12-28-2002

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PARTS AND PROPERTIES IN ARISTOTLE’S *CATEGORIES*

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Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at its meeting with the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association December 28, 2002, in Philadelphia

Abstract

Call a property *recurrent* if it can be found in more than one subject, and *nonrecurrent* otherwise. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively debate among recent commentators. An assumption held in common by both sides of the debate is that a property is nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject. In this paper, I’ll argue that this assumption is false. There are a variety of kinds of separation in Aristotle. When we focus attention on what notion of separation is relevant, we will see that the inseparability possessed by individual properties is neutral on the question whether such properties are recurrent or nonrecurrent. In particular, I’ll argue that Aristotle is only claiming that inherent properties, unlike parts, cannot be *severed* from their subjects.

Call a property *recurrent* if it can be found in more than one subject, and *nonrecurrent* otherwise. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively debate among recent commentators. An assumption held in common by both sides of the debate is that a property is nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject. In this paper, I’ll argue that this assumption is false. I’ll proceed as follows. In this introductory section, I’ll explain the issue and sketch the dialectic of the debate; then I’ll argue in more detail that both sides of the debate make this assumption; finally, I’ll argue against the assumption.

Aristotle’s fourfold classification of beings in the *Categories*—into individual substances, universal substances, nonsubstantial individuals and nonsubstantial universals—is expressed in terms of the notions of being present in a subject and being said of a subject: individual substances such as Callias are neither said of, nor present in, a subject; universal substances such as human are said of, but not present in, a subject; nonsubstantial universals such as color are both said of, and present in, a subject; nonsubstantial individuals are present in, but not said of, a subject. What sort of things are nonsubstantial individuals? Aristotle’s examples are a “certain item of grammatical knowledge” present in a soul and a “certain paleness” present in a body. But it is not clear from these examples whether nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent or nonrecurrent. Can your soul and mine share the same certain item of grammatical knowledge? Can your
body and mine share the same paleness? Nonsubstantial individuals are *inherent* or in a subject, and much of the debate on this issue has centered on the apparent definition of this notion at *Categories* 1a24-5:

By ‘in a subject’ I mean *(legō)* what is in something *(tini)*, not as a part, and cannot exist separately *(adunaton chōris einai)* from what it is in *(tou en ho estin)*.¹

As I will show in more detail below, the assumption that a property is nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject drives much of the dialectic of the debated reading of 1a24-5. Those who hold that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties read 1a24-5 as claiming that any nonsubstantial individual is inseparable from its subject, an individual substance; and those who hold that nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent read 1a24-5 as only committed to the claim that nonsubstantial individuals are inseparable from some of the subjects in which they are found, but not from the individual substances in which they are found. However, the assumption that a property is nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject is false. There are a variety of kinds of separation in Aristotle. When we focus attention on what notion of separation is relevant to a reading of 1a24-5, we will see that the inseparability possessed by individual properties entails neither that such properties are recurrent nor that they are nonrecurrent. In particular, I’ll argue that 1a24-5 is only claiming that inherent properties, unlike parts, cannot be severed from their subjects. This offers, I’m afraid, a deflationary position on the relevance of 1a24-5 to the question of nonrecurrent properties. The modest aim of the paper is to shift scholarly focus away from 1a24-5 and towards passages which might shed better light on the issue.

**A nonrecurrence reading of 1a24-5**

Although the view that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties was something of an orthodoxy before 1965, John Ackrill’s (1963: 74-5) reading of 1a24-5 provides an explicit argument for the view. He interprets the passage as giving the following necessary and sufficient condition for inherence:

(\(A\)) \(x\) is in \(y\) just in case:

(i) \(x\) is \(i_{n1}\) \(y\)
(ii) \(x\) is not a part of \(y\)
(iii) \(x\) cannot exist independently from \(y\).²

As Ackrill (1963: 74) notes, \((A)\) is circular unless we distinguish the ‘in’ in the *definiendum* from the ‘in’ in the *definiens*. I disambiguate with subscription. Ackrill suggests that (i) employs a non-technical notion of being in, writing that “Aristotle has in mind the occurrence in ordinary Greek of locutions like ‘heat in the water’, ‘courage in Socrates’.”
Ackrill takes (A) to entail that nonsubstantial universals can not be in\textsubscript{2} individual substances. He (1963: 74) writes: “Aristotle could not say that generosity is in\textsubscript{2} Callias as subject, since there could be generosity without any Callias. Only this individual generosity—Callias’ generosity—is in\textsubscript{2} Callias.” Let’s chart the moves here more carefully. Consider two claims:

(IEn) If x is inseparable from y, then x cannot exist independently from y;
(R) If x cannot exist independently from a subject, then x is nonrecurrent.

