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SAGP SSIPS 2012 Abstracts

Anthony Preus

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The 30th annual joint meeting of *The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP)* with
The Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science (SSIPS)

Abstracts

Karl Aho, Baylor University,
karl_aho@baylor.edu

“Philosophy as Training for Death: The reflexivity of Socratic exhortation in the *Phaedo*”

After telling his companions what he has heard about the afterlife, Socrates says “a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale.” (*Phaedo* 114d). In this passage, Socrates does not merely advise his companions to tell stories—he includes himself, a man, within the scope of this claim. So Socrates reaches his famously positive view of the afterlife (at least in part) through his practice of telling stories about the afterlife. In other words, since Socrates tells us that philosophy is training for death (*Phaedo* 67e), we should view the philosophizing that Socrates does in the *Phaedo* as his own preparation for death. In this paper, I argue that we should view Socrates’ claims about philosophy as training for death as reflexive, i.e. applying to himself in addition to his interlocutors. Socrates is not a fully-prepared philosopher instructing his followers. Instead, he is trying to prepare himself for death through exhorting his companions to prepare themselves. Some readers of Plato might find this view shocking, particularly given the standard view that Socrates is Plato’s moral exemplar and the paradigmatic figure of the wise philosopher.

To defend my thesis, I will first argue—against the standard reading of the *Phaedo*—that Plato’s character Socrates needs to prepare for death. Second, I will show how Socrates prepares himself for death by discussing Socrates’s conversation and storytelling in the dialogue as a spiritual exercise—of the sort discussed by Pierre Hadot—that helps him prepare for his own death. I conclude that in the *Phaedo* Socrates persuades himself to be cheerful about death and justifiably hopeful for the afterlife through his dialogue with others.

Doug Al-Maini, St. Francis Xavier University,
dalmaini@stfx.ca

“Happiness After Death in the *Nicomachean Ethics*”

Early in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle takes up the topic of the happiness of the dead, wondering if this happiness is changeable. Ultimately Aristotle concludes that in fact posthumous events can have affect happiness, but not so much as to make us change our assessment of the dead from happy to unhappy or vice versa. But are these two claims in fact compatible? For it would seem to be true that either posthumous events do affect happiness and so at least in principle ought to be able to make a happy person unhappy, or posthumous events cannot make a happy person unhappy and so are not really able to affect happiness. This paper aims at showing how Aristotle releases the tension between these two claims.

Ahmed Alwishah, Pitzer Colleges,
aalwisha@pitzer.edu

“Avicenna on Animals self-Awareness”

By and large, the writings of medieval and early modern philosophers, Descartes in particular, suggest two things concerning the Animals self-Awareness: (a) the human beings are the only conscious being in this world, and (b) animals lack thought, or even, as some believe, the most primitive sense of cognition, that is, self-awareness. In a number of places in his works Avicenna investigates this subject both independently and in relation to the self-awareness of humans. In dealing with the question of whether animals are aware of themselves, Avicenna explicitly asserts that animals do possess the capacity to be aware of themselves. In his paper I will first show how Avicenna justifies this claim by appealing to his doctrine of the internal senses, and especially to the faculty of estimation. Second examine his view that the concomitant relation between the existence of the self and self-awareness is not peculiar only to human beings; rather it can also be attributed to animals.

James Ambury, Saint Michael's College,
jamesmambury@gmail.com

“Dialectic as Care of the Soul”

This paper interrogates Plato's conception of dialectic and asks the question, what is it about dialectic that enables human beings to know? Throughout the Platonic corpus, dialectic is variously defined as simple question and answer, the ascension from hypotheses to first principles, and also as the method of collection and division. No matter the specific definition, dialectic is the process by which Forms are disclosed to interlocutors engaged in philosophical discussion. Typical accounts of dialectic treat the process or method of dialectic in terms of what is being said by the interlocutors about an assortment of philosophical issues rather than attending to the effect dialectic has on the character of the interlocutor himself. In my paper I argue that dialectic elicits a fundamental change in the soul of the interlocutor that thereby actualizes the inherent potential of the soul to grasp philosophical truth. Dialectic stabilizes the soul and orients it towards the intelligible realm of the Forms, to which it has a natural affinity. Therefore, while it is true that the dialectical process discloses Forms to the interlocutor, it is only because it is at the same time the proper care of the soul or the likening of the soul to the object of knowledge that dialectic can accomplish its noetic revelation. A sustained vision of formal reality presupposes a conversion of or transformation in the character of the interlocutor through dialectical question and answer.

Carolina Araujo, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro,
correio.carolina.araujo@gmail.com

“Crafts in the Argument with Polemarchus: A Reading of *Republic 1*”

The relationship between moral knowledge and craft (*technê*) is a common topos of the Platonic dialogues. However, the expression often used to name it, “craft analogy”, tempts us to fall into the error of assuming an interpretation for which the evidence is far from clear in the texts. Moreover, even if the actual state of the question discusses the extent of Plato's commitment to a moral education modeled on the crafts – a discussion ranging from the view that Plato defends a technical model for virtue to the view that he attacks it as a sophistic method of teaching, with interpretations that would classify the dialogues chronologically in accordance to their presentation of crafts ranging somewhere in between –, what seems completely absent from the debate is the question of whether this is actually the purpose of the arguments we find in *Republic 1*.

What I intend to show in this paper is how the first book of the *Republic* presents crafts not as a single model, but as a variety of kinds described according to the categories of restitution, adequacy, production, community, maintenance and education. This diversity of procedures is shown not in order to describe an epistemic model, but to allow Socrates to demonstrate their necessary interconnection within a communitarian craft, one of the models described, that will serve as a primary approach to politics.

Given that the definition of community is the main point to be sustained by the argument, the conclusion will be that the relation of the crafts to justice is not an analogical one and the argument is not an elenctic one resulting in aporia. On the contrary, the argument is inductive, inferring from the relationship of crafts among themselves a notion of justice as the principle that enables a city to be founded, a notion that will be resumed in books two (374a4-6) and four (433a1-4). As a consequence, this reading will contribute to an interpretation of the first book as a prelude to the work as a whole, inasmuch as it presents the community as a requirement for moral knowledge, thus establishing the basis upon which the argument for the philosopher-king will be built.

Kelly Arenson, Duquesne University,
arenson.k@gmail.com

“Stealing the Wits of the Wise? The Lucid and the Drunk in *Nicomachean Ethics VII.3*”

In this paper I address a difficulty faced by a prominent interpretation of Aristotle’s account of akrasia in *Nicomachean Ethics VII.3* in which the akratic is aware of precisely what he ought not do: if the akratic is lucid in this way, how can we make sense of Aristotle’s analogues of the akratic, namely, the drunk, madman, and sleeper, who are normally cognitively impaired in ways the lucid akratic is not? I suggest that Aristotle may be describing two kinds of akrasia in VII.3, a lucid and a non-lucid variety, and the analogues are meant to typify only the latter. Thus, as parallels of the lucid akratic the analogues do not fall short since they are not meant as such in the first place.

Anne Ashbaugh, Towson University and Rutgers University,
ashbaugh@rci.rutgers.edu

“Demonic Virtue”

In Plato’s dialogues Socrates claims that he knows when he is acting correctly by the simple fact that his inner demon has not nay-said the action (e.g., Phdr 242b-c, *Apology* 31d). Among the many difficulties that Socrates’ claim presents for the life of reason, two stand out: (1) The contradiction between the apparent control that a demonic voice exercises over a moral agent in view of the need for said agent to choose the good rationally, and (2) The potentially pathological state which the hearing of such voices signals. Regarding the first, given that the Platonic dialogues appear to endorse an ethics based on autonomous action, what are we to make of this compelling voice taken by commentators to be an other, a kind of internal oracle that directly touches Socrates but is not part of Socrates’ self? Is the demon inconsistent with a good life reliant on knowledge and an examined life? Can there be such a

thing as demonic virtue? That is, can Socrates consistently admit a demon-guided virtue that provokes and promotes human rectitude? Regarding the second difficulty, are we to admit that philosophy, at least as practiced by Socrates in the dialogues, depends on a pathological state that risks the proper functioning of reason? This became an issue for Plutarch and for all thinkers that took seriously the comments about Socrates' demon. Plutarch, in fact, goes out of the way to remove all suspicion of pathology from Socrates' experience by arguing that having no message in particular, the voice was a gentle divine prodding particularly suited to guide a soul so gifted that an almost imperceptible touch sufficed (*De genio Socratis*, 588 e ff). Olympiodorus, in turn, sought to deny that the demon spoke at all, suggesting instead that Socrates received an illumination that reached the organ of hearing (*Commentary on the First Acibiades of Plato*, 16). The two difficulties concerning Socrates' inner voice, one moral the other psychological, threaten the primacy of reason. In this paper, I examine these two aspects of Socrates' demon in light of the relevant commentaries and I advance an alternate reading based on an *analysis* of clues offered by the dialogues.

Emily Austin, Wake Forest University,
austinea@wfu.edu
"Plato on Grief as a Mental Disorder"

Plato's *Republic* does not directly address the question of whether the philosopher grieves. Instead, Socrates' two substantive discussions of the moral psychology and appropriateness of grief concern the "decent man" (ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ, 3: 387d5), who finds it "impossible" (ἀδύνατον, 10:603e8) not to grieve the death of his child. He desires to grieve, but he restrains himself in public out of a sense of shame. In private, however, he occasionally gives in to the part of him that desires to grieve "by nature" (φύσει, 10: 606a5). The fact that the decent person manifests a conflicted soul has led commentators to assume that he is deficiently virtuous, since they think that a virtuous soul would not resist itself or give in to negative emotions. According to this 'Stoic Reading,' the decent person makes a mistake about what is valuable, so that his desire to grieve manifests an error in judgment or perception (see Lorenz (2006, 62-3), Moss (2008, 54-5), Nussbaum (1984, 70-1)). Given Socrates's derogatory comments about grief and his wholesale censorship of its artistic representation, one might be tempted to accept the Stoic reading and conclude that the *Republic* advocates eliminating grief.

In this paper, however, I contest the Stoic Reading and offer a defense of what I will call the 'Conflict Reading'. I build a textual case that suggests that the decent person's restrained grieving is the fitting and appropriate response to a legitimate misfortune. Thus, psychic tension and moderate satisfaction of a desire to grieve can be both warranted and admirable. By 'fit,' I mean that the desire to grieve tracks an objective harm (e.g., the death of a child), and by 'appropriate,' I mean that the decent person controls and expresses his grief to the benefit of his overall psychological health. Taking the death of a child as my paradigm case, I show that Plato's dialogues consistently maintain that children, at least the good ones, are valuable external goods and that a child's death objectively harms her parents. The desire to produce children and other immortal goods (e.g., laws and philosophical works) is both "natural" and "divine" (*Symp.* 208b, *Lg.* 4: 721b-d), and failure on this front is a harm fitting of grief (*Menex.* 247c-248a). Nevertheless, overriding psychological and political considerations shape and limit the

appropriate expressions of grief. When Socrates provides reasons against indulging in grief, then, he intends to guide the appropriate expression of a fitting desire to grieve, not to eliminate or altogether impugn the desire to grieve itself. In short, the death of a child is a true misfortune.

Allan Back, Kutztown University,
fack@kutztown.edu
"Aristotle's Buddhism"

Much of Aristotle's Metaphysical vocabulary has a relational structure. The form is the form of some matter; a cause is a cause of the caused; a principle is a principle of something; a predicate is a predicate of a subject; an actuality is the actuality of some potentiality; even an essence is the essence of some being. All such statements exhibit the type of conversion taken by Aristotle in the *Categories* to be symptomatic of *relata*: the form is the form of some matter; therefore matter is matter for some form etc. On his own theory such relational items cannot exist in their own right or persist through change of their attributes: they are "least of all substances". Like things in the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination, their existence is dependent upon their correlatives.

Given Aristotle's penchant for applying his theory of categories in his ontological studies, would he not have noted the relational structure of his Metaphysical vocabulary? Indeed, as he himself suggests, the fact that individual substances are ultimate subjects having no taint of the relational strengthens their claim of being basic. Here I propose to show how Aristotle's own doctrine of relations justifies his claim that constituents of individual substances like its form cannot be substances.

Jesse Bailey, Sacred Heart University,
baileyj34@sacredheart.edu
"Odysseus Smote His Breast' Internal Conflict and Ethical Living in the *Republic* and *Phaedo*"

In this paper, I examine the way Socrates deploys the same Homeric quote ("Odysseus smote his breast . . .") in both the *Republic* and the *Phaedo* to explain the fragmentation of the self *in radically different ways*. The multiplicity and inner conflict of the self, marked by cognitive dissonance and a disharmonious mode of living, is addressed in many Platonic dialogues. Most notably, of course, in the *Republic* Socrates argues that the conflict within the self is 'mirrored' by the conflict between classes in society. In the *Phaedo*, political conflict is also said to arise from within the multiplicity of the self; specifically, Socrates says there that all "wars and factions and conflict" arise from conflict between soul and body (*Phaedo* 66c). In this paper, I examine the significance of the fact that this quote is used by Socrates as support for an argument for a unified soul (in opposition to the body) in the *Phaedo*, on the one hand, and as support for a *fragmented* soul in opposition to *itself* in the *Republic*, on the other.

Ronald Baumiller, University of Western Ontario,
rbaumill@uwo.ca
"What Does Flux Have to do With Naming?"

The Cratylus can easily be considered Plato's most comprehensive work on naming and etymology. Yet there is a further topic in the dialogue which has not received as much attention as it merits, namely, flux. This paper will first draw an original distinction between the types of flux Plato that recognized. It then will employ this distinction in order to obtain a clear notion of what flux is and, through textual evidence, determine the type of flux with which the *Cratylus* is concerned. In doing so, the role of flux in Plato's *Cratylus* will become apparent. This paper will show that the *Cratylus* was not only concerned with a particular type of flux, but this type of flux has its own unique threat to naming and helps us to better understand the dialogue.

Alina Beary, Baylor University,
alina_beary@baylor.edu
"Socratic Piety in *Apology* and *Phaedo*"

Most scholars that investigate the discussion of piety in *Euthyphro* believe that ultimately Socrates wants to understand piety as a part of justice. Though varied in their accounts of the way in which piety relates to justice, scholars are mostly united in shifting the focus away from the wishes of the gods and toward some virtue that a person might possess. In "Euthyphro's Thesis Revisited," Panos Dimas challenges this trend by drawing attention to Socrates' eagerness at the end of the dialogue to re-examine Euthyphro's second definition. Dimas suggests that a person's desire to please the gods constitutes an indispensable part of piety. I argue that the picture of Socrates' personal piety, presented in *Apology* and *Phaedo*, sheds additional light on the discussion in "Euthyphro." It supports Dimas' reading over those readings that seek to ground piety exclusively in the notion of justice. Socratic piety in *Apology*, and especially in *Phaedo*, cannot be explained without a reference to the wishes and desires of the gods.

Martha Beck, Lyon College,
martha.beck@lyon.edu
"The Veneer of Barbarism: Ignoring the Insights of Ancient Greek Wisdom in the Era of Globalization"

This paper tries to show that the insights of Ancient Greek wisdom are still relevant today and can provide guidance as we move toward what seems to be a historically unique complex network of interrelationships between human beings all over the world and between human society and the natural world. The paper focuses on only two of the deities of the Olympian pantheon: Aphrodite, goddess of beauty and Ares, god of war. The paper discusses the violent and unnatural birth of Aphrodite, the extreme attraction they feel toward each other, and their relationships to the other deities and to human beings. Like all the other deities, each of them can be either sacred and motivate human beings to noble achievements or they can drive individuals and societies to self-destruction.

The story of the Trojan War is the story of two cities in conflict because they reject wisdom as their cultural bedrock. Instead, Troy is the city dedicated to pleasure and wealth, Aphrodite, leading to a

young Prince whose drive for personal pleasure leads to the complete destruction of his city. The Achaeans, although they have a just cause, are really motivated by the desire for power, Ares, leading the bravest young man into a power struggle with the “ruler” in charge and extending the war for ten years.

The paper then applies these stories, these cautionary tales, to the way international development is taking place today. At the moment, development is focused disproportionately on economic growth. We seem to be creating a world of consumers, people conditioned to believe that working for a higher and higher material standard of living will lead to the greatest good for all. In other words, we are worshipping Aphrodite and not noticing that she will always bring Ares with her: faction and conflict within every nation and between nations. Individually and collectively, we are making the same mistakes, the mistakes the Greeks thought were the most obvious.

The paper also suggests that all aspects of Ancient Greek culture—institutions, festivals, literature, etc.—are structured to try and inspire as many people as possible to recognize the importance of dedicating themselves to the love of wisdom throughout their lives and showing them the great destruction that occurs when they choose pleasure/wealth or power/glory instead. In spite of the historical fact that Ancient Greek culture was used over and over to justify the greatest destruction and injustices of the colonial era, a fair understanding of the culture shows that the founders and those who carried the vision of a city governed by Athena, the goddess of justice and wisdom, can provide insights and ideas for the development of international culture today.

Aryya Bhattacharya, Vivekananda College For Women, Calcutta University,
aryyab@gmail.com
“I-consciousness and Cosmogony--the Unique Approach of Trika Philosophy”

Kashmir Saivism (also known as Trika Philosophy) is a rather neglected branch of Indian Philosophy. References to Saivism based on Agamas can be dated back to the era of the Mahabharata. But it was only later around the 11th century that it reached its pinnacle of glory under Abhinavagupta (1014 A.D.), the great Saivist of Kashmir. His theory marks a confluence of religion, philosophy and the mystical spiritual thoughts of the Sakti oriented Kaula, Krama and Kalinya schools. The Trika philosophy encompasses cosmogony, epistemology, metaphysics, the theory of liberation etc. all of which are related to the Supreme consciousness, which in reality is nothing but the I-consciousness at its fullest. An important point of focus is the area of the relation between the World, Parama Siva (the Supreme Consciousness) and Sakti (Supreme awareness and freedom).

In the history of philosophy Dualism (eg. Samkhya) and Monism (eg, Vedanta), or Realism and Idealism have always stood in opposition to each other. Any attempts at reconciliation, as far as philosophical systems are concerned, either proved to be futile or resulted in giving importance to one over another. Abhinavagupta is perhaps the only Indian philosopher who has pioneered a theory of metaphysics and

cosmogony that is based on the assumption of 'Identity in Difference' within a set up of Realistic Idealism

In this article the author has established the logic behind such assumption and shown how the theory of Abhnavagupta is different from Samkhya and Vedanta systems, yet an amalgamation of .all the two, thereby being a thesis which is both unique and exclusive as a school of thought.

Ruby Blondell, University of Washington,
blondell@uw.edu
"Gorgias: The Founding Father of Feminism"

Plato's Socrates famously argues that a woman's psyche is not intrinsically different from a man's (Rep. 454c). In this paper I shall argue that this radical claim was anticipated by the sophist *Gorgias* in his Encomium of Helen.

Gorgias argues that Helen is not guilty of eloping with Paris because she was either abducted by violence or overcome by the power of the gods, persuasion, or eros, all of which render her a helpless object and therefore blameless (Helen 6, 20). The latter two forces, which occupy the bulk of the speech, function through their impact on the psyche. The argument seems, superficially, to rely on conventional categories of Greek gender ideology that draw a bright line between male and female, identifying agency with the male and passivity with the female, a line grounded partly in the perception of the female psyche as more susceptible to emotion than the male. Yet *Gorgias* draws his examples from distinctively masculine spheres of activity, notably the battlefield (16-17), public speeches (13), and intellectual life (13). His argument is thus based on the idea that all people, male and female, are subject to the same kinds of forces and have souls that react in similar ways. It follows that if Helen is a mere passive object, devoid of any responsibility for her actions, the same is true of men--even men engaged in the most significant defining activities of masculinity.

As a defense of Helen this argument is, *Gorgias* tells us, a "plaything" or joke (21). Yet he leaves us with a challenge that escape the confines of his joke. Given his account of human psychology, which he presents as grounded in the observation of facts, is there really any difference between the female psyche and the male?

Geoffrey Bowe, İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, İstanbul, Turkey
geoffrey.bowe@gmail.com
"Neoplatonism, and the Emanation Cosmogony of Avicenna"

This study traces the significance of Neoplatonic cosmogony of emanation in Islamic philosophy, with a special focus on the harmony between the theory of emanation in Avicenna and the Muslim nature mysticism of unity of being (*al-Wahadat al-Wujud*).

Geoff Bowe, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul,
geoffrey.bowe@gmail.com

“Organic Imitation vs Neoplatonic Emanation”

This paper argues that Aristotle's metaphysical outlook presents us with as much of an imitative system, as does Plato's. In what I call a system of organic imitation in Aristotle, being understood *pros hen* equivocally is a manifestation of an unchangeable exemplar, in an organic cosmos. In other words Aristotle's solution to the diaspora of forms and particulars still leaves the question of why being does what it does unanswered. Plotinus' attempt to provide a more fluid account of the relationship of being to an unchangeable unity under the rubric of Platonic metaphysics attempts to resolve lacunae engendered by Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. I argue that Plotinus sees the value of Aristotle's organic imitation but also the explanatory lacuna at a number of levels, and this introduces an emanative metaphysics that provides a path to and from the source of being that is to have a profound affect on religious philosophy and mysticism.

Luigi Bradizza, Salve Regina University,
luigi.bradizza@salve.edu

“Father to Son: Cyrus's Wordly Education in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*”

In Book I, chapter 6 of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, Cambyses offers a political education to his son Cyrus. That education aims Cyrus at worldly success, understood as ruling over an empire. Indeed, Cambyses would have Cyrus subordinate both human and divine things to the satisfaction of his imperial ambitions. This subordination requires the use of men, nations, and gods as a means to Cyrus's personal, worldly ends. Cyrus is thus brought to view the cosmos in reductionistic terms, and he learns to appeal to the lower parts of men's souls. It is the argument of this paper that, while the education Cyrus receives from his father is undoubtedly effective in gaining Cyrus an empire, it does so at the cost of a fuller capacity for human flourishing in both Cyrus and his imperial subjects. Cambyses's education of Cyrus thus points to a tragic disjunction between politics and higher pursuits (which include religion, philosophy, and art), with success in one coming at the cost of success in the other.

David Buchta, Brown University, david_buchta@brown.edu.

“Is Postulation (Arthāpatti) Distinct from Inference (Anumāna)?”

Some schools of Classical Indian Philosophy, including Advaita Vedānta, identify Postulation (Arthāpatti) as a distinct Means of Knowing (Pramāṇa), while other schools, including Nyāya, account for the same type of Knowing (Pramiti) through a subtype of Inference (Anumāna), specifically Inference with Only Negative Concomitance (Kevala-vyatireki Anumāna). This paper will consider the issues involved in this disagreement, particularly focusing on two late (17th century) contributions which have the benefit of summarizing long developed positions: Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra's Vedāntaparibhāṣā and Annambhaṭṭa's

Tarkasaṅgraha. Following Adhvarīndra, I will argue for the distinct identification of Postulation, based on the methodological difference between it and other forms of Inference. Further, I will argue that Nyāya's use of Inference with Only Negative Concomitance creates epistemological problems, forcing the least principled component in their identification of potential logical fallacies, namely that an Inferential Reason (Hetu) may be Overridden (Bādhita).

