Title

Metaphysics H 6 and the Problem of Unity

Authors

Hye-Kyung Kim, University of Wisconsin-Green BayFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-28-2003

Abstract

I argue that H 6 should be taken as Aristotle's clarification on the causelessness in the unity of the parts of definition. In H 6 Aristotle is concerned with a general metaphysical problem affecting - threatening - his theory of substance at two major points. The unity of genus and differentia in the definition of form has to be accounted for without appealing to a unifying cause. If it were not accounted for, form would not be the primary cause of being and thus not primary substance. The unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance also has to be accounted for without appealing to a unifying cause. If it were not accounted for, the definition of composite substance would be merely a formula referring to the material parts, and wouldn't be the formula of an essence. And the composite substance would not be a substance.

Notes

Hye-Kung Kim presented “Metaphysics H6 and the Problem of Unity” to the Society at its Fiftieth Anniversary meeting with the Eastern Division in Washington DC in 2003. A revised version was published in the Journal of the History of Philosophy 46.1 (2008) 25-42.

For information about the author see:

https://www.uwgb.edu/philosophy/faculty/Kim.asp

Recommended Citation

Kim, Hye-Kyung, "Metaphysics H 6 and the Problem of Unity" (2003). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 400.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/400