(A) presupposes (IEn) in translating adunaton chōris einai as “cannot exist independently.” Condition (iii) of (A) has the following consequence when conjoined with (R):

(A1) Only nonrecurrent properties can be in\textsubscript{2} individual substances.

(A1) entails, when conjoined with the plausible thesis that nonsubstantial universals are recurrent properties, the claim that nonsubstantial universals can not be in\textsubscript{2} individual substances. This is what Ackrill claims in the above quotation. This, then, is Ackrill’s argument for the claim that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties: (A) is the correct reading of 1a24-5; (A) entails (A1) under the plausible assumption of (R); nonsubstantial individuals are in individual substances; so nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties.

(A1) is open to the objection that 2a34-b7 seems to explicitly deny the claim:

All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects.... [C]olour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all.... So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.

This passage seems to say that nonsubstantial universals are present in individual substances. This entails the denial of (A1) when conjoined with the thesis that universal properties are recurrent. Ackrill (1963: 83) denies that the passage does have this entailment, writing that to say that colour is in body is to say that every instance of colour is in an individual body. If so, Aristotle’s present formulation is compressed and careless. For he does not mention individual instances of colour; he speaks as if, because colour is in body, colour is in an individual body. Strictly, however, it is not colour, but this individual instance of colour, that is in this individual body; for colour could exist apart from this body (though this instance of colour could not). Aristotle’s use of a relaxed sense of ‘in’ may be connected with his almost complete neglect, after [Categories] Chapter 2, of individuals in non-substance categories.
Subsequent interpreters have ascribed to Aristotle not carelessness but a distinct and derivative sense of being in. Moravcsik (1967: 87) writes that “general attributes are indirectly inherent in particular substances.” Allen (1969: 35) takes a similar line, writing: “the ‘in’ here [in 2a34-b7] is not the technical ‘in’ of presence [i.e., of inherence: in₂], but an ‘in’ derived from it ... in that the first must obtain if the second is assertible.” Allen thus takes it that there is a third sense of ‘in’ in the *Categories* in addition to the ‘in’ of the *definiendum* of 1a24-5 and the occurrences of ‘in’ in the *definiens*: call this notion being in₃. Allen’s reading has the advantage over Ackrill’s of not ascribing carelessness to Aristotle. Rather, Allen has a precise condition for a universal x to be in₃ y: just in case an instance of x is in₂ y. Others have gone further. Duerlinger (1970: 185-6) explains 2b2-4 by successive applications of two accounts of derivative inherence. Let us say that A is in₄ B iff A is predicated of a and a is in₂ B; and that A is in₅ B iff, for some x and some y, A is predicated of x and B is predicated of y, and x is in₂ y. Then color is in₅ body since color is predicated of a particular color and body is predicated of a particular body, and the particular color is in₂ the particular body. Then, by the definition of being in₄, color is in₄ the particular body.

Heinaman (1981: 303) and others have been persuaded by this line of response to the objection to (A1). But it is an unattractive reading of 2a34-b7. For one thing, it requires positing at least a third sense of ‘in’, a postulation without independent textual support. But worse: the reading renders 2a34-b7 unintelligible. For if the sense in which the nonsubstantial universal colour is in individual substances were not the sense in which things are claimed at 2a35 to be in the primary substances as subjects, then the claim that colour is in individual substances would provide no evidence for the claim that all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. Indeed, 2a34-b7 is entirely mysterious on this reading. If the argument is to be valid, then each occurrence of ‘in’ must express the same notion of being in; since the first sentence requires that ‘in’ expresses the notion of being in₂, each occurrence of ‘in’ must express the notion of being in₃. Call this the problem of providing an unitary reading of ‘in’.