David Butorac, Fatih University, Istanbul

"The way up and down are not one and the same. Systematic problems of Procline science"

With both the Iamblichean theory of the descended soul incorporated into his system and the continued integration of Aristotelian science, Proclus must develop a system wherein the finite human perspective and the demand for a superior perspective in beginning from a higher and more universal principle are reconciled. However, I argue that this creates tremendous problems and ambiguities, as for instance when he elaborates how the soul acts or is when it knows different levels of causes. The soul is dianoetic and yet it must have some sort of noesis qualitatively different from dianoia with higher causes, but what would this look like? Scholars have not yet clarified this adequately. This paper will outline the integration of Aristotle in Syrianus and Proclus, it will then look at central texts on the soul's dianoia and noesis, and finally it will look back from Damascius to evaluate these from a critical yet Neoplatonic standpoint.

Eva Cadavid, Centre College,
eva.cadavid@centre.edu

"On Mathematical definitions, signification, and mathematical objects"

In *Posterior Analytics II.10*, Aristotle presents us with a discussion of definition and outlines different types of definitions, although how many is debatable and not relevant to this paper. It is clear from his discussion that he distinguishes between signifying (that it is) and explanation (why it is) definitions. He offers the definition of a mathematical object as an example of a signifying definition. Mathematical definitions give us genus and differentia. The puzzle is whether mathematical definitions can also be full explanations. If so, what sort of explanation do they give? Do they offer more than just an explanation of what it is to be a mathematical or the internal implication of a signifying definition?

An additional puzzle is raised when we consider that mathematical objects are separable in thought and that there is a type of fictionalism that mathematicians engage in when they define and postulate the objects of their science. The mathematician must not only define what a point is, but she must posit its existence. What do mathematical definitions signify independently of the mathematician?

In this paper, I explore mathematical definitions as signifying definitions and argue that they can also be explanations. Charles, Bayer, and others have argued for a unified account of definition that can also be applicable to mathematical definitions even if Aristotelian mathematics involves the use of fictions.

Silvia Carli, Skidmore College,
silvia.2016@yahoo.com
"Aristotle on the Temporality of Human Life"

According to the definition of the *Physics*, time is "the number of movement (kinesis) with respect to the before and after" (Phys. 10.11.219b2). Kinesis is a process of "becoming other" whose parts are different from one another and from the whole movement (NE 10. 1174a20-27). As the actuality of the potential qua potential (Phys. 3.2.201a10-11), moreover, it is always incomplete (Phys. 3.2.201b31-32; Met. 9.6.1048b29; NE. 10.4.1174b2), as the attainment of its telos is the cessation of the movement. To the extent that human beings spend their lives in the rapidly changing world of human affairs, and transform their surroundings and their relations to others through their actions, their life can be said to be measured by the time of the *Physics*. On the other hand, once an agent has acquired a stable character, acting is the actualization (energeia) of the lasting dispositions (hexeis) that constitute her ethical nature. Aristotle distinguishes energeia from kinesis: unlike the latter, the former has its end in itself (Met.9.6.1048b22) and, rather than being a process of becoming other, is an activity in which the potential is preserved "by what is actual and is like it" (DA 2.5.417b3-4). In addition, it is complete at any and every time (NE 10.4.1174a15-18; b5). In a number of passages the philosopher indicates that the difference between kinesis and energeia manifests itself also as a difference in their temporal structure. He writes, for instance, that "it is not true that at the same time a thing . . . is being moved and has been moved" (Met. 9.6.1048b30-32). Given that "what is being moved is different from what has been moved, and what is moving from what has moved" (Met. 9.6.1048b33-33), its duration is measured by successive and different "now" (nun). By contrast, we can say that "at the same time (ama) we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy" (Met. 9.6.1048b25-26).

The goal of this paper is to analyze the nature of "the time of energeia," and to explore the relation between the two dimensions of the temporality of the good life.

Rose Cherubin, George Mason University,
rcherubi@gmu.edu
"What Is Not Accomplished: Inquiry, Explanation, and Fifth-Century Responses to Parmenides"

Did any thinkers in the generation after Parmenides respond to his concerns regarding the requisites of inquiry and their relationship to familiar opinions about the way what is is?

I argue that at least some later fifth-century philosophical work shows awareness of these concerns. The extant fragments of that work provide evidence that responses to Parmenides were not limited to support for, dismissal of, or argument against monism; and evidence that his influence went beyond a tendency to incorporate argument in philosophy, and beyond the adoption of the principle that nothing comes from nothing.

Zeno's subject matter and extensive use of argument clearly reflect Parmenidean influence, as is generally acknowledged; less studied but perhaps equally important is the absence of direct ontological claims (in the sense of claims about what is) in his fragments. This absence appears more sharply when contrasted with Melissus' explicit and emphatic conclusions about the nature of what is.

Anaxagoras and the Atomists are also sensitive to Parmenides' caveats, whether or not they take them to be decisive. Their arguments against, and alternatives to, the goddess's assertions about how what-is must be understood on a viable road of inquiry reflect that they take her arguments seriously. I suggest that their focus is not only on her claims about the nature of what is, but also on the relationship between claims about what is and the possibility of explanation.

Scott Cleveland, Baylor University,
scott_cleveland@baylor.edu

"Aristotle's Account of Courage: Why Courage is More than Mere Structural Excellence"

Sometimes a distinction is drawn between two kinds of moral virtue. The putative distinguishing feature is that some virtues require action in accord with good reasons and some do not. The latter are merely structural, agential excellences utilizable for any task the agent chooses, even unjust actions. The merely agential excellence kind of virtue has been called structural virtue, executive virtue, or virtue of will-power. The kind of virtue that requires good reason has been called motivational virtue, substantive virtue, or virtue of attachment. Courage is supposed to be a prime example of a structural virtue. Justice is supposed to be a prime example of a motivational virtue.

I set out and defend Aristotle's account of courage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and argue that it provides reason to reject that courage is a structural virtue. I summarize Aristotle's courage as firmness of mind in apt pursuit, with fitting fear and fitting confidence, of a difficult good. I argue that courage has three major parts: a skill (know-how) part, an emotional part, and a reasons part. The first part includes conceptual, perceptual and self-management skills. The second involves the fit between the agent's emotions of fear and confidence and the situation. The third involves the agent's reasons for action.

I defend Aristotle's view from the objection that it is too strong – that courage is essentially reducible to its skill components. This putative reducibility provides strong reason to suppose that courage is a structural virtue. I defend Aristotle's rejection of this reduction this by way of engaging a question discussed by contemporary moral philosophers: does a daring murderer act with courage? Those who answer 'no' to this question often cite that it is the murderer's bad reasons for action that prevent the act from counting as courageous. While I side with those who answer this question in the negative, I try to motivate another reason for this view on the basis of courage's requiring fear and confidence fit to the situation. It is the murderer's failure of emotional attunement with the situation that undermines the courageousness of his action, even despite his aptitude at the skill components of courage. For example, he fails to fittingly fear the corruption to his character the murder will cause. Finally, I conclude that Aristotle's account of courage favors rejecting the view that courage is a structural virtue.

Clinton Corcoran, High Point University,
ccorcora@highpoint.edu
"The *Menexenus*, Socrates, and the Battle of Arginusae"

The *Menexenus* presents some of the most complex tonal problems in the entire Platonic corpus. Charles Kahn calls the dialogue a "riddle," "for this little work is almost certainly the most enigmatic of all of Plato's writings." In the *Menexenus* misdirection, omission, euphemism, and misplaced emphasis seem to carry Socrates' revisionist history of Athens. As Stephen Salkever observes, "over half of the epitaphios in the *Menexenus* (239d1-46a3) is chock-full of errors, omissions, and hyperbole," yet, "even though the dialogue's opening and closing conversation are insistently playful and ironic, the speech also presents a picture of good Athenian citizenship that seems plausibly Platonic or Socratic." No line is perhaps more outrageous than when Socrates claims that Athens, by winning the battle of Arginusae (406BCE), "won not only that naval engagement, but also the rest of the war." The battle, the last great Athenian victory of the Peloponnesian War, represented the last occasion when peace with Sparta could have been achieved on favorable terms. Socrates' reasoning for claiming victory is "...that our city could never be defeated in war, not even by all mankind. And that belief was true. We were overcome by our own quarrels, not by other men; by them we remain undefeated to this day, but we conquered ourselves and suffered defeat at our own hands" (243 c-d). Those 'quarrels' again resurface in Plato's *Apology* at 32 a-e where Socrates recounts his involvement in the trial of the eight victorious Athenian generals who were accused of failing to recover the Athenian survivors and dead following the naval engagement. This paper explores the question of what, if any, sense can be made of Socrates' claim that by winning at Arginusae Athens won the Peloponnesian War.

Carlos Cortissoz, SUNY Binghamton,
ccortis1@binghamton.edu
"Psychology of the State. Plato, Virtue Politics and the Collective Mind"

Departing from Plato's so called "City-Soul Analogy" and contemporary discussions on group agency, my paper discusses two interconnected ideas. On the one hand, the conceptual possibility to conceive of a collective mind, bearer of genuinely collective mental states. There really are desires, beliefs, emotions, etc. that we hold as a group, are not reducible to a function of individual ones, and are to a certain extent unified. On the other hand, the idea that political communities are to be conceived of, as I argue Plato did, as complex fabrics of collective mental states and not as sets of conventional institutions. Justice is then not a virtue of interpersonal relationships (enforced upon individuals through institutional arrangements), but the fundamental virtue of a group agent. I argue that it is only under such an understanding of the state that virtue ethics can transcend the discourse of political virtues (an effect perhaps of its excessive Aristotelianism) and grow into a genuine virtue politics.

Anna Cremaldi, Appalachian State University,

cremaldiam@appstate.edu

“The Idea of the Entire Soul in *Nicomachean Ethics* I.13”

Aristotle’s reference in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to a passage in Plato’s *Charmides* raises a puzzle about the sense in which Aristotle views politics as a science. In this paper, I argue that the reference suggests that politics is scientific for Aristotle insofar as it investigates definitions in the manner outlined in the *Posterior Analytics*. Aristotle writes in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that “the student of politics must know somehow the facts of the soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes must know about the whole body also....” (I.13). This passage echoes a passage in Plato’s *Charmides* in which Socrates claims that one cannot have knowledge of the eye without knowledge of the body (156c; cf. *Phaedrus* 270c). In one sense, the passages express the same emphasis on knowing the ‘whole’: there can be no scientific knowledge of some entity without knowledge of the whole of which it is a part. But, the passages also appear to express importantly different points. Whereas the *Charmides* emphasizes comprehensive, philosophical knowledge of the human body for knowledge of the eye, it is not clear that Aristotle endorses an analogous view – namely, that comprehensive, philosophical knowledge of the soul is required for knowledge of virtue. After all, Aristotle’s account of the soul in NE I.13 is ‘inexact’ and suitable for exoteric presentation, according to his own assessment. If Aristotle endorses the *Charmides*’ emphasis on thorough knowledge of body as part of an account of the eye, why does he fail to provide a thorough account of the soul as part of his account of virtue? D.S. Hutchinson attempts to explain the omission as Aristotle’s deliberate attempt to distance his conception of politics as an inexact science from Plato’s conception of politics as an exact science. However, Hutchinson’s reading ignores the multiple senses in which Aristotle may have referred to knowledge of the ‘whole.’ In this paper, I argue for a different explanation. Aristotle’s brief statement about the soul in NE I.13 is part of the process of providing the most complete definition of virtue according to the standards for definition outlined in the *Posterior Analytics*. The upshot of my interpretation is that it shows that politics can be science in the sense that it investigates definitions.

Matthew Dasti, Bridgewater State University,
mdasti@bridgew.edu

“Is Yogic Experience a Subspecies of Perception?”

The Nyāya tradition of classical India is well-known for its various rational arguments for God’s existence. What is less explored, however, is the Nyāya claim that experiences of the sort reported by yogis—which are said to have entities like the deep self and God as their objects—are in fact instances of perception, a well-trusted and familiar knowledge-source. This paper will examine and unpack Nyāya arguments for the validity of “yogic perception” in the work of thinkers like Vātsyāyana (c. 450 CE), Uddyotakara (c. 600 CE), Jayanta (c. 875 CE) and Udayana (c. 975 CE). Having briefly looked at the broader conception of mysticism and yogic experience in Indian thought, we will consider Nyāya accounts of perception and the attempts of Naiyāyikas (Nyāya thinkers) to categorize such experience as a subspecies of perception, which involves what I call the “principled extension of knowledge sources.” Classical objections to such an extension will be considered along with contemporary analogues.

Charles DiSimone, Ludwig-Maximilians-University/Stanford University,
charlesdisimone@gmail.com

“Thus Have We Read: Untangling the Intertextuality in Mahāyāna Sūtra Literature”

The *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, or *Compendium of Training*, is a seventh century manual for would be Mahāyāna bodhisattvas written by the famed mahāyānika monk Śāntideva. To say that Śāntideva is the author is somewhat problematic as the several hundred page text is actually a compilation of selections from ninety-seven separate Mahāyāna works that Śāntideva edited around twenty-seven root kārikās, a form of verse where the author concisely states his ideological stance, into one coherent text with its own meaning and purpose quite distinct from the content and historical time of its component works. In this paper I will explore aspects of intertextuality in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. My purpose for examining these instances of intertextuality is twofold. First, by pointing out very similar passages from sūtras quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, I wish to perhaps shed some light on the textual production of early Mahāyāna sūtras. Second, by creating an archaeology of citational practice in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, I hope to create a starting point for future research which will decipher: why this text was created in its particular socio-historical milieu; what made this intertextual methodology so valuable to

Śāntideva as opposed to other, more traditional, methods of textual creation; and are various methods of reading the text more or less useful within the field of Buddhist Studies?

Charlene Elsby, McMaster University,
elsbyc@mcmaster.ca

“Fictional Entities in Aristotle: Truth as a Function of Combination”

In this paper I will examine the nature of combination in an attempt to identify what particular sort of combination is required for either a subject term or its referent (a thing) to have a truth-value. The problem can be summarized as that of locating where falsehood is introduced, i.e., whether an inexistent object itself may be described as false, or whether falsehood is introduced when we attempt to predicate anything of a subject term whose referent does not exist (in the sense implied in *De Interpretatione*, such that non-existent terms symbolize affections of the soul of which there is no likeness in the extramental realm). It might seem (as Carson notes) that a combination of concepts not corresponding to a combination of things would give rise to a false subject term; however, a fictional entity (such as the goat-stag) is stated in the *De Interpretatione* to have no truth value unless some predicate is added. The combination of subject and verb is, for this reason, stated to be the shortest form of discourse in Plato’s *Sophist*; whereas strings of nouns do not qualify, for they have no truth-value. The possibility of true and false singular terms also arises in the *Cratylus*; however, in this context, the possibility of false terms serves as the premise leading to a naturalistic theory of word meaning as its conclusion, a theory which Aristotle rejects. I will use these discussions to distinguish between combinations giving rise to a fictional entity and those having a truth-value.

I conclude that for Aristotle combination is a necessary rather than sufficient condition for attributing to something the quality of truth or falsity. Combinations in thought resulting in our having a concept of a fictional entity do not have a truth-value. Rather, whether something has a truth-value or not depends on what kinds of things are combined, and whereas Plato assumes having a truth-value is a quality necessary of any definable part of discourse, Aristotle distinguishes between things said and things having a truth value using the necessary condition of combination. In discussing the notion of an image in relation to its subject (the context in which the goat-stag arises in Plato's *Republic*, and an example of homonymy which Aristotle defines in the *Categories*), I conclude that Aristotle's notion of existence precludes attributing existence to the subject of an image (as well as a thought); that is, the fact that something is represented gives it no kind of existence. That something non-existent is represented leads to Aristotle to define the representation as a false, existent thing, and in this way the homonymy of an image and the thing it represents can be explained as the correspondence of the falsity of the representation to the non-existence of the subject.

Mark Erste, Jr., Franciscan University of Steubenville,
merstejr@gmail.com

"The Universal Psychology Underpinning the Educational Theory in Plato's *Republic*"

Although the theory of primary education in Plato's *Republic* focuses on the particular causal link between the ideal curriculum designed in Books II and III and the well-ordered soul, careful textual analysis suggests that this theory relies on a set of universal psychological insights into the link between education per se and the soul. Analysis of this link reveals that it can serve as the foundation for an expansion of Plato's theory to account for the effect of any type of primary education on the order of the soul. Such an expansion would take the connection between the well-ordered soul and the ideal curriculum and generalize it to include the connection between the different curricula and the corresponding orders of soul, whether the ideal order of Book IV or a deviant order from Books VIII or IX. The possibility of expansion, however, does not suggest that Plato explicitly held such a universal theory, except in its seed form. The development of these psychological insights and the expansion of Plato's theory would deepen our understanding of his philosophy of education by identifying the processes by which he sees education impacting the soul, politics, culture and the constitution of the state. Further, such an exposition will allow his educational principles to be applied to disordered souls, help explain his theory of censorship, and help establish the validity of his claims. I will begin to develop such a universal theory first by analyzing Plato's text to examine the kinds of educational influences he identifies. Next I will elucidate the two steps by which these influences affect the soul: the production of virtue and vice and the impact of these on the order of the soul. By these analyses, I will attempt to demonstrate that the psychology of the *Republic* supports the existence of a universal, causal link between educational influences and the order of the soul.

Mohsen Eslami, *United Nations*,

eslami_mohsen@yahoo.com>

“The Logic of Contemporary Shi`a Political Philosophy of ‘Legal Supremacy of the Judiciary’ in a Tripartite State”

Plato’s model of tripartite branches of government has been the basis of a number of modifications, notably John Locke’s doctrine of priority of the legislative branch to promote laissez faire capitalism. This study clarifies the premises and the logic of arguments proffered for the concept of modern Islamic *Republic* (as established in Iran and Afghanistan) and its variation of both Plato’s ancient political philosophy and the medieval theory of prophetic imagination in Avicenna, Maimonides and Averroes.

Christos Evangeliou, Towson University,
cevang@aol.com

“The Power of Eros: Can Love Overcome Death?”

In Plato’s *Symposium*, Socrates is represented as objecting to the five previous encomiasts of Eros, that they failed to reveal the truth about the nature and power of Love as a force of life.

The Platonic Socrates also claims that he is in a position to reveal to them the truth about Eros, since the wise Diotima had taught it to him previously. He proceeds to elaborate on the three possible ways in which Love can help mortal man to overcome the unavoidable Death, that is, by biological reproduction, cultural production, and self-perfection of the true lover of wisdom.

In this paper, we will consider each of these three alternative ways to immortality with emphasis on the third, in order to show that in this dialogue Plato did not lapse into skepticism, as it has been alleged, regarding the immortality of the soul. On the contrary, his presentation in this work strengthens his theory of self-knowledge, self-love, self-perfection and assimilation to God. A similar view is expressed also in the Indian conception of identification of Atman and Brahman.

Shane Ewegen, Stonehill College,
sewegen@stonehill.edu

“‘Of the Swans’: Socratic Music in the *Phaedo* and *Apology*”

During the final hours of his life Socrates tells a story about swans (oi kuknoi) (Phd. 84e-85b), claiming that they sing more beautifully as they get closer to death. However, Socrates does not merely evoke the figure of the swans—he identifies himself with them, claiming to share their prophetic knowledge of the future and to be a fellow servant to Apollo. Socrates—at least according to Socrates himself—is of the swans (ton kuknon).

I will offer an *analysis* of the role of the prophetic swan for the ancient Greeks in general (i.e., Aesop, Homer, et al). Then I will turn to an *analysis* of the precise character of Socrates’ self-identification with the swans in the *Phaedo*. Some outstanding scholarly work has already been done in indicating the

extent to which Socrates 'sings' throughout the course of the *Phaedo*. I would like to go further in this direction by examining the precise character of Socratic music in general in light of his self-identification with the swans. Broadly stated, Socratic music will be identified with a mode of speech that proceeds out of an awareness of human finitude and (Socratic) ignorance, as well as an awareness of the limits of human *logos*. Parallel to this awareness of finitude is an awareness of the gods (especially Apollo) whose very nature is such as to exceed our finitude and cast it into relief.

Following this analysis I will turn a Platonic text in which this music can be seen to operate: the *Apology*. From the beginning of the *Apology*, Socrates calls attention to his own mode of discourse (*legein*), claiming that it will not be of the same sort as his accusers': rather, his words will be 'spoken at random' and yet will precisely thereby be true (17c). I would like to suggest that Socrates' self-identification with the swans in the *Phaedo* can shed light on his mode of discourse operative within the *Apology*. In short, I will argue that the *logos* of the *Apology* is, no less than the *logos* of the *Phaedo*, a swan-song, one meant to underscore human finitude. Indeed, I will go so far as to suggest that there is something essentially swan-like about Socrates' philosophical practice in general, at least so far as this can be gleaned from the *Apology*.

Zoli Filotas, McGill University,
edwin.filotas@mail.mcgill.ca
"Aristotle on Kinds Community and Kinds of Rule"

In his discussions of asymmetrical friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (as well as the parallel passage in the *EE*), Aristotle writes that the forms of friendship in the family correspond to different constitutions—marriage, he says, is like aristocracy, fatherhood like monarchy, and so on. It is not, however, immediately obvious what the analogy with constitutions is supposed to illustrate about personal relationships: what, for example, is the difference between a 'monarchical' and an 'aristocratic' relationship if exactly one person rules in both cases? Aristotle suggests that the relationships differ because they are governed by what we might call different 'divisions of labour'. A father rules over his child in every respect, a husband over his wife in certain areas delimited by their respective natures, and brothers over each other by taking turns, more or less arbitrarily. I argue that we can better understand these sketchy comments if we connect them to Aristotle's claim at *EN III 1111b28* that "things which come about through the agency of our friends do so in a way through our own agency, since their origin is in us." Aristotle is there suggesting that the psychic processes associated with an action—decision, deliberation, and practical perception—can in some cases be shared by more than one individual. More specifically, the deliberation of one person can in some cases have its origin (*arche*) in the decision of another. (This, I suggest, becomes clearer if we see the decision as providing a final cause, rather than merely an efficient one, for the deliberations of another person.)

This relationship between the decision of one person and the deliberation of another, I suggest, is simply the relationship of 'rule' (*archein* or *arche*). It corresponds neatly to the definition of personal rule at *Metaphysics* Delta, according to which whenever one person rules another, the other moves or changes

according to the ruler's decision (kata proairesis, 1013a10-11). And the analysis of different kinds of cooperation invoked by the analogy with the constitutions allows us to better understand Aristotle's claim—which he announces with some fanfare at the beginning of the *Politics*—that there are several different kinds of rule. The discussion of the natural differences between slaves, women, and children in terms of their deliberative faculties suggests precisely that while the head of the household rules over his wife, his children, and his slaves, he can do so in a variety of ways, depending on how the deliberative capacities of the people ruled (when they have such capacities) do and do not contribute toward his decisions.

