks at a recent debate about Aristotle’s definition of nature as an internal principle of motion in Physics B, in particular Kelsey (2015) and Fritsche (2018). Kelsey maintains that, according to Aristotle’s definition of nature, nature is an internal principle of motion not as an efficient cause, but as a final cause. Fritsche criticizes Kelsey’s view at length, maintaining that nature is indeed a final cause, but that the definition of nature in the opening of Physics B is intended to propose its role as an efficient cause of motion. I offer further support from Physics B in favor of Fritsche’s view that essential form is an efficient cause of motion and is the internal principle spoken of in Aristotle’s definition of nature, but argue that Fritsche’s assertion that the essential form is not “fully realized” in a developing organism subtly undermines his claim that it is the principle spoken of in the definitional passages. I further argue that form is fully realized in the developing organism, and that this must be the case whether or not there is a succession of essential forms in a developing organism. I conclude with a brief critique of Fritsche’s analogies for essential form as an efficient cause of motion, since they invite the interpretation that form is an efficient cause without being the cause of unity and existence of the substance whose form it is.
Aristotle spends much of *De Anima* [DA] talking about form: he defines the soul as the form of the body, and he describes perception as the taking on of perceptible form without the matter. As a consequence, the literature on DA also tends to appeal to formal causes much more so than it does to material, efficient, and final causation. However, Aristotle is clear in *Physics* and throughout his biological works that the final cause is the central cause we should cite when explaining the parts of animals and their functions. I argue that attention to features of teleological explanation can help us to address concerns both about the completeness of Aristotle’s psychology and about perception’s ability to ground knowledge.

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Michael Vazquez. *University of Pennsylvania*. yazm@sas.upenn.edu. “Cicero and Moral Duty.” (De Officiis, De Finibus.) Vazquez panel 2-1

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Kelsey Ward. *Hobart & William Smith Colleges*. “Polansky on Aristotle’s *De anima.*” kward@hws.edu. Harry Polansky Panel 3-1

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Nicholas Westberg. *Boston College*. westbern@bc.edu. “Metaphysics Zeta: Its Purpose and Argument.” 5-4

This paper tackles a longstanding and contested question about the *Metaphysics*, namely, what does Aristotle accomplish in Zeta? I argue against the predominant reading that its purpose is *not* to set the terms of the science of metaphysics. Zeta’s ultimate accomplishment is *not* to establish substantial form as the principle which leads to metaphysic’s chief object, God. When Zeta treats form, it does so to show that a formal-causal analysis of a material substance keeps philosophical inquiry within its ontological domain (namely, the material realm). Why would Aristotle include such an analysis in primary philosophy? To answer this, I demonstrate that Zeta 1’s argument is announced back in Epsilon 1-2, and thus is subservient to a greater project of finding a causal link to first entities or principles of being. Zeta’s particular purpose is to provide a causal analysis of substance (rather than a candidate argument for what counts as substance), inquiring into the cause or principle that makes a perceptible substance to be a substance at all. This particular analysis, which seeks a theoretical grasp of what the *Categories* calls substance, is achieved through the “*ti esti*” question. Zeta’s purpose is to show that the line of inquiry which seeks the formal cause through the “*ti esti*” question does not lead to the immaterial first entity of metaphysical science. So, Zeta demonstrates that substantial form is not the ultimate *genos* of the science of metaphysics.

In sum, this paper’s purpose is to argue that Zeta’s metaphysical inquiry into form is intentionally not the metaphysical link to God. The paper accomplishes this in the following steps: 1) a criticism of the standard interpretation of Zeta; 2) an argument that Zeta is a continuation of an investigation begun in Epsilon; 3) an exposition of Zeta 1-3 and 17 that shows
how its inquiry into substance is a possible but unsuccessful attempt to grasp first entities via the 
ti esti question; 4) further proof of my interpretation from Zeta 16.

Chad Wiener. Old Dominion University. chad.wiener@gmail.com. “A Reading of the First Book of the Republic: A Look to the Whole.” 5-2
The current standard view of the first book of the Republic is that it is an early dialogue attached to the rest of the text. It serves as a decent enough introduction to the scope and arguments of the whole. The stylometric evidence supports this reading. The elenctic nature of the text is in the same style of the early dialogues with a few possible exceptions. Vlastos tries to solidify this claim by showing that Book I conforms to all ten of his theses about the early dialogues. Preparing an attack on these claims may be a foolish way to proceed, so I present a different tactic. My thesis is that the arguments we find in Book I are integral to an understanding of the whole Republic. This is a tall order, so I restrict this particular investigation to one aspect of Book I along with the rest of the Republic. The definitions of justice examined in the first book are essential for the correct understanding of the definition of justice presented in Book IV. Each view of justice presented in Book I offers a partial understanding of justice and forms a proper part of one’s understanding of justice in the just city. Socrates’ refutation of each definition of justice presents the problems that must be resolved for the proper understanding of how that conception of justice fits with the whole. Book I is, thus, written with a look to the whole.

