Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Award

1978

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Stephen David Ross

Second Advisor

Justus Buchler

Third Advisor

Martin C. Dillon

Series

Humanities

Abstract

I begin and end with the idea that every metaphysical theory is a mode of philosophic discrimination –-- that the central concepts and categories of a theory convey a form of philosophic awareness. For the purpose of meta–physical comparison I consider the theories of Aristotle, John Dewey, John Herman Randall, and Alfred North Whitehead. The process of philosophic assessment I endorse identifies similarities and differences in outlook as well as ascertains adequacies of formulation, portrayal, and generalization. In Buchler’s outlook, whatever is, in whatever way, is a natural complex. Moreover, every natural complex is an order of complexes and belongs to an order of complexes. The principle of ontological parity implies that no complex is more “real,” “natural,” or “complex” than any other. In Buchler’s view, being a trait of a complex or having traits is of the same ontological standing. Each is essential to the constitution of any given complex. Neither being an order nor belonging to an order of complexes is conceived or portrayed as ontologically, epistemically, or logically prior to the other.

The principle of ontological parity is at the heart of Buchler’s mode of metaphysical awareness. The most general trait distinctive of the ontological parity of related complexes is the interdependence and mutual determination of trait/complex relationships. Every complex is a trait and is constituted by an order of traits. I introduce the term “reciprocal constitution” to portray the ontological parity, the interdependence and mutual relatedness, of being a complex and belonging to an order of complexes.

Albeit in different respects, related complexes are determinates of each other’s (ordinal) constitution. They are reciprocally constitutive. Each is a constituent of the other’s scope. Each includes the other in a certain respect. In Buchler’s outlook being a trait and having traits are indissociable and reciprocally related aspects of any given complex.

The concept of reciprocal constitution is ontological in scope. I examine Buchler’s metaphysics of the human process within the perspective of the most general concepts and categories of his system. Chapter I sets forth the rudiments of the principle of parity and the reciprocal constitution of natural complexes. Chapter II introduces the concepts and categories required for an adequately general examination of Buchler’s metaphysics of the human process. Chapter III applies the formulations of Chapters I and II to the concepts of experience, judgment, and perspective. Chapter IV elaborates and applies earlier formulations to the ontological concepts of natural definition, possibility, and actuality. I conclude my study with the observation that Buchler’s conception of the ontological parity of related complexes not only does philosophic justice to the ontological integrity of trait/complex relationships but, also, provides an inexhaustible prospect for the portrayal of the respects in which complexes locate and are located by other complexes. Buchler’s mode of philosophic discrimination is unique in its exhibitive subtlety and richness, in its fecund capacity to portray trait–complex relationships.

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