**A first recurrence reading of 1a24-5**

Because of this objection to (A1) and other objections, Owen (1965) rejects both (A) and Ackrill’s thesis that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties. He replaces Ackrill’s thesis with the view that nonsubstantial individuals are properties not predicable of anything less general. Individual colours, for example, are on this view not instances but fine-grained hues. Since nonsubstantial individuals are then not nonrecurrent properties but may exist in more than one subject, Owen cannot interpret 1a24-5 as (A); he rather offers the following:

(B) x is present in y just in case: there is a z such that
   (i) x is in y
   (ii) x is not a part of y
   (iii) x cannot exist apart from z.
(B) does not entail (A1). However, as Heinaman (1981: 296) and others note, (B) is an unattractive reading of 1a24-25: it requires that the indefinite pronoun *tini* and the relative clause *tou en ho estin* in 1a24-5 have different referents: their referents are represented in (B) as 'y' and 'z' respectively. Call this the coreference problem. (B) thus forces an unnatural reading of 1a24-5.6

So we have two desiderata. We would like to hold that all occurrences of 'in' in 2a34-b7 express the notion of inherence. The interpretation offered by Ackrill and his supporters fails to meet this desideratum. And we would like to hold that *tini* and *tou en ho estin* in 1a24-5 have the same referent. The interpretation offered by Owen and his supporters fails to meet this desideratum. An interpretation meeting both these desiderata would, all else being equal, be preferable to either the Ackrill or the Owen interpretation, for such an interpretation provides a natural reading of the passages.

One point of agreement among the disputants is this: *adunaton choris einai* is to be translated as 'cannot exist apart'. I have labelled this view (IEn). Although (A) and (B) differ as to that to which the inherent property is related, both formulations construe the relation as entailing an incapacity to exist independently. It is this assumption, when conjoined with the claim that *tini* and *tou en ho estin* in 1a24-5 have the same referent, that leads to the undesirable consequence, (A1), which seemingly conflicts with 2a34-b7. Ackrill and his supporters, having retained both assumptions, have been forced into an unnatural reading of 2a34-b7. Owen and his supporters, on the other hand, have retained the assumption that separation is a capacity for independent existence and, preferring the natural reading of 2a34-b7, have been forced to drop the claim that *tini* and *tou en ho estin* in 1a24-5 have the same referent.

These two routes are not the only means to avoid the conflict between 2a34-b7 and (A1). Might we not instead retain the claim that *tini* and *tou en ho estin* in 1a24-5 have the same referent and, preferring the natural reading of 2a34-b7, reject the thesis that separation is a capacity for independent existence? Certainly, this is the prima facie evidence of the text. Under the natural reading of 2a34-b7, nonsubstantial universals inhere in individual substances. This entails, when conjoined with the plausible thesis that universal properties are recurrent, that certain recurrent properties inhere in individual substances. Generosity can exist in both Callias and Socrates, and so apart from either. However, given that both are generous, the property is separable from neither.

The disputants seem to have merely assumed that separation is a capacity for independent existence and have been thus forced into an unnatural reading—either of 2a34-b7 or 1a24-5. Let us reverse the order of things. First, I advocate the natural reading of 2a34-b7 and 1a24-5. I will avoid commitment to (A1) by rejecting the thesis that separation is a capacity for independent existence. If I can give an alternative interpretation of separation which nonetheless allows me to retain the natural reading of the passages, then this alone will provide some reason to prefer the alternative interpretation to the orthodox. But before giving my reading of this passage, I'll rehearse one more wrinkle.
A better recurrence reading of la24-5

Frede (1987: 62) offers a reading of la24-5 which avoids the coreference problem and is consistent with the view that nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent. He views the passage as committed only to the following:

(C) x is present in a subject if there is a z such that
(i) x is not a part of z
(ii) x cannot exist independently from z.

(C) offers several advantages over (A) and (B). First, (C) avoids the problem of providing an unitary reading of ‘in’ in la24-5—the problem which sunk (A). Recall, Ackrill needed to posit two senses of ‘in’ in the passage, so to distinguish the ‘in’ in the definitendum from the ‘in’ in the definiens. This postulation, we have seen, is difficult to reconcile with 2a34-b7. But the right-hand side of (C) has no ‘in’. As such, no risk of circularity is incurred and no conflict with 2a34-b7 arises.