Melissa Fitzpatrick, Loyola Marymount University,
melfitz@gmail.com
"The Complexity of Form in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*"

This paper seeks to propose a solution to a potential contradiction in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: 1) Aristotle's assertion that form is primary substance, 2) his declaration that form is a universal such, rather than a this (Zeta 7-9), and 3) his dismissal of the universal as a viable candidate for primary substance (Zeta 13). I will attempt to show how Aristotle's rejection of the universal as primary substance in Zeta 13 is a dialectical response to his investigation of substance as the underlying subject in Zeta 7-9, thus securing unity in Book Zeta's moving investigation, while shedding light on what appears to be an explicit contradiction in the *Metaphysics*. I will begin with a general overview of Book Zeta's project, and provide close readings of Aristotle's investigation of primary substance as the underlying subject in Zeta 7-9, i.e., his treatment of form as a universal such, and his arguments against the universal as primary substance in Zeta 13. I will then illustrate how Zeta 7-9 and Zeta 13 are intimately connected, and how their dialogue contributes to Aristotle's project at large.

John Garner, Villanova University,
john.garner@villanova.edu
"The Lesson of the Arithmetical Example: Two Interpretations of Plato's *Hippias Major*, 301d3-303c4"

In the *Hippias Major*, 301d3-303c4, Socrates uses an arithmetical example to refute the "continuity principle" proposed by Hippias, i.e., the principle stating that both member of a pair (qua together) must share in exactly the same attribute that each member of the pair (qua individual) shares in. Socrates argues against this view, suggesting that both members of a pair together can participate in evenness, all while each member participates in oddness. While Socrates clearly uses the arithmetical notions of evenness and oddness to refute Hippias, it is not so easy to determine exactly how this refutation takes place, or what lesson the refutation is supposed to be. H.-G. Gadamer gives one compelling interpretation of Socrates' example. In fact, his reading of the lesson greatly influenced his own philosophy, for Gadamer found in his interpretation of the example a "model" for a theory of the communal nature of reason as such. His reading hinged on two theses. First, he argued, Socrates uses arithmetic to prove that both members of a pair must participate in some attribute not shared in by

each. Second, Socrates' lesson, he suggested, is not merely a lesson about arithmetic, but also a lesson about the very nature of reason (*logos*) and about its basis in human communities; the lesson provides a model of communal reason as such, which cannot be private or merely individual. If we follow in some sense Gadamer's second thesis--i.e., his suggestion of a parallel between the structure of the "arithmos paradigm" (i.e., the model of community proposed in the arithmetical example) and the structure of reason (*logos*)--, we might nevertheless question one aspect of his first thesis, concerning the interpretation of the example itself. As I shall argue, rather than proving the /impossibility/ of continuity between the community's attributes and those of its constituents (as Gadamer suggests), the lesson actually indicates that such a continuity is /possible/ but it is not guaranteed. That is, continuity between the attributes of a community and the attributes of its constituent elements, or its individual members, holds in some cases and does not hold in others. This seemingly minor difference in the interpretation of Socrates' lesson has major implications for how we might envision community and reason. At stake is the difference between, on the one hand, a community which must insist upon the irreconcilability of individual and group (which I take to be a consequence of Gadamer's interpretation) and, on the other hand, a community admitting that, while agreement between the group and the individual is not /guaranteed/ in any situation, such agreement is at least /possible/ and is perhaps even sometimes actual in good communities.

Erikk Geannikis, Catholic University of America,
emgeannikis@gmail.com

"Aristotle's Intelligible Matter and the Ontology of the Geometrical Object"

The phrase "intelligible material (*hulê noêtê*)" only appears three times in the corpus of Aristotle: twice in *Met. Z.10-11*, and once in *Met. H.6*. Most commentators report that the phrase in *Met. H.6* conveys a different meaning for intelligible material than do the *Met. Z* passages. Adherents to this standard view take the instances of *hulê noêtê* in *Met. Z.10-11* to signify something like "extension," and take the same phrase in *Met. H.6* to signify the genus ("material") element of a standard genus-species definition. Contrary to this view, my paper shows that the instance of *hulê noêtê* in *Met. H.6* can be understood as in complete accord with the earlier *Met. Z.10-11* instances if we do not interpret intelligible material as extension, but rather as the generative substrate for mathematical objects. The argument for this is in three parts: First, I focus on a passage from *Met. Z.3* on the dangers of "abstraction." Alongside John Cleary, I interpret this passage in reference to a logical method of subtraction, and show that the passage culminates in a *reductio ad absurdum*. "Abstraction" leads to an inappropriate and inaccurate characterization of a separation between material substrate and formal attributes, which Aristotle does not accept. Second, I examine passages from the subsequent progression of *Met. Z* to find that Aristotle abandons the conclusions of the abstractive procedure in favor of an adjectival conception of material. This adjectival sense is brought out by the role of material as the substrate for composite generation, detailed in *Met. Z*, and *Θ.7*. It is this conception that informs and allows the material component in a definition. Thus, the definitional matter/form structure is grounded in the ontology of compositional matter/form structure, and this in turn relies on the role of material as the substrate for generation. And

thirdly, I return to interpret Aristotle's Met. Z.10 invocation of "intelligible material" in light of these remarks on compositional generation. It is shown that mathematical objects are generated by an entelecheia of the intellect in a particular encounter with sensible objects. The sensible objects are intelligible material, as Aristotle's text reads; this claim is explained by casting sensible particulars in the role of material substrate for the generation of mathematical objects—intelligible material. Though the later passage from Met. H.6 does indeed employ the phrase "hulê noêtê" in conjunction with definitional materiality (there denoted as "hulê tou logou"), Aristotle does not intend to conflate the two. The form/matter definitional structure of mathematical objects depends upon the form/matter compositional structure in individual mathematical objects, and it is intelligible material that grounds this compositional structure for mathematical objects. In conclusion, I discuss the implications for this theory of intelligible material upon the interpretation of Aristotle's mathematical ontology. Aristotle's "abstraction" cannot be a solution to the problem of mathematical object ontology; it is used, rather, to state part of the problem.

Owen Goldin, Marquette University,
Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu
"Aristotle and the Pythagorean Opposites"

Aristotle presents the *Physics* as an inquiry into principles (arkhai) of nature. The first book leads to the conclusion that there are three principles of change: two contraries and a substrate. What does arkhê mean in this context? What are the demands that a satisfactory account of principles, in this sense, must meet? One way of approaching this question is to consider at what Aristotle has to say of the nature of accounts given by his predecessors. Unnamed Pythagoreans anticipated Aristotle in taking the principles of natural things to be correlated contraries, linked through causal relations. In *De Caelo* 2.2 Aristotle criticizes the Pythagoreans on the grounds that their appeal to contraries does not distinguish between which are prior and which are posterior. I here argue that Aristotle's point is that the Pythagoreans did not distinguish between causal priority and posteriority in their explanations. Certain principles are more causally basic than others, and explanations, in the natural sciences, and elsewhere, must make that apparent. The theory of demonstration presented within the *Posterior Analytics* is at least in part intended to show how explanations are to be structured to allow this to be so. I conclude by showing how, even though the account of the three principles of change developed in *Physics* 1 is not easily integrated with the Aristotle's syllogistic, it in principle is not subject to the objection that Aristotle raises against the Pythagorean appeal to contraries as explanatory principles.

Rebecca Goldner, Villanova University,
rebecca.goldner@villanova.edu
"More Than Ethical: Aristotle on the Mean"

This paper argues that there is an overlooked and undervalued consistency in Aristotle's description of the mean at work throughout the corpus, and that the relationship of the use of the mean in both the

physical world and in human life is best articulated in *de Anima*. While the so-called “doctrine of the mean” remains a critical component of the scholarship on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, far less attention has been given its use in the other works, but I argue here that only in looking to the physical and physiological uses of the term and, in particular, to *de Anima* (where sensation-- the very mark of animal life-- depends on a principle of receiving form without matter, a principle designated a mean), can we fully appreciate its use in the *Ethics*. Aristotle’s use of the mean in the psychology is deeply intertwined with his understanding of the mean and the intermediate (*meson* and *mesotes*, respectively) operative in the physical universe, and I claim that even in the *Ethics* and the *Politics* the mean is indicative of the ability of a being to hold itself in and consistently return to a state of equilibrium, one achieved as an appropriate, though not exact, proportion of contraries.

Thus, I investigate various articulations of *mesotes/meson* in order to uncover the relationship between texts and to draw out, if not an identity, a resonance produced by use of the same term across the corpus, a resonance that suggests that life in its various forms (and inclusive of thought and communication) seeks a type of harmony- a balance or equilibrium- in the encounter of one thing to another. Looking in particular at *de Caelo* and *Generation and Corruption*, we find that the heavens are organized such that there is eternal motion around a center or middle point, and in the sublunary world, we find that all perceptible bodies enact their existence as a middle point or a mean between the elemental transformations that bring them into existence and destroy them. Everything, from the heavens down to the smallest rock on earth, is what it is because it bears a relationship to a middle, and, as every body is an intermediate, perception must be an openness and receptiveness to these intermediates that allows for awareness of them. Ultimately, I draw attention to how this mean is enacted or lived by the human subject and I suggest that in our most basic life functions as well as our highest capacities as humans, we seek this very equilibrium in all of our experiences of the world, be they perceptual, practical, or social.

Francisco Gonzalez, University of Ottawa,
fgonzal2@uottawa.ca

“Motion or Activity? The Being and Temporality of Life in Aristotle”

As the first cause of motion that is not itself moved, Aristotle’s unmoved mover could be assumed to be, and often is taken to be, something static and timeless, a Parmenidean being existing in an eternal present. After all, something incapable of motion, we would assume, is inactive, absolutely present and self-same: in a word, dead. However, when we read Aristotle’s description of the being of the unmoved mover, we see it identified with *energeia*. That the word means here ‘activity’ rather than, as many translations would have it, some static ‘actuality’ is made clear when Aristotle proceeds to identify the *energeia* of the unmoved mover with life and pleasure. But how can something supposed to be unmoved be actively living and feeling pleasure? How can something lacking any potential (*dunamis*) be thus dynamic in its being? How can something eternal be characterized by activities that seem impossible to conceive of without reference to time? How, finally, can such activity be *ousia* in the highest and primary sense of the word? These are the questions the present paper proposes to address

by way of a reading of *Metaphysics* Theta 6 1048b18-35, in which a distinction between motion (kinêsis) and activity (energeia) is explained and defended, as well as through the critique of some recent interpretations that, among other things, seek to minimize the importance of this text.

Mirzoeva Gulrukhsor, Association of Persian Studies, Tajikistan,
preety_04@rambler.ru

“A Comparison between the Philosophical Presupposition of the Zoroastrian and Muslim Theologies”

This study begins by depicting a prima facie paradox. On the one hand Nietzsche has a very positive view of Zoroastrianism and a very negative appraisal of Monotheism. On the other hand Muslims take Zoroastrians- along with Jews and Christian to be people of a (sacred monotheistic book) [*ahl-i Kitab*]. Next the paper proposes that Nietzsche’s reading emphasizes on the role of free will in Zoroastrianism, while the Muslims reading emphasizes Zoroaster’s ethics of harmony between reason and an implicit concept of the “best of all possible world order.” The major difference is that Zoroaster, unlike Muslims or other monotheists does not assume that there is a conscious God Who is omnipotence. In contrast according to both Zoroastrian and Nietzsche, the free Good Will to power, is the main source of realization of the good life-not ascetic worship or blind obedience to a transcendent being.

Khalil Habib, Salve Regina University,
khalil.habib@salve.edu

“The Meaning of Socrates' Asceticism in Aristophanes' *Clouds*”

One could read the *Clouds* and conclude that Aristophanes is an esoteric Socratic; that is, a wise poet who, while viewing nature as indifferent to human flourishing, has (unlike his Socrates) the good grace and prudence to keep quiet about it. Is this Aristophanes’ deepest criticism of Socrates? This paper argues not.

Chelsea Harry, Duquesne University,
harryc@duq.edu

“The Meaning of Nous in *Physics* iv.14”

In *Physics* iv 11, Aristotle defines time (chronos) as the number (arithmos) of motion (kinesis) with respect to before and after (219b1-2). In *Physics* iv 14, Aristotle argues that time is dependent on nous (223a25). We can say, then, that the number of motion with respect to before and after is dependent on nous. What might this mean? In this paper, I offer up two arguments in defense of the view that nous here refers exclusively to the intellectual potency of the human soul, thus my claim is that human beings are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of actual time in Aristotle’s account. I will discuss in particular the relationship between number (arithmos) and nous in *Physics* iv 14 and Aristotle’s account of sensation in *De sensu* 436a-437a. Namely, I suggest that the existence of number requires

not only (1) an intellect capable of counting, but also (2) a body by which to sense perceive that which can be counted.

John Hendrix, University of Lincoln,
jhendrix@rwu.edu

“Philosophy of Intellect in the Long Commentary on the *De anima* of Averroes”

Averroes or Ibn Rushd was born in Cordoba in 1126 and died in Marrakech in 1198. He was educated in philosophy, theology, mathematics, medicine, and jurisprudence, and held the office of judge for many years. He was called "Commentator" for his commenaries on Aristotle, which are mostly known through Latin translations. In his *Long Commentary on the De anima*, Averroes posits three separate intelligences in the anima rationalis or the rational soul: agent intellect or intellectus agens, material or passible intellect, intellectus possibilis or intellectus passibilis, and speculative intellect, intellectus speculativus, or actualized or acquired intellect, intellectus adeptus. In the *De anima* 3.1.5, "there are three parts of the intellect in the soul; the first is the receptive intellect, the second, the active intellect, and the third is actual intellection..." that is, speculative or actualized, agent, and material. While material intellect is "partly generable and corruptible, partly eternal," corporeal and incorporeal, the speculative and agent intellects are purely eternal and incorporeal. In the *De anima* 3.1.5, the existence of intelligibles or first principles in intellect, as they are understood in actualized intellect, "does not simply result from the reception of the object," the sensible form in sense perception in material intellect, "but consists in attention to, or perception of, the represented forms..." the cognition of the forms in actualized intellect wherein they can be understood as intelligibles, which requires both the participation of active intellect and the motivation of the individual for intellectual development. The goal of intellectual development is to achieve union with active intellect, the final entelechy, and through this union the highest bliss in life can be achieved. Such bliss can only be achieved "in the eve of life." All individual material intellects are capable of some ability to form concepts and abstract ideas at a basic level, but beyond that, intellectual development varies among individuals according to the level of volition. Complete knowledge of the material world results in complete unity between the material intellect and the active intellect.

Hyun Höchsmann, New Jersey City University,
hhochsmann@njcu.edu

“Division, Measure and Weaving in the *Statesman*”

If a crane could speak, he would ... oppose men and all other animals to cranes

Plato explains that men, whether they are Athenians or Thracians, are no different from cranes, when they classify themselves as belonging to one category and group all others on the other side. In place of this haphazard way of classification which elevates Hellenes and denigrates the others as barbarians, Plato puts forward the dialectical method as an objective method of division, identification and classification.

The dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does not set the great above the small, but always arrives in its own way at the truest result.

Why does Plato expend what seems an inordinate amount of effort to specify to what class of things an individual entity belongs and what concept of measure should apply to classes of objects? What is “the truest result” when the dialectical method is applied to classification in the *Statesman*? There is political as well as logical significance in rejecting the division of mankind into Hellenes and barbarians. Plato points out the absurdity of the pride of Hellenes by placing them in the same category with Phrygians or Lydians. Plato advocates the impartiality of the dialectical method, which juxtaposes birds with men (as bipeds), and the king with the bird-catcher. A king and a vermin-destroyer belong to the same class.

Plato’s preoccupation with division and classification in the *Statesman* has been criticized as being pedantic and superfluous. But this received view disregards the significance of the processes of division and classification for the real task of the dialogue: the delineation of the functions of the statesman and the science of governing the state.

In order to specify what the function of the statesman consists in, Plato first examines what kinds of individual characteristics are present in the state. Some are temperate but deficient in courage while others are courageous and effective in action but deficient in temperance. Since both temperance and courage are necessary in due measure in the true art of the governing the task of the true statesman consists in weaving the two elements into one to produce the mean between excess and deficiency. Plato’s aim in classification is not for the sake making distinctions but to delineate the opposites so that when they are woven together the whole produces the mean exemplifying the harmony of opposites.

Plato’s conception of the science of the statesman as the process of weaving two contrasting strands to a whole is built on his dialectical method of division and measure.

Plato’s focus on division is essential for clarifying the concepts of measure and the mean in the science of the statecraft as weaving of opposites into a harmonious whole.

The conception of the just state as built on harmony of the constituents formulated in the *Republic* endorses the task of the statesman as a weaver of the divergent characteristics in the state.

Hyun Höchsmann, New Jersey City University,
hhochsmann@njcu.edu
“*Zhuangzi* on the Politics of the Sage”

Strife is fueled by obstinate adherence to one’s own views (*Zhuangzi* 26).xxxxxxThe great man does not harm others in his actions ... He recognizes that the right and the wrong are frequently indistinguishable and that what is small and what is great are frequently indefinable (*Zhuangzi* 17).xxxxxxThe sage harmonizes the right and the wrong and rests in the equal action of heaven. This is called following two paths (*Zhuangzi* 2).

The central themes in Zhuangzi’s political thought are: we ought to attempt resolving conflicts by examining the grounds of our own views; to avoid harming others by realizing that our value judgments

regarding right and wrong are not infallible; and seeking the common ground among opposing claims of right and wrong. xxxThe right course of action is not that which destroys what is considered to be wrong but seeking the common ground which is most conducive to establishing harmony. *Zhuangzi* urges all to seek common consensus. It is not unquestioning acceptance or compliance with the established point of view but the ability to resolve conflicts and reach a common understanding which characterizes the way of the sage.

He was never heard to take the lead but always appeared to be of the same mind as others (*Zhuangzi* 6).

This conception of political action as requiring the common consensus is supported by *Zhuangzi's* view that knowledge and virtue are constituted by what is held in common.

The work of government should be distributed in accordance with the approval of all (*Zhuangzi* 26).

It is possible to derive a political philosophy of peace and non-violence from *Zhuangzi's* conception of the good as that which yields rather than that which attacks or retaliates.

In contrast to the optimistic expectation that morality is achieved through vigorous inculcation of virtues and the belief in the inherent goodness of human nature, *Zhuangzi* urges that we allow the mind to become completely objective and impartial as a mirror of reality. Being still as still water, the sage is the "mirror of heaven and earth." The sage makes the mind of the people his mind.

The ancient rulers believed that the success of government resided in the people and the failure in themselves. They attributed what was right to the people and what was wrong to themselves. Therefore, even when one person lost his life, they withdrew and held themselves responsible. But now it is different (*Zhuangzi* 25).

Zhuangzi, without advocating the rule by the people, upholds the democratic ideal of the people determining what is right. Wrongdoing is caused by insufficiency of resources and unjust rule. The sage does not look outward for rules and customs to coerce others, but seeks simultaneously the autonomy of individuals and the common point of view. But how is unity to be achieved, given that we pursue divergent aims?

Human relations are difficult but there is an order and a pattern. The sage does not oppose human relations when he encounters them (*Zhuangzi* 22).

Noel Hubler, Lebanon Valley College,
hubler@lvc.edu

"Plato's Psychic Motion: Epistemological, cosmological, and practical consequences."

In the late dialogues, Plato develops a theory of cognition as a form of psychic motion. Although the consequences of Plato's analysis of cognition as psychic motion extend broadly throughout his late dialogues, its implications have yet to be studied in detail by modern commentators who have either

dismissed psychic motion as merely symbolic (Cornford, Annas, and Lee) or have mistaken it for locomotion (Sedley, Johansen, Kamtekar, and Karfik). The new theory allows Plato to overcome the strict division between sense and intellect espoused in the middle dialogues. In the middle dialogues, sense-perception cannot positively contribute to true understanding, but the senses must be left behind to come to knowledge of the forms. In the late dialogues, Plato develops a unified theory of cognition, based on his analysis of both sense and understanding as psychic motion. Both sense and intellect are self-originating, immaterial motions of the soul that conform to their objects, so each displays proper measure. Plato's new theory of cognition then allows for a new theory of *techne* (art or skill). As a species of knowledge, *techne* also conforms to measure through the apprehension of its standard and then moves the body to bring measure into the material realm. *Techne* combines both an understanding of formal measure and the ability to bring it to bear in the material realm. Plato's new theory of *techne* serves as a model for both his cosmology and his political theory. So the theory of psychic motion grounds Plato's late epistemology, cosmology, and practical theory.

John Humphrey, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University,
jhumphr@ncat.edu
"Plato's *Republic*: The Polis as a Paradigm"

In three previous papers, "Socrates' Interpretation of His Own Wisdom," "Socrates and Achilles: A Shift in Paradigms," and "Plato's Paradigm in the *Apology of Socrates*," I have been concerned with Plato's paradigm of the philosopher as represented in the character of Socrates. In particular, I have examined what Socrates means when he interprets his own wisdom by claiming that the god used his name in order to make him a model or a pattern [paradeigma], "as if he would say, 'That one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom'" (Ap. 23a-b). Considering Socrates as the paradigm of the philosopher, led to an investigation of Socrates' allusion to Achilles, the paradigmatic warrior in Plato's *Apology of Socrates* (Ap. 28b-29a), where Socrates implies that the philosopher, the paradigmatic rational individual, should replace the warrior, the paradigmatic individual governed by thymos. This study raised the question: just what sort of paradigm is Socrates, the paradigm of the philosopher? Juxtaposing Socrates to Achilles, the paradigmatic warrior, on the one hand, and Oedipus, who for Sophocles is the unenviable paradigm of the human because he enjoys only fleeting happiness, I argued that Socrates turns everything on its head; instead of suffering his fate, he embraces it and thus becomes enviable because in the face of the limits of human finitude, he presents us with a paradigm of a life guided by and subject to reason – a noble human life that, by embracing the human condition, transcends the human condition.

In this paper, I return to Plato's conception of a "paradigm," however, not as it appears in The *Apology of Socrates*, but as it is found in Plato's *Republic*. In Book V, Glaucon has been pressing Socrates to tell him whether the city is possible; Socrates, who by his own admission has been "loitering" (472a), finally asks: "Weren't we ... also making a pattern [paradeigma] in speech of a good city?" (472d-e). I shall argue that

in Plato's *Republic*, the city in speech is a paradigm, and that, according to Socrates, it is a paradigm absent in the life of the evil individual, but that in the life of the good person it is a pattern according to which he or she may model his or her life. Focusing on paradigms, then, raises questions about their ontological and epistemic status. A paradigm, for example is not a form (eidos), yet a paradigm seems to have some features similar to those of the forms. Additionally, focusing on paradigms raises questions about our understanding of Socrates and the philosophic task. Indeed, we must seriously consider the possibility that the *Apology of Socrates* is not really Socrates' attempt to defend himself from the charges brought against him, but a defense of the life devoted to philosophy, and that the *Republic* is not intended to found an 'ideal polis' as so many have claimed, but an attempt to defend the life devoted to justice – the philosophic life.

Timothy Huson, St. Louis University,
husontc95@yahoo.com
"Aristotle's *Teleia philia* as Principle of Political Critique"

I will first explore a circularity issue in the standard rational and state-teleological framework of Aristotle's political theory, and then show how Aristotle's idea of *teleia philia*, understood in the context of the sense of fairness or equity (to epieikes), enables a political critique grounded outside of the education institutions of any particular regime.

