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Faculty Sponsor

Dr. Wan Yu

Abstract

Zoning regulations are often referred to as tools for managing urban growth. First introduced in the 1916 Zoning Resolution, these tools are meant to respond to NYC’s residents to overcrowding of buildings, loss of light and air, and the unchecked rise of early skyscrapers. However, in highly financialized cities such as Manhattan, these tools, once meant for the public good, have transformed into opportunities for greater capital growth. This paper focuses on the C5 zoning district in Midtown Manhattan to examine how regulatory tools such as Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and other Transferable DEvelopment Rights (TDRs) transform the legally permitted concentration of built floor area of each zoning block to a financial asset. Drawing on the recent political economy and spatial theories from the works of Lefebvre, Harvey, and Smith, this paper argues that the C5 zoning district functions as a predictable investment product which favors investors, but it pushes out people that cannot compete financially, reshaping who gets to exist in Midtown. 

Using a spatial analysis of zoning capacity, unbuilt FAR, storefront vacancy clusters, and capital intensity, this paper shows how zoning-focused development incentivizes speculative holdings, a process where firms buy out entire lots with the intentions of its price rising in the future, leading to increased vacancies. While this framework has generated economic stability for Midtown Manhattan, it has systematically disadvantaged land uses dependent on continuous human labor and accessibility, particularly outpatient and community-based healthcare services.

Citation Style

Chicago

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