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Incomplete information shifted the narrative of the Cold War’s outcome in many ways. This paper employs the theoretical tools and methods of Disinformation Studies to critique a model of failed bargaining proposed by political scientists Frieden, Lake, and Schultz. According to these scholars, failed bargaining is when two states resort to war rather than negotiate. While this is a convincing model, I argue that the dissemination of intentionally false or misleading narratives plays a critical role in fueling support for various types of militarized conflict. Failed bargaining is shown to be a more convincing model of the failure of diplomacy when disinformation can be factored into the equation. A new version of this model of disinformation and bargaining was, thus, constructed in order to measure how this may alter the outcome of war. This model will undersee a variety of war scenarios to measure just how drastic the impact of disinformation is on failed bargaining. For instance, one could implement the Cold War, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the American Revolution. Analyzing such propagated scenarios will provide quantitative results that could promote the building of the aforementioned model of disinformation. Results ultimately show that incomplete information completely shifts the outcome of bargaining and gives the country doing so the upper hand. The presence of disinformation, ultimately, shifts scenarios that could have been explored in a peaceful manner. Perhaps, a median of some sort could resort to this model to prevent these implications and generate complete communication between the two states involved.



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Disinformation and Failed Bargaining