In Aristotle's political thought the individual is understood in terms of the state from which he/she receives an education that instills the moral archai that provide the fundamental sense of good and bad, just and unjust. These moral principles are in turn the basis for the particular form the state takes, since this form must be appropriate to the matter, the makeup of the citizenry, and thus a potential circularity can be discerned. This teleological relation between form and matter, where the state instills in the individual the telos and ethical archai, internalized as desire for the good, is also the main principle in Aristotle's own assessment of various governments – providing the framework for assessing the object studied and being involved in instilling in Aristotle his own intuition of the good. While assessing the good government involves a rational principle (in terms of numerical and proportional equality), this must be relative to the corresponding matter, the citizenry. So initially the socially acquired sense of right and wrong and the rational calculation of equality would seem to be the chief principles for critiquing a state – both for theoretical work and for political action. The potential of a circularity (and a vicious relativity) appears in that the essential sense of the good is acquired by influence of the particular regime that regulates the education system that instills that sense of good in both the citizenry and the researcher.

I argue that, though he does not present it as such, Aristotle intuitively provides the key response to this circularity issue with his understanding of *philia* as an extra-rational and extra-political sense of justice that runs against the grain of his basic principles of state teleology and rationally determined political justice. I connect this with Claudia Baracchi's suggestion that perfect friendship is a sort of extra-legal justice, while avoiding a potential circularity of making the state a precondition of *philia* by drawing on

Ronna Burger's emphasis of the independence of friendship. To understand *philia* for this purpose, taking *philia* as a bond of association, I must distinguish two differentiae for grasping its more chief sense (to *kuriōteron*): a private bond (as opposed to public) and a pure bond (as opposed to self-interested). In the latter sense, Aristotle's *teleia philia* has its proper political place – independently of and even running against or correcting the rational concept of justice – as the sense of justice and fairness between citizens in the equitable or fair person (*ho epieikēs*) and the discretion of a fair or equitable ruler or judge. This principle could also be employed, I think, as an extra-political basis of political criticism, both in theory and in practice.

Lisa Indraccolo, URPP Asia and Europe, University of Zurich, Switzerland,
lisa.indraccolo@uzh.ch

“Of Stones and Horses - Reading the *Gongsun Longzi* in Terms of Concrete Universals”

The Warring States period (475-221 B.C.) is often considered the age of the maximum flourishing of early Chinese politico-philosophical debate, which is best represented in those works that are traditionally categorized under the name of “masters texts” (*zishu*). However, Classical Chinese philosophical texts are often accused of being vague and extemporaneous, lacking a solid theoretical framework, a hodgepodge of commonsensical - and at times even nonsensical - arguments glued together by the later tradition. This is clearly a misreading of the specific modes of argument construction encountered in Classical Chinese texts. Not only do they provide evidence of the existence of a lively rhetorical tradition, but are vehicles for the exposition and the discussion of epistemologically well-grounded theories, though these are rarely explicitly expounded, but have to be extrapolated from the context through a close and attentive reading (Lu Xing 1998; Li Chenyang 1999, Wardy 2004).

From this point of view, the *Gongsun Longzi*, a collection of dialogues, speeches and essays named after and traditionally attributed to a homonymous, yet fictive persuader (Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan 2003; Smith 2003; Graham 1986), is usually considered one of the most puzzling and challenging texts to make sense of. Though expressed in some cases in a fluid dialogic thrust and counter-thrust style, as is the case with the two chapters considered here (the *Jianbai Lun* and the *Baima Lun*), the arguments discussed present a meditated, coherent and progressive exposition, and turn out to be based on a logically sound reasoning. I will analyse in detail the “hard and white stone” (*jianbai shi*) and the famous “white horse” (*baima*) arguments, after which the two dialogues in the collection are named. I will argue that it is possible to deduce and to delineate a whole theory of universals starting from these two examples, and to explain how sensitive perception and sense data are supposed to interact with our conception of objects in the world as theorized in the *Gongsun Longzi*.

In particular, in order to explain how qualities can be locally “preserved” (*zang*), perceivable and recognizable within the particular object to which they are temporarily attached and in which they find themselves concretized, and at the same time be “preserved in themselves” (*zizang*), I will propose an interpretation of qualities in terms of “concrete universals”, borrowing a mathematical definition, whereby ‘concrete universal’ designates “an object that has the property and has it in such a universal

sense that all other objects with the property resemble or participate in that paradigmatic or archetypal instance” (Ellerman 1988, p. 6; see also Acton 1936 and 1937).

This approach not only contributes a new perspective on the Gongsun Longzi, unravelling the sound logical reasoning underneath its paradoxical formulations, but also considerably improves our overall understanding of the text, shedding new light on some obscure passages.

John Inglis, University of Dayton,
inglis@notes.udayton.edu

“On the Eternity of the World: Moneta of Cremona, Maimonides, and Aquinas”

In regard to whether the world is eternal, Bonaventure raises the tone of the discussion in his commentary on the Sentences by calling his opponents demented and foolish. Yet he does not name the opponents. Who might these unnamed opponents be? Richard Dales claims in his history on the issue of the eternity of the world that there is no reason to think that Bonaventure is in debate with individuals of his own day. He understands Bonaventure’s opponents to be the adversaries of Augustine living eight hundred years before: “But in all of this there is nothing to indicate that Bonaventure’s opponents are contemporary theologians or philosophers. In fact, although he draws on a variety of Greek and Arabic sources, his opponents are Augustine’s contemporaries” (Dales 1990 95-96). According to Dales, Bonaventure singles out the opponents of Augustine for abuse: “Bonaventure becomes abusive of his long-dead opponents. . .”.

My argument is that widening our scope beyond the canonical philosophers and theologians allows us to identify Bonaventure’s contemporaries as Cathars and that this adds complexity to our picture of the Latin mining of Arabic and ancient philosophy. For example, the logician Moneta of Cremona appears to have been the first in northern Italy to put Maimonides to use and he did so in order to answer Cathars in regard to the eternity of the world. Arabic philosophy offered a conceptual language for discussing the origin of creation. The presentation focuses on Moneta of Cremona, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas on the eternity of the world in order to consider an example where an interdisciplinary approach deepens the reconstruction of specific arguments.

Cristina Ionescu, The Catholic University of America,
ionescu@cua.edu

“Dialectical Method and Myth in Plato's *Statesman*”

The Statesman begins the search for the nature of statesmanship by means of a dialectical method which proceeds by dividing a comprehensive kind into species, and continues this way at several levels, until it identifies the specific difference of the kind searched for. After a first attempt along these lines, this methodical approach is interrupted by a change in style that seems at least at first difficult to fit with it, a myth about cosmic reversals, much unlike the pedestrian considerations developed up to this point.

Once the myth is told, the discussion returns to using the method of division through to the end. We are left to wonder about the role of this mythical intermezzo in the unity of the dialogue.

The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between the myth and the dialectical method. I will argue that the two are significantly interwoven, the myth contributing to the employment of the dialectical method by providing the main guidelines for its successful application and suggesting reasons why it may fail on the occasions when it does so. While collection and division can be applied in various ontological horizons, the specific framework in which we apply them makes all the difference in terms of the cuts and distinctions that will stand out as natural and/or artificial. It is this framework that the myth reveals to us.

Beyond the veil of metaphor, the myth proposes an ontological model in four terms: the Demiurge, Forms, particulars, and a site of complete indetermination. The Demiurge acts as cause that harmonizes the two periods of rotation; Forms are "the most divine things of all" (269d), unchanging and constant; the universe as a whole and all of its contents are particulars fashioned by the Demiurge in imitation of Forms; finally, the site of complete indetermination, the ultimate stage of disintegration and chaos, is referred to as "boundless sea of unlikeness" (273d).

The paper defends its above-mentioned thesis by arguing for the following points: a) the myth accounts for the importance of making cuts at the natural joints to delimit real classes and not mere parts, and thus advising against restricting the method to bisective division; b) it provides the ontological framework within which divisions and collections are carried out in search for the statesman; c) it provides the basis for a hierarchical understanding of reality; d) it offers, in the persona of the Demiurge, a paradigm for the statesman, as harmonizer, as shepherd, as weaver, as doctor, as steersman and as moral reformer dealing with cosmic maladies and imbalance.

Parovakhon Jamsehdov, *Tajikistan Academy of Science*,
pjam07@mail.ru

"Cosmogony and Ethics of Classical Zoroastrian Philosophical Theology"

This study is an investigation of two specific themes in Zoroastrian philosophical theology : (i) a comparison of the cosmogony of Plotinus and Zoroastrianism with a focus on the notion of time in light of the later development of Zoroastrian tradition in Zurvanism (which like Heidegger relates "being" with "time") and (ii) the ethics of "pragmatic truth of the good will" constructed from the notions of "asha [arête, kamal] and "pendar-i neek" in the light of Nietache's modification of Zoroastrian ethics.

Jolanta Jaskolowska, Westwood College Chicago Loop,
jolaj@att.net

"The Account of Semantics in On Interpretation and Aristotle's Overall Theory of Language"

What is the relation of the very condensed discussion of semantics at the beginning of *On Interpretation* to Aristotle's overall understanding of language? In *On Interpretation* 4, Aristotle states that the consideration of non-assertoric statements is a part of the studies of the arts of poetry and rhetoric. Seen in this way, almost all of Aristotle's account of the philosophy of language takes place in the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*, rather than in *On Interpretation*. Following a tradition leading back to the Neoplatonic curriculum of the 5th and 6th centuries, we have a tendency to assign a priority to Aristotle's account of the assertion as the basis of logic in his overall account of language. Instead, I argue that the account of semantics is only a small part of Aristotle's overall philosophy of language, which is mainly found in his accounts of lexis in the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*. In contrast, Aristotle must indicate in *On Interpretation* the elements of his epistemology that support truth conditions for assertions because his account there must address both Platonic and Sophistic objections to our ability to grasp the truth in language (*logos*) at all. In conclusion, the account of semantics in *On Interpretation* addresses the Platonic and Sophistic accounts of language just as the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* address and criticize both Plato's and *Gorgias*' accounts of poetry and rhetoric.

Haewon Jeon, Northwestern University,
haewon@u.northwestern.edu
"The Moral Capacity of the Producers in Plato's *Republic*"

According to many interpreters, Plato in the *Republic* denies that a non-philosopher can possess virtue in a meaningful way. I argue against such interpretations. In particular, I focus on whether Plato thinks the producers of the kallipolis can satisfy one requirement of virtue that has a great intuitive appeal – the requirement that a virtuous person should to have right sorts of motivation for her actions.

My opponents' view can be summarized as the following. They argue that no matter how justly the producers behave outwardly, they can never have the right motivation for doing so. Such interpretations arise from the reading that for Plato, one cannot be ruled by the reasoning part of the soul unless one has the capacity and desire to do philosophy. Producers have neither the desire nor the capacity to do philosophy, so they cannot be ruled by reason. Instead, they are ruled by the appetitive part and are only capable of appreciating appetitive pleasures. This means that they cannot appreciate immaterial things like harmonious soul and virtue except as means to some appetitive good. Surely Plato would not consider such people genuinely virtuous.

To present an argument against such readings, I divide my paper into three parts. In Part 1, I argue that Plato's conception of psychological ruling does not require one to pursue philosophy to be ruled by reason. To rule the soul, the reasoning part only has to satisfy two conditions: (1) it has to have a correct belief about what is the most advantageous good for the soul as a whole, and (2) it has to have enough control over the other soul parts to actually carry out its plans for getting that good. In Part 2, I examine the way Plato opens and closes the dialogue to describe the sort of virtuous producer he might have envisioned. Through his depictions of the old man Cephalus and the Myth of Er, Plato tells us that non-

philosophers can satisfy the two above conditions by recognizing the importance of psychic harmony. In Part 3, I argue that the producers of kallipolis cannot be ruled by appetite if they are to behave the way Socrates envisions them to. If they indeed are ruled by appetite, they will run into the same sorts of problems that the faulty cities and souls of Book 8 and 9 do. Therefore, Plato does not have a choice but to permit his producers to have "virtuous motivations" – motivations that are worthier than some bodily goods at least.

Brian Johnson, Fordham University,
brjohnson@fordham.edu
"The Definition of Aristotelian Intellectual Virtue"

"What is the species of intellectual virtue?" Aristotle defines virtues of character as "mean states" and he apparently believes that virtues of intellect are "states" but it seems that he never quite gets around to telling us their species. While it prima facie appears that Aristotle should define intellectual virtue as "states concerned with truth", that definition will not work. First, it fails to parallel the definition of character virtues (which is entirely "internal", i.e. it picks out features of the hexeis themselves. If virtues of character were defined "externally," they would have to be "states concerned with certain types of actions"). Second, some of the lesser discussed intellectual virtues do not fit the "concerned with truth" model. E.g. euboulia does not seem to be about a body of knowledge but rather a skill of deliberation; epieikia is about the right discrimination, specifically about getting the right correction of legal justice. That seems more like a special act of intellectual perception than a kind of truth. In line with that, I will be arguing that the best way to distinguish character virtue from intellectual virtue is that character virtue is a scalar state whereas intellectual virtue is nonscalar. In turn, this difference has important implications for how we train ourselves to have each set of virtues.

Dana Johnson, Duquesne University,
dana.jo@gmail.com
"The Erotic Ascent: Plato and Plotinus on Beauty and Pedagogy"

Philosophical *erōs* gives rise to and sustains the ascent of the soul. Philosophical erotics is the soul's productive activity that requires dialectical pursuit of wisdom. Ascent is the productive activity of dialectic reasoning proceeding correctly; the soul flourishes when dialectical reasoning is paired with *erōs*. Philosophical *erōs* transforms endoxic longing into an even more frenzied passion for truth, which climaxes during contemplation of beauty itself.

In Plato's *Symposium* Diotima characterizes love as the activity of "giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul." Philosophy and philosophers play the role of the midwife who aids in the birth of beautiful ideas. The essence of Diotima's *scala amoris* is the pedagogical push towards a turning from the body to the intellect. The educator (*paiderastēs*) activates passionate desire for knowledge within the pedagogical relationship. The transformed erotic desire longs for the beautiful (to *kalon*). Love

inspires the virtuous and gradual ascent of the individual's psychē toward the object of desire--beauty as equated with the good (to agathon).

Socrates criticizes the erastês-erômenos (lover-beloved) relationships of his fellow symposiasts because it creates a duality between education and eroticism. The educational-erotic relationship should not reflect the duality of perceived reality: corporeal and incorporeal, sensible and intelligible. Rather, the educational-erotic should reflect the ladder of love: one ultimate aim that undergoes a gradual process of transformation closer and closer to beauty itself.

Plotinus' commentary on Plato's *Symposium* "On Beauty" from the *Enneads* identifies the desire for beauty as a way to understand the moral drive: "Labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine." Individuals are drawn to beautiful objects. Plotinus claims the moral imperative is to subtract the material from beautiful objects, thus yearning for beauty itself, an activity of ascent aiming at the divine, the One. The spark of the divine resides within the intellectual unconscious of the human soul. Turning inward leads to an understanding of the aim and source of erōs. Yearning to return to the source, the rational human soul, also known as the intellectual unconscious, works to shuffle off the material world by a turn inward closer to unity with the One. Love makes possible both emanation and return, descent and ascent.

Love is learning towards wisdom. Human reason accesses truth through the activity of philosophical erotics - a passionate love resulting in ascent as the virtuous life. A moral (correct) education involves both dialectical reasoning and philosophical erotics in order to gradually ascend and participate in beauty all the more. Without love, the beauty of wisdom is impossible.

Anton Kabeshkin, Johns Hopkins University Department of Philosophy,
akabeshkin@gmail.com
"Thumos in Plato's *Republic*"

In this paper I consider the essence of the "spirited" part or thumos in Plato's tripartition of the soul in the *Republic*. I analyze the official argument for the tripartition in book IV, the description of the "timocratic man" in book VIII and Plato's discussion of the ideal city denizens' education in books II-III. The argument leads to the conclusion that thumos is essentially a part of the soul which is concerned with socially inculcated values and shaped by social interactions. In defense of this interpretation I confront the widespread view of thumos as "good-dependent" or "good-sensitive" part of the soul. I argue that my interpretation has two important advantages over the rival one. First, it has more explanatory power, being able to account for oddities in the description of the timocratic man, being supported by Plato's discussion of the physical and "musical" education of children and shedding additional light on Plato's attitude towards art. Second, it allows to explain the spirited part's conformity to the councils of reason in some cases and its divergence from them in other cases, rather than to postulate it as a brute fact, as a rival interpretation essentially does. Additionally, this interpretation both supports and is supported by recent research on Plato's psychology which is primarily done on the basis of dialogues other than the *Republic*.

This interpretation of thumos affects the more general question of how exactly did Plato carve up the soul, and what is the principle of this division. Based on the understanding of spirit as the socially malleable and socially concerned part of the soul I will argue that both Plato's texts and some general considerations support another division: that into the part of the soul with relatively rigid desires, the part with socially malleable desires and the part which is capable of sophisticated reasoning and whose desires arise as a result of such reasoning.

Shalahudin Kafrawi, *Hobart and Smith Colleges*,
skafrawi@gmail.com

"Application of Logic of Intentionality and Sacred Religious Writings"

This study begins with the medieval tripartite interpretations of medieval theology into formal theology, philosophy and mysticism with reference to the systems of Averroes, Tusi and Mulla Sadra. Next, it clarifies the salient features of the application of hermeneutics to religious text. In its conclusion, this study clarifies the salient uses of notions of "self-reference" and "intentionality" for clarification of delineation between the languages of medieval nature mysticism and formal theology.

Vahid Karimi, *United Nations*,
svkarimi@gmail.com

"Contemporary Significance of Medieval Political Philosophy of Proxy War in Tusi and Machiavelli and Ancient Study of Arts of War"

This presentation clarifies the logic and contemporary applications of a twofold model of "proxy war" embedded in both ancient (e.g. *The Art of War* attributed to Sun Tzu) and later pre-modern literatures (e.g. Machiavelli's *The Prince*, and N. Tusi political writings). Finally this inquiry questions the universal applicability of political philosophies to different historical epochs.

Malcolm Keating, *University of Texas at Austin*,
c.malcolm.keating@gmail.com

"How Can I Know What You Mean? Implication, Inference, and Dhvani"

Given a sentence like "The fog comes on little cat feet", how is a hearer to know what is meant in such a novel and poetic context? The dhvani tradition in Indian aesthetics claims that much of what is meant can only be obtained by the sensitive, skillful hearer, through a process called "suggestion" which is not reducible to inference or any verbal operation such as denotation, metaphor, or metonymy. Writing in response to this view, Mukula Bhaṭṭa, in his *Abhidhāvṛttamāṭṛkā* ("The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function"), argues for an inferentialist account of what is meant by speakers using, for instance, novel metaphors. While he admits the relation between a sentence token and an utterance may not be instantly understood (*jhaṭiti*), he argues that this relation can be determined by reflection (*vicāraṇayā*). To explain this process, he relies upon presumption, or *arthāpatti*, using a broadly Gricean account of how implicatures may be constructed when literal meanings are blocked. He faces a similar

problem as Grice, however, since there often seem to be multiple candidates for implicatures for a given sentence token. How do we know which one(s) the speaker intend(s)? This is one reason the dhvani theorists think it is impossible to apply inferential reasoning to determine what is suggested by a sentence token: we would never have disagreements about what is meant, since one need only to mechanically apply inferential rules. However, Mukula's response does not require that we wholly abandon the requirement of aesthetic skill, simply that we can justify our judgment about meanings by appealing to some problem in accepting the literal meaning. We must be able to work backwards to make explicit what skillful hearers rely upon tacitly in their comprehension of poetic metaphors.

Farrukh Khudoidodov, Tajik Academy of Social Sciences,
farukh1984@mail.ru

“Philosophical AnaLysis of Logic of Categories in N. Tusi’s *Principles of Deduction (al-Asas-i Iqtibas)*”

Since Aristotle, some logicians that categories as “highest predicates” are themselves subject of philosophical investigation; for others categories as tools for philosophical analyses. Following Avicenna (11th Century), N. Tusi(13th Century) argues for a pragmatic intermediate position that categories may be used as a set of meta-language concepts for classification of terns; but syntactical distinctions of the categories are essential for construction of a systematic ontology. In support of my interpretation of Tusi’s logic, I shall distribute copies of the first English translation of key passages from Tusi’s celebrated *Principles of Deduction (al-Asas-i Iqtibas)* –the most extensive logic text in Farsi language.

Rodmon King, Hobart and William Smith Colleges,
king@hws.edu

“Definition and Signification in Aristotle's *On Interpretation* and *Posterior Analytics*”

In the opening chapters of *On Interpretation*, Aristotle discusses the signification of linguistic phenomena including names and verbs. Interestingly nowhere in these chapters does Aristotle discuss definition. In the *Posterior Analytics II*, Aristotle appeals to signification while developing an account of scientific inquiry. However, Aristotle does not directly connect this discussion with his investigation in *On Interpretation*. We are left with a puzzle regarding the exact relationship between Aristotle account of linguistic signification in *On Interpretation* and the account(s) of definition in the *Analytics*.

In this paper I explore this relationship and I argue that the types of definitions presented in *Posterior Analytics* explain some of the (seemingly) odd things Aristotle claims about signification. In addition, I contend that the account of signification developed in *On Interpretation* supplies more robust understanding of real and nominal definitions when applied to the discussion in the *Posterior Analytics*.

Achim Koeddermann, SUNY Oneonta,
koeddea@yahoo.com

"A Comparison of Shi`a and Medieval Christian Perspective on "Just War"

This paper compares the Shi`a and Medieval Christian criteria of a "just war". Its foci include: (i) mutual concerns on the protection and the sacredness of the lives of civilians in armed conflict; (ii) different doctrines of "*jihad*" in philosophical theology; (iii) Muslim and Christian underlying premises of a collectivist view of a global person; and (iv) complexities on construction of a universal trans-cultural theory of just war.

Taneli Kukkonen, University of Otago and University of Jyväskylä,
taneli.kukkonen@otago.ac.nz
"Al-Ghazali on Religion and Selfish Reason"

Al-Ghazali's understanding of religious tolerance has received a fair deal of scrutiny and even fame in recent years. As outlined in his famous treatise demarcating *The Decisive Criterion between Religion and Hidden Apostasy*, al-Ghazali advocates an utmost cautious attitude when it comes to hurling accusations of unbelief or heresy. For al-Ghazali, only the clear and explicit denial of God's unity or Muhammad's mission count as reliable--therefore punishable--manifestations of unbelief.

Less attention has been paid to al-Ghazali's account of the birth of empirical religions as so many deviations from the correct faith and straight path of Islam. Yet this is plainly a point of interest: not only does it tie in with the Islamic theme of Jews and Muslims falsifying their Scriptures, but it also cuts to the heart of al-Ghazali's idiosyncratic anthropology. Given that God is all-powerful and supremely benevolent, and that humanity is created with a natural desire to contemplate the divine countenance, how is it that people ever go wrong in their worship and belief? It turns out that al-Ghazali has a reasonably well worked out theory of human fallibility, within which he can then situate a working hypothesis concerning both the genesis of the various religious traditions and their surprising tenacity. Misguided and mistaken religion goes against the very grain of reality and as such might be expected to be weeded out by the testimony of our senses: however, al-Ghazali's keen awareness of what I deign to call the social construction of the self leads him to recognize how people may hang on to their misplaced evaluations against all evidence. This has implications as well for what al-Ghazali thinks are the real prospects for religious reform.