A second advantage is that (C) avoids the coreference problem—the problem which sunk (B). Recall, the difficulty here was that tini and tou en ho estin in la24-25 ought to have the same referent. (C) sidesteps this problem. la24-5, on Frede’s (1987: 59) reading, “do not provide a definition of the relation ‘x is in y as its subject’; rather, they provide a definition of the class of entities that are in something as their subject.” (Italics mine.) As such, tini can be left unspecified.

Notice, (C) preserves the inseparability thesis: if x is inseparable from y, then x cannot exit apart from y, and so x is nonrecurrent with respect to the kind of subject that y is. The strategy of (C) is to shift the subject from which the inherent property is inseparable. On this reading, for an individual nonsubstance such as this color to be in, say, Callias only requires that the nonsubstance be inseparable from some entity—for example, from body. There are no bodiless colors. Part of the appeal of (C) is that, under Frede’s reading, 1a24-5 has only these weak and uncontroversial commitments.

Despite the ingenuity and attractiveness of (C), there are several reasons to reject it as a reading of 1a24-5. I’ll give two. First, (C) reads ‘I mean’ (legein) as introducing a merely sufficient condition for being present in a subject. Both (A) and (B), by contrast, take ‘I mean” as introducing a definition of inherence. However, I find neither reading compelling. Rather, the most natural reading to my ear is to take ‘I mean” as introducing a clarification. Aristotle sometimes uses legein in this way. Moreover, a definition of inherence would be a little odd at the point in the Categories in which the passage occurs. The notions of being said of or present in a subject are used to give an initial taxonomy of beings; their usefulness for this end would be mitigated were they not intuitive notions—or, at least, intuitive to Aristotle’s intended audience—and so not needing definitions. Moreover, the said of relation is left undefined: if the notion of inherence is
being defined or if a sufficiency condition for inherence is being given, then the
asymmetry is puzzling. So I suspect that Aristotle’s concern in 1a24-5 is not to define the
present in relation but to distinguish his target notion from another sense of being in a
subject which would also be an intuitive notion to Aristotle’s readers. This is the notion
of being in a subject as a part is in a whole. 1a24-5 is merely intended to exclude this
sense of being in a subject. This brings me to my second criticism of (C).

Notice, the two conditions, (C, i) and (C, ii), are unrelated. Indeed, there is an
assumption held in common among all of the interpreters we have looked at so far.
Consider again Ackrill’s translation of 1a24-5:

By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist
separately from what it is in.

Let’s call the “not as a part” bit the nonmereological condition on inherence and the
“cannot exist separately from what it is in” bit the inseparability condition. The
translation, putting the conditions in the form of a conjunction, reinforces the view that
these are two distinct conditions. This view is held by supporters of all of (A), (B) and
(C). But it’s an unnatural reading of the text. The participle construction in the Greek
suggests that the inseparability condition is an explication of the nonmereological
condition. Recently, Daniel Devereaux (1992: 124-5) has given just such a reading of
1a24-5; and although, as I’ll explain below, I disagree with some points of Devereaux’s
interpretation. I’m entirely sympathetic to his view that the nonmereological and
inseparability conditions are related.

So let’s put these two claims together. 1a24-5 is intended to anticipate a potential
confusion among Aristotle’s readers. There are several senses of being in a subject,
including the sense in which a part is in a whole. The passage aims to clarify the target
notion of being in a subject by excluding this mereological sense of being in a subject.
Included in the passage is a brief explanation why the target notion is different from the
mereological notion. Unlike the relation holding between a part and its whole, an inherent
property is inseparable from its subject. The desideratum that the inseparability and the
nonmereological conditions of 1a24-5 be related suggests that the relevant notion of
separation, the notion of separation which is denied of inherent properties, is that ascribed
to parts. Now: what is Aristotle’s notion of mereological separation?