I proceed by looking at some of the problems Socrates raises with each character’s definition of justice, then I show how Socrates addresses these problems in the later books and are needed for the right understanding of the formulation of the definition we find in Book IV. The aim of the paper is not to be exhaustive but to present enough evidence that it becomes unreasonable to say that Book I is a mere introduction to the themes of Republic II-X written separately at some earlier time. I end by responding to some criticisms of this reading of the Republic.

Michael Wiitala. Cleveland State University. mwiitala@gmail.com. “Three Referents of “Non-Being” in the Sophist: The Nature of Non-Being, the Form Non-Being, and Things that Are Not.” 4-2
The Eleatic Stranger’s account of non-being in the Sophist digression is not easy to follow. Part of the reason for the difficulty is that we contemporary readers tend to look for the Stranger to define the term “non-being,” while the Stranger instead seems more intent on finding referents for the term. At the close of his account, the Stranger explicitly identifies two referents of “non-being,” saying, “we pointed out (apedeixamen) not only that non-beings (ta mê onta) are, but we also gave an account (apephênametha) of the form (eidos) which happens to be the form of non-being (tou mê ontos)” (258d5-7). Here non-beings are one kind of referent of the term “non-being,” while the form Non-Being is another. “Non-being” in the first case refers to a non-being, which is to say, to anything that is not. For example, a thing that is not large is a non-being, a not-being-large. “Non-being” in the second case refers to the form Non-Being. In addition to these two kinds of referents, the Stranger also speaks of the nature (phusis; ousia) of non-being (see 258b2, 9-11). While many commentators have followed the Stranger in distinguishing the first two referents of the term “non-being”—individual non-beings, on the one hand, and the form Non-Being, on the other—to my knowledge none have identified the nature of non-being as a distinct referent.
In this paper, I argue that the nature of non-being is a third distinct referent of the term “non-being,” in addition to individual non-beings and the form Non-Being. The nature of non-being, I contend, is the unique character of the form Non-Being and that which the form Non-Being explains in its participants. Instead of defining the term “non-being,” the Stranger defines (1) the nature of non-being, (2) the form Non-Being, and thereby (3) individual non-beings. I argue that he defines the nature of non-being as “the contrast (antithesis) between the nature of a part of different and the nature of being” (258a11-b1), and the form Non-Being as “the part of [the nature of different] contrasted with the being of each thing” (258e2). The result is that individual non-beings can be understood as participants in the form Non-Being.

After differentiating these three referents of the term “non-being” in the first part of the paper, in the second part I show how these three referents are related to one another, and how each of them plays a necessary role in the Stranger’s account. The interpretation I develop is important not only for understanding non-being, but for appreciating the role that the communing of kinds plays in the theory of forms, and the relationship between form and participant.


Plato’s Gorgias concerns the tension between politics and philosophy, and the power each wields. Socrates converses successively with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, intending to discover what the rhetorical art’s power is, and what its object is (447c). Gorgias’ formulation of rhetoric’s universal power underlies all three discussions of rhetoric’s object, political persuasion. As each interlocutor develops the previous account of rhetoric’s power, Socrates develops his own notion of power through his challenges to their claims. Scholars who consider power’s central focus rightly distinguish Socrates’ notion of power from rhetorical power, enabling us to find the dialogue’s central question, which is ultimately whether politics and philosophy can be reconciled. However, these authors distinguish politics from philosophy too absolutely, failing to acknowledge their common origins. In this paper, I will argue that Socrates’ notion of power is born of and thus related to Gorgias’ notion of rhetorical power’s universality. In so doing, I intend to understand politics and philosophy as unifiable to illuminate Socrates’ claim that he is one of a few Athenians who tries his hand at the political art and the only one to act politically (521d). Because Polus and Callicles develop Gorgias’ notion of rhetorical power into an account of tyranny, I conclude by considering how philosophy’s self-reflexive turn may enable one to avoid the temptation to become tyrannical, despite its claim to universal power.

John P.F. Wynne. University of Utah. john.wynne@utah.edu. “Cicero on parental love.”

Lockwood Panel 1-1

When he writes about certain theories of justice or friendship, Cicero often invites us to reflect first on how a parent loves his or her child. Cicero’s use of the example seems philosophically (although not biographically) puzzling. Parental love stems from a unique, biological relation—can it illuminate other relationships? Or again, David Konstan has argued that in On friendship Cicero’s use of parental love is in tension with the work’s arguments, since the animal and unconditional nature of parental love is in tension with an ideal of friendship based on community of virtue. (‘Cicero’s two loves’, Ciceroniana Online 1.2 (2017), 291-305) I argue that there are no such puzzles. Cicero does not think of parental love as a model for other relationships. Rather, he deploys it to prove a specific but controversial thesis, that it is possible naturally to wish another well just as one wishes oneself well. With this thesis in hand, he can
then give the arguments for the impartialist views about justice and friendship he likes to explore, to which a traditional objection is that they make psychologically impossible demands.