Farangiz Kurbansho, *St Petersburg University, The Russian Federation*
pjam07@mail.ru
"Global Framework of Islamic Political Philosophy"

This paper attends to the trans-national, global framework of Islamic political philosophy. It begins by clarification of a vision of human beings as essentially being citizens of the same globe, with accidental racial, gender, religious features. Next, the presentation focuses on a dialectical perspective of history in different époques, all leading to the unity of humanity. Finally the paper compares the global framework

of Islamic political theory with classical cases of individualism and their applicability to the present global village. There will be an emphasis on political theories of al-Farabi and Ibn Khaldun.

Maggie Labinski, Loyola University Chicago,

saraballae@gmail.com

“The Rooster and The Hen: Augustine's Philosophy of Education”

The goal of this paper is to explore Augustine's use of bird imagery within the context of his philosophy of education.

To this end, I first (1) examine the appearance of the rooster within *De ordine*. I argue that the rooster not only evokes the dialogues of the rhetoricians but, more importantly, it furthers the interlocutors' discussion of the pedagogical function of reason (*ratio*). Next (2), I analyze the image of the hen within *De catechizandis rudibus*. I argue that the hen not only evokes the Christian Bible but, more importantly, it furthers Augustine's description of the pedagogical function of desire (*amor*). I conclude (3) by articulating some of the questions these images raise about Augustine's interest in 'the animal' and his understanding of gender.

My hope is to convince readers that Augustine's philosophy of education not only addresses classically Augustinian topics – e.g., the self and his God – but that it reveals some of the ways in which Augustine saw reflections of these topics within the animal world.

Anna Lannstrom, Stonehill College,

alannstrom@yahoo.com

“The problem with moral gods: Thoughts about the trial of Socrates”

This paper considers the possibility that Socrates was tried and convicted because of his view that the gods were moral. I will argue that it by itself should not have been enough to motivate the trial because criticism of the Homeric gods was not that radical in Athens at the time and because the arguments linking Socrates' rejection of Homer and Hesiod to the trial oversimplify and misunderstand Greek religion. However, I maintain that the implications of a belief in moral gods may indeed have been troubling enough to be a contributing factor. In particular, I will argue that its implications for patriotism and sacrifice would have been deeply troubling.

Susan Levin, Smith College,

slevin@smith.edu

“Technê and Medicine in Plato's *Gorgias*”

The *Gorgias* foregrounds an agôn between two fundamentally opposed takes on *phusis* and *eudaimonia*, one centered on the fostering of humans' absolute well-being, the other on an unbounded pursuit of

whatever one's urges and practical goals happen to be at a given time. The philosophical frame for the conduct of this dispute is the dialogue's articulation of a highly normative construction of technê. On the *Gorgias*' account, many so-called technai (e.g., rhetoric, cookery) are unmasked as empeiriai (mere "knacks"); only those select endeavors meeting the dialogue's standards for a genuine technê warrant human beings' pursuit. While substantial depiction of the political technê--supreme due to its exclusive focus on the welfare of the highest good, namely, soul--must await later dialogues, core elements of the tack to be taken are evident.

In the *Gorgias*, medicine fares well when the comparison-point is rhetoric, cookery, and other practices of that ilk. Yet the very same criteria that warrant medicine's lauding there also show how its occupation with health, to which pursuit reflection on soul is incidental, rests on views of human nature and flourishing strongly at odds with Plato's own. Seen from this vantage point, the *Gorgias* not only debuts Plato's highly normative technê framework but also sets the course for his more openly critical stance toward medicine in the *Symposium* and *Republic*.

Donald Lindenmuth, The Pennsylvania State University,
dcl1@psu.edu
"The Treatment of Eros in Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*"

Both Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* deal with eros in relation to the arts of rhetoric and poetry. Both dialogues arise because of *Phaedrus*, who especially likes listening to rhetorical speeches, enjoys poetic diction, and seeks the advantages of love without any disadvantage. Many commentators have regarded the treatment that eros receives by Socrates in the *Phaedrus* as superior to that of the *Symposium*. I argue that the speeches can be interpreted as complementary due to the composite nature of *Phaedrus*, who is drawn both to rhetoric and poetry.

The *Phaedrus* is different from the *Symposium* in that the famous palinode of Socrates is not simply a refutation of the other speeches but specifically is a refutation of Socrates' previous speech in which he praised non-loving over loving, which itself is a superior formulation of Lysias' speech. The similarity and difference of *Phaedrus*' speech in the *Symposium* and Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus* provides the basis for the difference of Socrates' major speeches in each of the two dialogues. *Phaedrus*' character also provides the need for Socrates to speak rhetorically and to provide a philosophical evaluation of speaking and writing in the latter part of the dialogue. This positioning of speeches by Socrates is possible in the *Phaedrus* rather than the *Symposium* because Socrates can concentrate upon *Phaedrus* independent of all the other speakers in the *Symposium*.

Socrates' palinode involves recollection in place of climbing the stages to Beauty in the *Symposium*; it deals with the particular character of the beloved with a typology of character rather than simply beauty itself. The palinode also rest upon an account of soul as self-motion and a mythic elaboration of that motion, neither of which are found in Socrates' speech in the *Symposium*. The soul appears as a

monstrous combination of parts, while Socrates' speech in the *Symposium* rest upon eros as desiderative and more easily reducible to body.

Eros in the *Phaedrus* is reciprocal and visualized in terms of what a lover interprets as a likeness to himself. Such love is more visionary than generative; it doesn't produce another like oneself but sees another as oneself. Eros is a god rather than a daemon and the gods themselves are independent and not in need of another god to complete themselves. The *Symposium* is more oriented to the body while the *Phaedrus* is oriented to the soul. While the *Symposium* is largely a series of rhetorical exercises, the *Phaedrus* involves a distancing from the speeches it contains but, because that stance is not wholly explainable by what we are given explicitly in the dialogue, we reader are required to hold the dialogue together by reflection upon the complex nature of Socrates' interlocutor.

Tatiana Litvin, St.Petersburg State University,
littatiana@gmail.com

“The Concept of Time by St. Augustine and Its Phenomenological Interpretation”

In my paper I analyze the concept of time in Augustine's *Confessions* and the epistemological background of 'distentio animi'. The main aspects of the philosophy of time - memory, an internal word, the correlation of time and eternity, I consider from viewpoint of the phenomenological interpretation. The sensation of time, the analysis of presence, the perception of past and future constitute an anthropological idea of consciousness of time provided in the twentieth century by Husserl as a scheme of temporality of thought. The theory of Augustine, which includes both Neoplatonism and Christianity, demonstrates understanding of the nature of time and subjectivity, the methodological potential of medieval philosophy to contemporary philosophical reflection.

Yihong Liu, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing PRC,
yihongliucn@yahoo.com

“Sufi Mystical and other Persian Elements in Classics of Chinese Islamic Philosophical Tradition”

This paper proffers an account of Persian dimension of Islam in China from the ***Introduction of Islam in China (616-18) (i) by Sad ibn abi Waqqas, Travels of Persians to China in 637, by Sa`ad ibn Abi Waqqas*** with three Sahabas--namely Suhayla Abuarja, Uwais al-Qarni (594-657), and Hassan ibn Thabit (554-674)--as well as immigration of Persian artists and intellectuals to China during the Mongols rule of China in (1271-1368), and (ii) the philosophical themes of monism of “the unity of being.” The paper clarifies the philosophical themes such as monistic ontology of “unity of being (*al-Wahdat al-Wuhud*),” and “hermeneutic ethics of way (*Dao, Tariqa*)” of specific Chinese texts in Sufism. A focus is on Jami's vision of Persian Sufism, and the translation of his views in Chinese texts, namely Wang Tai-yu (*Great Learning of the Pure and Real*) and Liu Chih (*Displaying the*

Concealment of the Real Realm). Finally the research attends to recent English translations of these classics by S. Murata.

Deepa Majumdar, Purdue University North Central,
dmajumda@pnc.edu
"Transcendence as Immanence in Heraclitus' *Logos*"

Heraclitus, the sage of Ephesus, was known as an "obscure propounder of riddles," on account of his cryptic pronouncements. As Aristotle found, Heraclitus did not use the categories of formal logic. As Kirk and Raven point out, Heraclitus tended to describe the same entity "now as a God, now as a form of matter, now as a rule of behaviour or principle, which was nevertheless a physical constituent of things." Part of his so called "obscurity" lies perhaps in his very notion of the *Logos*, understood by Kirk and Raven as the "unifying formula" or "actual constituent of things." Heraclitus' *Logos*, as they put it, is "co-extensive with the primary cosmic constituent, fire." But the most "riddling" aspect of this *Logos* lies perhaps in its simultaneous transcendence of discrete things and its immanence "in" them. Even this immanence is extreme, for it strides both sides of the pairs of opposites. Heraclitus' *Logos* thereby reconciles the apparent opposition between the pairs of opposites.

In this paper, I explore Heraclitus' *Logos* for its logically simultaneous transcendence and immanence of discrete things. I focus, in particular, on *Fragments* 1, 8, 50, 51, 67, and 90. I then explore the transcendence of the *Logos* as a form of immanence, making references to Heraclitus' unique cosmology. I conclude that Heraclitus is among the most holistic of western thinkers, in his synthesis of divine transcendence and immanence.

Anne Mamary, Monmouth College,
annem@monmouthcollege.edu
"Geometry in the Humming of the Strings: Pythagorean Means and Plato's Divided Line"

On a legendary walk, Pythagoras is supposed to have heard musical harmony in a blacksmith's hammers ringing against anvils. The story goes that he discovered that the weights of the hammers to be 6, 8, 9, and 12 and that ratio of one to the other (rather than any absolute weight), produced the intervals that he heard. Although the story is apocryphal, those ratios, (12:8=3:2; 12:9=4:3; and 12:6=2:1) produce the fifth, the fourth, and the octave, respectively. These numbers and their ratios illustrate the relationships of the geometric, harmonic and arithmetic means we can discover in the *Republic's* divided line.

In this paper, I suggest that Socrates and his friends engage in another legendary walk as they journey through the *Republic* and that the divided line might be understood as the dialogue's diameter, divided into these three means. I argue that at the dialogue's arithmetic mean, at the center of our line or vibrating string, Glaucon faces an aporia of sorts as he confronts the three waves. It is, in its metaphors

of waves and water, a seething place, as musical intervals are seething places, depending on the vibrations between.

The sun-line-cave images come not long after the center of the dialogue. As McClain points out, there are two means in every interval, the arithmetic and the harmonic (15). While the arithmetic mean produces the octave, the harmonic (or subarithmetic) mean is in the ratio 4:3 or the 4th. At this place in the dialogue, at its harmonic mean, Socrates encourages Glaucon and his auditors to study geometry and astronomy in order to turn the eye toward the harmony of the cosmos and the soul toward the good.

Finally, the geometric mean also appears in Plato's line "divided in mean and extreme ratio" and producing the 5th. Along that line or diameter, if we think of the dialogue as a circle, Glaucon and friends encounter the divided line image at the point at which the dialogue's diameter is divided long segment from short. Drawing a perpendicular from the diameter to the circumference of the imagined circle, we encounter the golden mean, a special case of the geometric mean. The line both points beyond itself as a guide to a musical education and also enacts that very education for those who journey along its humming string, turning and tuning the soul.

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Janne Mattila, University of Helsinki,

janne.mattila@helsinki.fi

"Religious Pluralism and Philosophical Religion in the *Ikhwān al-Safā'*"

The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity (Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Safā') (ca. 950s-980s) are famously liberal in their attitude towards the plurality of religious beliefs, whether of the various Islamic sects or other religions. The doctrinal identity of the group itself has long been a subject of debate, although the majority of scholars today identify them with the Ismailis. In the context of the Ismaili doctrine of prophetic cycles, and possibly influenced by al-Fārābī, the Ikhwān adopt a pluralistic view of religion in which the various prophetic revelations are seen as representations of the same ultimate truth, conveyed to a specific time and place in history. Unlike for al-Fārābī, for the Ikhwān the concept of religion is not merely a philosophical abstraction, but they discuss the question of the plurality of religions also in more concrete terms in the 42. epistle. While tolerant of religious variance, the Ikhwān emphasize the necessity of religion for salvation, and condemn vehemently those contemporary philosophers whom they accuse to have renounced religion altogether.

While obviously identifying themselves as Muslims, the Ikhwān's perception of religion is highly philosophical. They identify different levels of exoteric and esoteric religious beliefs and practices, in

which the latter are restricted to the intellectual elite. Often a specific religious practice is interpreted to possess a higher meaning for the philosopher, set in the Neoplatonic context of the purification of the soul from its bodily attachments. Exoteric religious doctrines, as for al-Fārābī, are seen as symbolic images of the philosophical truth. Moreover, the Ikhwān also introduce the concepts of a philosophical religion (dīn al-falsafa) and philosophical worship (al-‘ibāda al-falsafiyya al-ilāhiyya) which go beyond the requirements of the exoteric religion. These include philosophical rites and festivals supposedly practiced by the Greek philosophers, which the Ikhwān perceive to be analogous with their Islamic counterparts.

The purpose of this paper is first of all to present the Ikhwān’s theory for the causes behind the existence of a plurality of religions, and secondly to see how it relates to their ideal of philosophical religion. When discussing their own religious practices and beliefs, they employ specifically Islamic terms. Still, the Ikhwān often speak approvingly of the practices of a variety of religions as fulfilling a similar spiritual purpose. Can all religions, then, be seen to be equal in the sense that all of them eventually lead to the same philosophical truth? Much of the religious pluralism in the Ikhwān can be understood from within the Ismaili doctrine of successive exoteric revelations. But the Ikhwān’s idea of religious pluralism appears to go beyond this, especially in its reversion of ancient Greek religious practices.

Pierre Mauboussin, Independent,
pierrem15@yahoo.com
“The Scope of Aristotelian Demonstration in Late Antiquity”

Proclus offers several criticisms of Aristotle's theory of mathematics, in particular, the notion of intellectual matter as it relates to Aristotle's theory of mathematical cognition. In several passages, Proclus also severely criticizes the limitations (as he sees them) of Aristotelian demonstration in comparison to the knowledge to be gained of the pure intelligibles apart from discursive reason, especially by means of theurgical rites. In comparison, Proclus' student Ammonius and his successors in Alexandria repeatedly stress the importance of logic and demonstration to philosophy as the “method” of philosophy. Ammonius goes so far as to reject Alexander of Aphrodisias by making logic itself part of (and not just a tool) of philosophy. These contrasts regarding the status of Aristotelian logic with both the Peripatetic and earlier Neoplatonic traditions suggests an important disagreement between the Alexandrians and the earlier commentators regarding the scope of knowledge obtainable by Aristotelian demonstration. In this paper, I trace the basis for these disagreements to differences in what objects are considered available to the unaided human intellect, with the later Alexandrians maintaining that Aristotelian science (in some sense) has access to the divine entities (such as the planets) that earlier Neoplatonism considered more properly to be above the level of the human intellect without divine assistance. In conclusion I suggest that these differences had an important role in medieval Christian and Islamic thought through the development of the notion of natural or rational theology.

Abdurakhmonova Mavzuna, *Khorog State University*, Tajikistan,
mavzuna-87@mail.ru

“The Global Perspective of Ancient Achaemenid and Roman Empires vs. the Greek Concept of a Limited City State”

As stated by J. Toynbee, the Ancient Iranian –Tajik Achaemenid Empire (550-330BC) is the first trans-national global vision of a political government. This paper depicts the underlying political philosophy of the Achaemenid dynasty and compares it with the political systems of ancient Assyria, Egypt, Attic Greek, and Rome. Special foci include allowance for freedom of choice in languages, religions and customs, as well as the imposition of unity in military security as well as economic systems of the empire. The presentation ends by reflections on the applicability of philosophical principles of ancient models of government to the present age of global village.

Marina McCoy, Boston College,
mccoyma@bc.edu

“Images as Argumentation in Plato's *Gorgias*”

Much Platonic scholarship presents Plato as either ignoring or disparaging the imagination as a legitimate part of argument. This paper argues that Socrates uses images as part of argumentation in the *Gorgias* and that such use ought to lead us to reconsider the standard view(s) of the Platonic imagination. Socrates seeks to use images to affect the appetitive and thumotic parts of Callicles' soul in order to persuade him to reconsider his intellectual concepts: images such as leaky jars, birds, and the kinaidos. There, Socrates uses imagery in order to bring to life tensions and even contradictions in the interior life of his interlocutor. Those tensions are not reducible to something like contradictions in Callicles' propositional beliefs, but rather are more like contradictions and tensions in Callicles' beliefs, desires, and vision of the good, that is, ideas that Callicles holds and lives, not only at an intellectual but also an affective level. I suggest that Socrates might understand such images to be useful because imagination is a faculty that draws together sensitive experience and abstract, universal thinking. Images presented verbally affect us both as a result of our past felt sensations and evaluative experiences, and also constitute categorical thinking, insofar as language always draws upon that which is universal. Thus, Plato shows that imagery can serve as a kind of bridge to other forms of rational argumentation.

Keith McPartland

“Inherence and Kath' Hauto Predication”

In *Posterior Analytics* I.4-5, Aristotle talks about the type of predication that must be present in the premises and conclusions of scientific demonstrations. He claims that the predicate must be predicated of the subject universally, where what is predicated of a subject universally is predicated of it ‘in every case’, ‘in itself’, and ‘as such’. Aristotle goes on to distinguish at least two different cases of ‘in itself’ or *kath' hauto* predication. In this paper, I first try to get a bit clearer on the nature of universal and *kath'*

hautō predication. I then argue that we can understand what is involved in *kath' hautō* predication in terms of the said-of and inherence relations that Aristotle discusses in the *Categories*. The ontological ground for one sort of *kath' hautō* predication is the fact that the ontological predicate is said-of the ontological subject. The ontological ground for another sort of *kath' hautō* predication is the inherence of the ontological predicate in the ontological subject.

Christopher Merwin, New School for Social Research,
merwc322@newschool.edu
"Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Democracy of Happiness"

My paper seeks to examine Aristotle's conception of happiness as described in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as an examination of Thomas Aquinas's reflections and reformulations of Aristotle and how this might help modern moral actors bridge the distance to Aristotle's virtue ethics. On its face Aristotle's virtue ethics do not appear to satisfy the needs of modern moral actors because of the inherently undemocratic nature of his conception. However, we can appeal to Aquinas's reinterpretation of some of the specific Aristotelian virtues (namely magnanimity and magnificence) which would seem to be at odds with modern democratic notions of happiness. In order to accomplish this I look at Aristotle's specific comments on magnanimity and magnificence and their general role in the overall discussion of eudaimonia and why these descriptions seem unsatisfying to modern moral actors. I then examine Aquinas's reinterpretation of the same sections of Aristotle and show how Aquinas's is able to preserve the spirit of Aristotle's virtue ethics while reinterpreting magnanimity and magnificence in a way which is more easily taken up by modern democratic moral agents.

Ryan Middleton, University of Western Ontario,
rmiddle6@uwo.ca
"Law As the Expression of Statesmanship: the rule of law in Plato's *Statesman*"

Plato's dialogue, the *Statesman*, is too often ignored in efforts to understand Plato's political theory. Worse, modern audiences (and scholars) who do read the dialogue imagine that Plato's statesman is a kind of tyrannical ruler whose decrees are to be followed exactly and under which laws the statesman himself is not subject. In other words, readers believe Plato's statesman is a despot. I shall argue that this reading of the *Statesman* needs correcting.

While it is true that the statesman is not subject to his (or any) laws, the reason for this is due to a limitation in law itself. To the statesman, the laws are merely a rough guide--similar to the general prescriptions of a physician to a large group. These, however, could hardly be preferred to a prescription tailored for the individual patient.

Likewise, the generality of laws prevents them from being perfectly beneficial in each particular case. Hence, the rule of law is only second-best to a situation where the expertise of statesmanship could

adjudicate particular cases. Yet the discussion in the *Statesman* suggests that democracy strips a society of its ability to discover and authorize genuine statesmen. The rule by statesmen (though preferred) is an option no longer available.

The only remaining alternative is the strict (i.e. 'to the letter') rule of the established laws--the admittedly outdated laws of the past. This, I shall argue, is the correct interpretation of the political theory in Plato's *Statesman*. To defend it, I will propose that the connection between these two options is found in the way that law imitates and represents statesmanship in lieu of an existing statesman.

In the *Statesman*, political integrity requires that sovereignty be constituted by the expertise of statesmanship. There is only one real and legitimate form of government: the one where the ruler or rulers truly possess statesmanship. Law can act as the expression of that knowledge. And in the absence of an existing statesman, the laws laid down by previous statesmen act as an acceptable substitute ruler. The rule of law, when that law is the product of statesmanship, is the best imitation of the rule by statesmen.

Mark Moes, Grand Valley State University,
moesm@gvsu.edu
"Socrates on the "Greatest Things" in the *Apology*"

Plato's Socrates says in the *Apology* that he spent his life examining and questioning people on how best to live, but avows that he himself knows nothing important about the "greatest things" (ta megista). In the *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, and *Phaedo*, however, Socrates presents radical and grandiose theories about the "greatest things." Sandra Peterson in her recent *Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato* (Cambridge, 2011) offers an illuminating and original hypothesis which explains this puzzle of Socrates' two contrasting ways of treating philosophy and the "greatest things," without appealing to dubious views about the development of Plato's authorial intentions. She bases her hypothesis upon a reading of the *Apology* that takes Socrates' avowals of ignorance about the "greatest things" as altogether sincere and straightforward. She argues that, in stretches of the latter three dialogues where Socrates appears to be confidently articulating his own doctrines, Plato really is depicting him as conducting the first steps of an examination in which he is eliciting or extracting what his interlocutors believe is the best way to live, constantly examining and always stopping short of endorsing any of the doctrines or suggestions he puts forward. Plato depicts him as holding a mirror up the interlocutors, in order to bring their many questionable convictions into the open for examination, and by doing so Plato gives readers reflections of themselves to examine. She concludes that there is a single Socrates whose conception and practice of philosophy, as centrally involving examining and as largely excluding the formulation of positive doctrines or the endorsement of particular conceptions, remains the same throughout the dialogues. Peterson uses her interpretation of Socrates' speech in the *Apology* as the main basis for her interpretations of all the dialogues. This approach bears a great deal of fruit in her stimulating reading of various other dialogues. Nevertheless her conclusion is highly contestable. For Plato depicts Socrates in the *Phaedrus* as embodying and expressing a dialectical method, a method which is not exhausted in

examination and refutation, but includes a (revisable) theory-building component as well, and which leaves place for the formulation of defensible positive theses (or at least the presentation of hints toward the formulation of such theses). In this paper, I present the beginnings of an argument for rejecting her conclusion, by putting some aspects of her reading of the *Apology* into question.

