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Abstract
This paper integrates theories of disinformation with the “Bargaining Model,” a theory in political science that explains why actors choose to go to war even though they might achieve their aims more efficiently through bargaining. As a case study, the paper takes a disinformation campaign during the Cold War and Russia’s war in Ukraine (2014-present) to provide evidence for the way that disinformation undermines international dialogue and bases the status quo in unreal conditions, thereby making the bargaining process irrational and diminishing the opportunity for resolution.
Recommended Citation
Jimenez, M. (2025). Compromised Communication: The Threat of Disinformation to Rational Bargaining. Binghamton University Undergraduate Journal, 10(1). Retrieved from https://orb.binghamton.edu/alpenglowjournal/vol10/iss1/8
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International Relations Commons, Models and Methods Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Political Theory Commons