Mereological separation

Aristotle at least sometimes holds that parts are inseparable from wholes.9 Consider Meta.
1040b5-8:

Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only
potentialities, e.g. the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately
(kechôrismenon); and when they are separated (chôrísthê), then they too exist, all
of them, merely as matter).
Here there seems to be two senses of separation. The occurrence of χόρισθη refers to severance. But what is the sense of κεχόρισμένον? The separation denied of parts here must be the separation Aristotle elsewhere ascribes to substances and denies of nonsubstances. For the demonstrandum of the passage is that parts are not substances. This would be established if it could be shown that parts are not separable in the way in which substances are separable. Under the orthodox view, such separation is a capacity for independent existence.

Devereux argues that Aristotle initially held that the parts of substances are themselves substances and only rejected this view in later writings such as the Metaphysics. On this view, the Aristotle of the Categories holds that parts are capable of existence apart from their wholes. So when Aristotle claims in 1a24-5 that inherent properties lack the separation which parts possess, he is claiming that they cannot exist independently from that in which they inhere. The question at hand, then, is: is Devereux right that the Aristotle of the Categories held that parts are substances? He (1992: 120) cites several passages as evidence for this claim. But I find that no passage convincingly supports Devereux's view. Consider 8b15-21:

But as for a head or a hand or any such substance, it is possible to know it--what it itself is--definitely, without necessarily knowing definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of. For whose this head is, or whose the hand, it is not necessary to know definitely. So these would not be relatives. And if they are not relatives it would be true to say that no substance is a relative.

Devereux takes this passage to be claiming that heads and hands are substances. But the passage can be read as making one of two weaker claims. It may be noting that parts are thought by some to be substances. The argument, on this reading, is: if parts, which are controversially claimed by some to be substances, are not relatives, then a fortiori things which are uncontroversially substances are not relatives. Alternatively, the passage might be claiming that a head or a hand is homonymously a substance. Of course, a body part has a semblance of substantiality: it is enformed matter. On this reading, the argument is: if parts, which are merely homonymously substances, are not relatives, then a fortiori things which are unequivocally substances are not relatives. At very least, we are not compelled to read the passage as claiming that parts are, strictly and truly speaking, substances.

The issue of mereology and substance in Aristotle is too complex to cover adequately here. But I see no compelling reason to believe that the Aristotle of the Categories holds that parts are substances. Moreover, even if he did, this is a substantial thesis (no pun intended)—it would serve Aristotle's purpose at the beginning of the Categories better to draw not on his technical vocabulary and controversial views but on uncontroversial and intuitive notions, not on a claim that parts possess ontological independence but just on the ordinary observation that physical parts are severable. This, then, strikes me as the most natural and least contentious reading of 1a24-5. The target notion of being in a subject is distinguished from the sense in which a part is in a whole. For, unlike physical parts, properties cannot be severed from what they are in.
I’ll conclude. We’ve rehearsed a debate on whether or not nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent properties. If my reading is correct, there is the following disappointing consequence. The passages 1a24-5 and 2a34-b7 give us no reason to prefer one view over the other. Indeed, when the false assumption of the debate, that separation is a capacity for independent existence, is exposed, the debated interpretation of these passages can be seen as not germane to the issue. A property which inheres in an individual subject cannot be separated—that is to say, severed—from its subject: but this entails neither that the property is recurrent nor that it’s nonrecurrent. For neither a recurrent property—being pale, say—nor a nonrecurrent property—being my pale, say—can be severed from me. So, if we are to give an account of nonsubstantial individuals in Aristotle, we need to look elsewhere.16, 17

WORKS CITED


1 Ackrill’s (1963: 4) translation.
2 Cf. Ross 1924/53: 24, nb 1; Jones 1949: 152-70; Anscombe 7-10.
3 Frede (1987: 89) makes the same point.
4 Ackrill’s comments, quoted above, are confused on another point. Aristotle’s claim is not that ‘because colour is in body, colour is in an individual body.’ His claim is that color is in body just in case color is in at least one individual body.
5 Of Owen’s three other objections, some have been adequately met by Allen (1969) and other authors. (1) Owen (1965: 101) argues that (A) makes all nonsubstances relative. Allen (1969: 33-4) rightly responds
that (A) only makes all non-substances dependent, a syncategorematic notion, not relative, a categorical notion.