Patrick Mooney, John Carroll University,
pmooney@jcu.edu
“Socrates' Philosophy of Language: What Ion Doesn't Know”

In Plato's *Ion*, Socrates argues that Ion the rhapsode is unable to speak “cleverly” about Homer's poetry on account of any knowledge he has of it, because he lacks any. This is an astonishing claim to make in light of Ion's recent competitive success at the Festival of Asclepius for his rhapsody (reciting epic poetry for audiences, Homer being Ion's specialty); in addition, Ion is known for his great ability to speak about Homer's work, presumably by offering explanations and interpretations of Homer's work. How, then, can he not possess knowledge of Homer's work? How can he not speak cleverly about it? And why is Socrates—someone otherwise exclusively focused upon questions about human virtue—interested in these topics?

This paper defends the view that, contrary to what is often concluded about this short dialogue, Socrates is in fact arguing that Ion cannot speak cleverly about Homer's poetry—precisely because he lacks knowledge of it (and so Socrates is not here instead paving the way for attributing Ion's ability to “divine inspiration”). What emerges from this view is nothing less than Socrates' philosophy of language—a philosophy that is all-but obscured by the more common reading of the dialogue—according to which it is our natural interest in the truth about things that secures reference, and not a sentence's “meaning” (a meaning that is officially neutral concerning matters of truth or falsehood).

In addition to defending Socrates' unusual philosophy of language, the paper explains what connection there is for him between questions about reference (as we moderns sometimes call them) and questions about virtue, his normal setting. This connection, it is maintained, rests with how he thinks about our natural interest in the truth about things, particularly when it comes to matters of the good.

Parviz Morewedge, GSP, SUNY OWB,
pmorewed@gmail.com
“Avicenna and Tusi on Analytics in the Light of Contemporary Philosophies of Logic and Mathematics”

This paper examines Avicenna's notion of number and categories and Tusi's doctrines of syntactical and phenomenological models of infinity in the context of contemporary philosophies of mathematics and logic.

J.J. Mulhern, University of Pennsylvania,
johnjm@sas.upenn.edu
"Politeia in Aristotle, Pol. IV: An Annotated Catalogue"

Aristotle's *Politics* contains over 500 occurrences of the expression politeia, and Book IV contains about 130 of them. Modern English-language translators have rendered by 'constitution' in almost every case; but few have said what they think that a constitution is, so it is not clear what they have intended their translations to mean. And in English, as the OED shows, 'constitution' is an expression with a variety of senses, which may not match up exactly with the senses of politeia in Aristotle or other Greek authors.

Following indications in Bonitz, Newman, Rhodes, Bordes, and others, I have undertaken an annotated catalogue of all the occurrences of this expression in the *Politics*, having already completed a trial run with the *Politeia of the Athenians*, which contains 62 occurrences and which was one of the preliminary studies on which the *Politics* was based. This scholarly tradition recognizes several senses of politeia, and I propose here to show how these are distributed in Book IV.

This trial-run material was presented in two conference papers: "Politeia in the Aristotelian Politeia of the Athenians: A Catalogue of Uses," Annual Meeting, Northeastern Political Science Association, Philadelphia, November 18, 2011; and "Politeia as Citizenship in Aristotle," Annual Meeting, American Philological Association, Philadelphia, Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Panel, January 7, 2012.

Takeshi Nakamura, Osaka University of Health and Sport Sciences,
nakamura@ouhs.ac.jp
"The Theory of Receptacle and the Theory of Geometrical Particles in Plato's *Timaeus*"

In the opening scene of the second part of the *Timaeus* (48e-52d) Plato introduces a genus called "Receptacle." This Receptacle seems to take up important roles in the *Timaeus*, but interpreters have widely disagreed on what kind of roles exactly it plays since the way it is talked about is quite vague. After introducing the theory of Receptacle, however, Plato starts presenting the theory that physical objects in this natural world all consist of geometrical particles (53c ff.). A variety of interpretations have also been offered regarding what these particles are.

At first sight, these two theories, the theory of Receptacle and that of geometrical particles, appear to be completely different or even opposing explanations of the changes of natural objects. Receptacle is, after all, a domain where many different qualities appear, and the qualitative changes of the same objects can be explained by saying different qualities enter this domain one after another. On the other hand, the theory of geometrical particles seems to explain the movements and qualitative changes of objects in terms of the gathering and scattering of particles. However, if these prima facie interpretations are on

the right track, why does Plato offer these two different explanations about the same event, i.e., the changes of natural objects, side by side?

Taking this question into consideration, I will discuss the relation between the two theories: whether they are compatible with each other and, as some have argued, they are complementing each other, or they are incompatible in some way or other, as some have suggested.

In this presentation, I will show that the two theories are in fact incompatible with each other from the following line of argument. First, as to the greatly controversial passage (48e-52d) in the theory of Receptacle, I will argue that Cherniss's and Lee's reading of the passage is much more plausible than the traditional reading. Then, I also suggest that even this (Cherniss's) reading implies an interpretation of the Receptacle which conflicts with the theory of geometrical particles. That is, according to Cherniss's (or Lee's) version of the Receptacle theory, our ordinary conception of "thinghood", which consists of an underlying substratum and changing qualities, is dissolved into (part of) the Receptacle and separate characters which enter and leave the Receptacle from time to time. Through this deconstruction of "things" we can avoid the Parmenidean logical puzzle, which accuses us of calling the same thing "fire" one moment and "water" the next. In one passage (81B-E) of the geometrical particle theory, however, elemental triangles are said to go through aging deterioration, and this seems to imply that those elemental triangles are, after all, functioning like "things", which persist through changes of qualities or characters.

Lawrence Nannery, St. Francis College,
lejn42@aol.com
"Epicureanism, Ancient and Modern"

A precis of the ethical teachings of Epicurus is given in the beginning. Then a consideration of David Hume's ethical thought is given. Last, an outline of the presuppositions contained in Utilitarian thought is provided.

A comparison among the three is the payoff, showing the superiorities of Epicurus to his modern counterparts.

Zarifbekova Nigina, Association of Persian Studies, Tajikistan
shamstitanur@mail.ru
"Analysis of Philosophical Terms in Firdousi's *Book of King (Shahname)*"

This presentation focuses on a selected set of terms used in the 60,000 versus of epical poetry of *Shahname* regarding the existential encounter such of human vision of free will vs. the determined universal world order, the ephemeral strength of youth vs. the reality of frailty of old age, as well as joys

and despairs of human existence. The paper concludes that Firdousi's aim is to depict human behavior in different existential situations; Firdousi does not prefer any specific universal ethics or theodicy.

Justin Nordin, Loyola University Chicago,
jpn144@gmail.com

"Playing With Mirrors: The Self-Reflexivity of Plato's Metaphysics and Dialogues"

This paper seeks to answer the following question: What is the relation between Plato's Metaphysics as developed in the dialogues and his use of the dialogical form as a tool for conveying his Metaphysics? While it has become relatively common for scholars to take into account the dramatic form of Plato's dialogues while interpreting them, the explicit connection between Plato's Metaphysics and his use of dialogues is rarely developed. In short, it seems that there is a tendency to either read the dialogues doctrinally, thus ignoring their dialogical form and the philosophical significance of this form, or to favor a dramatic reading at the expense of any doctrinal reading, thereby ignoring the actual metaphysical position that is developed within the dialogues.

In this essay, I will ground Plato's use of dialogues in his Metaphysics, particularly with regards to the relation between sensible and intelligible reality and the concept of recollection. Plato's ontology will be shown to be inherently self-reflexive, and this self-reflexivity will be shown to relate directly to Plato's use of the dialogical form. In order to bring the self-reflexive nature of Plato's Metaphysics and dialogues to light, I will focus on Plato's use of the mirroring metaphor throughout the dialogues. I will argue that the concept of "mirroring" pervades Plato's Metaphysics at every level and unifies the conceptual content of the dialogues with their dialogical form.

Lauren Olin, Washington University in St. Louis,
leolin@wustl.edu

"Plato on the Pleasures of Comedy"

Plato's writings testify to his comedic sensitivity. His main character Socrates is endowed with a cunning sense of humor and, often, this capacity is instrumental in his efforts to put "pretenders to wisdom" in their places (*Apology* 33c). However, evidence of Plato's skill as a humorist, and of Socrates' ironic disposition, is not easily brought to bear in interpretations of Plato's position on the nature and value of humor. In contrast to the view his talents inspire, Plato's explicit remarks on the subjects of humor and comedy are largely negative (e.g. *Laws* 934d-936c; *Apology* 18d, 19c; *Philebus* 48a-50c; cf. Morreal 1983: 4-5).

In considering Plato's position on humor, then, we are faced with an apparent paradox. There is evidence that Plato thought deeply about humor and recognized its value, but at the same time there is evidence that he disapproved of comedy and its consequences. As Wood (2007: 77) puts the point: "Plato seems to practice comedy himself while condemning its use by others. He uses precisely those features of comedy that his character Socrates criticizes in actual comedies: most notably imitation and

ridicule.” The paradox is sharpened by the fact that standard interpretations of Plato’s discussion of comedy in *Philebus* 48a-50c make it difficult to distinguish between the sorts of pleasures we experience watching Socrates ridicule and humiliate his interlocutors, and those a malicious person experiences witnessing the ridicule of a friend (Morreal 1983; McCabe 2010). It is made less obviously tractable by the fact that his dialogues do not include a complete account of humor or comedy.

This paper aims first to reconstruct his views on these topics, and secondly to examine this apparent paradox in light of that reconstruction. In the first part of the paper I provide an exposition of Plato’s discussion of comedy in the *Philebus*, and argue that it is intended to apply narrowly to the case of malicious comedy: Plato’s general account of comic pleasure is more nuanced than commonly supposed. In the second half I turn to the broader context of the *Philebus*, and reconstruct an account of humorous amusement that is consistent with Plato’s general account of pleasure, and which implies that different types of people experience the laughable in different ways – ways dictated by the desires of their souls. In conclusion, I apply this account to the apparent paradox outlined above, and show that Plato’s account, on my interpretation, has the resources to explain both why humor is a valuable part of the good life, and why, for some individuals, exposure to humor brings only deleterious effects and should not be indulged.

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Katharine O'Reilly, King's College London,
katharine.oreilly@kcl.ac.uk

“Epicurus and the Cyrenaics on Recollected and Anticipated Pain”

In his dying words, Epicurus describes the way in which the recollection of past pleasurable conversations served to offset the extreme pain caused by the kidney stones that would soon kill him. The memories brought him happiness, but in the mouth of a hedonist this produces a puzzle: since the Epicurean account of eudaimonia includes being free of pain, Epicurus seems to be contradicting himself if he says that he is happy while at the same time experiencing the greatest pain of his life.

In the rival camp, the Cyrenaics emphasise the pleasure of the moment - desiring particular pleasures for their own sake, and insisting that those are the telos of life. Yet we find in the ancient sources examples of the Cyrenaics discussing issues that would only be of interest to someone who concerned with their future happiness: pleasure over a lifetime, the utility of friendship, and the purpose of wealth, for

example. Most problematically, for those who consider the Cyrenaics extreme presentists, they have some strange advice about future pain, as reported by Cicero, in which they insist on the importance of anticipating possible future evils, the pre-rehearsal of which mitigates their pain.

In this paper, I explore the evidence for the importance of recollected and anticipated pain in the philosophy of these two schools. I argue that, for the Epicureans, training yourself to recall past pain-free moments vividly is their most important tool for pain management, and one which has much to reveal about the content of Epicurean therapy. The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, are not concerned with the past. Their striking advice about the future is explained by a kind of moral economics game: in anticipating merely possible future pain, they can lessen the shock of events which may come to pass, thereby reducing the pain, without experiencing any increased pain in the present.

Just as the views of these rival hedonists on pleasure are crucial to our understanding of their philosophy, so are their conceptions of the proper attitude towards pain. An exploration of their accounts, and the dialectical environment in which they arose, reveals a new dimension of these schools' prescribed routes to happiness.

Orusbekova Parvina , *Tajik Association of Media Professionals*, Tajikistan,
orusbekova@yahoo.com

“Platonic Sources of Philosophy of Persons in Medieval Tajik-Iranian Mystical Poetry”

This paper begins by constructing a model of process of self-realization ethics based on Plato's *The Republic* (the allegory of the cave, the divided line) and *The Symposium* (the ladder of Eros). Next it shows affinity between the original Greek model and the medieval Farsi mystical notions of *Tariqa* (the way, Dao), *Maqamat wa Ahwal* (the extensional and intentional (hermeneutic) phase of personal transformation. Finally, our *analysis* examines the notion of truth (*Asha* [Ancient Persian] with attention to P. Friedlander's criticism of Heidegger's reading of Plato's notion of truth (*aletheia*). Finally the investigation discusses how development of Platonic themes in medieval Persian mystical poetry is similar to the Neoplatonic readings of Plato.

Eric Perl, Loyola Marymount University,
eperl@lmu.edu

“The Analogy of Transcendence:”

Prop. 130 of the *Elements of Theology* begins, “In any divine order the first terms transcend those immediately subordinate to them in a greater way than the latter do their subsequents.” This means that the principle of analogy governs not only the contents of each level of reality in relation to others, but also the mode in which each level is higher than, or transcends, its subordinates. Thus, for example, it is misleading to say simply that intellect transcends soul and that soul transcends body. Such a formulation would suggest that transcendence itself is univocal in these two cases. Rather, we must say that intellect transcends soul in a greater way than soul transcends body: transcendence itself is

analogical. The same is true with regard to subdivisions within these levels, e.g. celestial as distinct from sublunar bodies or the intelligible as distinct from the intellectual. The full significance of this principle, however, emerges when it is applied to the highest level of all: the transcendence of the One to all things whatsoever, transcends the transcendence of the intelligible to the sensible, or any other lesser transcendence. The One's transcendence is thus irreducible to either the "ontic" difference of one being from another or the "metaphysical" difference of one level of reality from another. This is now well recognized, and has been expressed by such formulations as "the other otherness" or "the second transcendence." But what prop. 130 reveals is that, since the modes of transcendence are analogically related, the transcendence of the One may be regarded as the limit case of this general principle, the stretching to infinity of these ascending modes. Since there is no proportion of finite to infinite, the One's transcendence is indeed incommensurable with all lesser modes of transcendence, but it is nonetheless continuous with them. Taking the One as a "limit" that may be indefinitely approached but never reached, in accordance with the principle articulated in prop. 130, allows us to avoid the anarchic nihilism that threatens to result from the One's infinite absence, without hypostasizing the One as an attainable ultimate term in the ascending series.

Luca Pitteloud, Université de Fribourg, Switzerland,
luca.pitteloud@berkeley.edu
"Plato and thought experiments"

In this paper, I want to show how Plato uses thought experiments in order to prove the necessity of postulating the hypothesis of Forms. It seems plausible to assert that, for Plato, his metaphysical theory is linked with the possibility of describing the world without Forms. As his metaphysical proposal is indeed what he calls a hypothesis, thought experiments can be viewed as a process to provide a counter-hypothesis that would describe a possible world where the intelligible would have been eliminated. It seems that the possibility to imagine a counter-factual situation is for Plato an efficient way of providing an argument in favor of the existence of Forms. I shall propose a possible definition of what are thought experiments in Plato's *Metaphysics*: in order to provide a proper account of thought experiments, I will show that they have to be distinguished from other devices Plato sets up to illustrate what is the state of the world with the Forms, as for instance the Cave (*Republic*, 514a-521e). Contrary to an allegory, thought experiments consists of a counter-factual imaginative exercise which will be illustrated by the two following passages: 1) Socrates dream in the *Theaetetus* (201c-202c) in comparison with the Late Learners in the *Sophist* (251b) and the question of the absence of Forms; 2) the hypothesis "if the One is not" in the last two series of deductions in the *Parmenides* (164b6-166b2) as a way of describing the world of appearance if intelligible realities are supposed not to exist. I shall conclude my paper with some elements concerning the consistency of such thought experiments within a rational argument.

Julie Ponesse, SUNY Brockport,
jponesse@brockport.edu

“Aristotle on Akrasia and Moral Perception”

The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem of akrasia (incontinence or “weakness of will”) in *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.3. There, the explanation for why the akratic person fails to do what he believes to be right is that he acts in ignorance of the wrongness of his action. The akratic experiences what Christopher Shields calls a kind of “implementation failure,” abandoning reason because of the attraction of available pleasures. But the puzzle remains, why does the akratic fail to “exercise” or “attend to” the conclusion of his practical syllogism (1146b33-1147a18)?

To answer this question, commentators have tended to focus on the akratic's failure to properly adjudicate the struggle between his rational impulse and the countervailing influence of some non-rational emotion (*pathos*) that ultimately overwhelms his choice (1147a14-17). But this leaves unexplained what are the psychological mechanisms that account for this failure. To say that the akratic's desire for pleasure trumps his desire to follow reason is not to explain why this occurs.

A key piece of the puzzle is to be found outside Aristotle's moral philosophy, in his psychology and natural philosophy. I draw on Tony Roark's recent work in *Aristotle on Time*, which argues for the importance of temporal perception in the development of cognition, to explain why the akratic is unable to resist detrimental temptations. Roark's key insight is that reason (concerned with what may be in the future) and desire (concerned only with what is immediately at hand) generate for the akratic a conflict between what is good in the future versus what is good now. I appeal to Roark's account of the role of imagination (*phantasia*) in the formation of counterfactuals to explain why the akratic inadequately perceives the relevant features of his situation. Imagination, I will argue, allows the virtuous person to adopt the appropriate perspective on what is hypothetically possible. The akratic, by contrast, either cannot fully imagine future objects of desire or he misjudges their allure relative to present goods. Because the akratic sees a future pleasure as a non-live possibility and hence as no possibility at all, he cannot imagine himself choosing other than what is presented immediately to him.

This picture explains both forms of akrasia mentioned in NE VII.3: impetuosity and weakness (1150b19-26). The impetuous person's inability to form counterfactual phantasms prevents him from reaching the conclusion suggested by the major and minor premise (misjudgment); the weak person misjudges the relative goodness of counterfactual phantasms, which prevents him from allowing the dictates of the syllogism's conclusion to carry him all the way to action (inaction based on true judgment). In both cases, the akratic's underdeveloped moral perception makes him unable to apprehend the relevant facts of a conflicting situation in a motivationally effective way. Focusing on the akratic's failure in moral perception, and hence on his underdeveloped intellectual virtue, best explains why Aristotle would say that the akratic acts in ignorance, specifically in ignorance of the value of any future sense of his own agency.

“Scientific Method in *Meteorology IV*”

This paper is a contribution to the debate about the extent to which Aristotle’s theory of scientific inquiry outlined in the *Posterior Analytics* and elsewhere was applied in his works on zoology and ‘chemistry’. One of my main claims is that a careful reading of *Meteorology IV* can lend support to a number of recent studies devoted to Aristotle’s biological treatises, studies that emphasize significant connections with Aristotle’s more general and programmatic texts dealing with scientific understanding.

Material powers or dispositions (liquefiable, fragile etc.) play a dominant role in *Meteorology IV* (a) in virtue of their role in the generic division of uniform stuffs, based on successive differentiation and multiple differentiae, and (b) in virtue of their explanatory power, as they seem to reveal otherwise undetectable characteristics of uniform materials (chemical composition and physical microstructure). While Aristotle occasionally starts with accounts of ingredients and their ratio (e.g., ‘stuffs that contain mostly water behave in this or that way’), the natural direction of Aristotle’s investigation is from observations regarding dispositional properties and their manifestation to accounts of chemical composition and microstructure. Inferences that reflect this direction tend to be easily syllogizable; this feature (along with the criteria governing the method of division) argues, I believe, for the compatibility of *Meteorology IV* with texts such as the *Posterior Analytics*.

Tony Preus, Binghamton University,
apreus@binghamton.edu

“Socrates in Aristotle: Some Oddities”

Aristotle’s comments on the Socrates may be grouped into those that focus on metaphysical issues, particularly distinguishing Socrates’ views from those of Plato; opinions about ethical and political matters; and some miscellaneous comments that fit in neither of those categories. Some of these comments have had significant influence on the philosophical interpretation of Plato’s dialogues, especially, and on the reconstruction of the thought of the historical Socrates. It is not always easy to determine whether Aristotle is talking about the historical Socrates or the character in Plato’s dialogues; we also don’t know the extent to which Aristotle’s rather schematic understanding of the development of philosophy before his time has influenced his mental image of Socrates. We can, however, compare his comments with the texts of Plato and others and then point out discrepancies that need some sort of explanation. Does Aristotle provide a corrective to the Platonic image of Socrates, or does Aristotle reveal his own methodology in his treatment of the figure of Socrates? We here focus on the nature of the interpretive problem.

Habibeh Rahim, St. John’s University,
rahim.h2007@yahoo.com

“Considerations on Said Nursi and Allama Tabatabai as Regards Universalism and the Ethics of Humanity”

Originating from different socio-cultural backgrounds with varied creedal affiliations (Sunni and Shi'a), Said Nursi (d. 1960) and Allama Tabatabai (d. 1981) share a remarkable cohesion of positions and views. At the foremost, both were concerned with the morass of the Umma in general and sought ways to uplift them. Though they were distinct in the details of their approach, they were similar in recognizing the need for constructive progressive thought. Secondly, they sought to find common ground with other faith traditions in order to maintain and consolidate the essential *telos* of Islam. In this aspect as well, their methods differed but the end goal was similar. Finally, most significantly, they sought to refer to the revealed scripture of Islam, the sacred Qur'an, in order to find solutions and resolutions to the pragmatic and ideological needs of the societies in which they lived. To this end they penned voluminous commentaries related to the message of the Qur'an by way of the *Risale-i Nur* and *Tafsir al-Mizan* respectively. In my paper, I examine the remarkable convergences between these two thinkers and identify the details of their differences in their discussion of four seminal *ayats* of the Qur'an.

Jean-Philippe Ranger, St. Thomas University,
jpranger@stu.ca
"Was Callicles Refuted?"

In this paper, I analyze Socrates' refutation of Callicles (Gorg. 481b-506c) to determine whether it is successful. I argue that on one level, Socrates does refute Callicles insofar as he shows that there is an inconsistency in his opponent's initial set of beliefs: his praise of wisdom and courage is incompatible with hedonism. However, that refutation is for Callicles purely superficial and does not get to the bottom of things (499b). Furthermore, the lesson he takes away from the exchange is that it is imperative to reject hedonism. Insofar as Callicles does that, his debate with Socrates strengthens his overall position. In the end, Socrates does not succeed in refuting Callicles' ethical theory.

I develop this argument in three steps. First I analyze Callicles' position in his first speech by comparing it to two similar positions: the Athenians in Thucydides' Melian dialogue and Thrasymachus' in Rep. I. After having established that Callicles' position is different from the two others, I examine how the part of the debate that happens directly after the first speech provides useful insight into Calliclean ethics. In the second part of my paper, I examine certain formal elements of the Socratic elenchus that can help us understand Socrates' strategy in the exchange. Namely, it explains the (apparently sudden) examination of the value of temperance. In the third and final section of my paper, I analyze Socrates' response to Callicles' beliefs concerning pleasure. By showing Callicles how the claim that "pleasure is the good" is incompatible with his initial speech, he exposes an inconsistency in Callicles' belief-set. However, contrary to what seemingly happens in other dialogues where the elenchus is prominent, the result is not that Callicles rejects the belief he espouses in his first speech. Rather, he rejects the claim of hedonism. By the end of the debate (and at the end of the dialogue) Plato presents us two rival moral theories that are incompatible. The troubling point is that he does not offer us the tools to choose between them.

