The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

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Aristotle’s conception of truth looks like this:

TA-Schema: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ S is P.

TA-Schema(n): ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ S is not P.

By Tdf Aristotle need only mean that stating with respect to some property P that is in the case some subject S that P is in the case of S, is what amounts to truth. More precisely then for Aristotle the TA-Schema would amount to:

TA-Schema*: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ the universal P is instantiated in the case of S. TASchema( n)*: ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ the universal P is not instantiated in the case of S.

Does this conception of truth require correspondence? Some are inclined to think so. That is fine, as long as we understand in what respect.


Blake Hestir presented “Aristotle on Truth, Facts, and Relations (Cat, Int, Metaph Gamma)” to the Society at its meeting with the Pacific Division in San Diego in 2011. A much revised version appeared as “Aristotle’s Conception of Truth: An Alternative View.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51.2 (2013) 193-222. This research was also incorporated in his 2016 Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and Truth. Cambridge UP.

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