Document Type

Thesis

Date of Award

Spring 5-1979

Keywords

Philosophy, Linguistic Philosophy, Epistemology

Degree Name

Philosophy (BA)

Department

PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

It seems to be one of the characteristic features of philosophy that any and all claims made within the subject are open to dispute. The empirical sciences also contain claims which are only contingently true about the world, but, in contrast to philosophy, they have universally recognized and accepted procedures for deciding which theories to accept. Many philosophers have found this very appealing, and the history of philosophy shows that time and time again there have been attempts to change philosophy into a science. More often than not these attempts manifest themselves in the introduction of a new method, which brings with it by implication a new conception of what philosophy is and how philosophical knowledge is to be distinguished from philosophical opinion.

The history of philosophy also shows that each of these attempts has failed, and always for the same reason. This reason may be clearly shown in an example from the philosophy of Descartes. The method which he introduced, that of “clear and distinct ideas,” was found to be most useful in the formulation of his classic argument, alternately called the “argument from doubt,” or the “argument from conceivability,” which may be found in his second meditation. It essentially goes like this: I can conceive of myself existing without a body. This is because I can be directly aware of myself without having to experience any bodily sensations. I cannot, however, conceive of myself without thinking, that is, being aware of my mind. Hence, my mind is not identical to my body.

Whatever else may be said of Descartes' arguments, their fundamental error, I claim, lies in the fact that the method he employed presupposed an answer to the question at issue. “Thinking” was, for Descartes, a very broad term, and included under it was the act of conceiving. Hence, Descartes’ doctrine of Mind-Body Dualism was presupposed in his first premise, and this was solely because of the method he employed.

While Descartes' example may be the most striking, other philosophers are not immune to this criticism. Both Kant’s “transcendental method,” and Husserl’s “bracketing” are frequently cited in the literature as having succumbed to this type of criticism. It has come to be expected that “preference for a specific investigation method often reflects doctrinal leanings” (Glouberman 366), and that many times the method itself will provide positive support for the conclusion gained. There is at least one case where the absence of this relationship between method and doctrine was the basis for a criticism of the philosopher.

It appears to be a universal phenomena that every philosopher has made substantial presuppositions in just deciding which method he will use. It is for just this reason that no philosopher has discovered a method which could stand uncontested. Richard Rorty offers us a reason why this should come as no surprise. It would be difficult, he would say, to know what method would work without knowing something about the philosopher’s subject matter. Hence, “to know what method to adopt, one must already have arrived at some metaphysical and some epistemological conclusions. If one attempt s to defend these conclusions by the use of one’s chosen method, one is open to a charge of circularity. If one does not so defend them, maintaining that given these conclusions, the need to adopt the chosen method follows, one is open to the charge that the chosen method is inadequate, for it cannot be used to establish the crucial metaphysical and epistemological theses which are in dispute” (Rorty 1)

This appears to be true all the more so because method is itself a subject of philosophical dispute. It is being conceded that we can never gain philosophical knowledge because what counts as knowledge is itself a matter of opinion. It may be claimed at this point, then (and with some justification), that philosophy is not a worthwhile subject, because no progress is ever possible if all claims are a matter of opinion.

It seems to me though, that in at least some sense philosophy does make progress. Many views that were once popular have become generally discredited. Many of the greatest philosophers are considered so, not because of the solutions they pose, but because they have raised new issues for debate. So, philosophy does change, but whether this is progress or not depends on your criteria for success. It may be tempting to consider “progress” as a movement towards a consensus. In any case, it will be beneficial to examine the views of those philosophers who do think that progress has been made, so that it may be discovered what criteria for success is being employed. By so doing, we may also learn what counts as philosophical knowledge, and come to realize why philosophy is not just a matter of opinion.

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