Heather L. Reid, Morningside College,
reid@morningside.edu

“Beautiful Virtue: Aristotle on *Kalokagathia*”

In *Rhetoric* Aristotle praises the beauty of the pentathlete. It is not the idle observation of a sports fan. In fact, the balanced and harmonious beauty of these athletes’ bodies reflects Aristotle’s ideal of a virtuous soul as described in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: one able to discern noble ends and means, and to transform those ideas into physical activity completed by the pleasure appropriate to happiness (*eudaimonia*). In stark contrast to the aristocratic idea of inborn virtue, Aristotelian *aretē* is a matter of deliberate character training (*ethos*), complemented by the intellectual understanding of what is beautiful (*kalon*). In *Eudemian Ethics* 8.15. Aristotle goes on to explain his idea of beautiful goodness (*kalokagathia*). The purpose of this paper is to identify *kalokagathia* with the *aretē* described in *Nicomachean Ethics* as the ability to perform beautiful and good actions for the sake of beauty and goodness. As Aristotle says, “*Kalokagathia* is perfect excellence” ἔστιν οὖν καλοκάγαθία ἀρετὴ τέλειος (1249a15-17).

Matthew Robinson, Boston College,
matthew.robinson@bc.edu

“The Aristotelian noetic in Bonaventure and the early 13th Century Franciscans”

This paper aims to clarify the pre-Thomistic development of Latin interpretations of the agent intellect within the Franciscan school. It briefly outlines Bonaventure's interpretation of the agent intellect as a power of the individual soul, and then traces important elements of this account to the earlier Franciscans John of la Rochelle and Alexander of Hales, and to two anonymous Latin authors. The aim of the paper is to highlight to what degree Bonaventure's account is innovative, and in what ways it depends upon his predecessors.

Thanassis Samaras, UGA,
samaras@gwu.edu

“Who Are Aristotle's Many?”

In this paper I argue for the following theses:

- 1) Aristotle’s classification of constitutions in the *Politics* III 7, which follows Plato’s classification in the *Politicus* with one inconsequential change, decisively frames the discussion of constitutional types that follows. There has been a tendency among commentators to ignore or downplay this classification, but there is no reason to do so.
- 2) Despite being a form of ‘rule by the many’, polity is not a democracy either in the sense that a contemporary of Aristotle would understand the term or according to Aristotle’s own determination of what constitutes a democracy in III 1, 2 and 4.

The critical points which differentiate Aristotle's polity from democracy are:

- a) Not all native adult males are citizens.
- b) The many in polity turn out to be a group between the *dēmos* and the *oligoi*. They are a middle hoplitic class and in some versions of polity Aristotle calls them *hoi mesoi*, a term which cannot in any way be regarded as a synonym or even rough equivalent of the *hoi polloi*.

There are more differences to be added to this list, but it is also indicative of Aristotle's intentions that he calls this constitutional type *politeia*, a term which distinguishes it from democracy, whereas Plato was happy to call democracy both the correct and the deviant type of rule by the many.

For this reason, the position that Aristotle can be regarded as sympathetic to democracy because of the merits that he attributes to polity is untenable. On the more general question of his attitude towards democracy there is also III 11, where he talks about the intellectual abilities of the *plēthos*. I have explained why in my article in *Classical Quarterly* 57 (2007): 77–89.

- 3) If thesis 2 is correct, it is not possible to interpret Aristotle as a pro-democratic thinker who can be placed, historically, at the inception of what has come to be known as the republican tradition. Aristotle's concept of polity belongs to this tradition, but as part of a wider, and actually anti-democratic, net of ideas which were around in the fourth century.

Jonathan Sanford, Franciscan University of Steubenville,
jsanford@franciscan.edu
"Aristotle and the Privation Theory of Evil"

The contention that evil is a deprivation of a due good and *no per se* being is at the heart of Augustine's post-Manichean view of reality, but it is usually remembered that the origins of Augustine's theory are not Christian but Neoplatonic. In *Ennead* I.8 Plotinus posits matter as evil and at II.4 as a privation. The identification of a metaphysical account of evil with matter has its own problems, nevertheless one has to start somewhere, and philosophical accounts of evil as a privation begin there, or so the standard narrative goes.

Is this, however, the beginning of the story? I argue that it is not, and that, in fact, Aristotle employs a privation theory of evil. To be sure, this is not a privation theory of evil of the Plotinian variety, and indeed it is Plotinus himself who emphasizes the distance of his own account from Aristotle's when in *Ennead* II.4. 16, 3-8 he rejects the Aristotelian distinction between matter and privation. For Plotinus, matter is privation.

A typical interpretation is that Aristotle's treatment of evil is compatible with a privation theory of evil, but nevertheless that Aristotle lacks a metaphysical account of evil as privation. It is the latter assumption I wish to challenge.

The most critical passage for attempting to justify my claim that Aristotle maintains a privation theory of evil is Meta 9.9. In this chapter of Theta Aristotle compares the relative perfection of good potentialities and actualities (tēs spoudaias dunameōs hē energeia) on the one hand, and of potentialities and bad actualizations (tōs kakōs) on the other. He contends in this passage that although in general actuality is prior to potentiality in formula and substance, a bad actuality is always posterior to potentiality and further, that there can be no bad apart from bad things (dēlon ara hoti ouk esti to kakon para ta pragmata). The reasons for these claims, I will contend, is that any bad actuality can only be understood as such because it is the contrary of a good actuality, it is the good actuality which reveals the potentiality, and bad actualities manifest themselves as bad precisely because of their failure to achieve the actualization (entelecheia) of a given being's actuality (energeia), understood as a failure to reach the end (telos) of a substance's essence (to ti ēn einai).

This account makes possible a treatment of evil which attributes to it a sort of reality as either a kind of fulfillment (teleios), such as in Meta. V, or as a quality (to poion), such as in Meta. V. 14, while at the same seeing such fulfillments or qualities as perversions (kai gar hē diaphthora tōn kakōn estin (Meta. 1151a 21)). There are significant metaphysical and ethical implications which can be drawn from Aristotle's distinctive privation of theory of evil, but the purpose of this paper is not to draw them out but to make the case that Aristotle maintains such a theory.

Gina Santiago, Binghamton,
gsantia2@binghamton.edu

“Language and Reality in *Euthydemus*: The Denial of Becoming and Denial of Falsehood in the Second Eristic Display”

In this paper, my overall aim is to offer and defend an interpretation which examines the critical, philosophical function of two conclusions advanced by *Euthydemus* and *Dionysodorus*, in the second, eristic display of Plato's *Euthydemus*: the implied rejection of becoming and the denial of the possibility of falsehood. That is, the denial of becoming and the denial of falsehood are not solely facetious, insincere, and absurd claims consciously employed by Plato to expose the antipode of the Socratic dialectic, as Sprague suggests. What underpins these claim are philosophical issues that challenge the philosophical assumptions and concerns harbored by Socrates.

The one underlying, philosophical issue that is the focus of this paper is the degree to which language latches onto an ontological reality. The latter is inextricably tied to the former and in the *Euthydemus* they engender an obstruction to Socrates's' moral project. As O'Leary-Hawthorne notes, these two issues are also present in other dialogues, most notably *The Sophist*. What I am specifically concerned with is how the denial of becoming and the denial of falsehood challenge the moral aims of the Socratic elenchus.

In Section I, I briefly explicate the general differences between my approach to the dialogue and traditional approaches. A survey of the literature on *Euthydemus* suggests that the text has been primarily taken to be a protreptic, one in which Plato is juxtaposing two approaches to the philosophy

that have diametrical opposed aims: the eristic displays, geared toward verbal argumentation and victory, and the dialectic employed by Socrates, to exhort Cleinias to take up philosophy. According to Chance, Plato renders the eristic approach to philosophy a “negative paradigm” that is sharply contrasted with the more constructive elenchus of Socrates.

In Section II, I analyze the two passages in the second, eristic display, tracing out the emergence of the issue of language and ontology. I consider analyses of this passage offered by Chance, Sprague, which are helpful in highlighting the significance of this passage and how it impinges on Socrates concerns about virtue, knowledge and happiness. I am interested in the constructive and philosophically substantive ways in which the denial of becoming and the denial of falsehood motivate the philosophical issues within the context of *Euthydemus* itself. We can understand the claims made by the eristic pair as pointed examples of the tenuous relationship between language and ontology. They pose a challenge precisely because they highlight the disparity between language and ontology.

Since the aims of Socratic dialectic in the *Euthydemus* are centered on an exhortation to virtue, I consider whether the tenuous relationship between language and ontology is at all an issue for Socrates. The eristic arguments stem from ontological claims that do not seem to overlap with the broader, moral concerns. Nevertheless, I argue, Socrates ought to seriously consider these claims in order to resume his ultimate goal- the exhortation to virtue and self-knowledge.

Anne Schultz, Baylor,

Anne_Marie_Schultz@baylor.edu

“The Narrative Frame of Plato’s *Lysis*: A Socratic Self-Portrait of Moral Psychology and Philosophical Friendship”

In this paper, I analyze how the narrative aspects of the *Lysis* illustrate Socrates’ understanding of the moral psychology both in terms of his self-understanding and in terms of how he views what would morally benefit his interlocutors. As such, a consideration of moral psychology in this dialogue point to a reconsideration of the nature of friendship itself. This paper divides into three parts. First, I briefly describe the narrative structure and setting of the *Lysis* to establish what I mean by the narrative aspects of the dialogue. Briefly, the narrative aspects include an awareness of who Socrates’ auditor is, or at least the sort of person he might be, the very fact that Socrates is narrating an account of his own philosophical conversation, and that his narrative description provides interpretative tools to help us understand the philosophical elements of the dialogue. I then show that Socrates’ narrative commentary draws attention to Hippothales, Ctesippus, Lysis and Menexenus and how they interact with each other. By describing the emotions, psychological motivations and behaviors of his main interlocutors, Socrates highlights the differences between their active and passive modes of social engagement. These different modes of social engagement illustrate how their capacity for genuine friendship and for philosophical inquiry is shaped by their respective moral psychologies. Second, I demonstrate how Socrates’ narrative remarks highlight his own mental states, his emotional states, and his responses to his emotions. These self-reflective remarks offer a preliminary indication of how

Socrates' practice of philosophy incorporates the emotional as well as the intellectual dimensions of human experience. To explain briefly, when Socrates discloses his mental and emotional states to the auditor, he paints a detailed portrait of the philosopher in action. These details reveal Socrates' intellectual adaptability, his ongoing interrogative stance and his commitment to sustained philosophical conversation. But more importantly, the narrative commentary shows how Socrates' interest in eros particularly and the emotions more generally shapes his philosophic practice. By revealing these aspects of his philosophical process throughout his narrative commentary, Socrates provides the auditor with a positive model of friendship, the very quality under discussion in the dialogue. This narrative portrait of Socrates presents an initial challenge to the common view of Socrates as an intellectualist. Finally, I address how the narrative relationship between Socrates and his auditor allows us to interpret the aporetic conclusion of the dialogue in positive terms.

Bongrae Seok, Alvernia University,
Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu
"Correlative Homology and Confucian Moral Virtue"

Moral virtues are character traits or long term dispositions that guide a person's moral attitudes, emotions, and actions. In early Confucian tradition, however, moral virtues are often associated with and observed through non moral properties of the world, such as physical features of the body (facial features, skin color or texture), physiology of internal organs, and other non-moral qualities (color, sound, direct etc.) of the world. For example, righteousness (yi) is linked to and explained by the lungs and the musical note of shang. In many pre-Han and Han texts, this correlative homology is a popular style of explanation and argumentation in moral psychology and moral metaphysics. The paper discusses philosophical implications of the embodied and correlative nature of Confucian moral virtues. If moral virtues are compared with and explained by physical properties of the world, can Confucian virtues be regarded as character traits based on personal dispositions? Or are they particular patterns (personal/dispositional types) of causal relations that can be shared by many non-moral properties of the world? By analyzing early Confucian texts, the author of the paper develops an interpretation of the unity, cultivation, and identification of Confucian virtue in the context of correlative and embodied moral psychology.

Ehsan Shamsi, *George Town U, USA; Beheshti U, Iran*,
ehsan_shamsi2000@yahoo.com

Reflections on the Relation between Jurisprudence and Biomedical ethics in Medieval Islamic Tradition

This study investigates the philosophical theological basis of Islamic Jurisprudence as a framework for medieval bioethical theories in the medical works of Z. Razi and Avicenna, in comparison with Greek (e.g. Galen) and Jewish (e.g. Maimonides) traditions.

James Shaw, University of Tennessee,
jshaw15@utk.edu
“Hedonism and Courage in Plato”

In the *Gorgias* (497e-499b), Socrates offers an argument that hedonism effaces the distinctions between cowardice and courage and between wisdom and foolishness. In the *Philebus*(55b), he makes a very brief argument to the same effect. In the *Protagoras* (358a-360e), on the other hand, Socrates attempts a hedonist argument for the unity of courage and wisdom that maintains the distinction between that virtue and its opposite (which has, or has species with, various names: cowardice, rashness, madness, and ignorance).

Starting from a position that takes Plato to think that hedonism is the central commitment of popular morality, this paper attempts to recover Plato's argument that popular-cum-hedonist views cannot distinguish courage from cowardice. It then considers the relationship between the view so criticized and the view attributed to the many in the *Protagoras*, that courageous people go toward what they find fearful (359c-d; cf. 349e). Finally, it considers the consequences of this interpretation for questions about the attribution of hedonism in the *Protagoras*.

Mark Shiffman, Villanova University,
mark.shiffman@villanova.edu
“The Hermeneutics of Self-knowledge in Plutarch's *Isis* and *Osiris*”

Plutarch's *Isis* and *Osiris* presents itself as an effort to uncover the genuine meaning of Egyptian myths, doing so in terms of Platonic metaphysics. Understanding this goal simplistically leads scholars to see the text as a piece of Greco-Roman cultural imperialism. Plutarch, however, is less concerned with antiquarian accuracy in cultural studies than with promoting self-knowledge. He initially approaches his topic in terms of naturalistic and cosmological interpretations of the myths, but the ground soon shifts to an eroto-centric reading, then finally to a hermeneutical “recovery” of the original intentions of philosophical statesman-poets to overcome the “Typhonic” bestiality latent in the human soul by directing peoples toward a vision of the noble. Thus over the work as a whole, the emphasis shifts from the first principle sought by the soul to the experiences of the soul itself as incomplete and seeking; and Plutarch tries to put these experiences into the perspective of the shaping of the soul on the most fundamental level, accomplished by the laws. The initial structuring opposition of pure/impure is gradually replaced by that of human/bestial, with a corresponding shift in the relevant understanding of the kalon and the purposes of myth in the service of philosophy.

Chryssi Sidiropoulou, Boğazici University, Istanbul,
“Augustine and Islamic falsafa. Neo-platonic convergences and divergences”

This paper offers a comparison between St. Augustine's *Theory of Illumination* on the one hand, and the theory of conjunction with the Agent Intellect put forward by the representatives of Islamic falsafa, on the other. No exhaustive presentation of these theories will be attempted in the present confines. Rather, our focus is on highlighting what we see as a shared neoplatonic framework of assumptions behind both philosophical perspectives. So it is argued that both Augustine and Islamic philosophers such as Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina approach the question of human knowledge in a distinctively Platonic way, namely how do human beings *raise* themselves to the knowledge of universals? The paper retraces Augustine's theory of Illumination as it appears towards the end of *De Magistro*, intertwined with the conception of the Christ as the Interior Teacher. It then discusses the Islamic conception of the Agent Intellect (*al-'aql al-fa''āl*). In so doing, it underscores the latter's character of philosophical analogue for the angel of revelation (Jibril) in the religious tradition of Islam. Ultimately, the paper argues that both Augustine and the Islamic 'peripatetics' (*mashsha'i*) mentioned above, advance a very similar neo-platonic epistemology; but that they diverge where their respective theologies (Christianity's Incarnation, Trinitarian understanding of God and the *Logos* doctrine as opposed to Islam's strict monotheism, centrality of prophecy, and revelation to Muhammad) entail considerably different conceptual formations of their respective neo-platonic positions.

Chryssi Sidiropoulou, Boğazici University,

"Detached Souls versus Pious Persons: Agent Intellect and Human Destiny in Islamic Neoplatonism"

This paper examines Al-Farabi's and Ibn Sina's theory of the agent intellect focusing on their respective accounts of human knowledge through grasp of universals. In this context it discusses aspects of their epistemology in an attempt to highlight the neoplatonist character of their conception of the agent intellect and its repercussions for human happiness and fulfillment. From the point of view of Islamic orthodoxy this seems to raise considerable difficulties. It is argued that such difficulties lie behind Al-Ghazali's notorious criticism of the *falasifa* in his *Incoherence of the Philosophers*. Two of the issues raised by al-Ghazali are analyzed in this connection: a) The resurrection of bodies and b) God's knowledge of particulars. The paper suggests that both problems ultimately derive from a prevailing intellectualism of an unmistakably neoplatonist type.

Peter Simpson, CUNY,
psimpson@gc.cuny.edu

"aristotle's ethics: all four of them"

Scholars generally agree that Aristotle's *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* are genuine and that the *Eudemian* is earlier. They also generally agree that the *Magna Moralia* is probably not genuine and that *On Virtues and Vices* is certainly not genuine. There is, however, no non-question begging evidence for any of these claims, and the historical evidence is in favor of genuineness (only EE and NE having any doubt cast on them). The philosophical and literary features of all four works are better explained by difference of audience, not by difference of author or time of writing: NE is directed to legislators; EE to philosophers; MM to decent citizens; VV is an abstract of endoxa for philosophical purposes and is referred to as such by EE. This way of viewing the four works and their relations makes better sense of all of them.

Charles Snyder, New School for Social Research,
snydc357@newschool.edu
“Ethical Implications of Academic Epoche in Cicero's *Academica*”

This paper will argue that the Stoic apraxia charge against Academic epoche demonstrates the success of the Academic refutation of the cataleptic impression. This paper will conclude then that Academic skepticism is not required to defend the possibility of action or virtue on the basis of a theory of knowledge.

Nathanael Stein, Florida State University,
nstein2@fsu.edu
“Aristotle and the Whittling Argument”

In his discussion of time in *Physics* iv 10-14, Aristotle raises but ultimately does not answer a puzzle which purports to show that time does not exist. It takes the form of a dilemma, according to which, since neither the past nor the future exist, and non-existents cannot be combined to make something that does exist, time is not real. Nor can we reply that the present is a further part of time which does exist, the puzzle continues, since the “now” is something point-like, insofar as it has no temporal extension, and hence not really a part of time. This puzzle has noted similarities to arguments in Sextus and in Augustine, but neither it nor Aristotle’s ultimate response, if he were to give one, have yet been clarified as well as they might be. Some commentators have argued that the puzzle is a superficial one, not worthy of explicit response; others have argued that it is a deep one and have offered solutions on Aristotle’s behalf, though these largely involve offering Aristotle concepts which he does not develop in his discussion, such as that of a “tenseless” notion of existence. I argue first that the puzzle’s simplicity masks an important ambiguity which turns on what we take the alleged parts of time to be, and which has so far been largely ignored; as such, two versions of it may be formulated, one of which is stronger and more interesting than the other. I then propose a solution to the stronger puzzle on Aristotle’s behalf, one which makes better use of the resources he develops in his own account of time than is usually done. Aristotle’s response to the stronger formulation of the puzzle reveals, in turn, the outline of a more interesting theory of time than that with which he is usually credited.

Pavle Stojanovic, Johns Hopkins University,
pavle@jhu.edu
“Can non-unified objects be peculiarly qualified in Stoicism?”

The Stoics distinguished between objects that are unified in virtue of possessing a ‘tenor’ (hexis), and non-unified objects, those that exist by contact (e.g. a ship) or by separation (e.g. an army) and do not possess a hexis. Although our sources are not explicit about the Stoic position on this, it has been argued

recently, for example by Eric Lewis, T.H. Irwin and Giorgio Armato, that the Stoics thought that non-unified objects cannot be proper individuals, i.e. cannot be peculiarly qualified.

In this paper, I will argue that accepting that things without hexis can be peculiarly qualified need not be contradictory for the Stoics and that there is textual evidence that suggests that they indeed might have held such a view.

First, I focus on Simplicius' testimony that the Stoics thought that a non-unified object can be a qualified thing (to poion). According to him, non-unified things can be kata diaphoran, i.e. differentiated according to an intrinsic character, and not according to some external relation. Moreover, he reports that the Stoics thought that non-unified objects can be qualified in the strictest of the three Stoic senses of the word, the one according to which qualified things are those that are enduringly qualified.

Second, I analyze the suggestion of Simplicius (In Ar. Cat. 214,34) that the Stoics thought that certain non-unified objects are qualified in virtue of the co-operation of their parts towards a single function. This idea seems suggests that a non-unified object, e.g. a chorus, is qualified in virtue of the functional organization of its parts (i.e. its members) due to which it sings in a particular way. I argue that this type of functional organization of parts should be viewed as belonging to the third of the four Stoic "categories", 'disposed in a certain way' (pōs echon), and that there is nothing contradictory for the Stoics in claiming that non-unified objects that possess this special kind of functional organization can be ontologically unique, i.e. peculiarly qualified.

Finally, I address a potential problem that in a functionally organized non-unified object its parts would have to stand in extrinsic relations, i.e. they would have properties that belong to the fourth Stoic "category", "disposed in relation to something else" (pros ti pōs echon), and that such extrinsic properties are incapable of producing an object that is peculiarly qualified. I propose that the Stoics might have replied by referring to their claim that the world as a whole, whose parts are relatively disposed, i.e. pros ti pōs echon, nevertheless constitutes peculiarly qualified entity.