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Wen Xu. Colorado. Wen.xu@colorado.edu. “Plato on Arithmetic.” 5-2

Plato in Republic VII suggests that guardians of a city needs to have ten-year education in mathematics as a propaedeutic stage before they enter into the study of dialectic in order to grasp the idea of the Good. Such a presentation seems to fit the depiction of the Line that Plato offers in Republic VI where he uses the learners of mathematics as representatives who live in the stage of dianoetic (διάνοια) that is inferior to the stage of understanding (νοησις). Plato’s attitude towards the mathematical education causes much dispute. Does the dianoetic method identical to the mathematical method? How could one arrive the dialectic through the training in the mathematical subjects or how could one move up to the understanding stage from the dianoetic one? There are mainly three kinds of interpretation. Aristotle claims that mathematical objects are not Forms but intermediates since they are neither eternal nor objects of sense perceptions. Benson (2011) nevertheless suggests that dialectic method can be identified with the mathematical method and thus the exploration of mathematical objects also belong to the stage of understanding. Others like Brentlinger (1963) maintains that the dianoetic also studies Forms. I agree that there should be an overlap between the dialectic and the mathematical studies, but nevertheless I argue in this essay that the key for a learner of mathematics to ascent to the dialectic stage lies in her understanding of the arithmetic, which together with other three subjects—geometry/stereometry, astronomy, harmonics—constitutes mathematics as higher education for the guardians, because the learner will grasp at least a vague idea of unity in the course of studying arithmetic and the idea of unity directly relates to the idea of the Good and the Beautiful. I first investigate the functions and deficiencies of each of the four subjects presented in Republic VII, and I shall relate Plato’s idea on the mathematical subjects in Book VII to the Line analogy in Book VI, and finally offer a reflection on why arithmetic distinguishes itself from the other three mathematical subjects concerning the transition from the dianoetic to understanding.

Bibliography


Mostafa Younesie. Philadelphia, PA. Younesie_7@yahoo.com. “Empedocles on Name and its Connected Features” 5-1

One of the salient though unexplored issues about the fragments of Empedocles (https://sites.google.com/site/empedoclesacragas/bibliography-a-z) is about “name” and its pertinent features such as naming; name-giving / name-making (including the criterion for being right and correct); and name -complementing that all of them together form a set. Now with regard to the importance and even dominance of “name” in the lingual thoughts of the ancient Greek thinkers, in this paper I want to explore and examine the mentioned name-related set in Empedocles.

We begin with the core word in a very important fragment that includes some other points too:

…, φύσις δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν/
…,the name φύσις is given by [wise] men to those things [F8.7].

within the context of orality, Empedocles speaks of his own conception of mixture and separation in the substantive differentiation of the conception of birth and death (Ademollo 2011, 90). It seems that by using the middle-passive verb of ὄνομαζω on the one hand, he wants to say that wise human beings give or make names (in distinction of calling [F 15, 25]; voicing [F 62, 142]; sounding [F 74]; and speaking [F 9, 17]) and on the other hand, he means that in this practice human beings have no complete and absolute power and their names should express and have relation with the substance of their pertinent subjects.

We can see the same conception of naming in regard to ῥίζωματα/ roots/elements [F 6.2], as” they are obviously designated by terms fire, air, and water, by the names of divinities, and by their most obvious manifestations in the physical world” (M. R. Wright 1981, 22-23) - all these various terms are somehow interchangeable. In other words, the four elements/roots should be expressed and told to the addressees and it makes it necessary to communicate the idea through names that in the final analysis all refer to eternal characteristics and it makes them synonymous.

Before continuing with another issue that is embedded in this fragment, here is a good place that in the context of ancient Greek lingula thought consider Empedocles criteria for name-making or name-giving. As it became clear the criteria for right and correct naming is the manifestation of the nature of the pertinent subject in the name though it is not all:

…. then < they say > it birth [or: coming to be],

and when they are separated, this in turn they call pitiful fate;

ἣ θέμις < οὐκοῦ καλέουσι, νόμωι δ’ ἔπιφημι καὶ αὐτός they do nor call them right, but I myself concur in nomos. [F 9, 4 - 6]

Here and in continuation with the rationale of the previous fragment, Empedocles wants to say that human beings except himself are not “right” in speaking of “birth” and “death” as coming from and ending to nothing. At the same time, as a social animal he lives with other people and has interactions with them and habitually he uses their names.

At the same time, fragment sixth points to another feature of name that is name-complementing or epithet (also in F 3, 55, 80, 122, 131, 142, 149-151):
Here we can make different speculations about the names mentioned here and those in the other fragments: they either complete the meaning, or add new meaning to a familiar one, or deconstruct meaning, or emphasize a dimension of the name that is forgotten (Baxter 1992, 123).

In parallel to name-complementing or epithet, we read eponym or the use of names for one name for different reasons:

Here we see two names Γηθοσύνην and Ἀφροδίτην of the five names (Philotēs; Harmonia; Kypris) that in other fragments Empedocles names for love. Therefore, in specific circumstances and for distinct reasons five names are used for merely one name that is philia.