Climate change, individual obligations, harm, consequentialism, thresholds
Does the decision to relax by taking a drive rather than by taking a walk cause harm? In particular, do the additional carbon emissions caused by such a decision make anyone worse off? Recently several philosophers have argued that the answer is no, and on this basis have gone on to claim that act-consequentialism cannot provide a moral reason for individuals to voluntarily reduce their emissions. The reasoning typically consists of two steps. First, the effect of individual emissions on the weather is miniscule: the planet’s meteorological system is so large, and the size of individual emissions so tiny, that whatever impact an individual emission has on the weather must be vanishingly small. Second, vanishingly small impacts aren’t morally relevant because no one could possibly tell the difference between such an impact occurring and it not occurring. In this paper, we show why both steps are mistaken, and hence why act-consequentialism implies that each of us has an individual obligation to do what we can to stop damaging the climate, including by refraining from, or perhaps by purchasing offsets against, our own individual luxury carbon emissions.
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Ethical Theory & Moral Practice.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9517-9
Morgan-Knapp, Christopher and Goodman, Charles, "Consequentialism, Climate Harm and Individual Obligations" (2015). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 27.