Paul Symington, Franciscan University of Steubenville,
psymington@franciscan.edu
"Aquinas on Modes of Being"

Scholars of Aquinas's *Metaphysics* have discussed in great detail terms such as actus essendi, ens universale, esse, ens reale, etc.. However, scholars have not conducted much *analysis* of his use of modus essendi, beyond merely using the phrase. This is surprising since this term appears exactly where his *analysis* of core metaphysical concepts is most intense and in-depth. For example, he utilizes modus essendi when identifying the nature of categories as well as discussing the modality of natures existing inside and outside of the mind. Cribbing Augustine, in the *Summa theologiae* 2.1.49.2 co., Aquinas defines 'mode' as that which a measure determines: wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. In this way, modes of being are the various ways in which being is able to be "measured." Another way to understand Aquinas's notion of modes of being is that they are the ways

that things (res) are found to exist. Furthermore, modes of being can be thought as semantic determinations of essences, and really distinct from the latter. It is also important to point out that the phrase *modus essendi* is used a great majority of times in Aquinas's answers to objections (e.g., in his *Summa theologiae* and in a variety of his *Quaestiones disputatae*) and rarely in the objections themselves. In this way, Aquinas thought of the notion as a philosophical resource in addressing metaphysical problems and articulating solutions. In this paper, I conduct a careful philosophical examination of Aquinas's notion of *modus essendi* as he utilizes it throughout his corpus to the purpose of identifying a unified and integrated account of the phrase. I shall then show how it fits with some of Aquinas's key metaphysical terms as well as amplifying our understanding of these terms in a broad understanding of Aquinas's metaphysics. Some of the valuable contributions that modes of being brings to Aquinas's metaphysics involves how the unity of the substance can be maintained given the diversifying conditions that arise in the substance due to the actualization of accidental essences within it. It is also important for understanding his analogy of being doctrine. Finally, I shall also address some philosophical problems that arise from Aquinas's notion of modes of being, including how it is possible for one and the same essence to have more than one mode of being. This would seem to imply that a mode of being—or the existence of a thing—has some essential content that is not included in the essential content of the essence that can exist under distinct modes of being. Also, in his *Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671*, Robert Pasnau claims that the idea of an essence changing its modes of being is audacious and beyond comprehension. He illustrates this with the following analogy: to say that an essence can change its mode of being is like “an event's [sic] existing as an object, or an abstract object's [sic] taking on a concrete mode of existence. [But]...[h]ow can we make any sense, for instance, of the number nine's existing concretely?” (Pasnau, p. 188).

Basant B Thapa, Kangwon National University,
tbasant@gmail.com
“The Buddhist way to happiness”

Happiness is sometimes a very difficult thing to possess. It's difficult because we don't always have a good idea of what true happiness really is. We usually project our own ideas of what happiness is onto our everyday existence, and then we try to make sure that our life meets those same criteria. We can correctly say that happiness is truly universal: it's a universal goal, while at the same time being a universal mystery. We talk a lot about happiness, and yet our definitions of happiness are many and varied.

In its over 2500 year run, the Buddhist tradition has had a lot to say about happiness. What true happiness is and what it isn't from a Buddhist standpoint. A famous Buddhist saying goes, “Happiness is that which can be borne with ease; suffering is that which cannot be borne with ease.” Unsatisfactory state is the mental and spiritual breeding ground for all of those things which cannot be borne with ease. True happiness can be broadly defined as a mind-state. In Buddhist views happiness and the path to get that happiness are various ways with give up of Greed and desire, ignorance and delusion, Hatred and destructive urge.

Allison Thornton, Baylor University,
Allison_Thornton1@gmail.com
“Socrates' Profession of Ignorance and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion”

The tension between Socrates's profession of ignorance on the one hand and his confidence in expounding doctrines on the other is a current that runs through much of the Socratic dialogues. Many scholars have sought solutions to this problem (hereafter: the problem of Socratic ignorance). One such solution is Michael N. Forster's Socrates-as-saint model, according to which Socrates makes a distinction between knowledge and a certain sort of unknown but true belief, and maintains that the doctrines he asserts fall only into the latter category. This solves the problem of Socratic ignorance because the true-but-unknown beliefs are supposed to be deliverances of divinity. As such, they fail to meet the high standards necessary for counting as knowledge but are nevertheless certain enough to warrant assertion. Another contemporary current meets this solution to the problem of Socratic ignorance, namely the epistemological thesis that only knowledge warrants assertion. This popular thesis intensifies the conflict between Socrates's profession of ignorance and his assertions since according to the knowledge norm of assertion, we represent ourselves as knowing propositions whenever we assert them. Does Socrates affirm the knowledge norm of assertion, or does he deny it? In this paper, I'll argue that if the Socrates-as-saint model is to succeed, then we must understand Socrates (at least: Socrates as Plato depicted him) as denying the knowledge norm of assertion. That is, we must understand Socrates as denying a majority-held view in contemporary epistemology.

Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, Antioch College,
lcassity@antiochcollege.org
“Reflections on Water in Plato's *Laws*”

In this paper I will take up the role that the element of water plays in Plato's *Laws*. While much of the Athenian's focus is on the practical role that water plays in the life and indeed existence of the polis, the Athenian's treatment of water in the *Laws* sheds important light on one of the major philosophical themes of the text, the relationship between law (nomos) and nature (phusis).

The element water is treated under two paradigmatic conceptions in the *Laws*: the dangerous, uncontrollable briny sea (3.704a-705b) and the rains from Zeus that can benefit the polis if properly channeled (6.761a-c). The first conception of water assigns to the legislator the role of shipwright (7.803a-b), whose goal is to construct a vessel of nomoi to withstand or escape the harshness of natural necessity (anagke). The second conception of water assigns to the legislator the role of gardener, whose goal is to provide living things with the appropriate environmental prerequisites necessary to their flourishing.

The two aspects of water in the *Laws* provide us with a complicated view of the relationship of law to the elements of nature, and it shows the various approaches that the legislator takes to organizing the

elemental aspects of the world for the sake of the polis. Understanding the different aspects of water in the *Laws* is therefore not only an important way of coming to grips with the imagery and historical details of the text, but it also allows us to consider the specific ways in which the legislator of the *Laws* is partly akin to the “craftsman” (demiourgos) of the *Timaeus*, as Morrow suggested (“The Demiurge in Politics,” 1954).

Franco Trivigno, Marquette University,
franco.trivigno@mu.edu
“Medicine, Rhetoric and the Soul in Plato’s *Phaedrus*”

In Plato’s *Phaedrus*, there is a preponderance of references to doctors, medicine, health and medication. The presence of the medical theme should not be too surprising. After all, readers of Plato should be accustomed to the idea of philosophy as a kind of medicine for the soul. However, in no other dialogue is there such a prolific recurrence of medical references: [1] a doctor, Acumenus, provides a medical justification for walking outside the city; [2] references to sickness pervades the non-lover’s characterization of the lover; [3] medication, or pharmakon, is presented as, in some fundamental way ambivalent—both lethal and therapeutic—especially in the section on writing; and, most importantly, [4] Socrates employs the analogy of medicine in exploring what it would mean for rhetoric to be a techne, i.e. for it to be philosophical. In this paper, I wish to explore the medical theme in order to ascertain what implications the medical analogy has for our understanding of the aims, possibilities and scope of philosophical rhetoric. A guiding question will be whether the account implies that philosophical speeches may be, given certain conditions, poisonous for the soul, that is, lead it to vice.

Thomas Tuozzo, University of Kansas,
ttuozzo@ku.edu
“The Sisyphus Fragment and Critias’ Alleged Immoralism”

Critias, leader of the oligarchic regime of the Thirty at the end of the Peloponnesian War, was a playwright, prose author, and writer of sympotic poetry. The most extensive fragment of his work (DK 88 B 25) is a speech delivered by the character Sisyphus, probably in a tragedy of the same name. This speech contains an account of the origin of law and the belief in the gods from an original, Hobbesian state of nature. Since ancient times this fragment has been taken as evidence of Critias’ atheism; in modern times, it has also been thought to evince an immoralist doctrine of might-makes-right that Critias’ later political activities put into practice. I argue against these views by reading this fragment within the context of the other extant fragments of Critias’ writing. Critias has a nuanced view of the relation of human culture, nature, and the gods. Law (nomos) is essential for the establishment of societies where the naturally base may lead a peaceful life and where the naturally noble may cultivate their excellence and receive the recognition that is their due. Law, though necessary, is insufficient, for two reasons: (a) it does not prevent wrong-doing in the absence of witnesses, and (b) it is liable to be twisted by clever, unscrupulous speakers (see B 22). It needs to be supplemented by belief in punishing gods for the mediocre, and self-cultivation on the part of the noble. The former require external control,

while the latter exemplify self-control. Austere self-control, and not self-indulgent hedonism as represented by Plato's Callicles, is the Critian ideal.

Chris Tweedt, Baylor University,
chris_tweedt@baylor.edu
"What's So Bad about a Disjunctive Definition?"

Socrates' often rebuts his interlocutors' first attempts at a definition, because instead of giving a type they give an instance. For example, in the *Euthyphro*, Euthyphro says piety is "what I am doing now" (5d). But sometimes Socrates' interlocutors give more than an instance; they give a list of more specific types. For example, Meno answers "What is virtue?" by giving several specific types of virtue (71e-72a). Socrates usually does not offer counterexamples to these answers. Suppose Socrates couldn't give a counterexample to Meno's list because every instance of, say, virtue is covered by one of the disjuncts (types) in Meno's list and no instance of non-virtue is covered. The list, then, is exclusive and exhaustive. What's so bad with taking this list to be a definition? If an exclusive and exhaustive list of specific types or instances suffices for a definition, then if there are forms, possibly (at least some of) these forms are wholly constituted by their instances. To Plato at least, there's something bad about that, but exactly what is bad about that is unclear. In this paper, I will give and respond to unsuccessful answers to the question "What's so bad about a disjunctive definition?", then I will propose what I take to be a successful answer to the question. I will argue that my answer is one Plato would have given, and, finally, I will show how my answer to this question illuminates Socrates' dialectical enterprise.

Suresh Vythylingam, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,
forgivenandjustified@yahoo.com
"Aspects of the Metaphysics of Augustine"

This paper will analyze certain aspects of the metaphysics of Augustine. In light of this, some of Augustine's interaction between philosophy and Christian doctrine will be highlighted.

Matthew Walker, Yale-NUS College,
mattwalker2000@gmail.com
"Aristotle on the Ease of Philosophy: *Protrepticus* VI, 40.15-41.2"

Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was a popular work that sought to provide arguments to exhort its audience to the pursuit of a certain kind of philosophical life, viz., a contemplative life. In this paper, I examine a series of three Aristotelian arguments that respond to the worry that philosophical contemplation is

somehow too difficult to be pursued or enjoyed with profit. On the contrary, these arguments propose, such contemplation is actually easy.

At first blush, these arguments for the ease of philosophy are apt to strike contemporary readers as rather flimsy. As I argue, however, these arguments are worth examining closely and taking seriously. First, they contribute to a fuller understanding of Aristotle's grounds for valuing the activity of philosophical contemplation as highly as he does. Second, these arguments engage with a deep worry that Aristotle's audience, then as now, is likely to have concerning Aristotle's claims for the supreme happiness of the philosophical life. In this paper, then, I aim (i) to understand what these arguments are saying and (ii) to evaluate these arguments in the light of the best objections that they face. Ultimately, I contend, these arguments are stronger than they may initially appear.

Julie Ward, Loyola University,
jward9778@sbcglobal.net
"Aristotle on Theoria and Continuous Activities"

The well-known passage in EN X 7 where Aristotle identifies eudaimonia with theoria is comprised of a series of sub-arguments concerning the nature of theoria itself. Following the familiar opening lines of X 7, we find: "if eudaimonia consists in activity according to virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue (kratiste), and this will be of the best part (tou aristou)" (1177a13-14). Compressing the passage, Aristotle is after showing that since theoria is the highest single activity in which we can engage, it should comprise the highest activity overall, namely, eudaimonia, or happiness. His argument for the main conclusion rests in part on proving that theoria is the "most continuous" (sunechestate) activity, a notion supported by his claim that "we are able to think more continuously than perform any action" (1177a21-22). The claim we can engage in theoria more continuously than perform other actions seems to be taken as meaning that we can engage in thinking for longer periods of time. And yet suneches, typically translated as "continuous" here in relation to theoria, seems to imply something else than temporal continuity. For suneches is a term typically applied to certain kinds of quantities, like lines and planes (cf. *Categories* VI), that possess "a common limit" (koinos horos) at which the parts join (cf. 4b24-26). We may also call this feature "density," in the sense of having infinite divisibility. So, for Aristotle any line segment is suneches, and as such, is infinitely divisible. But the respect in which the term applies to theoria among other activities (energeiai) is not obvious and so warrants examination.

Joanne Waugh, USF,
jwaugh@usf.edu
"Protagoras, Doxa and the Democratic Polis"

The fragmentary state of our evidence for the teaching of Protagoras makes it difficult to talk about him. That the state of our evidence makes us turn to Plato's fourth century composition, *Protagoras*, in the

hope of learning about the fifth century sophist compounds the difficulty. Plato's Sokratikoi Logoi, as Aristotle reminds us, are a species of *mimēsis*, and as such, their theatricality (to use Ferrari's gloss on *mimēsis*) is at least as important as their fidelity to history. Indeed, as there was not yet a tradition of ancient biography, their fidelity to history may not have been a consideration at all.

Plato's Protagoras tends to be received by the modern reader just as Plato wanted it to be received by his ancient audience: Protagoras is presenting an outlandish doctrine, "man is the measure of all things." But for Protagoras' fifth century audience—and even for Plato's fourth century audience—Protagoras' teaching may be seen as the culmination of a tradition of embracing *doxa* that begins as early as Simonides. It is the city, Simonides says, that makes the man (*polis andra didaskei*). In the fifth century *doxa* becomes the term *par excellence* for decision-making in the City. If Josiah Ober is correct in claiming that "Athenian democracy operated on the basis of opinion, not truth," and "neither the possibility nor the normative desirability of apolitical forms of knowledge about society or its members ever entered the ordinary Athenian's head," Protagoras' teachings are not a large step for Athenians to take. Although not himself an Athenian, Protagoras can claim to teach the Athenians how to be effective in *doxa*.

Ryan West, Baylor University,
R_West@baylor.edu

"Is Plato's Socrates a Proto-Jamesian?: The Will to Believe in the *Phaedo*"

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates offers multiple arguments for the immortality of the soul. Ultimately, though, Socrates recognizes that these arguments do not allow him to insist that things are as he thinks. Still, he recommends "risking belief" in the immortality of the soul. In this paper, I will argue that Socrates' views on this matter are very similar to William James' position on the permissibility of belief that goes beyond the evidence. The paper will have two sections. First, I will outline James' position as presented in "The Will to Believe." On this view, belief is permitted, even in the absence of compelling argument, if the belief in question is a genuine option for the believer—that is, if the belief is a live, forced, and momentous option. Second, I will exposit Socrates' views on the ethics of belief as found in the *Phaedo*. By focusing attention on what Socrates and his interlocutors say about the effectiveness of his arguments (e.g., in 63b-c, 70b, 84c, 85c-d, 107b, 108d), as well as Socrates' recommendation regarding belief (114d), I will show that Socrates thinks his arguments are inconclusive, but that they nonetheless have a role in making it rational to believe in the immortality of the soul, and that in order to face death well one must venture out beyond what the evidence proves and risk belief. In so doing, I will show that Socrates' ideas can be mapped onto James', and that, though disagreeing on some matters, Socrates and James are in substantial agreement on the most fundamental issues regarding the ethics of belief.

Michael Wiitala, University of Kentucky,
mwiitala@gmail.com

"The Five Greatest Kinds as Preconditions for Any True *Logos*"

During the well known digression on non-being and falsehood in Plato's *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger identifies "five greatest kinds": being, motion, rest, same, and different. There is, of course, considerable disagreement among interpreters of Plato as to the significance and status of these five kinds. This paper argues that the five greatest kinds are significant because they are the immediate preconditions of any true statement (*logos*), and therefore the forms without which knowledge of and *logos* about anything would be impossible.

During his discussion of the Friends of the Forms, the Stranger notes that we presuppose that knowledge and *logos* are possible whenever we "make strong assertions about anything" (249c6-8). He also starts to identify certain things that must be the case given that knowledge and true predication are possible, beginning with rest and motion. In order for something to be a subject of predication, it must participate in the form "rest." While in order for one thing to be predicated of another, the latter must participate in the form "motion." This is perhaps most clearly exemplified through the practice of bifurcatory division which the Stranger and Theaetetus employ throughout much of the dialogue. A form qua subject of predication must remain at rest while its predicates move or change according to a fixed order of priority and posteriority. The art of angling, for instance, remains at rest while its predicates change: angling is an expertise, is a possession-taking expertise, is a kind of hunting, is a kind of aquatic hunting, and so on (221a7-c3). Furthermore, true *logos* presupposes the form "being," since the verb "to be" (*einai*) is at least implicit in any statement. Likewise, the Stranger shows that whether something is subject to negative or positive predication—i.e., the manner in which it participates in "being" and "non-being"—is determined by the way in which it participates in the form "same" and the form "different." The five greatest kinds and their communion, I contend, are presupposed by any *logos*, especially by the true *logos* entailed in knowledge.

The first part of the paper clarifies the meaning of each of the five greatest kinds. Then in the second part, I show how any true statement presupposes the five kinds and their participation in one another.

SIRIN YILMAZ, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY,
sirin.yilmaz@villanova.edu

"Establishing the Unity of Plato's *Phaedrus* through Dialectic"

In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates argues that "every speech must be put together like a living creature" (264c3). Such a speech "must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work" (264c5), so that it constitutes a complete unity. In reading the *Phaedrus* through the lens of the discussion of dialectic, this is probably one of the most important passages in the dialogue. In what sense, then, the *Phaedrus* itself could be conceived as constituting a unity? Does the

as a whole succumb to the same problem it criticizes? In what way can this dialogue be genuinely considered to be constructed like a living creature? At first, in the *Phaedrus* there seems to be two separate parts, each with its own subject matter. In the first part of the dialogue, the subject matter is love and there are three different discourses on love. In the second part, the subject matter of the

dialogue shifts to the discussion of what makes a discourse appropriate to inquire into the nature of a philosophical matter. There is also a contrast between dialectic and rhetoric, and through this contrast the question of techné is introduced as an issue as well.

Plato's *Phaedrus* is incredibly rich in terms of its content and this richness could also make it harder to conceive the parts of dialogue as constituting a unified whole. Love is certainly one of the most important themes; however, it is not the main focus in the second part. Not only the tone and form of the dialogue change, but also the focus is turned toward more technical matters. In the first part, there is a presentation of a written speech delivered by *Phaedrus* and two oral speeches offered by Socrates, while in the second part there is a critique of both written and oral forms of speech by appealing to the speeches provided in the first part of the dialogue.

What is introduced in the first part constitutes a preparation for and the background of the discussion in the second part. When the dialogue is considered as a whole, its profound concern seems to be about what the proper method is and how pursuing truth philosophically becomes possible. This method is certainly dialectic, and the *Phaedrus* presents dialectic as the best available method for a philosophical inquiry. In the dialogue, there is a movement from a least to most dialectical level, and this also works toward the unity of the *Phaedrus*.

By looking at the *Phaedrus* as a whole, together with a consideration of Plato's Seventh Letter, I will strengthen my position in establishing the unity of the *Phaedrus* through the theme of dialectic, and I will argue that the point Plato aims to make about philosophical inquiry in the *Phaedrus* is in line with what he acknowledges about the nature of philosophical activity in the Seventh Letter as well as in many other dialogues.

Pete Younger, Baylor University,
pete_younger@baylor.edu
"A Platonic Assessment of Socrates' Philosophical Legacy"

In the *Phaedo*, we see Socrates interacting with his philosophical legacy, that is, a group of philosophical figures deeply influenced by Socrates' life and teachings. I argue that through his choices of characters to include and exclude, Plato gives us a slim glimpse into his own appraisals of the diverse philosophical legacy that Socrates leaves behind. On this reading, I argue that Plato's view of Socrates' legacy is accepting of several responses, though not of all responses to Socrates. Plato sees his own response to Socrates as one of many valid responses, but he specifically condemns the response of Aristippus.

I then consider why Plato might reject Aristippus' response to Socrates' life and teachings. I suggest four likely reasons. By comparing the information we have about Aristippus' life with others whom Plato does not reject in this same fashion, I eliminate all of these options except one. The remaining open hypothesis is that Plato rejects Aristippus' response to Socrates' life and teachings because of Aristippus' hedonism.

Brandon Zimmerman, The Catholic University of America,
66zimmerman@cardinalmail.cua.edu
"Plotinus' Arguments Against Pantheism"

There is an old suspicion, especially among some twentieth century Christian scholars, that there is something pantheistic about Plotinus' metaphysics. Plotinus is said to confuse the 'being' of the One (insofar as the One can be said to have being) with the being of what comes from the One, or, in other words, the One is in some way a part of what it makes.

However, Plotinus expressly denies such a position throughout his corpus and even argues that such confusion of the One with what comes from it is metaphysically impossible. This paper will review and explain these arguments in order to show that the transcendence of the One makes pantheistic interpretations of Plotinus untenable. Furthermore, Plotinus' arguments against pantheism are consistent with his own negative theology; because the One is not a part of any finite being, our words and concepts cannot adequately express it.

This paper will conclude by connecting a clearer understanding of the One's transcendence to the issues of *tolma* and plenitude in Plotinus. Some scholars have explained *tolma* as a necessary check on the return of all things to the One so that all is not dissolved back into its source. On the contrary, the transcendence of the One enables it to be intimately present to all things, and for the highest parts of reality to be intimately present to it, without any possibility of dissolution. On the other hand, Plotinus' apparent endorsement of the 'principle of plenitude' may be inconsistent with his understanding of the One's transcendence, for how could a finite order of being ever definitively express the infinity of the One?

Coleen Zoller, Susquehanna University,
zoller@susqu.edu
"Exercising One's Whole Soul in the First City of Plato's *Republic*"

In the *Republic*, Plato has Socrates describe a city where the citizens are healthy and peace prevails. Is this "healthy," "true city" (372e) (what Aristotle calls the "First City") as ideal as Socrates claims? Is it an impossible fantasy? Scholars have considered the First City to be naïve and unrealistic, but, as Rachel Barney has noted, both those criticisms could also be made of the Kallipolis. In her view, the First City is "a strictly impossible city" because the rational and spirited aspects of the soul do not operate in the First City. In this paper, I will challenge Barney's claims that in the First City there is no political activity and no exercise of the rational or spirited aspects of the soul.

While Barney is correct that daily life in the First City does not involve philosopher-rulers or the military, I disagree with her assumptions that there is no political activity happening there. It is unfair to claim that the First City lacks political activity just because there is no mention of a constitution or rulers. The

citizens of this city come together because survival is considerably easier when they try to survive cooperatively (R. 369b-c). Their political activity at the very least consists in their cooperative effort to secure what is required for survival.

However, with respect to rationality and spirit, Plato does not go out of his way to clarify their status in the First City, but he has Socrates make a very important comment about how those citizens “enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war” (ouch huper tēn ousian poioumenoi tous paidas eulaboumenoi penian ê polemon) (372b-c). This brief but important comment insinuates that the citizens are doing more than just exercising the appetitive aspect of their souls. It is evident that they are thinking about the consequences of their actions. They are acting like people who have contemplated the ways poverty and war threaten health and survival. Their behavior demonstrates rational caution (eulabeia). This contradicts Barney’s assertion that in the First City “only appetitive motivations have any power.”

The account of the First City emphasizes that justice is manifest when everyone is provided for. Decisions such as how many children to bear have a tremendous impact on whether and how one’s needs can be met. If the citizens of the First City are cautious to avoid having too many children because they have employed rational thought, then it is likely that their spirited aspect would be active as well. Plato indicates that the function of the spirited aspect of the soul is to get angry when confronted by injustice (R. 439e, 440c-d) and that the spirited aspect is the natural ally of the rational aspect (R. 440b, 440d-e). So, given that the spirited aspect of the soul recoils from injustice, it seems likely that the spirited aspect would be involved in the citizens avoiding poverty and war by choosing not to bear too many children. Thus, our rational and spirited capacities appear to have a role even in the First City.