Aristotle’s conception of truth looks like this:
TA-Schema: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ S is P.
TA-Schema(n): ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ S is not P.
By Tdf Aristotle need only mean that stating with respect to some property P that is in the case some subject S that P is in the case of S, is what amounts to truth. More precisely then for Aristotle the TA-Schema would amount to:
TA-Schema*: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ the universal P is instantiated in the case of S. TASchema( n)*: ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ the universal P is not instantiated in the case of S.
Does this conception of truth require correspondence? Some are inclined to think so. That is fine, as long as we understand in what respect.
Hestir, Blake, "Aristotle on Truth, Facts, and Relations: Categories, De Interpretatione, Metaphysics Gamma" (2011). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 461.