(2) Owen (1965: 101) argues that (A) entails a 'paradox of implication': since it is not pink, say, which is in Socrates but Socrates's pink, 'The colour in Socrates's body is pink' is ill-formed. Allen (1969: 34) responds that 'The colour in Socrates's body is Socrates's pink' is an identity statement; 'The colour in Socrates's body is pink' is a well-formed, true predicative statement. Moravcsik (1967: 87) responds similarly.

(3) Owen (1965: 102) claims that (A) precludes asserting that two things have the same particular size. Allen (1969: 34 n. 6) responds that "'a particular size' is ambiguous as between a particular instance of size (which no two things can share) and a particular species of size (which many things can share)."

6 In addition to authors mentioned in the text, supporters of the view that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties include Devereux (1992) and Wedin (1993). Supporters of the view that nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent properties include Hetherinton (1984), Gill (1984), Furth (1988) and Matthews (1989 and 1991).


8 Legein is often used to introduce a sense or common opinion. For an example of a clarification use, see APr A1 24b20-2. Here the indirect speech clauses with lego clarify the sense of the to tauta einaí proviso in the definition of a syllogism. I know of no example where 'I mean' clearly introduces a definition.

9 But not always; at MA 703b21-22, Aristotle also asserts that the parts of animals are themselves, in a sense, separate animals (hósper zōon kechórismenon), since each contains vital moisture.

10 Severance might be thought of as local separation, defined at Phys. 226b21-3; cf. Meta. 1068b26; distinguished from temporal and definitional separation at 1016b2-3; distinguished from separation in form and in thought at 1052b17; ascribed to distant friends at EN 1157b8 and implicitly at 1159a5; ascribed to the solitary man at EE 1245a14, 46a4, a10; local separation denied of matter GC 320b24.

11 See Phys. 185a31-2, Meta. 1029a27-8, 40b28, 70b36, 86b17 ff., 87a23.


13 Let me make an aside on the kind of separation which Aristotle at least sometimes denies of parts. I agree with Devereaux that the relevant notion of separation is the separation which Aristotle ascribes to substances. However, were this notion a capacity for independent existence, as the orthodoxy has it, then Aristotle's thesis would be the absurd claim that parts do not even exist when severed from the whole. One might respond that parts do not exist as parts when severed. But this is only to concede that the inseparability of parts does not primarily concern mere existence. In my view, the claim that substances are separate is the claim that substances have the ontological status of beings independently of standing in a relation to something else. Nonsubstances, on the other hand, are inseparable from substances since they depend on inhering in or being said of substances for their ontological status. I argue for these claims in my "Ontological Independence in Aristotle", forthcoming.

14 Consider another passage, 3a29-32: "We need not be disturbed by any fear that we may be forced to say that the parts of a substance, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not substances. For when we spoke of things in a subject we did not mean things belonging in something as parts." Again, this passage only requires that parts are homonymously substances. The worry is that we might conclude that parts are in no way substances, not even homonymously, not that they are not, strictly speaking, substances.

Other passages cited by Devereaux include 298a29-32: "As substances I class the simple bodies--fire, earth, and the other terms of the series--and all things composed of them; for example, the heaven as a whole and its parts, animals, again, and plants and their parts." But this passage doesn't classify the parts of plants and animals as themselves substances but contrasts organic substances, articulated with parts, with the simple elemental bodies. Devereux also cites 818b5-8, but the work containing this passage is spurious.

15 Frede (1987, 61) views the nonmereological condition as denying that inherent properties are definitional parts. Again, I find this an overly theory laden reading. If we can provide an account which doesn't require the beginning of the Categories to presuppose so much Aristotelian technology, then so much the better.

16 Indeed, the interpretation of inherence is not quite the right focus for the issue of nonsubstantial individuals, since the property of inhering in a subject is not unique to the class: nonsubstantial universals
also inhere in a subject. For this reason, the relative neglect, in the literature on this issue, of Jones 1972 and 1974 is regrettable. Jones follows Aristotle's gloss, at 1b6-7, 3b12 and 4a10-21, on 'individual' as 'what is one in number' to provide an account based on Meta. 1. Annas (1974) raises some 'queries' for this position—Aristotle never himself offers Jones' account of individuals and indeed seems to offer an alternative account at 1089b24-8—but neither of these problems are insurmountable.

17 Thanks to Sean Kelsey, Gavin Lawrence and Calvin Normore for discussion.